Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Samuel Collin Robinson, Petitioner v. Katherine Lyman Freeman, fka Katherine Lyman Robinson

as"

No.

Supreme Court, U.§.

FILED

FEB 14 2026

OFFICE OF THE CLERK

In The

Supreme Court of the United States

Samuel Collin Robinson,

Petitioner

v.

Katherine Lyman Freeman,

Respondent

On Petition for Writ of Certiorari

to the Colorado Court of Appeals

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Samuel Collin Robinson

Post Office Box 4033

Grand Junction, CO 81502

(970) 822-2079

Questions to Review

Time with each parent is allocated to children

of divorce according to state statute listing some of

the factors to be considered by courts. Colorado

Revised Statutes 14-10-124(1.5)(a)(I) - (XI). Similar

factors are used in all 50 states. The list does not

include evaluation standards for its various topics.

This absence prompts questions of law. Does lack of

objective criteria leave the factors so vague that they

fail to give parents adequate notice of what must be

done to receive equal parenting time? Should the

factors be struck down as unconstitutional for

violating the Due Process provision of the 14th

Amendment? Without specific standards, can the

factors be dispositive? May a motion to modify

parenting time be summarily denied for declining to

recite the litany?

1

Parties to the Proceeding

All parties to this proceeding are named by the

caption on the cover page of this booklet. Katherine

was the original Petitioner in Colorado District Court

for Mesa County case 2012DR0018. Collin was the

Respondent. Although the motion at root of the

present petition was filed by Collin, the district court

continues to use the original party designations.

These are the opposite of the designations for the

present petition, so confusion could ensue.

Therefore, names are used in this petition, in the

interest of clarity. Katherine is represented by

counsel, Joshua Martin, Esq. The State of Colorado

may opt to intervene, per United States Code, Title

28, Section 2403(b).

Related Proceedings

In Re the Marriage ofRobinson, 2025SC589,

Colorado Supreme Court. Order filed November

24, 2025. Appendix B.

In Re the Marriage ofRobinson, 2025CA0306,

Colorado Court of Appeals. Opinion on the

merits announced August 14, 2025. Mandate

issued November 25, 2025. Appendix A and D.

In Re the Marriage ofRobinson, 2012DR18, District

Court for Mesa County, Colorado. Order filed

by Judge on February 12, 2025. Appendix G.

In Re the Marriage ofRobinson, 2012DR18, District

Court for Mesa County, Colorado. Order filed

by Magistrate on February 6, 2025. Appendix I.

2

Table of Contents

Table of Authorities......................................................... 5

Opinions Below................................................................. 6

Jurisdiction........................................................................6

Legal Provisions Concerned........................................... 7

Statement of the Case..................................................... 7

Reasons to Grant Writ................................................. 12

The Right to Bring Up Children.......................... 12

Parenting Time Factors........................................ 12

Vagueness of Factors............................................. 13

Violation of Due Process........................................ 13

Summary Denial.................................................... 15

Reasoning of the Court of Appeals............................ 16

Aspects of Due Process.......................................... 16

Fixed Rules.............................................................. 17

Role of Factual Findings....................................... 18

Legal Authority...................................................... 19

Aftermath................................................................

20

Summary........................................................................ 21

3

Appendix

A- Mandate of the Colorado

Court of Appeals.............................

25

B: Order of the Colorado

Supreme Court................................................. 27

C- Petition to the Colorado

Supreme Court

for Writ of Certiorari............................................. 29

D: Opinion of the Colorado

Court of Appeals............................................... 47

E- Opening Brief to the Colorado

Court of Appeals............................................... 55

F: Order of the Magistrate

to Set Hearing on Bond................................... 65

G: Order of the Mesa County

District Court Judge

on Parenting Time.................................................. 69

H- Petition for Judicial Review................................. 73

L Order of the Magistrate

on Parenting Time............................................ 79

J- Motion to Increase Bond....................................... 81

K- Response to Objection........................................... 85

U Objection to Motion to Modify.............................. 91

M: Motion to Modify Parenting Time....................... 97

N: Colorado Revised Statutes

14-10-124.......................................................... 99

O: Kentucky Revised Statutes

403.270(2)......................................................... 103

4

Table of Authorities

United States Constitution

Amendment 14, Section 1

1, 7, 9, 12, 13, 19, 21

United States Code

Title 26, Section 1

17

Title 28, Section 1257(a)

6

Title 28, Section 2403(b)

2

United States Supreme Court Rules

Rule 10(c)

6

Rule 29.4(c)

......... 6

Colorado Revised Statutes

Title 14, Article 10,

Section 124

1, 7, 8, 12, 13, 15,

16, 19, 20, 21

Colorado Rules of Civil Procedure

Rule 7(b)(1)

8

Kentucky Revised Statutes

Chapter 403, Section 270(2)

12

Published Opinions

Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352,

353, 361 (1983)

13

Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390,

399 (1923)

12

Sessions v. Dimaya, 584 U.S. 148,

156-157,189(2018)

,....... 14,19

Reference

Black’s Law Dictionary,

p 128 (12 ed., 2024)

17, 18

5

Opinions Below

1 On November 24th, 2025, the state court of last

resort, the Colorado Supreme Court, declined

certiorari review of this case by an unpublished order

that appears as Appendix B to the present petition.

The Colorado Court of Appeals is the highest state

court to review the merits of the case. The

unpublished opinion of that court was announced on

August 14th, 2025, and it appears verbatim as

Appendix D to this petition. This is the order

presented for review here.

Jurisdiction

^[2 Collin pleads for the United States Supreme

Court to exercise discretionary jurisdiction, given by

United States Code, Title 28, Section 1257(a), to

review this case, because the validity of state statute

is drawn in question on grounds that it is repugnant

to the federal constitution. As the highest state court

to address the merits of this case decided to defend

statute that violates the constitution, and, as similar

laws violate the constitution in the other states, this

topic elicits continuing public interest. The issue is

ripe to be taken up for the first time by the Supreme

Court, where judicial review can settle the important

questions of federal law presented by this case.

United States Supreme Court Rule 10(c). The

Attorney General of Colorado is being served notice,

simultaneous with this petition. Rule 29.4(c).

6

Legal Provisions Concerned

^3 Colorado Revised Statutes, Title 14, Article 10,

Section 124: This is the state statute under scrutiny

here. The statute is lengthy. The pertinent portions

are found in subsections 1 and 1.5. Appendix N.

If 4 Constitution of the United States of America,

Amendment 14, Section 1: This is the federal law

that governs the present appeal. The relevant part

is, “...nor shall any State deprive any person of life,

liberty, or property, without due’ process of law; nor

deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal

protection of the laws.”

Statement of the Case

TJ5 On May 20th, 2005, Katherine and Collin

married. In due time, they were blessed with a

daughter and then a son. On October 18th, 2012, the

District Court for Mesa County, Colorado, decreed

the marriage dissolved, with parenting time

allocated according to a stipulated parenting plan.

Katherine later remarried and changed surname.

The parenting plan went through a couple of

revisions over the years, whittling away time the

children get with Collin. The first revision was

appealed all the way to the United States Supreme

Court, where certiorari was denied on November

18th, 2019, in case 19'356. On January 14th, 2022,

the district court adopted the current version,

proposed by Katherine during a contested hearing.

The plan gives Katherine 86% of the parenting time,

7

while giving just 14% to Collin. This hegemony

sabotages the relationships between Collin and the

children. Collin appealed all the way to the United

States Supreme Court, where certiorari was again

denied on October 7th, 2024, in case 23-1244.

Tf6 On November 12th, 2024, Collin renewed the

effort by filing a Verified Motion to Modify Parenting

Time with the district court for Mesa County,

Colorado. Appendix M. This motion gives rise to the

present petition. The motion seeks replacement of

the existing parenting plan with a new plan to

restore balance to the parenting time schedule. On

November 14th, 2024, Katherine filed an objection,

alleging that the motion failed the particularity

requirement of Colorado Rules of Civil Procedure

7(b)(1) by neglecting to address the factors listed by

Colorado Revised Statutes 14-10-124(1.5)(a)(I) - (XI).

Appendix L. On November 19th, 2024, Collin filed a

response explaining that the factors were not

addressed because they lack evaluation standards

and are, therefore, not dispositive. The response also

gave additional information in the form of a detailed

example of the dysfunction to be cured by the new

plan, so the court could ascertain that genuine issues

exist and necessitate a hearing. Appendix K.

Without holding a hearing, Magistrate Garcia issued

an order, on February 6th, 2025, directing that the

motion be denied for failing the particularity

requirement. No further explanation was given. The

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flaw in the statute and the additional information

were ignored. Appendix I.

*(|7 On February 10th, 2025, Collin filed a Petition

for Judicial Review of the magistrate’s order. The

petition addressed the particularity requirement and

pointed out that no amount of detail in the text of a

motion can overcome the deficiency of the statute.

The lack of objective criteria leads to violation of due

process and equal protection rights granted by the

14th Amendment. Appendix H, p 76. This was the

stage in the proceeding when the federal questions

were raised before the court of first instance,

preserving the issues on appeal. On February 12th,

2025, Judge Lawrence issued the order of the district

court, adopting the magistrate’s decision. As basis,

the Judge found that Collin, “...[did] not identify

specifically the provision of the parenting time order

that was violated”. Appendix G, p 70. This finding

was out of place, because neither the motion to

modify parenting time, nor the petition for judicial

review were based on, or even mentioned, any

violation of the plan, so of course they did not

identify a violated provision. Violation is not a

requirement for modification. The order made no

mention of evaluation standards or constitutionality

of statute, important issues that were raised by the

petition and ignored by the district court.

T[8 The judge’s adoption of the magistrate’s order,

without even acknowledging that due process and

constitutionality of statute were questioned by the

9

petition for review, appears to defy explanation.

Additional information is necessary to understand

the mistake made by the judge. While the events

described by the preceding paragraphs were

occurring, a second series of events was going on in

parallel. On December 17th, 2024, Collin filed a

motion concerning parenting time disputes that

sought an increase of the bond paid by Katherine to

the district court. The motion cited a specific

violation of the existing parenting plan and proposed

relief designed to support future compliance.

Appendix J. On February 15th, 2025, Magistrate

Garcia issued an order directing that the motion to

increase the bond be set for hearing. Appendix F.

T|9 The facts of the case indicate that the district

court judge confused or conflated the motion to

modify parenting time with the separate motion to

increase the compliance bond. This failure to

recognize the two motions as discrete actions lead to

subsequent failure to consider the issues raised by

the petition for judicial review, including violation of

a constitutional right to due process. Appendix G, p

70, and H, p 76.

^[10 Although a final order was issued by the district

court, the primary questions requiring review were

missed or skipped outright, so Collin raised the

issues to the Colorado Court of Appeals, sending an

opening brief on May 7th, 2025. Appendix E. This

was the stage in the proceeding when the federal

questions were raised for review before the appellate

10

courts. With panel concurrence, Judge Freyre

affirmed the district court order on August 14th,

2025. Appendix D.

^11 The court of appeals was correct to point out

that, although the elder of the two children in this

case was a minor when the motion to modify

parenting time was filed, in 2024, that child reached

18 years of age in 2025, so parenting time is no

longer applicable to one of the two children. The

questions of law remain valid, as they relate to the

younger child, who is 16 years of age at present.

There is no dispute as to the dismissal in part,

relating to the elder child. Also, the court of appeals

was correct that the standard for questions of

statutory constitutionality is de novo review.

Appendix D, Paragraph 6. The other assertions of

the court of appeals were not correct. The opinion

that affirmed the district court order remains at

issue, as discussed in detail under a subsequent

heading - Reasoning of the Court of Appeals.

^[12 Faults within the opinion of the Colorado Court

of Appeals were raised to the Colorado Supreme

Court by a petition for writ of certiorari, mailed on

September 18th, 2025. Appendix C. On November

24th, 2025 the Colorado Supreme Court declined to

consider the merits of the case. Appendix B. Justice

Hart did not participate. The next day, November

25th, 2025, the Colorado Court of Appeals issued its

mandate. Appendix A. The present petition raises

11

unresolved questions of constitutional law to the

United States Supreme Court.

Reasons to Grant Writ

T|13 The Right to Bring Up Children- The 14th

Amendment of the Constitution of the United States

provides that no State shall, “deprive any person of

life, liberty, or property, without due process of law;

nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the

equal protection of the laws.” The Supreme Court

holds that, without doubt, the liberty protected by

this Due Process provision includes the right of

individuals to bring up children. Meyer v. Nebraska,

262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923).

Parenting Time Factors: Time with each parent

is allocated to children of divorce according to state

statute listing some of the factors to be considered by

courts. Colorado Revised Statutes 14-10124(1.5)(a)(I) — (XI). Appendix N. Similar law

prevails in all 50 states.1 Some states, like

Kentucky, set forth an explicit presumption of equal

allocation of time for each parent to participate in

bringing up their children. Even there, statute lists

factors to consider for unequal allocation. Kentucky

Revised Statutes 403.270(2)(a)-(k). Appendix O.

1 https7/www .justia.com/family/child-custody-and-suport/childcustody-forms-50-state-resources/

Date viewed: 2026.01.23

12

T|15 Vagueness of Factors: Although Colorado

Revised Statutes 14-10-124(1.5)(a)(I)-(XI) specify

some factors to consider, the list fails to give

standards for evaluation of information relating to

the factors, leaving the statute ambiguous and well

short of dispositive. As example, one factor, listed by

(1.5)(a)(IV), directs courts to consider adjustment of a

child to their home, school, and community in

determining their best interests for the purpose of

allocating parenting time. By what criteria is

adjustment to home at Mom’s or home at Dad’s

determined to be best? How are best interests

interpreted as they relate to school selection, attitude

about education, and support of extra-curricular

activities? What relative weight should each topic

get? Is participation in one volunteer organization

preferable community involvement to participation

in another organization? This isn’t just less than

optimal clarity, it’s no clarity. These questions arise

from a single factor, picked from the list to give a

concise example. As the other factors also lack

standards, they give rise to more unanswered

questions. The entire list is faulty.

TJ16 Violation of Due Process: Statute this vague

violates the Due Process provision of the 14th

Amendment by encouraging arbitrary enforcement

through failure to describe what a suspect must do in

order to satisfy the law. This is unconstitutional.

Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 353, 361 (1983).

In the present case, a parent has been accused of

13

being less supportive of the best interests of their

child than the other parent. The operative statute

does not specify what objective criteria the suspect

parent must meet in order for their parenting to be

deemed satisfactory. The result here, in a prior

action, was arbitrary imposition of lopsided minority

time on one parent, by the court, at the instance of

the other parent. The statute is too vacuous to

prevent this abuse from recurring in the present

action.

^17 While some may argue that the need for clarity

is not as strong in this domestic relations case as in

the cited criminal case, personal experience of the

party deprived of equal opportunity to parent their

children for 14 years, and counting, forecloses the

assertion. Less than equal parenting time is a

grievous loss. The most exacting anti-ambiguity

standard should govern.2 Sessions v. Dimaya, 584

U.S. 148, 156-157 (2018)3. It may also be argued

that the subject statute does give a clear standard

applicable to all factors — the best interests of the

child. Further, the flexibility afforded by this

standard is, arguably, indispensable. These

assertions ignore the legitimate need for discernable

2 Appendix H, Paragraph 2, includes one claim inconsistent

with the present paragraph. Please accept this apology.

3 This is from the opinion of Justice Kagan, referring to a

different court order of similar gravity.

14

standards, relating to the subjects of the factors, to

give parents adequate notice of what the law

requires them to do for equal parenting time.

Although beyond the scope of the present petition,

allocation of decision-making responsibility under

14-10-124(1.5)(b) suffers from the same unmet need,

because it uses the same factors, plus similar factors.

5[18 Recent revision of the statute inserted a new

provision at 14-10-124(1.5)(a.5) directing courts to,

“...strive not to consider as a relevant factor

information or recommendations that are biased,

including bias regarding religion, gender, [or other

itemized characteristics].” While this addition seems

noble, the new direction does not answer any of the

questions from Paragraph 15 of the present petition,

so the value of its protection against slanted

decisions is minimal. Magistrates can finesse

expression of findings to justify disparate allocation

when the actual reason is personal preference

operating in a realm of undefined criteria.

^[19 Summary Denial- No amount of copious detail

in the text of a motion can overcome the lack of

objective criteria for evaluating information related

to the statutory factors. Therefore, recapitulation of

the factors is not a necessary component of a viable

motion to modify parenting time. A specific reason

or set of reasons may well warrant modification of

parenting time independent of the statutory list of

factors. The list does not exclude other concerns and

does not settle parenting time controversies.

15

Summary denial of the subject motion to modify

parenting time, for failure to recite the deficient

factors, should be overturned.

Reasoning of the Court of Appeals

H[20 Aspects of Due Process^ Attempting to defend

the problematic factors, the Colorado Court of

Appeals distinguishes procedural from substantive

due process, describes these terms as addressing

different aspects, and treats the controversy here as

a substantive claim. Appendix D, Paragraphs 11 and

12. The opening brief to the court of appeals makes

no such distinction, because, some jurists disagree

with the segregation.

^[21 The subject statute gives no evaluation

standard to notify parents what will be considered

adequate to merit award of any particular proportion

of parenting time and to prevent the court from

ruling in an arbitrary manner. This creates

simultaneous violation of both purported aspects of

due process, so the claim is valid whether the

distinction is valid or not. The United States

Supreme Court need not diagnose every violation

that may be occasioned by the subject statute. The

procedural due process violation, perpetrated

through lack of adequate notice, gives enough reason

to declare Colorado Revised Statutes 14-10124(1.5) (a) (I)-(XI) unconstitutional and overrule the

orders below, without even citing substantive due

process or equal protection.

16

*122 Fixed Rules- According to the definition used by

the court of appeals, a determination made without

consideration of fixed rules is arbitrary. Black’s Law

Dictionary, p 128, definition 1 (12 ed. 2024).

Therefore, the court of appeals attempts to prop up

an assertion that the statute is not arbitrary by

noting that it provides a discrete list of

considerations that inform orders. Appendix D,

Paragraph 12. The statutory best interests factors

are not fixed rules — as presented, they are aspects of

a child’s life to ponder. While contemplation of the

factors may be commendable, it is not the same as

application of fixed rules.

T|23 For contrast, United States Code, Title 26,

Section 1(a), does give fixed rules. Married

individuals filing joint returns whose taxable income

exceeds $36,900 without exceeding $89,150 are to

pay tax in the amount of $5,535 plus 28% of the

excess over $36,9004. Those whose taxable income

exceeds $89,150 without exceeding $140,000 are to

pay $20,165 plus 31% of the excess over $89,150.

Additional rules give prescriptions for several other

income levels and marital status designations. There

is a stark difference between these rules and the best

interests factors.

•|24 Should allocation of parenting time be as

formulaic as tax brackets? Perhaps not; and yet,

4 These numbers don’t match 2025 Internal Revenue Service

tables! they just serve as examples of fixed rules.

17

shouldn’t parents receive notice of what they can do

in order to retain or recover equal opportunity to

participate in the upbringing of their children? The

best interests factors give no such notice. They are

as lawless as a bully’s playground, where partisan

practitioners exact misplaced retribution and make

money by playing a cruel game of keep-away to

benefit one parent at the expense of the other parent,

the children, and, by extension, the nation.

•|25 Role of Factual Findings: The court of appeals

seeks to sooth its conscience by recalling that the

district court must make factual findings on the

relevant factors to explain the basis of a parenting

time order by identifying the evidence which the fact

finder deemed determinative, as if this will prevent

arbitrary orders. Appendix D, Paragraph 12. In the

absence of fixed rules, factual findings cannot

prevent arbitrary orders, because the parties are left

in the dark regarding criteria, and because different

decision-makers may well return very different

decisions from the same facts.

•|26 According to a definition neglected by the court

of appeals, a judicial decision founded on preference,

rather than reason, is arbitrary. Black’s Law

Dictionary, p 128, definition 2 (12 ed. 2024).

Considering statutory factors without criteria to

evaluate relevant information does not give rational

basis for decisions that are independent of decision­

maker preferences. While factual findings are a good

start, they do not solve the problem.

18

•|27 Legal Authority- The court of appeals takes the

fallback position that, since the opening brief does

not cite any supporting legal authority or develop the

argument beyond a conclusory statement, the court

may decline decision. Appendix D, Paragraph 13.

These allegations are not true. The 14th Amendment

is the legal authority asserted by the brief. This

requires that statute not be so ambiguous that

traditional canons of interpretation fail to answer the

questions laws beget. Sessions v. Dimaya, 584 U.S.

148, 189 (2018)5. The opening brief to the court of

appeals goes beyond stating this point by developing

the argument with specific questions begotten of the

subject factors. Appendix E, pp 61 and 62.6 The

questions are original, so there is no reference to an

outside source. Why would the court of appeals

refuse to even acknowledge presentation of these

questions? Could it be recognition that the questions

lay bare the fatal flaw in the statute?

^28 According to 14-10-124(1.5)(a), restriction of

parenting time is governed by specific endangerment

criteria, distinct from the best interests factors.

These criteria have not been met during the history

of this case, so formal restriction has not been

imposed. The allocation limiting time with one

parent to 14% is an arbitrary de facto restriction,

5 This is from the opinion of Justice Gorsuch.

6 Herein Paragraph 15.

19

perpetrated behind a smokescreen of

unconstitutional factors. The courts below have been

acting beyond the limits of their legal authority.

Aftermath

T|29 Will decision-makers be left unable to protect

children, where real danger is present, after the

factors are struck down? Will the States enact

evaluation standards so exhaustive that minute

details of family life will be codified in dystopian

style? Such dismal futures need not prevail. In the

few authentic cases of endangerment, courts will

remain authorized to restrict parenting time under

Colorado Revised Statutes 14-10-124(1.5)(a). While

even this statute can be abused, at least the correct

requirements would govern. Where no legitimate

endangerment exists, Colorado Revised Statutes 1410-124(1) will continue to encourage sharing the

rights and responsibilities of parenting, in the best

interests of all. Parties equal before the law share

alike. Children should be granted the same amount

of time with each parent.

20

Summary

T|30 The subject statute is commonly referred to as

the “best interests of the child standard”. This term

is a misnomer. The statutory factors are

standardless. They lack evaluation criteria, so they

are not dispositive. They fail to give adequate notice

and they invite arbitrary decisions. Colorado

Revised Statutes 14-10-124(1.5)(a)(I) - (XI) should be

struck down for violating the Due Process provision

of the 14th Amendment. A motion to modify

parenting time must not be summarily denied for

declining to recite the list of faulty factors. Please

cure this ongoing wrong by overruling the orders

below and declaring the deficient factors

unconstitutional to clear the way for both parents to

receive equal opportunity to raise their children with

love.

Pled from the heart,

Samuel Collin Robinson

Date

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