Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Steve Snyder, et al., Petitioners v. Village of Luckey, Ohio

No. ________

IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

STEVE SNYDER, et al.,

Petitioners,

v.

VILLAGE OF LUCKEY, OHIO,

Respondent.

On Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the

United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit

CORRECTED PETITION FOR WRIT OF

CERTIORARI

MARVIN A. ROBON*

ZACHARY J. MURRY

BARKAN & ROBON, LTD

1701 Woodlands Drive Suite 100

Maumee, Ohio 43537

(419) 897-6500

Ohio Bar No. 0087421

Email: zmurry@barkanrobon.com

*Counsel of Record

Attorneys for Petitioners

i

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

In addition to the reversal of the November 24,

2025, Judgment of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the

Sixth Circuit, the questions for which Petitioners seek

certiorari are as follows:

1.

Whether this Court’s Opinion in Knick,

supra, permits a federal cause of action against a

municipal entity for an uncompensated physical

taking when the municipal entity has materially

impaired the value and precluded the alienability of

the Petitioners’ property.

2.

Whether the actions of the Village in

singling out the Petitioners’ property and engaging in

concerted actions to prevent its sale at auction are

sufficient to state a claim for violation of Petitioners’

rights to due process and equal protection under the

Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution.

ii

LIST OF PARTIES

Petitioner Steve Snyder is a natural person

who, at all relevant times, was the record owner of

certain real property located in Wood County, Ohio.

Petitioner Tim Snyder is a natural person who,

at all relevant times, was the record owner of certain

real property located in Wood County, Ohio.

Petitioner T&S Agriventures, LLC is an Ohio

limited liability company whom, at all relevant times,

was the record owner of certain real property located

in Wood County, Ohio. At all relevant times,

Petitioner Tim Snyder and Petitioner Steve Snyder

were the sole members of Petitioner T&S

Agriventures, LLC, with each having an equal

interest therein.

The Petitioner Beth Rose Real Estate and

Auction, LLC is an Ohio limited liability company

whom, at all relevant times, was in the business of

marketing, selling, and auctioning real property in

Northwest Ohio, including the subject property.

The Respondent Village of Luckey, Ohio is, and

at all relevant times was, is a municipal corporation

incorporated under the laws of Ohio pursuant to OH.

Rev. C. § 707.01, et seq.

CORPORATE DISCLOSURE

STATEMENT

Counsel for Petitioners hereby states and

affirms that none of the Petitioners are a subsidiary

and/or affiliate of a publicly owned corporation.

Counsel for Petitioners further states that Petitioners

are not aware of any publicly owned corporation that

has a financial interest in the outcome of this appeal.

iii

LIST OF RELATED CASES

Luckey v. Snyder, Wood County, Ohio Common

Pleas Case No. 2023CV0144. Property Owners’

Consolidated Motion to Show Cause, Motion to Set

Aside Judgment, and Motion to Dismiss Petition is

pending before the state court with a status pretrial

scheduled for April 21, 2026. A copy of the pending

state court motion is reproduced at Pet.App. 86a.

iv

TABLE OF CONTENTS

QUESTIONS PRESENTED ........................................ i

LIST OF PARTIES .................................................... iii

CORPORATE DISCLOSURE STATEMENT ........... iii

LIST OF RELATED CASES .................................... iv

TABLE OF CONTENTS ............................................. v

TABLE OF CITED AUTHORITIES ........................ vii

CORRETED PETITION FOR A WRIT OF

CERTIORARI.............................................................. 1

OPINION BELOW ...................................................... 1

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION ........................... 1

CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY

PROVISIONS INVOLVED ......................................... 2

INTRODUCTION ....................................................... 3

STATEMENT OF THE CASE .................................... 6

I. Factual Background .............................................. 6

A. The Subject Property ............................................. 6

B. The Village of Luckey Interferes with and Prevents

the Sale of the Property ........................................ 7

v

C. The Village’s Sham Efforts to Appropriate the

Subject Property .................................................. 10

D. Legislative and Administrative Changes at the

Village Expose its Scheme .................................. 12

II. Procedural History ............................................. 14

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT ................ 16

I. The Fifth Amendment’s Self-Executing Guarantee

of Just Compensation is a Foundational

Constitutional Right and that Right May

Not be Qualified or Abridged ............................. 16

II. The Sixth Circuit’s Opinion Conflicts with its Own

Prior Express Holding as Well the Express

Precedent Established by this Court in Knick ... 21

III. The Sixth Circuit’s November 24, 2025 Opinion is

Contrary to the Precedent of Other Circuit

Courts of Appeal ............................................... 27

CONCLUSION ......................................................... 29

vi

TABLE OF CITED AUTHORITIES

CASES

PAGE(S)

Accord, Freed v. Thomas, 81 F.4th 655

(6th Cir. 2023) ........................................................... 27

Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 6 S. Ct. 524,

29 L. Ed. 746 (1886) .................................................. 30

City of Norwood v. Horney, 110 Ohio St.3d 353,

853 N.E.2d 1115 (Ohio 2006) ..................................... 4

Etzler v. City of Cincinnati, Ohio, No. 1:07CV1035,

2009 WL 3210337 (S.D. Ohio Sept. 30, 2009) ............ 4

First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of

Glendale v. Los Angeles Cty., Cal., 482 U.S. 304,

107 S.Ct. 2378, 96 L.Ed.2d 250 (1987) ..................... 19

GeorgiaCarry.Org, Inc. v. Georgia, 687 F.3d 1244

(11th Cir.2012) .......................................................... 17

Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1, 223, 6 L. Ed. 23

(1824) ......................................................................... 16

In re Abbotts Dairies of Pennsylvania, Inc.,

788 F.2d 143 (3d Cir. 1986) ...................................... 27

In re Pursuit Cap. Mgmt., LLC, 874 F.3d 124

(3d Cir. 2017) ............................................................ 27

J.C. Penney Co. v. Giant Eagle, Inc., 813 F.Supp. 360

(W.D.Pa. 1992) .......................................................... 18

vii

Keyerleber v. Euclid Congregation of Jehovah’s

Witnesses, 103 Ohio App. 423, 143 N.E.2d 313

(1957) ......................................................................... 24

K-Mart v. Oriental Plaza Inc., 875 F.2d 907

(1st Cir.1989) ............................................................ 18

Knick v. Twp. of Scott, Pennsylvania, 588 U.S. 180,

204 L. Ed. 2d

558, 139 S. Ct. 2162 (2019) ....................................... 17

Ladd v. Marchbanks, 971 F.3d 574 (6th Cir. 2020) 17

Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 112 S.

Ct. 2886, 120 L. Ed. 2d 798 (1992) ........................... 27

Manhattan Cmty. Access Corp. v. Halleck, 587 U.S.

802, 139 S. Ct. 1921, 1937–38, 204 L. Ed. 2d 405

(2019) ........................................................................... 4

Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 81 S. Ct. 1684, 6 L. Ed.

2d 1081 (1961) ........................................................... 30

Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 163, 2 L.Ed. 60

(1803) ......................................................................... 18

New York v. Sage, 239 U.S. 57, 36 S.Ct. 25, 60 L.Ed.

143 (1915) .................................................................. 26

Norwood v. Horney, 110 Ohio St.3d 353, 361-62853

N.E.2d 1115 (Ohio 2006) .......................................... 20

Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 121 S.Ct.

2448, 150 L.Ed.2d 592 (2001) ................................... 19

Pelfresne v. Village of Williams Bay, 865 F.2d 877

viii

(7th Cir. 1989) ........................................................... 18

Seaboard Air Line Ry. v. United States, 261 U.S. 299

(1923) ......................................................................... 26

Stueve Bros. Farms, LLC v. United States, 737

F.3d 750 (Fed. Cir. 2013) .......................................... 28

Thomas W. Garland, Inc. v. City of St. Louis, 596

F.2d 784 (8th Cir. 1979)............................................ 28

United Church of Medical Center v. Medical Center

Com., 689 F.2d 693 (7th Cir. 1982) .......................... 18

United States v. 50 Acres of Land, 469 U.S. 24

(1984) ......................................................................... 26

United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946) ......... 26

United States v. Craft, 535 U.S. 274, 122 S.Ct. 1414,

152 L.Ed.2d 437 (2002) ............................................... 4

United States v. Miller, 317 U.S. 369, 63 S. Ct. 276,

87 L. Ed. 336 (1943) .................................................. 26

Urbanizadora Versalles, Inc. v. Rivera Rios, 701 F.2d

993 (1st Cir. 1983)..................................................... 23

von Kerssenbrock-Praschma v. Saunders, 48 F.3d

323 (8th Cir. 1995) (quoting 73 C.J.S. Property § 27

(1983) ......................................................................... 24

Williamson County Regional Planning Comm'n v.

Hamilton Bank of Johnson City, 473 U.S. 172, 105

S.Ct. 3108, 87 L.Ed.2d 126 (1985) ............................ 25

ix

Williamson Cty. Reg'l Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton

Bank of Johnson City, 473 U.S. 172, 105 S. Ct. 3108,

87 L. Ed. 2d 126 (1985) ....................................... 19, 29

Constitutional Provisions

Fifth Amendment ................................................... ii, 2

Fourteenth Amendment ............................................ 2

United States Code Sections

28 U.S.C. § 1254 .......................................................... 1

28 U.S.C. § 1331 ........................................................ 14

42 U.S.C. § 1983 .............................................. 3, 26, 29

Ohio Revised Code Sections

Chapter 163......................................................... 23, 26

743.01 .................................................................... 9, 23

Secondary Sources

Robert Brauneis, The First Constitutional Tort:

The Remedial Revolution in Nineteenth-Century

State Just Compensation Law, 52 Vand. L. Rev. 57

(1999) ......................................................................... 18

1

CORRECTED PETITION FOR A WRIT

OF CERTIORARI

__________

Petitioners Steve Snyder, Tim Snyder, T&S

Agriventures, LLC, and Beth Rose Real Estate and

Auctions, LLC respectfully petition for a writ of

certiorari to review and reverse the November 25,

2025, Opinion and Judgment of the United States

Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit in this case.

OPINIONS BELOW

The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals’ January 5,

2026, Order denying Petitioners’ petition for

rehearing en banc is reproduced at Pet.App.1a. The

Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals’ November 24, 2025,

Opinion affirming the dismissal of Petitioners’

Complaint is reproduced at Pet.App.3a.

The U.S. District Court for the Northern

District of Ohio’s June 7, 2024, Memorandum Opinion

and Order denying Petitioners’ Motion to alter or

amend its dismissal of Petitioners’ case is reproduced

herewith as Pet.App. 49a. The district court’s

February 12, 2024, Memorandum Opinion and Order

dismissing the Petitioners’ Amended Complaint is

reproduced herewith as Pet.App. 59a.

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

The Opinion and Judgment of the U.S. Court of

Appeals for the Sixth Circuit was entered on

2

November 24, 2025. A timely petition for rehearing en

banc was denied on January 5, 2026. (Pet.App.1a).

This Court’s jurisdiction rests on 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1).

CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY

PROVISIONS INVOLVED

The Fifth Amendment to the United States

Constitution states:

No person shall be held to answer for a

capital, or otherwise infamous crime,

unless on a presentment or indictment of

a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in

the land or naval forces, or in the Militia,

when in actual service in time of War or

public danger; nor shall any person be

subject for the same offence to be twice

put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall

be compelled in any criminal case to be a

witness against himself, nor be deprived

of life, liberty, or property, without due

process of law; nor shall private property

be taken for public use, without just

compensation.

The Fourteenth Amendment to the United

States Constitution states, in relevant part:

Section 1. All persons born or

naturalized in the United States, and

subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are

citizens of the United States and of the

State wherein they reside. No State shall

make or enforce any law which shall

3

abridge the privileges or immunities of

citizens of the United States; nor shall

any State deprive any person of life,

liberty, or property, without due process

of law; nor deny to any person within its

jurisdiction the equal protection of the

laws.

42 U.S. Code Section 1983, which states, in

relevant part:

Every person who, under color of any

statute, ordinance, regulation, custom,

or usage, of any State or Territory or the

District of Columbia, subjects, or causes

to be subjected, any citizen of the United

States or other person within the

jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of

any rights, privileges, or immunities

secured by the Constitution and laws,

shall be liable to the party injured in an

action at law, suit in equity, or other

proper proceeding for redress, except

that in any action brought against a

judicial officer for an act or omission

taken in such officer’s judicial capacity,

injunctive relief shall not be granted

unless a declaratory decree was violated

or declaratory relief was unavailable.

For the purposes of this section, any Act

of Congress applicable exclusively to the

District of Columbia shall be considered

to be a statute of the District of

Columbia.

4

INTRODUCTION

It has long been recognized that private

property rights are comprised of “a ‘bundle of sticks’—

a collection of individual rights which, in certain

combinations, constitute property. . . Rights to exclude

and to use are two of the most crucial sticks in the

bundle.” Manhattan Cmty. Access Corp. v. Halleck,

587 U.S. 802, 825, 139 S. Ct. 1921, 1937–38, 204 L.

Ed. 2d 405 (2019) (quoting United States v. Craft, 535

U.S. 274, 278, 122 S.Ct. 1414, 152 L.Ed.2d 437 (2002)).

Moreover, under Ohio law, the right to dispose of

property is “an original and fundamental right.”

Etzler v. City of Cincinnati, Ohio, No. 1:07CV1035,

2009 WL 3210337, at *2 (S.D. Ohio Sept. 30, 2009)

(quoting City of Norwood v. Horney, 110 Ohio St.3d

353, 853 N.E.2d 1115, 1128 (Ohio 2006)).

The actions of the Village of Luckey between

August 4, 2021, and the September 18, 2021,

attempted auction evidence a clear and unambiguous

intention to interfere with the fundamental ‘sticks’ in

the Petitioners’ bundle of property rights. Moreover,

this impairment of the Petitioners’ constitutional

rights was further perpetuated through the Village’s

initiation of a sham state appropriation proceeding,

premised exclusively upon misrepresentations of fact

by the Village’s officials. Thus, the Village has made

Ohio’s state court system an unwitting accomplice in

its scheme to purloin and impair the Petitioners’

foundational constitutional rights.

The facts of this case present a shocking abuse

of government authority and present exactly the type

of ‘gap’ in our constitutional protections that this

5

Court has previously sought to plug with its holding

in Knick that:

[i]f a local government takes private

property without paying for it, that

government has violated the Fifth

Amendment—just as the Takings Clause

says—without regard to subsequent

state court proceedings. And the

property owner may sue the government

at that time in federal court for the

“deprivation” of a right “secured by the

Constitution.”

Knick v. Twp. of Scott, Pennsylvania, 588 U.S. at 18990. Ohio law does not provide an adequate remedy--or even any remedy at all---for the impairment and

deprivation of Petitioners’ constitutional rights

inflicted by the Village. Accordingly, federal law is

obliged to provide both a forum and a mechanism for

the Petitioners to secure the vindication of their

fundamental rights as American Citizens.

The constitutional malfeasance suffered by

Petitioners is even more egregious when viewed in

light of the Village’s admissions that:

1. it had no interest in taking the Petitioners’

property until the Petitioners tried to auction

it;

2. it had no idea as to the cost or feasibility of

constructing any of the planned improvements

and did not even know if the liquid in the

quarry well was potable water; and

3. it had no timeline for any aspect of the project,

had no money to perform the conceptualized

6

improvement, and had no idea whether the

project would be undertaken or completed in

ten years, 20 years, or ever.

The Village has violated their constitutional rights

under color of state law and Petitioners have stated a

claim in their Amended Complaint upon which relief

can---and must---be granted.

Finally, absent the intervention of this Court,

the lower courts judgments will serve to embolden

municipalities to disregard the guarantees embodied

in the United States Constitution and its

Amendments, placing the fundamental property

rights of all Ohioans under the ‘Sword of Damocles’ of

bad faith appropriation, with no remedy for their

constitutional injury.

These issues are of vital constitutional

importance and the November 24, 2025, Judgment of

the Sixth Circuit, if allowed to stand, will perpetuate

the profound truncation of Ohioans’ rights under the

Fifth---and also the Fourteenth---Amendments.

Petitioners pray the Court grant certiorari.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

I.

Factual Background

A.

The Subject Property

The Petitioners’ property is located within the

confines of the Village of Luckey, Ohio. The site was

formerly utilized by France Stone Company as a

quarry. The subject property is ± 72.49 acres and

includes a quarry site (hereinafter the “quarry well”),

7

which has an area of ± 30 acres and a depth between

70-80’. The quarry well is filled through a combination

of surface and storm runoff as well as water rising

from the carbonate bedrock aquifer that was hit

during the quarry’s operational period. An aerial of

the subject property, as it was identified and

marketed in advance of the Petitioners,’ attempted,

September 18, 2021, auction is below:

Petitioners Tim and Steve Snyder, through

Petitioner T&S Agriventures, LLC (“Snyder”),

originally purchased the land as part of a larger,

multi-parcel purchase in 2005. From 2005 through

2021, Petitioners made substantial improvements to

the property with the intention of selling the property

to a developer.

8

B.

The Village of Luckey Interferes

with and Prevents the Sale of the

Property

In July 2021, Snyder entered into an agreement

with Petitioner Beth Rose Real Estate and Auctions,

LLC (“Beth Rose”), to market and sell the subject

property at auction. Per the parties’ agreement, Beth

Rose was to receive a percentage of the sale proceeds

as compensation for her services in auctioning the

property. The auction was scheduled for September

18, 2021, and, shortly after the execution of the

agreement between Snyder and Beth Rose, significant

efforts were undertaken to market the property for

auction.

On or about August 4, 2021, as the marketing

efforts for the auction were intensifying, the Village

became aware of Snyder’s plan to sell the subject

property. Having previously rejected an invitation to

submit a purchase offer for the Snyder land, the

Village immediately began scrambling to thwart the

auction. As contained in the minutes for the August

17, 2021, Council Meeting, the Village passed a

Motion to direct the Village Solicitor, Attorney

Speweik, to “begin the eminent domain process on the

[Petitioners’ properties] for public purpose.” Neither

the minutes nor the motion provided any information

on what the ‘public purpose’ allegedly was. However,

at no point during the August 17, 2021, meeting or

thereafter, until September 21, 2022, did the Village

pass/enter a Resolution authorizing the appropriation

of the subject property.

On August 20, 2021---three (3) days after the

Council Meeting and without a Resolution or

Ordinance authorizing the appropriation of the

9

Snyder property---the Village issued its first Notice of

Intent to Acquire to the Petitioners. The Notice

identifies the alleged purpose of the appropriation for

a “public water supply and/or park.” This Notice was

deficient on its face as it was not supported by any

legislative enactment and further, was contrary to

Ohio Revised Code Section 743.01, which acts to

specifically limit the Village’s eminent domain power

by mandating that “[a]ny land, water right, or

easement so taken possession of for water-works

purposes shall not be used for any other purpose,

except by authority of the director of public service

and with consent of such legislative authority.”

In addition to the void and ultra vires Notice of

Intent to Acquire, the Village engaged in a concerted

pattern of activity, through its elected officials and

agents, to prevent the auction and limit the

marketability and alienability of the Snyder property.

For example, the Village demanded that Beth Rose

notify all bidders of the Village’s actions and sent

representatives to the auction---not to bid, but to

dissuade others from bidding. The Village, via its

police force, also erected ‘No Parking’ signage and

barriers to accessing the property in a clear attempt

to disrupt the auction.

The Village’s efforts were successful in chilling

potential bidders and sabotaging the auction. The

property failed to meet its reserve---with less than

$8,500/acre being offered for the property in spite of

its buildable road frontage, access to utilities, and

improved, shovel-ready condition--- and Snyder was

left to retain title in the property. Moreover, any

efforts to sell or market the property were precluded

10

by the cloud placed on the title by the Village’s

misconduct.

C.

The Village’s Sham Efforts to

Appropriate the Subject Property

Nearly 19 months after the issuance of the

facially deficient Notice of Intent to Acquire, 18

months after its sabotage of the auction, and following

the filing of the Petitioners’ federal lawsuit, the

Village chose to initiate appropriation proceedings

against Snyder in the Wood County, Ohio Court of

Common Pleas in the action captioned Village of

Luckey Ohio v. T&S Agriventures, LLC, No.

2023CV0144.

On September 21-22, 2023, the parties

participated in the state court Necessity Hearing to

determine whether the Village had the ability to

appropriate the property under Ohio law. During the

Hearing the Village’s Mayor, Mr. Corey Panning,

admitted that there was no interest by the Village in

the establishment of a new public water source and

system until August 2021, when the Village became

aware of Petitioners’ intention to sell the property via

auction.

Testimony from Village officials further

confirmed that the entire basis for the appropriation,

Resolution 393---which declared the necessity of the

appropriation of the entirety of Petitioners’ property--was adopted prior to performance of any testing,

before the village had any sense or idea of the

potability of the water on the property, and before it

had even contacted a contractor to develop a

conceptual proposal for the project. Mayor Panning

even confirmed that the Village initiated the

11

appropriation process against the Petitioners’

property prior to having an idea of what the Village

would ultimately use the property for once it was

acquired, and without any timeframe for the

development or improvement---for any purpose---of

the subject property after acquisition.

The Village’s own officials emphasized that the

only plan of the Village was to prevent the sale of the

Snyder property at its fair market value. Other than

a single test on the water in the quarry well in

September 2021, the Village testified that it had

performed no other testing on the soil or water on

subject property and had no plans to do so in the

future. The Village also testified that it had not

performed any feasibility analysis or even hired an

engineer or other professional to perform such

inquiry. Finally, the Village admitted that it did not

have sufficient funds allocated or available to perform

any of the contemplated infrastructure improvements

to create a Village public water system.

In spite of the Village’s stated lack of any public

necessity, planning, or financial ability to even

contemplate the project, the Wood County Court

found that the Village had met its burden to proceed

with the appropriation. This conclusion was later

affirmed by Ohio Sixth Appellate District which held

that the Village’s stated ‘open-ended’ need for the

property comported with Ohio law that permitted the

appropriation of land for “future needs.” Luckey v. T

& S Agriventures, LLC, 2025-Ohio-871, ¶ 47, 265

N.E.3d 798, 807, appeal not allowed sub nom. Luckey

v. T&S Agriventures, L.L.C., 2025-Ohio-2348, 178

Ohio St. 3d 1517, 262 N.E.3d 427. However,

subsequent events during the pendency of this appeal

12

have demolished the Village’s feeble façade and

exposed their conduct, both prior to and during the

state appropriation proceeding, as an ongoing effort to

deprive the Petitioners of their fundamental

constitutional rights.

D.

Legislative

and

Administrative

Changes at the Village Expose its

Scheme

During the pendency of the state court

appropriation proceedings, the actions of the Village

began to gain larger awareness amongst the

electorate and dissatisfaction with the Village’s

actions regarding the subject property. This led to

contested Village Council elections in November 2025.

The November vote resulted in the election of

several new Council members, all of whom ran upon

their opposition to the alleged water project and the

taking of the Petitioners’ property. Following the

election results, but before the new Council started its

term, the then-current Village Council, as well as the

mayor and village solicitor, resigned, rendering the

future of the alleged project even more remote and

uncertain. See, e.g., Alex Bracken, Luckey Officials

Resign, Sowing Uncertainty about Water Project’s

Future,

Toledo

Blade,

Nov.

22,

2025,

https://www.toledoblade.com/local/suburbs/2025/11/2

1/luckey-officials-resign-uncertainty-waterproject/stories/20251120121; Alex Bracken, Luckey

Mayor Resigns, Newly Elected Council President to

Fill

Role,

Toledo

Blade,

Dec.

5,

2025,

https://www.toledoblade.com/local/suburbs/2025/12/0

5/luckey-mayor-resigns-new-council-president-fillrole-village/stories/20251204104.

13

The state court case having become the

litigation equivalent of Schrodinger’s cat, neither

alive nor dead, the Petitioners awaited the

commencement of the new Council term and the first

meeting of 2026.

The agenda for the Luckey Village Council

meeting on January 21, 2026, included discussion of

the ongoing state and federal lawsuits. The meeting

was attended by the Petitioners and recorded in

accordance with Ohio law. The recording of the

meeting,

and

the

Petitioners

subsequent

conversations with past and current Council members

were subsequently transcribed and filed with the

Wood County Court of Common Pleas. The statements

made in these recordings confirm the sham nature of

the contemplated appropriation as well as its

complete lack of factual, legal, or economic basis.

Instead, the recordings and the transcripts produced

therefrom establish the following:

a. There was never any plan or intention of

providing public water to the village.

b. There was never any interest in the property,

until the Petitioners put up auction signs;

c. Based on concern that the property would be

sold for an industrial use, the then-Village

Solicitor unilaterally placed the issue of the

Petitioners’ property before the Village Council.

The Village, acting in concert with its thenSolicitor determined they would commence

eminent domain/appropriation proceedings

solely to stop the auction sale.

14

These admissions were directly contrary to the sworn

testimony of the Village and its officials, as presented

to the state court and which served as the exclusive

factual basis for the Court’s finding of necessity.

Accordingly, Petitioners, as defendants in the state

court action, filed their Consolidated Motion to Show

Cause, Motion to Set Aside Judgment, and Motion to

Dismiss Petition, which is currently awaiting the

Village’s response.

Since August 2021, Petitioners have been

substantially denied the use and enjoyment of their

fundamental property interests and the Village’s

actions were undertaken with clear malice against the

rights of the Petitioners. Petitioners suffered

significant financial damage as a result of the

Village’s misconduct and have stated a valid claim for

redress of their constitutional injury.

II.

Procedural History

Petitioners initiated this action with the filing

of their Verified Complaint on December 20, 2022. The

District Court’s jurisdiction over the subject matter of

Petitioners’ claims was premised upon 28 U.S.C.

§1331 as Petitioners’ alleged that the Village of

Luckey, Ohio had, inter alia, completely impaired

their ability to dispose of the subject property and had

taken their property without payment of just

compensation.

Following service of the Complaint, and prior to

filing its responsive pleading, the Village initiated

state court appropriation proceedings against the

Petitioner landowners to appropriate the entirety of

the subject property in the Wood County, Ohio, Court

of Common Pleas at the case caption Village of Luckey,

15

Ohio v. T&S Agriventures, LLC, et al., Case No.

2023CV0144.

Thereafter, on April 10, 2024, Petitioners

sought and were granted leave to file an Amended

Complaint. Petitioners’ Amended Complaint was filed

on April 10, 2024. The Village filed its Motion to

Dismiss Petitioners’ Amended Complaint on April 24,

2024.

On February 12, 2024, the District Court issued

its Memorandum Opinion and Order, dismissing

Petitioners’ claims on the basis that Petitioners had

failed to identify a constitutionally protected property

interest that was impaired by the Village’s

interference with the September 18, 2021, auction.

In light of the erroneous nature of the District

Court’s order and also as a result of new evidence

obtained through the state court appropriation

proceeding, Petitioners timely filed their Motion to

Alter or Amend Judgment on April 1, 2024. On June

7, 2024, the District Court issued its Memorandum

Opinion and Order denying the Petitioners’ Motion

Petitioners timely filed their Notice of Appeal

to the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth

Circuit on June 13, 2024. Oral argument was held on

January 30, 2025. On November 24, 2025, the court,

over the dissent of Judge Clay, affirmed the judgment

of the Northern District of Ohio, concluding that

although “many aspects of the Village’s conduct in this

matter are troubling” they did not rise to the level of

an uncompensated taking and violation of the

Petitioners’ constitutional rights.(Pet.App. 20a).

16

Petitioners timely petitioned the Court of

Appeals for rehearing en banc on December 9, 2025.

The petition for rehearing was denied on January 5,

2026. (Pet.App.1a).

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT

I.

The Fifth Amendment’s Self-Executing

Guarantee of Just Compensation is a

Foundational Constitutional Right and

that Right May Not Be Qualified or

Abridged.

Given that this appeal involves analysis of the

Fifth Amendment’s takings clause, it may seem selfevident to note the fundamental right of the

Petitioners in this case to own and control their own

property. However, in dismissing Petitioners’ claims,

the lower courts lost sight of the magnitude of the

violation of their rights at the hands of the Village of

Luckey and also of the paramount importance of

private property rights in engineering “the last great

experiment for promoting human happiness.” George

Washington, Jan. 9, 1790. Indeed, and as explained by

Justice Johnson “[t]he great and paramount purpose

[of the constitution], was to unite this mass of wealth

and

power,

for

the

protection

of

the

humblest individual; his rights, civil and political, his

interests and prosperity, are the sole end; the rest are

nothing but the means.” Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1,

223, 6 L. Ed. 23 (1824) (Johnson, J. dissenting)

(emphasis in original).

This view as to inviolate nature of individual

liberty, and particularly of private property rights,

17

was universally held at the founding of the Republic.

As explained by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the

Eleventh Circuit, “the Founding Fathers placed the

right to private property upon the highest of

pedestals,” ensuring our country’s commitment to

protecting the ‘three-legged stool’ of individual

liberties---”personal security, personal liberty, and

private property.” GeorgiaCarry.Org, Inc. v. Georgia,

687 F.3d 1244, 1265 (11th Cir. 2012).

The importance of private property ownership,

and the United States’ commitment to its protection,

is laid bare in the plain language of the Fifth

Amendment’s takings clause, which states that “nor

shall private property be taken for public use, without

just compensation.” This language constitutes a twofold guarantee on the part of the United States: (1)

that private property will only be taken for a public

purpose; and (2) that just compensation will be paid

for any taking. This guarantee extends to the States,

not only by the ratification of the Fourteenth

Amendment, but also by virtue of a State’s ratification

of the Federal Constitution and Bill of Rights as a

condition of their admission into the Union. Ladd v.

Marchbanks, 971 F.3d 574, 577 (6th Cir. 2020).

Likewise, this Court unequivocally held in Knick, that

the Fifth Amendment’s guarantee of payment and its

creation of a constitutional cause of action, and

remedy, for uncompensated takings applied with

equal force to takings by political subdivisions, like

the Village of Luckey:

the same reasoning applies to takings by

the States. The availability of any

particular compensation remedy, such as

an inverse condemnation claim under

18

state law, cannot infringe or restrict the

property owner’s federal constitutional

claim.

Knick, 588 U.S. at 191.

In failing to appropriately analyze the nature of

the Petitioners’ claims, the lower courts missed the

opportunity to view this litigation through the

analytical framework articulated by Knick and, in so

doing, produced a result that is contrary to one of the

bedrock principles of the judiciary, that “[t]he very

essence of civil liberty certainly consists in the right of

every individual to claim the protection of the laws,

whenever he receives an injury.’ Marbury v. Madison,

1 Cranch 137, 163, 2 L.Ed. 60 (1803).

It is well-established that real property and

damages associated therewith are generally unique.

See K-Mart v. Oriental Plaza Inc., 875 F.2d 907, 91516 (1st Cir.1989) (“Real estate has long been thought

unique, and thus, injuries to real estate interests

frequently come within the ken of the chancellor.”);

J.C. Penney Co. v. Giant Eagle, Inc., 813 F.Supp. 360,

369 (W.D.Pa. 1992) (“damage to interests in real

estate are generally viewed as unique”), aff’d, 955

F.2d 217 (3d Cir. 1993); see also, Pelfresne v. Village of

Williams Bay, 865 F.2d 877, 883 (7th Cir. 1989);

United Church of Medical Center v. Medical Center

Com., 689 F.2d 693, 701 (7th Cir. 1982). Indeed, these

tenets of property law, coupled with the inviolate

nature of property ownership, have led commentators

to view uncompensated takings, as occurred in this

case, as “The First Constitutional Tort.” See, Robert

Brauneis, The First Constitutional Tort: The Remedial

Revolution in Nineteenth-Century State Just

Compensation Law, 52 Vand. L. Rev. 57 (1999).

19

Accordingly, given the magnitude of property

rights in the founding and organization of our

Country, it has long been required that states provide

“reasonable, certain, and adequate procedures” for

seeking just compensation to individuals who have

suffered an uncompensated taking or risk running

afoul of the guarantees enshrined in the Fifth

Amendment. See, Williamson Cty., 473 U.S. at 194.

Accord, Knick:

As long as an adequate provision for

obtaining just compensation exists, there

is no basis to enjoin the government’s

action effecting a taking. But that is

because, as the Court explained in [First

English Evangelical Lutheran Church of

Glendale v. Los Angeles Cty., Cal., 482

U.S. 304, 107 S.Ct. 2378, 96 L.Ed.2d 250

(1987)], such a procedure is a remedy for

a taking that violated the Constitution,

not because the availability of the

procedure somehow prevented the

violation from occurring in the first

place.

Knick, 588 U.S. at 201.

As such, the availability of a complete and

appropriate remedy for an uncompensated taking is

mandated by the Fifth Amendment. Palazzolo v.

Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 617, 121 S.Ct. 2448, 150

L.Ed.2d 592 (2001)). In essence, the current law

regarding uncompensated takings in violation of the

Fifth Amendment is simply a restatement of the

maxim ubi jus ibi remedium---for every wrong, the law

must provide a remedy.

20

Not surprisingly, Ohio’s Supreme Court has

also emphasized the essential nature of individual

property rights:

Ohio has always considered the right of

property to be a fundamental right.

There can be no doubt that the bundle of

venerable

rights

associated

with

property is strongly protected in the Ohio

Constitution and must be trod upon

lightly, no matter how great the weight

of other forces.

Norwood v. Horney, 110 Ohio St.3d 353, 361-62, 853

N.E.2d 1115 (Ohio 2006) (internal citations omitted).

The Ohio Supreme Court further noted that, in

addition to the actual property itself, it described the

“rights related to property, i.e., to acquire, use, enjoy,

and dispose of property” as “among the most revered

in our law and traditions.” Id. at 361 (emphasis

added).

In spite of these lofty ideals, the Village of

Luckey was able to abuse the eminent domain

authority afforded it under Ohio law. Its pretextual

Resolution, and subsequent ‘notice’ to the Petitioners

and interference with the September 18, 2024, auction

evidence an intentional and callous disregard for the

property interests of the Petitioners.

The Village’s actions to prevent the Petitioners

from even ascertaining the fair market value were

swiftly implemented and bore immediate fruit, with

the thwarting of the September auction. Petitioners

suffered material, specific, and calculable injury to

their respective property interests. However, the

lower courts have concluded that no remedy exists

21

under federal law for this constitutional injury. Such

a conclusion must not be permitted to stand. Ubi jus

ibi remedium.

II.

The Sixth Circuit’s Opinion Conflicts with

its Own Prior Express Holding as Well the

Express Precedent Established by this

Court in Knick.

The holdings of the lower courts in this case

offend the constitutional order by allowing the Village

to violate its obligations under the Fifth Amendment

without provision of a remedy to the Petitioners.

These holdings are also directly contrary to previously

established Sixth Circuit precedent in Amen v. City of

Dearborn, 718 F.2d 789 (6th Cir. 1983). These failures

mandate the Court’s acceptance of the Petition.

In Amen v. City of Dearborn, the city wanted to

redevelop a neighborhood it deemed blighted. 718

F.2d at 797. Aiming to eventually begin eminent

domain proceedings if needed, the city first delayed

and

unreasonably

denied

permits

to

the

neighborhood’s residents, thereby encouraging them

to relocate. Id. The city demanded maintenance and

remodeling beyond what was required by applicable

building codes. Id. At the same time, it allowed some

properties to remain vacant and unprotected to

encourage residents to sell nearby properties to the

city. Id.

The Sixth Circuit concluded that these actions

amounted to a “deliberate course of conduct [that]

caused such substantial damage to plaintiffs’

properties that the properties in effect were actually

taken.” Id. at 797-98. Put differently, the city in Amen

used unconstitutional tactics to drive down the cost of

22

just compensation and effectively force property

owners to sell to the city at depressed values. The city

did not take title, nor even a lesser formal interest in

the property such as an easement, but the Sixth

Circuit nonetheless held a “taking” had occurred

within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment, and just

compensation was required. Id.

The facts and holdings in Amen provided a

ready---and controlling---analogue to the Village’s

attempts in the matter sub judice to “engage in a

deliberate course of conduct to force the sale of private

property at reduced value.” Id. at 797.

First, the fact that the Village subsequently

initiated appropriation proceedings against the

Petitioner landowners in state court expressly

supports the application of the holding in Amen to the

facts of this case. As previously explained by the Sixth

Circuit, the fact that the Amen plaintiff’s property was

targeted by the City of Dearborn for appropriation

was a specific and dispositive consideration in finding

that

Dearborn’s

actions

constituted

an

uncompensated taking. Id.

In this case, there is no dispute that, on or

about August 4, 2021, and shortly after learning of the

planned auction, the Village specifically and

exclusively targeted the Petitioners’ property for

appropriation. However, the Village failed to enter a

Resolution authorizing the appropriation of the

property until September 21, 2022.

Instead, the Village:

1.

Sent out a defective and ultra vires Notice of

Intent to Acquire, affirmatively misstating its

23

authority under Ohio Revised Code Section

743.01, and under Chapter 163;

2.

Demanded that Beth Rose notify all bidders

of its intention to take the property from

whomever bought it at auction;

3.

Sent representatives to the September 18,

2021, auction---not to bid, but to dissuade

others from bidding;

4.

Erected ‘No Parking’ signage and placed

barriers to accessing the property in a clear

attempt to disrupt the September 18, 2021,

auction; and

5.

Waited an additional 18 months after its

sabotage of the auction to initiate

appropriation proceedings against the

Petitioner landowners in the Wood County

Court of Common Pleas, and only in response

to the filing of this lawsuit in December 2022.

Under the facts of this case, and the

appropriate application of this Court’s holding in

Amen, Petitioners’ amended pleading presented valid

claims under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments

that the “‘freezing’ of plaintiff’s land . . . amounted to

an unconstitutional deprivation” and that the

Village’s “deliberate course of conduct caused such

substantial damage to plaintiffs’ properties that the

properties in effect were actually taken . . . for which

just compensation is due.” Urbanizadora Versalles,

Inc. v. Rivera Rios, 701 F.2d 993, 996 (1st Cir. 1983);

Amen, 718 F.2d at 798.

Again, the right “to sell or otherwise dispose of

[property] according to the will of the owner, and

24

without any diminution or control save only by the

laws of the land,” is an essential incident of

ownership. von Kerssenbrock-Praschma v. Saunders,

48 F.3d 323, 325–26 (8th Cir. 1995) (quoting 73 C.J.S.

Property § 27 (1983)); see also Keyerleber v. Euclid

Congregation of Jehovah’s Witnesses, 103 Ohio App.

423, 430, 143 N.E.2d 313, 317 (1957) (“This right—jus

disponendi—is an incident of the ownership of

property.”) The Village’s concerted efforts, taken

under color of law, to interfere with the September 18,

2021, auction and to prevent the Petitioners from

ascertaining the fair market value of their property,

deprived them of this essential right.

The lower courts’ attempts to distinguish the

present case from the controlling precedent of Amen,

rest entirely upon the fact that the actions of the City

on Dearborn were undertaken over a period of years,

while the scheme undertaken by the Village of

Luckey, in this case, inflicted constitutional injury

upon the Petitioners in a period of months. However,

as noted by the dissent, the overall timeframe of the

Village’s “deliberate course of conduct” was

immaterial in light of the “intentional wrongdoing and

deliberate sabotage of the property’s sale”:

But the Village did not provide only an

announcement or simply express

interest in the property. Nor did the

Village follow the normal process of

governmental decision making or take

standard preliminary steps towards a

condemnation. Rather, the Village

carried out an intentional and concerted

series of actions to undermine the sale of

the property, devalue the property, and

25

acquire ownership of the property at a

cheaper price. The Village’s course of

conduct

involving

intentional

wrongdoing and interference sets this

case apart from those prior holdings.

(Pet.App. at 47a.).

The majority’s failure to adhere to Amen’s

holding and the imposition of an additional pleading

standards upon Petitioners in this case---such as a

showing of physical degradation of the property, or

that the offensive conduct occur for some years-long

duration---are expressly not part of the holding in

Amen.

The Sixth Circuit’s inappropriate ‘remix’ of

Amen’s controlling precedent also places the

November 24, 2025, Opinion in direct conflict with the

express precedent of this Court. As held by Knick, the

Fifth Amendment’s Takings Clause is “self-executing”

and “no matter what sort of procedures the

government puts in place to remedy a taking, a

property owner has a Fifth Amendment entitlement

to compensation as soon as the government takes his

property without paying for it.” Knick, 588 U.S. at 190

(emphasis added). The immediate vesting of this

right-to-remedy was the basis for this Court’s

overruling of Williamson County Regional Planning

Comm’n v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson City, 473 U.S.

172, 105 S.Ct. 3108, 87 L.Ed.2d 126 (1985), and

carries equal weight in its application here.

In Knick, use of a portion of the property

owner’s 90-acre parcel was impaired by the passage of

a township cemetery ordinance. Knick, 588 U.S. at

180. In ruling in favor of the property owner, the

26

Supreme Court held that the property owner had

stated a valid claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and she

was entitled to immediate relief. Id. The scope of the

governmental action in Knick was also objectively less

impactful on the subject property than the actions of

the Village in this case.

The Village undertook express and concerted

action to prevent the Petitioners from even

participating in the marketplace. The actions of the

village completely destroyed the fair market value of

the subject property in order to arbitrarily keep the

property at a reduced value for a potential later

acquisition. These actions were performed under the

color of State law, but without legal basis or the

appropriate invocation of Chapter 163 of the Ohio

Revised Code until after the auction had failed.

“It is the owner’s loss, not the taker’s gain,

which is the measure of the value of the property

taken.” United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 261

(1946). The fair market value of what is taken, plus

interest, is the normal measure of recovery. Knick,

588 U.S. at 190; Seaboard Air Line Ry. v. United

States, 261 U.S. 299, 305 (1923). Fair market value

has been described by the Supreme Court as what “a

willing buyer would pay in cash to a willing seller.”

United States v. 50 Acres of Land, 469 U.S. 24, 25-26

(1984). Just compensation means the “full and perfect

equivalent in money of the property taken [which is

equal to what] ‘it fairly may be believed that a

purchaser in fair market conditions would have

given.’” United States v. Miller, 317 U.S. 369, 374, 63

S. Ct. 276, 280, 87 L. Ed. 336 (1943) (quoting New York

v. Sage, 239 U.S. 57, 61, 36 S.Ct. 25, 26, 60 L.Ed. 143

(1915).

27

It is well-established that an open and

competitive “public auction . . . is the best possible

determinant of the value of” assets. In re Pursuit Cap.

Mgmt., LLC, 874 F.3d 124, 136 (3d Cir. 2017) (quoting

In re Abbotts Dairies of Pennsylvania, Inc., 788 F.2d

143, 149 (3d Cir. 1986)). Accord, Freed v. Thomas, 81

F.4th 655, 659 (6th Cir. 2023) (“best evidence of a

foreclosed property’s value is the property’s sales

price”); Case, Inc. v. United States, 62 F.3d 1430 (Fed.

Cir. 1995) (“auction price as the best evidence of fair

market value“).

The Village of Luckey, Ohio’s intentional

elimination of the Petitioners’ right to determine the

property’s value via participation in the auction

process---or to participate in the market process at all--“is inconsistent with the historical compact recorded

in the Takings Clause that has become part of our

constitutional culture.” Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council,

505 U.S. 1003, 1028, 112 S. Ct. 2886, 2900, 120 L. Ed.

2d 798 (1992).

The Sixth Circuit’s November 24, 2025,

Opinion is contrary that Circuit’s controlling

precedent, as well as contrary to the express holding

of this Court in Knick. Accordingly, the Court must

accept this Petition and grant certiorari.

III.

The Sixth Circuit’s November 24, 2025,

Opinion is Contrary to the Precedent of

Other Circuit Courts of Appeal.

The panels’ November 24, 2025, opinion is

completely inconsistent with the law of other Circuits

holding that targeted governmental action to render

property unsaleable and deliberately depressing the

price to be paid in subsequent eminent domain actions

28

are considered “de facto” or constructive takings. See,

e.g., Thomas W. Garland, Inc. v. City of St. Louis, 596

F.2d 784, 787 (8th Cir. 1979) (“governmental action

short of acquisition or occupancy may constitute a

constructive or de facto taking”); Stueve Bros. Farms,

LLC v. United States, 737 F.3d 750, 759 (Fed. Cir.

2013) (collecting cases recognizing “de facto takings”).

The Ninth Circuit has similarly held that when,

as here, targeted precondemnation interference

makes property unsaleable, the government has

“taken” property within the meaning of the Fifth

Amendment and, therefore, must pay just

compensation. Richmond Elks Hall Ass’n v. Richmond

Redev. Agency, 561 F.2d 1327 (9th Cir. 1977).

In that case, a local redevelopment agency

included an Elks Hall in an area deemed “blighted.”

Id. at 1329. While redevelopment efforts were

pending, the agency “severely limited” the Elks’

ability to improve the property, rendering it

“unsaleable in the open market.” Id. at 1330-31. The

agency later abandoned condemnation. Id. at 1329.

Nevertheless, the agency’s interference with the Elks’

property rights “was direct and substantial” and “the

result of this interference was a significant reduction

in the value of the subject property.” Id. at 1331. The

Ninth Circuit held that “[w]hen a public entity acting

in furtherance of a public project directly and

substantially interferes with property rights and

thereby significantly impairs the value of the

property, the result is a taking in the constitutional

sense and compensation must be paid.” Id. at 1330.

These holdings all share the holding articulated

by the Sixth Circuit in Amen---that a when an agency

engages in precodemnation chicanery amounting to a

29

“deliberate course of conduct [causing] substantial

damage to plaintiffs’ properties”, a property owner has

a valid claim for an uncompensated taking under the

Fifth Amendment and 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Amen, 718

F.2d at 797.

Petitioners met their burden to state a claim

upon which relief could, and should, be granted.

Petitioners pray the Court grant certiorari.

CONCLUSION

The November 24, 2025, Opinion of the Sixth

Circuit Court of Appeals has closed and locked the

doors to the Courthouse on federal takings claims that

this Court expressly reopened with its holding in

Knick. Petitioners presented well-pleaded and valid

claims that the district court was vested with subject

matter jurisdiction to entertain.

Petitioners were denied the ability to ascertain

the fair market value of the subject property, denied

the ability to alienate the property according to their

wishes, and were denied the ability to even fairly

participate in the marketplace.

The arbitrary pleading standards imposed by

the lower courts are contrary to the precedent of this

Court, violative of the Sixth Circuit’s own precedent,

and defies common sense. The Village’s misconduct

did not take years precisely because it was able to

inflict constitutional injury and destroy the market

value of the subject property over the course of a

month. Impairing the Petitioners’ constitutional

rights ‘efficiently’ is not a basis upon which the Village

30

could avoid liability, but that is effectively what the

lower courts have held.

Finally, the Village’s perpetuation of its sham

appropriation proceeding, undertaken solely to stymie

the Petitioners’ ability to obtain federal relief,

evidences a callous and continuing effort to

undermine the rule of law. It is the foundational

wellspring of the federal judiciary that “constitutional

provisions for the security of person and property

should be liberally construed.” Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S.

643, 647, 81 S. Ct. 1684, 1687, 6 L. Ed. 2d 1081 (1961)

(quoting Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 635, 6 S.

Ct. 524, 535, 29 L. Ed. 746 (1886)).The judgments of

the lower courts in this case represent an abdication

of this principle.

Accordingly, Petitioners respectfully request

that this Court train its vigilant eye upon the

constitutional injury that they have suffered in this

case and grant certiorari on all questions presented by

and through this Petition.

Dated: May 25, 2026

Respectfully Submitted:

Marvin a. Robon*

Zachary J. Murry

Barkan & Robon, Ltd

1701 Woodlands Drive

Suite 100

Maumee, Ohio 43537

(419) 897-6500

Email: zmurry@barkanrobon.com

*Counsel of Record

Attorneys for Petitioners