Opposition Brief — Google LLC, Petitioner v. VirtaMove, Corp., et al.
Supreme Court briefJul 13, 2026
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NO. 25-1230
IN THE
Supreme Court of the United States
________________
GOOGLE LLC,
Petitioner,
v.
VIRTAMOVE, CORP., ET AL.,
________________
Respondents.
On Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the United
States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
________________
BRIEF IN OPPOSITION
________________
BRIAN LEDAHL
Counsel of Record
MARC A. FENSTER
REZA MIRZAIE
JAMES A. MILKEY
RUSS AUGUST & KABAT
12424 Wilshire Blvd., 12th Fl
Los Angeles, CA 90025
(310) 826-7474
bledahl@raklaw.com
mfenster@raklaw.com
rmirzaie@raklaw.com
jmilkey@raklaw.com
Counsel for Respondent VirtaMove, Corp.
July 13, 2026
i
QUESTIONS PRESENTED
Whether the PTO retains statutory authority to
deny institution based on the “settled expectations”
factor, where discretion is committed to the PTO and
no statutory provision prohibits consideration of
settled expectations.
Whether the “drastic and extraordinary”
remedy of mandamus is appropriate where Google
identifies no statutory text that has been violated and
the Federal Circuit has held that an alternative
vehicle—a
notice-and-comment
rulemaking
challenge—remains available.
ii
RULE 29.6 STATEMENT
VirtaMove, Corp. does not have a parent entity,
is not publicly traded, and no publicly held company
owns 10% or more of its stock/equity.
iii
TABLE OF CONTENTS
QUESTIONS PRESENTED ......................................... i
TABLE OF CONTENTS ............................................ iii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ....................................... iv
INTRODUCTION ........................................................ 1
STATEMENT OF THE CASE..................................... 2
REASONS FOR DENYING THE PETITION ............ 6
A. Google Is Not Entitled to Mandamus Relief. ... 6
B. Because Denial of Institution Is Committed
to the PTO’s Discretion With No Law to
Apply in Reviewing Such Denial, There Is
No Statutory Violation. ................................... 12
C. The USPTO Has Not Enacted a Statute of
Limitations as Google Suggests. .................... 21
D. This Case Is a Poor Vehicle for Review.......... 24
CONCLUSION ........................................................... 27
iv
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases
Apple Inc. v. Fintiv, Inc.,
Case No. IPR2020-00019, Paper No. 11, (P.T.A.B.
Mar. 20, 2020) ......................................................... 15
Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Ct. for D.C.,
542 U.S. 367 (2004)............................................... 1, 8
Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee,
579 U.S. 261 (2016)............................. 1, 9, 12, 14, 18
Farmworker Just. Fund, Inc. v. Brock,
811 F.2d 613 (D.C. Cir. 1987)................................. 11
Gen. Plastic Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Canon Kabushiki
Kaisha,
Case No. IPR2016-01357, Paper No. 19 (Sept. 6,
2017) ........................................................................ 14
Google LLC v. VirtaMove, Corp.,
Case No. IPR2025-00487, Paper No. 8 (May 12,
2025) .......................................................... 3, 4, 24, 26
Heckler v. Chaney,
470 U.S. 821 (1985)................................................... 9
In re Cambridge Indus. USA Inc.,
No. 2026-101, 2025 WL 3526129 (Fed. Cir. Dec. 9,
2025) .......................................................... 5, 7, 23, 25
In re Google LLC,
No. 2026-111, 2026 WL 204945 (Fed. Cir. Jan. 27,
2026) .......................................................................... 5
Lincoln v. Vigil,
508 U.S. 182 (1993)................................................. 26
Loper Bright Enters. v. Raimondo,
603 U.S. 369 (2024)................................................. 14
Mullin v. Doe,
609 U.S. ____ (2026) ............................................... 11
v
Mylan Labs. Ltd. v. Janssen Pharmaceutica,
N.V., 989 F.3d 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2021) ....................... 9
NHK Spring Co., Ltd. v. Intri-Plex Techs., Inc.,
Case No. IPR2018-00752, Paper No. 8 (P.T.A.B.
Sept. 12, 2018) ........................................................ 15
Rodriguez v. Mayorkas,
No. 23-435-CV, 2024 WL 4023841 (2d Cir. Sept. 3,
2024) ........................................................................ 10
SAS Institute, Inc. v. Iancu,
584 U.S. 357 (2018)................................................. 18
Sotera Wireless, Inc. v. Masimo Corp.,
Case No. IPR2020-01019, Paper No. 12 (P.T.A.B.
Dec. 1, 2020) ............................................................ 15
Thryv, Inc v. Click-To-Call Techs., LP,
590 U.S. 45 (2020)................................................... 13
Ward v. Skinner,
943 F.2d 157 (1st Cir. 1991) ................................... 10
Weyerhaeuser Co. v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv.,
586 U.S. 9 (2018)....................................................... 9
Statutes
35 U.S.C. § 286 ........................................................... 20
35 U.S.C. § 311 ....................................................... 3, 18
35 U.S.C. § 312(a) ........................................................ 3
35 U.S.C. § 314(a) ...................................... 3, 13, 15–17
35 U.S.C. § 314(b) .................................................. 3, 12
35 U.S.C. § 314(d) .................................................. 1, 13
35 U.S.C. § 315(b) ...................................................... 18
35 U.S.C. § 318(a) ...................................................... 12
5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2) ................................................ 9, 18
Leahy-Smith America Invents Act,
Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011) ................. 2
vi
Administrative Materials
Additional Discretionary Institution Considerations—
U.S. Manufacturing and Small Business Use of
AIA Proceedings
(Mar. 11, 2026) ........................................................ 16
Memorandum Regarding Interim Processes for PTAB
Workload Management
(Mar. 26, 2025) ........................................................ 15
1
INTRODUCTION
Google asks this Court to deploy the
extraordinary writ of mandamus to overturn a
decision that Congress committed to the Patent
Office’s discretion and expressly made “final and
nonappealable.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(d). The Federal
Circuit correctly declined that invitation, and nothing
in the Petition warrants this Court’s intervention.
As an initial matter, Google identifies no
statutory text that the Director’s decision even
arguably violates. The AIA imposes a number of
mandatory duties on the Director, but not a single
provision requires him to institute inter partes review,
and none restricts the factors he may weigh in
declining to do so. That is why this Court has
recognized that “[t]he agency’s decision to deny a
petition is a matter committed to the Patent Office’s
discretion.” Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee, 579 U.S.
261, 273 (2016). There is certainly no violation that
presents the “clear and indisputable” right to relief
required for a writ of mandamus. Cheney v. U.S. Dist.
Ct. for D.C., 542 U.S. 367, 381 (2004).
Furthermore, the Petition rests on a false
factual premise: that the PTO has “conjur[ed] from
whole cloth” a six-year “limitations period” that
“foreclose[s]” review of older patents. See Petition at
2–3. The data concerning Google’s own petitions for
IPR refute that characterization. The rate at which
the PTO exercises discretion for patents more than six
years old differs from the overall rate at which the
PTO exercises its discretion by less than four
2
percentage points (80.4% compared to 76.6%), clearly
showing that the PTO has not enacted a de facto
statute of limitations on inter partes review.
Finally, this case is a uniquely poor vehicle for
review. Because the denial below rested on a holistic
assessment of multiple factors, the Court cannot
determine whether “settled expectations” was
dispositive here without guessing at what motivated
the agency, such that any resulting decision would
amount to an advisory opinion. Meanwhile, the better
vehicle the Federal Circuit has identified—an APA
notice-and-comment rulemaking challenge before a
district court, where a factfinder could develop the
record Google’s rule-based theory requires—remains
open to Google.
In short, there has been no statutory violation,
much less one that would present a clear and
indisputable right to the mandamus relief sought by
Google. And if Google were correct that the PTO’s
consideration of a patent’s age is a de facto limitations
period, the appropriate vehicle for review would be a
district court APA action, not Google’s flawed request
for mandamus.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
In 2011, Congress enacted the Leahy-Smith
America Invents Act (“AIA”), Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125
Stat. 284 (2011), which made various changes to the
Patent Act. 35 U.S.C. § 1 et seq. Among those changes
was the creation of a new proceeding before the U.S.
Patent and Trademark Office (“PTO”) called an inter
3
partes review (“IPR”). This new IPR process allowed
private parties the opportunity to request that the
PTO reconsider, on specific grounds, the validity of a
patent that had previously been fully issued by the
Office. See 35 U.S.C. § 311. Nothing in the Act changed
or withdrew the ability of anyone sued for
infringement of a patent to challenge its validity in a
district court action. The AIA set forth various rules
and procedures for IPR proceedings. Among those
procedures, the Act required that a party seeking to
pursue such a challenge file a petition identifying the
validity challenge and that the Director of the PTO
determine whether or not to institute an IPR
proceeding to review the challenged patent. Id.
§§ 312(a), 314(b). The statute committed this
determination of whether to review the patent to the
discretion of the Director and explicitly indicated that
the decision to institute or not institute an IPR
proceeding was not reviewable by any court. Id.
§ 314(a) (imposing no requirement to institute any
inter partes review); id. § 314(d) (“The determination
by the Director whether to institute an inter partes
review under this section shall be final and
nonappealable.”).
In 2025, Google filed petitions for inter partes
review challenging patents that VirtaMove had
asserted against Google in parallel district court
infringement litigation. In response, VirtaMove
requested that the PTO exercise its discretion to deny
several petitions for IPR filed by Google. E.g., Google
LLC v. VirtaMove, Corp., Case No. IPR2025-00487,
Paper No. 8 (May 12, 2025). Those requests identified
numerous factors supporting exercise of the Director’s
4
discretion, including the fact that Google filed
numerous parallel petitions (id. at 18–19), the
substantive weakness of Google’s IPR petition (id. at
15–17), the lack of relevant changed legal standards
since issuance of the claims (id. at 15), Google’s
extensive over-reliance on expert testimony to
establish the presence of claim elements in the prior
art (id. at 3–5) and the presence of parallel district
court litigation (id. at 5–14). VirtaMove also identified
its settled expectations as relevant, given that the
challenged claims had been in effect for nearly fifteen
years. Id. at 17–18.
Google responded to VirtaMove’s request for
discretionary denial, disagreeing with VirtaMove’s
application of the relevant discretionary factors. See
Google LLC v. VirtaMove, Corp., Case No. IPR202500487, Paper No. 9 (June 10, 2025). As part of its
response, Google reserved the right to challenge “the
Director’s March 26, 2025 memorandum”—which
articulated the “settled expectations” factor—as
“legally invalid as . . . adopted without notice-andcomment rulemaking.” Id. at 31 n.12.
After considering VirtaMove’s arguments
requesting discretionary denial as well as Google’s
responsive arguments, the Acting Director’s delegee
exercised her discretion to deny institution. Google
LLC v. VirtaMove, Corp., Case No. IPR2025-00487,
Paper No. 10 (July 11, 2025). The PTO stated that
because the patent had “been in force for more than 14
years” there were “strong settled expectations,” and
further noted that Google did “not provide any
persuasive reasoning why an inter partes review is an
5
appropriate use of Board resources.” Id. at 2. The
order denying institution further noted that the
“determination is based on the totality of the evidence
and arguments the parties have presented,” and not
limited to the “certain arguments . . . highlighted
above.” Id.
On Google’s request for a writ of mandamus, the
Federal Circuit found mandamus was not an
appropriate vehicle to challenge “the PTO’s use of
‘settled expectations’ as a factor in denying institution
of inter partes review.” In re Google LLC, No. 2026111, 2026 WL 204945, at *1 (Fed. Cir. Jan. 27, 2026) .
The Federal Circuit’s opinion noted that the court had
previously decided the same issues in In re Cambridge
Indus. USA Inc., No. 2026-101, 2025 WL 3526129
(Fed. Cir. Dec. 9, 2025), and that Google had not
presented reasoning that would support a different
outcome. 2026 WL 204945, at *1. In the In re
Cambridge opinion cited in denying Google’s
mandamus request, the Federal Circuit held that the
“factors the Director may consider when deciding
whether to institute IPR” “focus directly and expressly
on institution standards,” and are thus not reviewable
under this Court’s precedent. In re Cambridge, 2025
WL 3526129, at *3.
In re Cambridge further noted that a challenge
to the PTO’s use of the “settled expectations” factor as
creating a de facto rule would more appropriately be
brought “in an APA action in federal district court”
than a mandamus petition. Id. at *2. Despite alleging
that the PTO’s actions and guidance constitute “a rule
that, like any limitations period, affects parties’
6
substantive rights” (Petition at 23), Google has not
pursued an APA action in district court challenging
the PTO’s actions as inconsistent with notice-andcomment rulemaking.
REASONS FOR DENYING THE PETITION
Google’s Petition should be denied for
numerous reasons. First, Google cannot satisfy any of
the requirements for the extraordinary relief of
mandamus: Google has adequate alternative means of
relief (including invalidity challenges in the parallel
district court proceedings and a district court APA
notice-and-comment rulemaking action that Google
has not yet pursued) and it has no clear and
indisputable right to relief. Second, Google identifies
no statutory provision that the Director’s decision
violates; the AIA commits denial of institution to the
Director’s discretion and supplies no law by which to
review discretionary denial. Third, the central
premise of Google’s Petition—that the PTO has
enacted a de facto six-year limitations period—is false,
as the data concerning Google’s own petitions for IPR
demonstrate. Fourth, this case is a poor vehicle for
review because the PTO’s denial of institution rested
on a holistic assessment of multiple factors, and the
better vehicle that Google has declined to pursue
remains open to Google.
A. Google Is Not Entitled to Mandamus
Relief.
A writ of mandamus is “one of the most potent
weapons in the judicial arsenal,” and each of “three
7
conditions must be satisfied before it may issue.”
Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Ct. for D.C., 542 U.S. 367, 380–81
(2004) (cleaned up).
First, in order to ensure that mandamus “will
not be used as a substitute for the regular appeals
process,” the party seeking mandamus must “have no
other adequate means to attain the relief he desires.”
Id. at 380–81. Second, the party seeking relief bears
the burden of showing a “clear and indisputable” right
to relief. Id. at 381. Finally, “even if the first two
prerequisites have been met,” the issuing court must
find the writ to be “appropriate under the
circumstances.” Id.
All three requirements are lacking here. First,
Google—at least under its own characterization of the
record wherein the PTO’s consideration of settled
expectations acts as a rule rather than a legitimate
exercise of discretion (see Petition at 23)—has an
alternative right to relief in the form of an APA noticeand-comment rulemaking action before a district
court. See In re Cambridge Indus. USA Inc., No. 2026101, 2025 WL 3526129 (Fed. Cir. Dec. 9, 2025)
(“Cambridge's contention that the PTO was required
to promulgate relevant considerations for institution
through notice-and-comment rulemaking procedures
can be raised in an APA action in federal district court;
thus, it has failed to demonstrate lack of available
alternatives for relief.”).
Google also has a second, and even more direct,
alternative avenue of relief: it may simply litigate its
invalidity contentions in the parallel district court
8
infringement litigation. Denial of institution deprives
Google of nothing but a supplementary administrative
forum. Every invalidity defense that Google raised in
its IPR petitions remains fully available to Google in
the parallel district court litigation. See 35 U.S.C.
§ 282(b) (“The following shall be defenses in any action
involving . . . the infringement of a patent: . . .
Invalidity of the patent . . . .”). A party that retains a
complete opportunity to litigate the very issue on
which it sought agency action cannot show that it has
“no other adequate means to attain the relief” it seeks.
Cheney, 542 U.S. at 380.
Second, Google cannot identify any statutory
provision that has even potentially been violated,
much less establish a “clear and indisputable” right to
relief. Cheney, 542 U.S. at 381. As discussed in further
detail in Section B, infra, Google’s challenge at most
presents policy considerations that it attempts to
glean from the overall structure of the statutory
scheme (such as Congress’s decision not to impose a
limitations period based on a patent’s age), rather
than identify any specific text of any statutory
provision that the PTO’s consideration of settled
expectations violates. Nor does Google show (or even
attempt to show) that there is any law set forth in the
statute regarding how the Director must exercise his
discretion, because there is none. The lack of law
governing review of the Director’s exercise of
discretion is precisely why the Federal Circuit has
stated that “it is difficult to imagine a mandamus
petition that challenges a denial of institution and
identifies a clear and indisputable right to relief.” See
9
Mylan Labs. Ltd. v. Janssen Pharmaceutica, N.V., 989
F.3d 1375, 1382 (Fed. Cir. 2021).
Indeed, Google itself concedes that the APA
precludes review of an agency’s exercise of discretion
when “the relevant statute is drawn so that a court
would have no meaningful standard against which to
judge the agency’s exercise of discretion.”
Weyerhaeuser Co. v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 586
U.S. 9, 23 (2018) (cited by Petition at 21). This is
precisely the case here, because no aspect of the AIA
sets forth any guidelines for how the Director must
exercise discretion.
For the same reason, the Director’s refusal to
institute review is agency inaction of the kind this
Court
has
long
treated
as
presumptively
unreviewable. See Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821,
831–32 (1985). An agency’s decision not to act “often
involves a complicated balancing of a number of
factors which are peculiarly within its expertise,”
including “whether agency resources are best spent on
this violation or another.” Id. at 831. A decision
declining institution is precisely such a refusal to act:
the Director must weigh the strength of the petition,
the demands on the Board’s resources, the posture of
any parallel litigation, and the parties’ reliance
interests. That is the same balancing of priorities that
Heckler commits to agency judgment—and it is why
this Court cited 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2) in recognizing
that the denial of a petition “is a matter committed to
the Patent Office’s discretion.” Cuozzo, 579 U.S. at
273.
10
Google’s attempt to distinguish Heckler on the
ground that Google alleges a statutory violation
(Petition at 22 n.11) is circular; while Google
superficially alleges a statutory violation, Google
identifies no portion of the statute that sets forth any
requirement that has purportedly been violated.
Google’s assertion that “there is, of course, ‘law to
apply’—the statute” (Petition at 21) rings hollow when
Google identifies nothing in the statute that provides
any such law. Because no provision of the AIA
constrains the factors the Director may weigh in
denying institution, there is no more law to apply here
than there is to any other exercise of enforcement
discretion.
Because the AIA provides no law to apply in
reviewing the Director’s exercise of discretion, this
case is readily distinguishable from the cases cited by
Google, all of which involved statutory provisions
describing the bounds of the agency’s discretion. See
Rodriguez v. Mayorkas, No. 23-435-CV, 2024 WL
4023841, at *2 (2d Cir. Sept. 3, 2024) (“[R]ather than
challenging a discretionary determination, Rodriguez
questions whether the agency adhered to express
directives given to it by Congress. This is squarely
within our constitutional mandate for review of
agency action, even if the agency’s ultimate decision
on the matter is otherwise committed to its
discretion.”) (emphasis added); Ward v. Skinner, 943
F.2d 157, 160 (1st Cir. 1991) (statute specified
discretionary waiver could be applied only “if the
Secretary determines that such waiver is not contrary
to the public interest and is consistent with the safe
operation of motor vehicles”); Farmworker Just. Fund,
11
Inc. v. Brock, 811 F.2d 613, 619 (D.C. Cir. 1987)
(discretion to set standards was limited “to serve the
purposes of the Act”) (cleaned up). This distinction is
even clearer in view of the AIA’s nonappealability
provision, 35 U.S.C. § 314 (d). See Mullin v. Doe, 609
U.S. ____, slip op. at 13 (2026) (holding that a “judicialreview bar very clearly overcomes the general
presumption in favor of judicial review” pertaining to
an agency’s determination).
Third, a writ of mandamus is not “appropriate
under the circumstances” because it would circumvent
the AIA’s express insulation of institution decisions
from appellate review. See 35 U.S.C. § 314(d) (“No
Appeal.—The determination by the Director whether
to institute an inter partes review under this section
shall be final and nonappealable.”) (emphasis added).
The statutorily mandated nonappealability of
institution decisions, coupled with the AIA’s inclusion
of no standards by which to judge the Director’s
exercise of discretion, shows that issuing a writ of
mandamus would be inappropriate because it would
require the Judiciary to second-guess a decision that
Congress expressly left to the Executive.
Accordingly, Google is not entitled to its
requested writ of mandamus.
12
B. Because Denial of Institution Is
Committed to the PTO’s Discretion
With No Law to Apply in Reviewing
Such Denial, There Is No Statutory
Violation.
1. Denial of Institution Is Entirely Committed
to the Director’s Discretion.
The Director of the PTO is never commanded to
institute any IPR. Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee,
579 U.S. 261, 273 (2016) (“[T]he agency's decision to
deny a petition is a matter committed to the Patent
Office's discretion.”).
This understanding follows from the statutory
scheme itself. For instance, the America Invents Act
(“AIA”) does require the Director to “determine
whether to institute an inter partes review” according
to a specified timeline. 35 U.S.C. § 314(b) (“The
Director shall determine whether to institute an
inter partes review… within 3 months after—(1)
receiving a preliminary response to the petition . . . or
(2) . . . the last date on which such response may be
filed.”) (emphasis added). The AIA further requires
the Director to notify the parties of the Director’s
determination whether to institute. 35 U.S.C. § 314(c)
(“The Director shall notify the petitioner and patent
owner,
in
writing,
of
the
Director’s
determination . . . .”) (emphasis added). And if an IPR
is instituted, the Board “shall issue” a final written
decision regarding patentability. See 35 U.S.C.
§ 318(a).
13
In stark contrast to these mandatory
requirements, the AIA places only restrictions, not
requirements, on which IPRs are instituted. 35 U.S.C.
§ 314(a) (“The Director may not authorize an inter
partes review to be instituted unless the Director
determines . . . that there is a reasonable likelihood
that the petitioner would prevail . . . .”) (emphasis
added).
The contrast between what the Director must
do under the AIA, and what the Director is prevented
from doing is clear from the text of the AIA. Despite
numerous mandatory acts placed on the Director and
the Board, there is not a single provision of the AIA
that requires the Director to institute any IPR. Nor is
there any provision of the AIA restricting what factors
the Director may consider in the exercise of his
discretion to deny institution.
The Director’s discretion on denial of institution
is further reinforced by the statute’s express provision
that institution decisions be shielded from appellate
review. 35 U.S.C. § 314(d) (“The determination by the
Director whether to institute an inter partes review
under this section shall be final and nonappealable.”);
Thryv, Inc. v. Click-To-Call Techs., LP, 590 U.S. 45, 60
(2020) (explaining that “§ 314(d) makes” an attempt to
“overturn the Board’s” decision regarding institution
“unreviewable”).
Importantly, because this grant of discretion to
deny institution flows from the text of the statute
itself, the Director’s discretion is distinct from the type
of discretion agencies have previously asserted under
14
Chevron, which discretion purported to flow from
statutory ambiguity. See Loper Bright Enters. v.
Raimondo, 603 U.S. 369, 455 (2024) (“The Chevron
deference rule is to the same effect: The Court
generally assumes that Congress intends to confer
discretion on agencies to handle statutory ambiguities
or gaps, absent a direction to the contrary.”) (Kagan,
J., dissenting) (emphasis added). With regard to
denial of institution, the statute does not have any
ambiguity; rather, the grant of discretion to the
Director directly follows from unambiguous statutory
text which imposes only limits, not mandates, on
institution of an IPR. Accordingly, this Court has
recognized that the AIA itself, independent from any
application of Chevron deference, grants the Director
discretion. Cuozzo, 579 U.S. at 273 (“[T]he agency's
decision to deny a petition is a matter committed to
the Patent Office's discretion.”).
Consistent with this Court’s precedent, the
AIA’s direct grant of statutory discretion has been
exercised to deny institution based on a wide range of
factors that are not mentioned in the AIA, well beyond
the “settled expectations” factor Google’s Petition
addresses. For instance, the PTO routinely exercises
discretion to deny institution of IPRs involving serial
or follow-on petitions for IPR. E.g., Gen. Plastic Indus.
Co., Ltd. v. Canon Kabushiki Kaisha, Case No.
IPR2016-01357, Paper No. 19 at 8–11 (Sept. 6, 2017)
(precedential) (setting forth seven factors to be
considered in evaluating discretionary denial in view
of serial or follow-on petitions).
15
Likewise, the PTO routinely exercises
discretion to deny institution where “proceeding in
parallel with the district court litigation is an
inefficient use of our time and resources.” E.g., NHK
Spring Co., Ltd. v. Intri-Plex Techs., Inc., Case No.
IPR2018-00752, Paper No. 8 at 11 (P.T.A.B. Sept. 12,
2018) (precedential); Apple Inc. v. Fintiv, Inc., Case
No. IPR2020-00019, Paper No. 11, at 5–16 (P.T.A.B.
Mar. 20, 2020) (precedential) (laying out six factors for
consideration in evaluating discretionary denial
involving parallel district court litigation). The PTO
subsequently emphasized its consideration of whether
a petitioner has entered into a “stipulation” which
“mitigates any concerns of duplicative efforts between
the district court and the Board” as weighing “strongly
in favor of not exercising discretion to deny institution
under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a).” Sotera Wireless, Inc. v.
Masimo Corp., Case No. IPR2020-01019, Paper No. 12
(P.T.A.B. Dec. 1, 2020) (precedential).
More recently, the PTO stated that it intends to
consider additional factors in exercising discretion,
including the “[s]ettled expectations of the parties” as
well as “[w]hether there have been changes in the
law . . . since issuance of the claims that may affect
patentability,” and “[w]hether the PTAB or another
forum has already adjudicated the validity or
patentability of the challenged patent claims.” Acting
Director Coke Morgan Stewart, Memorandum
Regarding Interim Processes for PTAB Workload
Management (Mar. 26, 2025) (reproduced at Pet. App.
8a–11a). And earlier this year, the PTO stated that it
intends to consider whether “any products accused of
infringement in a parallel proceeding” or “any
16
products made, sold, or licensed by the patent owner
that compete with the accused products” are
“manufactured in the United States.” John A. Squires,
Additional Discretionary Institution Considerations—
U.S. Manufacturing and Small Business Use of AIA
Proceedings (Mar. 11, 2026).1
None of the discretionary factors discussed
above are mentioned in the statutory text of the AIA.
Instead, they represent the PTO’s independent
assessment of a variety of underlying policy
considerations, including whether institution is an
efficient use of PTO resources and whether the public
interest will be served by institution, in furtherance of
the exercise of discretion that Congress granted the
agency.
2. The Director’s Exercise of Congressionally
Granted Discretion Cannot Constitute a
Statutory Violation.
Google fails to identify any statutory provision
of the AIA that has been violated by the Director’s
decision not to institute in the proceedings below.
Google’s failure to do so is a direct result of the statute
providing only limits, not requirements, on when the
Director may institute an IPR. See Section B.1, supra;
35 U.S.C. § 314(a) (“The Director may not authorize
an inter partes review to be instituted unless . . . .”).
1
Available
at
https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/Additional_
Discretionary_Institution_Considerations_US_Manufacturing_a
nd_Small_Business_Use_of_AIA_Proceedings.pdf.
17
Specifically, Google contends that the Director’s
exercise of discretion based on a patent owner’s
“settled expectations” “conflicts with Congress’s
decision not to impose any limitations period based on
patent age.” Petition at 14. But tellingly, Google does
not identify any statutory provision prohibiting the
consideration of a patent’s age in the discretionary
analysis.
The fact that Congress did not mandate that the
Director limit review of patents that have been in force
for a lengthy period of time does not mean that the
Director cannot even consider this as a factor in the
exercise of his discretion under § 314(a). Google’s
failure to identify any statutory provision limiting the
Director’s authority in this regard establishes that no
statutory violation has occurred.
In effect, Google’s argument is that because the
AIA contains no provision requiring the Director to
deny institution based on a patent’s age, the Director
is prohibited from doing so. See Petition at 17
(implying that Congress’s omission of “an age-based
limitations period from the AIA” means that the
Director cannot even consider a patent’s age in
denying institution).2 But this ignores the fact that
2 An alternative reading of Google’s argument is that the Director
has imposed a de facto rule that operates like a statute of
limitations period. See Petition at 17. But that is not correct, as
explained in Section C, infra. And if it were correct, the
appropriate avenue for obtaining relief would be a notice-andcomment rulemaking challenge before a district court under the
APA, not the mandamus relief Google seeks here. See Section A,
supra; Section D, infra.
18
denial of institution is committed to agency discretion
by statute. Cuozzo, 579 U.S. at 273 (citing both 5
U.S.C. § 701(a)(2) and 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) for the
proposition that “the agency’s decision to deny a
petition is a matter committed to the Patent Office’s
discretion”).
Nor is Google aided by this Court’s statements
that judicial review may remain available where the
agency “act[s] outside its statutory limits,” Cuozzo,
579 U.S. at 275, or engages in “shenanigans,” SAS
Institute, Inc. v. Iancu, 584 U.S. 357, 371 (2018). See
Petition at 25–28. Those reservations address
institution of review in excess of statutory constraints,
such as “canceling a patent claim for indefiniteness
under § 112 in an inter partes review” despite 35
U.S.C. § 311(b) limiting the scope of IPR to invalidity
under Sections 102 and 103. See Cuozzo, 579 U.S. at
275 (internal quotation marks omitted). A denial of
institution cannot transgress the statute’s limits,
because no provision of the AIA ever requires
institution; there is simply no statutory command to
violate. Indeed, in Thryv this Court held that even an
alleged violation of an express statutory prohibition on
institution—the one-year time limit of 35 U.S.C.
§ 315(b)—was unreviewable. 590 U.S. at 53–54. That
same conclusion applies with even more force here
because the AIA never requires the Director to
institute IPR and contains no provision prohibiting
consideration of a patent’s age in the Director’s
exercise of discretion.
It is Google’s interpretation, not the Federal
Circuit’s or VirtaMove’s, that would ignore the
19
statutory text, because Google’s view would invite
courts to second-guess every exercise of discretion to
determine whether or not such an exercise relied only
upon factors explicitly allowed by the statute. (There
is no dispute that no provision of the AIA prohibits any
factors from being considered in the Director’s exercise
of discretion.) If Google’s position were adopted, it
would open the floodgates to judicial review of
discretionary denial decisions (despite the AIA
expressly prohibiting appeal of such decisions) and
would further require judicial review despite the
statute providing no law to govern such review.3
Furthermore, Google’s contention that “[t]he
AIA itself prevents patentholders from ever acquiring
‘settled
expectations’
against
administrative
challenge” (Petition at 17) conflates two distinct
concepts. It is certainly true that no provision of the
AIA itself grants patentholders “settled expectations”
based on a patent’s age. But it is equally true that no
provision of the AIA prevents patentholders from
reasonably expecting that, if a patent has been issued
for many years and no one has challenged the patent,
the patentholder may have the validity of its patent
decided before an Article III court rather than agency
proceedings. Nor does any provision of the AIA
prevent the Director from considering these
reasonable expectations in the exercise of his
discretion.
3 The AIA provides no law to apply in judicial review, presumably
because such review is expressly prohibited by the statute itself.
20
Google’s view would also have sweeping
implications for every other express delegation of
discretion to agencies beyond the PTO. The natural
implication of Google’s argument is that if a statute
does not grant a party a legally enforceable interest,
then the agency is prohibited from considering any
practical (non-legally enforceable) interest that party
might have. Google presents no authority supporting
such a proposition, and this proposed exception to the
rule that Congress may grant discretion to an agency
would threaten to subsume that rule entirely, by
preventing agencies from considering any factors
other than those explicitly articulated by a statute.
Rather than identify any plausible statutory
violation, Google’s Petition presents only a policy
disagreement with the Director of the type that is not
suitable for review. For instance, whether or not
consideration of a patent’s age is consistent as a policy
matter with 35 U.S.C. § 286’s “approach[] to settled
expectations” (Petition at 19) is purely a question of
policy—whether the policies underlying Congress’s
decision to create a particular statutory provision are
the same policies underlying the Director’s
independent decision to exercise his discretion under
certain circumstances. There is certainly no dispute
that Section 286 itself has no provision prohibiting a
patent’s age from being considered in the Director’s
exercise of discretion.
Similarly,
whether
“settled-expectations
denials” are “intended to protect property rights”
(Petition at 19) is a policy issue of how and when
property rights are subject to agency review. Google’s
21
argument that “if a patent was wrongly granted . . . it
confers no valid property rights at all” (Petition at 19–
20) ignores the procedural question of how the validity
of the property rights are determined. Specifically, it
is the Director’s policy view that by allowing
patentholders to defend their patent rights before an
Article III court—rather than before the PTO with a
different standard of proof—patentholders’ valid
rights will be more reliably respected. Google’s
disagreement with that policy view does not amount
to a plausible allegation that exercise of the Director’s
discretion violates the AIA itself.
C. The USPTO Has Not Enacted a Statute
of Limitations as Google Suggests.
Google’s Petition relies extensively on a
significant misrepresentation regarding how the PTO
has evaluated patent age in exercising its discretion.
As discussed above, exercise of discretion on a
case-by-case basis is committed to the Director’s
discretion and is shielded from judicial review. This is
presumably why Google chooses to repeatedly
characterize the PTO’s settled expectation denials as
a “rule” or a “limitations period” that “foreclose[s] inter
partes review based on patent age.” Petition at 2–3;
see also, e.g., id. at 2 (alleging “the PTO has . . .
conjur[ed] from whole cloth a limitations period”
which corresponds to a “patent’s six-year age”); id. at
3 (alleging an “overarching presumptive rule at issue
here”); id. at 13 (“The PTO has no authority to create
a limitations period where Congress did not . . . .”); id.
at 15 (discussing the PTO’s “patent-age rule”); id. at
22
23 (alleging the PTO’s consideration of patent age “is
much more akin to a rule than to an exercise of caseby-case discretion,” and “it is a rule . . . like any
limitations period”); id. (conceding the PTO has the
power “to promulgate such rules,” but “courts [do not]
lack power to review those rules for compliance with
statutory limits”); id. at 27 (“Google challenges the
PTO’s rule-like use of patent age as a justification for
denying institution in cases involving six-year-old
patents.”).
Google’s characterization of the PTO’s practice
is false, because a patent’s age is far from dispositive
in the PTO’s exercise of discretion. This is apparent
from an analysis of publicly available data concerning
Google’s own petitions for IPR.
Specifically, since “settled expectations” has
been articulated as a factor relevant to the PTO’s
exercise of discretion, the PTO has decided 77 requests
for discretionary denial involving IPR petitions filed
by Google.4 Of those 77 decided requests, 59 were
granted, reflecting a 76.6% rate at which the PTO has
exercised discretion. For patents that were more than
six years old at the time of the decision (the duration
that Google contends constitutes a “limitations period”
which “foreclose[s] inter partes review based on patent
age”—Petition at 2–3), there have been 46 decisions,
with 37 granting discretionary denial, reflecting an
4 The statistics addressed in this analysis were derived from an
analysis of opinions where the PTO has rendered an opinion on
discretionary denial requests through July 10, 2026, as obtained
from DocketNavigator. For ease of analysis, the data considered
was limited to IPRs involving Google itself.
23
80.4% rate at which the PTO has exercised discretion
for these older patents.
Thus, the rate at which the PTO exercises
discretion for patents more than six years old (80.4%)
differs from the overall rate at which the PTO
exercises discretion (76.6%) by less than 4 percentage
points with respect to Google. This difference is not
entirely insignificant, but it is also not consistent with
the PTO having created a “limitations period.” See
Petition at 13–14 (alleging that the “PTO’s practice . . .
conflicts with Congress’s decision not to impose any
limitations period”). Among other things, it shows that
the Director has declined to discretionarily deny
institution in at least nine IPRs involving patents
older than six years—and that is counting Google’s
petitions alone. If the Director had a rigid “rule”
against challenges to patents older than six years,
that number would be zero. This fact alone shows the
falsity of Google’s argument.
Furthermore, even if Google’s characterization
were correct and a rule had effectively been issued,
this case should be handled via an APA notice-andcomment rulemaking challenge before a district court,
not mandamus relief, as the Federal Circuit has
explicitly invited parties to pursue. See In re
Cambridge Indus. USA Inc., No. 2026-101, 2025 WL
3526129 (Fed. Cir. Dec. 9, 2025) (“Cambridge's
contention that the PTO was required to promulgate
relevant considerations for institution through noticeand-comment rulemaking procedures can be raised in
an APA action in federal district court; thus, it has
failed to demonstrate lack of available alternatives for
24
relief.”); see also Apple Inc. v. Vidal, 63 F.4th 1, 15
(Fed. Cir. 2023) (noting that litigants may pursue a
“challenge to the Director's instructions as invalid for
want of notice-and-comment rulemaking” before a
district court).
Thus, a central premise of Google’s challenge—
that the PTO has established a rule that operates as a
de facto limitations period on when an IPR may be
brought—is false. And if that premise were correct, a
district court APA action, rather than mandamus,
would be the proper vehicle for relief, as further
discussed in the following Section.
D. This Case Is a Poor Vehicle for Review.
1. Google’s Mandamus Action Is a Uniquely
Poor Vehicle.
As discussed above in Section A, none of the
three requisite conditions for mandamus are satisfied.
Google’s requested mandamus relief is additionally
flawed here, because the PTO’s decision denying
institution of Google’s IPRs was explicit that despite
VirtaMove’s “strong settled expectations” being one
factor, that was not the only factor. For instance, the
PTO noted that Google did “not provide any
persuasive reasoning why an inter partes review is an
appropriate use of Board resources.” Google LLC v.
VirtaMove, Corp., No. IPR2025-00487, 2025 WL
1913566, at *1 (P.T.A.B. July 11, 2025). And the PTO
further stated that “the determination to exercise
discretion to deny institution is based on a holistic
25
assessment of all of the evidence and arguments
presented.” Id.
In essence, Google asks the Court to guess at
what motivated the instant denial of institution and
render an advisory opinion on that basis. Because of
the uncertainty as to whether the PTO’s consideration
of settled expectations was dispositive as to noninstitution in this specific case, Google’s mandamus
action is a poor vehicle for evaluating any broader
pattern that exists within the PTO’s consideration of
settled expectations.
2. A Far Better Vehicle Exists, But Google Has
Declined to Pursue It.
A better vehicle is available because Google has
an alternative avenue of relief which the Federal
Circuit has already blessed. Specifically, Google may
bring an APA notice-and-comment rulemaking
challenge before a district court, a course of action that
the Federal Circuit has made clear is the appropriate
vehicle for parties such as Google to challenge the
PTO’s “settled expectations” policy. In re Cambridge
Indus. USA Inc., No. 2026-101, 2025 WL 3526129
(Fed. Cir. Dec. 9, 2025) (“Cambridge's contention that
the PTO was required to promulgate relevant
considerations for institution through notice-andcomment rulemaking procedures can be raised in an
APA action in federal district court; thus, it has failed
to demonstrate lack of available alternatives for
relief.”).
26
Specifically, Google’s challenge is based on the
allegation that the agency has “adopt[ed] [an]
overarching presumptive rule,” which is “a rule that,
like any limitations period, affects parties’ substantive
rights.” Petition at 3, 23. Indeed, Google explicitly
alleges that the Director’s actions are “much more
akin to a rule than to an exercise of case-by-case
discretion.” Petition at 23 (emphasis in original). And
Google expressly reserved “the right to challenge” the
Director’s policy as “legally invalid as” being “adopted
without notice-and-comment rulemaking.” Google
LLC v. VirtaMove, Corp., Case No. IPR2025-00487,
Paper No. 9, at 31 n.12 (June 10, 2025) (Google’s
opposition to VirtaMove’s request for discretionary
denial).
If Google is in fact correct that the Director is
not merely exercising his discretion (which would be
unreviewable by any court) but instead has enacted a
de facto rule, the appropriate challenge would be an
APA notice-and-comment rulemaking challenge
“brought against the Director in district court under
the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C.
§§ 701–706.” See Apple Inc. v. Vidal, 63 F.4th 1, 14
(Fed. Cir. 2023) (“Whether notice-and-comment
rulemaking procedures had to be employed for an
agency action presents a matter ‘quite apart from the
matter of substantive reviewability’ of the action for
being contrary to statute or arbitrary and capricious.”)
(quoting Lincoln v. Vigil, 508 U.S. 182, 195 (1993)).
Indeed, the Federal Circuit previously reached
this same conclusion in Apple v. Vidal, where that
court rejected a challenge to a non-institution decision
27
but allowed a notice-and-comment rulemaking
challenge to continue before the district court. Id. at
5–6, 17 (“[W]e conclude that Apple has standing to
press the claim that the [alleged rule was] improperly
put
in
place
without
notice-and-comment
rulemaking.”). Google was well aware of this result, as
it was a party to the Apple v. Vidal action. See id. at 5.
An APA notice-and-comment rulemaking
challenge would additionally be more appropriate
than mandamus because it far better matches the
facts as Google alleges them—that the Director has
imposed a de facto statute of limitations that acts as a
rule. And the notice-and-comment rulemaking
challenge would allow a district court to properly act
as a factfinder in addressing whether the evidence
supports Google’s contention that the Director has in
fact instituted a rule. In contrast, the relevant record
of the impact of a patent’s age on discretionary denial
decisions has not been developed by any finder of fact
in the present action.
CONCLUSION
For all of the reasons set forth above, this Court
should deny Google’s Petition.
28
Respectfully submitted,
Brian Ledahl
Counsel of Record
Marc A. Fenster
Reza Mirzaie
James A. Milkey
RUSS AUGUST & KABAT
12424 Wilshire Blvd., 12th
Fl
Los Angeles, CA 90025
(310) 826-7474
bledahl@raklaw.com
mfenster@raklaw.com
rmirzaie@raklaw.com
jmilkey@raklaw.com
Counsel for VirtaMove, Corp.
July 13, 2026
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.