Petition for Writ of Certiorari — City of Bossier City, Louisiana, Petitioner v. Richard Hershey, et al.

Supreme Court briefMay 13, 2026

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APPENDIX

APPENDIX

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

Appendix A — Court of appeals denial of

rehearing en banc (Dec. 18, 2025) ........ 1a

Appendix B — Court of appeals panel opinion

(Oct. 7, 2025) .......................................... 38a

Appendix C — District court order granting

motion to dismiss (Sept. 24, 2021) ...... 96a

Appendix D — Magistrate judge recommendation

and report in favor of granting

motion to dismiss (Aug. 23, 2025) ....... 97a

Appendix E — First amended complaint

(May 20, 2021) ..................................... 123a

Appendix F — Exhibit to first amended complaint

(June 21, 2021) .................................... 138a

Appendix G — Court of appeals denial of panel

rehearing (Jan. 13, 2026) .................... 145a

APPENDIX A

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE

FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 21-30754

RICHARD HERSHEY,

v.

Plaintiff — Appellant,

CITY OF BOSSIER CITY; BOBBY GILBERT, Individually

and in his Capacity as Deputy Marshall; DANIEL

STOLL; DAVID SMITH; TYSHON HARVEY; EUGENE

TUCKER,

Defendants — Appellees.

Filed: December 18, 2025

On Petition for Rehearing En Banc

Before DENNIS, RICHMAN, and HO, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

The petition for rehearing en banc is DENIED. At the

request of one of its members, the court was polled, and a

majority did not vote in favor of rehearing (FED. R. APP.

P. 40 and 5TH CIR. R. 40).

(1a)

2a

In the en banc poll, seven judges voted in favor of

rehearing (JUDGES JONES, SMITH, RICHMAN, DUNCAN,

ENGELHARDT, OLDHAM, and WILSON), and ten judges

voted against rehearing (CHIEF JUDGE ELROD, and

JUDGES STEWART, SOUTHWICK, HAYNES, GRAVES,

HIGGINSON, WILLETT, HO, DOUGLAS, and RAMIREZ).

JAMES C. HO, Circuit Judge, concurring in the denial

of rehearing en banc:

Popular speech doesn’t need protection. It’s only when

speech is unpopular that you need the First Amendment.

That’s why the devout look to the judiciary for

protection. Religious speech is often unpopular speech,

as people of faith have known for thousands of years. See,

e.g., JOHN 15:18–19 (“If the world hates you, you know

that it has hated Me before it hated you. If you were of

the world, the world would love you as its own; but

because you are not of the world, but I chose you out of

the world, because of this the world hates you.”).

It should go without saying, then, that the freedom of

speech secured by the First Amendment includes

religious speech. It protects not only the right to pray,

but to preach—not just to worship, but to witness—to

exercise your faith by evangelizing your faith. Our

Founders secured these rights even if—indeed,

especially if—the government doesn’t want you to

exercise them.

So it should be obvious that believers have the right to

share the good news with others. And the obviousness of

that right should have been enough to defeat qualified

immunity in this case, without the need for a factually

identical case saying so.

3a

Our now-Chief Judge made this point in Morgan v.

Swanson, 659 F.3d 359, 414 n.30 (5th Cir. 2011) (Elrod, J.,

dissenting in part). But a majority of our en banc court

refused that view in Morgan. And a majority of our en

banc court affirmatively rejected it in Villarreal v. City of

Laredo, 94 F.4th 374, 395 (5th Cir. 2024). I detailed all of

this in my dissent in Villarreal, 94 F.4th at 413–14, and

again in McMurry v. Weaver, 142 F.4th 292, 304–07 (5th

Cir. 2025) (Ho, J., concurring), and Hershey v. City of

Bossier City, 156 F.4th 555, 557, 558–60 (5th Cir. 2025)

(Ho, J., concurring). But I’m duty-bound to follow our en

banc precedents, whether I agree with them or not.

Governing precedent does not, however, foreclose

municipal liability under Monell v. New York City Dep’t

of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611

(1978). To the contrary, the Supreme Court has

unanimously held that “the need to train officers . . . can

be said to be ‘so obvious,’ that failure to do so could

properly be characterized as ‘deliberate indifference’ to

constitutional rights.” City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S.

378, 390 n.10, 109 S.Ct. 1197, 103 L.Ed.2d 412 (1989).1

“[I]n the absence of training, there is no way for novice

officers to obtain the legal knowledge they require.

Under those circumstances there is an obvious need for

some form of training.” Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S.

51, 64, 131 S.Ct. 1350, 179 L.Ed.2d 417 (2011).

Harris refers to “fleeing felons,” but nothing in § 1983 suggests

that courts should favor the rights of criminals over the rights of lawabiding citizens. We made that mistake as to qualified immunity, see

Villarreal v. City of Laredo, 94 F.4th 374, 413 (5th Cir. 2024) (Ho, J.,

dissenting), and I’m grateful that we won’t be repeating that mistake

here as to municipal liability.

1

4a

The petition for rehearing en banc asks us to shield

obvious violations of religious liberty under Monell.

What’s more, it would allow municipalities to trample on

religious liberty simply by deputizing private actors to do

their dirty work. But see NRA v. Vullo, 602 U.S. 175, 198,

144 S.Ct. 1316, 218 L.Ed.2d 642 (2024) (“the First

Amendment prohibits government officials from wielding

their power selectively to punish or suppress speech,

directly or (as alleged here) through private

intermediaries”); Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 66

S.Ct. 276, 90 L.Ed. 265 (1946); Murthy v. Missouri, 603

U.S. 43, 79–80, 99, 144 S.Ct. 1972, 219 L.Ed.2d 604 (2024)

(Alito, J., dissenting). That’s wrong, and I’m glad we’re

not going along with it. I concur in the denial of the

petition for rehearing en banc.

*

*

*

My dissenting colleagues would grant the petition for

rehearing en banc. In doing so, they claim that I’m wrong

on three fronts. I’m wrong about our court’s qualified

immunity jurisprudence. I’m wrong about our approach

to municipal liability under Monell.

And most

importantly, I’m wrong that there’s a sincere concern

about religious liberty presented here.

I’ll begin by responding to the two procedural

justifications for shielding even obvious First

Amendment violations from judicial review, before

addressing my colleagues’ curious skepticism about the

legitimate religious liberty concerns implicated in this

case (which should be resolved in the first instance at trial

in any event).

In doing so, I note that it’s become a regrettable but

unfortunately common practice of judges to invent

reasons to avoid addressing sensitive matters of

5a

conscience on the merits—whether it’s by concocting

procedural problems or distorting the facts. I’m not the

only one to notice this tactic.2 But I note it here because

this case is Exhibit A in the use of these stratagems.

I.

Let’s start with qualified immunity. For any citizen

who seeks damages from a public official for violating

their rights, it’s not enough that their rights have been

violated. Their rights must also be “clearly established”

at the time of the violation. One way to make this showing

is to identify binding precedent with sufficiently similar

facts that the violation should have been clear to the

public official at the time of the incident. But that’s not

supposed to be the only way to do it. Under Hope v.

Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 122 S.Ct. 2508, 153 L.Ed.2d 666

See, e.g., Christian Legal Society v. Martinez, 561 U.S. 661, 707–

18, 130 S.Ct. 2971, 177 L.Ed.2d 838 (2010) (Alito, J., dissenting)

(detailing the numerous ways in which “[t]he Court provides a

misleading portrayal of this [religious liberty] case”); Parents

Protecting Our Children v. Eau Claire Area Sch. Dist., — U.S. —,

145 S.Ct. 14, 14–15, 220 L.Ed.2d 265 (2024) (Alito, J., dissenting from

the denial of certiorari) (“I am concerned that some federal courts

are succumbing to the temptation to use the doctrine of Article III

standing as a way of avoiding some particularly contentious

constitutional questions.”); see also Tucker v. Gaddis, 40 F.4th 289,

293–97 (5th Cir. 2022) (Ho, J., concurring) (collecting examples from

other circuits about misuse of procedural doctrines to avoid deciding

religious liberty claims); U.S. Navy SEALs 1-26 v. Biden, 72 F.4th

666, 677–78 (5th Cir. 2023) (Ho, J., dissenting) (misuse of mootness to

avoid deciding religious liberty challenge to vaccine mandate); Neese

v. Becerra, 127 F.4th 601, 603–06 & n.1 (5th Cir. 2025) (Ho, J.,

dissenting from the denial of rehearing en banc) (misuse of standing

and mischaracterization of facts to avoid addressing conscience

objections to gender ideology mandate).

2

6a

(2002), and Taylor v. Riojas, 592 U.S. 7, 141 S.Ct. 52, 208

L.Ed.2d 164 (2020), a plaintiff can also overcome qualified

immunity if the violation is so egregious that it should’ve

been obvious to the official, without the need for a

materially similar case. See Hope, 536 U.S. at 741, 122

S.Ct. 2508 (“general statements of the law . . . may apply

with obvious clarity to the specific conduct in question,

even though the very action in question has not previously

been held unlawful”) (cleaned up) (quoting United States

v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 270–71, 117 S.Ct. 1219, 137

L.Ed.2d 432 (1997), and Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S.

635, 640, 107 S.Ct. 3034, 97 L.Ed.2d 523 (1987)); Taylor,

592 U.S. at 8–9 & n.2, 141 S.Ct. 52 (summarily reversing

our court's grant of qualified immunity due to the

“obviousness” of the constitutional violation) (citing Hope

and Lanier).

Unfortunately, we didn’t follow this principle in

Villarreal v. City of Laredo, 94 F.4th 374 (5th Cir. 2024).

The en banc majority held that Hope and Taylor are

Eighth Amendment cases that do not apply in other

contexts, such as the First Amendment. Id. at 395. I

dissented, noting the oddity of treating claims from

incarcerated criminals more favorably than law-abiding

citizens. Id. at 413–14 (Ho, J., dissenting).3

The Supreme Court vacated our en banc decision in Villarreal.

— U.S. —, 145 S. Ct. 368, 220 L.Ed.2d 137 (2024). But on remand,

our court reinstated its earlier en banc decision. See Villarreal v. City

of Laredo, 134 F.4th 273, 276 (5th Cir. 2025) (“[o]ur previous en banc

majority opinion is superseded only to th[e] extent” necessary to

respond to the Supreme Court's vacatur regarding the substantive

requirements of a First Amendment retaliation claim).

3

7a

Naturally, I wish my views had prevailed in Villarreal.

But they didn’t, and I’m bound to acknowledge that fact

in all intellectual honesty.

What I could not have fathomed is what my colleagues

are saying about Villarreal today. Having won in

Villarreal, they now dispute what it is that they won.

They deny that they held in Villarreal that “the

obviousness exception does not apply in First

Amendment cases.” Post, at 307.

So let’s just roll the tape. Here’s verbatim what the

Villarreal en banc majority said about qualified

immunity, Hope, Taylor, and obvious violations:

Villarreal cites no case, nor are we aware of one,

where the Supreme Court, or any other court, has

held that it is unconstitutional to arrest a person,

even a journalist, upon probable cause for violating

a statute that prohibits solicitation and receipt of

nonpublic information from the government for

personal benefit. Under the normal standards of

qualified immunity, no “clearly established law”

placed the officers on notice of Villarreal’s First

Amendment right not to be arrested. Villarreal,

however, relies on Eighth Amendment cases

where the Supreme Court denied qualified

immunity for deliberate indifference to

unconstitutional prison conditions and declined to

scrutinize the cases fact-specifically. See Hope v.

Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 738–39, 122 S.Ct. 2508, 153

L.Ed.2d 666 (2002) (“[T]he risk of harm [to the

prisoners] is obvious.”); Taylor v. Riojas, 592 U.S.

7, 9, 141 S.Ct. 52, 208 L.Ed.2d 164 (2020) (per

curiam) (“Confronted with the particularly

egregious facts of this case, any reasonable officer

8a

should have realized that Taylor’s conditions of

confinement offended the Constitution.”) (footnote

omitted)); McCoy v. Alamu, — U.S. —, 141 S. Ct.

1364, 209 L.Ed.2d 114 (2021) (instructing the court

to reconsider an Eighth Amendment case “in light

of Taylor”).

Hope and its progeny express a general, but

decidedly narrow, obviousness exception to the

requirement that “clearly established law” be

founded on materially identical facts. In any

event, those cases are inappropriate templates for

describing “clearly established” law in this

context. In Morgan v. Swanson, 659 F.3d 359, 373

(5th Cir. 2011) (en banc), a case involving First

Amendment free exercise rights, this court noted

that Hope does not stand for the broad proposition

that plaintiffs need not offer any similar cases to

prove that an officer should have been on notice

that his conduct violated the Constitution. . . .

Consequently, we adhere to the general rule that

for an asserted right to be clearly established for

purposes of qualified immunity, it must “have a

sufficiently clear foundation in then-existing

precedent” that it is “settled law.” [District of

Columbia v.] Wesby, 583 U.S. [48] at 63, 138 S.Ct.

577 [199 L.Ed.2d 453 (2018)] (citation omitted).

“The precedent must be clear enough that every

reasonable official would interpret it to establish

the particular rule the plaintiff seeks to apply.” Id.

(emphasis added).

The law is not clearly

established if referenced cases are “materially

distinguishable and thus do[ ] not govern the facts

of this case.” Rivas-Villegas [v. Cortesluna], 595

U.S. [1] at 6, 142 S.Ct. 4 [211 L.Ed.2d 164 (2021)].

9a

94 F.4th at 395 (cleaned up).

It’s hard to misread this passage. Villarreal reads

Hope and Taylor to apply only to “Eighth Amendment

cases.” Id. Hope and Taylor don’t apply in cases

“involving First Amendment free exercise rights.” Id.

And the court justifies this result by citing our earlier en

banc decision in Morgan. Id.

Now I’ll quote verbatim what I said in response in my

dissent:

The Supreme Court has made clear that public

officials who commit obvious constitutional

violations are not entitled to qualified immunity.

In fact, the Court has repeatedly reversed circuits,

including ours, for granting qualified immunity for

obvious violations of constitutional rights. See,

e.g., Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 741, 122 S.Ct.

2508, 153 L.Ed.2d 666 (2002); Taylor v. Riojas, 592

U.S. 7, 9, 141 S.Ct. 52, 208 L.Ed.2d 164 (2020).

The majority responds that the standard

articulated in Hope and Taylor doesn't apply here,

because those cases arose under the Eighth

Amendment, not the First Amendment. Ante, at

395.

But that would treat the First Amendment as a

second-class right. Nothing in § 1983 suggests

that courts should favor the Eighth Amendment

rights of convicted criminals over the First

Amendment rights of law-abiding citizens.

Nothing in Hope or Taylor indicates that those

decisions apply only to prison conditions. And no

other circuit takes the approach urged by our

colleagues in the majority. To the contrary, nine

circuits have indicated that the standards

10a

articulated in Hope apply specifically in the First

Amendment context. See, e.g., Diaz-Bigio v.

Santini, 652 F.3d 45, 50 (1st Cir. 2011); Nagle v.

Marron, 663 F.3d 100, 115–116 (2nd Cir. 2011);

McGreevy v. Stroup, 413 F.3d 359, 366 (3rd Cir.

2005); Tobey v. Jones, 706 F.3d 379, 391 n.6 (4th

Cir. 2013); MacIntosh v. Clous, 69 F.4th 309, 399

(6th Cir. 2023); Kristofek v. Vill. of Orland Hills,

832 F.3d 785, 798 (7th Cir. 2016); Galvin v. Hay,

374 F.3d 739, 746–47 (9th Cir. 2004); Frasier v.

Evans, 992 F.3d 1003, 1021–22 (10th Cir. 2021);

Leslie v. Hancock Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 720 F.3d

1338, 1345–46 (11th Cir. 2013). See also Cheeks v.

Belmar, 80 F.4th 872, 877 (8th Cir. 2023) (applying

Hope to the Fourteenth Amendment); Atherton v.

Dist. of Columbia Off. of the Mayor, 706 F.3d 512,

515 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (applying Hope to the Fifth

Amendment).

So I would apply Hope and Taylor in the First

Amendment context.

See also Morgan v.

Swanson, 659 F.3d 359, 412, 414 n.30 (5th Cir.

2011) (en banc) (Elrod, J., dissenting in part)

(concluding that Hope applies to obvious First

Amendment violations).

Id. at 413–14 (Ho, J., dissenting) (cleaned up).

If my dissent mischaracterized the majority’s ruling,

surely they would've taken me to task. But they didn’t.

Because I didn’t. (Put it another way: If our colleagues

agreed with my dissent that Hope and Taylor apply to the

First Amendment, why did they vote against Priscilla

Villarreal?) People can debate, of course, who’s right

about qualified immunity, Hope, and Taylor—the en banc

majority or my dissent. But we should be candid about

what our opinions do and don’t say. Numerous religious

11a

liberty organizations and other public interest groups

have filed amicus briefs criticizing Villarreal for refusing

to apply the obviousness exception to the First

Amendment. Start with the Alliance Defending Freedom

and the Dhillon Law Group, and their amicus brief on

behalf of the Young America’s Foundation and the

Manhattan Institute. Here’s what they said:

Some applications of laws are so “obvious[ly]”

unconstitutional, Rivas-Villegas, 595 U.S. at 6, 142

S.Ct. 4, or “egregious,” Taylor, 592 U.S. at 9, 141

S.Ct. 52, that qualified immunity dissolves without

a factually analogous case on the books. Often this

principle is associated with Hope v. Pelzer, 536

U.S. at 741, 122 S.Ct. 2508, where this Court said

“a general constitutional rule already identified in

the decisional law may apply with obvious clarity

to the specific conduct in question.” Accord, e.g.,

Anderson, 483 U.S. at 640, 107 S.Ct. 3034

(rejecting the notion “that an official action is

protected by qualified immunity unless the very

action in question has previously been held

unlawful”).

The Fifth Circuit en banc majority avoided this

conclusion by throwing out the obviousness

exception to “normal” qualified-immunity rules in

the free-speech and free exercise context.

Villarreal, 94 F.4th at 395. It refused to accept

that “the ‘obvious’ violation exception applies

broadly to arrests that may impinge on First

Amendment rights.” Id. at 392. Obviousness, the

majority said, is “no more than a possible

exception,” ibid., or one narrowly confined to

“Eighth Amendment cases,” id. at 395.

12a

This dispelling of the obviousness exception is

mistaken. Eighth Amendment precedent has its

oddities but qualified immunity isn't one of them.

Nothing in Hope or Taylor suggests that the

exception applies only to claims of cruel and

unusual punishment. Nor does confining the

obviousness exception to that narrow context

make sense. Freedoms of speech, press, and

religion are among our proudest liberties, not

“second-class right[s].” Villarreal, 94 F.4th at 413

(Ho, J., dissenting).

Brief for Young America’s Foundation and Manhattan

Institute as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner,

Villarreal v. Alaniz, 145 S. Ct. 368 (2024) (No. 23-1155),

2024 WL 2786483, *9–10.

According to ADF, Dhillon, and company, Villarreal is

“dangerous” for religious liberty: “Left undisturbed, the

Fifth Circuit’s ruling provides dangerous license for

government actors to flagrantly violate the Constitution

without recourse, even against the most established

rights, simply because they invoke a novel factual

situation never before specifically addressed by the

courts.” Id. at *12.

Consider also what the First Liberty Institute wrote:

The approach taken by the Fifth Circuit towards

qualified immunity is exactly the kind of approach

this Court castigated in Hope and its progeny. In

Hope, this Court indicated that public officials who

commit obvious constitutional violations are not

entitled to qualified immunity. See 536 U.S. at

740–42, 745–46, 122 S.Ct. 2508. Although this

principle was first articulated in the Eighth

Amendment context, it has been extended to cases

13a

involving the First Amendment, by [the Supreme]

Court and nine circuits.”

Brief of First Liberty Institute as Amicus Curiae in

Support of Petitioner, Villarreal v. Alaniz, 145 S. Ct. 368

(2024) (No. 23-1155), 2024 WL 2058693, *10.

The First Liberty Institute concluded that Villarreal is

an “insidious” ruling for religious liberty: “Whatever

value qualified immunity has, it cannot be predicated on

the distinctly un-American notion that our freedoms are

only cognizable in the light of judicial pronouncements

cast down from on high.” Id. at *11. These are the views

of the Nation’s most respected religious liberty law firms.

And they aren’t alone. A number of other organizations

have also filed Supreme Court amicus briefs protesting

our court’s elimination of the obviousness exception in

First Amendment cases. See Docket, Villarreal v.

Alaniz, No. 23-1155 (U.S.); Docket, Villarreal v. Alaniz,

No. 25-29 (U.S.); see also McMurry, 142 F.4th at 305–06

(Ho, J., concurring) (citing amici).

So they may be surprised to see what our colleagues

have to say today.

*

*

*

One possible explanation for their dissent is that our

colleagues regret what they did in Villarreal (and before

that in Morgan). But if that is so, I just wish they had

expressed this regret to the rest of us earlier, when we

could’ve done something about it. Because it’s not what

they’ve ever said before today. It’s not what our

dissenting colleague said in her opinion at the panel stage.

And it’s certainly not what Defendants have urged in

their petition for rehearing en banc. They said none of

this until today’s dissent.

14a

And notably, Hershey himself did not file an en banc

rehearing petition asking us to overturn Villarreal—

presumably because he and his counsel know how to read

opinions and count votes.

But make no mistake: Now that everyone’s on record,

I’d welcome an en banc petition from Hershey asking us

to overturn the mistaken principles of Morgan and

Villarreal, deny qualified immunity, and grant Hershey

the opportunity to go to trial. Because it sounds like there

are now the votes to do it.

That said, Hershey may prefer to preserve his Monell

win, and leave it to someone else to invoke today’s

surprising developments to try to overturn Villarreal.

And that leads me to my final point on Villarreal. I’m

beyond delighted by this surprising turn of events, to be

sure. But it bears noting that this is precisely the kind of

“surprise switcheroo” that members of our court have

criticized federal agencies for doing. Wages and White

Lion Investments, L.L.C. v. FDA, 90 F.4th 357, 386 (5th

Cir. 2024), rev’d, 604 U.S. 542, 145 S.Ct. 898, 221 L.Ed.2d

436 (2025).

I’d hold us to the same standard that we apply to others.

As imperfect human beings, we’re allowed to change our

mind, of course. But we should be candid, not caustic,

when we do so. “When an agency changes its existing

position, it . . . must at least display awareness that it is

changing position.” Id. at 381 (quotations omitted). At

least one influential scholar has suggested the same. See

Josh Blackman, A Fifth Circuit Disgrantle in the Alien

Enemies Act Case, REASON.COM, Oct. 1, 2025 (comparing

the dueling en banc opinions in United States v. Abbott,

15a

110 F.4th 700 (5th Cir. 2024), with later developments).4

Finally, the dissent asks a question that deserves a

fulsome response: “Why say ‘We are bound by this

terrible opinion,’” but “oppose rehearing to fix the

purportedly terrible opinion?” Post, at 308. “Wouldn’t it

be easier to do the right thing and vote for rehearing

now?” Id.

My two responses to their question/offer: It’s deeply

disingenuous. But I happily accept.

First, it’s disingenuous. Defendants’ petition for

rehearing en banc (obviously) doesn’t ask the court to

reverse its qualified immunity win by revisiting

Villarreal. Their petition is solely about Monell. The en

banc poll is solely about Monell. And the poll closed long

ago in any event—well before any of them ever told me

(or anyone else, from what I can tell) that they suddenly

share my opposition to Villarreal.

So they can theorize all they want that I somehow

secretly like what happened in Villarreal. But personally,

I don’t think it passes the laugh test. See, e.g., Villarreal,

94 F.4th at 409 (Ho, J., dissenting) (opposing the en banc

My colleagues deny the surprise switcheroo, and insist that we

must read Villarreal “in the context in which it was decided.” Post,

at 308. In their view, Villarreal wasn’t about refusing Hope and

Taylor at all—it was about the “concededly untainted intermediary

and the valid arrest warrant.” Post, at 307. But that’s wrong on both

fronts. It’s wrong because it can’t be squared with the verbatim

language from Villarreal that I quoted earlier. And it’s wrong

because the intermediary and warrant issues weren’t “conceded” at

all—to the contrary, multiple dissents in Villarreal discussed in

detail the tainted intermediary and invalid warrant. See, e.g., 94

F.4th at 403–04 (Higginson, J., dissenting); id. at 418–19 (Ho, J.,

dissenting).

4

16a

decision in Villarreal); McMurry, 142 F.4th at 302 (Ho,

J., concurring) (opposing the en banc decision in

Villarreal); Hershey, 156 F.4th at 557 (Ho, J., concurring)

(opposing the en banc decision in Villarreal); see also

Oliver v. Arnold, 19 F.4th 843, 843 (5th Cir. 2021) (Ho, J.,

concurring in the denial of rehearing en banc) (supporting

relief in Villarreal); Mayfield v. Butler Snow, 78 F.4th

796, 797 (5th Cir. 2023) (Ho, J., dissenting from the denial

of rehearing en banc) (supporting relief in Villarreal);

Gonzalez v. Trevino, 60 F.4th 906, 907 (5th Cir. 2023) (Ho,

J., dissenting from the denial of rehearing en banc)

(supporting relief in Villarreal). I regret the increasing

lack of candor that has come to pervade our court’s en

banc proceedings of late.

But no matter. I vote for rehearing. I’m happy to let

bygones be bygones, and ignore from here on out what

my colleagues may or may not have said before, in either

Morgan or Villarreal. I’m delighted to go back to what

we said in my original panel majority opinion in

Villarreal: Of course the obviousness exception of Hope

and Taylor applies to the First Amendment.

So as a member of the panel, I vote for the panel to

rehear this case. After today’s order is out, I’m sure that

the panel will deny qualified immunity in this case. And

that will be that.

II.

Next, municipal liability. It’s established law that, to

obtain liability under Monell, an extensive pattern of past

violations by municipal employees is sufficient—but it’s

not necessary. A single incident can also trigger liability,

but only if there’s an obvious risk of a constitutional

violation if the municipality provides “no training

whatsoever.”

17a

Our dissenting colleagues insist that that’s wrong.

Indeed, they claim that it’s “a sea change from our court’s

prior approach” to contend that “a political subdivision is

liable under Monell when it provides ‘no training

whatsoever’ on the First Amendment.” Post, at 306

(emphasis added).

But virtually every member of the dissent has

previously agreed that “a political subdivision is liable

under Monell when it provides ‘no training

whatsoever’”—at least in other constitutional contexts.

Id. See, e.g., Henderson v. Harris Cnty, 51 F.4th 125, 131

(5th Cir. 2022) (Monell liability available under the

Fourth Amendment where “the government actor was

provided no training whatsoever”) (quotations omitted);

York v. Welch, 2024 WL 775179, *5 (5th Cir.) (again,

Monell liability available under the Fourth Amendment

where “the government actor was provided no training

whatsoever”) (quotations omitted); Covington v. City of

Madisonville, 812 F. App’x 219, 225 (5th Cir. 2020)

(Monell liability available where “it should have been

apparent” that the complete “failure to train” would

result in a Fourteenth Amendment violation) (quotations

omitted); Peterson v. City of Fort Worth, 588 F.3d 838,

849 (5th Cir. 2009) (Monell liability available under the

Fourth Amendment based on “a complete failure to

train”).

None of these cases suggest a different rule for the

First Amendment. To the contrary, a municipality is

liable if it provides “‘no training whatsoever’ with respect

to the relevant constitutional duty.” Littell v. Houston

Indep. Sch. Dist., 894 F.3d 616, 625 n.5 (5th Cir. 2018)

(emphasis added).

So I don’t see a “sea change”—I see equal respect for

religious liberty when we apply Monell liability to a

18a

municipality that “provides ‘no training whatsoever’ on

the First Amendment.” Post, at 306 (emphasis added).

The dissenters wonder what might happen if we apply

our established law to the First Amendment. They

worry, for example, that federal judges might start

forcing cities to train all of their employees on “the

intricacies of commercial speech.” Post, at 306. Rest

assured that no one is saying that. Nor is anyone

ordering municipal waste workers to be taught about

Obergefell, or insisting that firefighters be instructed on

tax law.

We’re only saying what the law already says—and what

the dissenters once agreed: a municipality is liable if it

provides “‘no training whatsoever’ with respect to the

relevant constitutional duty.” Littell, 894 F.3d at 625 n.5

(emphasis added). If the training isn’t relevant, then it

isn’t required.

And that gets us to what I believe is the heart of the

dispute. The dissent seems to think that the problem with

this case is that the “risk of a constitutional violation was

infinitesimal.” Post, at 305.

I have a different view. Street preaching is not some

infinitesimally rare and obscure practice. Nor is it one

that municipalities never bother with.

People of faith have long sought opportunities to spread

the gospel in the public square. Nearly a century ago, the

Supreme Court observed that “[t]he hand distribution of

religious tracts is an age-old form of missionary

evangelism—as old as the history of printing presses.”

Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 108, 63 S.Ct. 870,

87 L.Ed. 1292 (1943). “It has been a potent force in

various religious movements down through the years,” as

people of faith “carry the Gospel to thousands upon

19a

thousands of homes and seek through personal visitations

to win adherents.” Id. at 108–9, 63 S.Ct. 870. So anyone

who is “rightfully on a street which the state has left open

to the public carries with him there as elsewhere the

constitutional right to express his views in an orderly

fashion.” Jamison v. Texas, 318 U.S. 413, 416, 63 S.Ct.

669, 87 L.Ed. 869 (1943). “This right extends to the

communication of ideas by handbills and literature as well

as by the spoken word.” Id.

It’s a religious practice that dates back thousands of

years. The Bible speaks of the Great Commission, in

which Jesus calls on the disciples to go forth and spread

the word to others in every nation. MATTHEW 28:16–20.

“[O]pen-air preaching was a preferred method of Jonah,

Jeremiah, the apostle Paul, and many others.” Ryan

Denton, Into the Highways and Hedges: A Primer for

Open-Air Preaching, DESIRING GOD, Feb. 4, 2024,

available

at

www.desiringgod.org/articles/into-thehighways-and-hedges. “They went to the people and

preached God’s word.” Id. After all, “Jesus went into the

boat or up on the mountainside to preach the good news.”

Id.

My dissenting colleagues question why I invoke

“thousands of years” of religious tradition. Post, at 305.

But they invoked millennia of legal tradition in

Environment Texas Citizen Lobby, Inc. v. ExxonMobil

Corp., 123 F.4th 309 (5th Cir. 2024)—even where it didn’t

seem relevant.5 So if we’re going to consider millennia of

5

In that case, I questioned the relevance of Roman law to the

established practice of American courts on dismissing appeals as

improvidently granted. I’m grateful that my colleagues stepped

away from the point shortly thereafter. See, e.g., Silverthorne

20a

legal tradition since at least the time of Roman rule, then

we ought to consider millennia of religious tradition since

Roman times as well—particularly where it’s actually

relevant to the issues presented.

The Harvard Religious Freedom Clinic certainly thinks

it relevant. Just this year, they briefed the U.S. Supreme

Court that street preaching is an “ancient tradition” with

“deep historical roots.” Brief of Stephen Nylen et al. as

Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner, Olivier v. City of

Brandon, No. 24-993 (U.S.), 2025 WL 2676057, *4. I

agree that it’s relevant in cases like this that the devout

have sought to spread the gospel to others as an essential

part of their faith for millennia.

The most effective way to spread the word to others, of

course, is to go where lots of people congregate. “The

First Amendment protects the right of every citizen to

reach the minds of willing listeners and to do so there

must be opportunity to win their attention.” Heffron v.

Int’l Soc. for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640,

655, 101 S.Ct. 2559, 69 L.Ed.2d 298 (1981) (cleaned up,

emphasis added). Concert venues are an ideal forum for

the street preacher. As one of the most famous street

preachers has observed, “music venues” are a “good

open-air setting” for street preaching because it’s a

“public location where people gather where they’re not in

a hurry and can take time to listen.” RAY COMFORT,

FIFTY YEARS OF OPEN-AIR PREACHING 50 (2024). See

also Denton, Into the Highways (“open-air preaching is

especially useful . . . outside a sporting event”).

Seismic v. Sterling Seismic Srvs., 125 F.4th 593, 598 & n.5 (5th Cir.

2025) (discussing practice of dismissing discretionary appeals as

improvidently granted).

21a

Municipalities are not only well aware of this—a

number of them don’t like it, and endeavor to stop it.

In fact, municipalities are so actively opposed to street

preaching that our court has had to adjudicate

constitutional objections to their restrictive policies in

case after case. See, e.g., Siders v. City of Brandon, 123

F.4th 293 (5th Cir. 2024) (Christian advocate prevented

from evangelizing outside public amphitheater); Herridge

v. Montgomery Cnty., No. 21-20264, 2022 WL 989421 (5th

Cir. Apr. 1, 2022) (Christian advocate prevented from

distributing pamphlets near outdoor pavilion in Houston);

Olivier v. City of Brandon, 2023 WL 5500223 (5th Cir.)

(street preacher prevented from evangelizing outside

public amphitheater), cert. granted, — U.S. —, 145 S. Ct.

2871, 222 L.Ed.2d 1154 (2025); Denton v. City of El Paso,

861 F. App’x 836 (5th Cir. 2021) (Christian advocate

prevented from evangelizing at an outdoor farmer’s

market); Roy v. City of Monroe, 950 F.3d 245 (5th Cir.

2020) (street preacher prevented from evangelizing on

the sidewalk outside of a local bar); Allen v. Cisneros, 815

F.3d 239 (5th Cir. 2016) (street preacher prevented from

evangelizing on the streets of Houston); Grisham v. City

of Fort Worth, 837 F.3d 564 (5th Cir. 2016) (Christian

advocate prevented from distributing literature on public

sidewalks).

Our dissenting colleagues know this. Take Siders, for

example, about a “Christian who seeks to evangelize and

share the gospel with others.” 123 F.4th at 298. She

“particularly likes to share the gospel on public ways near

and outside of public events . . . because such occasions

offer her an opportunity to reach a meaningful number of

people with her message.” Id. She likes preaching at

music venues because “she can find meaningful

22a

pedestrian traffic flow on days of amphitheater events as

attendees walk toward the amphitheater.” Id.

Our colleagues have acknowledged that this is no

obscure exercise of faith—to the contrary, they’ve

suggested that there’s so much of it that they worry about

obstructing traffic. See Siders v. Mississippi, 130 F.4th

188, 190 (5th Cir. 2025) (noting concerns about

“congestion,” “interference with ingress or egress,”

“ensuring public safety and order,” and “promoting the

free flow of traffic on streets and sidewalks” to justify

shutting down street preachers).

In sum: In Hershey, the activity is rare, so there’s no

liability. In Siders, the activity occurs far too much, so

there’s no liability. I would not treat these conflicts as

infinitesimally rare. I would suggest that we’re all just

making a judgment call as to whether we think this is a

First Amendment right worth protecting—or not.6

6

Our dissenting colleagues highlight the amicus brief filed by the

states in our circuit. It’s not surprising, of course, that the states

would oppose litigants who seek to hold government officials liable.

Counsel for government always argues against liability for

government. That’s their job. It’s our job to enforce the Constitution.

The states are concerned about being flooded with frivolous

prisoner complaints. So am I. Of course, they’re already flooded with

such suits—since well before Hershey.

We can—and we must—protect the First Amendment rights of

law-abiding citizens, even as we work to shield prison officials from

frivolous prisoner complaints. We can walk and chew gum at the

same time. As federal judges, we’re paid to do so.

And that leads me to the question we should really be asking. Why

acknowledge only the government amici? Why not also acknowledge

the numerous amici who have filed brief after brief after brief

expressing grave concerns about the state of freedom of speech and

23a

III.

That brings us to the main event—religious liberty. As

I noted at the outset, the First Amendment violation

presented here should be obvious. Of course people have

the right to spread the gospel in public spaces. Yet our

colleagues deny that this case presents a legitimate

religious liberty issue.

Richard Hershey claims the right to share religious

materials in public spaces. But our colleagues deny that

his claim has anything to do with religious liberty.

To begin with, their challenge to Hershey’s sincerity is

ultimately a red herring. Because the rule of liability they

propose would govern the most faithful as well as the

most imperfect (which is to say, all of us).

It’s also an issue to be resolved by a jury—not appellate

judges. The amended complaint makes clear that

“Hershey

was

distributing

free,

educational,

noncommercial, religious booklets on behalf of a nonprofit

organization

named

the

Christian

Vegetarian

Association.” ROA.75. It’s a message that Hershey has

made clear he “feels compelled to share with others.”

ROA.192. My colleagues question Hershey’s bona fides

as a Christian. But that strikes me as (among other

things) beyond our province at this stage of the

proceedings.

Hershey’s sincerity was not doubted by the district

court. And even at the panel stage, one of our dissenting

religious liberty in our circuit? See, e.g., McMurry, 142 F.4th at 305–

06 (Ho, J., concurring) (noting broad range of amici and religious

liberty experts who have criticized our decisions in Morgan and

Villarreal); Gonzalez v. Trevino, 60 F.4th 906, 913 & n.4 (5th Cir.

2023) (Ho, J., dissenting from the denial of rehearing en banc) (same).

24a

colleagues doubted only whether Defendants had ever

“previously” targeted “someone engaging in free

exercise of religion or free speech.” Hershey, 156 F.4th

at 577–78 (Richman, J., concurring in part and dissenting

in part). Defendants themselves have acknowledged on

appeal that Hershey “travels around the country

spreading his Christian vegetarian message on college

campuses, at event centers, and other forums.” Brief for

Defendants, Hershey v. City of Bossier, 156 F.4th 555

(2025) (No. 21-30754), 2022 WL 1136998, *3 (quotations

omitted).

But our dissenting colleagues now question “what [the

Christian Vegetarian Association] has to do with

Christianity.” Post, at 305.

Paul’s epistle to the Romans acknowledges that some

people of faith will only eat vegetables. Paul warns

believers to respect such views. “The one who eats

everything must not treat with contempt the one who

does not, and the one who does not eat everything must

not judge the one who does, for God has accepted them.

Who are you to judge someone else’s servant? To their

own master, servants stand or fall. And they will stand,

for the Lord is able to make them stand.” ROMANS 14:3-4.

Our colleagues also highlight the fact that “Hershey

gets paid” for spreading these religious views. Post, at

305. But recall Paul’s first epistle to the church in

Corinth. See 1 CORINTHIANS 9:3-14. Paul observes that

“those who preach the gospel should receive their living

from the gospel.” 1 CORINTHIANS 9:14 (emphasis added).

See also Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens

Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 761, 96 S.Ct. 1817,

48 L.Ed.2d 346 (1976) (“Speech . . . is protected even

though it is . . . ‘sold’ for profit.”); Villarreal, 94 F.4th at

25a

420 (Ho, J., dissenting) (“There is no pro bono

requirement to the freedom of speech.”).

So I would not question the sincerity of Hershey’s faith

(and especially not at this early stage of the proceedings,

on review of a motion to dismiss). Nor is this the first time

we’ve seen unwarranted skepticism when it comes to

religious liberty. In Siders, our colleagues argued that

the ordinance challenged there did not prevent citizens

from evangelizing on public grounds. See, e.g., 130 F.4th

at 189 (Oldham, J., concurring in the denial of rehearing

en banc) (“[T]he ordinance does not purport to regulate

prayer, conversation, t-shirts, evangelism, or tracts.”).

But in Olivier, by contrast, they condemned the same

ordinance at the same amphitheater because it prevents

“an evangelical Christian who feels called to share the

good news with his fellow citizens . . . from doing so

outside the city's public amphitheater.” 121 F.4th 511, 512

(5th Cir. 2024) (Ho, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing

en banc, joined by five members of the court).7

Finally, the dissent suggests that I am violating party

presentation by treating this as a religious liberty case, rather than

as a free speech case. Post, at 308-309. My colleagues made the same

point in Siders. And my response is the same: “religious expression

is, of course, protected under the Freedom of Speech Clause.”

Siders, 130 F.4th at 192 (Ho, J., dissenting from the denial of

rehearing en banc). The Supreme Court’s recent decision in 303

Creative LLC v. Elenis, 600 U.S. 570, 143 S.Ct. 2298, 216 L.Ed.2d

1131 (2023), was based on the Free Speech Clause. Would the

dissenters be horrified if anyone called that decision a win for

religious liberty? Surely not. As the Supreme Court recently

reminded us, “the Free Speech Clause provides overlapping

protection for expressive religious activities.” Kennedy v. Bremerton

Sch. Dist., 597 U.S. 507, 523, 142 S.Ct. 2407, 213 L.Ed.2d 755 (2022).

“That the First Amendment doubly protects religious speech is no

accident. It is a natural outgrowth of the framers’ distrust of

7

26a

*

*

*

Judicial opinions should be read charitably. But I

struggle to see how our dissenting colleagues haven’t

reversed themselves on qualified immunity under

Villarreal and Morgan—or on whether Monell applies

when there’s been no training whatsoever—or on what

government actions threaten religious liberty. If I was

one of the religious liberty groups who devotes their Godgiven talents, time, and treasure to advocating for folks

like Spring Siders, Gabriel Olivier, Richard Hershey, and

Priscilla Villarreal, I’d wonder why they’re being accused

of misrepresenting this court’s precedents and

fabricating religious liberty threats out of thin air. I’d

also wonder about the unexplained changes of position

that they’ve seen from this court. I’d “wonder what’s

driving all of these gymnastics.” Post, at 309.

ANDREW S. OLDHAM, Circuit Judge, joined by JONES,

SMITH, RICHMAN, DUNCAN, ENGELHARDT, and WILSON,

Circuit Judges, dissenting from the denial of rehearing en

banc:

Richard Hershey is a “vegetarian advocate whose

ethical beliefs compel him to share his message with

others.” ROA.75. When security officers told Hershey to

stop distributing his leaflets, he sued for “deprivation of

his rights of speech.” ROA.85, 86–87. Hershey does not

allege that the officers even knew of the content of his

government attempts to regulate religion and suppress dissent. In

Anglo–American history, government suppression of speech has so

commonly been directed precisely at religious speech that a freespeech clause without religion would be Hamlet without the prince.”

Id. (cleaned up).

27a

vegetarianism leaflets—let alone targeted him for his

vegetarian views. See ROA.75–79. Nor does Hershey

allege anything about his religion. You’ll look in vain for

any mention in Hershey’s complaint about faith,

religiosity, the First Amendment’s Religion Clauses, or

evangelism. The closest he gets is to allege that he

distributed leaflets from “the Christian Vegetarian

Association”—without any allegation about what that

organization is, what it has to do with Christianity, what

it has to do with Hershey’s faith, or whether Hershey is

even a man of any faith. ROA.75. To the contrary, the

complaint alleges that Hershey gets paid to distribute

leaflets “by various nonprofit organizations”—without

regard to religion of any kind. Ibid.

But you would not know that from the opinion

concurring in the denial of rehearing en banc. In that

opinion, this case about vegetarian ethics somehow

transforms into a battle over street preaching, the Great

Commission, hatred of Christians, and religious

persecution dating back “thousands of years.” Ante, at

301 (Ho, J., concurring); see also Siders v. Mississippi,

130 F.4th 188, 191 (Ho, J., dissenting from the denial of

rehearing en banc) (5th Cir. 2025) (doing the same thing).

This quixotic effort does nothing to justify the panel’s

badly splintered, three-judge-four-opinion approach to

this case. And while it tilts at windmills that appear

nowhere in this case, it does nothing to justify our court’s

refusal to reconsider the matter en banc.

At the panel stage, the three-judge panel issued four

opinions. The per curiam opinion recognized that the

panel was (to put it mildly) “splintered.” Hershey v. City

of Bossier City, 156 F.4th 555, 556 (5th Cir. 2025) (per

curiam). Then all three judges issued their own opinions.

Judges Richman and Ho wrote the controlling rule on

28a

qualified immunity. Judge Ho declared that he would

have sided with Judge Dennis on qualified immunity had

circuit precedent not prevented him. Then Judges

Dennis and Ho wrote the controlling rule on the City’s

liability under Monell v. Department of Social Services of

City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d

611 (1978). Given the far-reaching implications of the

qualified immunity rule embraced by Judge Ho, given the

Monell holding embraced by Judges Dennis and Ho, and

given that future parties will need Venn diagrams to

understand what this deeply fractured panel held, we

should have taken the case en banc.

I begin with (I) the panel’s Monell holding, because it's

the most egregious. Then I address (II) the panel’s

qualified immunity holding. Finally, I address the

hyperbolic assertion that (III) rehearing this case would

have been comparable to throwing Christians to the lions.

I

First, Monell. I begin with (A) the Monell rule

announced by Judges Dennis and Ho and then turn to (B)

its anomalies.

A

Judges Dennis and Ho turn the world upside down. See

Hershey, 156 F.4th at 561 (HO, J., concurring); id. at 563–

64 (DENNIS, J., concurring in relevant part). Before the

panel’s decision, plaintiffs could allege a Monell claim

based on a single incident only if a municipality “fail[ed]

to train its employees concerning a clear constitutional

duty implicated in recurrent situations that a particular

employee is certain to face.” Littell v. Houston Indep.

Sch. Dist., 894 F.3d 616, 624–25 (5th Cir. 2018) (quoting

City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 396, 109 S.Ct.

1197, 103 L.Ed.2d 412 (1989) (O’CONNOR, J., concurring

29a

in part and dissenting in part)). Such circumstances were

“very narrow.” Id. at 624. The classic example: if a city

gave its officers guns but no training on when to use them.

See Canton, 489 U.S. at 390 n.10, 109 S.Ct. 1197.

Under the rule embraced by Judges Dennis and Ho,

however, plaintiffs need only allege that defendants

lacked training to handle plaintiff’s case—even if the ex

ante risk of a constitutional violation was infinitesimal.

ROA.86; see also Hershey, 156 F.4th at 561 (HO, J.,

concurring); id. at 563–64 (DENNIS, J., concurring in

relevant part). This doctrinal Calvinball will have

predictable effect: As Judge Richman ably explained,

plaintiffs can always “granulate allegations so finely that

they arrive at a ‘complete failure to train,’” so they will be

able to allege municipal liability in “virtually every

instance.” Id. at 578 (RICHMAN, J., dissenting in relevant

part) (quotation omitted).

That might be a good rule; it might be a bad one. But

either way, it’s a sea change from our court’s prior

approach. See Pineda v. City of Houston, 291 F.3d 325,

334 (5th Cir. 2002) (emphasizing that this court has

“necessarily [ ] been wary of finding municipal liability”

based on a single incident). And it’s the sort of thing that

our en banc court should announce with clarity—not the

sort of thing we should sort-of say in a four-way fractured

decision that has all the precision of a cubist painting.

B

The controlling Monell rule creates a host of anomalies.

Three bear emphasis.

First, Monell liability is generally derivative of an

underlying constitutional tort committed by an officer.

“As is well established, every Monell claim requires an

underlying constitutional violation.” Hicks-Fields v.

30a

Harris County, 860 F.3d 803, 808 (5th Cir. 2017)

(quotation omitted). Consequently, we routinely dismiss

Monell claims against political subdivisions where the

plaintiff fails to establish a § 1983 claim against an

individual officer. But one of the panel opinions does the

opposite: It says no individual officer ever can be held

liable—even for the most obvious First Amendment

violation—but every political subdivision can always be

held liable for any failure to train—even for potentialities

that could not reasonably be foreseen. See Hershey, 156

F.4th at 561 (HO, J., concurring).

Second, the panel’s Monell rule proves both too much

and too little. The rule provides that a political

subdivision is liable under Monell when it provides “no

training whatsoever” on the First Amendment. Hershey,

156 F.4th at 561 (HO, J., concurring); id. at 563–64

(DENNIS, J., concurring in relevant part). That proves far

too much because if Bossier City had provided training on

say, the intricacies of commercial speech, then

presumably this case would have come out differently? It

also proves far too little because Hershey provided no

evidence whatsoever of a failure to train. Nor did

Hershey do anything to show that officers ever faced

another vegetarian-ethicist pamphleteer (or any other

pamphleteer, or any other speech problem for that

matter). See ROA.85–86. So even if Bossier City did not

provide any training, that fact does not save Hershey’s

deficient pleadings.

Third, the Monell rule is equally applicable to failureto-train cases under the Fourth or Eighth Amendments.

Plaintiffs need only allege that officers were not trained

the specific situation at hand and, voila, the plaintiff has

a Monell claim. That is why every State in our circuit

urged us to rehear this case—and warned us that lawsuits

31a

will proliferate, discovery costs will soar, and

municipalities will be forced to re-allocate precious time

and resources.

Br. for the States of Louisiana,

Mississippi, and Texas as Amici Curiae, at 6–10. This

burden will weigh most heavily on prisons and jails, which

face constant failure-to-train allegations. See id. at 8.

And it will embolden judges to find Monell violations in

such contexts. See, e.g., Alvarez v. City of Brownsville,

904 F.3d 382, 402 (5th Cir. 2018) (en banc) (Dennis, J.,

dissenting) (dissenting from court’s rejection of Monell

claim that city failed to disclose exculpatory evidence); see

also Bond v. Nueces County, No. 20-40050, 2022 WL

4595000, at *9 (5th Cir. Sept. 30, 2022) (opinion of

DENNIS, J.) (vacating district court’s rejection of

plaintiff’s Monell claim based on alleged constitutional

violations by a prison).

The predictable consequences of the panel’s flawed

Monell holding further underscore why we should have

taken this case en banc.

II

Next, qualified immunity. According to Judge Ho, our

court’s approach to qualified immunity in First

Amendment cases is deeply flawed. So flawed that it has

garnered scathing criticism from the Alliance Defending

Freedom, the First Liberty Institute, and other religiousliberty organizations. If our precedent is that bad,

however, we should obviously go en banc to overturn it.

It’s surpassing strange to say, “our precedent requires

persecution of Christians,” and then say, “we should not

go en banc to fix it!” See ante, at 293 (Ho, J., concurring)

(saying that).

32a

I explain (A) Fifth Circuit precedent and (B) the

puzzling decision to recognize an error, refuse to overturn

it, and then complain about it anyway.

A

At the panel stage in this case, two judges would have

denied qualified immunity. See Hershey, 156 F.4th at

558–59 (HO, J., concurring); id. at 564 (DENNIS, J.,

dissenting in relevant part). But one of these panel

members opted to grant qualified immunity because,

apparently, our court has held that the obviousness

exception does not apply in First Amendment cases. See

id. at 560 (HO, J., concurring) (citing Villarreal v. City of

Laredo, 94 F.4th 374, 395 (5th Cir. 2024) (en banc)

(Villarreal II); see also ante, at 293 (same).

I do not read Villarreal II that way. In that case, the

panel itself held the state statute at issue was “not one of

those ‘obviously unconstitutional’ statutes” on its face.

Villarreal v. City of Laredo, 44 F.4th 363, 372 (5th Cir.

2022) (opinion of HO, J.) (Villarreal I). So the question

for the en banc court in Villarreal II was whether officers

unconstitutionally applied that valid statute to a “citizen

journalist”—even after an independent intermediary

found probable cause for the citizen’s arrest and issued a

valid warrant. 94 F.4th at 393– 94; see also id. at 394

(noting Villarreal alleged nothing to say the independent

intermediary was somehow tainted). “[I]n this context,”

the court held, cases discussing “obvious” constitutional

violations like Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 122 S.Ct. 2508,

153 L.Ed.2d 666 (2002), and Taylor v. Riojas, 592 U.S. 7,

141 S.Ct. 52, 208 L.Ed.2d 164 (2020), were “inappropriate

templates” for the qualified-immunity inquiry. Villarreal

II, 94 F.4th at 395. That does not forever and for all

reasons reject obviousness as a ground for denying

qualified immunity. It simply holds that, in the context of

33a

the particular circumstances of the concededly untainted

intermediary and the valid arrest warrant in Villarreal’s

case, the officers did not obviously violate the

Constitution by arresting her. See id. at 397 (holding

Villarreal failed to show an “obvious” constitutional

violation—not that “obviousness” is no longer a

cognizable claim in our circuit (quotation omitted)).

Judge Ho’s contrary reading of Villarreal II is the

opposite of “charitabl[e].” Ante, at 304. Both because it

requires reading lines in Villarreal II out of context, and

because it pits Villarreal II against binding Supreme

Court precedent. As the Supreme Court has said,

“[t]here can be no doubt that the First Amendment

protects the right to pray”—even in the absence of a case

so holding. Sause v. Bauer, 585 U.S. 957, 959, 138 S.Ct.

2561, 201 L.Ed.2d 982 (2018) (per curiam). Indeed, the

entire point of § 1983 liability in First Amendment cases

is that plaintiffs can prevail without pointing to earlier,

on-point cases. See, e.g., Gonzalez v. Trevino, 602 U.S.

653, 658, 144 S.Ct. 1663, 219 L.Ed.2d 332 (2024) (per

curiam). Our sister circuits agree. Some have denied

qualified immunity in the First Amendment context on

obviousness grounds. See MacIntosh v. Clous, 69 F.4th

309, 320 (6th Cir. 2023); Tobey v. Jones, 706 F.3d 379, 392

(4th Cir. 2013). Many have granted qualified immunity in

the First Amendment context while acknowledging that

alleged facts did not fall within the obviousness exception.

See Diaz-Bigio v. Santini, 652 F.3d 45, 50 (1st Cir. 2011);

Nagle v. Marron, 663 F.3d 100, 115–16 (2d. Cir. 2011);

Kristofek v. Vill. of Orland Hills, 832 F.3d 785, 798 (7th

Cir. 2016); Galvin v. Hay, 374 F.3d 739, 746–47 (9th Cir.

2004); Frasier v. Evans, 992 F.3d 1003, 1021–22 (10th Cir.

2021); Leslie v. Hancock Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 720 F.3d

1338, 1346 (11th Cir. 2013). We should not lightly

presume that Villarreal II meant to break with all these

34a

authorities—especially when a more plausible and

narrower reading of the precedent is readily available.

That is not a “surprise switcheroo.” Ante, at 298 (HO,

J., concurring). That is simply reading an opinion in the

context in which it was decided.

B

But insofar as Villarreal II held what Judge Ho says it

held, that is all the more reason to go en banc and to do

so immediately. “This is terrible, so please do not fix it”

is an incoherent basis for voting against rehearing. It is

even more incoherent to deny rehearing, end the case in

this court, and then invite the parties to continue

litigating. See ante, at 299 (HO, J., concurring). Why say

“We are bound by this terrible opinion,” oppose rehearing

to fix the purportedly terrible opinion, celebrate the order

preserving the purportedly terrible opinion, and then

invite additional litigation to, what, remain bound by the

purportedly terrible opinion? Wouldn’t it be easier to do

the right thing and vote for rehearing now? Unless the

point of all of this is to imagine a horrible rule for the

purpose of inveighing against it? Whatever the point, a

vote to deny en banc rehearing here protects a precedent

that Judge Ho reads to “treat[] claims from incarcerated

criminals more favorably than law-abiding citizens.”

Ante, at 295. An “oddity” for sure. Ibid.

III

Finally, a word about the religious-liberty implications

of this case. Judge Ho says the court was correct to deny

rehearing in this case because doing so protects “the right

to spread the gospel in public spaces.” Ante, at 303.

Again, this assertion is bizarre.

Perhaps it’s true that the rules announced in the panel’s

four-way, deeply fractured opinions implicate religious

35a

liberty. That is all the more reason to rehear this case en

banc rather than rely on future parties and panels to

decipher the relevant holding in the short per curiam

opinion—which is the only opinion that garnered a

majority vote. That is especially true if the premise of this

entire mess was a reading of Villarreal II that conflicts

with Supreme Court precedent, splits from every other

circuit to consider the question, and portends disastrous

consequences for people of faith. See Part II, supra.

But even if it’s true that this case has implications for

Christian evangelism, that does not mean that Richard

Hershey is himself a Christian evangelist. If Hershey

alleged something—anything—about his faith, we’d

obviously be bound to accept it. Courts have “no license

to declare . . . whether an adherent has ‘correctly

perceived’ the commands of his religion.” Masterpiece

Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. C.R. Comm’n, 584 U.S. 617, 651,

138 S.Ct. 1719, 201 L.Ed.2d 35 (2018) (Gorsuch, J.,

concurring). We take a plaintiff’s religious claims as they

come, since it is “not for us to say that [a plaintiff’s]

religious beliefs are mistaken or insubstantial.” Burwell

v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682, 725, 134 S.Ct.

2751, 189 L.Ed.2d 675 (2014). The problem is that

Hershey himself alleges nothing about Rome, persecuted

Christians, street preaching, the Great Commission,

religious liberty, or anything that implicates the First

Amendment’s Religion Clauses in any way. But see ante,

at 303-04 (Ho, J., concurring) (invoking 1 CORINTHIANS

9:3-14 for the proposition that Richard Hershey is a

Christian pastor?). Observing that fact says nothing

about the sincerity of Hershey’s belief. In fact, it does the

opposite: it recognizes and honors the belief that Hershey

chose to identify in his court filings—namely, the belief

that he has a free speech right to hand out vegetarianism

36a

pamphlets for money. In other circumstances, members

of our court care about party presentation:

In our adversarial system of adjudication, we

follow the principle of party presentation. We rely

on the parties to frame the issues for decision and

assign to courts the role of neutral arbiter of

matters the parties present. Our system is

designed around the premise that parties

represented by competent counsel know what is

best for them, and are responsible for advancing

the facts and argument entitling them to relief. In

short: Courts are essentially passive instruments

of government. They do not sally forth each day

looking for wrongs to right. They wait for cases to

come to them, and when cases arise, courts

normally decide only questions presented by the

parties.

Gonzalez v. CoreCivic, Inc., 986 F.3d 536, 540 (5th Cir.

2021) (Ho, J., concurring) (quotations omitted). But in

this case, the court apparently is an active instrument of

government that can sally forth and right wrongs that

Richard Hershey and his able counsel never imagined.

*

*

*

At the end of the day, my concurring colleague presents

an imaginary case that implicates persecuted Christians

in Rome, “religious liberty,” and the “ancient tradition” of

street preaching, ante, at 301, 393-94 (Ho, J.,

concurring)—rather than the facts of this case. He reads

our precedent to create catastrophic consequences for

religious liberty—and then says we should retain that

horrible precedent and embrace the horrible

consequences. And then he turns Monell upside down

and celebrates a new failure-to-train theory that will

benefit hardened criminals and saddle political

37a

subdivisions in every § 1983 case. You have to wonder

what’s driving all of these gymnastics. I would have

granted en banc rehearing to figure it out.

I respectfully dissent.

38a

APPENDIX B

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE

FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 21-30754

RICHARD HERSHEY,

Plaintiff — Appellant,

v.

CITY OF BOSSIER CITY; BOBBY GILBERT, Individually

and in his Capacity as Deputy Marshall; DANIEL

STOLL; DAVID SMITH; TYSHON HARVEY; EUGENE

TUCKER,

Defendants — Appellees.

Filed: October 7, 2025

Revised: October 8, 2025

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Louisiana

USDC No. 5:21-CV-460

Before DENNIS, RICHMAN, and HO, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

This is a splintered panel decision involving an

individual’s First Amendment right to distribute leaflets

on the sidewalk on the grounds of CenturyLink Center.

A majority of the panel (JUDGES DENNIS and HO) agrees

39a

to reverse the district court’s dismissal of the Monell1

claim against Bossier City for failure to train. A second

majority (JUDGES RICHMAN and HO) agrees to affirm the

grant of qualified immunity for the police officers and to

affirm the dismissal of the security guards.

We AFFIRM in part and REVERSE in part the

district court’s judgment.

JAMES C. HO, Circuit Judge, concurring:

The First Amendment protects not just the right to

pray, but to preach. To not only worship, but to witness.

The right to exercise your religion includes the right to

evangelize your faith.

And that’s what's at issue in this case. Richard Hershey

alleges that he wanted to distribute religious pamphlets

on a public sidewalk while a concert was being held

nearby—but that a group of police officers and security

guards threatened to arrest him if he did so.

So I agree that we should remand Hershey’s claim

against the City of Bossier for failing to train its officers

to respect the constitutional rights of its citizens.

Moreover, if it were up to me, his claims against the

individual police officers and security guards would

proceed to trial as well. Unfortunately, recent precedents

of our court force us to grant qualified immunity.

To be sure, I strongly disagree with our court’s

approach to qualified immunity as applied in the First

Monell v. New York City Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 98

S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978).

1

40a

Amendment and other contexts. See, e.g., Villarreal v.

City of Laredo, 94 F.4th 374, 409 (5th Cir. 2024) (Ho, J.,

dissenting); see also McMurry v. Weaver, 142 F.4th 292,

304–7 (5th Cir. 2025) (Ho, J., concurring) (discussing

Villarreal and Morgan v. Swanson, 659 F.3d 359 (5th Cir.

2011)). Likewise, I strongly disagree with our court’s

approach to the First Amendment as applied to acts of

evangelism on public sidewalks outside a public

amphitheater. See, e.g., Siders v. City of Brandon, 130

F.4th 188, 191 (5th Cir. 2025) (Ho, J., dissenting from

denial of rehearing en banc).

Our court’s record of protecting First Amendment

rights leaves much to be desired, to say the least. But as

a member of this panel, I’m bound to faithfully follow our

precedents, whether I agree with them or not. So I

reluctantly concur in affirming the grant of qualified

immunity, as compelled by our (mistaken) circuit

precedent.

I.

The First Amendment protects the “free exercise” of

religion, not just the right to “worship.” Horvath v. City

of Leander, 946 F.3d 787, 795–96 (5th Cir. 2020) (Ho, J.,

concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in

part). And “the right to the free exercise of religion

unquestionably encompasses the right to preach,

proselyte, and perform other similar religious functions.”

McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618, 626, 98 S.Ct. 1322, 55

L.Ed.2d 593 (1978). “The dissemination of . . . religious

views and doctrines is protected by the First

Amendment.”

Heffron v. Int’l Soc. for Krishna

Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640, 647, 101 S.Ct. 2559, 69

L.Ed.2d 298 (1981).

41a

This right plainly encompasses the distribution of

religious pamphlets—the activity at issue in this case. As

the Supreme Court observed nearly a century ago, “[t]he

hand distribution of religious tracts is an age-old form of

missionary evangelism—as old as the history of printing

presses.” Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 108,

63 S.Ct. 870, 87 L.Ed. 1292 (1943). “It has been a potent

force in various religious movements down through the

years,” as people of faith “carry the Gospel to thousands

upon thousands of homes and seek through personal

visitations to win adherents.” Id. at 108–9, 63 S.Ct. 870.

“This form of religious activity occupies the same high

estate under the First Amendment as do worship in the

churches and preaching from the pulpits.” Id. at 109, 63

S.Ct. 870.

So anyone who is “rightfully on a street which the state

has left open to the public carries with him there as

elsewhere the constitutional right to express his views in

an orderly fashion.” Jamison v. Texas, 318 U.S. 413, 416,

63 S.Ct. 669, 87 L.Ed. 869 (1943). “This right extends to

the communication of ideas by handbills and literature as

well as by the spoken word.” Id.

II.

Hershey’s right to evangelize on a public sidewalk is not

undermined by the fact that the city-owned facility

abutting the sidewalk happens to be managed by a private

corporation. Nor should it matter that his rights were

violated by private security guards working alongside

police officers. Municipalities cannot abrogate the

constitutional rights of their citizens simply by delegating

their coercive governmental powers to private agents.

The Supreme Court addressed this very contention in

Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 66 S.Ct. 276, 90 L.Ed.

42a

265 (1946). In Marsh, the Court was asked to answer the

following question: “Can th[e] people who live in or come

to Chickasaw be denied freedom of press and religion

simply because a single company has legal title to all the

town?” Id. at 505, 66 S.Ct. 276. “For it is the State’s

contention that the mere fact that all the property

interests in the town are held by a single company is

enough to give that company power, enforceable by a

state statute, to abridge these freedoms.” Id.

The Court made clear that it “cannot accept that

contention.” Id. at 506, 66 S.Ct. 276. “Whether a

corporation or a municipality owns or possesses the town

the public in either case has an identical interest in the

functioning of the community in such manner that the

channels of communication remain free.” Id. at 507, 66

S.Ct. 276. “The managers appointed by the corporation

cannot curtail the liberty of press and religion of these

people consistently with the purposes of the

Constitutional guarantees.” Id. at 508, 66 S.Ct. 276.

“Many people in the United States live in company-owned

towns. These people, just as residents of municipalities,

are free citizens of their State and country.” Id. “There

is no more reason for depriving these people of the

liberties guaranteed by the First and Fourteenth

Amendments than there is for curtailing these freedoms

with respect to any other citizen.” Id. at 508–09, 66 S.Ct.

276.

Accordingly, the Court vacated the conviction of a

member of Jehovah’s Witnesses, for her only crime was

leafletting on the sidewalks of the company town. See id.

at 509, 66 S.Ct. 276 (“Insofar as the State has attempted

to impose criminal punishment on appellant for

undertaking to distribute religious literature in a

company town, its action cannot stand.”). See also Lee v.

43a

Katz, 276 F.3d 550, 557 (9th Cir. 2002) (private lessee of

public plaza cannot violate the First Amendment rights of

street preachers).

Like Grace Marsh, Richard Hershey’s First

Amendment rights should not depend on whether he was

ejected by a cop or a contractor. He alleges that private

security guards assisted the police in ejecting him from

the area. So he has stated a cognizable claim against

“[p]rivate persons” who “jointly engaged with state

officials in the prohibited action.” United States v. Price,

383 U.S. 787, 794, 86 S.Ct. 1152, 16 L.Ed.2d 267 (1966).

III.

All of this should have been amply sufficient to defeat

qualified immunity at this preliminary stage of the

proceedings—and to allow Hershey to proceed to trial.

After all, the Supreme Court has repeatedly denied

qualified immunity where it found the constitutional

violation so “obvious” that it didn’t require the plaintiff to

identify factually indistinguishable case law. See, e.g.,

Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 741, 122 S.Ct. 2508, 153

L.Ed.2d 666 (2002) (“general statements of the law . . .

may apply with obvious clarity to the specific conduct in

question, even though the very action in question has not

previously been held unlawful”) (cleaned up) (quoting

United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 270–71, 117 S.Ct.

1219, 137 L.Ed.2d 432 (1997), and Anderson v. Creighton,

483 U.S. 635, 640, 107 S.Ct. 3034, 97 L.Ed.2d 523 (1987));

see also Taylor v. Riojas, 592 U.S. 7, 8–9 & n.2, 141 S.Ct.

52, 208 L.Ed.2d 164 (2020) (citing Hope and Lanier)

(summarily reversing our court’s grant of qualified

immunity due to the “obviousness” of the constitutional

violation).

44a

Under Hope and Taylor, it should be enough to defeat

qualified immunity that the alleged constitutional

violation is obvious. And this “obviousness” principle

should be intuitive to all who treasure our constitutional

rights. As then-Judge Gorsuch put it, “some things are

so obviously unlawful that they don’t require detailed

explanation.” Browder v. City of Albuquerque, 787 F.3d

1076, 1082 (10th Cir. 2015). “[S]ometimes the most

obviously unlawful things happen so rarely that a case on

point is itself an unusual thing.” Id. “[I]t would be

remarkable if the most obviously unconstitutional

conduct should be the most immune from liability only

because it is so flagrantly unlawful that few dare its

attempt.” Id. at 1082–83.

I most certainly agree. To my mind, “[i]t seems absurd

to suggest that the most egregious constitutional

violations imaginable are somehow immune from liability

precisely because they're so egregious. It would make a

mockery of our rights to grant qualified immunity just

because no one in government has yet to be abusive

enough to commit that particular violation—and then

stubborn enough to litigate it, not only before a district

court, but also in the court of appeals (or the Supreme

Court).” McMurry, 142 F.4th at 304 (Ho, J., concurring).

A.

But here’s the problem: In our circuit, Hope and

Taylor apply only to the Eighth Amendment claims of

incarcerated criminals. They do not apply to the First

Amendment claims of law-abiding citizens. That's

because of our decision in Villarreal.

In Villarreal, the majority acknowledged that Hope

and Taylor denied qualified immunity based on “obvious”

and “particularly egregious” constitutional violations—

45a

and did so without requiring a “fact-specific[]”

presentation of case law. 94 F.4th at 395. But the

majority distinguished those decisions on the ground that

they're “Eighth Amendment cases” that establish only a

“narrow[] obviousness exception” that should not apply to

obvious violations of the First Amendment. Id. It

claimed support in our earlier en banc decision in

Morgan, 659 F.3d 359. Contra id. at 412, 414 n.30 (Elrod,

J., dissenting in part) (concluding that Hope applies to

obvious First Amendment violations).

Villarreal has been widely criticized. See McMurry,

142 F.4th at 305–06 (Ho, J., concurring) (surveying

criticism). And the Supreme Court has vacated it. See

Villarreal v. Alaniz, — U.S. —, 145 S. Ct. 368, 220

L.Ed.2d 137 (2024). But our court has now reinstated it.

See Villarreal v. City of Laredo, 134 F.4th 273, 276 (5th

Cir. 2025) (“[o]ur previous en banc majority opinion is

superseded only to th[e] extent” necessary to respond to

the Supreme Court’s vacatur regarding the substantive

requirements of a First Amendment retaliation claim).

So it doesn't matter how obvious a First Amendment

violation might be demonstrated at trial. To overcome

qualified immunity under Villarreal, the plaintiff must

satisfy “the requirement that ‘clearly established law’ be

founded on materially identical facts.” 94 F.4th at 395.

B.

Hershey has been unable to identify favorable

precedent with the “materially identical facts” required

by Villarreal. Id.

So I’m forced to conclude that qualified immunity must

be granted—to both cops and contractors alike. See, e.g.,

Filarsky v. Delia, 566 U.S. 377, 393–94, 132 S.Ct. 1657,

46a

182 L.Ed.2d 662 (2012) (holding that private individuals

temporarily retained by the government may invoke

qualified immunity); Meadows v. Rockford Hous. Auth.,

861 F.3d 672, 678 (7th Cir. 2017) (extending qualified

immunity to private security guards performing

governmental functions).

In fact, the closest case in recent years is profoundly

unfavorable to people of faith. In Siders, we rejected a

First Amendment challenge to a local ordinance that

prevented citizens from distributing religious materials

on a sidewalk outside a public amphitheater. See Siders

v. City of Brandon, 123 F.4th 293 (5th Cir. 2024).

I strongly disagree with that ruling. See Siders, 130

F.4th at 191 (Ho, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing

en banc). But our court denied rehearing en banc in that

matter by a lopsided vote.2

So I’m bound by Siders. To be sure, Siders was decided

at the preliminary injunction stage. So in theory, I

Several members of the court tried to defend the panel ruling in

Siders by recharacterizing it. That is, they theorized that the

challenged ordinance did not actually prevent any citizen from

evangelizing on public grounds. See, e.g., id. at 189 (Oldham, J.,

concurring in the denial of rehearing en banc) (“the ordinance does

not purport to regulate prayer, conversation, t-shirts, evangelism, or

tracts”).

2

But this rationalization effort is hard to reconcile with what several

members of the court said in the companion case of Olivier v. City of

Brandon, 121 F.4th 511 (5th Cir. 2024). See, e.g., id. at 512 (Ho, J.,

dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc, joined by six members

of the court) (condemning same local ordinance at same public

amphitheater because it prevents “an evangelical Christian who feels

called to share the good news with his fellow citizens . . . from doing

so outside the city’s public amphitheater”).

47a

suppose that Siders could still prevail on the merits. But

regardless of how Siders is ultimately decided on the

merits, it seems difficult to see how Hershey has stated a

“clearly established” violation in our circuit, when

another panel of our court (wrongly) found a similar claim

unlikely to succeed on the merits in Siders. See, e.g.,

Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 741, 131 S.Ct. 2074, 179

L.Ed.2d 1149 (2011) (to find a “clearly established”

violation, “existing precedent must have placed the

statutory or constitutional question beyond debate”); see

also Nat’l Institutes of Health v. Am. Pub. Health Ass’n,

606 U.S. –––, 145 S. Ct. 2658, 2663, 222 L.Ed.2d 1191

(2025) (Gorsuch, J., concurring) (“Of course, decisions

regarding interim relief are not necessarily conclusive as

to the merits because further litigation may follow. But

regardless of a decision’s procedural posture, its

reasoning—its ratio decidendi—carries precedential

weight in future cases.”) (cleaned up).

C.

Qualified immunity, of course, only applies to the

damages claim against the individual Defendants.

Qualified immunity does not bar claims for injunctive

relief. But Hershey’s appeal appears to be focused only

on damages, and not injunctive relief.

IV.

I turn now to Hershey’s claim that the City of Bossier

failed to train its officers to respect the constitutional

rights of its citizens.

Under Monell v. New York City Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436

U.S. 658, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978),

municipalities may be held liable for constitutional

violations.

A failure to train officers to respect

48a

constitutional rights, including those protected by the

First Amendment, “can without question give rise” to this

liability. World Wide Street Preachers Fellowship v.

Town of Columbia, 591 F.3d 747, 756 (5th Cir. 2009).

To establish Monell liability on a failure to train theory,

a plaintiff must allege that the municipality had

inadequate training procedures and was deliberately

indifferent in adopting them, and that the failure to train

caused the violation in question. See id.

Although deliberate indifference is usually inferred

“from a pattern of constitutional violations,” we will also

infer it where “the policymaker provides no training

whatsoever with respect to the relevant constitutional

duty.” Garza v. City of Donna, 922 F.3d 626, 637–38 (5th

Cir. 2019) (internal quotation marks omitted).

That’s exactly what Hershey alleges here.

His

complaint contends that Bossier City did not train its

police officers and private security personnel that the

park surrounding the Bossier City Arena is public

property, or that citizens are entitled to exercise their

First Amendment rights there. Moreover, at oral

argument, counsel for Hershey agreed that the officers

“received literally zero training” on First Amendment

issues. Oral Arg. at 13:20–13:26. If these facts are true,

they show that the City provided “no training

whatsoever” regarding the application of the First

Amendment to the park. Garza, 922 F.3d at 638. They

are “facts sufficient to show” that the city acted with

deliberate indifference. Johnson v. City of Shelby, 574

U.S. 10, 12, 135 S.Ct. 346, 190 L.Ed.2d 309 (2014).

Hershey also alleges that the City’s failure caused the

violations of his rights. He contends that the City’s failure

to inform officers that the park was public property led

49a

officers to believe that the park was private property, and

that citizens could therefore be ejected without regard to

the First Amendment. He alleges that the officers who

removed him from the park held this belief, and told him

he had to leave the park because it was private property.

In sum, he pled facts sufficient to show that the City’s

complete lack of training was the cause of his injury.

*

*

*

I agree that Hershey’s Monell claim against the City of

Bossier may proceed. I reluctantly concur that, under our

court’s current precedent, qualified immunity disposes of

his claims against the individual Defendants.

JAMES L. DENNIS, Circuit Judge, concurring in part

and dissenting in part:

Richard Hershey peacefully distributed free pamphlets

about Christian vegetarianism on the public sidewalks

outside the city-owned CenturyLink Center in Bossier

City, Louisiana. The surrounding streets and sidewalks

are part of a public park, open and unrestricted to the

public. At the same time, another person handed out

commercial advertisement cards for an internet radio

station. Two City police officers—Deputy City Marshal

Bobby Gilbert and Officer Daniel Stoll—and three Center

security guards—David Smith, Tyshon Harvey, and

Eugene Tucker—approached only Hershey and told him

to stop leafletting. They waved handcuffs at Hershey and

warned that if he continued, they would arrest him.

Hershey attempted to explain that he had a legal right to

hand out his literature, but Deputy Marshal Gilbert cut

him off and told him that he was on private property, he

had to leave or face arrest, and he could not return.

50a

As Hershey was leaving, he inquired about the

commercial literature being distributed by the person

working for the internet radio station. Security guard

Harvey responded that Hershey’s literature had not been

“approved” by the Center, and that Hershey had to

submit his literature in advance. When Hershey repeated

his question, Harvey said he did not know whether the

radio station’s commercial literature had been approved,

but because Hershey’s had not, he needed to leave. The

officers and security guards then “used their command

presence to assist in the removal of Hershey from the

park.” Hershey left without handing out more literature

and has not returned because he fears arrest and jail. The

officers did not remove the other leafleteer.

Hershey sued the City, the officers, and security

guards, alleging that they violated his First Amendment

rights by evicting him. The district court dismissed his

claims at the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)

stage, ruling that (1) the officers were entitled to qualified

immunity because Hershey failed to show that the law

clearly established his right to distribute literature free

from viewpoint discrimination in a traditional public

forum; (2) the security guards did not qualify as state

actors under 42 U.S.C. § 1983; and (3) Hershey did not

allege a municipal policy or custom that could make the

City liable under Monell.3

In my view, the district court erred in dismissing

Hershey’s Monell failure to train claim. Hershey

sufficiently pleaded facts to show the City was

deliberately indifferent to the violation of his First

Monell v. New York City Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 98

S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978).

3

51a

Amendment rights when it provided no training

whatsoever as to an officer's duties under the First

Amendment. We reverse on this claim, described more

fully in Part A below.

For the officers and security guards, JUDGE RICHMAN

and JUDGE HO affirm across the board. Judge Richman’s

opinion (the PR OPINION) reasons that Hershey failed to

meet the clearly established prong of the qualified

immunity analysis against the police officers and failed to

demonstrate the security guards were acting under the

color of state law for purposes of § 1983. I respectfully

dissent. Because the law clearly established Hershey’s

right to leaflet in a traditional public forum without

viewpoint discrimination, qualified immunity is

inappropriate. See Part B. And Hershey plausibly

alleged that the security guards acted under color of state

law when they exercised the public function of policing.

See Part C.

A

The district court erred by dismissing Hershey’s

Monell failure to train claim against the City. “A

municipality's failure to train its police officers can

without question give rise to § 1983 liability.” World Wide

Street Preachers Fellowship v. Town of Columbia, 591

F.3d 747, 756 (5th Cir. 2009) (citations omitted). To

prevail on a “failure to train theory,” a plaintiff must

demonstrate that (1) the municipality’s training

procedures were inadequate; (2) the municipality was

deliberately indifferent in adopting its training policy;

and (3) the inadequate training policy directly, caused the

violations in question. Id.

Hershey has sufficiently alleged the first element—

that the City’s training procedures were inadequate. The

52a

City failed to train its officers that the Center and its

surrounding area were public property, that the adjacent

streets and sidewalks were a traditional public forum,

and, therefore, that citizens were entitled to exercise their

free speech rights there. Because of this failure to train,

the officers mistakenly believed that the Center was

private property. The first element is satisfied.

Under the second element, “[d]eliberate indifference

may be inferred either from a pattern of constitutional

violations or, absent proof of a pattern, from ‘showing a

single incident with proof of the possibility of recurring

situations that present an obvious potential for violation

of constitutional rights.’” Garza v. City of Donna, 922

F.3d 626, 637–38 (5th Cir. 2019) (emphasis added)

(citation modified). “The latter inference ‘is possible only

in very narrow circumstances’ because we have ‘generally

reserved the single-incident method . . . for cases in

which the policymaker provides no training whatsoever

with respect to the relevant constitutional duty, as

opposed to training that is inadequate only as to the

particular conduct that gave rise to the plaintiff’s injury.’”

Id. at 638 (emphasis added) (citation modified).

Hershey’s allegations fall within the latter “narrow

circumstances” because he alleged the City completely

failed to train officers on their First Amendment duties.

The PR OPINION characterizes the failure to train claim

here as a failure to train “in one limited area”—the

particular conduct giving rise to the plaintiff’s injury—

rather than a complete failure to train officers on the

First Amendment. But this misconstrues the allegations

in Hershey’s complaint. Hershey alleged the City “did

not have any policy . . . regulating speech activities

protected by the First Amendment.” Hershey alleged the

City failed to train its police officers and private security

53a

personnel of citizens’ First Amendment rights on public

property, including the area surrounding the Center. At

oral argument, counsel for Hershey confirmed that the

officers “received literally zero training” on First

Amendment issues. The complaint backs this up. Taking

these facts as true, the City provided “no training

whatsoever” regarding the First Amendment’s

application to speech in traditional public forums. See

Garza, 922 F.3d at 638. These are “facts sufficient to

show” that the City was deliberately indifferent to the

deprivation of Hershey’s First Amendment rights.

Johnson v. City of Shelby, 574 U.S. 10, 12, 135 S.Ct. 346,

190 L.Ed.2d 309 (2014).

The PR OPINION, relying on Garza, argues that the

need for training was not “obvious” because “this is a case

in which only a few individuals violated” First

Amendment rights “on one occasion,” and there is “no

evidence” to infer any subsequent incidents relevant to

the City’s failure to train. But Garza was decided on

summary judgment with the benefit of a developed

record. And the failure to train claim in Garza was based

on a theory of inadequate training in a jail, rather than a

theory of no officer training whatsoever on the First

Amendment. At the motion-to-dismiss stage, Hershey

has alleged that the City’s complete lack of training

directly caused the First Amendment violation in

question. At this stage, entirely failing to train officers

about their duties under the First Amendment will

predictably and obviously result in recurring violations of

citizens’ First Amendment rights. This is sufficient to

allege deliberate indifference.

Finally, Hershey plausibly alleged that the City’s

failure to train caused the violation at issue. The City’s

failure to train officers that the park was a public forum

54a

led officers to believe that the park was private property

and that citizens could be ejected without violating their

First Amendment rights. Hershey also alleged that the

officers who removed him from the park held this belief

and told him he had to leave the park because it was

private property.

Hershey has pleaded facts sufficient to show that the

City’s complete lack of training was the cause of his

injury. Hershey has stated a plausible failure to train

claim against the City, and the district court erred in

dismissing his Monell claim.

B

I depart from the majority on all remaining issues,

beginning with the grant of qualified immunity to the

police officers at the Rule 12(b)(6) stage. Qualified

immunity requires two inquiries: first, whether the

officer violated a constitutional right; and second,

whether that right was clearly established at the time of

the misconduct. Morrow v. Meachum, 917 F.3d 870, 874

(5th Cir. 2019). The PR OPINION collapses the inquiries

to ultimately conclude Hershey cannot meet the clearly

established prong. But taking the allegations in the

complaint as true, as we must, Hershey satisfies both

prongs: viewpoint discrimination, regardless of forum,

violates the First Amendment, and the right to be free

from viewpoint discrimination is clearly established.

Because the law governing speech depends on the

forum, the threshold question is whether Hershey

leafletted in a traditional public forum. Public sidewalks

and parks fall squarely into that category. Minn. Voters

Alliance v. Mansky, 585 U.S. 1, 11, 138 S.Ct. 1876, 201

L.Ed.2d 201 (2018). Courts must assess the property at

issue based on its particular facts. Brister v. Faulkner,

55a

214 F.3d 675, 681–83 (5th Cir. 2000). “The location and

purpose of a publicly owned sidewalk is critical” to forum

analysis. United States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720, 729–30,

110 S.Ct. 3115, 111 L.Ed.2d 571 (1990). We also consider

whether the property is “indistinguishable from . . . [a]

city sidewalk.” Brister, 214 F.3d at 683. Because forum

status turns on factual circumstances, it rarely lends itself

to resolution on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion. See Stewart v.

D.C. Armory Bd., 863 F.2d 1013, 1018 (D.C. Cir. 1988).

The PR OPINION reasons that sidewalk status was not

clearly established, relying on Powell v. Noble, 798 F.3d

690, 700 (8th Cir. 2015), which treated fairground

sidewalks as a limited public forum. But Powell arose on

appeal from a preliminary injunction, where the court

conducted a fact intensive review of congestion, signage,

police presence, and fencing at the fair. Id. That context

does not exist here. The PR OPINION nonetheless

imports Powell’s fact-finding into this Rule 12(b)(6)

posture, citing contractual arrangements and event

management at the Center.

Hershey, however, distributed literature on a public

sidewalk within a public park, where public streets and

sidewalks led directly to the Center, and no gates or

restrictions blocked access. The district court agreed

those allegations sufficed to plead that the sidewalk

qualifies as a traditional public forum, and neither party

disputes that point. At this stage, we must take

Hershey’s allegations as true. Brister, 214 F.3d at 683.

By discounting them, the PR OPINION departs from our

Rule 12(b)(6) standard.

The second step asks what kind of restriction Hershey

faced. The officers stopped him from distributing

religious literature while allowing another individual to

56a

distribute commercial handbills. Harvey, the security

guard, told Hershey that leaflets required advance

approval, but admitted he did not know whether the other

leafleteer had approval. The district court correctly

recognized that Hershey’s allegations raised a plausible

inference of viewpoint discrimination. Neither party

disputes that characterization.

The PR OPINION instead faults Hershey for not

alleging what happened after he left—for example,

whether the other leafleteer stayed for a “substantial

period of time.” But Rule 12(b)(6) requires only wellpleaded allegations of unequal treatment, which Hershey

provided. His complaint plausibly alleged that the

officers engaged in viewpoint discrimination in violation

of the First Amendment.

The district court nevertheless held that the right was

not clearly established. That conclusion was error. The

Supreme Court and this court have long recognized that

viewpoint-based

restrictions

violate

the

First

Amendment in any forum. See, e.g., Chiu v. Plano I.S.D.,

260 F.3d 330, 350 (5th Cir. 2001); Hobbs v. Hawkins, 968

F.2d 471, 481 (5th Cir. 1992); Pleasant Grove City v.

Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 469, 129 S.Ct. 1125, 172 L.Ed.2d

853 (2009). We have also refused to grant qualified

immunity at the motion-to-dismiss stage when plaintiffs

plausibly alleged viewpoint discrimination. See Biggers v.

Massingill, No. 23-11023, 2025 WL 429974, at *2–3 (5th

Cir. Feb. 7, 2025).

The PR OPINION leans on Morgan v. Swanson, 755

F.3d 757 (5th Cir. 2014), which warned that the general

prohibition against viewpoint discrimination does not

always give officials sufficient notice. But Morgan

involved the interplay of the Establishment Clause, the

57a

Free Speech Clause, and school speech—a uniquely

complex setting. Id.; see also Morgan v. Swanson, 659

F.3d 359, 364 (5th Cir. 2011) (en banc). This case is

simpler: Hershey peacefully distributed free Christian

literature on a public sidewalk while another individual

handed out commercial flyers. The officers forced

Hershey to leave but allowed the other to continue.

Construing his allegations in his favor, Hershey pleaded

a straightforward claim of viewpoint discrimination in a

traditional public forum.

Qualified immunity does not protect blatant viewpoint

discrimination. Any reasonable officer would have

understood that ejecting Hershey while permitting

another leafleteer to remain violated the First

Amendment. Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640,

107 S.Ct. 3034, 97 L.Ed.2d 523 (1987). Because Hershey

has alleged both a constitutional violation and the

violation of a clearly established right, reversal of the

district court's grant of qualified immunity is warranted.

C

I also disagree that security guards Smith, Harvey, and

Tucker were not acting under the color of state law when

they removed Hershey from the public sidewalks outside

the Center. Policing free speech in a traditional public

forum is a traditional and exclusive function of the state

or municipal government—such that it constitutes state

action.

Smith, Harvey, and Tucker were employees of ASM

Global, a private company, not the state. “[M]ere[]

private conduct, no matter how discriminatory or

wrongful,” is generally excluded from § 1983’s reach,

unless the private conduct is fairly attributable to the

state. Richard v. Hoechst Celanese Chem. Grp., 355 F.3d

58a

345, 352 (5th Cir. 2003). There are three tests that

provide exceptions to the general rule: the public function

test, the nexus test, and the joint action test. Cornish v.

Corr. Servs. Corp., 402 F.3d 545, 549–50 (5th Cir. 2005).

Relevantly here, “[u]nder the public function test, a

‘private entity may be deemed a state actor when that

entity performs a function which is traditionally the

exclusive province of the state.’” Bass v. Parkwood

Hosp., 180 F.3d 234, 241–42 (5th Cir. 1999) (quoting Wong

v. Stripling, 881 F.2d 200, 202 (5th Cir. 1989));

Manhattan Cmty. Access Corp. v. Halleck, 587 U.S. 802,

809, 139 S.Ct. 1921, 204 L.Ed.2d 405 (2019) (“[T]o qualify

as a traditional, exclusive public function within the

meaning of our state action precedents, the government

must have traditionally and exclusively performed the

function.”).

This case involves officers regulating free speech in a

traditional public forum through policing, which is an

exclusive function of the state or municipal government.

If, as in this case, that responsibility is delegated to a

private entity, the private actors’ conduct remains state

action. Foley v. Connelie, 435 U.S. 291, 297, 98 S.Ct. 1067,

55 L.Ed.2d 287 (1978) (describing the “police function” as

“a description of one of the basic functions of

government”); Brown v. Maryland, 25 U.S. 419, 443, 12

Wheat. 419, 6 L.Ed. 678 (1827) (“[P]olice power, which

unquestionably remains, and ought to remain, with the

States.”). Several circuits have determined private

security guards were state actors when delegated

exclusive police powers. Romanski v. Detroit Ent., LLC,

428 F.3d 629, 637 (6th Cir. 2005); see also Payton v. Rush–

Presbyterian, 184 F.3d 623, 630 (7th Cir. 1999).

The security guards, in overseeing City property, were

for all purposes acting as de facto police officers. Harvey,

59a

Smith, and Tucker surrounded Hershey during the initial

encounter alongside the police officers, and they used

their command presence to remove Hershey from the

scene. Harvey was the one explaining the allegedly

unconstitutional speech regulations to Hershey as he was

ejected, not a police officer. The actions taken by the

police officers and the security guards were one and the

same.

Further, Hershey alleged that the City employs a

policy of allowing their officers and security guards to

“use their unfettered discretion to arbitrarily and

capriciously remove individuals who are peacefully

exercising their First Amendment rights,” because the

Center “does not have any written or official policy

prohibiting, regulating or licensing the distribution of

leaflets on its grounds.” In allowing the security guards

to use their discretion to decide which types of speech are

permissible, the City has empowered private security

guards who patrol its property to regulate speech with no

oversight.

Taking all well-pleaded facts as true and in the light

most favorable to him, Hershey has sufficiently alleged

that the individual security guards were state actors

under the public function test.4 The district court erred

in dismissing Hershey’s § 1983 claims against Smith,

Harvey, and Tucker.

A wholly different version of the facts may be presented as the

case progresses to trial. But taking all well-pleaded facts as true and

in the light most favorable to him, Hershey has sufficiently alleged

that the individual security guards were state actors at this juncture.

4

60a

*

*

*

In sum, the panel affirms the district court’s judgment

in part and reverses it in part. As to Hershey’s Monell

claim, JUDGE HO and I hold that the district court

reversibly erred. JUDGE RICHMAN dissents. As to the

district court’s dismissal of Hershey’s claims against the

City officers and Center security guards, JUDGES

RICHMAN and HO affirm. I respectfully dissent as to

those issues.

PRISCILLA RICHMAN, Circuit Judge, concurring in part

and dissenting in part:

With great respect, the panel majority radically

expands Monell1 municipal liability in at least two

unprecedented and unwarranted respects:

(1) by

sanctioning a “gotcha” claim based on “failure to train at

all”; and (2) by holding that a municipality is liable for

failure to train security guards hired by a private entity

that leases and operates property owned by the

municipality.

First: This is a single-incident case. It involves

nuanced First Amendment law. Instead of adhering to

the boundaries that limit the “very narrow

circumstances” in which courts will permit an inference of

deliberate indifference to be drawn from “an obvious

potential for violation of constitutional rights,”2 the

separate opinions of JUDGE DENNIS and JUDGE HO open

Monell v. New York City Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 98

S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978).

1

2

Garza v. City of Donna, 922 F.3d 626, 637-38 (5th Cir. 2019).

61a

the door to permit a broad swath of failure-to-train claims

to defeat a municipality's qualified immunity.

The Supreme Court has made clear that municipal

liability based on Monell requires deliberate

indifference.3 Deliberate indifference may be inferred in

failure-to-train-at-all cases “in a narrow range of

circumstances” if the violation of federal rights is “a

highly predictable consequence of a failure to equip law

enforcement officers with specific tools to handle

recurring situations.”4 The Supreme Court emphasized

that whether such a consequence is “obvious” depends on

“[t]he likelihood that the situation will recur and the

predictability that an officer lacking specific tools to

handle that situation will violate citizens’ rights.”5

There is no allegation in this case that viewpoint

discrimination by a Bossier City law enforcement officer

against someone engaging in free exercise of religion or

free speech has ever previously occurred. It is not highly

predictable that law enforcement officers would have

recurring encounters with individuals paid to distribute

literature outside a large, ticketed event and that, absent

training about what is “public” versus “private” property

and viewpoint discrimination, those officers would

discriminate based on the content of the literature being

distributed. JUDGE DENNIS’s and JUDGE HO’s opinions

say that if a city fails to train “at all” regarding the First

City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 389, 109 S.Ct. 1197, 103

L.Ed.2d 412 (1989).

3

4

Bd. of Cnty. Commissioners of Bryan Cnty. v. Brown, 520 U.S.

397, 409-410, 117 S.Ct. 1382, 137 L.Ed.2d 626 (1997).

5

Id.

62a

Amendment, then it is “obvious” that a constitutional

violation will occur. This not only permits liability for

what may be, at most, mere negligence, it essentially

imposes strict liability for a failure to train.

Second: Perhaps even more remarkably, JUDGE

DENNIS’s and JUDGE HO’s opinions say a municipality can

be liable for failure to train private security guards who

are hired by a private entity for an event at an arena it

has leased from the municipality and operates. Hershey

has alleged that Bossier City should have trained private

security personnel who were engaged for a large concert

event and that Bossier City is liable for that failure to

train. The panel’s majority opinions allow this claim to

proceed on the basis that it was obvious Bossier City

needed to train security guards hired by a third party,

even though the law is far from clear that a city has a duty

to train security guards.

As to the liability of the individual defendants in this

case (Bossier City law enforcement officers and private

security guards), JUDGE HO and I agree that the district

court did not err in dismissing the claims against them,

though our views as to why are not congruent.

I would affirm the district court’s judgment in all

respects. I therefore concur in part and dissent in part.

I

The City of Bossier City, Louisiana owns a multipurpose arena (which I will call the Center), formerly

known as CenturyLink Center, and also Bossier City

Arena. It is currently known as Brookshire Grocery

Arena. The Center has been the site of sporting events,

such as NBA and NCAA basketball games, and an NHL

63a

hockey game.6 The forum has hosted well-known

entertainers including, but not limited to, Paul

McCartney, Elton John, Taylor Swift, Cher, Carrie

Underwood, Justin Timberlake and Miranda Lambert, to

name a few.7

The Center is located in a public park. At the time

relevant to this litigation, the Center was managed by

ASM Global, a private entity. ASM Global leased both the

interior space and outdoor areas of the Center for events.

On February 28, 2020, the Center hosted a Christian rock

concert known as Winter Jam. Guests paid to attend.

Hershey’s Amended Complaint alleges that he is a

vegetarian and that on the day of the Winter Jam concert,

he was distributing “free, educational, noncommercial,

religious booklets on behalf of a nonprofit organization

named the Christian Vegetarian Association.” He is paid

“by various nonprofit organizations for his advocacy and

distribution of literature.” He further alleges that he was

peacefully engaging in leafleting activity when he was

approached by Bossier City Deputy Marshal Bobby

Gilbert, Bossier City police officer Daniel Stoll, and three

private security agents (David Smith, Tyshon Harvey,

and Eugene Tucker) employed by ASM Global.

Hershey’s Amended Complaint asserts he was told by

Deputy Marshal Gilbert that he was on private property

and that “he had to leave, that he would be arrested if he

did not leave.” Hershey alleges that another person was

See

Brookshire

Grocery

Arena,

Wikipedia,

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Brookshire_Grocery_Arena

(last

visited October 6, 2025).

6

7

Id.

64a

handing out cards for a radio station, for a commercial

purpose, but that person had not been asked to leave

when Hershey was approached by the Bossier City

officers and ASM Global security guards. Hershey says

he was told he had to leave the area because he had not

obtained authorization to distribute booklets ahead of

time. Hershey alleges he inquired about the person

distributing cards for a radio station and was told

essentially, “We don’t know whether he [that other

person] has permission.” Hershey left the premises and

was not arrested.

He brought this suit, alleging § 1983 claims against the

City law enforcement officers, the private security

guards, and Bossier City. Hershey asserts in his briefing

that he was subjected to viewpoint discrimination. He

also alleges that each of the ASM Global security guards

was “a willing participant in joint action with state

actors.”

In framing his claims, Hershey repeatedly alleges that

the Center and the areas surrounding it are public

property, or in the alternative, that the disputed area is a

designated public forum. Hershey asserts in his briefing

that he was asked to leave based on his or the leaflets’

viewpoint. He further alleges that Bossier City failed to

train its officers and ASM Global’s security guards about

the public nature of the property and attendant First

Amendment considerations. He asserts that the Bossier

City officers and private security personnel whom he

encountered engaged in viewpoint discrimination and

should be liable because Hershey was on public, not

private, property.

Hershey also alleges that Bossier City “has a longstanding custom of allowing police officers, employees

65a

and/or officials of CenturyLink Center to use their

unfettered discretion to arbitrarily and capriciously

remove individuals who are peacefully exercising their

First Amendment rights from the CenturyLink

property.” However, he does not allege that Bossier City

officials or officers or private security personnel have

ever removed anyone from the Center or the surrounding

property who was peacefully exercising their First

Amendment rights, other than himself.

Almost a year after the incident in question, Hershey’s

attorney contacted ASM Global and was told in an email,

which is attached as an exhibit to Hershey’s Amended

Complaint, that ASM Global’s policies regarding the

Center are as follows:

If the public would like to engage in a peaceful

protests [sic] or distribution of pamphlets, they are

free to do so as long as it does not interfere with

the safe ingress or egress of guests. This is

especially important when the facility and

property has been exclusively leased for an event.

In addition, CenturyLink Center has instituted a

CODE OF CONDUCT which must be adhered to

while on the premises. This Code of Conduct (copy

inserted) is posted on our website under Arena

Info.

Hershey’s counsel had also asked for an “incident

report” regarding the day Hershey was told to leave the

area near the Center, which was February 28, 2020. The

author of the ASM Global email responded:

I did see an incident report from 2/28/2020, that

states “Security Observed two individuals handing

out pamphlets in the Parking Lots A & D. The

66a

individuals became argumentative and Security

called for Bossier City Police for assistance.” It

further states the Pamphleteers then left the

property. (It does not state they were removed.)

I, myself, remember this incident, as I heard the

call over the radio for police assistance and went to

the area. When I arrived, I saw police talking with

two people. I did not interject. Our security

guards (ASM Global employees) told me that two

people with pamphlets were shouting at our guests

in line that they were going to Hell for attending

this event, and that it made a few “children” cry.

It is my understanding that the Police asked the

pamphleteers to stop upsetting the guests and that

they left of their own accord.

I see no other documentation or incidents

pertaining to the subject of your request.

It is unclear whether the “incident report” in this email

or the events recounted in that email involved Hershey.

As the magistrate judge’s report reflects, this is not the

first time Hershey has had an encounter that has given

rise to First Amendment litigation.8 Hershey is a serial

plaintiff.

8

See ROA.130 n.1, which reflects:

Hershey v. Jasinski et al, United States District Court, Western

District of Missouri, St. Joseph Division, Docket No. 20-06088-CVW-BP; (2) Hershey v. Turner, No. CIV-19-344-SPS, 2020 WL

1932911 (E.D. Okla. Apr. 21, 2020); (3) Hershey v. Kansas City

Kansas Cmty. Coll., No. 2:16-CV-2251-JTM, 2017 WL 661581 (D.

Kan. Feb. 17, 2017); (4) Hershey v. Goldstein, 938 F. Supp. 2d 491

(S.D.N.Y. 2013); (5) Hershey v. Multi-Purpose Civic Ctr. Facility Bd.

67a

The defendants moved to dismiss the suit. The

magistrate judge prepared a detailed report and

recommendations, recommending dismissal based on

qualified immunity and for failure to state a claim. The

district court agreed with those recommendations and

dismissed the suit.

II

Hershey’s first contention on appeal is that Marshal

Gilbert and Officer Stoll are not entitled to qualified

immunity because the right to be free from viewpoint

discrimination was clearly established on February 20,

2020, the date the incident in question occurred. The

magistrate judge concluded otherwise, and after a

conducting a de novo review, the district court agreed

with the magistrate judge.

for Pulaski Cty., Arkansas, No. 4:18-CV-00476 BSM, 2020 WL

4741900 (E.D. Ark. Aug. 14, 2020); (6) Hershey v. Walker, No.

4:12CV01603 ERW, 2013 WL 657873 (E.D. Mo. Feb. 22, 2013); (7)

Hershey v. Thomas et al, United States District Court, Eastern

District of Arkansas, Central Division, Docket No. 4:20-cv-01397KGB; (8) Hershey v. Junior College District of St. Louis-St. Louis

County et al, United States District Court, Eastern District of

Missouri, Docket No. 4:10-cv-1116; (9) Hershey v. The Curators of

University of Missouri et al, United States District Court, Eastern

District of Missouri, Docket No. 4:16-cv-1229; (10) Hershey v. Junior

College District of Central Southwest Missouri et al, United States

District Court, Western District of Missouri, Docket No. 6:14-cv3375; (11) Hershey v. The Curators of the University of Missouri, et

al, United States District Court, Western District of Missouri,

Central Division, Docket No. 2:20-cv-04239-BCW; (12) Hershey v.

Oldham, et al, United States District Court, Middle District of

Tennessee, Docket No. 2:20-cv-0012; (13) Hershey v. Oldham, et al,

United States District Court, Middle District of Tennessee, Docket

No. 2:20-cv-0264.

68a

Hershey maintains that based on First Amendment

law, the Center is a traditional public forum or, in the

alternative, that it is a designated public forum. The

magistrate judge’s report reasoned that only the

sidewalks outside the arena are at issue, and that some

decisions have held that sidewalks outside an arena are

either nonpublic or limited forums. Ultimately, the

magistrate judge concluded

Plaintiff does not point to a single decision from any

court that has held, before or after the date of this

incident, that an officer violated the rights of a leafleteer

who was removed from a similar arena premises. The

discussions above demonstrate that there are many

nuances to First Amendment claims of this nature,

beginning with questions about the category of the forum

and continuing through the reasonableness of various

regulations or restrictions. Very little about this field of

law is clearly established.

I agree with the magistrate judge and the district court.

The Supreme Court has explained that “[t]he standards

that we apply to determine whether a State has

unconstitutionally excluded a private speaker from use of

a public forum depend on the nature of the forum.”9 The

Eighth Circuit has explained, for example, that “[l]imited

public forums (sometimes called nonpublic forums)

include public properties that are not by tradition or

designation public forums but have been opened by the

government for limited purposes, communicative or

Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 106, 121 S.Ct.

2093, 150 L.Ed.2d 151 (2001).

9

69a

otherwise.”10 That court further explained that “[t]he

government, no less than a private owner of property, has

the power to preserve the property under its control for

the use to which it is lawfully dedicated.”11 “‘[T]he

location and purpose of a publicly owned sidewalk is

critical to determining whether such a sidewalk

constitutes a public forum.’”12 The Eighth Circuit

concluded that sidewalks serving the purpose of

admitting thousands of people to a state fair were a

limited public forum.13 It held that restrictions on speech

in a limited public forum must be reasonable and

viewpoint neutral.14 It further held that the plaintiff in

that case was not likely to prevail on his claim that his

First Amendment rights were violated when he was

prohibited from holding a pole with a poster-sized sign on

it while on sidewalks near entrances to a state fair.15

Powell v. Noble, 798 F.3d 690, 699 (8th Cir. 2015) (citing

Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, 473 U.S. 788, 802,

105 S.Ct. 3439, 87 L.Ed.2d 567 (1985)).

10

Id. at 699-700 (quoting United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 178,

103 S.Ct. 1702, 75 L.Ed.2d 736 (1983)).

11

Id. (quoting United States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720, 728–29, 110

S.Ct. 3115, 111 L.Ed.2d 571 (1990) (plurality opinion)).

12

13

Id. at 700.

Id. (citing Christian Legal Soc’y Chapter of the Univ. of Cal.,

Hastings Coll. of the L. v. Martinez, 561 U.S. 661, 679, 130 S.Ct. 2971,

177 L.Ed.2d 838 (2010) (“Recognizing a State’s right to preserve the

property under its control for the use to which it is lawfully dedicated,

the Court has permitted restrictions on access to a limited public

forum . . . with this key caveat: Any access barrier must be

reasonable and viewpoint neutral.”)).

14

15

Id. at 701-02.

70a

JUDGE DENNIS’s opinion notes that the Eighth

Circuit’s decision in Powell was reached only after the

court held a preliminary injunction hearing and

“conducted a fact-intensive review of congestion, signage,

police presence, and fencing at the fair.”16 It was only

then, JUDGE DENNIS’s opinion posits, that the court was

able to conclude that the law was not clearly established

as to the character, for First Amendment purposes, of the

area in which the plaintiff had displayed his sign.17 But

this discussion exemplifies the whole point of qualified

immunity. First, Powell was, as noted, a preliminary

injunction case. Qualified immunity is not a defense to

injunctive relief. The present case is a suit for damages.

Second, we do not hold officers like the individual

defendants in the present case liable for damages after

we conduct a hearing to determine, in hindsight, whether

they property they were policing was a public forum. Our

inquiry is whether the law was clearly established when

the defendant acted or failed to act. Third, we cannot

expect officers, even those trained in First Amendment

law, to know whether a given area near an arena being

used in a particular way at a given time is or is not a public

forum given the uncertainties of the law in this area.

Hershey proceeds on the basis that the law was (and is)

clearly established that the sidewalk surrounding the

Center was a public forum even though the city-owned

arena was managed by a private entity and that private

entity oversaw the concert that was ongoing at the time

of the incident at issue. There is evidence, from an exhibit

to the Amended Complaint, that the outside of the Center

16

Ante at [564-65].

17

Id.

71a

as well as the inside can be leased for events. Hershey

alleges that the sidewalks just outside the concert were

public, but he does not consider what contractual

arrangements ASM Global may have had in place with the

concert organizers.

Several courts have recognized that public property

may change its character for purposes of First

Amendment forum analysis based on temporary uses. In

considering the public sidewalks used for the Iowa State

Fair, the Eighth Circuit concluded that the public

property “should be considered a limited public forum, at

least during the 11 days each year when the Iowa State

Fair is underway.”18 The Supreme Court similarly found

that the Minnesota State Fair “is a limited public forum

in that it exists to provide a means for a great number of

exhibitors temporarily.”19

Our court recently addressed a factual situation that is

similar to the one presented in this case. In Siders v. City

of Brandon, Mississippi,20 a Christian evangelist

challenged a city ordinance that restricted protesting and

demonstrating on a sidewalk outside a city-owned and

operated public amphitheater during time periods

surrounding a live, ticketed concert event.21 In that case,

we determined the sidewalk outside the amphitheater to

be a traditional public forum.22 We nevertheless held that

18

Powell, 798 F.3d at 700 (emphasis added).

Heffron v. Int’l Soc. For Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S.

640, 650-51, 101 S.Ct. 2559, 69 L.Ed.2d 298 (1981) (emphasis added).

19

20

123 F.4th 293 (5th Cir. 2024).

21

Id. at 296.

22

Id. at 303.

72a

the plaintiff was not likely to succeed on the merits of the

claim that the ordinance violated First Amendment

rights. As to whether the sidewalks at issue were a

traditional public forum, Siders is distinguishable from

the instant case because here a private entity was

involved in managing the Center. Additionally, given that

the Supreme Court has indicated that sidewalks on public

property are not automatically public forums23 and that

the district court considered several cases concerning the

forum status of spaces surrounding arenas that do not

speak in unison,24 the forum status of the space in

question was not clearly established. Hershey has not

overcome the qualified immunity defense.

I also note that in the district court, the Bossier City

defendants argued that Hershey had failed to allege facts

to support his claim that the officers discriminated

against him on the basis of viewpoint. They pointed out

that Hershey failed to allege that the officers looked at

the content of his leaflets or otherwise knew about the

content. Nor did he allege the officers heard any

See, e.g., Kokinda, 497 U.S. at 730, 110 S.Ct. 3115 (noting it “is

not [] settled doctrine” to “designate all sidewalks open to the public

as public fora”); Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 216, 112 S.Ct.

1846, 119 L.Ed.2d 5 (1992) (SCALIA, J., concurring) (“ ‘Streets and

sidewalks’ are not public forums in all places.”) (emphasis omitted).

23

24

See Ball v. City of Lincoln, 870 F.3d 722, 736 (8th Cir. 2017)

(holding a plaza area outside of a city-owned arena to be a nonpublic

forum); Pomicter v. Luzerne Cnty. Convention Ctr. Auth., 939 F.3d

534, 537 (3d Cir. 2019) (analyzing concourse outside of a publiclyowned arena as a nonpublic forum). But see Brister v. Faulkner, 214

F.3d 675, 683 (5th Cir. 2000) (affirming that public university

property between an arena and a city sidewalk is a traditional public

forum).

73a

statements Hershey made while passing out leaflets. As

to the alleged differing treatment accorded the person

who was distributing cards for a radio station, Hershey

says he was told he had to leave the premises because he

had not obtained authorization ahead of time to distribute

leaflets outside of and during a large concert that patrons

paid to attend. Hershey inquired about the person

distributing cards and was told essentially, “We don’t

know whether he has permission.” Hershey left the

premises and does not allege what occurred thereafter.

Hershey does not allege that the officer or security

guard who asked him to leave subsequently failed to

ascertain whether the other individual had prior

authorization. Hershey does not allege that after he left,

the other person was permitted to continue to hand out

cards for any substantial period of time even though he

did not have prior authorization.

The Amended

Complaint depends on speculation to draw an inference

that Hershey was singled out based on the content of his

literature. The Amended Complaint does not sufficiently

allege content or viewpoint discrimination.

Even assuming Hershey could allege that he was

treated differently from the person distributing cards for

the radio station, the magistrate judge and district court

correctly concluded that the law regarding viewpoint

discrimination is not clearly established in circumstances

like those in the present case.

“The First Amendment provides that ‘Congress shall

make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech. . . . ’

There is no doubt that as a general matter peaceful

picketing and leafletting are expressive activities

74a

involving ‘speech’ protected by the First Amendment.”25

“It is also true that ‘public places’ historically associated

with the free exercise of expressive activities, such as

streets, sidewalks, and parks, are considered, without

more, to be ‘public forums.’”26 “In such places, the

government’s ability to permissibly restrict expressive

conduct is very limited: the government may enforce

reasonable time, place, and manner regulations as long as

the restrictions ‘are content-neutral, are narrowly

tailored to serve a significant government interest, and

leave

open

ample

alternative

channels

of

communication.’”27 However, if an area is a limited public

forum or a nonpublic forum, “[t]he government can

restrict access . . . as long as the restrictions are

reasonable and [are] not an effort to suppress expression

merely because public officials oppose the speaker’s

view.”28

It is, of course, “axiomatic that the government may not

regulate speech based on its substantive content or the

message it conveys.”29 But that principle is a very general

one. It does not clearly establish what the First

Amendment prohibits or requires of law enforcement

United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 176, 103 S.Ct. 1702, 75

L.Ed.2d 736 (1983) (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. I).

25

26

Id. at 177, 103 S.Ct. 1702.

Id. (quoting Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Loc. Educators’ Ass’n,

460 U.S. 37, 45, 103 S.Ct. 948, 74 L.Ed.2d 794 (1983)).

27

Chiu v. Plano Indep. Sch. Dist., 260 F.3d 330, 347 (5th Cir. 2001)

(alteration in original) (quoting Ark. Educ. Television Comm’n v.

Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 677-78, 118 S.Ct. 1633, 140 L.Ed.2d 875 (1998)).

28

Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819,

828, 115 S.Ct. 2510, 132 L.Ed.2d 700 (1995).

29

75a

officers when they are policing an area in circumstances

similar to those existing at the Center during the Winter

Jam concert.

Our court’s decision in Morgan v. Swanson30 is

instructive on this point. In Morgan, the plaintiff argued

that “his right to distribute religious material is clearly

established because ‘regardless of forum, viewpoint

discrimination

regarding

private

speech

is

31

unconstitutional.’” Our court acknowledged that while

this is “generally true,” that proposition was too broad to

denote a clearly established right.32 The Morgan decision

explained, “such a broad generalization is exactly the kind

of proposition that will not suffice for the purposes of

qualified immunity analysis, as it simply does not provide

the official with any sense of what is permissible under a

certain set of facts.”33 Our court concluded, “[f]or

example, the nearly universal prohibition against

viewpoint discrimination does not inform an official as to

what, precisely, constitutes viewpoint discrimination.”34

The Supreme Court has “repeatedly told courts . . . not to

define clearly established law at a high level of

generality.”35

30

755 F.3d 757 (5th Cir. 2014).

31

Id. at 761.

32

Id.

33

Id.

34

Id.

Mullenix v. Luna, 577 U.S. 7, 12, 136 S.Ct. 305, 193 L.Ed.2d 255

(2015) (per curiam) (quoting Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 742,

131 S.Ct. 2074, 179 L.Ed.2d 1149 (2011)).

35

76a

Hershey addresses Morgan in his briefing. He says:

“Morgan . . . involved the governmental actors

attempting

to

balance

competing,

significant

constitutional interests,” making the case “inapplicable”

to this one. He characterizes Morgan’s outcome as the

result of the “special First Amendment context” present

in public schools.

But our analysis in Morgan did not turn on the

complexity of the context. Rather than focusing on any

“special First Amendment context,” Morgan hinged on

whether the official was on notice that their conduct was

unconstitutional.36 Under Supreme Court precedent,

“‘[t]he dispositive question’ . . . is whether the violative

nature of [the] particular conduct is clearly

established.”37

Hershey relies on the statement in Chiu v. Plano

Independent School District38: “It is well settled that

viewpoint discrimination is a clearly established violation

of the First Amendment in any forum.”39 Our decision in

Morgan considered Chiu “inapposite” because of factual

dissimilarities and concluded: “[W]hile Chiu may indeed

be relevant in discerning the nature and extent of

Morgan’s rights in the classroom, the case does not itself

establish those rights. ”40 Just as Morgan eschewed Chiu

36

Morgan, 755 F.3d at 760.

37

Cunningham v. Castloo, 983 F.3d 185, 191 (5th Cir. 2020)

(quoting Mullenix, 577 U.S. at 12, 136 S.Ct. 305).

38

260 F.3d 330 (5th Cir. 2001) (per curiam).

39

Id. at 350.

40

Morgan v. Swanson, 755 F.3d 757, 761 (2014).

77a

as clearly establishing law that governed in that case, we

should do likewise in the present case.

Writing for the Court in Anderson v. Creighton,41

JUSTICE SCALIA cogently explained “that the doctrine of

qualified immunity reflects a balance that has been struck

‘across the board.’”42

The Court recounted the

underpinnings of the doctrine of qualified immunity.43 It

then said, “[s]omewhat more concretely, whether an

official protected by qualified immunity may be held

personally liable for an allegedly unlawful official action

generally turns on the ‘objective legal reasonableness’ of

the action . . . assessed in light of the legal rules that were

‘clearly established’ at the time it was taken.”44 The Court

continued, “[t]he operation of this standard, however,

depends substantially upon the level of generality at

41

483 U.S. 635, 107 S.Ct. 3034, 97 L.Ed.2d 523 (1987).

Id. at 642, 107 S.Ct. 3034 (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S.

800, 821, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982) (BRENNAN, J.,

concurring)).

42

43

See id. at 638, 107 S.Ct. 3034:

(“When government officials abuse their offices, “action[s] for

damages may offer the only realistic avenue for vindication of

constitutional guarantees.” On the other hand, permitting damages

suits against government officials can entail substantial social costs,

including the risk that fear of personal monetary liability and

harassing litigation will unduly inhibit officials in the discharge of

their duties. Our cases have accommodated these conflicting

concerns by generally providing government officials performing

discretionary functions with a qualified immunity, shielding them

from civil damages liability as long as their actions could reasonably

have been thought consistent with the rights they are alleged to have

violated.” (internal citations omitted).

44

Id. at 639, 107 S.Ct. 3034 (internal citation omitted).

78a

which the relevant ‘legal rule’ is to be identified.”45 The

Court admonished that if the level of generality at which

the legal rule is identified is too high, “Plaintiffs would be

able to convert the rule of qualified immunity that our

cases plainly establish into a rule of virtually unqualified

liability simply by alleging violation of extremely abstract

rights. Harlow would be transformed from a guarantee

of immunity into a rule of pleading.”46

Hershey has not cited decisions that clearly establish

that the conduct of Marshal Gilbert and Officer Stoll

violated First Amendment rights.

III

Hershey’s second contention on appeal is that Marshal

Gilbert and Officer Stoll are not entitled to qualified

immunity because the law was clearly established that

they had to provide Hershey with ample alternative

Id.; see also id. at 639-40, 107 S.Ct. 3034 (“It should not be

surprising, therefore, that our cases establish that the right the

official is alleged to have violated must have been ‘clearly established’

in a more particularized, and hence more relevant, sense: The

contours of the right must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable

official would understand that what he is doing violates that right.

This is not to say that an official action is protected by qualified

immunity unless the very action in question has previously been held

unlawful . . . but it is to say that in the light of pre-existing law the

unlawfulness must be apparent.”) (internal citation omitted).

45

Id. at 639, 107 S.Ct. 3034; see also id. (“Such an approach, in sum,

would destroy ‘the balance that our cases strike between the interests

in vindication of citizens’ constitutional rights and in public officials’

effective performance of their duties,’ by making it impossible for

officials ‘reasonably [to] anticipate when their conduct may give rise

to liability for damages.’ ”) (quoting Davis v. Scherer, 468 U.S. 183,

195, 104 S.Ct. 3012, 82 L.Ed.2d 139 (1984)).

46

79a

channels of communication, and they did not. Hershey

asserts in his briefing that if the officers “were attempting

to enforce a time, place and manner restriction, they must

also

‘leave

ample

alternative

channels

of

communication.’”

Here again, the law as to how the Center should be

characterized for First Amendment purposes is far from

clear. More pointedly, Hershey has not cited any

authority that would put on notice a law enforcement

officer policing an event like the one at the Center on the

date in question that the officer, personally, was required

to provide an alternate forum for distributing leaflets.

IV

Hershey’s third contention on appeal is that Marshal

Gilbert and Officer Stoll are not entitled to qualified

immunity because they are either plainly incompetent or

knowingly violated the law. He argues that if they

“genuinely believed that Plaintiff did not have any First

Amendment rights on the Bossier City Arena property

because it was private property, then they are ‘plainly

incompetent.’” Here again, Hershey cites no decision

that would have clearly put the officers on notice that the

Center was not comparable to “private property” for

First Amendment purposes during the Winter Jam

concert, or that their conduct in asking Hershey to leave

the area violated his First Amendment rights.

V

Hershey contends that he has pled a facially plausible

Monell claim based on his allegations that Bossier City

failed to train both its own law enforcement officers and

ASM’s private security guards “allowed to serve as

security personnel” at the Center. The Supreme Court

80a

has made clear that municipal liability based on Monell47

requires deliberate indifference.48 With great respect,

JUDGE DENNIS’s and JUDGE HO’s opinions in the present

case substantially erode and trivialize that principle. This

is a single-incident case in which Hershey relies on his

own confrontation with city officers and private security

guards to establish municipal liability. This case does not

present the “rare” and “narrow and extreme

circumstances” that our court and the Supreme Court has

said permit “drawing the inference” of “deliberate

indifference.”49

A

The Supreme Court established in Monell50 that

“municipal liability under section 1983 requires proof of

three elements: a policymaker; an official policy; and a

violation of constitutional rights whose ‘moving force’ is

Monell v. New York City Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 98

S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978).

47

City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 389, 109 S.Ct. 1197, 103

L.Ed.2d 412 (1989).

48

Garza v. Donna, 922 F.3d 626, 638 (5th Cir. 2019) (quoting Littell

v. Hous. Indep. Sch. Dist., 894 F.3d 616 (5th Cir. 2018)).

49

Monell v. New York City Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 98

S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978).

50

81a

the policy or custom.”51 A party must sufficiently allege

each element before municipal liability can attach.52

The Supreme Court explained in City of Canton v.

Harris53 that “[m]unicipal liability under § 1983 attaches

where—and only where—a deliberate choice to follow a

course of action is made from among various alternatives”

by city policymakers.”54 The Supreme Court continued,

“Only where a failure to train reflects a ‘deliberate’ or

‘conscious’ choice by a municipality—a ‘policy’ as defined

by our prior cases—can a city be liable for such a failure

under § 1983.”55 While a failure to train can be a

“policy,”56 that determination usually requires a pattern

51

Winder v. Gallardo, 118 F.4th 638, 647 (5th Cir. 2024), cert.

denied, — U.S. —, 145 S. Ct. 2816, 222 L.Ed.2d 1099 (2025) (quoting

Piotrowski v. City of Hous., 237 F.3d 567, 578 (5th Cir. 2001) (citing

Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56

L.Ed.2d 611 (1978)).

See Brown v. Tarrant County, Tex., 985 F.3d 489, 497 (5th Cir.

2021) (concluding that this court need not consider whether the

plaintiff sufficiently alleged the policymaker or constitutional

violation element when “he did not link his allegedly unconstitutional

confinement to any county ‘policy or custom’); Zarnow v. City of

Wichita Falls, Tex., 614 F.3d 161, 171 (5th Cir. 2010) (not considering

the “moving force factor” because the plaintiff had “not established a

‘custom or policy’”).

52

53

489 U.S. 378, 109 S.Ct. 1197, 103 L.Ed.2d 412 (1989).

Id. at 389, 109 S.Ct. 1197 (citing Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471

U.S. 808, 823, 105 S.Ct. 2427, 85 L.Ed.2d 791 (1985) (opinion of

REHNQUIST, J.)).

54

55

Id.

56

See Garza, 922 F.3d at 637.

82a

of constitutional violations.57

There is nothing in

Hershey’s Amended Complaint that reflects a deliberate

or conscious choice by Bossier City among various

alternatives regarding the need for training its law

enforcement officers. There had been no prior incident in

which it was even alleged that city officers had violated

the First Amendment by telling individuals they could not

pass out literature without prior approval, much less

allegations of viewpoint discrimination.

The Supreme Court explained its rationale more fully

in Board of County Commissioners of Bryan County v.

Brown.58 The Court said that in Canton, it “spoke . . . of

a deficient training ‘program,’ necessarily intended to

apply over time to multiple employees.”59 The Court

reasoned that:

[i]f a program does not prevent constitutional

violations, municipal decisionmakers may

eventually be put on notice that a new program is

called for. Their continued adherence to an

approach that they know or should know has failed

to prevent tortious conduct by employees may

establish the conscious disregard for the

consequences of their action—the “deliberate

indifference”—necessary to trigger municipal

liability.60

57

Harris, 489 U.S. at 397, 109 S.Ct. 1197 (O’Connor, J., concurring

in part and dissenting in part); Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs of Bryan Cnty.

v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 409, 117 S.Ct. 1382, 137 L.Ed.2d 626 (1997).

58

520 U.S. 397, 409-410, 117 S.Ct. 1382, 137 L.Ed.2d 626 (1997).

59

Id. at 407, 117 S.Ct. 1382.

60

Id.

83a

The Supreme Court again emphasized in Connick v.

Thompson61 that “[w]ithout notice that a course of

training is deficient in a particular respect,

decisionmakers can hardly be said to have deliberately

chosen a training program that will cause violations of

constitutional rights.”62

The Supreme Court has made clear that in Monell63

cases, deliberate indifference may be inferred in failureto-train-at-all cases “in a narrow range of circumstances”

if the violation of federal rights is “a highly predictable

consequence of a failure to equip law enforcement officers

with specific tools to handle recurring situations.”64 The

Supreme Court emphasized that whether such a

consequence is “obvious” depends on “[t]he likelihood

that the situation will recur and the predictability that an

officer lacking specific tools to handle that situation will

violate citizens’ rights.”65

There is no allegation that viewpoint discrimination by

a Bossier City law enforcement officer against someone

engaging in free exercise of religion or free speech has

ever previously occurred.66 It is not highly predictable

61

563 U.S. 51, 131 S.Ct. 1350, 179 L.Ed.2d 417 (2011).

62

Id. at 62, 131 S.Ct. 1350.

Monell v. New York City Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 98

S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978).

63

Bd. of Cty. Commissioners of Bryan Cty. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397,

409-410, 117 S.Ct. 1382, 137 L.Ed.2d 626 (1997).

64

65

Id.

But see Littell v. Houston Indep. Sch. Dist., 894 F.3d 616,

624–25 (5th Cir. 2018) (“The municipal entity must have ‘fail[ed] to

train its employees concerning a clear constitutional duty implicated

66

84a

that law enforcement officers would have recurring

encounters with individuals paid to distribute literature

outside a large, pay-to-attend event. Nor is it highly

predictable that, absent specific training about what is

“public” versus “private” property and viewpoint

discrimination, those officers would discriminate based on

the content of the literature being distributed.

JUDGE DENNIS’s and JUDGE HO’s opinions permit an

outsized path to liability because many plaintiffs would be

able to granulate allegations so finely that they arrive at

a “complete failure to train” as to the relevant conduct.

This ignores the Supreme Court’s repeated warning:

“[I]n virtually every instance where a person has had his

or her constitutional rights violated by a city employee, a

§ 1983 plaintiff will be able to point to something the city

could have done to prevent the unfortunate incident.”67

“[V]irtually every instance”68 is just the opposite of the

“rare”69 and “extreme”70 circumstances in which the

single-incident exception should apply.

Hershey says, and JUDGE DENNIS’s and HO’s opinions

agree, that if a city fails to train “at all” regarding the

First Amendment, then it is “obvious” that a

constitutional violation will occur. This not only permits

in recurrent situations that a particular employee is certain to face.’ ”

(emphasis added) (quoting Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 396, 109

S.Ct. 1197, 103 L.Ed.2d 412 (1989) (O’Connor, J., concurring)).

City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 392, 109 S.Ct. 1197, 103

L.Ed.2d 412 (1989) (internal quotation marks omitted).

67

68

Id.

69

Littell, 894 F.3d at 627.

70

Id.

85a

liability for what may be, at most, mere negligence, it

essentially imposes strict liability for a failure to train.71

Our court has said that in some circumstances “there is

a difference between a complete failure to train . . . and a

failure to train in one limited area.”72 Hershey alleges the

City failed to train its officers on the public nature of the

arena and surrounding park and the corresponding First

71

See, e.g., Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 61–62, 131 S.Ct.

1350, 179 L.Ed.2d 417, (2011) (“[W]hen city policymakers are on

actual or constructive notice that a particular omission in their

training program causes city employees to violate citizens’

constitutional rights, the city may be deemed deliberately indifferent

if the policymakers choose to retain that program A less stringent

standard of fault for a failure-to-train claim ‘would result in de facto

respondeat superior liability on municipalities . . . ’ ” (quoting City of

Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. at 392, 109 S.Ct. 1197 (1989))); see also

Loera v. Kingsville Indep. Sch. Dist., 151 F.4th 813, 820, No. 24-40481

(5th Cir. Aug. 22, 2025) (“Deliberate indifference ‘is a stringent

standard, requiring proof that a municipal actor disregarded a known

or obvious consequence of his action.’ ‘A showing of simple or even

heightened negligence will not suffice.’ ” (first quoting Brown v.

Bryan County, 219 F.3d 450, 457 (5th Cir. 2000) (quoting Bd. of Cnty.

Comm’rs of Bryan Cnty., Okl. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 410, 117 S.Ct.

1382, 137 L.Ed.2d 626 (1997), then quoting Brown, 520 U.S. at 410,

117 S.Ct. 1382)).

Cozzo v. Tangipahoa Parish Council, 279 F.3d 273 (5th Cir.

2002) (alteration and internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting

McClendon v. City of Columbia, 258 F.3d 432, 442–43 (5th Cir. 2001),

vacated for reh’g en banc, 285 F.3d 1078 (5th Cir. 2001), decision on

rehearing en banc, 305 F.3d 314 (5th Cir. 2002)); see also Peterson v.

City of Fort Worth, 588 F.3d 838, 849 (5th Cir. 2009) (“[The] ‘narrow’

single incident exception has applied when the court finds a complete

failure to train, not just a failure to train in ‘one limited area’”

(quoting Estate of Davis ex rel. McCully v. City of N. Richland Hills,

406 F.3d 375, 383, 386 (5th Cir. 2005)).

72

86a

Amendment implications.73 In other words, Hershey

alleges a “failure to train in one limited area” and not “a

complete failure to train.”74 But even if Hershey’s

Amended Complaint could be characterized as alleging a

complete failure to train, to say that the need for training

was “obvious” in this case would undermine virtually

every precept of our Monell jurisprudence.

Our court has refused to allow single-incident failureto-train cases to diminish the bedrock concepts

underpinning Monell liability, even when the plaintiff’s

injury was severe and it might seem “obvious” to a lay

person that training likely would have prevented the

injury. Our decision in Garza75 is just one example.

JUDGE DENNIS’s and JUDGE HO’s opinions both rely on

Garza, but it completely undermines the positions

espoused in those opinions. In Garza, Garza’s mother

sought help from law enforcement when she feared her

son, who was intoxicated, would take his own life or would

hurt himself.76 Garza was taken into custody at a

detention center.77 Sometime after 8:00 a.m., he obscured

the lens of the camera that was trained on him in his cell.78

The person tasked with monitoring the camera feed,

Minerva Perez, said that after 8:00 a.m., when jailers

arrived for their shifts, it was their responsibility to

73

See Ante at 568-69.

Peña v. City of Rio Grande City, 879 F.3d 613, 624 (5th Cir.

2018).

74

75

Garza v. City of Donna, 922 F.3d 626 (5th Cir. 2019).

76

Id. at 630-31.

77

Id.

78

Id. at 631.

87a

monitor the jail inmates.79 When the jailers were on duty,

they became occupied putting up a sarcastic “welcome”

sign for inmates and the logo of a comic-book character,

and they “missed that Garza had hanged himself.”80 ICE

agents arrived at 8:40 a.m. and found Garza dead at 8:49

a.m.81 In the ensuing litigation, Garza’s survivors claimed

that “Perez displayed ‘utter confusion’ about her

responsibility to monitor the jail’s camera feeds, invoking

the failure-to-train principles articulated by City of

Canton v. Harris.”82 Our court held that this claim failed

because “[a]s we have emphasized, deliberate

indifference may be inferred this way ‘only in narrow and

extreme circumstances,’ and decisions by our court

drawing the inference are rare.”83 We further explained

that “the record has no evidence about the population that

passes through the City’s jail or about the jail’s operations

from which the possibility of recurring situations

threatening to constitutional rights might be assessed. It

is apparent that this record is inadequate to support a

failure-to-train theory as to Perez.”84

So too, in this case. There is no allegation as to how

many individuals frequent areas outside the Center

during events in order to distribute literature. There is

no allegation from which the risk of recurring situations

like the one at issue in this case can be assessed. Again,

79

Id.

80

Id.

81

Id.

82

Id. at 637.

83

Id. at 638.

84

Id.

88a

the Supreme Court has emphasized that whether a

consequence is “obvious” depends on “[t]he likelihood

that the situation will recur and the predictability that an

officer lacking specific tools to handle that situation will

violate citizens’ rights.”85

Saying that the need for training was “obvious” in this

case would call into question the core tenets of our Monell

jurisprudence, for the reasons discussed above. Even if

Hershey’s constitutional rights were violated, this is a

case in which only a few individuals violated those rights

on one occasion. This a not a case for application of the

“obvious” exception. We have reserved that exception for

cases of a far different ilk than this one.

JUDGE DENNIS’s opinion asserts that Hershey alleged

Bossier City “did not have any policy . . . regulating

speech activities protected by the First Amendment.”86

This implies, if not states, that if Bossier City had

provided at least some training on any aspect of the First

Amendment, there could be no “complete failure to train”

claim, and we would be in ordinary “failure-to-train”

territory. The logic here escapes me. If Bossier City had

trained its law enforcement officers about how to address

an entirely different First Amendment issue—for

instance, permissible means of policing protestors who

shut down a highway with their presence—how would

that have affected Hershey’s claim? Such training would

not bear on preventing viewpoint discrimination against

someone handing out leaflets. Yet, it would be “some”

Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs of Bryan Cnty. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397,

409, 117 S.Ct. 1382, 137 L.Ed.2d 626 (1997).

85

86

Ante at [563-64].

89a

First Amendment training, so the “no training at all”

theory would be inapplicable. This elusive and slippery

nature of a failure-to-train-at-all claim in the context of

this case is apparent from the very next sentence in Judge

Dennis’s opinion, which says, “Hershey alleged the City

failed to train its police officers and private security

personnel of citizens’ First Amendment rights on public

property, including the area surrounding the Center.”87

That is a much more specific claim, and if Bossier City had

notice that it needed to train for that specific potentiality,

Hershey likely would have stated a claim. So, to be clear,

the failure-to-train-at-all theory in a case like the present

one is nothing more than a “gotcha.” Providing some

First Amendment training, even though it had no bearing

at all on the alleged First Amendment violation, would

foreclose reliance on the theory. But failure to train “at

all” results in strict liability when there was no notice “at

all” of the need to train for the specific First Amendment

violation alleged.

“A municipality's culpability for a deprivation of rights

is at its most tenuous where a claim turns on a failure to

train,” and “‘[d]eliberate indifference’ is a stringent

standard of fault.”88 The requisite standard of fault is not

met here and Hershey has therefore failed to sufficiently

plead allegations of liability under Monell.89

87

[Id.]

88

Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 61, 131 S.Ct. 1350, 179

L.Ed.2d 417 (2011).

89

Supra note 50 and accompanying text.

90a

B

Hershey’s Amended Complaint seeks money damages

from Bossier City for its failure to train not only its own

law enforcement officers but the private security guards

who were hired by ASM Global for a concert on a

particular day.

Hershey’s brief cites no decision

whatsoever that holds a municipality liable for failure to

train a private party’s employees.

Nevertheless, JUDGE DENNIS’s and HO’s opinions

permit Hershey to proceed with his claim that Bossier

City is liable for failing to train security guards ASM

hired. I disagree and would affirm the district court's

judgment in this regard.

VI

In a fifth issue raised in Hershey’s appeal, he asserts

that ASM Global’s private security guards worked

together with the Bossier City defendants to eject him

from the Center and that he has stated a cause of action

under the “nexus/joint action tests.” “To state a claim

under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right

secured by the Constitution and laws of the United

States, and must show that the alleged deprivation was

committed by a person acting under color of state law.”90

A

The nexus test asks “whether the State has inserted

‘itself into a position of interdependence with the [private

actor, such] that it was a joint participant in the

West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48, 108 S.Ct. 2250, 101 L.Ed.2d 40

(1988) (emphasis added).

90

91a

enterprise.’”91 In other words, the question is whether

there is a “‘close nexus between the State and the

challenged action’ that seemingly private behavior ‘may

be fairly treated as that of the State itself.’”92

Hershey’s complaint alleges virtually no facts

regarding “interdependence” between Bossier City and

ASM Global’s private security guards. The Amended

Complaint alleges that the City “owns and operates a

public facility known as the Bossier City Arena, which at

all times relevant herein was known as the CenturyLink

Center.” It alleges that defendant security guards were

security guards at the CenturyLink Center. It then

alleges: “Defendant the City has a longstanding custom

of allowing police officers, employees and/ or officials of

CenturyLink Center to use their unfettered discretion to

arbitrarily and capriciously remove individuals who are

peacefully exercising their First Amendment rights from

the CenturyLink property.” This latter allegation is

entirely conclusory. It provides no factual support

whatsoever for this assertion.

These allegations are insufficient to permit a factfinder

to infer that there is such a close nexus between Bossier

City and ASM Global security guards that the actions of

the latter “may be fairly treated as that of the State

Cornish v. Corr. Srvs. Corp., 402 F.3d 545, 550 (5th Cir. 2005)

(alteration in original) (quoting Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co., 419

U.S. 345, 357-58, 95 S.Ct. 449, 42 L.Ed.2d 477 (1974)).

91

Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 531

U.S. 288, 295, 121 S.Ct. 924, 148 L.Ed.2d 807 (2001) (quoting Jackson,

419 U.S. at 351, 95 S.Ct. 449).

92

92a

itself.”93 There are no allegations about the nature of the

contractual relationship between Bossier City and ASM

Global, or between ASM Global and its security guards.

Nor are there factual allegations about whether the City

routinely relies on private security guards to police the

areas abutting or surrounding the Center.

B

Under the joint action test, “private actors will be

considered state actors where they are ‘willful

participant[s] in joint action with the State or its

agents.’”94 “[T]he plaintiff must allege and prove that the

citizen conspired with or acted in concert with state

actors.”95

Hershey’s Amended Complaint alleges that Bossier

City Marshal Gilbert approached Hershey with security

guard Harvey and police officer Stoll. Marshal Gilbert

waived a pair of handcuffs at Hershey, and Officer Stoll

told Hershey that he had been told to leave the park.

Marshal Gilbert then told Hershey that he had bracelets

for Hershey and would put them on him and take him to

jail. Marshal Gilbert said that “people were there to have

a good time.” Security guards Smith and Tucker arrived

shortly thereafter. Hershey asked about the commercial

leafleteer distributing literature nearby, and security

guard Harvey replied that Hershey’s literature was

See Brentwood Acad., 531 U.S. at 295, 121 S.Ct. 924 (quoting

Jackson, 419 U.S. at 351, 95 S.Ct. 449).

93

94

Cornish v. Corr. Srvs. Corp., 402 F.3d 545, 550 (5th Cir. 2005)

(quoting Dennis v. Sparks, 449 U.S. 24, 27, 101 S.Ct. 183, 66 L.Ed.2d

185 (1980)).

95

Mylett v. Jeane, 879 F.2d 1272, 1275 (5th Cir. 1989).

93a

unauthorized—but that Harvey did not know whether the

commercial leafleteer was authorized.

The facts alleged regarding security guards Smith and

Tucker are not sufficient to meet the joint action test. The

complaint alleges only that “Smith and Tucker were

present during Hershey's ejectment from the park . . .

and, acting jointly with the other Defendants, used their

command presence to assist in the removal of Hershey

from the park by Defendant Deputy Marshal Gilbert,

Officer Stoll, and Harvey.” Smith and Tucker allegedly

“arrived shortly” after Marshal Gilbert had told Hershey

to leave and had waived handcuffs at him. A reasonable

factfinder could not infer from Smith and Tucker’s

presence that they willfully participated in Hershey’s

removal. Nor does the complaint allege that the “use[]”

of their “command presence” meant more than that

Smith and Tucker were present during the incident.

Security guard Harvey spoke to Hershey in the

presence of the two Bossier City law enforcement

officers. But security guard Harvey’s statements do not

indicate he understood or believed that Bossier City, as

opposed to ASM Global, required prior approval before

literature could be distributed. Hershey alleged quite

specifically that security guard Harvey said that

Hershey’s “literature had not been approved by

CenturyLink Center, and that Hershey had to submit his

literature in advance for approval.” That is a requirement

of a private, not a state, actor. Neither of the city law

enforcement officers indicated that they thought there

was a prior-approval requirement by either Bossier City

or ASM Global. Hershey’s allegations do not sufficiently

allege joint action.

VII

94a

Hershey contends in his sixth and final issue on appeal

that he stated a claim against the private security guards

under the public function test. Under that test, “a private

entity may qualify as a state actor when it exercises

‘powers traditionally exclusively reserved to the State.’”96

But, “to qualify as a traditional, exclusive public function

within the meaning of our state-action precedents, the

government must have traditionally and exclusively

performed the function” and “[t]he [Supreme] Court has

stressed that ‘very few’ functions fall into that

category.”97 One of those narrow categories is “operating

a company town.”98

Hershey argues that the defendants “engaged in the

regulation of speech on the public sidewalk” and that

“[t]he regulation of speech in a public forum has been

traditionally and exclusively a function of the state.”

However, the only authority he cites for this proposition

is Marsh v. Alabama,99 a case involving the regulation of

speech in a company town.100 That case does not carry the

day based on the facts Hershey has alleged.

Manhattan Cmty. Access Corp. v. Halleck, 587 U.S. 802, 809, 139

S.Ct. 1921, 204 L.Ed.2d 405 (2019) (quoting Jackson, 419 U.S. at 352,

95 S.Ct. 449).

96

97

Id. (quoting Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 158, 98

S.Ct. 1729, 56 L.Ed.2d 185 (1978)).

98

Id.

99

326 U.S. 501, 505–06, 66 S.Ct. 276, 90 L.Ed. 265 (1946).

See id. (“Our question then narrows down to this: Can those

people who live in or come to Chickasaw be denied freedom of press

and religion simply because a single company has legal title to all the

town?”).

100

95a

The Center was being used to host a concert at the time

Hershey was asked to leave. Hershey has cited no

authority that policing the sidewalks abutting an arena

like the Center during such an event is a power exercised

exclusively by state actors.

Hershey’s complaint does not allege that the defendant

security guards were licensed by Bossier City or

“endowed by law with plenary police powers such that

they are de facto police officers.”101 Nor does he allege

that the private security guards were licensed by the city

and empowered by an ordinance to exercise “all of the

powers of the regular police patrol.”102

*

*

*

I would AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.

See Romanski v. Detroit Ent., L.L.C., 428 F.3d 629, 637 (6th Cir.

2005).

101

See Payton v. Rush-Presbyterian-St. Luke’s Med. Ctr., 184 F.3d

623, 630 (7th Cir. 1999). (quoting CHI., ILL., MUN. CODE § 4-340-100

(1992)).

102

96a

APPENDIX C

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT,

WESTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA,

SHREVEPORT DIVISION

Case No. 5:21-CV-00460

Richard HERSHEY,

Plaintiff

v.

CITY OF BOSSIER CITY et al.,

Defendants

Signed: September 24, 2021

T ERRY A . DOUGHTY, United States District Judge:

The Report and Recommendation of the Magistrate

Judge [Doc. No. 33] having been considered, together

with the written Objection [Doc. No. 37] thereto filed with

this Court, and, after a de novo review of the record,

finding that the Magistrate Judge’s Report and

Recommendation is correct and that judgment as

recommended therein is warranted,

IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and DECREED that

the Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss [Doc. No. 19] is

GRANTED.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and

DECREED that all claims against the City of Bossier

City, Bobby Gilbert, and Daniel Stoll are DISMISSED

WITH PREJUDICE.

97a

APPENDIX D

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT,

WESTERN DISTRICT LOUISIANA,

SHREVEPORT DIVISION

Civil Action No. 21-cv-460

Richard HERSHEY,

v.

CITY OF BOSSIER CITY, et al.,

Signed: August 23, 2021

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

MARK L. HORNSBY, United States Magistrate

Judge:

Introduction

Richard Hershey (“Plaintiff ”) was distributing leaflets

outside a public arena when a policeman ordered him to

leave or be arrested and taken to jail. Plaintiff left. He

later filed this civil rights action against the City of

Bossier City, two law enforcement officers, and three

security officers. He alleges that his eviction from the

grounds violated his First Amendment rights. Before the

court is a Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 19) filed by the City and

the two law enforcement officers. The three security

officers have filed a separate motion to dismiss (Doc. 28)

that will be addressed later. For the reasons that follow,

it is recommended that the City Defendants’ motion to

dismiss be granted.

98a

Rule 12(b)(6)

The City Defendants move for dismissal based on Fed.

R. Civ. Pro. 12(b)(6). In assessing the motion, the court

must accept as true all well-pleaded facts in the complaint

and view those facts in the light most favorable to the

plaintiff. In re Katrina Canal Breaches Litigation, 495

F.3d 191, 205 (5th Cir. 2007). Those facts must state a

claim that rises above the speculative level and is

plausible on its face. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 127

S.Ct. 1955, 1964-65 (2007); Amacker v. Renaissance Asset

Mgmt., LLC, 657 F.3d 252, 254 (5th Cir. 2011). A

complaint is not sufficient if it offers only “labels and

conclusions,” or “a formulaic recitation of the elements of

a cause of action.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949

(2009) (quoting Twombly, 127 S.Ct. at 1965).

The Allegations

The relevant facts for purposes of assessing the motion

to dismiss are found in Plaintiff’s First Amended

Complaint (Doc. 17). Plaintiff, a senior citizen from

Missouri, is a vegetarian advocate whose ethical beliefs

compel him to share his message with others. He is

compensated by various nonprofit organizations for his

advocacy and distribution of literature. First Amended

Complaint, ¶¶ 4, 15-17. A Christian rock concert known

as Winter Jam was held on February 28, 2020 at a Bossier

City arena that was then known as CenturyLink Center.

¶ 24. The facility has since been rebranded as Brookshire

Grocery Arena. The court will refer to it as the Arena.

The Arena is situated in a public park, with no restriction

on access to any of the sidewalks and streets through the

par

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