Petition for Writ of Certiorari — City of Bossier City, Louisiana, Petitioner v. Richard Hershey, et al.
Supreme Court briefMay 13, 2026
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APPENDIX
APPENDIX
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
Appendix A — Court of appeals denial of
rehearing en banc (Dec. 18, 2025) ........ 1a
Appendix B — Court of appeals panel opinion
(Oct. 7, 2025) .......................................... 38a
Appendix C — District court order granting
motion to dismiss (Sept. 24, 2021) ...... 96a
Appendix D — Magistrate judge recommendation
and report in favor of granting
motion to dismiss (Aug. 23, 2025) ....... 97a
Appendix E — First amended complaint
(May 20, 2021) ..................................... 123a
Appendix F — Exhibit to first amended complaint
(June 21, 2021) .................................... 138a
Appendix G — Court of appeals denial of panel
rehearing (Jan. 13, 2026) .................... 145a
APPENDIX A
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE
FIFTH CIRCUIT
No. 21-30754
RICHARD HERSHEY,
v.
Plaintiff — Appellant,
CITY OF BOSSIER CITY; BOBBY GILBERT, Individually
and in his Capacity as Deputy Marshall; DANIEL
STOLL; DAVID SMITH; TYSHON HARVEY; EUGENE
TUCKER,
Defendants — Appellees.
Filed: December 18, 2025
On Petition for Rehearing En Banc
Before DENNIS, RICHMAN, and HO, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
The petition for rehearing en banc is DENIED. At the
request of one of its members, the court was polled, and a
majority did not vote in favor of rehearing (FED. R. APP.
P. 40 and 5TH CIR. R. 40).
(1a)
2a
In the en banc poll, seven judges voted in favor of
rehearing (JUDGES JONES, SMITH, RICHMAN, DUNCAN,
ENGELHARDT, OLDHAM, and WILSON), and ten judges
voted against rehearing (CHIEF JUDGE ELROD, and
JUDGES STEWART, SOUTHWICK, HAYNES, GRAVES,
HIGGINSON, WILLETT, HO, DOUGLAS, and RAMIREZ).
JAMES C. HO, Circuit Judge, concurring in the denial
of rehearing en banc:
Popular speech doesn’t need protection. It’s only when
speech is unpopular that you need the First Amendment.
That’s why the devout look to the judiciary for
protection. Religious speech is often unpopular speech,
as people of faith have known for thousands of years. See,
e.g., JOHN 15:18–19 (“If the world hates you, you know
that it has hated Me before it hated you. If you were of
the world, the world would love you as its own; but
because you are not of the world, but I chose you out of
the world, because of this the world hates you.”).
It should go without saying, then, that the freedom of
speech secured by the First Amendment includes
religious speech. It protects not only the right to pray,
but to preach—not just to worship, but to witness—to
exercise your faith by evangelizing your faith. Our
Founders secured these rights even if—indeed,
especially if—the government doesn’t want you to
exercise them.
So it should be obvious that believers have the right to
share the good news with others. And the obviousness of
that right should have been enough to defeat qualified
immunity in this case, without the need for a factually
identical case saying so.
3a
Our now-Chief Judge made this point in Morgan v.
Swanson, 659 F.3d 359, 414 n.30 (5th Cir. 2011) (Elrod, J.,
dissenting in part). But a majority of our en banc court
refused that view in Morgan. And a majority of our en
banc court affirmatively rejected it in Villarreal v. City of
Laredo, 94 F.4th 374, 395 (5th Cir. 2024). I detailed all of
this in my dissent in Villarreal, 94 F.4th at 413–14, and
again in McMurry v. Weaver, 142 F.4th 292, 304–07 (5th
Cir. 2025) (Ho, J., concurring), and Hershey v. City of
Bossier City, 156 F.4th 555, 557, 558–60 (5th Cir. 2025)
(Ho, J., concurring). But I’m duty-bound to follow our en
banc precedents, whether I agree with them or not.
Governing precedent does not, however, foreclose
municipal liability under Monell v. New York City Dep’t
of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611
(1978). To the contrary, the Supreme Court has
unanimously held that “the need to train officers . . . can
be said to be ‘so obvious,’ that failure to do so could
properly be characterized as ‘deliberate indifference’ to
constitutional rights.” City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S.
378, 390 n.10, 109 S.Ct. 1197, 103 L.Ed.2d 412 (1989).1
“[I]n the absence of training, there is no way for novice
officers to obtain the legal knowledge they require.
Under those circumstances there is an obvious need for
some form of training.” Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S.
51, 64, 131 S.Ct. 1350, 179 L.Ed.2d 417 (2011).
Harris refers to “fleeing felons,” but nothing in § 1983 suggests
that courts should favor the rights of criminals over the rights of lawabiding citizens. We made that mistake as to qualified immunity, see
Villarreal v. City of Laredo, 94 F.4th 374, 413 (5th Cir. 2024) (Ho, J.,
dissenting), and I’m grateful that we won’t be repeating that mistake
here as to municipal liability.
1
4a
The petition for rehearing en banc asks us to shield
obvious violations of religious liberty under Monell.
What’s more, it would allow municipalities to trample on
religious liberty simply by deputizing private actors to do
their dirty work. But see NRA v. Vullo, 602 U.S. 175, 198,
144 S.Ct. 1316, 218 L.Ed.2d 642 (2024) (“the First
Amendment prohibits government officials from wielding
their power selectively to punish or suppress speech,
directly or (as alleged here) through private
intermediaries”); Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 66
S.Ct. 276, 90 L.Ed. 265 (1946); Murthy v. Missouri, 603
U.S. 43, 79–80, 99, 144 S.Ct. 1972, 219 L.Ed.2d 604 (2024)
(Alito, J., dissenting). That’s wrong, and I’m glad we’re
not going along with it. I concur in the denial of the
petition for rehearing en banc.
*
*
*
My dissenting colleagues would grant the petition for
rehearing en banc. In doing so, they claim that I’m wrong
on three fronts. I’m wrong about our court’s qualified
immunity jurisprudence. I’m wrong about our approach
to municipal liability under Monell.
And most
importantly, I’m wrong that there’s a sincere concern
about religious liberty presented here.
I’ll begin by responding to the two procedural
justifications for shielding even obvious First
Amendment violations from judicial review, before
addressing my colleagues’ curious skepticism about the
legitimate religious liberty concerns implicated in this
case (which should be resolved in the first instance at trial
in any event).
In doing so, I note that it’s become a regrettable but
unfortunately common practice of judges to invent
reasons to avoid addressing sensitive matters of
5a
conscience on the merits—whether it’s by concocting
procedural problems or distorting the facts. I’m not the
only one to notice this tactic.2 But I note it here because
this case is Exhibit A in the use of these stratagems.
I.
Let’s start with qualified immunity. For any citizen
who seeks damages from a public official for violating
their rights, it’s not enough that their rights have been
violated. Their rights must also be “clearly established”
at the time of the violation. One way to make this showing
is to identify binding precedent with sufficiently similar
facts that the violation should have been clear to the
public official at the time of the incident. But that’s not
supposed to be the only way to do it. Under Hope v.
Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 122 S.Ct. 2508, 153 L.Ed.2d 666
See, e.g., Christian Legal Society v. Martinez, 561 U.S. 661, 707–
18, 130 S.Ct. 2971, 177 L.Ed.2d 838 (2010) (Alito, J., dissenting)
(detailing the numerous ways in which “[t]he Court provides a
misleading portrayal of this [religious liberty] case”); Parents
Protecting Our Children v. Eau Claire Area Sch. Dist., — U.S. —,
145 S.Ct. 14, 14–15, 220 L.Ed.2d 265 (2024) (Alito, J., dissenting from
the denial of certiorari) (“I am concerned that some federal courts
are succumbing to the temptation to use the doctrine of Article III
standing as a way of avoiding some particularly contentious
constitutional questions.”); see also Tucker v. Gaddis, 40 F.4th 289,
293–97 (5th Cir. 2022) (Ho, J., concurring) (collecting examples from
other circuits about misuse of procedural doctrines to avoid deciding
religious liberty claims); U.S. Navy SEALs 1-26 v. Biden, 72 F.4th
666, 677–78 (5th Cir. 2023) (Ho, J., dissenting) (misuse of mootness to
avoid deciding religious liberty challenge to vaccine mandate); Neese
v. Becerra, 127 F.4th 601, 603–06 & n.1 (5th Cir. 2025) (Ho, J.,
dissenting from the denial of rehearing en banc) (misuse of standing
and mischaracterization of facts to avoid addressing conscience
objections to gender ideology mandate).
2
6a
(2002), and Taylor v. Riojas, 592 U.S. 7, 141 S.Ct. 52, 208
L.Ed.2d 164 (2020), a plaintiff can also overcome qualified
immunity if the violation is so egregious that it should’ve
been obvious to the official, without the need for a
materially similar case. See Hope, 536 U.S. at 741, 122
S.Ct. 2508 (“general statements of the law . . . may apply
with obvious clarity to the specific conduct in question,
even though the very action in question has not previously
been held unlawful”) (cleaned up) (quoting United States
v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 270–71, 117 S.Ct. 1219, 137
L.Ed.2d 432 (1997), and Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S.
635, 640, 107 S.Ct. 3034, 97 L.Ed.2d 523 (1987)); Taylor,
592 U.S. at 8–9 & n.2, 141 S.Ct. 52 (summarily reversing
our court's grant of qualified immunity due to the
“obviousness” of the constitutional violation) (citing Hope
and Lanier).
Unfortunately, we didn’t follow this principle in
Villarreal v. City of Laredo, 94 F.4th 374 (5th Cir. 2024).
The en banc majority held that Hope and Taylor are
Eighth Amendment cases that do not apply in other
contexts, such as the First Amendment. Id. at 395. I
dissented, noting the oddity of treating claims from
incarcerated criminals more favorably than law-abiding
citizens. Id. at 413–14 (Ho, J., dissenting).3
The Supreme Court vacated our en banc decision in Villarreal.
— U.S. —, 145 S. Ct. 368, 220 L.Ed.2d 137 (2024). But on remand,
our court reinstated its earlier en banc decision. See Villarreal v. City
of Laredo, 134 F.4th 273, 276 (5th Cir. 2025) (“[o]ur previous en banc
majority opinion is superseded only to th[e] extent” necessary to
respond to the Supreme Court's vacatur regarding the substantive
requirements of a First Amendment retaliation claim).
3
7a
Naturally, I wish my views had prevailed in Villarreal.
But they didn’t, and I’m bound to acknowledge that fact
in all intellectual honesty.
What I could not have fathomed is what my colleagues
are saying about Villarreal today. Having won in
Villarreal, they now dispute what it is that they won.
They deny that they held in Villarreal that “the
obviousness exception does not apply in First
Amendment cases.” Post, at 307.
So let’s just roll the tape. Here’s verbatim what the
Villarreal en banc majority said about qualified
immunity, Hope, Taylor, and obvious violations:
Villarreal cites no case, nor are we aware of one,
where the Supreme Court, or any other court, has
held that it is unconstitutional to arrest a person,
even a journalist, upon probable cause for violating
a statute that prohibits solicitation and receipt of
nonpublic information from the government for
personal benefit. Under the normal standards of
qualified immunity, no “clearly established law”
placed the officers on notice of Villarreal’s First
Amendment right not to be arrested. Villarreal,
however, relies on Eighth Amendment cases
where the Supreme Court denied qualified
immunity for deliberate indifference to
unconstitutional prison conditions and declined to
scrutinize the cases fact-specifically. See Hope v.
Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 738–39, 122 S.Ct. 2508, 153
L.Ed.2d 666 (2002) (“[T]he risk of harm [to the
prisoners] is obvious.”); Taylor v. Riojas, 592 U.S.
7, 9, 141 S.Ct. 52, 208 L.Ed.2d 164 (2020) (per
curiam) (“Confronted with the particularly
egregious facts of this case, any reasonable officer
8a
should have realized that Taylor’s conditions of
confinement offended the Constitution.”) (footnote
omitted)); McCoy v. Alamu, — U.S. —, 141 S. Ct.
1364, 209 L.Ed.2d 114 (2021) (instructing the court
to reconsider an Eighth Amendment case “in light
of Taylor”).
Hope and its progeny express a general, but
decidedly narrow, obviousness exception to the
requirement that “clearly established law” be
founded on materially identical facts. In any
event, those cases are inappropriate templates for
describing “clearly established” law in this
context. In Morgan v. Swanson, 659 F.3d 359, 373
(5th Cir. 2011) (en banc), a case involving First
Amendment free exercise rights, this court noted
that Hope does not stand for the broad proposition
that plaintiffs need not offer any similar cases to
prove that an officer should have been on notice
that his conduct violated the Constitution. . . .
Consequently, we adhere to the general rule that
for an asserted right to be clearly established for
purposes of qualified immunity, it must “have a
sufficiently clear foundation in then-existing
precedent” that it is “settled law.” [District of
Columbia v.] Wesby, 583 U.S. [48] at 63, 138 S.Ct.
577 [199 L.Ed.2d 453 (2018)] (citation omitted).
“The precedent must be clear enough that every
reasonable official would interpret it to establish
the particular rule the plaintiff seeks to apply.” Id.
(emphasis added).
The law is not clearly
established if referenced cases are “materially
distinguishable and thus do[ ] not govern the facts
of this case.” Rivas-Villegas [v. Cortesluna], 595
U.S. [1] at 6, 142 S.Ct. 4 [211 L.Ed.2d 164 (2021)].
9a
94 F.4th at 395 (cleaned up).
It’s hard to misread this passage. Villarreal reads
Hope and Taylor to apply only to “Eighth Amendment
cases.” Id. Hope and Taylor don’t apply in cases
“involving First Amendment free exercise rights.” Id.
And the court justifies this result by citing our earlier en
banc decision in Morgan. Id.
Now I’ll quote verbatim what I said in response in my
dissent:
The Supreme Court has made clear that public
officials who commit obvious constitutional
violations are not entitled to qualified immunity.
In fact, the Court has repeatedly reversed circuits,
including ours, for granting qualified immunity for
obvious violations of constitutional rights. See,
e.g., Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 741, 122 S.Ct.
2508, 153 L.Ed.2d 666 (2002); Taylor v. Riojas, 592
U.S. 7, 9, 141 S.Ct. 52, 208 L.Ed.2d 164 (2020).
The majority responds that the standard
articulated in Hope and Taylor doesn't apply here,
because those cases arose under the Eighth
Amendment, not the First Amendment. Ante, at
395.
But that would treat the First Amendment as a
second-class right. Nothing in § 1983 suggests
that courts should favor the Eighth Amendment
rights of convicted criminals over the First
Amendment rights of law-abiding citizens.
Nothing in Hope or Taylor indicates that those
decisions apply only to prison conditions. And no
other circuit takes the approach urged by our
colleagues in the majority. To the contrary, nine
circuits have indicated that the standards
10a
articulated in Hope apply specifically in the First
Amendment context. See, e.g., Diaz-Bigio v.
Santini, 652 F.3d 45, 50 (1st Cir. 2011); Nagle v.
Marron, 663 F.3d 100, 115–116 (2nd Cir. 2011);
McGreevy v. Stroup, 413 F.3d 359, 366 (3rd Cir.
2005); Tobey v. Jones, 706 F.3d 379, 391 n.6 (4th
Cir. 2013); MacIntosh v. Clous, 69 F.4th 309, 399
(6th Cir. 2023); Kristofek v. Vill. of Orland Hills,
832 F.3d 785, 798 (7th Cir. 2016); Galvin v. Hay,
374 F.3d 739, 746–47 (9th Cir. 2004); Frasier v.
Evans, 992 F.3d 1003, 1021–22 (10th Cir. 2021);
Leslie v. Hancock Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 720 F.3d
1338, 1345–46 (11th Cir. 2013). See also Cheeks v.
Belmar, 80 F.4th 872, 877 (8th Cir. 2023) (applying
Hope to the Fourteenth Amendment); Atherton v.
Dist. of Columbia Off. of the Mayor, 706 F.3d 512,
515 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (applying Hope to the Fifth
Amendment).
So I would apply Hope and Taylor in the First
Amendment context.
See also Morgan v.
Swanson, 659 F.3d 359, 412, 414 n.30 (5th Cir.
2011) (en banc) (Elrod, J., dissenting in part)
(concluding that Hope applies to obvious First
Amendment violations).
Id. at 413–14 (Ho, J., dissenting) (cleaned up).
If my dissent mischaracterized the majority’s ruling,
surely they would've taken me to task. But they didn’t.
Because I didn’t. (Put it another way: If our colleagues
agreed with my dissent that Hope and Taylor apply to the
First Amendment, why did they vote against Priscilla
Villarreal?) People can debate, of course, who’s right
about qualified immunity, Hope, and Taylor—the en banc
majority or my dissent. But we should be candid about
what our opinions do and don’t say. Numerous religious
11a
liberty organizations and other public interest groups
have filed amicus briefs criticizing Villarreal for refusing
to apply the obviousness exception to the First
Amendment. Start with the Alliance Defending Freedom
and the Dhillon Law Group, and their amicus brief on
behalf of the Young America’s Foundation and the
Manhattan Institute. Here’s what they said:
Some applications of laws are so “obvious[ly]”
unconstitutional, Rivas-Villegas, 595 U.S. at 6, 142
S.Ct. 4, or “egregious,” Taylor, 592 U.S. at 9, 141
S.Ct. 52, that qualified immunity dissolves without
a factually analogous case on the books. Often this
principle is associated with Hope v. Pelzer, 536
U.S. at 741, 122 S.Ct. 2508, where this Court said
“a general constitutional rule already identified in
the decisional law may apply with obvious clarity
to the specific conduct in question.” Accord, e.g.,
Anderson, 483 U.S. at 640, 107 S.Ct. 3034
(rejecting the notion “that an official action is
protected by qualified immunity unless the very
action in question has previously been held
unlawful”).
The Fifth Circuit en banc majority avoided this
conclusion by throwing out the obviousness
exception to “normal” qualified-immunity rules in
the free-speech and free exercise context.
Villarreal, 94 F.4th at 395. It refused to accept
that “the ‘obvious’ violation exception applies
broadly to arrests that may impinge on First
Amendment rights.” Id. at 392. Obviousness, the
majority said, is “no more than a possible
exception,” ibid., or one narrowly confined to
“Eighth Amendment cases,” id. at 395.
12a
This dispelling of the obviousness exception is
mistaken. Eighth Amendment precedent has its
oddities but qualified immunity isn't one of them.
Nothing in Hope or Taylor suggests that the
exception applies only to claims of cruel and
unusual punishment. Nor does confining the
obviousness exception to that narrow context
make sense. Freedoms of speech, press, and
religion are among our proudest liberties, not
“second-class right[s].” Villarreal, 94 F.4th at 413
(Ho, J., dissenting).
Brief for Young America’s Foundation and Manhattan
Institute as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner,
Villarreal v. Alaniz, 145 S. Ct. 368 (2024) (No. 23-1155),
2024 WL 2786483, *9–10.
According to ADF, Dhillon, and company, Villarreal is
“dangerous” for religious liberty: “Left undisturbed, the
Fifth Circuit’s ruling provides dangerous license for
government actors to flagrantly violate the Constitution
without recourse, even against the most established
rights, simply because they invoke a novel factual
situation never before specifically addressed by the
courts.” Id. at *12.
Consider also what the First Liberty Institute wrote:
The approach taken by the Fifth Circuit towards
qualified immunity is exactly the kind of approach
this Court castigated in Hope and its progeny. In
Hope, this Court indicated that public officials who
commit obvious constitutional violations are not
entitled to qualified immunity. See 536 U.S. at
740–42, 745–46, 122 S.Ct. 2508. Although this
principle was first articulated in the Eighth
Amendment context, it has been extended to cases
13a
involving the First Amendment, by [the Supreme]
Court and nine circuits.”
Brief of First Liberty Institute as Amicus Curiae in
Support of Petitioner, Villarreal v. Alaniz, 145 S. Ct. 368
(2024) (No. 23-1155), 2024 WL 2058693, *10.
The First Liberty Institute concluded that Villarreal is
an “insidious” ruling for religious liberty: “Whatever
value qualified immunity has, it cannot be predicated on
the distinctly un-American notion that our freedoms are
only cognizable in the light of judicial pronouncements
cast down from on high.” Id. at *11. These are the views
of the Nation’s most respected religious liberty law firms.
And they aren’t alone. A number of other organizations
have also filed Supreme Court amicus briefs protesting
our court’s elimination of the obviousness exception in
First Amendment cases. See Docket, Villarreal v.
Alaniz, No. 23-1155 (U.S.); Docket, Villarreal v. Alaniz,
No. 25-29 (U.S.); see also McMurry, 142 F.4th at 305–06
(Ho, J., concurring) (citing amici).
So they may be surprised to see what our colleagues
have to say today.
*
*
*
One possible explanation for their dissent is that our
colleagues regret what they did in Villarreal (and before
that in Morgan). But if that is so, I just wish they had
expressed this regret to the rest of us earlier, when we
could’ve done something about it. Because it’s not what
they’ve ever said before today. It’s not what our
dissenting colleague said in her opinion at the panel stage.
And it’s certainly not what Defendants have urged in
their petition for rehearing en banc. They said none of
this until today’s dissent.
14a
And notably, Hershey himself did not file an en banc
rehearing petition asking us to overturn Villarreal—
presumably because he and his counsel know how to read
opinions and count votes.
But make no mistake: Now that everyone’s on record,
I’d welcome an en banc petition from Hershey asking us
to overturn the mistaken principles of Morgan and
Villarreal, deny qualified immunity, and grant Hershey
the opportunity to go to trial. Because it sounds like there
are now the votes to do it.
That said, Hershey may prefer to preserve his Monell
win, and leave it to someone else to invoke today’s
surprising developments to try to overturn Villarreal.
And that leads me to my final point on Villarreal. I’m
beyond delighted by this surprising turn of events, to be
sure. But it bears noting that this is precisely the kind of
“surprise switcheroo” that members of our court have
criticized federal agencies for doing. Wages and White
Lion Investments, L.L.C. v. FDA, 90 F.4th 357, 386 (5th
Cir. 2024), rev’d, 604 U.S. 542, 145 S.Ct. 898, 221 L.Ed.2d
436 (2025).
I’d hold us to the same standard that we apply to others.
As imperfect human beings, we’re allowed to change our
mind, of course. But we should be candid, not caustic,
when we do so. “When an agency changes its existing
position, it . . . must at least display awareness that it is
changing position.” Id. at 381 (quotations omitted). At
least one influential scholar has suggested the same. See
Josh Blackman, A Fifth Circuit Disgrantle in the Alien
Enemies Act Case, REASON.COM, Oct. 1, 2025 (comparing
the dueling en banc opinions in United States v. Abbott,
15a
110 F.4th 700 (5th Cir. 2024), with later developments).4
Finally, the dissent asks a question that deserves a
fulsome response: “Why say ‘We are bound by this
terrible opinion,’” but “oppose rehearing to fix the
purportedly terrible opinion?” Post, at 308. “Wouldn’t it
be easier to do the right thing and vote for rehearing
now?” Id.
My two responses to their question/offer: It’s deeply
disingenuous. But I happily accept.
First, it’s disingenuous. Defendants’ petition for
rehearing en banc (obviously) doesn’t ask the court to
reverse its qualified immunity win by revisiting
Villarreal. Their petition is solely about Monell. The en
banc poll is solely about Monell. And the poll closed long
ago in any event—well before any of them ever told me
(or anyone else, from what I can tell) that they suddenly
share my opposition to Villarreal.
So they can theorize all they want that I somehow
secretly like what happened in Villarreal. But personally,
I don’t think it passes the laugh test. See, e.g., Villarreal,
94 F.4th at 409 (Ho, J., dissenting) (opposing the en banc
My colleagues deny the surprise switcheroo, and insist that we
must read Villarreal “in the context in which it was decided.” Post,
at 308. In their view, Villarreal wasn’t about refusing Hope and
Taylor at all—it was about the “concededly untainted intermediary
and the valid arrest warrant.” Post, at 307. But that’s wrong on both
fronts. It’s wrong because it can’t be squared with the verbatim
language from Villarreal that I quoted earlier. And it’s wrong
because the intermediary and warrant issues weren’t “conceded” at
all—to the contrary, multiple dissents in Villarreal discussed in
detail the tainted intermediary and invalid warrant. See, e.g., 94
F.4th at 403–04 (Higginson, J., dissenting); id. at 418–19 (Ho, J.,
dissenting).
4
16a
decision in Villarreal); McMurry, 142 F.4th at 302 (Ho,
J., concurring) (opposing the en banc decision in
Villarreal); Hershey, 156 F.4th at 557 (Ho, J., concurring)
(opposing the en banc decision in Villarreal); see also
Oliver v. Arnold, 19 F.4th 843, 843 (5th Cir. 2021) (Ho, J.,
concurring in the denial of rehearing en banc) (supporting
relief in Villarreal); Mayfield v. Butler Snow, 78 F.4th
796, 797 (5th Cir. 2023) (Ho, J., dissenting from the denial
of rehearing en banc) (supporting relief in Villarreal);
Gonzalez v. Trevino, 60 F.4th 906, 907 (5th Cir. 2023) (Ho,
J., dissenting from the denial of rehearing en banc)
(supporting relief in Villarreal). I regret the increasing
lack of candor that has come to pervade our court’s en
banc proceedings of late.
But no matter. I vote for rehearing. I’m happy to let
bygones be bygones, and ignore from here on out what
my colleagues may or may not have said before, in either
Morgan or Villarreal. I’m delighted to go back to what
we said in my original panel majority opinion in
Villarreal: Of course the obviousness exception of Hope
and Taylor applies to the First Amendment.
So as a member of the panel, I vote for the panel to
rehear this case. After today’s order is out, I’m sure that
the panel will deny qualified immunity in this case. And
that will be that.
II.
Next, municipal liability. It’s established law that, to
obtain liability under Monell, an extensive pattern of past
violations by municipal employees is sufficient—but it’s
not necessary. A single incident can also trigger liability,
but only if there’s an obvious risk of a constitutional
violation if the municipality provides “no training
whatsoever.”
17a
Our dissenting colleagues insist that that’s wrong.
Indeed, they claim that it’s “a sea change from our court’s
prior approach” to contend that “a political subdivision is
liable under Monell when it provides ‘no training
whatsoever’ on the First Amendment.” Post, at 306
(emphasis added).
But virtually every member of the dissent has
previously agreed that “a political subdivision is liable
under Monell when it provides ‘no training
whatsoever’”—at least in other constitutional contexts.
Id. See, e.g., Henderson v. Harris Cnty, 51 F.4th 125, 131
(5th Cir. 2022) (Monell liability available under the
Fourth Amendment where “the government actor was
provided no training whatsoever”) (quotations omitted);
York v. Welch, 2024 WL 775179, *5 (5th Cir.) (again,
Monell liability available under the Fourth Amendment
where “the government actor was provided no training
whatsoever”) (quotations omitted); Covington v. City of
Madisonville, 812 F. App’x 219, 225 (5th Cir. 2020)
(Monell liability available where “it should have been
apparent” that the complete “failure to train” would
result in a Fourteenth Amendment violation) (quotations
omitted); Peterson v. City of Fort Worth, 588 F.3d 838,
849 (5th Cir. 2009) (Monell liability available under the
Fourth Amendment based on “a complete failure to
train”).
None of these cases suggest a different rule for the
First Amendment. To the contrary, a municipality is
liable if it provides “‘no training whatsoever’ with respect
to the relevant constitutional duty.” Littell v. Houston
Indep. Sch. Dist., 894 F.3d 616, 625 n.5 (5th Cir. 2018)
(emphasis added).
So I don’t see a “sea change”—I see equal respect for
religious liberty when we apply Monell liability to a
18a
municipality that “provides ‘no training whatsoever’ on
the First Amendment.” Post, at 306 (emphasis added).
The dissenters wonder what might happen if we apply
our established law to the First Amendment. They
worry, for example, that federal judges might start
forcing cities to train all of their employees on “the
intricacies of commercial speech.” Post, at 306. Rest
assured that no one is saying that. Nor is anyone
ordering municipal waste workers to be taught about
Obergefell, or insisting that firefighters be instructed on
tax law.
We’re only saying what the law already says—and what
the dissenters once agreed: a municipality is liable if it
provides “‘no training whatsoever’ with respect to the
relevant constitutional duty.” Littell, 894 F.3d at 625 n.5
(emphasis added). If the training isn’t relevant, then it
isn’t required.
And that gets us to what I believe is the heart of the
dispute. The dissent seems to think that the problem with
this case is that the “risk of a constitutional violation was
infinitesimal.” Post, at 305.
I have a different view. Street preaching is not some
infinitesimally rare and obscure practice. Nor is it one
that municipalities never bother with.
People of faith have long sought opportunities to spread
the gospel in the public square. Nearly a century ago, the
Supreme Court observed that “[t]he hand distribution of
religious tracts is an age-old form of missionary
evangelism—as old as the history of printing presses.”
Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 108, 63 S.Ct. 870,
87 L.Ed. 1292 (1943). “It has been a potent force in
various religious movements down through the years,” as
people of faith “carry the Gospel to thousands upon
19a
thousands of homes and seek through personal visitations
to win adherents.” Id. at 108–9, 63 S.Ct. 870. So anyone
who is “rightfully on a street which the state has left open
to the public carries with him there as elsewhere the
constitutional right to express his views in an orderly
fashion.” Jamison v. Texas, 318 U.S. 413, 416, 63 S.Ct.
669, 87 L.Ed. 869 (1943). “This right extends to the
communication of ideas by handbills and literature as well
as by the spoken word.” Id.
It’s a religious practice that dates back thousands of
years. The Bible speaks of the Great Commission, in
which Jesus calls on the disciples to go forth and spread
the word to others in every nation. MATTHEW 28:16–20.
“[O]pen-air preaching was a preferred method of Jonah,
Jeremiah, the apostle Paul, and many others.” Ryan
Denton, Into the Highways and Hedges: A Primer for
Open-Air Preaching, DESIRING GOD, Feb. 4, 2024,
available
at
www.desiringgod.org/articles/into-thehighways-and-hedges. “They went to the people and
preached God’s word.” Id. After all, “Jesus went into the
boat or up on the mountainside to preach the good news.”
Id.
My dissenting colleagues question why I invoke
“thousands of years” of religious tradition. Post, at 305.
But they invoked millennia of legal tradition in
Environment Texas Citizen Lobby, Inc. v. ExxonMobil
Corp., 123 F.4th 309 (5th Cir. 2024)—even where it didn’t
seem relevant.5 So if we’re going to consider millennia of
5
In that case, I questioned the relevance of Roman law to the
established practice of American courts on dismissing appeals as
improvidently granted. I’m grateful that my colleagues stepped
away from the point shortly thereafter. See, e.g., Silverthorne
20a
legal tradition since at least the time of Roman rule, then
we ought to consider millennia of religious tradition since
Roman times as well—particularly where it’s actually
relevant to the issues presented.
The Harvard Religious Freedom Clinic certainly thinks
it relevant. Just this year, they briefed the U.S. Supreme
Court that street preaching is an “ancient tradition” with
“deep historical roots.” Brief of Stephen Nylen et al. as
Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner, Olivier v. City of
Brandon, No. 24-993 (U.S.), 2025 WL 2676057, *4. I
agree that it’s relevant in cases like this that the devout
have sought to spread the gospel to others as an essential
part of their faith for millennia.
The most effective way to spread the word to others, of
course, is to go where lots of people congregate. “The
First Amendment protects the right of every citizen to
reach the minds of willing listeners and to do so there
must be opportunity to win their attention.” Heffron v.
Int’l Soc. for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640,
655, 101 S.Ct. 2559, 69 L.Ed.2d 298 (1981) (cleaned up,
emphasis added). Concert venues are an ideal forum for
the street preacher. As one of the most famous street
preachers has observed, “music venues” are a “good
open-air setting” for street preaching because it’s a
“public location where people gather where they’re not in
a hurry and can take time to listen.” RAY COMFORT,
FIFTY YEARS OF OPEN-AIR PREACHING 50 (2024). See
also Denton, Into the Highways (“open-air preaching is
especially useful . . . outside a sporting event”).
Seismic v. Sterling Seismic Srvs., 125 F.4th 593, 598 & n.5 (5th Cir.
2025) (discussing practice of dismissing discretionary appeals as
improvidently granted).
21a
Municipalities are not only well aware of this—a
number of them don’t like it, and endeavor to stop it.
In fact, municipalities are so actively opposed to street
preaching that our court has had to adjudicate
constitutional objections to their restrictive policies in
case after case. See, e.g., Siders v. City of Brandon, 123
F.4th 293 (5th Cir. 2024) (Christian advocate prevented
from evangelizing outside public amphitheater); Herridge
v. Montgomery Cnty., No. 21-20264, 2022 WL 989421 (5th
Cir. Apr. 1, 2022) (Christian advocate prevented from
distributing pamphlets near outdoor pavilion in Houston);
Olivier v. City of Brandon, 2023 WL 5500223 (5th Cir.)
(street preacher prevented from evangelizing outside
public amphitheater), cert. granted, — U.S. —, 145 S. Ct.
2871, 222 L.Ed.2d 1154 (2025); Denton v. City of El Paso,
861 F. App’x 836 (5th Cir. 2021) (Christian advocate
prevented from evangelizing at an outdoor farmer’s
market); Roy v. City of Monroe, 950 F.3d 245 (5th Cir.
2020) (street preacher prevented from evangelizing on
the sidewalk outside of a local bar); Allen v. Cisneros, 815
F.3d 239 (5th Cir. 2016) (street preacher prevented from
evangelizing on the streets of Houston); Grisham v. City
of Fort Worth, 837 F.3d 564 (5th Cir. 2016) (Christian
advocate prevented from distributing literature on public
sidewalks).
Our dissenting colleagues know this. Take Siders, for
example, about a “Christian who seeks to evangelize and
share the gospel with others.” 123 F.4th at 298. She
“particularly likes to share the gospel on public ways near
and outside of public events . . . because such occasions
offer her an opportunity to reach a meaningful number of
people with her message.” Id. She likes preaching at
music venues because “she can find meaningful
22a
pedestrian traffic flow on days of amphitheater events as
attendees walk toward the amphitheater.” Id.
Our colleagues have acknowledged that this is no
obscure exercise of faith—to the contrary, they’ve
suggested that there’s so much of it that they worry about
obstructing traffic. See Siders v. Mississippi, 130 F.4th
188, 190 (5th Cir. 2025) (noting concerns about
“congestion,” “interference with ingress or egress,”
“ensuring public safety and order,” and “promoting the
free flow of traffic on streets and sidewalks” to justify
shutting down street preachers).
In sum: In Hershey, the activity is rare, so there’s no
liability. In Siders, the activity occurs far too much, so
there’s no liability. I would not treat these conflicts as
infinitesimally rare. I would suggest that we’re all just
making a judgment call as to whether we think this is a
First Amendment right worth protecting—or not.6
6
Our dissenting colleagues highlight the amicus brief filed by the
states in our circuit. It’s not surprising, of course, that the states
would oppose litigants who seek to hold government officials liable.
Counsel for government always argues against liability for
government. That’s their job. It’s our job to enforce the Constitution.
The states are concerned about being flooded with frivolous
prisoner complaints. So am I. Of course, they’re already flooded with
such suits—since well before Hershey.
We can—and we must—protect the First Amendment rights of
law-abiding citizens, even as we work to shield prison officials from
frivolous prisoner complaints. We can walk and chew gum at the
same time. As federal judges, we’re paid to do so.
And that leads me to the question we should really be asking. Why
acknowledge only the government amici? Why not also acknowledge
the numerous amici who have filed brief after brief after brief
expressing grave concerns about the state of freedom of speech and
23a
III.
That brings us to the main event—religious liberty. As
I noted at the outset, the First Amendment violation
presented here should be obvious. Of course people have
the right to spread the gospel in public spaces. Yet our
colleagues deny that this case presents a legitimate
religious liberty issue.
Richard Hershey claims the right to share religious
materials in public spaces. But our colleagues deny that
his claim has anything to do with religious liberty.
To begin with, their challenge to Hershey’s sincerity is
ultimately a red herring. Because the rule of liability they
propose would govern the most faithful as well as the
most imperfect (which is to say, all of us).
It’s also an issue to be resolved by a jury—not appellate
judges. The amended complaint makes clear that
“Hershey
was
distributing
free,
educational,
noncommercial, religious booklets on behalf of a nonprofit
organization
named
the
Christian
Vegetarian
Association.” ROA.75. It’s a message that Hershey has
made clear he “feels compelled to share with others.”
ROA.192. My colleagues question Hershey’s bona fides
as a Christian. But that strikes me as (among other
things) beyond our province at this stage of the
proceedings.
Hershey’s sincerity was not doubted by the district
court. And even at the panel stage, one of our dissenting
religious liberty in our circuit? See, e.g., McMurry, 142 F.4th at 305–
06 (Ho, J., concurring) (noting broad range of amici and religious
liberty experts who have criticized our decisions in Morgan and
Villarreal); Gonzalez v. Trevino, 60 F.4th 906, 913 & n.4 (5th Cir.
2023) (Ho, J., dissenting from the denial of rehearing en banc) (same).
24a
colleagues doubted only whether Defendants had ever
“previously” targeted “someone engaging in free
exercise of religion or free speech.” Hershey, 156 F.4th
at 577–78 (Richman, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part). Defendants themselves have acknowledged on
appeal that Hershey “travels around the country
spreading his Christian vegetarian message on college
campuses, at event centers, and other forums.” Brief for
Defendants, Hershey v. City of Bossier, 156 F.4th 555
(2025) (No. 21-30754), 2022 WL 1136998, *3 (quotations
omitted).
But our dissenting colleagues now question “what [the
Christian Vegetarian Association] has to do with
Christianity.” Post, at 305.
Paul’s epistle to the Romans acknowledges that some
people of faith will only eat vegetables. Paul warns
believers to respect such views. “The one who eats
everything must not treat with contempt the one who
does not, and the one who does not eat everything must
not judge the one who does, for God has accepted them.
Who are you to judge someone else’s servant? To their
own master, servants stand or fall. And they will stand,
for the Lord is able to make them stand.” ROMANS 14:3-4.
Our colleagues also highlight the fact that “Hershey
gets paid” for spreading these religious views. Post, at
305. But recall Paul’s first epistle to the church in
Corinth. See 1 CORINTHIANS 9:3-14. Paul observes that
“those who preach the gospel should receive their living
from the gospel.” 1 CORINTHIANS 9:14 (emphasis added).
See also Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens
Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 761, 96 S.Ct. 1817,
48 L.Ed.2d 346 (1976) (“Speech . . . is protected even
though it is . . . ‘sold’ for profit.”); Villarreal, 94 F.4th at
25a
420 (Ho, J., dissenting) (“There is no pro bono
requirement to the freedom of speech.”).
So I would not question the sincerity of Hershey’s faith
(and especially not at this early stage of the proceedings,
on review of a motion to dismiss). Nor is this the first time
we’ve seen unwarranted skepticism when it comes to
religious liberty. In Siders, our colleagues argued that
the ordinance challenged there did not prevent citizens
from evangelizing on public grounds. See, e.g., 130 F.4th
at 189 (Oldham, J., concurring in the denial of rehearing
en banc) (“[T]he ordinance does not purport to regulate
prayer, conversation, t-shirts, evangelism, or tracts.”).
But in Olivier, by contrast, they condemned the same
ordinance at the same amphitheater because it prevents
“an evangelical Christian who feels called to share the
good news with his fellow citizens . . . from doing so
outside the city's public amphitheater.” 121 F.4th 511, 512
(5th Cir. 2024) (Ho, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing
en banc, joined by five members of the court).7
Finally, the dissent suggests that I am violating party
presentation by treating this as a religious liberty case, rather than
as a free speech case. Post, at 308-309. My colleagues made the same
point in Siders. And my response is the same: “religious expression
is, of course, protected under the Freedom of Speech Clause.”
Siders, 130 F.4th at 192 (Ho, J., dissenting from the denial of
rehearing en banc). The Supreme Court’s recent decision in 303
Creative LLC v. Elenis, 600 U.S. 570, 143 S.Ct. 2298, 216 L.Ed.2d
1131 (2023), was based on the Free Speech Clause. Would the
dissenters be horrified if anyone called that decision a win for
religious liberty? Surely not. As the Supreme Court recently
reminded us, “the Free Speech Clause provides overlapping
protection for expressive religious activities.” Kennedy v. Bremerton
Sch. Dist., 597 U.S. 507, 523, 142 S.Ct. 2407, 213 L.Ed.2d 755 (2022).
“That the First Amendment doubly protects religious speech is no
accident. It is a natural outgrowth of the framers’ distrust of
7
26a
*
*
*
Judicial opinions should be read charitably. But I
struggle to see how our dissenting colleagues haven’t
reversed themselves on qualified immunity under
Villarreal and Morgan—or on whether Monell applies
when there’s been no training whatsoever—or on what
government actions threaten religious liberty. If I was
one of the religious liberty groups who devotes their Godgiven talents, time, and treasure to advocating for folks
like Spring Siders, Gabriel Olivier, Richard Hershey, and
Priscilla Villarreal, I’d wonder why they’re being accused
of misrepresenting this court’s precedents and
fabricating religious liberty threats out of thin air. I’d
also wonder about the unexplained changes of position
that they’ve seen from this court. I’d “wonder what’s
driving all of these gymnastics.” Post, at 309.
ANDREW S. OLDHAM, Circuit Judge, joined by JONES,
SMITH, RICHMAN, DUNCAN, ENGELHARDT, and WILSON,
Circuit Judges, dissenting from the denial of rehearing en
banc:
Richard Hershey is a “vegetarian advocate whose
ethical beliefs compel him to share his message with
others.” ROA.75. When security officers told Hershey to
stop distributing his leaflets, he sued for “deprivation of
his rights of speech.” ROA.85, 86–87. Hershey does not
allege that the officers even knew of the content of his
government attempts to regulate religion and suppress dissent. In
Anglo–American history, government suppression of speech has so
commonly been directed precisely at religious speech that a freespeech clause without religion would be Hamlet without the prince.”
Id. (cleaned up).
27a
vegetarianism leaflets—let alone targeted him for his
vegetarian views. See ROA.75–79. Nor does Hershey
allege anything about his religion. You’ll look in vain for
any mention in Hershey’s complaint about faith,
religiosity, the First Amendment’s Religion Clauses, or
evangelism. The closest he gets is to allege that he
distributed leaflets from “the Christian Vegetarian
Association”—without any allegation about what that
organization is, what it has to do with Christianity, what
it has to do with Hershey’s faith, or whether Hershey is
even a man of any faith. ROA.75. To the contrary, the
complaint alleges that Hershey gets paid to distribute
leaflets “by various nonprofit organizations”—without
regard to religion of any kind. Ibid.
But you would not know that from the opinion
concurring in the denial of rehearing en banc. In that
opinion, this case about vegetarian ethics somehow
transforms into a battle over street preaching, the Great
Commission, hatred of Christians, and religious
persecution dating back “thousands of years.” Ante, at
301 (Ho, J., concurring); see also Siders v. Mississippi,
130 F.4th 188, 191 (Ho, J., dissenting from the denial of
rehearing en banc) (5th Cir. 2025) (doing the same thing).
This quixotic effort does nothing to justify the panel’s
badly splintered, three-judge-four-opinion approach to
this case. And while it tilts at windmills that appear
nowhere in this case, it does nothing to justify our court’s
refusal to reconsider the matter en banc.
At the panel stage, the three-judge panel issued four
opinions. The per curiam opinion recognized that the
panel was (to put it mildly) “splintered.” Hershey v. City
of Bossier City, 156 F.4th 555, 556 (5th Cir. 2025) (per
curiam). Then all three judges issued their own opinions.
Judges Richman and Ho wrote the controlling rule on
28a
qualified immunity. Judge Ho declared that he would
have sided with Judge Dennis on qualified immunity had
circuit precedent not prevented him. Then Judges
Dennis and Ho wrote the controlling rule on the City’s
liability under Monell v. Department of Social Services of
City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d
611 (1978). Given the far-reaching implications of the
qualified immunity rule embraced by Judge Ho, given the
Monell holding embraced by Judges Dennis and Ho, and
given that future parties will need Venn diagrams to
understand what this deeply fractured panel held, we
should have taken the case en banc.
I begin with (I) the panel’s Monell holding, because it's
the most egregious. Then I address (II) the panel’s
qualified immunity holding. Finally, I address the
hyperbolic assertion that (III) rehearing this case would
have been comparable to throwing Christians to the lions.
I
First, Monell. I begin with (A) the Monell rule
announced by Judges Dennis and Ho and then turn to (B)
its anomalies.
A
Judges Dennis and Ho turn the world upside down. See
Hershey, 156 F.4th at 561 (HO, J., concurring); id. at 563–
64 (DENNIS, J., concurring in relevant part). Before the
panel’s decision, plaintiffs could allege a Monell claim
based on a single incident only if a municipality “fail[ed]
to train its employees concerning a clear constitutional
duty implicated in recurrent situations that a particular
employee is certain to face.” Littell v. Houston Indep.
Sch. Dist., 894 F.3d 616, 624–25 (5th Cir. 2018) (quoting
City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 396, 109 S.Ct.
1197, 103 L.Ed.2d 412 (1989) (O’CONNOR, J., concurring
29a
in part and dissenting in part)). Such circumstances were
“very narrow.” Id. at 624. The classic example: if a city
gave its officers guns but no training on when to use them.
See Canton, 489 U.S. at 390 n.10, 109 S.Ct. 1197.
Under the rule embraced by Judges Dennis and Ho,
however, plaintiffs need only allege that defendants
lacked training to handle plaintiff’s case—even if the ex
ante risk of a constitutional violation was infinitesimal.
ROA.86; see also Hershey, 156 F.4th at 561 (HO, J.,
concurring); id. at 563–64 (DENNIS, J., concurring in
relevant part). This doctrinal Calvinball will have
predictable effect: As Judge Richman ably explained,
plaintiffs can always “granulate allegations so finely that
they arrive at a ‘complete failure to train,’” so they will be
able to allege municipal liability in “virtually every
instance.” Id. at 578 (RICHMAN, J., dissenting in relevant
part) (quotation omitted).
That might be a good rule; it might be a bad one. But
either way, it’s a sea change from our court’s prior
approach. See Pineda v. City of Houston, 291 F.3d 325,
334 (5th Cir. 2002) (emphasizing that this court has
“necessarily [ ] been wary of finding municipal liability”
based on a single incident). And it’s the sort of thing that
our en banc court should announce with clarity—not the
sort of thing we should sort-of say in a four-way fractured
decision that has all the precision of a cubist painting.
B
The controlling Monell rule creates a host of anomalies.
Three bear emphasis.
First, Monell liability is generally derivative of an
underlying constitutional tort committed by an officer.
“As is well established, every Monell claim requires an
underlying constitutional violation.” Hicks-Fields v.
30a
Harris County, 860 F.3d 803, 808 (5th Cir. 2017)
(quotation omitted). Consequently, we routinely dismiss
Monell claims against political subdivisions where the
plaintiff fails to establish a § 1983 claim against an
individual officer. But one of the panel opinions does the
opposite: It says no individual officer ever can be held
liable—even for the most obvious First Amendment
violation—but every political subdivision can always be
held liable for any failure to train—even for potentialities
that could not reasonably be foreseen. See Hershey, 156
F.4th at 561 (HO, J., concurring).
Second, the panel’s Monell rule proves both too much
and too little. The rule provides that a political
subdivision is liable under Monell when it provides “no
training whatsoever” on the First Amendment. Hershey,
156 F.4th at 561 (HO, J., concurring); id. at 563–64
(DENNIS, J., concurring in relevant part). That proves far
too much because if Bossier City had provided training on
say, the intricacies of commercial speech, then
presumably this case would have come out differently? It
also proves far too little because Hershey provided no
evidence whatsoever of a failure to train. Nor did
Hershey do anything to show that officers ever faced
another vegetarian-ethicist pamphleteer (or any other
pamphleteer, or any other speech problem for that
matter). See ROA.85–86. So even if Bossier City did not
provide any training, that fact does not save Hershey’s
deficient pleadings.
Third, the Monell rule is equally applicable to failureto-train cases under the Fourth or Eighth Amendments.
Plaintiffs need only allege that officers were not trained
the specific situation at hand and, voila, the plaintiff has
a Monell claim. That is why every State in our circuit
urged us to rehear this case—and warned us that lawsuits
31a
will proliferate, discovery costs will soar, and
municipalities will be forced to re-allocate precious time
and resources.
Br. for the States of Louisiana,
Mississippi, and Texas as Amici Curiae, at 6–10. This
burden will weigh most heavily on prisons and jails, which
face constant failure-to-train allegations. See id. at 8.
And it will embolden judges to find Monell violations in
such contexts. See, e.g., Alvarez v. City of Brownsville,
904 F.3d 382, 402 (5th Cir. 2018) (en banc) (Dennis, J.,
dissenting) (dissenting from court’s rejection of Monell
claim that city failed to disclose exculpatory evidence); see
also Bond v. Nueces County, No. 20-40050, 2022 WL
4595000, at *9 (5th Cir. Sept. 30, 2022) (opinion of
DENNIS, J.) (vacating district court’s rejection of
plaintiff’s Monell claim based on alleged constitutional
violations by a prison).
The predictable consequences of the panel’s flawed
Monell holding further underscore why we should have
taken this case en banc.
II
Next, qualified immunity. According to Judge Ho, our
court’s approach to qualified immunity in First
Amendment cases is deeply flawed. So flawed that it has
garnered scathing criticism from the Alliance Defending
Freedom, the First Liberty Institute, and other religiousliberty organizations. If our precedent is that bad,
however, we should obviously go en banc to overturn it.
It’s surpassing strange to say, “our precedent requires
persecution of Christians,” and then say, “we should not
go en banc to fix it!” See ante, at 293 (Ho, J., concurring)
(saying that).
32a
I explain (A) Fifth Circuit precedent and (B) the
puzzling decision to recognize an error, refuse to overturn
it, and then complain about it anyway.
A
At the panel stage in this case, two judges would have
denied qualified immunity. See Hershey, 156 F.4th at
558–59 (HO, J., concurring); id. at 564 (DENNIS, J.,
dissenting in relevant part). But one of these panel
members opted to grant qualified immunity because,
apparently, our court has held that the obviousness
exception does not apply in First Amendment cases. See
id. at 560 (HO, J., concurring) (citing Villarreal v. City of
Laredo, 94 F.4th 374, 395 (5th Cir. 2024) (en banc)
(Villarreal II); see also ante, at 293 (same).
I do not read Villarreal II that way. In that case, the
panel itself held the state statute at issue was “not one of
those ‘obviously unconstitutional’ statutes” on its face.
Villarreal v. City of Laredo, 44 F.4th 363, 372 (5th Cir.
2022) (opinion of HO, J.) (Villarreal I). So the question
for the en banc court in Villarreal II was whether officers
unconstitutionally applied that valid statute to a “citizen
journalist”—even after an independent intermediary
found probable cause for the citizen’s arrest and issued a
valid warrant. 94 F.4th at 393– 94; see also id. at 394
(noting Villarreal alleged nothing to say the independent
intermediary was somehow tainted). “[I]n this context,”
the court held, cases discussing “obvious” constitutional
violations like Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 122 S.Ct. 2508,
153 L.Ed.2d 666 (2002), and Taylor v. Riojas, 592 U.S. 7,
141 S.Ct. 52, 208 L.Ed.2d 164 (2020), were “inappropriate
templates” for the qualified-immunity inquiry. Villarreal
II, 94 F.4th at 395. That does not forever and for all
reasons reject obviousness as a ground for denying
qualified immunity. It simply holds that, in the context of
33a
the particular circumstances of the concededly untainted
intermediary and the valid arrest warrant in Villarreal’s
case, the officers did not obviously violate the
Constitution by arresting her. See id. at 397 (holding
Villarreal failed to show an “obvious” constitutional
violation—not that “obviousness” is no longer a
cognizable claim in our circuit (quotation omitted)).
Judge Ho’s contrary reading of Villarreal II is the
opposite of “charitabl[e].” Ante, at 304. Both because it
requires reading lines in Villarreal II out of context, and
because it pits Villarreal II against binding Supreme
Court precedent. As the Supreme Court has said,
“[t]here can be no doubt that the First Amendment
protects the right to pray”—even in the absence of a case
so holding. Sause v. Bauer, 585 U.S. 957, 959, 138 S.Ct.
2561, 201 L.Ed.2d 982 (2018) (per curiam). Indeed, the
entire point of § 1983 liability in First Amendment cases
is that plaintiffs can prevail without pointing to earlier,
on-point cases. See, e.g., Gonzalez v. Trevino, 602 U.S.
653, 658, 144 S.Ct. 1663, 219 L.Ed.2d 332 (2024) (per
curiam). Our sister circuits agree. Some have denied
qualified immunity in the First Amendment context on
obviousness grounds. See MacIntosh v. Clous, 69 F.4th
309, 320 (6th Cir. 2023); Tobey v. Jones, 706 F.3d 379, 392
(4th Cir. 2013). Many have granted qualified immunity in
the First Amendment context while acknowledging that
alleged facts did not fall within the obviousness exception.
See Diaz-Bigio v. Santini, 652 F.3d 45, 50 (1st Cir. 2011);
Nagle v. Marron, 663 F.3d 100, 115–16 (2d. Cir. 2011);
Kristofek v. Vill. of Orland Hills, 832 F.3d 785, 798 (7th
Cir. 2016); Galvin v. Hay, 374 F.3d 739, 746–47 (9th Cir.
2004); Frasier v. Evans, 992 F.3d 1003, 1021–22 (10th Cir.
2021); Leslie v. Hancock Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 720 F.3d
1338, 1346 (11th Cir. 2013). We should not lightly
presume that Villarreal II meant to break with all these
34a
authorities—especially when a more plausible and
narrower reading of the precedent is readily available.
That is not a “surprise switcheroo.” Ante, at 298 (HO,
J., concurring). That is simply reading an opinion in the
context in which it was decided.
B
But insofar as Villarreal II held what Judge Ho says it
held, that is all the more reason to go en banc and to do
so immediately. “This is terrible, so please do not fix it”
is an incoherent basis for voting against rehearing. It is
even more incoherent to deny rehearing, end the case in
this court, and then invite the parties to continue
litigating. See ante, at 299 (HO, J., concurring). Why say
“We are bound by this terrible opinion,” oppose rehearing
to fix the purportedly terrible opinion, celebrate the order
preserving the purportedly terrible opinion, and then
invite additional litigation to, what, remain bound by the
purportedly terrible opinion? Wouldn’t it be easier to do
the right thing and vote for rehearing now? Unless the
point of all of this is to imagine a horrible rule for the
purpose of inveighing against it? Whatever the point, a
vote to deny en banc rehearing here protects a precedent
that Judge Ho reads to “treat[] claims from incarcerated
criminals more favorably than law-abiding citizens.”
Ante, at 295. An “oddity” for sure. Ibid.
III
Finally, a word about the religious-liberty implications
of this case. Judge Ho says the court was correct to deny
rehearing in this case because doing so protects “the right
to spread the gospel in public spaces.” Ante, at 303.
Again, this assertion is bizarre.
Perhaps it’s true that the rules announced in the panel’s
four-way, deeply fractured opinions implicate religious
35a
liberty. That is all the more reason to rehear this case en
banc rather than rely on future parties and panels to
decipher the relevant holding in the short per curiam
opinion—which is the only opinion that garnered a
majority vote. That is especially true if the premise of this
entire mess was a reading of Villarreal II that conflicts
with Supreme Court precedent, splits from every other
circuit to consider the question, and portends disastrous
consequences for people of faith. See Part II, supra.
But even if it’s true that this case has implications for
Christian evangelism, that does not mean that Richard
Hershey is himself a Christian evangelist. If Hershey
alleged something—anything—about his faith, we’d
obviously be bound to accept it. Courts have “no license
to declare . . . whether an adherent has ‘correctly
perceived’ the commands of his religion.” Masterpiece
Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. C.R. Comm’n, 584 U.S. 617, 651,
138 S.Ct. 1719, 201 L.Ed.2d 35 (2018) (Gorsuch, J.,
concurring). We take a plaintiff’s religious claims as they
come, since it is “not for us to say that [a plaintiff’s]
religious beliefs are mistaken or insubstantial.” Burwell
v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682, 725, 134 S.Ct.
2751, 189 L.Ed.2d 675 (2014). The problem is that
Hershey himself alleges nothing about Rome, persecuted
Christians, street preaching, the Great Commission,
religious liberty, or anything that implicates the First
Amendment’s Religion Clauses in any way. But see ante,
at 303-04 (Ho, J., concurring) (invoking 1 CORINTHIANS
9:3-14 for the proposition that Richard Hershey is a
Christian pastor?). Observing that fact says nothing
about the sincerity of Hershey’s belief. In fact, it does the
opposite: it recognizes and honors the belief that Hershey
chose to identify in his court filings—namely, the belief
that he has a free speech right to hand out vegetarianism
36a
pamphlets for money. In other circumstances, members
of our court care about party presentation:
In our adversarial system of adjudication, we
follow the principle of party presentation. We rely
on the parties to frame the issues for decision and
assign to courts the role of neutral arbiter of
matters the parties present. Our system is
designed around the premise that parties
represented by competent counsel know what is
best for them, and are responsible for advancing
the facts and argument entitling them to relief. In
short: Courts are essentially passive instruments
of government. They do not sally forth each day
looking for wrongs to right. They wait for cases to
come to them, and when cases arise, courts
normally decide only questions presented by the
parties.
Gonzalez v. CoreCivic, Inc., 986 F.3d 536, 540 (5th Cir.
2021) (Ho, J., concurring) (quotations omitted). But in
this case, the court apparently is an active instrument of
government that can sally forth and right wrongs that
Richard Hershey and his able counsel never imagined.
*
*
*
At the end of the day, my concurring colleague presents
an imaginary case that implicates persecuted Christians
in Rome, “religious liberty,” and the “ancient tradition” of
street preaching, ante, at 301, 393-94 (Ho, J.,
concurring)—rather than the facts of this case. He reads
our precedent to create catastrophic consequences for
religious liberty—and then says we should retain that
horrible precedent and embrace the horrible
consequences. And then he turns Monell upside down
and celebrates a new failure-to-train theory that will
benefit hardened criminals and saddle political
37a
subdivisions in every § 1983 case. You have to wonder
what’s driving all of these gymnastics. I would have
granted en banc rehearing to figure it out.
I respectfully dissent.
38a
APPENDIX B
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE
FIFTH CIRCUIT
No. 21-30754
RICHARD HERSHEY,
Plaintiff — Appellant,
v.
CITY OF BOSSIER CITY; BOBBY GILBERT, Individually
and in his Capacity as Deputy Marshall; DANIEL
STOLL; DAVID SMITH; TYSHON HARVEY; EUGENE
TUCKER,
Defendants — Appellees.
Filed: October 7, 2025
Revised: October 8, 2025
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Louisiana
USDC No. 5:21-CV-460
Before DENNIS, RICHMAN, and HO, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
This is a splintered panel decision involving an
individual’s First Amendment right to distribute leaflets
on the sidewalk on the grounds of CenturyLink Center.
A majority of the panel (JUDGES DENNIS and HO) agrees
39a
to reverse the district court’s dismissal of the Monell1
claim against Bossier City for failure to train. A second
majority (JUDGES RICHMAN and HO) agrees to affirm the
grant of qualified immunity for the police officers and to
affirm the dismissal of the security guards.
We AFFIRM in part and REVERSE in part the
district court’s judgment.
JAMES C. HO, Circuit Judge, concurring:
The First Amendment protects not just the right to
pray, but to preach. To not only worship, but to witness.
The right to exercise your religion includes the right to
evangelize your faith.
And that’s what's at issue in this case. Richard Hershey
alleges that he wanted to distribute religious pamphlets
on a public sidewalk while a concert was being held
nearby—but that a group of police officers and security
guards threatened to arrest him if he did so.
So I agree that we should remand Hershey’s claim
against the City of Bossier for failing to train its officers
to respect the constitutional rights of its citizens.
Moreover, if it were up to me, his claims against the
individual police officers and security guards would
proceed to trial as well. Unfortunately, recent precedents
of our court force us to grant qualified immunity.
To be sure, I strongly disagree with our court’s
approach to qualified immunity as applied in the First
Monell v. New York City Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 98
S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978).
1
40a
Amendment and other contexts. See, e.g., Villarreal v.
City of Laredo, 94 F.4th 374, 409 (5th Cir. 2024) (Ho, J.,
dissenting); see also McMurry v. Weaver, 142 F.4th 292,
304–7 (5th Cir. 2025) (Ho, J., concurring) (discussing
Villarreal and Morgan v. Swanson, 659 F.3d 359 (5th Cir.
2011)). Likewise, I strongly disagree with our court’s
approach to the First Amendment as applied to acts of
evangelism on public sidewalks outside a public
amphitheater. See, e.g., Siders v. City of Brandon, 130
F.4th 188, 191 (5th Cir. 2025) (Ho, J., dissenting from
denial of rehearing en banc).
Our court’s record of protecting First Amendment
rights leaves much to be desired, to say the least. But as
a member of this panel, I’m bound to faithfully follow our
precedents, whether I agree with them or not. So I
reluctantly concur in affirming the grant of qualified
immunity, as compelled by our (mistaken) circuit
precedent.
I.
The First Amendment protects the “free exercise” of
religion, not just the right to “worship.” Horvath v. City
of Leander, 946 F.3d 787, 795–96 (5th Cir. 2020) (Ho, J.,
concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in
part). And “the right to the free exercise of religion
unquestionably encompasses the right to preach,
proselyte, and perform other similar religious functions.”
McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618, 626, 98 S.Ct. 1322, 55
L.Ed.2d 593 (1978). “The dissemination of . . . religious
views and doctrines is protected by the First
Amendment.”
Heffron v. Int’l Soc. for Krishna
Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640, 647, 101 S.Ct. 2559, 69
L.Ed.2d 298 (1981).
41a
This right plainly encompasses the distribution of
religious pamphlets—the activity at issue in this case. As
the Supreme Court observed nearly a century ago, “[t]he
hand distribution of religious tracts is an age-old form of
missionary evangelism—as old as the history of printing
presses.” Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 108,
63 S.Ct. 870, 87 L.Ed. 1292 (1943). “It has been a potent
force in various religious movements down through the
years,” as people of faith “carry the Gospel to thousands
upon thousands of homes and seek through personal
visitations to win adherents.” Id. at 108–9, 63 S.Ct. 870.
“This form of religious activity occupies the same high
estate under the First Amendment as do worship in the
churches and preaching from the pulpits.” Id. at 109, 63
S.Ct. 870.
So anyone who is “rightfully on a street which the state
has left open to the public carries with him there as
elsewhere the constitutional right to express his views in
an orderly fashion.” Jamison v. Texas, 318 U.S. 413, 416,
63 S.Ct. 669, 87 L.Ed. 869 (1943). “This right extends to
the communication of ideas by handbills and literature as
well as by the spoken word.” Id.
II.
Hershey’s right to evangelize on a public sidewalk is not
undermined by the fact that the city-owned facility
abutting the sidewalk happens to be managed by a private
corporation. Nor should it matter that his rights were
violated by private security guards working alongside
police officers. Municipalities cannot abrogate the
constitutional rights of their citizens simply by delegating
their coercive governmental powers to private agents.
The Supreme Court addressed this very contention in
Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 66 S.Ct. 276, 90 L.Ed.
42a
265 (1946). In Marsh, the Court was asked to answer the
following question: “Can th[e] people who live in or come
to Chickasaw be denied freedom of press and religion
simply because a single company has legal title to all the
town?” Id. at 505, 66 S.Ct. 276. “For it is the State’s
contention that the mere fact that all the property
interests in the town are held by a single company is
enough to give that company power, enforceable by a
state statute, to abridge these freedoms.” Id.
The Court made clear that it “cannot accept that
contention.” Id. at 506, 66 S.Ct. 276. “Whether a
corporation or a municipality owns or possesses the town
the public in either case has an identical interest in the
functioning of the community in such manner that the
channels of communication remain free.” Id. at 507, 66
S.Ct. 276. “The managers appointed by the corporation
cannot curtail the liberty of press and religion of these
people consistently with the purposes of the
Constitutional guarantees.” Id. at 508, 66 S.Ct. 276.
“Many people in the United States live in company-owned
towns. These people, just as residents of municipalities,
are free citizens of their State and country.” Id. “There
is no more reason for depriving these people of the
liberties guaranteed by the First and Fourteenth
Amendments than there is for curtailing these freedoms
with respect to any other citizen.” Id. at 508–09, 66 S.Ct.
276.
Accordingly, the Court vacated the conviction of a
member of Jehovah’s Witnesses, for her only crime was
leafletting on the sidewalks of the company town. See id.
at 509, 66 S.Ct. 276 (“Insofar as the State has attempted
to impose criminal punishment on appellant for
undertaking to distribute religious literature in a
company town, its action cannot stand.”). See also Lee v.
43a
Katz, 276 F.3d 550, 557 (9th Cir. 2002) (private lessee of
public plaza cannot violate the First Amendment rights of
street preachers).
Like Grace Marsh, Richard Hershey’s First
Amendment rights should not depend on whether he was
ejected by a cop or a contractor. He alleges that private
security guards assisted the police in ejecting him from
the area. So he has stated a cognizable claim against
“[p]rivate persons” who “jointly engaged with state
officials in the prohibited action.” United States v. Price,
383 U.S. 787, 794, 86 S.Ct. 1152, 16 L.Ed.2d 267 (1966).
III.
All of this should have been amply sufficient to defeat
qualified immunity at this preliminary stage of the
proceedings—and to allow Hershey to proceed to trial.
After all, the Supreme Court has repeatedly denied
qualified immunity where it found the constitutional
violation so “obvious” that it didn’t require the plaintiff to
identify factually indistinguishable case law. See, e.g.,
Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 741, 122 S.Ct. 2508, 153
L.Ed.2d 666 (2002) (“general statements of the law . . .
may apply with obvious clarity to the specific conduct in
question, even though the very action in question has not
previously been held unlawful”) (cleaned up) (quoting
United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 270–71, 117 S.Ct.
1219, 137 L.Ed.2d 432 (1997), and Anderson v. Creighton,
483 U.S. 635, 640, 107 S.Ct. 3034, 97 L.Ed.2d 523 (1987));
see also Taylor v. Riojas, 592 U.S. 7, 8–9 & n.2, 141 S.Ct.
52, 208 L.Ed.2d 164 (2020) (citing Hope and Lanier)
(summarily reversing our court’s grant of qualified
immunity due to the “obviousness” of the constitutional
violation).
44a
Under Hope and Taylor, it should be enough to defeat
qualified immunity that the alleged constitutional
violation is obvious. And this “obviousness” principle
should be intuitive to all who treasure our constitutional
rights. As then-Judge Gorsuch put it, “some things are
so obviously unlawful that they don’t require detailed
explanation.” Browder v. City of Albuquerque, 787 F.3d
1076, 1082 (10th Cir. 2015). “[S]ometimes the most
obviously unlawful things happen so rarely that a case on
point is itself an unusual thing.” Id. “[I]t would be
remarkable if the most obviously unconstitutional
conduct should be the most immune from liability only
because it is so flagrantly unlawful that few dare its
attempt.” Id. at 1082–83.
I most certainly agree. To my mind, “[i]t seems absurd
to suggest that the most egregious constitutional
violations imaginable are somehow immune from liability
precisely because they're so egregious. It would make a
mockery of our rights to grant qualified immunity just
because no one in government has yet to be abusive
enough to commit that particular violation—and then
stubborn enough to litigate it, not only before a district
court, but also in the court of appeals (or the Supreme
Court).” McMurry, 142 F.4th at 304 (Ho, J., concurring).
A.
But here’s the problem: In our circuit, Hope and
Taylor apply only to the Eighth Amendment claims of
incarcerated criminals. They do not apply to the First
Amendment claims of law-abiding citizens. That's
because of our decision in Villarreal.
In Villarreal, the majority acknowledged that Hope
and Taylor denied qualified immunity based on “obvious”
and “particularly egregious” constitutional violations—
45a
and did so without requiring a “fact-specific[]”
presentation of case law. 94 F.4th at 395. But the
majority distinguished those decisions on the ground that
they're “Eighth Amendment cases” that establish only a
“narrow[] obviousness exception” that should not apply to
obvious violations of the First Amendment. Id. It
claimed support in our earlier en banc decision in
Morgan, 659 F.3d 359. Contra id. at 412, 414 n.30 (Elrod,
J., dissenting in part) (concluding that Hope applies to
obvious First Amendment violations).
Villarreal has been widely criticized. See McMurry,
142 F.4th at 305–06 (Ho, J., concurring) (surveying
criticism). And the Supreme Court has vacated it. See
Villarreal v. Alaniz, — U.S. —, 145 S. Ct. 368, 220
L.Ed.2d 137 (2024). But our court has now reinstated it.
See Villarreal v. City of Laredo, 134 F.4th 273, 276 (5th
Cir. 2025) (“[o]ur previous en banc majority opinion is
superseded only to th[e] extent” necessary to respond to
the Supreme Court’s vacatur regarding the substantive
requirements of a First Amendment retaliation claim).
So it doesn't matter how obvious a First Amendment
violation might be demonstrated at trial. To overcome
qualified immunity under Villarreal, the plaintiff must
satisfy “the requirement that ‘clearly established law’ be
founded on materially identical facts.” 94 F.4th at 395.
B.
Hershey has been unable to identify favorable
precedent with the “materially identical facts” required
by Villarreal. Id.
So I’m forced to conclude that qualified immunity must
be granted—to both cops and contractors alike. See, e.g.,
Filarsky v. Delia, 566 U.S. 377, 393–94, 132 S.Ct. 1657,
46a
182 L.Ed.2d 662 (2012) (holding that private individuals
temporarily retained by the government may invoke
qualified immunity); Meadows v. Rockford Hous. Auth.,
861 F.3d 672, 678 (7th Cir. 2017) (extending qualified
immunity to private security guards performing
governmental functions).
In fact, the closest case in recent years is profoundly
unfavorable to people of faith. In Siders, we rejected a
First Amendment challenge to a local ordinance that
prevented citizens from distributing religious materials
on a sidewalk outside a public amphitheater. See Siders
v. City of Brandon, 123 F.4th 293 (5th Cir. 2024).
I strongly disagree with that ruling. See Siders, 130
F.4th at 191 (Ho, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing
en banc). But our court denied rehearing en banc in that
matter by a lopsided vote.2
So I’m bound by Siders. To be sure, Siders was decided
at the preliminary injunction stage. So in theory, I
Several members of the court tried to defend the panel ruling in
Siders by recharacterizing it. That is, they theorized that the
challenged ordinance did not actually prevent any citizen from
evangelizing on public grounds. See, e.g., id. at 189 (Oldham, J.,
concurring in the denial of rehearing en banc) (“the ordinance does
not purport to regulate prayer, conversation, t-shirts, evangelism, or
tracts”).
2
But this rationalization effort is hard to reconcile with what several
members of the court said in the companion case of Olivier v. City of
Brandon, 121 F.4th 511 (5th Cir. 2024). See, e.g., id. at 512 (Ho, J.,
dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc, joined by six members
of the court) (condemning same local ordinance at same public
amphitheater because it prevents “an evangelical Christian who feels
called to share the good news with his fellow citizens . . . from doing
so outside the city’s public amphitheater”).
47a
suppose that Siders could still prevail on the merits. But
regardless of how Siders is ultimately decided on the
merits, it seems difficult to see how Hershey has stated a
“clearly established” violation in our circuit, when
another panel of our court (wrongly) found a similar claim
unlikely to succeed on the merits in Siders. See, e.g.,
Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 741, 131 S.Ct. 2074, 179
L.Ed.2d 1149 (2011) (to find a “clearly established”
violation, “existing precedent must have placed the
statutory or constitutional question beyond debate”); see
also Nat’l Institutes of Health v. Am. Pub. Health Ass’n,
606 U.S. –––, 145 S. Ct. 2658, 2663, 222 L.Ed.2d 1191
(2025) (Gorsuch, J., concurring) (“Of course, decisions
regarding interim relief are not necessarily conclusive as
to the merits because further litigation may follow. But
regardless of a decision’s procedural posture, its
reasoning—its ratio decidendi—carries precedential
weight in future cases.”) (cleaned up).
C.
Qualified immunity, of course, only applies to the
damages claim against the individual Defendants.
Qualified immunity does not bar claims for injunctive
relief. But Hershey’s appeal appears to be focused only
on damages, and not injunctive relief.
IV.
I turn now to Hershey’s claim that the City of Bossier
failed to train its officers to respect the constitutional
rights of its citizens.
Under Monell v. New York City Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436
U.S. 658, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978),
municipalities may be held liable for constitutional
violations.
A failure to train officers to respect
48a
constitutional rights, including those protected by the
First Amendment, “can without question give rise” to this
liability. World Wide Street Preachers Fellowship v.
Town of Columbia, 591 F.3d 747, 756 (5th Cir. 2009).
To establish Monell liability on a failure to train theory,
a plaintiff must allege that the municipality had
inadequate training procedures and was deliberately
indifferent in adopting them, and that the failure to train
caused the violation in question. See id.
Although deliberate indifference is usually inferred
“from a pattern of constitutional violations,” we will also
infer it where “the policymaker provides no training
whatsoever with respect to the relevant constitutional
duty.” Garza v. City of Donna, 922 F.3d 626, 637–38 (5th
Cir. 2019) (internal quotation marks omitted).
That’s exactly what Hershey alleges here.
His
complaint contends that Bossier City did not train its
police officers and private security personnel that the
park surrounding the Bossier City Arena is public
property, or that citizens are entitled to exercise their
First Amendment rights there. Moreover, at oral
argument, counsel for Hershey agreed that the officers
“received literally zero training” on First Amendment
issues. Oral Arg. at 13:20–13:26. If these facts are true,
they show that the City provided “no training
whatsoever” regarding the application of the First
Amendment to the park. Garza, 922 F.3d at 638. They
are “facts sufficient to show” that the city acted with
deliberate indifference. Johnson v. City of Shelby, 574
U.S. 10, 12, 135 S.Ct. 346, 190 L.Ed.2d 309 (2014).
Hershey also alleges that the City’s failure caused the
violations of his rights. He contends that the City’s failure
to inform officers that the park was public property led
49a
officers to believe that the park was private property, and
that citizens could therefore be ejected without regard to
the First Amendment. He alleges that the officers who
removed him from the park held this belief, and told him
he had to leave the park because it was private property.
In sum, he pled facts sufficient to show that the City’s
complete lack of training was the cause of his injury.
*
*
*
I agree that Hershey’s Monell claim against the City of
Bossier may proceed. I reluctantly concur that, under our
court’s current precedent, qualified immunity disposes of
his claims against the individual Defendants.
JAMES L. DENNIS, Circuit Judge, concurring in part
and dissenting in part:
Richard Hershey peacefully distributed free pamphlets
about Christian vegetarianism on the public sidewalks
outside the city-owned CenturyLink Center in Bossier
City, Louisiana. The surrounding streets and sidewalks
are part of a public park, open and unrestricted to the
public. At the same time, another person handed out
commercial advertisement cards for an internet radio
station. Two City police officers—Deputy City Marshal
Bobby Gilbert and Officer Daniel Stoll—and three Center
security guards—David Smith, Tyshon Harvey, and
Eugene Tucker—approached only Hershey and told him
to stop leafletting. They waved handcuffs at Hershey and
warned that if he continued, they would arrest him.
Hershey attempted to explain that he had a legal right to
hand out his literature, but Deputy Marshal Gilbert cut
him off and told him that he was on private property, he
had to leave or face arrest, and he could not return.
50a
As Hershey was leaving, he inquired about the
commercial literature being distributed by the person
working for the internet radio station. Security guard
Harvey responded that Hershey’s literature had not been
“approved” by the Center, and that Hershey had to
submit his literature in advance. When Hershey repeated
his question, Harvey said he did not know whether the
radio station’s commercial literature had been approved,
but because Hershey’s had not, he needed to leave. The
officers and security guards then “used their command
presence to assist in the removal of Hershey from the
park.” Hershey left without handing out more literature
and has not returned because he fears arrest and jail. The
officers did not remove the other leafleteer.
Hershey sued the City, the officers, and security
guards, alleging that they violated his First Amendment
rights by evicting him. The district court dismissed his
claims at the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)
stage, ruling that (1) the officers were entitled to qualified
immunity because Hershey failed to show that the law
clearly established his right to distribute literature free
from viewpoint discrimination in a traditional public
forum; (2) the security guards did not qualify as state
actors under 42 U.S.C. § 1983; and (3) Hershey did not
allege a municipal policy or custom that could make the
City liable under Monell.3
In my view, the district court erred in dismissing
Hershey’s Monell failure to train claim. Hershey
sufficiently pleaded facts to show the City was
deliberately indifferent to the violation of his First
Monell v. New York City Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 98
S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978).
3
51a
Amendment rights when it provided no training
whatsoever as to an officer's duties under the First
Amendment. We reverse on this claim, described more
fully in Part A below.
For the officers and security guards, JUDGE RICHMAN
and JUDGE HO affirm across the board. Judge Richman’s
opinion (the PR OPINION) reasons that Hershey failed to
meet the clearly established prong of the qualified
immunity analysis against the police officers and failed to
demonstrate the security guards were acting under the
color of state law for purposes of § 1983. I respectfully
dissent. Because the law clearly established Hershey’s
right to leaflet in a traditional public forum without
viewpoint discrimination, qualified immunity is
inappropriate. See Part B. And Hershey plausibly
alleged that the security guards acted under color of state
law when they exercised the public function of policing.
See Part C.
A
The district court erred by dismissing Hershey’s
Monell failure to train claim against the City. “A
municipality's failure to train its police officers can
without question give rise to § 1983 liability.” World Wide
Street Preachers Fellowship v. Town of Columbia, 591
F.3d 747, 756 (5th Cir. 2009) (citations omitted). To
prevail on a “failure to train theory,” a plaintiff must
demonstrate that (1) the municipality’s training
procedures were inadequate; (2) the municipality was
deliberately indifferent in adopting its training policy;
and (3) the inadequate training policy directly, caused the
violations in question. Id.
Hershey has sufficiently alleged the first element—
that the City’s training procedures were inadequate. The
52a
City failed to train its officers that the Center and its
surrounding area were public property, that the adjacent
streets and sidewalks were a traditional public forum,
and, therefore, that citizens were entitled to exercise their
free speech rights there. Because of this failure to train,
the officers mistakenly believed that the Center was
private property. The first element is satisfied.
Under the second element, “[d]eliberate indifference
may be inferred either from a pattern of constitutional
violations or, absent proof of a pattern, from ‘showing a
single incident with proof of the possibility of recurring
situations that present an obvious potential for violation
of constitutional rights.’” Garza v. City of Donna, 922
F.3d 626, 637–38 (5th Cir. 2019) (emphasis added)
(citation modified). “The latter inference ‘is possible only
in very narrow circumstances’ because we have ‘generally
reserved the single-incident method . . . for cases in
which the policymaker provides no training whatsoever
with respect to the relevant constitutional duty, as
opposed to training that is inadequate only as to the
particular conduct that gave rise to the plaintiff’s injury.’”
Id. at 638 (emphasis added) (citation modified).
Hershey’s allegations fall within the latter “narrow
circumstances” because he alleged the City completely
failed to train officers on their First Amendment duties.
The PR OPINION characterizes the failure to train claim
here as a failure to train “in one limited area”—the
particular conduct giving rise to the plaintiff’s injury—
rather than a complete failure to train officers on the
First Amendment. But this misconstrues the allegations
in Hershey’s complaint. Hershey alleged the City “did
not have any policy . . . regulating speech activities
protected by the First Amendment.” Hershey alleged the
City failed to train its police officers and private security
53a
personnel of citizens’ First Amendment rights on public
property, including the area surrounding the Center. At
oral argument, counsel for Hershey confirmed that the
officers “received literally zero training” on First
Amendment issues. The complaint backs this up. Taking
these facts as true, the City provided “no training
whatsoever” regarding the First Amendment’s
application to speech in traditional public forums. See
Garza, 922 F.3d at 638. These are “facts sufficient to
show” that the City was deliberately indifferent to the
deprivation of Hershey’s First Amendment rights.
Johnson v. City of Shelby, 574 U.S. 10, 12, 135 S.Ct. 346,
190 L.Ed.2d 309 (2014).
The PR OPINION, relying on Garza, argues that the
need for training was not “obvious” because “this is a case
in which only a few individuals violated” First
Amendment rights “on one occasion,” and there is “no
evidence” to infer any subsequent incidents relevant to
the City’s failure to train. But Garza was decided on
summary judgment with the benefit of a developed
record. And the failure to train claim in Garza was based
on a theory of inadequate training in a jail, rather than a
theory of no officer training whatsoever on the First
Amendment. At the motion-to-dismiss stage, Hershey
has alleged that the City’s complete lack of training
directly caused the First Amendment violation in
question. At this stage, entirely failing to train officers
about their duties under the First Amendment will
predictably and obviously result in recurring violations of
citizens’ First Amendment rights. This is sufficient to
allege deliberate indifference.
Finally, Hershey plausibly alleged that the City’s
failure to train caused the violation at issue. The City’s
failure to train officers that the park was a public forum
54a
led officers to believe that the park was private property
and that citizens could be ejected without violating their
First Amendment rights. Hershey also alleged that the
officers who removed him from the park held this belief
and told him he had to leave the park because it was
private property.
Hershey has pleaded facts sufficient to show that the
City’s complete lack of training was the cause of his
injury. Hershey has stated a plausible failure to train
claim against the City, and the district court erred in
dismissing his Monell claim.
B
I depart from the majority on all remaining issues,
beginning with the grant of qualified immunity to the
police officers at the Rule 12(b)(6) stage. Qualified
immunity requires two inquiries: first, whether the
officer violated a constitutional right; and second,
whether that right was clearly established at the time of
the misconduct. Morrow v. Meachum, 917 F.3d 870, 874
(5th Cir. 2019). The PR OPINION collapses the inquiries
to ultimately conclude Hershey cannot meet the clearly
established prong. But taking the allegations in the
complaint as true, as we must, Hershey satisfies both
prongs: viewpoint discrimination, regardless of forum,
violates the First Amendment, and the right to be free
from viewpoint discrimination is clearly established.
Because the law governing speech depends on the
forum, the threshold question is whether Hershey
leafletted in a traditional public forum. Public sidewalks
and parks fall squarely into that category. Minn. Voters
Alliance v. Mansky, 585 U.S. 1, 11, 138 S.Ct. 1876, 201
L.Ed.2d 201 (2018). Courts must assess the property at
issue based on its particular facts. Brister v. Faulkner,
55a
214 F.3d 675, 681–83 (5th Cir. 2000). “The location and
purpose of a publicly owned sidewalk is critical” to forum
analysis. United States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720, 729–30,
110 S.Ct. 3115, 111 L.Ed.2d 571 (1990). We also consider
whether the property is “indistinguishable from . . . [a]
city sidewalk.” Brister, 214 F.3d at 683. Because forum
status turns on factual circumstances, it rarely lends itself
to resolution on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion. See Stewart v.
D.C. Armory Bd., 863 F.2d 1013, 1018 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
The PR OPINION reasons that sidewalk status was not
clearly established, relying on Powell v. Noble, 798 F.3d
690, 700 (8th Cir. 2015), which treated fairground
sidewalks as a limited public forum. But Powell arose on
appeal from a preliminary injunction, where the court
conducted a fact intensive review of congestion, signage,
police presence, and fencing at the fair. Id. That context
does not exist here. The PR OPINION nonetheless
imports Powell’s fact-finding into this Rule 12(b)(6)
posture, citing contractual arrangements and event
management at the Center.
Hershey, however, distributed literature on a public
sidewalk within a public park, where public streets and
sidewalks led directly to the Center, and no gates or
restrictions blocked access. The district court agreed
those allegations sufficed to plead that the sidewalk
qualifies as a traditional public forum, and neither party
disputes that point. At this stage, we must take
Hershey’s allegations as true. Brister, 214 F.3d at 683.
By discounting them, the PR OPINION departs from our
Rule 12(b)(6) standard.
The second step asks what kind of restriction Hershey
faced. The officers stopped him from distributing
religious literature while allowing another individual to
56a
distribute commercial handbills. Harvey, the security
guard, told Hershey that leaflets required advance
approval, but admitted he did not know whether the other
leafleteer had approval. The district court correctly
recognized that Hershey’s allegations raised a plausible
inference of viewpoint discrimination. Neither party
disputes that characterization.
The PR OPINION instead faults Hershey for not
alleging what happened after he left—for example,
whether the other leafleteer stayed for a “substantial
period of time.” But Rule 12(b)(6) requires only wellpleaded allegations of unequal treatment, which Hershey
provided. His complaint plausibly alleged that the
officers engaged in viewpoint discrimination in violation
of the First Amendment.
The district court nevertheless held that the right was
not clearly established. That conclusion was error. The
Supreme Court and this court have long recognized that
viewpoint-based
restrictions
violate
the
First
Amendment in any forum. See, e.g., Chiu v. Plano I.S.D.,
260 F.3d 330, 350 (5th Cir. 2001); Hobbs v. Hawkins, 968
F.2d 471, 481 (5th Cir. 1992); Pleasant Grove City v.
Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 469, 129 S.Ct. 1125, 172 L.Ed.2d
853 (2009). We have also refused to grant qualified
immunity at the motion-to-dismiss stage when plaintiffs
plausibly alleged viewpoint discrimination. See Biggers v.
Massingill, No. 23-11023, 2025 WL 429974, at *2–3 (5th
Cir. Feb. 7, 2025).
The PR OPINION leans on Morgan v. Swanson, 755
F.3d 757 (5th Cir. 2014), which warned that the general
prohibition against viewpoint discrimination does not
always give officials sufficient notice. But Morgan
involved the interplay of the Establishment Clause, the
57a
Free Speech Clause, and school speech—a uniquely
complex setting. Id.; see also Morgan v. Swanson, 659
F.3d 359, 364 (5th Cir. 2011) (en banc). This case is
simpler: Hershey peacefully distributed free Christian
literature on a public sidewalk while another individual
handed out commercial flyers. The officers forced
Hershey to leave but allowed the other to continue.
Construing his allegations in his favor, Hershey pleaded
a straightforward claim of viewpoint discrimination in a
traditional public forum.
Qualified immunity does not protect blatant viewpoint
discrimination. Any reasonable officer would have
understood that ejecting Hershey while permitting
another leafleteer to remain violated the First
Amendment. Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640,
107 S.Ct. 3034, 97 L.Ed.2d 523 (1987). Because Hershey
has alleged both a constitutional violation and the
violation of a clearly established right, reversal of the
district court's grant of qualified immunity is warranted.
C
I also disagree that security guards Smith, Harvey, and
Tucker were not acting under the color of state law when
they removed Hershey from the public sidewalks outside
the Center. Policing free speech in a traditional public
forum is a traditional and exclusive function of the state
or municipal government—such that it constitutes state
action.
Smith, Harvey, and Tucker were employees of ASM
Global, a private company, not the state. “[M]ere[]
private conduct, no matter how discriminatory or
wrongful,” is generally excluded from § 1983’s reach,
unless the private conduct is fairly attributable to the
state. Richard v. Hoechst Celanese Chem. Grp., 355 F.3d
58a
345, 352 (5th Cir. 2003). There are three tests that
provide exceptions to the general rule: the public function
test, the nexus test, and the joint action test. Cornish v.
Corr. Servs. Corp., 402 F.3d 545, 549–50 (5th Cir. 2005).
Relevantly here, “[u]nder the public function test, a
‘private entity may be deemed a state actor when that
entity performs a function which is traditionally the
exclusive province of the state.’” Bass v. Parkwood
Hosp., 180 F.3d 234, 241–42 (5th Cir. 1999) (quoting Wong
v. Stripling, 881 F.2d 200, 202 (5th Cir. 1989));
Manhattan Cmty. Access Corp. v. Halleck, 587 U.S. 802,
809, 139 S.Ct. 1921, 204 L.Ed.2d 405 (2019) (“[T]o qualify
as a traditional, exclusive public function within the
meaning of our state action precedents, the government
must have traditionally and exclusively performed the
function.”).
This case involves officers regulating free speech in a
traditional public forum through policing, which is an
exclusive function of the state or municipal government.
If, as in this case, that responsibility is delegated to a
private entity, the private actors’ conduct remains state
action. Foley v. Connelie, 435 U.S. 291, 297, 98 S.Ct. 1067,
55 L.Ed.2d 287 (1978) (describing the “police function” as
“a description of one of the basic functions of
government”); Brown v. Maryland, 25 U.S. 419, 443, 12
Wheat. 419, 6 L.Ed. 678 (1827) (“[P]olice power, which
unquestionably remains, and ought to remain, with the
States.”). Several circuits have determined private
security guards were state actors when delegated
exclusive police powers. Romanski v. Detroit Ent., LLC,
428 F.3d 629, 637 (6th Cir. 2005); see also Payton v. Rush–
Presbyterian, 184 F.3d 623, 630 (7th Cir. 1999).
The security guards, in overseeing City property, were
for all purposes acting as de facto police officers. Harvey,
59a
Smith, and Tucker surrounded Hershey during the initial
encounter alongside the police officers, and they used
their command presence to remove Hershey from the
scene. Harvey was the one explaining the allegedly
unconstitutional speech regulations to Hershey as he was
ejected, not a police officer. The actions taken by the
police officers and the security guards were one and the
same.
Further, Hershey alleged that the City employs a
policy of allowing their officers and security guards to
“use their unfettered discretion to arbitrarily and
capriciously remove individuals who are peacefully
exercising their First Amendment rights,” because the
Center “does not have any written or official policy
prohibiting, regulating or licensing the distribution of
leaflets on its grounds.” In allowing the security guards
to use their discretion to decide which types of speech are
permissible, the City has empowered private security
guards who patrol its property to regulate speech with no
oversight.
Taking all well-pleaded facts as true and in the light
most favorable to him, Hershey has sufficiently alleged
that the individual security guards were state actors
under the public function test.4 The district court erred
in dismissing Hershey’s § 1983 claims against Smith,
Harvey, and Tucker.
A wholly different version of the facts may be presented as the
case progresses to trial. But taking all well-pleaded facts as true and
in the light most favorable to him, Hershey has sufficiently alleged
that the individual security guards were state actors at this juncture.
4
60a
*
*
*
In sum, the panel affirms the district court’s judgment
in part and reverses it in part. As to Hershey’s Monell
claim, JUDGE HO and I hold that the district court
reversibly erred. JUDGE RICHMAN dissents. As to the
district court’s dismissal of Hershey’s claims against the
City officers and Center security guards, JUDGES
RICHMAN and HO affirm. I respectfully dissent as to
those issues.
PRISCILLA RICHMAN, Circuit Judge, concurring in part
and dissenting in part:
With great respect, the panel majority radically
expands Monell1 municipal liability in at least two
unprecedented and unwarranted respects:
(1) by
sanctioning a “gotcha” claim based on “failure to train at
all”; and (2) by holding that a municipality is liable for
failure to train security guards hired by a private entity
that leases and operates property owned by the
municipality.
First: This is a single-incident case. It involves
nuanced First Amendment law. Instead of adhering to
the boundaries that limit the “very narrow
circumstances” in which courts will permit an inference of
deliberate indifference to be drawn from “an obvious
potential for violation of constitutional rights,”2 the
separate opinions of JUDGE DENNIS and JUDGE HO open
Monell v. New York City Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 98
S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978).
1
2
Garza v. City of Donna, 922 F.3d 626, 637-38 (5th Cir. 2019).
61a
the door to permit a broad swath of failure-to-train claims
to defeat a municipality's qualified immunity.
The Supreme Court has made clear that municipal
liability based on Monell requires deliberate
indifference.3 Deliberate indifference may be inferred in
failure-to-train-at-all cases “in a narrow range of
circumstances” if the violation of federal rights is “a
highly predictable consequence of a failure to equip law
enforcement officers with specific tools to handle
recurring situations.”4 The Supreme Court emphasized
that whether such a consequence is “obvious” depends on
“[t]he likelihood that the situation will recur and the
predictability that an officer lacking specific tools to
handle that situation will violate citizens’ rights.”5
There is no allegation in this case that viewpoint
discrimination by a Bossier City law enforcement officer
against someone engaging in free exercise of religion or
free speech has ever previously occurred. It is not highly
predictable that law enforcement officers would have
recurring encounters with individuals paid to distribute
literature outside a large, ticketed event and that, absent
training about what is “public” versus “private” property
and viewpoint discrimination, those officers would
discriminate based on the content of the literature being
distributed. JUDGE DENNIS’s and JUDGE HO’s opinions
say that if a city fails to train “at all” regarding the First
City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 389, 109 S.Ct. 1197, 103
L.Ed.2d 412 (1989).
3
4
Bd. of Cnty. Commissioners of Bryan Cnty. v. Brown, 520 U.S.
397, 409-410, 117 S.Ct. 1382, 137 L.Ed.2d 626 (1997).
5
Id.
62a
Amendment, then it is “obvious” that a constitutional
violation will occur. This not only permits liability for
what may be, at most, mere negligence, it essentially
imposes strict liability for a failure to train.
Second: Perhaps even more remarkably, JUDGE
DENNIS’s and JUDGE HO’s opinions say a municipality can
be liable for failure to train private security guards who
are hired by a private entity for an event at an arena it
has leased from the municipality and operates. Hershey
has alleged that Bossier City should have trained private
security personnel who were engaged for a large concert
event and that Bossier City is liable for that failure to
train. The panel’s majority opinions allow this claim to
proceed on the basis that it was obvious Bossier City
needed to train security guards hired by a third party,
even though the law is far from clear that a city has a duty
to train security guards.
As to the liability of the individual defendants in this
case (Bossier City law enforcement officers and private
security guards), JUDGE HO and I agree that the district
court did not err in dismissing the claims against them,
though our views as to why are not congruent.
I would affirm the district court’s judgment in all
respects. I therefore concur in part and dissent in part.
I
The City of Bossier City, Louisiana owns a multipurpose arena (which I will call the Center), formerly
known as CenturyLink Center, and also Bossier City
Arena. It is currently known as Brookshire Grocery
Arena. The Center has been the site of sporting events,
such as NBA and NCAA basketball games, and an NHL
63a
hockey game.6 The forum has hosted well-known
entertainers including, but not limited to, Paul
McCartney, Elton John, Taylor Swift, Cher, Carrie
Underwood, Justin Timberlake and Miranda Lambert, to
name a few.7
The Center is located in a public park. At the time
relevant to this litigation, the Center was managed by
ASM Global, a private entity. ASM Global leased both the
interior space and outdoor areas of the Center for events.
On February 28, 2020, the Center hosted a Christian rock
concert known as Winter Jam. Guests paid to attend.
Hershey’s Amended Complaint alleges that he is a
vegetarian and that on the day of the Winter Jam concert,
he was distributing “free, educational, noncommercial,
religious booklets on behalf of a nonprofit organization
named the Christian Vegetarian Association.” He is paid
“by various nonprofit organizations for his advocacy and
distribution of literature.” He further alleges that he was
peacefully engaging in leafleting activity when he was
approached by Bossier City Deputy Marshal Bobby
Gilbert, Bossier City police officer Daniel Stoll, and three
private security agents (David Smith, Tyshon Harvey,
and Eugene Tucker) employed by ASM Global.
Hershey’s Amended Complaint asserts he was told by
Deputy Marshal Gilbert that he was on private property
and that “he had to leave, that he would be arrested if he
did not leave.” Hershey alleges that another person was
See
Brookshire
Grocery
Arena,
Wikipedia,
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Brookshire_Grocery_Arena
(last
visited October 6, 2025).
6
7
Id.
64a
handing out cards for a radio station, for a commercial
purpose, but that person had not been asked to leave
when Hershey was approached by the Bossier City
officers and ASM Global security guards. Hershey says
he was told he had to leave the area because he had not
obtained authorization to distribute booklets ahead of
time. Hershey alleges he inquired about the person
distributing cards for a radio station and was told
essentially, “We don’t know whether he [that other
person] has permission.” Hershey left the premises and
was not arrested.
He brought this suit, alleging § 1983 claims against the
City law enforcement officers, the private security
guards, and Bossier City. Hershey asserts in his briefing
that he was subjected to viewpoint discrimination. He
also alleges that each of the ASM Global security guards
was “a willing participant in joint action with state
actors.”
In framing his claims, Hershey repeatedly alleges that
the Center and the areas surrounding it are public
property, or in the alternative, that the disputed area is a
designated public forum. Hershey asserts in his briefing
that he was asked to leave based on his or the leaflets’
viewpoint. He further alleges that Bossier City failed to
train its officers and ASM Global’s security guards about
the public nature of the property and attendant First
Amendment considerations. He asserts that the Bossier
City officers and private security personnel whom he
encountered engaged in viewpoint discrimination and
should be liable because Hershey was on public, not
private, property.
Hershey also alleges that Bossier City “has a longstanding custom of allowing police officers, employees
65a
and/or officials of CenturyLink Center to use their
unfettered discretion to arbitrarily and capriciously
remove individuals who are peacefully exercising their
First Amendment rights from the CenturyLink
property.” However, he does not allege that Bossier City
officials or officers or private security personnel have
ever removed anyone from the Center or the surrounding
property who was peacefully exercising their First
Amendment rights, other than himself.
Almost a year after the incident in question, Hershey’s
attorney contacted ASM Global and was told in an email,
which is attached as an exhibit to Hershey’s Amended
Complaint, that ASM Global’s policies regarding the
Center are as follows:
If the public would like to engage in a peaceful
protests [sic] or distribution of pamphlets, they are
free to do so as long as it does not interfere with
the safe ingress or egress of guests. This is
especially important when the facility and
property has been exclusively leased for an event.
In addition, CenturyLink Center has instituted a
CODE OF CONDUCT which must be adhered to
while on the premises. This Code of Conduct (copy
inserted) is posted on our website under Arena
Info.
Hershey’s counsel had also asked for an “incident
report” regarding the day Hershey was told to leave the
area near the Center, which was February 28, 2020. The
author of the ASM Global email responded:
I did see an incident report from 2/28/2020, that
states “Security Observed two individuals handing
out pamphlets in the Parking Lots A & D. The
66a
individuals became argumentative and Security
called for Bossier City Police for assistance.” It
further states the Pamphleteers then left the
property. (It does not state they were removed.)
I, myself, remember this incident, as I heard the
call over the radio for police assistance and went to
the area. When I arrived, I saw police talking with
two people. I did not interject. Our security
guards (ASM Global employees) told me that two
people with pamphlets were shouting at our guests
in line that they were going to Hell for attending
this event, and that it made a few “children” cry.
It is my understanding that the Police asked the
pamphleteers to stop upsetting the guests and that
they left of their own accord.
I see no other documentation or incidents
pertaining to the subject of your request.
It is unclear whether the “incident report” in this email
or the events recounted in that email involved Hershey.
As the magistrate judge’s report reflects, this is not the
first time Hershey has had an encounter that has given
rise to First Amendment litigation.8 Hershey is a serial
plaintiff.
8
See ROA.130 n.1, which reflects:
Hershey v. Jasinski et al, United States District Court, Western
District of Missouri, St. Joseph Division, Docket No. 20-06088-CVW-BP; (2) Hershey v. Turner, No. CIV-19-344-SPS, 2020 WL
1932911 (E.D. Okla. Apr. 21, 2020); (3) Hershey v. Kansas City
Kansas Cmty. Coll., No. 2:16-CV-2251-JTM, 2017 WL 661581 (D.
Kan. Feb. 17, 2017); (4) Hershey v. Goldstein, 938 F. Supp. 2d 491
(S.D.N.Y. 2013); (5) Hershey v. Multi-Purpose Civic Ctr. Facility Bd.
67a
The defendants moved to dismiss the suit. The
magistrate judge prepared a detailed report and
recommendations, recommending dismissal based on
qualified immunity and for failure to state a claim. The
district court agreed with those recommendations and
dismissed the suit.
II
Hershey’s first contention on appeal is that Marshal
Gilbert and Officer Stoll are not entitled to qualified
immunity because the right to be free from viewpoint
discrimination was clearly established on February 20,
2020, the date the incident in question occurred. The
magistrate judge concluded otherwise, and after a
conducting a de novo review, the district court agreed
with the magistrate judge.
for Pulaski Cty., Arkansas, No. 4:18-CV-00476 BSM, 2020 WL
4741900 (E.D. Ark. Aug. 14, 2020); (6) Hershey v. Walker, No.
4:12CV01603 ERW, 2013 WL 657873 (E.D. Mo. Feb. 22, 2013); (7)
Hershey v. Thomas et al, United States District Court, Eastern
District of Arkansas, Central Division, Docket No. 4:20-cv-01397KGB; (8) Hershey v. Junior College District of St. Louis-St. Louis
County et al, United States District Court, Eastern District of
Missouri, Docket No. 4:10-cv-1116; (9) Hershey v. The Curators of
University of Missouri et al, United States District Court, Eastern
District of Missouri, Docket No. 4:16-cv-1229; (10) Hershey v. Junior
College District of Central Southwest Missouri et al, United States
District Court, Western District of Missouri, Docket No. 6:14-cv3375; (11) Hershey v. The Curators of the University of Missouri, et
al, United States District Court, Western District of Missouri,
Central Division, Docket No. 2:20-cv-04239-BCW; (12) Hershey v.
Oldham, et al, United States District Court, Middle District of
Tennessee, Docket No. 2:20-cv-0012; (13) Hershey v. Oldham, et al,
United States District Court, Middle District of Tennessee, Docket
No. 2:20-cv-0264.
68a
Hershey maintains that based on First Amendment
law, the Center is a traditional public forum or, in the
alternative, that it is a designated public forum. The
magistrate judge’s report reasoned that only the
sidewalks outside the arena are at issue, and that some
decisions have held that sidewalks outside an arena are
either nonpublic or limited forums. Ultimately, the
magistrate judge concluded
Plaintiff does not point to a single decision from any
court that has held, before or after the date of this
incident, that an officer violated the rights of a leafleteer
who was removed from a similar arena premises. The
discussions above demonstrate that there are many
nuances to First Amendment claims of this nature,
beginning with questions about the category of the forum
and continuing through the reasonableness of various
regulations or restrictions. Very little about this field of
law is clearly established.
I agree with the magistrate judge and the district court.
The Supreme Court has explained that “[t]he standards
that we apply to determine whether a State has
unconstitutionally excluded a private speaker from use of
a public forum depend on the nature of the forum.”9 The
Eighth Circuit has explained, for example, that “[l]imited
public forums (sometimes called nonpublic forums)
include public properties that are not by tradition or
designation public forums but have been opened by the
government for limited purposes, communicative or
Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 106, 121 S.Ct.
2093, 150 L.Ed.2d 151 (2001).
9
69a
otherwise.”10 That court further explained that “[t]he
government, no less than a private owner of property, has
the power to preserve the property under its control for
the use to which it is lawfully dedicated.”11 “‘[T]he
location and purpose of a publicly owned sidewalk is
critical to determining whether such a sidewalk
constitutes a public forum.’”12 The Eighth Circuit
concluded that sidewalks serving the purpose of
admitting thousands of people to a state fair were a
limited public forum.13 It held that restrictions on speech
in a limited public forum must be reasonable and
viewpoint neutral.14 It further held that the plaintiff in
that case was not likely to prevail on his claim that his
First Amendment rights were violated when he was
prohibited from holding a pole with a poster-sized sign on
it while on sidewalks near entrances to a state fair.15
Powell v. Noble, 798 F.3d 690, 699 (8th Cir. 2015) (citing
Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, 473 U.S. 788, 802,
105 S.Ct. 3439, 87 L.Ed.2d 567 (1985)).
10
Id. at 699-700 (quoting United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 178,
103 S.Ct. 1702, 75 L.Ed.2d 736 (1983)).
11
Id. (quoting United States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720, 728–29, 110
S.Ct. 3115, 111 L.Ed.2d 571 (1990) (plurality opinion)).
12
13
Id. at 700.
Id. (citing Christian Legal Soc’y Chapter of the Univ. of Cal.,
Hastings Coll. of the L. v. Martinez, 561 U.S. 661, 679, 130 S.Ct. 2971,
177 L.Ed.2d 838 (2010) (“Recognizing a State’s right to preserve the
property under its control for the use to which it is lawfully dedicated,
the Court has permitted restrictions on access to a limited public
forum . . . with this key caveat: Any access barrier must be
reasonable and viewpoint neutral.”)).
14
15
Id. at 701-02.
70a
JUDGE DENNIS’s opinion notes that the Eighth
Circuit’s decision in Powell was reached only after the
court held a preliminary injunction hearing and
“conducted a fact-intensive review of congestion, signage,
police presence, and fencing at the fair.”16 It was only
then, JUDGE DENNIS’s opinion posits, that the court was
able to conclude that the law was not clearly established
as to the character, for First Amendment purposes, of the
area in which the plaintiff had displayed his sign.17 But
this discussion exemplifies the whole point of qualified
immunity. First, Powell was, as noted, a preliminary
injunction case. Qualified immunity is not a defense to
injunctive relief. The present case is a suit for damages.
Second, we do not hold officers like the individual
defendants in the present case liable for damages after
we conduct a hearing to determine, in hindsight, whether
they property they were policing was a public forum. Our
inquiry is whether the law was clearly established when
the defendant acted or failed to act. Third, we cannot
expect officers, even those trained in First Amendment
law, to know whether a given area near an arena being
used in a particular way at a given time is or is not a public
forum given the uncertainties of the law in this area.
Hershey proceeds on the basis that the law was (and is)
clearly established that the sidewalk surrounding the
Center was a public forum even though the city-owned
arena was managed by a private entity and that private
entity oversaw the concert that was ongoing at the time
of the incident at issue. There is evidence, from an exhibit
to the Amended Complaint, that the outside of the Center
16
Ante at [564-65].
17
Id.
71a
as well as the inside can be leased for events. Hershey
alleges that the sidewalks just outside the concert were
public, but he does not consider what contractual
arrangements ASM Global may have had in place with the
concert organizers.
Several courts have recognized that public property
may change its character for purposes of First
Amendment forum analysis based on temporary uses. In
considering the public sidewalks used for the Iowa State
Fair, the Eighth Circuit concluded that the public
property “should be considered a limited public forum, at
least during the 11 days each year when the Iowa State
Fair is underway.”18 The Supreme Court similarly found
that the Minnesota State Fair “is a limited public forum
in that it exists to provide a means for a great number of
exhibitors temporarily.”19
Our court recently addressed a factual situation that is
similar to the one presented in this case. In Siders v. City
of Brandon, Mississippi,20 a Christian evangelist
challenged a city ordinance that restricted protesting and
demonstrating on a sidewalk outside a city-owned and
operated public amphitheater during time periods
surrounding a live, ticketed concert event.21 In that case,
we determined the sidewalk outside the amphitheater to
be a traditional public forum.22 We nevertheless held that
18
Powell, 798 F.3d at 700 (emphasis added).
Heffron v. Int’l Soc. For Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S.
640, 650-51, 101 S.Ct. 2559, 69 L.Ed.2d 298 (1981) (emphasis added).
19
20
123 F.4th 293 (5th Cir. 2024).
21
Id. at 296.
22
Id. at 303.
72a
the plaintiff was not likely to succeed on the merits of the
claim that the ordinance violated First Amendment
rights. As to whether the sidewalks at issue were a
traditional public forum, Siders is distinguishable from
the instant case because here a private entity was
involved in managing the Center. Additionally, given that
the Supreme Court has indicated that sidewalks on public
property are not automatically public forums23 and that
the district court considered several cases concerning the
forum status of spaces surrounding arenas that do not
speak in unison,24 the forum status of the space in
question was not clearly established. Hershey has not
overcome the qualified immunity defense.
I also note that in the district court, the Bossier City
defendants argued that Hershey had failed to allege facts
to support his claim that the officers discriminated
against him on the basis of viewpoint. They pointed out
that Hershey failed to allege that the officers looked at
the content of his leaflets or otherwise knew about the
content. Nor did he allege the officers heard any
See, e.g., Kokinda, 497 U.S. at 730, 110 S.Ct. 3115 (noting it “is
not [] settled doctrine” to “designate all sidewalks open to the public
as public fora”); Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 216, 112 S.Ct.
1846, 119 L.Ed.2d 5 (1992) (SCALIA, J., concurring) (“ ‘Streets and
sidewalks’ are not public forums in all places.”) (emphasis omitted).
23
24
See Ball v. City of Lincoln, 870 F.3d 722, 736 (8th Cir. 2017)
(holding a plaza area outside of a city-owned arena to be a nonpublic
forum); Pomicter v. Luzerne Cnty. Convention Ctr. Auth., 939 F.3d
534, 537 (3d Cir. 2019) (analyzing concourse outside of a publiclyowned arena as a nonpublic forum). But see Brister v. Faulkner, 214
F.3d 675, 683 (5th Cir. 2000) (affirming that public university
property between an arena and a city sidewalk is a traditional public
forum).
73a
statements Hershey made while passing out leaflets. As
to the alleged differing treatment accorded the person
who was distributing cards for a radio station, Hershey
says he was told he had to leave the premises because he
had not obtained authorization ahead of time to distribute
leaflets outside of and during a large concert that patrons
paid to attend. Hershey inquired about the person
distributing cards and was told essentially, “We don’t
know whether he has permission.” Hershey left the
premises and does not allege what occurred thereafter.
Hershey does not allege that the officer or security
guard who asked him to leave subsequently failed to
ascertain whether the other individual had prior
authorization. Hershey does not allege that after he left,
the other person was permitted to continue to hand out
cards for any substantial period of time even though he
did not have prior authorization.
The Amended
Complaint depends on speculation to draw an inference
that Hershey was singled out based on the content of his
literature. The Amended Complaint does not sufficiently
allege content or viewpoint discrimination.
Even assuming Hershey could allege that he was
treated differently from the person distributing cards for
the radio station, the magistrate judge and district court
correctly concluded that the law regarding viewpoint
discrimination is not clearly established in circumstances
like those in the present case.
“The First Amendment provides that ‘Congress shall
make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech. . . . ’
There is no doubt that as a general matter peaceful
picketing and leafletting are expressive activities
74a
involving ‘speech’ protected by the First Amendment.”25
“It is also true that ‘public places’ historically associated
with the free exercise of expressive activities, such as
streets, sidewalks, and parks, are considered, without
more, to be ‘public forums.’”26 “In such places, the
government’s ability to permissibly restrict expressive
conduct is very limited: the government may enforce
reasonable time, place, and manner regulations as long as
the restrictions ‘are content-neutral, are narrowly
tailored to serve a significant government interest, and
leave
open
ample
alternative
channels
of
communication.’”27 However, if an area is a limited public
forum or a nonpublic forum, “[t]he government can
restrict access . . . as long as the restrictions are
reasonable and [are] not an effort to suppress expression
merely because public officials oppose the speaker’s
view.”28
It is, of course, “axiomatic that the government may not
regulate speech based on its substantive content or the
message it conveys.”29 But that principle is a very general
one. It does not clearly establish what the First
Amendment prohibits or requires of law enforcement
United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 176, 103 S.Ct. 1702, 75
L.Ed.2d 736 (1983) (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. I).
25
26
Id. at 177, 103 S.Ct. 1702.
Id. (quoting Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Loc. Educators’ Ass’n,
460 U.S. 37, 45, 103 S.Ct. 948, 74 L.Ed.2d 794 (1983)).
27
Chiu v. Plano Indep. Sch. Dist., 260 F.3d 330, 347 (5th Cir. 2001)
(alteration in original) (quoting Ark. Educ. Television Comm’n v.
Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 677-78, 118 S.Ct. 1633, 140 L.Ed.2d 875 (1998)).
28
Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819,
828, 115 S.Ct. 2510, 132 L.Ed.2d 700 (1995).
29
75a
officers when they are policing an area in circumstances
similar to those existing at the Center during the Winter
Jam concert.
Our court’s decision in Morgan v. Swanson30 is
instructive on this point. In Morgan, the plaintiff argued
that “his right to distribute religious material is clearly
established because ‘regardless of forum, viewpoint
discrimination
regarding
private
speech
is
31
unconstitutional.’” Our court acknowledged that while
this is “generally true,” that proposition was too broad to
denote a clearly established right.32 The Morgan decision
explained, “such a broad generalization is exactly the kind
of proposition that will not suffice for the purposes of
qualified immunity analysis, as it simply does not provide
the official with any sense of what is permissible under a
certain set of facts.”33 Our court concluded, “[f]or
example, the nearly universal prohibition against
viewpoint discrimination does not inform an official as to
what, precisely, constitutes viewpoint discrimination.”34
The Supreme Court has “repeatedly told courts . . . not to
define clearly established law at a high level of
generality.”35
30
755 F.3d 757 (5th Cir. 2014).
31
Id. at 761.
32
Id.
33
Id.
34
Id.
Mullenix v. Luna, 577 U.S. 7, 12, 136 S.Ct. 305, 193 L.Ed.2d 255
(2015) (per curiam) (quoting Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 742,
131 S.Ct. 2074, 179 L.Ed.2d 1149 (2011)).
35
76a
Hershey addresses Morgan in his briefing. He says:
“Morgan . . . involved the governmental actors
attempting
to
balance
competing,
significant
constitutional interests,” making the case “inapplicable”
to this one. He characterizes Morgan’s outcome as the
result of the “special First Amendment context” present
in public schools.
But our analysis in Morgan did not turn on the
complexity of the context. Rather than focusing on any
“special First Amendment context,” Morgan hinged on
whether the official was on notice that their conduct was
unconstitutional.36 Under Supreme Court precedent,
“‘[t]he dispositive question’ . . . is whether the violative
nature of [the] particular conduct is clearly
established.”37
Hershey relies on the statement in Chiu v. Plano
Independent School District38: “It is well settled that
viewpoint discrimination is a clearly established violation
of the First Amendment in any forum.”39 Our decision in
Morgan considered Chiu “inapposite” because of factual
dissimilarities and concluded: “[W]hile Chiu may indeed
be relevant in discerning the nature and extent of
Morgan’s rights in the classroom, the case does not itself
establish those rights. ”40 Just as Morgan eschewed Chiu
36
Morgan, 755 F.3d at 760.
37
Cunningham v. Castloo, 983 F.3d 185, 191 (5th Cir. 2020)
(quoting Mullenix, 577 U.S. at 12, 136 S.Ct. 305).
38
260 F.3d 330 (5th Cir. 2001) (per curiam).
39
Id. at 350.
40
Morgan v. Swanson, 755 F.3d 757, 761 (2014).
77a
as clearly establishing law that governed in that case, we
should do likewise in the present case.
Writing for the Court in Anderson v. Creighton,41
JUSTICE SCALIA cogently explained “that the doctrine of
qualified immunity reflects a balance that has been struck
‘across the board.’”42
The Court recounted the
underpinnings of the doctrine of qualified immunity.43 It
then said, “[s]omewhat more concretely, whether an
official protected by qualified immunity may be held
personally liable for an allegedly unlawful official action
generally turns on the ‘objective legal reasonableness’ of
the action . . . assessed in light of the legal rules that were
‘clearly established’ at the time it was taken.”44 The Court
continued, “[t]he operation of this standard, however,
depends substantially upon the level of generality at
41
483 U.S. 635, 107 S.Ct. 3034, 97 L.Ed.2d 523 (1987).
Id. at 642, 107 S.Ct. 3034 (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S.
800, 821, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982) (BRENNAN, J.,
concurring)).
42
43
See id. at 638, 107 S.Ct. 3034:
(“When government officials abuse their offices, “action[s] for
damages may offer the only realistic avenue for vindication of
constitutional guarantees.” On the other hand, permitting damages
suits against government officials can entail substantial social costs,
including the risk that fear of personal monetary liability and
harassing litigation will unduly inhibit officials in the discharge of
their duties. Our cases have accommodated these conflicting
concerns by generally providing government officials performing
discretionary functions with a qualified immunity, shielding them
from civil damages liability as long as their actions could reasonably
have been thought consistent with the rights they are alleged to have
violated.” (internal citations omitted).
44
Id. at 639, 107 S.Ct. 3034 (internal citation omitted).
78a
which the relevant ‘legal rule’ is to be identified.”45 The
Court admonished that if the level of generality at which
the legal rule is identified is too high, “Plaintiffs would be
able to convert the rule of qualified immunity that our
cases plainly establish into a rule of virtually unqualified
liability simply by alleging violation of extremely abstract
rights. Harlow would be transformed from a guarantee
of immunity into a rule of pleading.”46
Hershey has not cited decisions that clearly establish
that the conduct of Marshal Gilbert and Officer Stoll
violated First Amendment rights.
III
Hershey’s second contention on appeal is that Marshal
Gilbert and Officer Stoll are not entitled to qualified
immunity because the law was clearly established that
they had to provide Hershey with ample alternative
Id.; see also id. at 639-40, 107 S.Ct. 3034 (“It should not be
surprising, therefore, that our cases establish that the right the
official is alleged to have violated must have been ‘clearly established’
in a more particularized, and hence more relevant, sense: The
contours of the right must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable
official would understand that what he is doing violates that right.
This is not to say that an official action is protected by qualified
immunity unless the very action in question has previously been held
unlawful . . . but it is to say that in the light of pre-existing law the
unlawfulness must be apparent.”) (internal citation omitted).
45
Id. at 639, 107 S.Ct. 3034; see also id. (“Such an approach, in sum,
would destroy ‘the balance that our cases strike between the interests
in vindication of citizens’ constitutional rights and in public officials’
effective performance of their duties,’ by making it impossible for
officials ‘reasonably [to] anticipate when their conduct may give rise
to liability for damages.’ ”) (quoting Davis v. Scherer, 468 U.S. 183,
195, 104 S.Ct. 3012, 82 L.Ed.2d 139 (1984)).
46
79a
channels of communication, and they did not. Hershey
asserts in his briefing that if the officers “were attempting
to enforce a time, place and manner restriction, they must
also
‘leave
ample
alternative
channels
of
communication.’”
Here again, the law as to how the Center should be
characterized for First Amendment purposes is far from
clear. More pointedly, Hershey has not cited any
authority that would put on notice a law enforcement
officer policing an event like the one at the Center on the
date in question that the officer, personally, was required
to provide an alternate forum for distributing leaflets.
IV
Hershey’s third contention on appeal is that Marshal
Gilbert and Officer Stoll are not entitled to qualified
immunity because they are either plainly incompetent or
knowingly violated the law. He argues that if they
“genuinely believed that Plaintiff did not have any First
Amendment rights on the Bossier City Arena property
because it was private property, then they are ‘plainly
incompetent.’” Here again, Hershey cites no decision
that would have clearly put the officers on notice that the
Center was not comparable to “private property” for
First Amendment purposes during the Winter Jam
concert, or that their conduct in asking Hershey to leave
the area violated his First Amendment rights.
V
Hershey contends that he has pled a facially plausible
Monell claim based on his allegations that Bossier City
failed to train both its own law enforcement officers and
ASM’s private security guards “allowed to serve as
security personnel” at the Center. The Supreme Court
80a
has made clear that municipal liability based on Monell47
requires deliberate indifference.48 With great respect,
JUDGE DENNIS’s and JUDGE HO’s opinions in the present
case substantially erode and trivialize that principle. This
is a single-incident case in which Hershey relies on his
own confrontation with city officers and private security
guards to establish municipal liability. This case does not
present the “rare” and “narrow and extreme
circumstances” that our court and the Supreme Court has
said permit “drawing the inference” of “deliberate
indifference.”49
A
The Supreme Court established in Monell50 that
“municipal liability under section 1983 requires proof of
three elements: a policymaker; an official policy; and a
violation of constitutional rights whose ‘moving force’ is
Monell v. New York City Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 98
S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978).
47
City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 389, 109 S.Ct. 1197, 103
L.Ed.2d 412 (1989).
48
Garza v. Donna, 922 F.3d 626, 638 (5th Cir. 2019) (quoting Littell
v. Hous. Indep. Sch. Dist., 894 F.3d 616 (5th Cir. 2018)).
49
Monell v. New York City Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 98
S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978).
50
81a
the policy or custom.”51 A party must sufficiently allege
each element before municipal liability can attach.52
The Supreme Court explained in City of Canton v.
Harris53 that “[m]unicipal liability under § 1983 attaches
where—and only where—a deliberate choice to follow a
course of action is made from among various alternatives”
by city policymakers.”54 The Supreme Court continued,
“Only where a failure to train reflects a ‘deliberate’ or
‘conscious’ choice by a municipality—a ‘policy’ as defined
by our prior cases—can a city be liable for such a failure
under § 1983.”55 While a failure to train can be a
“policy,”56 that determination usually requires a pattern
51
Winder v. Gallardo, 118 F.4th 638, 647 (5th Cir. 2024), cert.
denied, — U.S. —, 145 S. Ct. 2816, 222 L.Ed.2d 1099 (2025) (quoting
Piotrowski v. City of Hous., 237 F.3d 567, 578 (5th Cir. 2001) (citing
Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56
L.Ed.2d 611 (1978)).
See Brown v. Tarrant County, Tex., 985 F.3d 489, 497 (5th Cir.
2021) (concluding that this court need not consider whether the
plaintiff sufficiently alleged the policymaker or constitutional
violation element when “he did not link his allegedly unconstitutional
confinement to any county ‘policy or custom’); Zarnow v. City of
Wichita Falls, Tex., 614 F.3d 161, 171 (5th Cir. 2010) (not considering
the “moving force factor” because the plaintiff had “not established a
‘custom or policy’”).
52
53
489 U.S. 378, 109 S.Ct. 1197, 103 L.Ed.2d 412 (1989).
Id. at 389, 109 S.Ct. 1197 (citing Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471
U.S. 808, 823, 105 S.Ct. 2427, 85 L.Ed.2d 791 (1985) (opinion of
REHNQUIST, J.)).
54
55
Id.
56
See Garza, 922 F.3d at 637.
82a
of constitutional violations.57
There is nothing in
Hershey’s Amended Complaint that reflects a deliberate
or conscious choice by Bossier City among various
alternatives regarding the need for training its law
enforcement officers. There had been no prior incident in
which it was even alleged that city officers had violated
the First Amendment by telling individuals they could not
pass out literature without prior approval, much less
allegations of viewpoint discrimination.
The Supreme Court explained its rationale more fully
in Board of County Commissioners of Bryan County v.
Brown.58 The Court said that in Canton, it “spoke . . . of
a deficient training ‘program,’ necessarily intended to
apply over time to multiple employees.”59 The Court
reasoned that:
[i]f a program does not prevent constitutional
violations, municipal decisionmakers may
eventually be put on notice that a new program is
called for. Their continued adherence to an
approach that they know or should know has failed
to prevent tortious conduct by employees may
establish the conscious disregard for the
consequences of their action—the “deliberate
indifference”—necessary to trigger municipal
liability.60
57
Harris, 489 U.S. at 397, 109 S.Ct. 1197 (O’Connor, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part); Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs of Bryan Cnty.
v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 409, 117 S.Ct. 1382, 137 L.Ed.2d 626 (1997).
58
520 U.S. 397, 409-410, 117 S.Ct. 1382, 137 L.Ed.2d 626 (1997).
59
Id. at 407, 117 S.Ct. 1382.
60
Id.
83a
The Supreme Court again emphasized in Connick v.
Thompson61 that “[w]ithout notice that a course of
training is deficient in a particular respect,
decisionmakers can hardly be said to have deliberately
chosen a training program that will cause violations of
constitutional rights.”62
The Supreme Court has made clear that in Monell63
cases, deliberate indifference may be inferred in failureto-train-at-all cases “in a narrow range of circumstances”
if the violation of federal rights is “a highly predictable
consequence of a failure to equip law enforcement officers
with specific tools to handle recurring situations.”64 The
Supreme Court emphasized that whether such a
consequence is “obvious” depends on “[t]he likelihood
that the situation will recur and the predictability that an
officer lacking specific tools to handle that situation will
violate citizens’ rights.”65
There is no allegation that viewpoint discrimination by
a Bossier City law enforcement officer against someone
engaging in free exercise of religion or free speech has
ever previously occurred.66 It is not highly predictable
61
563 U.S. 51, 131 S.Ct. 1350, 179 L.Ed.2d 417 (2011).
62
Id. at 62, 131 S.Ct. 1350.
Monell v. New York City Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 98
S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978).
63
Bd. of Cty. Commissioners of Bryan Cty. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397,
409-410, 117 S.Ct. 1382, 137 L.Ed.2d 626 (1997).
64
65
Id.
But see Littell v. Houston Indep. Sch. Dist., 894 F.3d 616,
624–25 (5th Cir. 2018) (“The municipal entity must have ‘fail[ed] to
train its employees concerning a clear constitutional duty implicated
66
84a
that law enforcement officers would have recurring
encounters with individuals paid to distribute literature
outside a large, pay-to-attend event. Nor is it highly
predictable that, absent specific training about what is
“public” versus “private” property and viewpoint
discrimination, those officers would discriminate based on
the content of the literature being distributed.
JUDGE DENNIS’s and JUDGE HO’s opinions permit an
outsized path to liability because many plaintiffs would be
able to granulate allegations so finely that they arrive at
a “complete failure to train” as to the relevant conduct.
This ignores the Supreme Court’s repeated warning:
“[I]n virtually every instance where a person has had his
or her constitutional rights violated by a city employee, a
§ 1983 plaintiff will be able to point to something the city
could have done to prevent the unfortunate incident.”67
“[V]irtually every instance”68 is just the opposite of the
“rare”69 and “extreme”70 circumstances in which the
single-incident exception should apply.
Hershey says, and JUDGE DENNIS’s and HO’s opinions
agree, that if a city fails to train “at all” regarding the
First Amendment, then it is “obvious” that a
constitutional violation will occur. This not only permits
in recurrent situations that a particular employee is certain to face.’ ”
(emphasis added) (quoting Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 396, 109
S.Ct. 1197, 103 L.Ed.2d 412 (1989) (O’Connor, J., concurring)).
City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 392, 109 S.Ct. 1197, 103
L.Ed.2d 412 (1989) (internal quotation marks omitted).
67
68
Id.
69
Littell, 894 F.3d at 627.
70
Id.
85a
liability for what may be, at most, mere negligence, it
essentially imposes strict liability for a failure to train.71
Our court has said that in some circumstances “there is
a difference between a complete failure to train . . . and a
failure to train in one limited area.”72 Hershey alleges the
City failed to train its officers on the public nature of the
arena and surrounding park and the corresponding First
71
See, e.g., Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 61–62, 131 S.Ct.
1350, 179 L.Ed.2d 417, (2011) (“[W]hen city policymakers are on
actual or constructive notice that a particular omission in their
training program causes city employees to violate citizens’
constitutional rights, the city may be deemed deliberately indifferent
if the policymakers choose to retain that program A less stringent
standard of fault for a failure-to-train claim ‘would result in de facto
respondeat superior liability on municipalities . . . ’ ” (quoting City of
Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. at 392, 109 S.Ct. 1197 (1989))); see also
Loera v. Kingsville Indep. Sch. Dist., 151 F.4th 813, 820, No. 24-40481
(5th Cir. Aug. 22, 2025) (“Deliberate indifference ‘is a stringent
standard, requiring proof that a municipal actor disregarded a known
or obvious consequence of his action.’ ‘A showing of simple or even
heightened negligence will not suffice.’ ” (first quoting Brown v.
Bryan County, 219 F.3d 450, 457 (5th Cir. 2000) (quoting Bd. of Cnty.
Comm’rs of Bryan Cnty., Okl. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 410, 117 S.Ct.
1382, 137 L.Ed.2d 626 (1997), then quoting Brown, 520 U.S. at 410,
117 S.Ct. 1382)).
Cozzo v. Tangipahoa Parish Council, 279 F.3d 273 (5th Cir.
2002) (alteration and internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting
McClendon v. City of Columbia, 258 F.3d 432, 442–43 (5th Cir. 2001),
vacated for reh’g en banc, 285 F.3d 1078 (5th Cir. 2001), decision on
rehearing en banc, 305 F.3d 314 (5th Cir. 2002)); see also Peterson v.
City of Fort Worth, 588 F.3d 838, 849 (5th Cir. 2009) (“[The] ‘narrow’
single incident exception has applied when the court finds a complete
failure to train, not just a failure to train in ‘one limited area’”
(quoting Estate of Davis ex rel. McCully v. City of N. Richland Hills,
406 F.3d 375, 383, 386 (5th Cir. 2005)).
72
86a
Amendment implications.73 In other words, Hershey
alleges a “failure to train in one limited area” and not “a
complete failure to train.”74 But even if Hershey’s
Amended Complaint could be characterized as alleging a
complete failure to train, to say that the need for training
was “obvious” in this case would undermine virtually
every precept of our Monell jurisprudence.
Our court has refused to allow single-incident failureto-train cases to diminish the bedrock concepts
underpinning Monell liability, even when the plaintiff’s
injury was severe and it might seem “obvious” to a lay
person that training likely would have prevented the
injury. Our decision in Garza75 is just one example.
JUDGE DENNIS’s and JUDGE HO’s opinions both rely on
Garza, but it completely undermines the positions
espoused in those opinions. In Garza, Garza’s mother
sought help from law enforcement when she feared her
son, who was intoxicated, would take his own life or would
hurt himself.76 Garza was taken into custody at a
detention center.77 Sometime after 8:00 a.m., he obscured
the lens of the camera that was trained on him in his cell.78
The person tasked with monitoring the camera feed,
Minerva Perez, said that after 8:00 a.m., when jailers
arrived for their shifts, it was their responsibility to
73
See Ante at 568-69.
Peña v. City of Rio Grande City, 879 F.3d 613, 624 (5th Cir.
2018).
74
75
Garza v. City of Donna, 922 F.3d 626 (5th Cir. 2019).
76
Id. at 630-31.
77
Id.
78
Id. at 631.
87a
monitor the jail inmates.79 When the jailers were on duty,
they became occupied putting up a sarcastic “welcome”
sign for inmates and the logo of a comic-book character,
and they “missed that Garza had hanged himself.”80 ICE
agents arrived at 8:40 a.m. and found Garza dead at 8:49
a.m.81 In the ensuing litigation, Garza’s survivors claimed
that “Perez displayed ‘utter confusion’ about her
responsibility to monitor the jail’s camera feeds, invoking
the failure-to-train principles articulated by City of
Canton v. Harris.”82 Our court held that this claim failed
because “[a]s we have emphasized, deliberate
indifference may be inferred this way ‘only in narrow and
extreme circumstances,’ and decisions by our court
drawing the inference are rare.”83 We further explained
that “the record has no evidence about the population that
passes through the City’s jail or about the jail’s operations
from which the possibility of recurring situations
threatening to constitutional rights might be assessed. It
is apparent that this record is inadequate to support a
failure-to-train theory as to Perez.”84
So too, in this case. There is no allegation as to how
many individuals frequent areas outside the Center
during events in order to distribute literature. There is
no allegation from which the risk of recurring situations
like the one at issue in this case can be assessed. Again,
79
Id.
80
Id.
81
Id.
82
Id. at 637.
83
Id. at 638.
84
Id.
88a
the Supreme Court has emphasized that whether a
consequence is “obvious” depends on “[t]he likelihood
that the situation will recur and the predictability that an
officer lacking specific tools to handle that situation will
violate citizens’ rights.”85
Saying that the need for training was “obvious” in this
case would call into question the core tenets of our Monell
jurisprudence, for the reasons discussed above. Even if
Hershey’s constitutional rights were violated, this is a
case in which only a few individuals violated those rights
on one occasion. This a not a case for application of the
“obvious” exception. We have reserved that exception for
cases of a far different ilk than this one.
JUDGE DENNIS’s opinion asserts that Hershey alleged
Bossier City “did not have any policy . . . regulating
speech activities protected by the First Amendment.”86
This implies, if not states, that if Bossier City had
provided at least some training on any aspect of the First
Amendment, there could be no “complete failure to train”
claim, and we would be in ordinary “failure-to-train”
territory. The logic here escapes me. If Bossier City had
trained its law enforcement officers about how to address
an entirely different First Amendment issue—for
instance, permissible means of policing protestors who
shut down a highway with their presence—how would
that have affected Hershey’s claim? Such training would
not bear on preventing viewpoint discrimination against
someone handing out leaflets. Yet, it would be “some”
Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs of Bryan Cnty. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397,
409, 117 S.Ct. 1382, 137 L.Ed.2d 626 (1997).
85
86
Ante at [563-64].
89a
First Amendment training, so the “no training at all”
theory would be inapplicable. This elusive and slippery
nature of a failure-to-train-at-all claim in the context of
this case is apparent from the very next sentence in Judge
Dennis’s opinion, which says, “Hershey alleged the City
failed to train its police officers and private security
personnel of citizens’ First Amendment rights on public
property, including the area surrounding the Center.”87
That is a much more specific claim, and if Bossier City had
notice that it needed to train for that specific potentiality,
Hershey likely would have stated a claim. So, to be clear,
the failure-to-train-at-all theory in a case like the present
one is nothing more than a “gotcha.” Providing some
First Amendment training, even though it had no bearing
at all on the alleged First Amendment violation, would
foreclose reliance on the theory. But failure to train “at
all” results in strict liability when there was no notice “at
all” of the need to train for the specific First Amendment
violation alleged.
“A municipality's culpability for a deprivation of rights
is at its most tenuous where a claim turns on a failure to
train,” and “‘[d]eliberate indifference’ is a stringent
standard of fault.”88 The requisite standard of fault is not
met here and Hershey has therefore failed to sufficiently
plead allegations of liability under Monell.89
87
[Id.]
88
Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 61, 131 S.Ct. 1350, 179
L.Ed.2d 417 (2011).
89
Supra note 50 and accompanying text.
90a
B
Hershey’s Amended Complaint seeks money damages
from Bossier City for its failure to train not only its own
law enforcement officers but the private security guards
who were hired by ASM Global for a concert on a
particular day.
Hershey’s brief cites no decision
whatsoever that holds a municipality liable for failure to
train a private party’s employees.
Nevertheless, JUDGE DENNIS’s and HO’s opinions
permit Hershey to proceed with his claim that Bossier
City is liable for failing to train security guards ASM
hired. I disagree and would affirm the district court's
judgment in this regard.
VI
In a fifth issue raised in Hershey’s appeal, he asserts
that ASM Global’s private security guards worked
together with the Bossier City defendants to eject him
from the Center and that he has stated a cause of action
under the “nexus/joint action tests.” “To state a claim
under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right
secured by the Constitution and laws of the United
States, and must show that the alleged deprivation was
committed by a person acting under color of state law.”90
A
The nexus test asks “whether the State has inserted
‘itself into a position of interdependence with the [private
actor, such] that it was a joint participant in the
West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48, 108 S.Ct. 2250, 101 L.Ed.2d 40
(1988) (emphasis added).
90
91a
enterprise.’”91 In other words, the question is whether
there is a “‘close nexus between the State and the
challenged action’ that seemingly private behavior ‘may
be fairly treated as that of the State itself.’”92
Hershey’s complaint alleges virtually no facts
regarding “interdependence” between Bossier City and
ASM Global’s private security guards. The Amended
Complaint alleges that the City “owns and operates a
public facility known as the Bossier City Arena, which at
all times relevant herein was known as the CenturyLink
Center.” It alleges that defendant security guards were
security guards at the CenturyLink Center. It then
alleges: “Defendant the City has a longstanding custom
of allowing police officers, employees and/ or officials of
CenturyLink Center to use their unfettered discretion to
arbitrarily and capriciously remove individuals who are
peacefully exercising their First Amendment rights from
the CenturyLink property.” This latter allegation is
entirely conclusory. It provides no factual support
whatsoever for this assertion.
These allegations are insufficient to permit a factfinder
to infer that there is such a close nexus between Bossier
City and ASM Global security guards that the actions of
the latter “may be fairly treated as that of the State
Cornish v. Corr. Srvs. Corp., 402 F.3d 545, 550 (5th Cir. 2005)
(alteration in original) (quoting Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co., 419
U.S. 345, 357-58, 95 S.Ct. 449, 42 L.Ed.2d 477 (1974)).
91
Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 531
U.S. 288, 295, 121 S.Ct. 924, 148 L.Ed.2d 807 (2001) (quoting Jackson,
419 U.S. at 351, 95 S.Ct. 449).
92
92a
itself.”93 There are no allegations about the nature of the
contractual relationship between Bossier City and ASM
Global, or between ASM Global and its security guards.
Nor are there factual allegations about whether the City
routinely relies on private security guards to police the
areas abutting or surrounding the Center.
B
Under the joint action test, “private actors will be
considered state actors where they are ‘willful
participant[s] in joint action with the State or its
agents.’”94 “[T]he plaintiff must allege and prove that the
citizen conspired with or acted in concert with state
actors.”95
Hershey’s Amended Complaint alleges that Bossier
City Marshal Gilbert approached Hershey with security
guard Harvey and police officer Stoll. Marshal Gilbert
waived a pair of handcuffs at Hershey, and Officer Stoll
told Hershey that he had been told to leave the park.
Marshal Gilbert then told Hershey that he had bracelets
for Hershey and would put them on him and take him to
jail. Marshal Gilbert said that “people were there to have
a good time.” Security guards Smith and Tucker arrived
shortly thereafter. Hershey asked about the commercial
leafleteer distributing literature nearby, and security
guard Harvey replied that Hershey’s literature was
See Brentwood Acad., 531 U.S. at 295, 121 S.Ct. 924 (quoting
Jackson, 419 U.S. at 351, 95 S.Ct. 449).
93
94
Cornish v. Corr. Srvs. Corp., 402 F.3d 545, 550 (5th Cir. 2005)
(quoting Dennis v. Sparks, 449 U.S. 24, 27, 101 S.Ct. 183, 66 L.Ed.2d
185 (1980)).
95
Mylett v. Jeane, 879 F.2d 1272, 1275 (5th Cir. 1989).
93a
unauthorized—but that Harvey did not know whether the
commercial leafleteer was authorized.
The facts alleged regarding security guards Smith and
Tucker are not sufficient to meet the joint action test. The
complaint alleges only that “Smith and Tucker were
present during Hershey's ejectment from the park . . .
and, acting jointly with the other Defendants, used their
command presence to assist in the removal of Hershey
from the park by Defendant Deputy Marshal Gilbert,
Officer Stoll, and Harvey.” Smith and Tucker allegedly
“arrived shortly” after Marshal Gilbert had told Hershey
to leave and had waived handcuffs at him. A reasonable
factfinder could not infer from Smith and Tucker’s
presence that they willfully participated in Hershey’s
removal. Nor does the complaint allege that the “use[]”
of their “command presence” meant more than that
Smith and Tucker were present during the incident.
Security guard Harvey spoke to Hershey in the
presence of the two Bossier City law enforcement
officers. But security guard Harvey’s statements do not
indicate he understood or believed that Bossier City, as
opposed to ASM Global, required prior approval before
literature could be distributed. Hershey alleged quite
specifically that security guard Harvey said that
Hershey’s “literature had not been approved by
CenturyLink Center, and that Hershey had to submit his
literature in advance for approval.” That is a requirement
of a private, not a state, actor. Neither of the city law
enforcement officers indicated that they thought there
was a prior-approval requirement by either Bossier City
or ASM Global. Hershey’s allegations do not sufficiently
allege joint action.
VII
94a
Hershey contends in his sixth and final issue on appeal
that he stated a claim against the private security guards
under the public function test. Under that test, “a private
entity may qualify as a state actor when it exercises
‘powers traditionally exclusively reserved to the State.’”96
But, “to qualify as a traditional, exclusive public function
within the meaning of our state-action precedents, the
government must have traditionally and exclusively
performed the function” and “[t]he [Supreme] Court has
stressed that ‘very few’ functions fall into that
category.”97 One of those narrow categories is “operating
a company town.”98
Hershey argues that the defendants “engaged in the
regulation of speech on the public sidewalk” and that
“[t]he regulation of speech in a public forum has been
traditionally and exclusively a function of the state.”
However, the only authority he cites for this proposition
is Marsh v. Alabama,99 a case involving the regulation of
speech in a company town.100 That case does not carry the
day based on the facts Hershey has alleged.
Manhattan Cmty. Access Corp. v. Halleck, 587 U.S. 802, 809, 139
S.Ct. 1921, 204 L.Ed.2d 405 (2019) (quoting Jackson, 419 U.S. at 352,
95 S.Ct. 449).
96
97
Id. (quoting Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 158, 98
S.Ct. 1729, 56 L.Ed.2d 185 (1978)).
98
Id.
99
326 U.S. 501, 505–06, 66 S.Ct. 276, 90 L.Ed. 265 (1946).
See id. (“Our question then narrows down to this: Can those
people who live in or come to Chickasaw be denied freedom of press
and religion simply because a single company has legal title to all the
town?”).
100
95a
The Center was being used to host a concert at the time
Hershey was asked to leave. Hershey has cited no
authority that policing the sidewalks abutting an arena
like the Center during such an event is a power exercised
exclusively by state actors.
Hershey’s complaint does not allege that the defendant
security guards were licensed by Bossier City or
“endowed by law with plenary police powers such that
they are de facto police officers.”101 Nor does he allege
that the private security guards were licensed by the city
and empowered by an ordinance to exercise “all of the
powers of the regular police patrol.”102
*
*
*
I would AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.
See Romanski v. Detroit Ent., L.L.C., 428 F.3d 629, 637 (6th Cir.
2005).
101
See Payton v. Rush-Presbyterian-St. Luke’s Med. Ctr., 184 F.3d
623, 630 (7th Cir. 1999). (quoting CHI., ILL., MUN. CODE § 4-340-100
(1992)).
102
96a
APPENDIX C
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT,
WESTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA,
SHREVEPORT DIVISION
Case No. 5:21-CV-00460
Richard HERSHEY,
Plaintiff
v.
CITY OF BOSSIER CITY et al.,
Defendants
Signed: September 24, 2021
T ERRY A . DOUGHTY, United States District Judge:
The Report and Recommendation of the Magistrate
Judge [Doc. No. 33] having been considered, together
with the written Objection [Doc. No. 37] thereto filed with
this Court, and, after a de novo review of the record,
finding that the Magistrate Judge’s Report and
Recommendation is correct and that judgment as
recommended therein is warranted,
IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and DECREED that
the Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss [Doc. No. 19] is
GRANTED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and
DECREED that all claims against the City of Bossier
City, Bobby Gilbert, and Daniel Stoll are DISMISSED
WITH PREJUDICE.
97a
APPENDIX D
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT,
WESTERN DISTRICT LOUISIANA,
SHREVEPORT DIVISION
Civil Action No. 21-cv-460
Richard HERSHEY,
v.
CITY OF BOSSIER CITY, et al.,
Signed: August 23, 2021
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
MARK L. HORNSBY, United States Magistrate
Judge:
Introduction
Richard Hershey (“Plaintiff ”) was distributing leaflets
outside a public arena when a policeman ordered him to
leave or be arrested and taken to jail. Plaintiff left. He
later filed this civil rights action against the City of
Bossier City, two law enforcement officers, and three
security officers. He alleges that his eviction from the
grounds violated his First Amendment rights. Before the
court is a Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 19) filed by the City and
the two law enforcement officers. The three security
officers have filed a separate motion to dismiss (Doc. 28)
that will be addressed later. For the reasons that follow,
it is recommended that the City Defendants’ motion to
dismiss be granted.
98a
Rule 12(b)(6)
The City Defendants move for dismissal based on Fed.
R. Civ. Pro. 12(b)(6). In assessing the motion, the court
must accept as true all well-pleaded facts in the complaint
and view those facts in the light most favorable to the
plaintiff. In re Katrina Canal Breaches Litigation, 495
F.3d 191, 205 (5th Cir. 2007). Those facts must state a
claim that rises above the speculative level and is
plausible on its face. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 127
S.Ct. 1955, 1964-65 (2007); Amacker v. Renaissance Asset
Mgmt., LLC, 657 F.3d 252, 254 (5th Cir. 2011). A
complaint is not sufficient if it offers only “labels and
conclusions,” or “a formulaic recitation of the elements of
a cause of action.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949
(2009) (quoting Twombly, 127 S.Ct. at 1965).
The Allegations
The relevant facts for purposes of assessing the motion
to dismiss are found in Plaintiff’s First Amended
Complaint (Doc. 17). Plaintiff, a senior citizen from
Missouri, is a vegetarian advocate whose ethical beliefs
compel him to share his message with others. He is
compensated by various nonprofit organizations for his
advocacy and distribution of literature. First Amended
Complaint, ¶¶ 4, 15-17. A Christian rock concert known
as Winter Jam was held on February 28, 2020 at a Bossier
City arena that was then known as CenturyLink Center.
¶ 24. The facility has since been rebranded as Brookshire
Grocery Arena. The court will refer to it as the Arena.
The Arena is situated in a public park, with no restriction
on access to any of the sidewalks and streets through the
par
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