Opposition Brief — Google LLC, Petitioner v. VirtaMove, Corp., et al.

Supreme Court briefJul 13, 2026

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NO. 25-1230

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

________________

GOOGLE LLC,

Petitioner,

v.

VIRTAMOVE, CORP., ET AL.,

________________

Respondents.

On Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the United

States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit

________________

BRIEF IN OPPOSITION

________________

BRIAN LEDAHL

Counsel of Record

MARC A. FENSTER

REZA MIRZAIE

JAMES A. MILKEY

RUSS AUGUST & KABAT

12424 Wilshire Blvd., 12th Fl

Los Angeles, CA 90025

(310) 826-7474

bledahl@raklaw.com

mfenster@raklaw.com

rmirzaie@raklaw.com

jmilkey@raklaw.com

Counsel for Respondent VirtaMove, Corp.

July 13, 2026

i

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

Whether the PTO retains statutory authority to

deny institution based on the “settled expectations”

factor, where discretion is committed to the PTO and

no statutory provision prohibits consideration of

settled expectations.

Whether the “drastic and extraordinary”

remedy of mandamus is appropriate where Google

identifies no statutory text that has been violated and

the Federal Circuit has held that an alternative

vehicle—a

notice-and-comment

rulemaking

challenge—remains available.

ii

RULE 29.6 STATEMENT

VirtaMove, Corp. does not have a parent entity,

is not publicly traded, and no publicly held company

owns 10% or more of its stock/equity.

iii

TABLE OF CONTENTS

QUESTIONS PRESENTED ......................................... i

TABLE OF CONTENTS ............................................ iii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ....................................... iv

INTRODUCTION ........................................................ 1

STATEMENT OF THE CASE..................................... 2

REASONS FOR DENYING THE PETITION ............ 6

A. Google Is Not Entitled to Mandamus Relief. ... 6

B. Because Denial of Institution Is Committed

to the PTO’s Discretion With No Law to

Apply in Reviewing Such Denial, There Is

No Statutory Violation. ................................... 12

C. The USPTO Has Not Enacted a Statute of

Limitations as Google Suggests. .................... 21

D. This Case Is a Poor Vehicle for Review.......... 24

CONCLUSION ........................................................... 27

iv

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases

Apple Inc. v. Fintiv, Inc.,

Case No. IPR2020-00019, Paper No. 11, (P.T.A.B.

Mar. 20, 2020) ......................................................... 15

Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Ct. for D.C.,

542 U.S. 367 (2004)............................................... 1, 8

Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee,

579 U.S. 261 (2016)............................. 1, 9, 12, 14, 18

Farmworker Just. Fund, Inc. v. Brock,

811 F.2d 613 (D.C. Cir. 1987)................................. 11

Gen. Plastic Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Canon Kabushiki

Kaisha,

Case No. IPR2016-01357, Paper No. 19 (Sept. 6,

2017) ........................................................................ 14

Google LLC v. VirtaMove, Corp.,

Case No. IPR2025-00487, Paper No. 8 (May 12,

2025) .......................................................... 3, 4, 24, 26

Heckler v. Chaney,

470 U.S. 821 (1985)................................................... 9

In re Cambridge Indus. USA Inc.,

No. 2026-101, 2025 WL 3526129 (Fed. Cir. Dec. 9,

2025) .......................................................... 5, 7, 23, 25

In re Google LLC,

No. 2026-111, 2026 WL 204945 (Fed. Cir. Jan. 27,

2026) .......................................................................... 5

Lincoln v. Vigil,

508 U.S. 182 (1993)................................................. 26

Loper Bright Enters. v. Raimondo,

603 U.S. 369 (2024)................................................. 14

Mullin v. Doe,

609 U.S. ____ (2026) ............................................... 11

v

Mylan Labs. Ltd. v. Janssen Pharmaceutica,

N.V., 989 F.3d 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2021) ....................... 9

NHK Spring Co., Ltd. v. Intri-Plex Techs., Inc.,

Case No. IPR2018-00752, Paper No. 8 (P.T.A.B.

Sept. 12, 2018) ........................................................ 15

Rodriguez v. Mayorkas,

No. 23-435-CV, 2024 WL 4023841 (2d Cir. Sept. 3,

2024) ........................................................................ 10

SAS Institute, Inc. v. Iancu,

584 U.S. 357 (2018)................................................. 18

Sotera Wireless, Inc. v. Masimo Corp.,

Case No. IPR2020-01019, Paper No. 12 (P.T.A.B.

Dec. 1, 2020) ............................................................ 15

Thryv, Inc v. Click-To-Call Techs., LP,

590 U.S. 45 (2020)................................................... 13

Ward v. Skinner,

943 F.2d 157 (1st Cir. 1991) ................................... 10

Weyerhaeuser Co. v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv.,

586 U.S. 9 (2018)....................................................... 9

Statutes

35 U.S.C. § 286 ........................................................... 20

35 U.S.C. § 311 ....................................................... 3, 18

35 U.S.C. § 312(a) ........................................................ 3

35 U.S.C. § 314(a) ...................................... 3, 13, 15–17

35 U.S.C. § 314(b) .................................................. 3, 12

35 U.S.C. § 314(d) .................................................. 1, 13

35 U.S.C. § 315(b) ...................................................... 18

35 U.S.C. § 318(a) ...................................................... 12

5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2) ................................................ 9, 18

Leahy-Smith America Invents Act,

Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011) ................. 2

vi

Administrative Materials

Additional Discretionary Institution Considerations—

U.S. Manufacturing and Small Business Use of

AIA Proceedings

(Mar. 11, 2026) ........................................................ 16

Memorandum Regarding Interim Processes for PTAB

Workload Management

(Mar. 26, 2025) ........................................................ 15

1

INTRODUCTION

Google asks this Court to deploy the

extraordinary writ of mandamus to overturn a

decision that Congress committed to the Patent

Office’s discretion and expressly made “final and

nonappealable.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(d). The Federal

Circuit correctly declined that invitation, and nothing

in the Petition warrants this Court’s intervention.

As an initial matter, Google identifies no

statutory text that the Director’s decision even

arguably violates. The AIA imposes a number of

mandatory duties on the Director, but not a single

provision requires him to institute inter partes review,

and none restricts the factors he may weigh in

declining to do so. That is why this Court has

recognized that “[t]he agency’s decision to deny a

petition is a matter committed to the Patent Office’s

discretion.” Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee, 579 U.S.

261, 273 (2016). There is certainly no violation that

presents the “clear and indisputable” right to relief

required for a writ of mandamus. Cheney v. U.S. Dist.

Ct. for D.C., 542 U.S. 367, 381 (2004).

Furthermore, the Petition rests on a false

factual premise: that the PTO has “conjur[ed] from

whole cloth” a six-year “limitations period” that

“foreclose[s]” review of older patents. See Petition at

2–3. The data concerning Google’s own petitions for

IPR refute that characterization. The rate at which

the PTO exercises discretion for patents more than six

years old differs from the overall rate at which the

PTO exercises its discretion by less than four

2

percentage points (80.4% compared to 76.6%), clearly

showing that the PTO has not enacted a de facto

statute of limitations on inter partes review.

Finally, this case is a uniquely poor vehicle for

review. Because the denial below rested on a holistic

assessment of multiple factors, the Court cannot

determine whether “settled expectations” was

dispositive here without guessing at what motivated

the agency, such that any resulting decision would

amount to an advisory opinion. Meanwhile, the better

vehicle the Federal Circuit has identified—an APA

notice-and-comment rulemaking challenge before a

district court, where a factfinder could develop the

record Google’s rule-based theory requires—remains

open to Google.

In short, there has been no statutory violation,

much less one that would present a clear and

indisputable right to the mandamus relief sought by

Google. And if Google were correct that the PTO’s

consideration of a patent’s age is a de facto limitations

period, the appropriate vehicle for review would be a

district court APA action, not Google’s flawed request

for mandamus.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

In 2011, Congress enacted the Leahy-Smith

America Invents Act (“AIA”), Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125

Stat. 284 (2011), which made various changes to the

Patent Act. 35 U.S.C. § 1 et seq. Among those changes

was the creation of a new proceeding before the U.S.

Patent and Trademark Office (“PTO”) called an inter

3

partes review (“IPR”). This new IPR process allowed

private parties the opportunity to request that the

PTO reconsider, on specific grounds, the validity of a

patent that had previously been fully issued by the

Office. See 35 U.S.C. § 311. Nothing in the Act changed

or withdrew the ability of anyone sued for

infringement of a patent to challenge its validity in a

district court action. The AIA set forth various rules

and procedures for IPR proceedings. Among those

procedures, the Act required that a party seeking to

pursue such a challenge file a petition identifying the

validity challenge and that the Director of the PTO

determine whether or not to institute an IPR

proceeding to review the challenged patent. Id.

§§ 312(a), 314(b). The statute committed this

determination of whether to review the patent to the

discretion of the Director and explicitly indicated that

the decision to institute or not institute an IPR

proceeding was not reviewable by any court. Id.

§ 314(a) (imposing no requirement to institute any

inter partes review); id. § 314(d) (“The determination

by the Director whether to institute an inter partes

review under this section shall be final and

nonappealable.”).

In 2025, Google filed petitions for inter partes

review challenging patents that VirtaMove had

asserted against Google in parallel district court

infringement litigation. In response, VirtaMove

requested that the PTO exercise its discretion to deny

several petitions for IPR filed by Google. E.g., Google

LLC v. VirtaMove, Corp., Case No. IPR2025-00487,

Paper No. 8 (May 12, 2025). Those requests identified

numerous factors supporting exercise of the Director’s

4

discretion, including the fact that Google filed

numerous parallel petitions (id. at 18–19), the

substantive weakness of Google’s IPR petition (id. at

15–17), the lack of relevant changed legal standards

since issuance of the claims (id. at 15), Google’s

extensive over-reliance on expert testimony to

establish the presence of claim elements in the prior

art (id. at 3–5) and the presence of parallel district

court litigation (id. at 5–14). VirtaMove also identified

its settled expectations as relevant, given that the

challenged claims had been in effect for nearly fifteen

years. Id. at 17–18.

Google responded to VirtaMove’s request for

discretionary denial, disagreeing with VirtaMove’s

application of the relevant discretionary factors. See

Google LLC v. VirtaMove, Corp., Case No. IPR202500487, Paper No. 9 (June 10, 2025). As part of its

response, Google reserved the right to challenge “the

Director’s March 26, 2025 memorandum”—which

articulated the “settled expectations” factor—as

“legally invalid as . . . adopted without notice-andcomment rulemaking.” Id. at 31 n.12.

After considering VirtaMove’s arguments

requesting discretionary denial as well as Google’s

responsive arguments, the Acting Director’s delegee

exercised her discretion to deny institution. Google

LLC v. VirtaMove, Corp., Case No. IPR2025-00487,

Paper No. 10 (July 11, 2025). The PTO stated that

because the patent had “been in force for more than 14

years” there were “strong settled expectations,” and

further noted that Google did “not provide any

persuasive reasoning why an inter partes review is an

5

appropriate use of Board resources.” Id. at 2. The

order denying institution further noted that the

“determination is based on the totality of the evidence

and arguments the parties have presented,” and not

limited to the “certain arguments . . . highlighted

above.” Id.

On Google’s request for a writ of mandamus, the

Federal Circuit found mandamus was not an

appropriate vehicle to challenge “the PTO’s use of

‘settled expectations’ as a factor in denying institution

of inter partes review.” In re Google LLC, No. 2026111, 2026 WL 204945, at *1 (Fed. Cir. Jan. 27, 2026) .

The Federal Circuit’s opinion noted that the court had

previously decided the same issues in In re Cambridge

Indus. USA Inc., No. 2026-101, 2025 WL 3526129

(Fed. Cir. Dec. 9, 2025), and that Google had not

presented reasoning that would support a different

outcome. 2026 WL 204945, at *1. In the In re

Cambridge opinion cited in denying Google’s

mandamus request, the Federal Circuit held that the

“factors the Director may consider when deciding

whether to institute IPR” “focus directly and expressly

on institution standards,” and are thus not reviewable

under this Court’s precedent. In re Cambridge, 2025

WL 3526129, at *3.

In re Cambridge further noted that a challenge

to the PTO’s use of the “settled expectations” factor as

creating a de facto rule would more appropriately be

brought “in an APA action in federal district court”

than a mandamus petition. Id. at *2. Despite alleging

that the PTO’s actions and guidance constitute “a rule

that, like any limitations period, affects parties’

6

substantive rights” (Petition at 23), Google has not

pursued an APA action in district court challenging

the PTO’s actions as inconsistent with notice-andcomment rulemaking.

REASONS FOR DENYING THE PETITION

Google’s Petition should be denied for

numerous reasons. First, Google cannot satisfy any of

the requirements for the extraordinary relief of

mandamus: Google has adequate alternative means of

relief (including invalidity challenges in the parallel

district court proceedings and a district court APA

notice-and-comment rulemaking action that Google

has not yet pursued) and it has no clear and

indisputable right to relief. Second, Google identifies

no statutory provision that the Director’s decision

violates; the AIA commits denial of institution to the

Director’s discretion and supplies no law by which to

review discretionary denial. Third, the central

premise of Google’s Petition—that the PTO has

enacted a de facto six-year limitations period—is false,

as the data concerning Google’s own petitions for IPR

demonstrate. Fourth, this case is a poor vehicle for

review because the PTO’s denial of institution rested

on a holistic assessment of multiple factors, and the

better vehicle that Google has declined to pursue

remains open to Google.

A. Google Is Not Entitled to Mandamus

Relief.

A writ of mandamus is “one of the most potent

weapons in the judicial arsenal,” and each of “three

7

conditions must be satisfied before it may issue.”

Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Ct. for D.C., 542 U.S. 367, 380–81

(2004) (cleaned up).

First, in order to ensure that mandamus “will

not be used as a substitute for the regular appeals

process,” the party seeking mandamus must “have no

other adequate means to attain the relief he desires.”

Id. at 380–81. Second, the party seeking relief bears

the burden of showing a “clear and indisputable” right

to relief. Id. at 381. Finally, “even if the first two

prerequisites have been met,” the issuing court must

find the writ to be “appropriate under the

circumstances.” Id.

All three requirements are lacking here. First,

Google—at least under its own characterization of the

record wherein the PTO’s consideration of settled

expectations acts as a rule rather than a legitimate

exercise of discretion (see Petition at 23)—has an

alternative right to relief in the form of an APA noticeand-comment rulemaking action before a district

court. See In re Cambridge Indus. USA Inc., No. 2026101, 2025 WL 3526129 (Fed. Cir. Dec. 9, 2025)

(“Cambridge's contention that the PTO was required

to promulgate relevant considerations for institution

through notice-and-comment rulemaking procedures

can be raised in an APA action in federal district court;

thus, it has failed to demonstrate lack of available

alternatives for relief.”).

Google also has a second, and even more direct,

alternative avenue of relief: it may simply litigate its

invalidity contentions in the parallel district court

8

infringement litigation. Denial of institution deprives

Google of nothing but a supplementary administrative

forum. Every invalidity defense that Google raised in

its IPR petitions remains fully available to Google in

the parallel district court litigation. See 35 U.S.C.

§ 282(b) (“The following shall be defenses in any action

involving . . . the infringement of a patent: . . .

Invalidity of the patent . . . .”). A party that retains a

complete opportunity to litigate the very issue on

which it sought agency action cannot show that it has

“no other adequate means to attain the relief” it seeks.

Cheney, 542 U.S. at 380.

Second, Google cannot identify any statutory

provision that has even potentially been violated,

much less establish a “clear and indisputable” right to

relief. Cheney, 542 U.S. at 381. As discussed in further

detail in Section B, infra, Google’s challenge at most

presents policy considerations that it attempts to

glean from the overall structure of the statutory

scheme (such as Congress’s decision not to impose a

limitations period based on a patent’s age), rather

than identify any specific text of any statutory

provision that the PTO’s consideration of settled

expectations violates. Nor does Google show (or even

attempt to show) that there is any law set forth in the

statute regarding how the Director must exercise his

discretion, because there is none. The lack of law

governing review of the Director’s exercise of

discretion is precisely why the Federal Circuit has

stated that “it is difficult to imagine a mandamus

petition that challenges a denial of institution and

identifies a clear and indisputable right to relief.” See

9

Mylan Labs. Ltd. v. Janssen Pharmaceutica, N.V., 989

F.3d 1375, 1382 (Fed. Cir. 2021).

Indeed, Google itself concedes that the APA

precludes review of an agency’s exercise of discretion

when “the relevant statute is drawn so that a court

would have no meaningful standard against which to

judge the agency’s exercise of discretion.”

Weyerhaeuser Co. v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 586

U.S. 9, 23 (2018) (cited by Petition at 21). This is

precisely the case here, because no aspect of the AIA

sets forth any guidelines for how the Director must

exercise discretion.

For the same reason, the Director’s refusal to

institute review is agency inaction of the kind this

Court

has

long

treated

as

presumptively

unreviewable. See Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821,

831–32 (1985). An agency’s decision not to act “often

involves a complicated balancing of a number of

factors which are peculiarly within its expertise,”

including “whether agency resources are best spent on

this violation or another.” Id. at 831. A decision

declining institution is precisely such a refusal to act:

the Director must weigh the strength of the petition,

the demands on the Board’s resources, the posture of

any parallel litigation, and the parties’ reliance

interests. That is the same balancing of priorities that

Heckler commits to agency judgment—and it is why

this Court cited 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2) in recognizing

that the denial of a petition “is a matter committed to

the Patent Office’s discretion.” Cuozzo, 579 U.S. at

273.

10

Google’s attempt to distinguish Heckler on the

ground that Google alleges a statutory violation

(Petition at 22 n.11) is circular; while Google

superficially alleges a statutory violation, Google

identifies no portion of the statute that sets forth any

requirement that has purportedly been violated.

Google’s assertion that “there is, of course, ‘law to

apply’—the statute” (Petition at 21) rings hollow when

Google identifies nothing in the statute that provides

any such law. Because no provision of the AIA

constrains the factors the Director may weigh in

denying institution, there is no more law to apply here

than there is to any other exercise of enforcement

discretion.

Because the AIA provides no law to apply in

reviewing the Director’s exercise of discretion, this

case is readily distinguishable from the cases cited by

Google, all of which involved statutory provisions

describing the bounds of the agency’s discretion. See

Rodriguez v. Mayorkas, No. 23-435-CV, 2024 WL

4023841, at *2 (2d Cir. Sept. 3, 2024) (“[R]ather than

challenging a discretionary determination, Rodriguez

questions whether the agency adhered to express

directives given to it by Congress. This is squarely

within our constitutional mandate for review of

agency action, even if the agency’s ultimate decision

on the matter is otherwise committed to its

discretion.”) (emphasis added); Ward v. Skinner, 943

F.2d 157, 160 (1st Cir. 1991) (statute specified

discretionary waiver could be applied only “if the

Secretary determines that such waiver is not contrary

to the public interest and is consistent with the safe

operation of motor vehicles”); Farmworker Just. Fund,

11

Inc. v. Brock, 811 F.2d 613, 619 (D.C. Cir. 1987)

(discretion to set standards was limited “to serve the

purposes of the Act”) (cleaned up). This distinction is

even clearer in view of the AIA’s nonappealability

provision, 35 U.S.C. § 314 (d). See Mullin v. Doe, 609

U.S. ____, slip op. at 13 (2026) (holding that a “judicialreview bar very clearly overcomes the general

presumption in favor of judicial review” pertaining to

an agency’s determination).

Third, a writ of mandamus is not “appropriate

under the circumstances” because it would circumvent

the AIA’s express insulation of institution decisions

from appellate review. See 35 U.S.C. § 314(d) (“No

Appeal.—The determination by the Director whether

to institute an inter partes review under this section

shall be final and nonappealable.”) (emphasis added).

The statutorily mandated nonappealability of

institution decisions, coupled with the AIA’s inclusion

of no standards by which to judge the Director’s

exercise of discretion, shows that issuing a writ of

mandamus would be inappropriate because it would

require the Judiciary to second-guess a decision that

Congress expressly left to the Executive.

Accordingly, Google is not entitled to its

requested writ of mandamus.

12

B. Because Denial of Institution Is

Committed to the PTO’s Discretion

With No Law to Apply in Reviewing

Such Denial, There Is No Statutory

Violation.

1. Denial of Institution Is Entirely Committed

to the Director’s Discretion.

The Director of the PTO is never commanded to

institute any IPR. Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee,

579 U.S. 261, 273 (2016) (“[T]he agency's decision to

deny a petition is a matter committed to the Patent

Office's discretion.”).

This understanding follows from the statutory

scheme itself. For instance, the America Invents Act

(“AIA”) does require the Director to “determine

whether to institute an inter partes review” according

to a specified timeline. 35 U.S.C. § 314(b) (“The

Director shall determine whether to institute an

inter partes review… within 3 months after—(1)

receiving a preliminary response to the petition . . . or

(2) . . . the last date on which such response may be

filed.”) (emphasis added). The AIA further requires

the Director to notify the parties of the Director’s

determination whether to institute. 35 U.S.C. § 314(c)

(“The Director shall notify the petitioner and patent

owner,

in

writing,

of

the

Director’s

determination . . . .”) (emphasis added). And if an IPR

is instituted, the Board “shall issue” a final written

decision regarding patentability. See 35 U.S.C.

§ 318(a).

13

In stark contrast to these mandatory

requirements, the AIA places only restrictions, not

requirements, on which IPRs are instituted. 35 U.S.C.

§ 314(a) (“The Director may not authorize an inter

partes review to be instituted unless the Director

determines . . . that there is a reasonable likelihood

that the petitioner would prevail . . . .”) (emphasis

added).

The contrast between what the Director must

do under the AIA, and what the Director is prevented

from doing is clear from the text of the AIA. Despite

numerous mandatory acts placed on the Director and

the Board, there is not a single provision of the AIA

that requires the Director to institute any IPR. Nor is

there any provision of the AIA restricting what factors

the Director may consider in the exercise of his

discretion to deny institution.

The Director’s discretion on denial of institution

is further reinforced by the statute’s express provision

that institution decisions be shielded from appellate

review. 35 U.S.C. § 314(d) (“The determination by the

Director whether to institute an inter partes review

under this section shall be final and nonappealable.”);

Thryv, Inc. v. Click-To-Call Techs., LP, 590 U.S. 45, 60

(2020) (explaining that “§ 314(d) makes” an attempt to

“overturn the Board’s” decision regarding institution

“unreviewable”).

Importantly, because this grant of discretion to

deny institution flows from the text of the statute

itself, the Director’s discretion is distinct from the type

of discretion agencies have previously asserted under

14

Chevron, which discretion purported to flow from

statutory ambiguity. See Loper Bright Enters. v.

Raimondo, 603 U.S. 369, 455 (2024) (“The Chevron

deference rule is to the same effect: The Court

generally assumes that Congress intends to confer

discretion on agencies to handle statutory ambiguities

or gaps, absent a direction to the contrary.”) (Kagan,

J., dissenting) (emphasis added). With regard to

denial of institution, the statute does not have any

ambiguity; rather, the grant of discretion to the

Director directly follows from unambiguous statutory

text which imposes only limits, not mandates, on

institution of an IPR. Accordingly, this Court has

recognized that the AIA itself, independent from any

application of Chevron deference, grants the Director

discretion. Cuozzo, 579 U.S. at 273 (“[T]he agency's

decision to deny a petition is a matter committed to

the Patent Office's discretion.”).

Consistent with this Court’s precedent, the

AIA’s direct grant of statutory discretion has been

exercised to deny institution based on a wide range of

factors that are not mentioned in the AIA, well beyond

the “settled expectations” factor Google’s Petition

addresses. For instance, the PTO routinely exercises

discretion to deny institution of IPRs involving serial

or follow-on petitions for IPR. E.g., Gen. Plastic Indus.

Co., Ltd. v. Canon Kabushiki Kaisha, Case No.

IPR2016-01357, Paper No. 19 at 8–11 (Sept. 6, 2017)

(precedential) (setting forth seven factors to be

considered in evaluating discretionary denial in view

of serial or follow-on petitions).

15

Likewise, the PTO routinely exercises

discretion to deny institution where “proceeding in

parallel with the district court litigation is an

inefficient use of our time and resources.” E.g., NHK

Spring Co., Ltd. v. Intri-Plex Techs., Inc., Case No.

IPR2018-00752, Paper No. 8 at 11 (P.T.A.B. Sept. 12,

2018) (precedential); Apple Inc. v. Fintiv, Inc., Case

No. IPR2020-00019, Paper No. 11, at 5–16 (P.T.A.B.

Mar. 20, 2020) (precedential) (laying out six factors for

consideration in evaluating discretionary denial

involving parallel district court litigation). The PTO

subsequently emphasized its consideration of whether

a petitioner has entered into a “stipulation” which

“mitigates any concerns of duplicative efforts between

the district court and the Board” as weighing “strongly

in favor of not exercising discretion to deny institution

under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a).” Sotera Wireless, Inc. v.

Masimo Corp., Case No. IPR2020-01019, Paper No. 12

(P.T.A.B. Dec. 1, 2020) (precedential).

More recently, the PTO stated that it intends to

consider additional factors in exercising discretion,

including the “[s]ettled expectations of the parties” as

well as “[w]hether there have been changes in the

law . . . since issuance of the claims that may affect

patentability,” and “[w]hether the PTAB or another

forum has already adjudicated the validity or

patentability of the challenged patent claims.” Acting

Director Coke Morgan Stewart, Memorandum

Regarding Interim Processes for PTAB Workload

Management (Mar. 26, 2025) (reproduced at Pet. App.

8a–11a). And earlier this year, the PTO stated that it

intends to consider whether “any products accused of

infringement in a parallel proceeding” or “any

16

products made, sold, or licensed by the patent owner

that compete with the accused products” are

“manufactured in the United States.” John A. Squires,

Additional Discretionary Institution Considerations—

U.S. Manufacturing and Small Business Use of AIA

Proceedings (Mar. 11, 2026).1

None of the discretionary factors discussed

above are mentioned in the statutory text of the AIA.

Instead, they represent the PTO’s independent

assessment of a variety of underlying policy

considerations, including whether institution is an

efficient use of PTO resources and whether the public

interest will be served by institution, in furtherance of

the exercise of discretion that Congress granted the

agency.

2. The Director’s Exercise of Congressionally

Granted Discretion Cannot Constitute a

Statutory Violation.

Google fails to identify any statutory provision

of the AIA that has been violated by the Director’s

decision not to institute in the proceedings below.

Google’s failure to do so is a direct result of the statute

providing only limits, not requirements, on when the

Director may institute an IPR. See Section B.1, supra;

35 U.S.C. § 314(a) (“The Director may not authorize

an inter partes review to be instituted unless . . . .”).

1

Available

at

https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/Additional_

Discretionary_Institution_Considerations_US_Manufacturing_a

nd_Small_Business_Use_of_AIA_Proceedings.pdf.

17

Specifically, Google contends that the Director’s

exercise of discretion based on a patent owner’s

“settled expectations” “conflicts with Congress’s

decision not to impose any limitations period based on

patent age.” Petition at 14. But tellingly, Google does

not identify any statutory provision prohibiting the

consideration of a patent’s age in the discretionary

analysis.

The fact that Congress did not mandate that the

Director limit review of patents that have been in force

for a lengthy period of time does not mean that the

Director cannot even consider this as a factor in the

exercise of his discretion under § 314(a). Google’s

failure to identify any statutory provision limiting the

Director’s authority in this regard establishes that no

statutory violation has occurred.

In effect, Google’s argument is that because the

AIA contains no provision requiring the Director to

deny institution based on a patent’s age, the Director

is prohibited from doing so. See Petition at 17

(implying that Congress’s omission of “an age-based

limitations period from the AIA” means that the

Director cannot even consider a patent’s age in

denying institution).2 But this ignores the fact that

2 An alternative reading of Google’s argument is that the Director

has imposed a de facto rule that operates like a statute of

limitations period. See Petition at 17. But that is not correct, as

explained in Section C, infra. And if it were correct, the

appropriate avenue for obtaining relief would be a notice-andcomment rulemaking challenge before a district court under the

APA, not the mandamus relief Google seeks here. See Section A,

supra; Section D, infra.

18

denial of institution is committed to agency discretion

by statute. Cuozzo, 579 U.S. at 273 (citing both 5

U.S.C. § 701(a)(2) and 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) for the

proposition that “the agency’s decision to deny a

petition is a matter committed to the Patent Office’s

discretion”).

Nor is Google aided by this Court’s statements

that judicial review may remain available where the

agency “act[s] outside its statutory limits,” Cuozzo,

579 U.S. at 275, or engages in “shenanigans,” SAS

Institute, Inc. v. Iancu, 584 U.S. 357, 371 (2018). See

Petition at 25–28. Those reservations address

institution of review in excess of statutory constraints,

such as “canceling a patent claim for indefiniteness

under § 112 in an inter partes review” despite 35

U.S.C. § 311(b) limiting the scope of IPR to invalidity

under Sections 102 and 103. See Cuozzo, 579 U.S. at

275 (internal quotation marks omitted). A denial of

institution cannot transgress the statute’s limits,

because no provision of the AIA ever requires

institution; there is simply no statutory command to

violate. Indeed, in Thryv this Court held that even an

alleged violation of an express statutory prohibition on

institution—the one-year time limit of 35 U.S.C.

§ 315(b)—was unreviewable. 590 U.S. at 53–54. That

same conclusion applies with even more force here

because the AIA never requires the Director to

institute IPR and contains no provision prohibiting

consideration of a patent’s age in the Director’s

exercise of discretion.

It is Google’s interpretation, not the Federal

Circuit’s or VirtaMove’s, that would ignore the

19

statutory text, because Google’s view would invite

courts to second-guess every exercise of discretion to

determine whether or not such an exercise relied only

upon factors explicitly allowed by the statute. (There

is no dispute that no provision of the AIA prohibits any

factors from being considered in the Director’s exercise

of discretion.) If Google’s position were adopted, it

would open the floodgates to judicial review of

discretionary denial decisions (despite the AIA

expressly prohibiting appeal of such decisions) and

would further require judicial review despite the

statute providing no law to govern such review.3

Furthermore, Google’s contention that “[t]he

AIA itself prevents patentholders from ever acquiring

‘settled

expectations’

against

administrative

challenge” (Petition at 17) conflates two distinct

concepts. It is certainly true that no provision of the

AIA itself grants patentholders “settled expectations”

based on a patent’s age. But it is equally true that no

provision of the AIA prevents patentholders from

reasonably expecting that, if a patent has been issued

for many years and no one has challenged the patent,

the patentholder may have the validity of its patent

decided before an Article III court rather than agency

proceedings. Nor does any provision of the AIA

prevent the Director from considering these

reasonable expectations in the exercise of his

discretion.

3 The AIA provides no law to apply in judicial review, presumably

because such review is expressly prohibited by the statute itself.

20

Google’s view would also have sweeping

implications for every other express delegation of

discretion to agencies beyond the PTO. The natural

implication of Google’s argument is that if a statute

does not grant a party a legally enforceable interest,

then the agency is prohibited from considering any

practical (non-legally enforceable) interest that party

might have. Google presents no authority supporting

such a proposition, and this proposed exception to the

rule that Congress may grant discretion to an agency

would threaten to subsume that rule entirely, by

preventing agencies from considering any factors

other than those explicitly articulated by a statute.

Rather than identify any plausible statutory

violation, Google’s Petition presents only a policy

disagreement with the Director of the type that is not

suitable for review. For instance, whether or not

consideration of a patent’s age is consistent as a policy

matter with 35 U.S.C. § 286’s “approach[] to settled

expectations” (Petition at 19) is purely a question of

policy—whether the policies underlying Congress’s

decision to create a particular statutory provision are

the same policies underlying the Director’s

independent decision to exercise his discretion under

certain circumstances. There is certainly no dispute

that Section 286 itself has no provision prohibiting a

patent’s age from being considered in the Director’s

exercise of discretion.

Similarly,

whether

“settled-expectations

denials” are “intended to protect property rights”

(Petition at 19) is a policy issue of how and when

property rights are subject to agency review. Google’s

21

argument that “if a patent was wrongly granted . . . it

confers no valid property rights at all” (Petition at 19–

20) ignores the procedural question of how the validity

of the property rights are determined. Specifically, it

is the Director’s policy view that by allowing

patentholders to defend their patent rights before an

Article III court—rather than before the PTO with a

different standard of proof—patentholders’ valid

rights will be more reliably respected. Google’s

disagreement with that policy view does not amount

to a plausible allegation that exercise of the Director’s

discretion violates the AIA itself.

C. The USPTO Has Not Enacted a Statute

of Limitations as Google Suggests.

Google’s Petition relies extensively on a

significant misrepresentation regarding how the PTO

has evaluated patent age in exercising its discretion.

As discussed above, exercise of discretion on a

case-by-case basis is committed to the Director’s

discretion and is shielded from judicial review. This is

presumably why Google chooses to repeatedly

characterize the PTO’s settled expectation denials as

a “rule” or a “limitations period” that “foreclose[s] inter

partes review based on patent age.” Petition at 2–3;

see also, e.g., id. at 2 (alleging “the PTO has . . .

conjur[ed] from whole cloth a limitations period”

which corresponds to a “patent’s six-year age”); id. at

3 (alleging an “overarching presumptive rule at issue

here”); id. at 13 (“The PTO has no authority to create

a limitations period where Congress did not . . . .”); id.

at 15 (discussing the PTO’s “patent-age rule”); id. at

22

23 (alleging the PTO’s consideration of patent age “is

much more akin to a rule than to an exercise of caseby-case discretion,” and “it is a rule . . . like any

limitations period”); id. (conceding the PTO has the

power “to promulgate such rules,” but “courts [do not]

lack power to review those rules for compliance with

statutory limits”); id. at 27 (“Google challenges the

PTO’s rule-like use of patent age as a justification for

denying institution in cases involving six-year-old

patents.”).

Google’s characterization of the PTO’s practice

is false, because a patent’s age is far from dispositive

in the PTO’s exercise of discretion. This is apparent

from an analysis of publicly available data concerning

Google’s own petitions for IPR.

Specifically, since “settled expectations” has

been articulated as a factor relevant to the PTO’s

exercise of discretion, the PTO has decided 77 requests

for discretionary denial involving IPR petitions filed

by Google.4 Of those 77 decided requests, 59 were

granted, reflecting a 76.6% rate at which the PTO has

exercised discretion. For patents that were more than

six years old at the time of the decision (the duration

that Google contends constitutes a “limitations period”

which “foreclose[s] inter partes review based on patent

age”—Petition at 2–3), there have been 46 decisions,

with 37 granting discretionary denial, reflecting an

4 The statistics addressed in this analysis were derived from an

analysis of opinions where the PTO has rendered an opinion on

discretionary denial requests through July 10, 2026, as obtained

from DocketNavigator. For ease of analysis, the data considered

was limited to IPRs involving Google itself.

23

80.4% rate at which the PTO has exercised discretion

for these older patents.

Thus, the rate at which the PTO exercises

discretion for patents more than six years old (80.4%)

differs from the overall rate at which the PTO

exercises discretion (76.6%) by less than 4 percentage

points with respect to Google. This difference is not

entirely insignificant, but it is also not consistent with

the PTO having created a “limitations period.” See

Petition at 13–14 (alleging that the “PTO’s practice . . .

conflicts with Congress’s decision not to impose any

limitations period”). Among other things, it shows that

the Director has declined to discretionarily deny

institution in at least nine IPRs involving patents

older than six years—and that is counting Google’s

petitions alone. If the Director had a rigid “rule”

against challenges to patents older than six years,

that number would be zero. This fact alone shows the

falsity of Google’s argument.

Furthermore, even if Google’s characterization

were correct and a rule had effectively been issued,

this case should be handled via an APA notice-andcomment rulemaking challenge before a district court,

not mandamus relief, as the Federal Circuit has

explicitly invited parties to pursue. See In re

Cambridge Indus. USA Inc., No. 2026-101, 2025 WL

3526129 (Fed. Cir. Dec. 9, 2025) (“Cambridge's

contention that the PTO was required to promulgate

relevant considerations for institution through noticeand-comment rulemaking procedures can be raised in

an APA action in federal district court; thus, it has

failed to demonstrate lack of available alternatives for

24

relief.”); see also Apple Inc. v. Vidal, 63 F.4th 1, 15

(Fed. Cir. 2023) (noting that litigants may pursue a

“challenge to the Director's instructions as invalid for

want of notice-and-comment rulemaking” before a

district court).

Thus, a central premise of Google’s challenge—

that the PTO has established a rule that operates as a

de facto limitations period on when an IPR may be

brought—is false. And if that premise were correct, a

district court APA action, rather than mandamus,

would be the proper vehicle for relief, as further

discussed in the following Section.

D. This Case Is a Poor Vehicle for Review.

1. Google’s Mandamus Action Is a Uniquely

Poor Vehicle.

As discussed above in Section A, none of the

three requisite conditions for mandamus are satisfied.

Google’s requested mandamus relief is additionally

flawed here, because the PTO’s decision denying

institution of Google’s IPRs was explicit that despite

VirtaMove’s “strong settled expectations” being one

factor, that was not the only factor. For instance, the

PTO noted that Google did “not provide any

persuasive reasoning why an inter partes review is an

appropriate use of Board resources.” Google LLC v.

VirtaMove, Corp., No. IPR2025-00487, 2025 WL

1913566, at *1 (P.T.A.B. July 11, 2025). And the PTO

further stated that “the determination to exercise

discretion to deny institution is based on a holistic

25

assessment of all of the evidence and arguments

presented.” Id.

In essence, Google asks the Court to guess at

what motivated the instant denial of institution and

render an advisory opinion on that basis. Because of

the uncertainty as to whether the PTO’s consideration

of settled expectations was dispositive as to noninstitution in this specific case, Google’s mandamus

action is a poor vehicle for evaluating any broader

pattern that exists within the PTO’s consideration of

settled expectations.

2. A Far Better Vehicle Exists, But Google Has

Declined to Pursue It.

A better vehicle is available because Google has

an alternative avenue of relief which the Federal

Circuit has already blessed. Specifically, Google may

bring an APA notice-and-comment rulemaking

challenge before a district court, a course of action that

the Federal Circuit has made clear is the appropriate

vehicle for parties such as Google to challenge the

PTO’s “settled expectations” policy. In re Cambridge

Indus. USA Inc., No. 2026-101, 2025 WL 3526129

(Fed. Cir. Dec. 9, 2025) (“Cambridge's contention that

the PTO was required to promulgate relevant

considerations for institution through notice-andcomment rulemaking procedures can be raised in an

APA action in federal district court; thus, it has failed

to demonstrate lack of available alternatives for

relief.”).

26

Specifically, Google’s challenge is based on the

allegation that the agency has “adopt[ed] [an]

overarching presumptive rule,” which is “a rule that,

like any limitations period, affects parties’ substantive

rights.” Petition at 3, 23. Indeed, Google explicitly

alleges that the Director’s actions are “much more

akin to a rule than to an exercise of case-by-case

discretion.” Petition at 23 (emphasis in original). And

Google expressly reserved “the right to challenge” the

Director’s policy as “legally invalid as” being “adopted

without notice-and-comment rulemaking.” Google

LLC v. VirtaMove, Corp., Case No. IPR2025-00487,

Paper No. 9, at 31 n.12 (June 10, 2025) (Google’s

opposition to VirtaMove’s request for discretionary

denial).

If Google is in fact correct that the Director is

not merely exercising his discretion (which would be

unreviewable by any court) but instead has enacted a

de facto rule, the appropriate challenge would be an

APA notice-and-comment rulemaking challenge

“brought against the Director in district court under

the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C.

§§ 701–706.” See Apple Inc. v. Vidal, 63 F.4th 1, 14

(Fed. Cir. 2023) (“Whether notice-and-comment

rulemaking procedures had to be employed for an

agency action presents a matter ‘quite apart from the

matter of substantive reviewability’ of the action for

being contrary to statute or arbitrary and capricious.”)

(quoting Lincoln v. Vigil, 508 U.S. 182, 195 (1993)).

Indeed, the Federal Circuit previously reached

this same conclusion in Apple v. Vidal, where that

court rejected a challenge to a non-institution decision

27

but allowed a notice-and-comment rulemaking

challenge to continue before the district court. Id. at

5–6, 17 (“[W]e conclude that Apple has standing to

press the claim that the [alleged rule was] improperly

put

in

place

without

notice-and-comment

rulemaking.”). Google was well aware of this result, as

it was a party to the Apple v. Vidal action. See id. at 5.

An APA notice-and-comment rulemaking

challenge would additionally be more appropriate

than mandamus because it far better matches the

facts as Google alleges them—that the Director has

imposed a de facto statute of limitations that acts as a

rule. And the notice-and-comment rulemaking

challenge would allow a district court to properly act

as a factfinder in addressing whether the evidence

supports Google’s contention that the Director has in

fact instituted a rule. In contrast, the relevant record

of the impact of a patent’s age on discretionary denial

decisions has not been developed by any finder of fact

in the present action.

CONCLUSION

For all of the reasons set forth above, this Court

should deny Google’s Petition.

28

Respectfully submitted,

Brian Ledahl

Counsel of Record

Marc A. Fenster

Reza Mirzaie

James A. Milkey

RUSS AUGUST & KABAT

12424 Wilshire Blvd., 12th

Fl

Los Angeles, CA 90025

(310) 826-7474

bledahl@raklaw.com

mfenster@raklaw.com

rmirzaie@raklaw.com

jmilkey@raklaw.com

Counsel for VirtaMove, Corp.

July 13, 2026

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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