Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Nicholas Honchariw, Trustee, Honchariw Family Trust, Petitioner v. County of Stanislaus, California

Supreme Court briefMar 9, 2026

Ask Donna

What actually matters in this document.

Text

No. 25In the

Supreme Court of the United States

NICHOLAS HONCHARIW, TRUSTEE,

HONCHARIW FAMILY TRUST,

Petitioner,

v.

COUNTY OF STANISLAUS,

Respondent.

On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the

United States Court of A ppeals for the Ninth Circuit

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Nicholas Honchariw

Attorney at Law

1033 South Carson Street

Carson City, NV 89701

(415) 225-3048

nh@nhpart.com

Counsel for Petitioner

120987

A

(800) 274-3321 • (800) 359-6859

i

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

Whether an approved vesting tentative map which

conferred a statutory vested right to finalize a subdivision

upon substantial compliance with the conditions of

approval is property protected by the Takings Clause?

Whether a claim of taking of rights under an approved

vesting tentative map is tested with regard to the vesting

tentative map in and of itself or with regard to the overall

property encompassing the subdivision?

ii

LIST OF ALL PARTIES

The party to the judgment from which review is

sought is Petitioner Nicholas Honchariw, Trustee of

the Honchariw Family Trust U/A/D March 8, 1991, as

amended. He was a party in all proceedings below.

Respondent is the County of Stanislaus.

iii

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

QUESTIONS PRESENTED . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . i

LIST OF ALL PARTIES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ii

TABLE OF CONTENTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iii

TABLE OF APPENDICES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . v

TABLE OF CITED AUTHORITIES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vi

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI . . . . . . . 1

OPINIONS BELOW . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

JURISDICTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

CONST I T U T IONA L A N D STAT U T ORY

PROVISIONS AT ISSUE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

STATEMENT OF THE CASE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

A. Factual Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

B. State Court Procedure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10

C. Federal Court Procedure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION . . . . 11

iv

Table of Contents

Page

I.

Honchariw’s taking claim is based on

the County’s taking of his statutory

vest ed proper ty r ights under V TM

2006-06 and his associated rights under

the Anti-NIMBY Law . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

II. Honc h a r i w h a d a ve st e d pr op e r t y

right in VTM 2006-06 protected by the

Takings Clause in and of itself . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18

CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27

v

TABLE OF APPENDICES

Page

A P PEN DI X A — M EMOR A N DU M OF

T H E U N I T ED S TAT E S C OU RT OF

APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT,

FILED DECEMBER 9, 2025 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1a

A PPEN DI X B — OR DER OF T H E

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR T H E E A S T ER N DI S T RIC T OF

CALIFORNIA, DATED AUGUST 21, 2024

AND FILED AUGUST 22, 2024 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7a

vi

TABLE OF CITED AUTHORITIES

Page

CASES

Andrus v. Allard,

444 U.S. 51 (1979) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20, 21

Beck Development Co., Inc. v.

Southern Pacific Transportation Company,

44 C.A.4th 1160 (1996) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14

Bowers v. Whitman,

671 F.3d 906 (9th Cir. 2012) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22-25

City of Oakland v. Oakland Raiders,

32 C.3d 60 (1982) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20

Honchariw, Ttee v. County of Stanislaus,

200 C.A.4th 1066 (2011) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2, 6, 13, 14, 17

Honchariw, Ttee v. County of Stanislaus,

51 C.A.5th 243 (2020) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3, 10, 15-17

Horne v. Department of Agric.,

576 U.S. 351 (2015) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20

Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass’n v.

DeBenedictis,

480 U.S. 470 (1987) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20, 21, 24

Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City,

438 U.S. 104 (1978) . . . . . . . . . . 4, 11, 12, 20, 21, 24-26

vii

Cited Authorities

Page

Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co.,

467 U.S. 986 (1984) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4, 5, 18-20, 25

Zeyen v. Bonneville Joint District,

114 F.4th 1129 (9th Cir. 2024) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS

U.S. Const. amend. V . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

STATUTES

28 U.S.C. § 1254(1) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

28 U.S.C. § 1331 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

42 U.S.C. § 1983 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

Cal. Gov’t C. § 66473 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15

Cal. Gov’t C. § 66474.1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14

Cal. Gov’t C. § 66498(a) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18, 24

Cal. Gov’t C. § 65589.5 . . . . . . . . . . . . 2, 5, 6, 13, 17, 24, 26

1

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Nicholas Honchariw, Trustee of the Honchariw Family

Trust U/A/D March 8, 1991, as amended, respectfully

requests that this Court issue a writ of certiorari to review

the judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for

the Ninth Circuit.

OPINIONS BELOW

The Memorandum Opinion of the Ninth Circuit

Court of Appeals is unpublished. It is attached hereto

as Appendix (App.) A. The Order Granting Defendant’s

Motion for Summary Judgment of the district court is

reported at Honchariw, Ttee v. County of Stanislaus,

No. 1:21-cv-00801-SKO (E.D.Cal. August 22 2024). It is

attached hereto as App. B.

JURISDICTION

The lower court had jurisdiction over this case

under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and the Fifth

Amendment to the United States Constitution. The Court

of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit entered final judgment on

December 9 2025. App. A at 1. This Court has jurisdiction

under 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1).

CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY

PROVISIONS AT ISSUE

The Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution

provides, “nor shall private property be taken for public

use, without just compensation.” U.S. Const. amend. V.

2

INTRODUCTION

After denial in 2009, in 2012 the County approved

Honchariw’s vesting tentative map 2006-06 (“VTM 200606”) for subdivision of a portion of his 33 acres of rural

land into 3 5-acre lots, 4 1-acre lots, one ½-acre already

improved lot, and a 13-acre remainder pursuant to review

under mandate ordered by the California Fifth District

Court of Appeals under the California Anti-NIMBY Law.

Honchariw, Ttee v. County of Stanislaus, 200 C.A.4th

1066, 1075 (2011) (“Honchariw, Ttee 2011”). Approval of a

vesting tentative map conferred a statutory vested right

to finalize the subdivision by substantial compliance with

the conditions of approval.

In 2016 Honchariw submitted his proposed final map

for VTM 2006-06 with plans and specs for improvements

required by the conditions of approval to the County to

finalize the subdivision in substantial compliance with

the conditions of approval. But the County demanded

that he add a municipal-sized fire suppression system to

the water line extension that he was required to design

and construct for the local Knights Ferry Community

Services District (“KFCSD”) water system to serve the

proposed 4 1-acre lots, which were within the district,

with municipal-sized 1000 gallon-per-minute (“gpm”) fire

flows. No such requirement was included in his conditions

of approval. The conditions of approval provided that

fire suppression was to be addressed by the KFCSD in

accordance with its usual rural fire standards. The County

had no authority to impose additional requirements. The

demand was infeasible and stopped the project in its tracks

after years of time, money and effort, spent at significant

investment risk. The project could not bear the cost of a

3

municipal-sized fire suppression system to serve 4 rural

1-acre lots and Honchariw had no ability to supply water

at 1000 gpm while the KFCSD system only supplied 50

gpm for the line extension.

Honchariw sought another writ of mandate to compel

withdrawal of the demand. In Honchariw, Ttee v. County

of Stanislaus, 51 C.A.5th 243 (2020) (“Honchariw, Ttee

2020”), the Fifth District held that the County violated

Honchariw’s statutory vested rights to finalize his

subdivision.

The Fifth District affirmed that the County had a

statutory ministerial duty to approve his proposed plans

and specs for the water line extension if they were in

substantial compliance with the requirements of VTM

2006-06. The Fifth District recognized that the County

had provided for Honchariw to rely upon KFCSD for

both domestic and fire suppression water and held that

the County had “unambiguously” delegated exclusive

authority for design of the extension, including fire

suppression, to KFCSD. If, as determined, the plans

and specs complied with KFCSD rules, they had to be

approved. While public safety is of course a legitimate

public purpose, having exercised its discretionary

authority to provide for fire suppression at approval of

VTM 2006-06 in the conditions of approval by delegation

to KFCSD, the County had no basis to demand more

years later.

Honchariw’s writ petition was granted, and the

County was forced to accept his proposed plans and

specs as approved by KFCSD for water improvements,

including for fire suppression, and his right to rely upon

4

KFCSD water, in 2021. Since the demands brought the

project to a halt for almost 5 years, Honchariw filed this

action for compensation for a temporary regulatory taking

of his rights under VTM 2006-06 and / or damages for a

deprivation of substantive due process. The County moved

for summary judgment, and the district court granted

the motion.

In granting the County’s motion for summary judgment

as to the taking claim, the district court did not recognize

Honchariw’s vested property interest in VTM 2006-06 as

a property right itself constitutionally protected under

the Takings Clause, instead treating it as just another

strand of the bundle of rights comprising ownership of real

property. As just another strand, a taking claim would only

be addressed with reference to the property as a whole

under well-established law. The district court applied the

Penn Central factors to the property as a whole as though

this was just another instance of a run-of-the-mill denial

of a subdivision application under the broad discretionary

authority accorded a local agency. This ineluctably doomed

his claim. The property as a whole did not suffer a loss

in value sufficient to state a taking claim under wellestablished law—Honchariw might otherwise develop his

property with another application, and he retained a usable

13-acre remainder. The County eviscerated his rights under

VTM 2006-06.

Application of the Penn Central factors with respect

to his rights in VTM 2006-06 rather than his property

as a whole would mandate a finding of a taking. While

all of the Penn Central factors would be satisfied, the

complete taking of VTM 2006-06 compelled a finding of a

taking under Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986

5

(1984), as an interference with Honchariw’s investmentbacked expectations. Ruckelshaus found that this factor

overwhelmed the other Penn Central factors and by itself

mandated a finding of a taking.

Petitioner argues that the district court and then

the Ninth Circuit erred in not recognizing that his right

to finalize VTM 2006-06 was a vested property right

protected by the Takings Clause in and of itself, not with

regard to his property as a whole.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

A. Factual Background

In 2009 the County denied Honchariw’s application

for approval of VTM 2006-06 in the face of strong

NIMBY opposition to its four 1-acre lots. In doing so, it

overrode the findings of its Planning Department that the

project complied with all local zoning and general plan

requirements, met all local requirements for subdivision,

and its recommendation for approval. The Board of

Supervisors applied its broad discretionary powers under

the local version of the California Subdivision Map Act to

“find” that the project site was “unsuitable”. It rejected

Honchariw’s demand to apply the California “Anti-NIMBY

Law”, Cal. Gov. C. § 65589.5 et al, requiring approval of

a residential subdivision which complied with all zoning

and general plan requirements unless an agency made

“written findings supported by substantial evidence on the

record” that the project would have a “specific, adverse

impact upon the public health or safety” and that “there is

no feasible method to satisfactorily mitigate or avoid the

adverse impact . . . other than disapproval. . . .”

6

Honchariw filed a petition for writ to overturn the

disapproval, but the Stanislaus County Superior Court

rejected the petition on the basis of the County’s new

assertion—repudiating the finding of the Planning

Department—that the project did not comply with general

plan and zoning requirements because the proposed

lots were not connected to the KFCSD water system.

In Honchariw, Ttee 2011, the Fifth District Court of

Appeals held in a unanimous published opinion that the

disapproval was an unlawful abuse of discretion. The

Fifth District found the language of the statute “clear

and unambiguous”. 200 C.A.4th at 1073. Pointedly it

found that the County’s critical representation to the

trial court that Honchariw failed to comply with local

water connection requirements was wholly specious—the

court saw “nothing in this record which would support a

conclusion that” Honchariw’s project did not comply with

the requirement of County Code section 20.52.210 that

“lots of a subdivision shall be connected to a public water

system . . . ”, recognizing that “[l]ots of a subdivision

cannot be connected to a public water system until those

‘lots of a subdivision’ exist.” Id. at 1080. No lots existed

until lots were approved and additional steps completed.

The court recognized that “[Honchariw] has consistently

asserted that if the project were approved . . . [he] would

connect the lots as required by the County ordinance”.

Id. at 1080-81.

Pursuant to the Fifth District’s order, the trial court

issued its writ, and, upon reconsideration, the Board of

Supervisors was unable to find any basis to disapprove the

project under the Anti-NIMBY Law and finally approved

it in May 2012. In ordinary course, the approval of VTM

2006-06 carried conditions of approval. The relevant ones

7

in this action addressed extension and functionality of the

KFCSD water system. Because the four 1-acre lots were

within the KFCSD district, Honchariw had to connect

those lots to the system under County Code § 20.52.210

and seek water service from KFCSD. (The three 5-acre

lots were outside the district and would rely upon wells.)

Since water connection requirements were a central

issue in Honchariw’s successful litigation, the Planning

Department’s 2012 Action Agenda Summary for VTM

2006-06 prepared by the Planning Department for the

Board identified water service as a “core issue” in its

analysis of the application and its preparation of proposed

conditions of approval for the Board.

The inadequacies of the KFCSD system were wellknown. It was and remains a small antiquated rural system

serving the unincorporated community of Knights Ferry

(population 92) with 65 users. Its distribution facilities

were severely limited, with only 150 gpm pumps at the

storage tank, well under standard fire flows of 1000 gpm

for municipal water districts, with flows diminishing to

50 gpm over small main lines to the foot of the Honchariw

property. At its terminus at the foot of the property, the

water main was only 2”, not the 8” demanded for extension

by the County. To connect the four 1-acre lots would

require the design and construction of an uphill extension

of the water main over 1000’ with booster pumps.

In anticipation of the Board’s re-hearing of his

application pursuant to the Fifth District decision, County

planning staff met with KFCSD. KFCSD confirmed that

it had water capacity and that service would be available

upon extension of the water line to the four new 1-acre lots.

The Planning Department accordingly drafted conditions

8

of approval providing for fire as well as domestic water

service for the four 1-acre lots within the district to be

obtained from KFCSD under applicable KFCSD rules,

regulations, standards and ordinances and delegated

responsibility for the water line extension to KFCSD.

Customized fire flow requirements would be designed

case-by-case as new houses were built upon the lots

based upon a number of variables, eg, their size, type

of construction, type of in-structure sprinklers, water

storage (eg, pools or tanks), etc. As expressly referenced

in the Action Agenda Summary, this approach to fire

flows in rural and suburban areas in which adequate and

reliable water systems did not exist was authorized by the

California Fire Code (24 Cal. Code Regs., Title 24, Part

9), which had been adopted by the County (County Code

§ 16.55.010) without relevant change (see § 16.55.040).

In 2015, Honchariw submitted a request to KFCSD

for water service for the 4 1-acre lots, secured a “will

serve letter”, and reached agreement with KFCSD for

the water line extension, including primary and back-up

booster pumps to supply water uphill to the four 1-acre

lots together with a 2000 gallon stainless steel pressurized

storage tank. With its incoming flows of only 50 gpm

to the foot of the property, KFCSD requested that the

booster pumps be limited to 60 gpm and buffered with a

pressurized storage tank in order to avoid draining the

system.

Honchariw had plans prepared accordingly, with a 60

gpm booster pump, a 60-gpm back-up pump, a 2000-gallon

pressurized storage tank, and risers for the future

attachment of hydrants, and submitted them to the County

9

Department of Public Works upon submitting his proposed

final map to the County in April 2016. The proposed final

map and plans and specs were in substantial compliance

with the conditions of approval of VTM 2006-06.

But the County rejected his plans. It demanded

that he design and construct a full municipal-sized fire

suppression system with fire flows “based on functional

fire hydrants” of 1000 gpm for 2 hours, refusing to

recognize that it had accepted the alternative fire flow

and water supply measures provided in the Fire Code

and in the County Fire Directive for substandard systems

such as the KFCSD system at approval of VTM 2006-06.

This required a pumping station larger than the KFCSD

pumping station, with primary and back-up 1000 gpm

pumps, with massive back-up on-site power generators

with fuel storage in case of power outage, and water flows

at 1000 gpm. Since KFCSD could not supply 1000 gpm,

the County declared that Honchariw would have to supply

them himself and would need to construct storage tanks

for two hours of fire flows of 1000 gpm, or 120,000 gallons.

The demands were out of the blue. Nowhere in the

conditions of approval was there any requirement of a

municipal-sized fire suppression system; municipal fire

flows were never even mentioned in the Action Agenda

Summary or at the hearing by anyone; KFCSD testified

that it operated at 50 gpm and wanted to stay at that level.

The County’s demands rendered VTM 2006-06

infeasible. Honchariw’s best quote for the improvements

demanded by the County was for over $500,000 over

and above the costs of the water line extension of over

$300,000. Yet the County’s own appraiser here estimated

10

the value of the four 1-acre lots at not more than $100,000

each, or $400,000 in total.

After over a decade, and significant costs of time,

money and effort, the project was stone-cold dead. VTM

2006-06 was rendered worthless.

B. State Court Procedure

Accordingly Honchariw filed a petition for writ of

mandate in August 2017 to compel withdrawal of the

County’s demand for a municipal-sized fire suppression

system. It was denied by the superior court on the basis

that the County was within its discretion to interpret

the conditions of approval to require the municipal-sized

fire suppression system since it was a “matter of life and

death”.

Honchariw appealed. In June 2020, the Fifth District

reversed and ordered the trial court to issue its writ

to enjoin the County’s demands in accordance with its

opinion. Honchariw, Ttee 2020.

Upon remand, the superior court vacated its judgment

in July 2020 and issued a writ of mandate. Upon issuance

of the writ, the County in 2021 finally approved a final map

and the proposed plans and specs prepared in accordance

with KFCSD’s requirements and abandoned its demand

for a municipal-sized fire suppression system.

Since Honchariw had to bear significant costs from

the delay and the trust was deprived of sales proceeds

and absorbed extra costs for the entire period of the

demands, Honchariw filed a supplemental and amended

11

complaint for damages. Under California procedural

requirements, Honchariw had to secure the writ before

seeking compensation for a taking or damages for a

deprivation of due process.

C. Federal Court Procedure

The County removed the action to the United States

District Court, Eastern District, on May 17 2021. The

County filed a Motion to Dismiss December 3 2021. The

motion was granted November 7 2022 with leave to amend.

Honchariw filed a First Amended Complaint November

28 2022. The County again filed a Motion to Dismiss on

December 22 2022. The motion was granted April 13 2023

with leave to amend. Honchariw filed a Second Amended

Complaint May 3 2023. The County again filed a Motion

to Dismiss on May 16 2023. The court denied the Motion

on July 18 2023.

On May 28 2024, the County filed its Motion for

Summary Judgment. The Motion was granted and

judgment entered August 22 2024.

A notice of appeal to the Ninth Circuit was timely filed

by Honchariw on September 20 2024. The Ninth Circuit

issued its Memorandum Opinion on December 9 2025

affirming the district court judgment.

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION

Both the district court and the Ninth Circuit

smothered Honchariw’s claim of a taking of his rights

under VTM 2006-06 under the blanket rule stated in Penn

Central. The district court quoted Penn Central:

12

“‘Taking’ jurisprudence does not divide a single

parcel into discrete segments and attempt

to determine whether rights in a particular

segment have been entirely abrogated. In

deciding whether a particular governmental

action has effected a taking, this Court focuses

rather on the character of the action and the

nature and extent of the interference with

rights in the parcel as a whole. . . .” 438 U.S. at

130-31 (emphasis added). “

App. B at 20a. The district court rotely treated his claim

as simply a claim for interference with just one of the many

strands of ownership comprising the bundle of rights of

ownership of his property. It noted:

“[p]laintiff does not cite, and the Court

has not found, any legal authority finding a

statutory entitlement to real estate development

constitutes a property interest cognizable apart

from the underlying land for takings purposes.”

App. B at 22a-23a. The Ninth Circuit affirmed, echoing

the district court’s reasoning. Honchariw was in no

different position than if he were challenging an initial

disapproval of an initial subdivision application. While

the blanket Penn Central rule remains fundamental in

takings jurisprudence, it should be recognized by the

Court explicitly that any strand which is itself a vested

property right is protected by the Takings Clause in and

of itself and any claim of taking is tested with regard to

the right itself, not with regard to the underlying parcel

as a whole. Absent such explicit recognition, such vested

rights can be simply extinguished without compensation.

13

I.

Honchariw’s taking claim is based on the County’s

taking of his statutory vested property rights under

VTM 2006-06 and his associated rights under the

Anti-NIMBY Law.

After the County’s disapproval of VTM 2006-06

in 2009, Honchariw established his statutory rights to

develop his property as a residential subdivision under

the California Housing Accountability Act (known as the

“Anti-NIMBY Law”) in Honchariw, Ttee 2011. The court

explained:

“Government Code Section 65589.5 is known

as the Housing Accountability Act (see sec

65589.5, subd. (o)), and has been referred to

colloquially as the ‘Anti-NIMBY law’. The

purpose of the statute is to limit the ability

of local governments ‘to reject or make

infeasible housing developments . . . without a

thorough analysis of the economic, social and

environmental effects of the action. . . .’ (Sec

65589.5, subd. (b)). Subdivision (j) of the statute

provides that ‘[w]hen a proposed housing

development complies with applicable, objective

general plan and zoning standards, including

design review standards, in effect at the time

that the housing development’s application

is determined to be complete,’ a local agency

which ‘proposes to disapprove the project . . .

shall base its decision regarding the proposed

housing development upon written findings

supported by substantial evidence on the record

that . . . (1) [t]he housing development would have

a specific, adverse impact upon the public health

14

or safety unless the project is disapproved’ and

‘(2) [t]here is no feasible method to satisfactorily

mitigate or avoid the adverse impact . . . other

than disapproval of the housing development

project. . . .” (Italics added)

200 C.A.4th at 1068-69. The Fifth District ordered

issuance of a writ ordering reconsideration of the

application. Unable to cite any specific, adverse impact

upon public health or safety, the Board was compelled to

approve VTM 2006-06 and did so upon re-hearing in 2012.

Upon approval, Honchariw had statutory vested rights

to finalize VTM 2006-06 with approval and recordation of

a final map on the basis of substantial compliance with its

terms and conditions. Cal. Gov. C. § 66474.1. Approval was

a ministerial act. The County could not impose further

demands. In Beck Development Co., Inc. v. Southern

Pacific Transportation Company, 44 C.A.4th 1160, 1199

(1996), the court explained:

“The approval of a tentative map gives the

subdivider certain rights with respect to

approval of a final map. Thus, a final map

may not be disapproved if it is in substantial

compliance with a previously approved tentative

map. (Gov. Code Sec. 66474.1). A nd only

those requirements and conditions that were

applicable to the subdivision at the time of

approval of the tentative map may be considered

with respect to the final map. (Gov. Code Sec.

66473) In other words, the time for a local

agency to take action with respect to a proposed

subdivision is when the tentative map is under

15

consideration and, provided the final map is in

substantial compliance with the tentative map

and any conditions attached on its approval, the

approval of the final map becomes a ministerial

act. (See Youngblood v. Board of Supervisors

(1978) 22 Cal.3d 644, 656.)”

Upon issuance of a “will serve” letter from KFCSD,

the conditions of approval required Honchariw to

construct a water line extension to the four 1-acre lots as

prescribed by KFCSD in accordance with its applicable

rules and regulations. Domestic and fire suppression

water would be provided by KFCSD. The County has

never questioned that Honchariw was not required to

include a municipal-sized fire suppression system in his

water line extension under any local ordinance, standard,

or policy applicable upon approval in 2012. The County

could demand a municipal-sized fire suppression system

only if authorized by the conditions of approval.

“[A] final map shall be disapproved only for

failure to meet or perform requirements

or conditions which were applicable to the

subdivision at the time of approval of the

tentative map.”

Cal. Gov. C. § 66473. Honchariw, Ttee 2020 explained:

“The vesting tentative map statute was enacted

to ‘establish a procedure for the approval of

tentative maps that will provide statutorily

vested rights to a subdivider’ (Sec. 66498,

subd. (a)) and to ‘insure that local requirements

governing the development of a proposed

16

subdivision are established in accordance

with Section 66498.1 when a local agency

approves or conditionally approves a vesting

tentative map.’ (Sec. 66498.9, subd. (b).) The

Legislature declared that ‘[t]he private sector

should be able to rely upon an approved vesting

tentative map prior to expending resources and

incurring liabilities without the risk of having

the project frustrated by subsequent action by

the approving local agency. . . .’ (Sec. 66498.9,

subd. (b).)

51 C.A. 5th at 254. The Fifth District recognized:

“An approach that fails to protect the objectively

reasonable expectations of the applicant would

undermine the purpose of the vesting tentative

map statute. (See Sec. 66498.9, subd. (b).)”

Id. It held that the County’s demands for a municipalsized fire suppression system were beyond Honchariw’s

objectively reasonable expectations under the conditions

of approval and thus violated Honchariw’s vested rights.

The court expressly determined that the County had no

authority in any case to impose its own demands. Noting

that the conditions of approval required Honchariw to

“cause all public improvements required by KFCSD to be

completed and accepted for public use”, the court found

that “[t]his clause is unambiguously limited to public

improvements required by KFCSD. As a result, the clause

does not support the imposition of requirements by other

entities”. 51 C.A.5th in unpublished Part III. The County

was barred from superimposing its own demands. The

court summarized:

17

“In summary, an objective interpretation of the

language in the conditions of approval leads

to the conclusion that the County delegated

to KFCSD the determinations about the fire

suppression water service that would need to

be in place prior to the approval of the final

subdivision map. The fact County personnel

regret this choice and now offer rational

arguments for imposing requirements beyond

those required by KFCSD prior to approving

the final map is not a justification for altering

the conditions of approval as drafted.”

Id. The court remanded for determination whether

Honchariw’s plans were approved by KFCSD and ordered

the County, as a ministerial duty, to approve such plans.

Upon remand, Honchariw established that his plans were

approved by KFCSD, and the County finally withdrew its

demands. The County had violated its ministerial duty to

approve Honchariw’s plans in 2016.

In doing so, it also violated his rights under the AntiNIMBY Law. As recognized in Honchariw, Ttee 2011,

the Anti-NIMBY Law barred a local agency not only

from rejecting but also from “making infeasible” housing

developments absent substantial evidence of a specific,

adverse impact upon public health or safety that could not

be satisfactorily mitigated. The Action Agenda Summary

itself had recognized that the determination of fire flow

and fire suppression requirements could—and would—be

made under Chapter 5 of the Fire Code at permitting and

construction of new structures. Because a municipal-sized

fire suppression system would make the project infeasible,

and there were officially-accepted ways to mitigate fire

18

dangers, the County could not have imposed a requirement

for municipal-size fire suppression infrastructure in 2012,

and it could not do so in 2017. Indeed, the three 5-acre lots

immediately adjacent to the four 1-acre lots were approved

for residential development under VTM 2006-06 without

any public water system at all, just on the basis of these

same officially-accepted ways to mitigate fire dangers.

II. Honchariw had a vested property right in VTM

2006-06 protected by the Takings Clause in and of

itself.

Under Cal. Gov. C. § 66498.1(b) (formerly § 66498(a)),

Honchariw enjoyed vested property rights in VTM 2006-06:

“When a local agency approves or conditionally

approves a vesting tentative map, that approval

shall confer a vested right to proceed with

development. . . .”

As vested property rights expressly conferred by statute,

Honchariw’s rights to finalize his subdivision were

entitled to the protection of the Takings Clause of the

U.S. Constitution and the Takings clause of the California

Constitution.

The Supreme Court addressed the question what

rights constitute a property interest protected by the

Takings Clause in Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467

U.S. 986 (1984). Monsanto had collected health, safety,

and environmental data protected as trade secrets by

Missouri law and submitted it to the EPA. The threshold

question identified by the Court was whether Monsanto

had a property interest protected by the Takings Clause

19

against public use by the EPA. In answering the question,

the Court was:

“mindful of the basic axiom that ““[p]roperty

interests . . . are not created by the Constitution.

Rather, they are created and their dimensions

are defined by existing rules or understandings

that stem from an independent source such as

state law.”” Webb’s Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc.

v. Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155, 161 (1980), quoting

Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577

(1972).”

Id. at 1001. The Court recognized:

“That intangible property rights protected by

state law are deserving of the protection of the

Takings Clause has long been implicit in the

thinking of the Court.”

Id. at 1003. The Court concluded:

“We therefore hold that, to the extent that

Monsanto has an interest in its health, safety,

and environmental data cognizable as a trade

secret under Missouri law, that property right

is protected by the Takings Clause of the Fifth

Amendment.”

Id. at 1003-1004.

Since Honchariw’s rights under VTM 2006-06 were

expressly created and recognized by California law, they

similarly were property protected by the Takings Clause.

20

This is true whether the rights are categorized as real

or personal property rights, including intangible rights.

In Horne v. Department of Agric., 576 U.S. 351 (2015),

the Supreme Court traced the history leading to the

adoption of the Takings Clause to demonstrate that the

term “private property” includes both real and personal

property, which may be tangible (see Andrus v. Allard,

444 U.S. 51, 65 (1979), cited by the Court) or intangible

personal property (see Ruckelshaus, 467 U.S. at 1000,

also cited).

The California Supreme Court in City of Oakland

v. Oakland Raiders, 32 C.3d 60 (1982) canvassed the

application of the California takings clause to intangible

personal property. In doing so, it confirmed that the

California takings clause also extended to real and

personal property, including intangible property. Noting

that “numerous . . . decisions both federal and state have

expressly acknowledged that intangible assets are subject

to condemnation”, the court declared that “neither the

federal nor the State Constitution distinguishes between

property which is real or personal, tangible or intangible”.

Id. at 68.

Nevertheless the district court ruled that case law

precludes a finding that a “statutory entitlement to

real estate development constitutes a property interest

cognizable apart from the underlying land for takings

purposes”, citing Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass’n v.

DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470 (1987), itself citing Penn

Central and Andrus. App. B at 22a-23a. It then applied the

Penn Central tests to Honchariw’s property as a whole.

The court of appeal affirmed this ruling.

21

But their citations are off the mark. Honchariw does

not challenge the holdings. They are simply inapposite.

While each did reject an attempt to categorize a claim

except with regard to the underlying parcel of real

property as a whole, each claim was founded upon a single

strand of the bundle of rights comprising ownership

which—in and of itself—did not rise to the level of a vested

property interest protected by state law. In Penn Central

itself, the right at issue was the right to develop air space.

Penn Central enjoyed no statutory vested rights to develop

the air space above its terminal. The right to develop air

space was simply one of many strands in its bundle of

rights. In Andrus, similarly, the property owners had no

cognizable vested interest protected by state law, simply

a single strand of a bundle of rights. While state law

recognized a “support estate” in Keystone, the support

rights were similarly just one strand in the traditional

bundle of rights. Nowhere did plaintiff claim a statutory

vested right.

If Honchariw were claiming a taking based on

disapproval of a subdivision application under the

discretionary authority usually conferred upon local

agency, his claim would be but for taking of a single

strand in his bundle of rights which was not itself a vested

property right. A Penn Central analysis with respect to his

property as a whole—as performed by the district court

here—would be appropriate. But Honchariw’s taking

claim should be reviewed on the basis of his vested rights

under VTM 2006-06, not on the basis of the property as a

whole. The County’s demand effected a complete taking

of his vested rights.

22

That individual strands of ownership may be vested

property interests which are themselves protected by

the Takings Clause has been recognized. The Ninth

Circuit recognized that a land use right can itself become

protected under the Takings Clause by vesting in Bowers

v. Whitman, 671 F.3d 905 (9th Cir. 2012). Oregon voters

had adopted “Measure 37” in 2004 to provide that

government compensate land owners for the reduction

in market value resulting from any land use regulations

restricting use regardless whether the regulations

effected a taking. The government could avoid payment

by granting a waiver from the regulations. By 2007, the

legislature extinguished Measure 37. Land owners who

had applied for but not received compensation under

Measure 37 sought, inter alia, just compensation for a

taking. The Ninth Circuit set forth its framework for

analysis:

“‘We use a two-step analysis to determine

whether a [constitutional] ‘taking’ has occurred:

first, we determine whether the subject matter

is ‘property within the meaning of the Fifth

Amendment and, second, we establish whether

there has been a taking of that property for

which compensation is due’. [Citations omitted]

‘Property interests . . . are not created by the

Constitution. Rather they are created and their

dimensions are defined by existing rules or

understandings that stem from an independent

source such as state law rules that secure certain

benefits and that support claims of entitlement

to those benefits’. [Citations omitted]

23

In some cases, the Supreme Cour t has

r e cog n i z e d pr op er t y r ight s t hat wer e

constitutionally protected, such that they

were safeguarded by due process, but still not

vested, and thus the government could take

away these interests so long as it provided

proper procedures. [Citations omitted] But in

other cases, constitutionally protected property

rights were held to have been vested and thus

became cognizable under the Takings Clause,

such that the government could not remove the

right without providing just compensation. See

United States v. Sioux Nation, 448 U.S. 371,

414-15, 424 (1980) (holding that the government

could not enact legislation to take back land it

had expressly given to the Sioux Nation without

committing a constitutional taking); Webb’s

Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith, 449

U.S. 155, 164-65 (1980) (holding that the state’s

confiscation of the interest on interpleader

funds was a constitutional taking); Lynch v.

United States, 292 U.S. 571, 576 (1934) (holding

that the government could not avoid payment

of its commitment to pay disability and life

insurance by enacting a statute repealing the

laws granting the benefit without committing

a constitutional taking). . . .”

Id. at 912-13. Accord Zeyen v. Bonneville Joint District,

114 F.4th 1129 (9th Cir. 2024).

While holding that the property interests under

Measure 37 were not constitutionally protected by the

24

Takings Clause, the Ninth Circuit recognized that vested

rights could qualify:

“To the extent that the property interest

provided under Measure 37 was merely a

right to particular land uses, it is analogous

to a zoning permit. It is well established that

there is ‘no federal Constitutional right to

be free from changes in the land use laws’.

[Citations omitted] Therefore, an interest in

a particular land use does not constitute a

protected property interest, unless the interest

has vested in equity based on principles of

detrimental reliance.”

Id. at 915. “Vesting” distinguishes an approved vesting

tentative map which confers a vested right to finalize

a development from rights which are just unvested

strands in the bundle of ownership rights, such as “air

rights” in Penn Central, “support rights” in Keystone,

or rights to subdivide land generally. Approval of VTM

2006-06 in May 2012 conferred a vested right under Cal.

Gov. C. § 66498.1(b) (formerly § 66498(a)) to finalize his

subdivision, and Honchariw incurred significant costs of

time, money, and effort to finalize the subdivision. This

has been undisputed.

Honchariw was completely deprived of his statutory

vested right to finalize VTM 2006-06 under Cal. Gov. C.

§ 66498.1(b) (formerly § 66498(a)) (and, since the County

“made” the project “infeasible”, under the Anti-NIMBY

Law). The deprivation was complete and by its terms

permanent, not a temporary moratorium. If the County

had directly rescinded the approval for VTM 2006-06,

25

there could be no question that this would constitute a

complete taking of a vested protected property right

under the Bowers analysis. It would be irrelevant that the

underlying property retained meaningful value. It would

be irrelevant that Honchariw could file an application for

another subdivision. The only question would be the value

of his lost rights.

The Penn Central factors would provide an appropriate

framework of analysis if applied with regard to his vested

property right in VTM 2006-06 itself, not with regard to

the property as a whole. This would flip the conclusions of

the district court and the Ninth Circuit. Indeed, one factor

by itself—the County’s interference with his reasonable

investment-backed expectations evidenced by VTM 200606—compels a finding of a taking. This is the directive

of Ruckelshaus. With regard to certain trade secrets,

the Federal government had guaranteed to Monsanto an

extensive measure of confidentiality and exclusive use.

The Court elaborated:

“This explicit government guarantee formed

the basis of a reasonable investment-backed

expectation. If EPA . . . were now to disclose

trade secret data . . . EPA’s actions would

frustrate Monsanto’s reasonable investmentbacked expectations. . . .”

467 U.S. at 1005. Identifying the salient factors for its

analysis as “the character of the governmental action,

its economic impact, and its interference with reasonable

investment-backed expectations” per Penn Central, the

Court stated:

26

“It is to the last of these three factors that we

now direct our attention, for we find that the

force of this factor is so overwhelming . . . that

it disposes of the taking question. . . .”

Id. Here the application for, and approval of, VTM 200606—a subdivision designed for the sale of custom lots—

provides the basis for a reasonable investment-backed

expectation. Thus it similarly disposes of the taking

question. But the other factors support a determination

of a taking as well. While the lower courts here found

insufficient economic impact with regard to the value

of the Honchariw property as a whole, VTM 2006-06

itself lost all of its economic value. While the lower

courts found the character of the governmental action

with regard to Honchariw’s property as a whole to be a

misguided attempt to regulate land use for the legitimate

purpose of fire safety, even if misconceived, its character

with regard to VTM 2006-06 was a unilateral demand

“unambiguously” beyond its authority in blatant violation

of Honchariw’s vested rights under VTM 2006-06 and the

Anti-NIMBY Law prohibition against rendering a housing

development “infeasible”.

Because the County withdrew its demands pursuant

to the writ secured by Honchariw, ultimately the

confiscation was only temporary, but he completely lost

his right to finalize VTM 2006-06 and the ability to offer

and sell his lots for an extended period while bearing

carrying costs. The County’s demands brought to a dead

stop a project with vested statutory rights underway since

before Honchariw’s application in 2006. He is entitled to

compensation for damages arising from the delay.

27

CONCLUSION

The Court should grant the Petition for Writ of

Certiorari.

DATED: March 9, 2026

Respectfully submitted,

Nicholas Honchariw

Attorney at Law

1033 South Carson Street

Carson City, NV 89701

(415) 225-3048

nh@nhpart.com

Counsel for Petitioner

APPENDIX

i

TABLE OF APPENDICES

Page

A P PEN DI X A — M EMOR A N DU M OF

T H E U N I T ED S TAT E S C OU RT OF

APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT,

FILED DECEMBER 9, 2025 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1a

A PPEN DI X B — OR DER OF T H E

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR T H E E A S T ER N DI S T RIC T OF

CALIFORNIA, DATED AUGUST 21, 2024

AND FILED AUGUST 22, 2024 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7a

1a

A

APPENDIX A —Appendix

MEMORANDUM

OF THE

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE

NINTH CIRCUIT, FILED DECEMBER 9, 2025

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

NICHOLAS HONCHARIW, TRUSTEE,

HONCHARIW FAMILY TRUST,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

COUNTY OF STANISLAUS,

Defendant-Appellee.

No. 24-5788

D.C. No. 1:21-cv-00801-SKO

MEMORANDUM*

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of California

Sheila K. Oberto, Magistrate Judge, Presiding

Submitted December 3, 2025**

San Francisco, California

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not

precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

** The panel unanimously concludes that this case is suitable

for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

2a

Appendix A

Before: RAWLINSON and SANCHEZ, Circuit Judges,

and ROSENTHAL,*** District Judge.

Nicholas Honchariw, trustee, appeals the district

court’s summary judgment for the County of Stanislaus

over a land use dispute. Honchariw had tried to finalize a

property subdivision that the County alleged did not comply

with plans it had previously approved. We have jurisdiction

under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we review the district court’s

summary judgment ruling de novo. See Johnson v. Barr,

79 F.4th 996, 998-99 (9th Cir. 2023). We affirm.

1. Honchariw argues that the County’s interpretation

of the conditions of approval on his vesting tentative

subdivision map, and the resulting delays in finalizing the

subdivision of his property, amounted to an uncompensated

taking. “Where the government ‘physically acquires

private property for a public use,’ a ‘per se’ taking has

occurred.” Pharm. Rsch. & Mfrs. of Am. v. Stolfi, 153 F.4th

795, 833 (9th Cir. 2025) (quoting Cedar Point Nursery v.

Hassid, 594 U.S. 139, 147-48, 141 S. Ct. 2063, 210 L. Ed. 2d

369 (2021)). “But where the government ‘instead imposes

regulations that restrict an owner’s ability to use his own

property,’ courts ‘appl[y] the flexible test developed in’”

Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New York,

438 U.S. 104, 98 S. Ct. 2646, 57 L. Ed. 2d 631 (1978). Id.

Honchariw asserts that the relevant property interest

was his “statutory vested rights” in his tentative map and

that the County’s actions that delayed the finalization of

*** The Honorable Lee H. Rosenthal, United States District

Judge for the Southern District of Texas, sitting by designation.

3a

Appendix A

his subdivision plans interfered with those rights and

resulted in a per se taking. However, a court may not

extract one “strand” out of a “bundle” of property rights

and analyze it separately. Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S.

51, 66, 100 S. Ct. 318, 62 L. Ed. 2d 210 (1979); see also

Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass’n v. DeBenedictis, 480

U.S. 470, 500, 107 S. Ct. 1232, 94 L. Ed. 2d 472 (1987)

(the Supreme Court’s takings jurisprudence “forecloses

reliance on . . . legalistic distinctions within a bundle

of property rights”). The relevant property interest is

Honchariw’s parcel as a whole and it must be analyzed

under Penn Central. See Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council,

Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 331,

122 S. Ct. 1465, 152 L. Ed. 2d 517 (2002).

Under Penn Central, three factors determine whether

government action constitutes a regulatory taking: (1)

“[t]he economic impact of the regulation on the claimant,”

(2) “the extent to which the regulation has interfered with

distinct investment-backed expectations,” and (3) “the

character of the governmental action.” Penn Cent. Transp.

Co., 438 U.S. at 124. As to the first factor, the record shows

that the value of Honchariw’s property after the alleged

taking was comparable to its original value. That is not

sufficient for a taking. See Colony Cove Props., LLC v. City

of Carson, 888 F.3d 445, 451 (9th Cir. 2018) (explaining

that courts are loath to find a taking where diminution

of value is less than 50 percent and have found no taking

even where diminution is between 75 and 92.5 percent).

4a

Appendix A

The second factor similarly does not weigh in

Honchariw’s favor because there was insufficient

interference with his investment-backed expectations.

The kind of delays he encountered are “a normal part of

the development process.” Landgate, Inc. v. California

Coastal Comm’n, 17 Cal. 4th 1006, 1030, 73 Cal. Rptr.

2d 841, 953 P.2d 1188 (1998). Honchariw had only an

“expectation, but not an assurance” that he would be able

to subdivide the property when he acquired it. MacLeod

v. Santa Clara Cnty., 749 F.2d 541, 548 (9th Cir. 1984)

(rejecting the argument that a taking occurred when

the government denied an owner’s permit to “exploit

his property by pursuing a particular project” that he

believed “would be available for development”).

Third, the “character” of the County’s action also

weighs against finding a taking. Requiring fire safety

equipment generally does not “amount to a physical

invasion.” Bridge Aina Le’a, LLC v. Land Use Comm’n,

950 F.3d 610, 635-36 (9th Cir. 2020) (cleaned up); see

Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458

U.S. 419, 440, 102 S. Ct. 3164, 73 L. Ed. 2d 868 (1982)

(holding that regulations that require “smoke detectors,

fire extinguishers, and the like” are not physical takings).

The record also does not show that the County “single[d]

out” Honchariw “from similarly situated landowners.”

Bridge Aina Le’a, 950 F.3d at 636. And even if this factor

weighed in Honchariw’s favor, it is not a sufficient basis

on its own for finding a taking. Id.

5a

Appendix A

2. Honchariw also arg ues that the County’s

interpretations of the conditions of approval violated

substantive due process. “To state a substantive due

process claim, the plaintiff must show as a threshold

matter that a state actor deprived it of a constitutionally

protected life, liberty or property interest.” Shanks

v. Dressel, 540 F.3d 1082, 1087 (9th Cir. 2008). In the

permitting context, “only egregious official conduct can

be said to be arbitrary,” and the conduct “must amount

to an abuse of power lacking any reasonable justification

in the service of a legitimate governmental objective.” Id.

at 1088 (cleaned up).

The record shows no abuse of power sufficient for

a substantive due process claim. Although the parties

disagreed in state court as to the meaning of the conditions

of approval, the County’s interpretation was reasonable.

See Brittain v. Hansen, 451 F.3d 982, 996 (9th Cir.

2006) (“Substantive due process secures individuals

from arbitrary government action that rises to the

level of egregious conduct, not from reasonable, though

possibly erroneous, legal interpretation.” (cleaned up)).

Honchariw does not dispute that County had a legitimate

interest in fire safety, instead arguing that it acted with

“no authority” to impose additional conditions before

approving his final map. This argument is undercut by

his concession that the official in charge of reviewing the

tentative map for compliance with the conditions acted

in good faith.

6a

Appendix A

Although Honchariw endured delay and aggravation

in the development process, he did not meet his “heavy

burden” of demonstrating that the County’s actions

violated his substantive due process rights. Halverson

v. Skagit Cnty., 42 F.3d 1257, 1262 (9th Cir. 1994). The

district court did not err in granting summary judgment

to the County on this claim.

AFFIRMED.

7a

Appendix

B UNITED STATES

APPENDIX B — ORDER

OF THE

DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT

OF CALIFORNIA, DATED AUGUST 21, 2024 AND

FILED AUGUST 22, 2024

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

Case No. 1:21-cv-00801-SKO

(Doc. 61)

NICHOLAS HONCHARIW, TRUSTEE,

HONCHARIW FAMILY TRUST,

Plaintiff,

v.

COUNTY OF STANISLAUS,

Defendant.

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S

MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

I.

INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff Nicholas Honchariw (“Plaintiff”), in his

capacity as trustee for the Honchariw Family Trust,

brings this action against Defendant County of Stanislaus

(“the County”) alleging causes of action under 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983 for a temporary taking and denial of due process

under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the

8a

Appendix B

United States Constitution, and Article I, Sections 7 and

19 of the California Constitution. (Doc. 44.)1 On May 28,

2024, the County filed a motion for summary judgment.

(Doc. 61.) Pursuant to stipulation (Doc. 60), Plaintiff filed

his opposition on July 2, 2024 (Doc. 63)2 , and the County

replied on July 23, 2024 (Doc. 64). After reviewing the

parties’ papers, the matter was deemed suitable for

decision without oral argument pursuant to Local Rule

230(g), and the Court vacated the hearing set for August

7, 2024. (Doc. 65.)

For the reasons set forth below, the County’s motion

for summary judgment will be granted. 3

1. The operative pleading is Plaintiff’s Second Amended

Complaint (“SAC”). (Doc. 44.)

2. In the absence of prejudice, which the County has not

shown, the Court has considered Plaintiff’s opposition in its

entirety despite it exceeding the 25-page limit. (See Doc. 56 at 4.)

3. The parties consented to the jurisdiction of a U.S.

Magistrate Judge for all purposes. (See Doc. 28.)

9a

Appendix B

II. SUMMARY OF RELEVANT EVIDENCE4

A.

The Property

At all times relevant to this action, the property at

issue in the litigation (“Property”) comprised 33 acres in

unincorporated Stanislaus County, near the community

of Knights Ferry, California. (Doc. 61-1, JSUF ¶ 1.) The

Property was subject to different zoning designations

and included a 13-acre area with a historical zoning

designation to the east, and a 20-acre area with an

agricultural zoning designation to the west. (Id.) The

Property includes a three-bedroom house with a living

room, kitchen, one full bath, an attic, and a full basement.

(Id. ¶ 2.) In approximately 2008, Plaintiff renovated the

house, including installing new electrical and plumbing

systems, remodeling the kitchen and bathroom, and

renovating the septic system. (Id.)

4. The evidence adduced by the parties in conjunction

with this motion comprises: (i) the parties’ Joint Statement of

Undisputed Facts (“JSUF”) (Doc. 61-1); (ii) the County’s Separate

Statement of Undisputed Facts (“Def.’s SSUF”) (Doc. 61-2); (iii)

Declaration of Angela Freitas (“Freitas Decl.”) (Doc. 61-3); (iv)

Declaration of Frederic Clark (“Clark Decl.”) (Doc. 61-4); (v)

Declaration of Jeremy Ballard (“Ballard Decl.”) (Doc. 61-5);

(vi) Declaration of Matthew D. Zinn (“Zinn Decl.”) (Doc. 61-6);

(vii) Declaration of David Wraa (“Wraa Decl.”) (Doc. 61-7); (viii)

exhibits to the foregoing declarations (Doc. 61-8); (ix) Declaration

of Plaintiff Nicholas Honchariw (“Honchariw Decl.”) (Doc. 63-1);

and (x) Plaintiff’s Response to the County’s Separate Statement

of Undisputed Facts (“Plt.’s Resp. to Def.’s SSUF”) (Doc. 63-2).

The summary of relevant evidence is distilled from these sources.

10a

Appendix B

Plaintiff’s predecessor-in-interest, Reverend Iwan

Honchariw, acquired the Property in 1973. (Doc. 61-1,

JSUF ¶ 3.) Reverend Honchariw purchased the Property

as a long-term investment, which he intended to operate

and develop while using the small house as his residence.

(Id. ¶ 5.) The Property had been operated for years as

a family resort. (Id.) Reverend Honchariw had longerterm plans to subdivide the Property into multiple small

residential lots in the eastern area with historic zoning

and residential lots in the western area with agricultural

zoning. (Id.) In 1991, Reverend Honchariw transferred the

Property to the Honchariw Family Trust (“Trust”). (Id.

¶ 3.) Plaintiff became the successor trustee of the Trust

in 1992. (Id.)

B. Application to Subdivide the Property

In 2006, Plaintiff filed an application with the County

for a “Vesting Tentative Subdivision Map” (“VTSM”)

under the California Subdivision Map Act, Cal. Gov’t

Code § 64410 et seq.,5 proposing to subdivide the Property

5. The Subdiv ision Map Act (“Act”) requi res ever y

subdivision of land, with few exceptions, to be approved by

the local government. See Witt Home Ranch, Inc. v. Cty. of

Sonoma, 165 Cal. App. 4th 543, 551 (2008). The Act ensures local

governments have “the power to regulate the manner in which

their communities grow” and necessary improvements are made

before new development is built. Id. The Act provides a two-step

process for review of proposed subdivisions creating five or more

parcels. See Cal. Gov’t Code § 66426. The applicant first submits

either a tentative map or vesting tentative map depicting the

proposed subdivision. Id. §§ 66424.5, 66452. The local government

may approve the map, conditionally approve it, or disapprove it. Id.

11a

Appendix B

into eight lots and a remainder.6 (Doc. 61-1, JSUF ¶ 6.)

Specifically, the VTSM provided that the Property be

divided into three five-acre lots in the western portion

of the Property; four one-acre lots on the north side of

the Property; and one river-front half-acre lot including

the existing house at the corner of the property nearest

Knights Ferry, with balance of the Property consisting

of a large remainder. (Id. ¶ 10.)

The County’s Board of Supervisors (“Board”) denied

the VTSM in 2009. (Doc. 61-1, JSUF ¶ 7.) Plaintiff filed a

petition for writ of mandate and complaint in state court to

overturn the denial. (Id. ¶ 8.) The superior court denied the

petition, but the appellate court reversed and ordered reconsideration of the VTSM under the California Housing

Accountability Act. (Id.)

C.

Conditional Approval of the VTSM

In 2012, the Board approved the VTSM, subject to

conditions of approval (“Conditions of Approval”). (Doc.

§§ 66452.1, 66452.2. The applicant then prepares a detailed final

map for approval, including depiction of required infrastructure

and improvements to serve the new lots in the subdivision. Id.

§§ 66456, 66457; Witt Home Ranch, 165 Cal. App. 4th at 551.

The subdivider must ensure the final map is consistent with the

tentative map and complies with the conditions of approval of

the tentative map. Cal. Gov’t Code §§ 66458(a). The map is then

considered by the local legislative body, id. § 66457(a), here the

County Board of Supervisors, for final approval.

6. The Court has previously taken judicial notice of the

VTSM. (See Doc. 41 at 2 n.4.)

12a

Appendix B

61-1, JSUF ¶ 9.) The Conditions of Approval included

three conditions (numbers 24, 25, and 40) addressing

improvements related to water service for domestic and

fire suppression purposes for the four one-acre lots.7 (Id.

7. Conditions of Approval numbers 24, 25, and 40 read as

follows:

24. Prior to recording the “Final” Subdivision Map.

the applicant shall contact the Knights Ferry

Community Services District (KFCSD) and submit

a written application to obtain water service

(domestic & fire suppression) for all lots within

the Community Services District boundaries,

in accordance with all applicable KFCSD rules,

regulations, standards, and ordinances, and shall

cause all public improvements required by KFCSD

to be completed and accepted for public use.

25. Prior to recording the “Final” Subdivision

Map, water service provided by the Knights

Ferry Community Services District, shall be

established, constructed and operational for the

four (4) proposed 1-Acre Lots, identified as being

Lots No. 4-7 on the [VTSM], and the designated

“Remainder” parcel.

[. . .]

40. Fire hydrants shall be extended to serve any new

structures. on parcels within the Community

Services District boundaries, with no structure

residing further than 1000 feet from a hydrant

or as required by Knights Ferry Community

Services District ordinance, whichever provides

a higher level of fire protection.

(Doc. 61-3, Freitas Decl. ¶ 5; Doc. 61-8, Ex. 4.)

13a

Appendix B

¶ 11.) The three five-acre lots would be served by their own

wells, and the remainder had an existing water connection.

(Id. ¶ 12.) That water connection was to the Knights

Ferry Community Services District (“KFCSD”) water

system, a small antiquated rural system with substandard

distribution facilities. (Id. ¶ 13.)

In April 2016, Plaintiff submitted plans to the County

showing proposed infrastructure and improvements to

address the Conditions of Approval for the VSTM. (Doc.

61-1, JSUF ¶ 15.) The plans were based upon connection

to, and reliance upon water from, KFCSD. (Id.) At the

request of KFCSD, he provided stub-outs for hydrants

instead of hydrants themselves. Unless and until KFCSD’s

water system was upgraded, the water system could not

provide normal flows. (Id.)

The County responded in November 2016 in a letter

that cited several deficiencies in the plans, including

Plaintiff’s failure to “provide calculations to show that

pressure and flow conditions [for fire suppression] are

met.” (Doc. 61-1, JSUF ¶ 16.) Plaintiff then re-submitted

plans and met with County staff. (Id. ¶ 17.)

D.

Disagreement over the Conditions of Approval

for the VTSM

In early 2017, it became clear that Plaintiff and County

staff disagreed about the meaning of the Conditions of

Approval related to fire suppression infrastructure for the

four one-acre lots on the VTSM. (Doc. 61-1, JSUF ¶ 18.)

Plaintiff took the position that the Conditions of Approval

14a

Appendix B

required him to design infrastructure—including fire

hydrants—sufficient to handle fire suppression flows

should KFCSD upgrade its system to be able to supply

them. (Id. ¶ 19.) Further, he took the position that the

actual fire suppression requirements—and the source of

water to meet them—would be resolved by lot owners at

the building permit stage. (Id.)

The County took the position that Conditions of

Approval’s requirement for fire hydrants “to serve any

new structures” (see fn.5, supra) meant that Plaintiff

was required to design and construct (or bond for the

construction of) functioning fire hydrants, including a

water supply capable of providing fire suppression flows,

prior to final map approval in order to protect the future

residents of the subdivision from life safety hazards,

including wildfire. (Doc. 61-1, JSUF ¶ 20; Doc. 63-2, Plt.’s

Resp. to Def.’s SSUF ¶ 4.)

In August 2017, Plaintiff filed another petition for writ

of mandate and complaint in state court relating to the

disagreement over the conditions of approval related to

fire suppression for the four one-acre lots on the VTSM.

(Doc. 61-1, JSUF ¶ 21.) The superior court denied the

petition in early 2018. (Id. ¶ 22.) The court of appeals

reversed, and the superior court issued a writ of mandate

on April 15, 2021. 8 (Id. ¶¶ 23-24.) Two weeks later, the

County withdrew its fire suppression demands for the

VTSM. (Id.¶ 25.)

8. This Court has previously taken judicial notice of the facts

and proceedings in Honchariw v. Cty. of Stanislaus, 51 Cal. App.

5th 243 (2020). (See Doc. 29 at 2 n.3; Doc. 41 at 2 n.4.)

15a

Appendix B

E. The County Approves a Final Parcel Map for

the Property

To date, Plaintiff has not submitted a final version

of the VTSM for approval or made (or bond for) any

improvements required by the Conditions of Approval.

(Doc. 61-1, JSUM ¶ 26.) Instead, while the state court

litigation was pending in 2019, Plaintiff applied for a

“vesting tentative parcel map” that would create three

five-acre lots on the western portion of the Property

and an approximately 18-acre remainder. 9 (Id. ¶ 27.)

The County approved Plaintiff’s final parcel map for the

Property in 2023. (Id. ¶ 28.)

In July 2023, Plaintiff sold the three five-acre lots to

a single buyer for $1.15 million. (Doc. 61-1, JUSF ¶ 29.)

After the purchase, the buyer applied to the County for,

and the County approved, a merger of two of the five-acre

parcels into one ten-acre parcel. (Id. ¶ 30.) The value of

the approximately 18-acre remainder retained by Plaintiff

following the sale of 15 acres in 2023 retains “significant

value.”10 (Doc. 63-2, Plt.’s Resp. to Def.’s SSUF ¶ 8.)

9. A subdivider seeking to create four or fewer new parcels

submits a “parcel map,” rather than a subdivision map. Cal. Gov’t

Code § 66426. “Parcel map procedures are considerably simpler,

and parcel maps can usually be processed far more quickly than

[subdivision] maps.” Curtin, et al., California Subdivision M ap Act

and the Development P rocess § 3.9 (Con’t Ed. Bar 2d ed. 2023));

see also Cal. Gov’t Code § 66411.1 (limiting improvements that

may be required in parcel maps).

10. As of March 2017, the value of the remainder was

appraised at $780,000. (Doc. 63-2, Plt.’s Resp. to Def.’s SSUF ¶ 9.)

16a

Appendix B

F.

Plaintiff Files the Present Suit for Damages

Following the superior court’s issuance of the writ of

mandate in 2021, Plaintiff filed a supplemental complaint

in the state court asserting three state and federal claims

arising from the County’s rejection of the VTSM for his

failure to comply with the Conditions of Approval. Plaintiff

alleged (1) a violation of California Government Code

§ 815.6; (2) inverse condemnation and temporary taking

under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the

U.S. Constitution; Article I, Section 19 of the California

Constitution; and 42 U.S.C. § 1983; and (3) denial of

his substantive due process rights under the Fifth and

Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution; Article

1, Section 7 of the California Constitution; and 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983. (Doc. 1 at 237-45.) The County removed the action

to this Court in May 2021. (See Doc. 1.)

The County filed three motions to dismiss. (Docs.

15, 35, 45.) The Court granted the first two motions,

dismissing Honchariw’s state law claim without leave to

amend, and twice dismissing the takings and substantive

due process claims with leave to amend. (Docs. 29, 41.)

The Court denied the County’s third motion to dismiss

directed to Plaintiff ’s Second Amended Complaint

(“SAC”). (Doc. 51.)

III. LEGAL STANDARD

Summa r y judg ment is appropr iate when the

pleadings, disclosure materials, discovery, and any

affidavits provided establish that “there is no genuine

17a

Appendix B

dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled

to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A

material fact is one that may affect the outcome of the case

under the applicable law. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby,

Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A dispute is genuine “if the

evidence is such that a reasonable [factfinder] could return

a verdict in favor of the nonmoving party.” Id.

The party seeking summary judgment “always bears

the initial responsibility of informing the district court of

the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of

the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories,

and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any,

which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine

issue of material fact.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477

U.S. 317, 323 (1986) (internal quotation marks omitted).

The exact nature of this responsibility, however, varies

depending on whether the issue on which summary

judgment is sought is one in which the movant or the

nonmoving party carries the ultimate burden of proof. See

Soremekun v. Thrifty Payless, Inc., 509 F.3d 978, 984 (9th

Cir. 2007). If the movant will have the burden of proof at

trial, it must demonstrate, with affirmative evidence, that

“no reasonable trier of fact could find other than for the

moving party.” Id. By contrast, if the nonmoving party

will have the burden of proof at trial, “the movant can

prevail merely by pointing out that there is an absence

of evidence to support the nonmoving party’s case.” Id.

(citing Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323).

If the movant satisfies its initial burden, then the

nonmoving party must go beyond the allegations in its

18a

Appendix B

pleadings to “show a genuine issue of material fact by

presenting affirmative evidence from which a [factfinder]

could find in [its] favor.” FTC v. Stefanchik, 559 F.3d

924, 929 (9th Cir. 2009) (emphasis in original). “[B]ald

assertions or a mere scintilla of evidence” will not suffice

in this respect. Id. at 929; see also Matsushita Electric

Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586

(1986) (“When the moving party has carried its burden

under Rule 56(c), its opponent must do more than simply

show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the

material facts.”) (footnote omitted). “Where the record

taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to

find for the non-moving party, there is no ‘genuine issue

for trial.’” Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587 (quoting First Nat.

Bank of Ariz. v. Cities Serv. Co., 391 U.S. 253, 289 (1968)).

In resolving a summary judgment motion, “the

court does not make credibility determinations or weigh

conflicting evidence.” Soremekun, 509 F.3d at 984. That

remains the province of the fact finder. See Anderson, 477

U.S. at 255. Instead, “[t]he evidence of the non-movant

is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to

be drawn in his favor.” Id. Inferences, however, are not

drawn out of the air; the nonmoving party must produce a

factual predicate from which the inference may reasonably

be drawn. See Richards v. Nielsen Freight Lines, 602

F. Supp. 1224, 1244-45 (E.D. Cal. 1985), aff’d, 810 F.2d

898 (9th Cir. 1987).

19a

Appendix B

IV. DISCUSSION

A.

Plaintiff Cannot Prevail on His Regulatory

Takings Claim under Penn Central

As this Court has previously held (see Docs. 29, 41,

51), Plaintiff’s regulatory takings claim is governed

by the Supreme Court’s decision in Penn Central

Transportation Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104

(1978) (“Penn Central”). Under Penn Central, three

factors are of “particular significance” in determining

whether a regulatory taking has occurred: (1) “[t]he

economic impact of the regulation on the claimant;” (2)

“the extent to which the regulation has interfered with

distinct investment-backed expectations;” and (3) “the

character of the governmental action.” Penn Central, 438

U.S. at 124. “‘Government hardly could go on if to some

extent values incident to property could not be diminished

without paying for every such change in the general law,’

. . . and this Court has accordingly recognized, in a wide

variety of contexts, that government may execute laws

or programs that adversely affect recognized economic

values.” Id. (quoting Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393,

413 (1922)). “The first and second Penn Central factors are

the primary factors.” Bridge Aina Le’a, LLC v. Land Use

Comm’n, 950 F.3d 610, 630 (9th Cir. 2020) (citing Lingle

v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 538-39 (2005)).

However, Penn Central sets forth no “set formula” to

determine whether a regulatory action is “‘functionally

equivalent to the classic taking.’” Guggenheim v. City

of Goleta, 638 F.3d 1111, 1120 (9th Cir. 2010). Instead,

the outcome of the inquiry “depends largely upon the

20a

Appendix B

particular circumstances in the case at hand.” Bridge

Aina Le’a, LLC, 950 F.3d at 630 (internal quotations

omitted).

1.

The Relevant Property is the Property as

a Whole

As an initial matter, the parties disagree as to the

relevant property right at issue in this case. The County

contends that a takings inquiry must focus on Plaintiff’s

right in the entire parcel, that is, all 33 acres of the

Property. (Doc. 61 at 19-20; Doc. 64 at 4-5.) Plaintiff

asserts instead that the “property” taken by the County

is the “right to finalize his subdivision” of a portion of the

Property as set forth in the VTSM, which he contends

is protected by the Housing Accountability Act and the

Subdivision Map Act. (Doc. 63 at 16-23.)

As explained in Penn Central,

“Taking” jurisprudence does not divide a single

parcel into discrete segments and attempt

to determine whether rights in a particular

segment have been entirely abrogated. In

deciding whether a particular governmental

action has effected a taking, this Court focuses

rather both on the character of the action and on

the nature and extent of the interference with

rights in the parcel as a whole. . . .

438 U.S. at 130-31 (emphasis added). See Tahoe-Sierra

Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Plan. Agency, 535 U.S.

21a

Appendix B

302, 326-27 (2002) (Penn Central did . . . make it clear that

even though multiple factors are relevant in the analysis of

regulatory takings claims, in such cases we must focus on

‘the parcel as a whole.’”). See also Murr v. Wisconsin, 582

U.S. 383, 396 (2017) (“[T]he Court has declined to limit the

parcel in an artificial manner to the portion of property

targeted by the challenged regulation.”); Andrus v.

Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 65-66 (1979) (“At least where an owner

possesses a full ‘bundle’ of property rights, the destruction

of one ‘strand’ of the bundle is not a taking, because the

aggregate must be viewed in its entirety.”). Following

this legal authority, this Court previously held in this case

that to determine whether a taking has occurred, it must

evaluate the “economic impact to Plaintiff’s property as

a whole.” (Doc. 41 at 9 (emphasis added).)

Plaintiff has provided no basis to depart from the law

of the case as to this issue.11.He attempts to distinguish

Penn Central’s “parcel-as-a-whole” rule by pointing to

state statutes that allegedly “protect” his right to finalize

the subdivision of a portion of the Property, but none of the

cases on which he relies supports this distinction. (See Doc.

63 at 20-21.) Plaintiff cites Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto, 467

11. See Huynh v. Harasz, No. 14-CV-02367-LHK, 2016 WL

2757219, at *21 (N.D. Cal. May 12, 2016) (applying the “law of the

case” doctrine to preclude summary judgment on legal issues

previously decided by a court on a motion to dismiss) (citing

Bollinger v. Oregon, 172 F. App’x 770, 771 (9th Cir. 2006)). See

also Morgan v. Haviland, No. 2:09-CV-2155 WBS KJN, 2011 WL

6153602, at *6 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 9, 2011) (“While defendant raises

these arguments in the context of a summary judgment motion

rather than a motion to dismiss, it has presented no grounds for

departing from the law of the case.”).

22a

Appendix B

U.S. 986 (1984), and City of Oakland v. Oakland Raiders,

32 Cal. 3d 60 (1982), but those cases involved discrete

intangible personal property interests—trade secrets

and contractual rights in an NFL team, respectively—

not rights to use real property. Ruckelshaus, 467 U.S. at

1001-03; City of Oakland, 32 Cal. 3d at 66-67.

Plaintiff’s reliance on North Pacifica LLC v. City of

Pacifica, 234 F. Supp. 2d 1053 (N.D. Cal. 2002), is equally

unavailing. (See Doc. 63 at 21.) That case concerned

whether the plaintiff had pleaded a cognizable property

interest under the Housing Accountability Act sufficient

to support a substantive due process—not takings—claim.

234 F. Supp. 2d at 1059-60. The court further considered

whether the plaintiff’s due process claim was preempted

by the Taking Clause, found that it was, and dismissed the

claim on grounds of ripeness. Id. at 1061-66. Nowhere did

North Pacifica consider, much less hold, that the Housing

Accountability Act (or any other statute) gave rise to a

protected property interest for the purposes of a takings

claim. And, because North Pacifica did not concern a

takings claim in the first instance, it did not address or

distinguish either Penn Central or the “parcel-as-a-whole”

rule.12

Plaintiff does not cite, and the Court has not found,

any legal authority finding a statutory entitlement to

12. In fact, the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s

determination that the plaintiff’s substantive due process was

preempted, holding that the court “incorrectly treat[ed] it as a

takings claim.” N. Pacifica LLC v. City of Pacifica, 526 F.3d 478,

480, 484-85 (9th Cir. 2008).

23a

Appendix B

real estate development constitutes a property interest

cognizable apart from the underlying land for takings

purposes. In fact, case law suggests the contrary. See, e.g.,

Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass’n v. DeBenedictis, 480

U.S. 470, 500 (1987) (rejecting takings claim where state

law created a “distinct segment of property,” observing

that “[i]t is clear . . . that our takings jurisprudence

forecloses reliance on such legalistic distinctions within

a bundle of property rights.”) (citing Penn Central, 438

U.S. at 130, and Andrus, 444 U.S. at 65-66). Cf. The Park

at Cross Creek, LLC v. City of Malibu, 12 Cal. App. 5th

1196, 1209 (2017) (A land use permit “is not a personal

interest. It does not attach to the permittee; rather, [it]

creates a right that runs with the land.”).

The Court w ill therefore not revisit its prior

determination based on pertinent, Supreme Court case

authority, that the property interest at issue here is

Plaintiff’s right in the entire 33 acres of the Property, and

not his right in the subdivision of a portion of it.

2.

There is No Triable Question of Fact as to

Economic Impact to the Property

As to the first “primary” Penn Central factor, Plaintiff

has not presented sufficient evidence from which a finder

of fact could conclude that the economic impact to the

Property, when construed as a whole, rose to the level of

an unconstitutional taking by the County.

Economic impact “is determined by comparing the

total value of the affected property before and after the

24a

Appendix B

government action.” Colony Cove Properties, LLC v.

City of Carson, 888 F.3d 445, 450 (9th Cir. 2018) (citing

MHC Fin. Ltd. P’ship v. City of San Rafael, 714 F.3d

1118, 1127 (9th Cir. 2013)); see Keystone Bituminous Coal

Ass’n, 480 U.S. at 497 (“[O]ur test for regulatory taking

requires us to compare the value that has been taken

from the property with the value that remains in the

property. . . .”). “Not every diminution in property value

caused by a government regulation rises to the level of

an unconstitutional taking.” Colony Cove, 888 F.3d at 451;

see MacLeod v. Santa Clara Cnty., 749 F.2d 541, 548 (9th

Cir. 1984) (“The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that

mere diminution in value, standing alone, cannot establish

a taking.”) (citing Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 131). Although

there is “no litmus test [that] determines whether a

taking occurred,” the Ninth Circuit has made clear that

diminution in property value “ranging from 75% to 92.5%

does not constitute a taking,” and it is “aware of no case

in which a court has found a taking where diminution in

value was less than 50 percent.” Id. (citations omitted). See

also Bridge Aina Le’a, LLC, 950 F.3d at 631 (“[O]ur value

comparison again aims ‘to identify regulatory actions

that are functionally equivalent to the classic taking in

which government directly appropriates private property

or ousts the owners from his domain.’”) (quoting Lingle,

544 U.S. at 539).

Here, Plaintiff concedes that “[t]he value of the

Property at the end of the alleged taking was comparable

to the value of the Property at the start of the alleged

taking.” (Doc. 63-2, Plt.’s Resp. to Def.’s SSUF ¶ 17

(emphasis added).) Consistent with this concession, the

25a

Appendix B

undisputed evidence demonstrates that the difference in

the value of the Property as a whole between the time the

County rejected the VTSM for Plaintiff’s failure to comply

with its fire suppression demands and the withdrawal

of those demands (after which Plaintiff abandoned the

VTSM and successfully obtained a final parcel map

from the County) was $820,000, representing only 29.8%

diminution in value. (See Doc. 64 at 6. See also Doc. 61-1,

JSUF ¶ 29; Doc. 63-1, Honchariw Decl. ¶ 64; Doc. 63-2,

Plt.’s Resp. to Def.’s SSUF ¶¶ 9, 12.) Such diminution in

value falls substantially below that which the Ninth Circuit

requires to establish a taking. See Colony Cove, 888 F.3d

at 451. There is therefore no triable question of fact as

to the economic impact to the Property by the County’s

rejection of the VTSM.

3.

Plaintiff Has Not Adduced Evidence

of the County’s Interference with Any

Reasonable Distinct Investment-Backed

Expectations

Plaintiff also has not adduced any evidence as to

the second “primary” Penn Central factor, i.e., that the

County’s rejection of the VTSM interfered with Plaintiff’s

“investment-backed expectations.” Such expectations

must be “objectively reasonable.” Colony Cove, 888 F.3d at

452. In addition, “what is relevant and important in judging

reasonable expectations is the regulatory environment at

the time of the acquisition of the property.” Bridge Aina

Le’a, LLC, 950 F.3d at 634 (internal quotations and citation

omitted); see Pakdel v. City & Cnty. of San Francisco, 636

F. Supp. 3d 1065, 1076 (N.D. Cal. 2022) (“[T]his factor must

26a

Appendix B

consider the extent to which the challenged regulation

departs from or extends beyond past or conceivable future

regulatory developments.”).

Plaintiff contends that the County interfered with

his “entitlement to finalize his residential development

in substantial compliance with the terms and conditions

attached to [the VTSM]” (Doc. 63 at 24), but such

expectation was not objectively reasonable at the time the

Property was acquired in 1992.13 See Colony Cove, 888

F.3d at 452 (“[A] purported distinct investment-backed

expectation must be objectively reasonable” in order “to

form the basis for a taking claim.”). At that time, Plaintiff

had no entitlement to the finalization of the VTSM, as the

undisputed facts show it was not submitted for approval

to the County until 14 years later, in 2006.

As for approval of a tentative subdivision map

generally (a necessary step in the process of subdividing

13. Plaintiff also could not have reasonably expected the

County to approve the VTSM without delay associated with

litigation concerning the Conditions of Approval, as such litigation

“is a normal part of the regulatory process.” Landgate, Inc. v.

California Coastal Comm’n, 17 Cal. 4th 1006, 1030, 953 P.2d 1188,

1203 (1998). See Loewenstein v. City of Lafayette, 103 Cal. App.

4th 718, 737, 127 Cal. Rptr. 2d 79, 93 (2002) (“A landowner can have

no reasonable expectation that there will be no delays or bona fide

differences of opinion in the application process for development

permits. Sometimes the application process must detour to the

court process to resolve a genuine disagreement.”). Cf. TahoeSierra Preservation Council, 535 U.S. at 335 (“[N]ormal delays

in obtaining building permits, changes in zoning ordinances,

variances, and the like . . . have long been considered permissible

exercises of the police power” that do not require compensation.).

27a

Appendix B

property in California, Cal. Gov’t Code § 64410 et seq.),

such approval was and is a matter within the County’s

discretion. See Youngblood v. Bd. of Supervisors, 22 Cal.

3d 644, 655-56 (1978) (whether and upon what conditions

to approve a proposed subdivision based on a tentative

map a “discretionary decision”). As such, at the time he

acquired the Property in 1992, Plaintiff would have had

an “expectation, but not an assurance” that a tentative

subdivision map would be approved. See MacLeod, 749

F.2d at 548. Under these circumstances, such expectancy

is not reasonable. See id.; Furey v. City of Sacramento,

592 F. Supp. 463 (E.D. Cal. 1984), aff’d, 780 F.2d 1448

(9th Cir. 1986). See also Evans Creek, LLC v. City of

Reno, No. 21-16620, 2022 WL 14955145, at *2 (9th Cir.

Oct. 26, 2022) (noting the city’s discretion to annex the

property under Nevada law cuts against the plaintiff’s

economic expectations); Collins v. Cnty. of Monterey,

No. 22-CV-02560-NC, 2023 WL 5743236, at *7 (N.D. Cal.

Aug. 18, 2023) (“The closest Collins comes to a reasonable

expectation are the recommendations to approve the

rezone issued by County planning staff. However, any

such expectation is quickly dispelled by the applicable

regulatory backdrop and uncertain nature of the political

process.”), aff’d, No. 23-16153, 2024 WL 3066046 (9th

Cir. June 20, 2024); Diller v. Schenk, No. CIV.A. C-8320043WAI, 1986 WL 1788, at *19 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 6, 1986)

(“[E]ven investment-backed expectations may not be

reasonable if their fruition depends on discretionary

acts by governmental authorities, i.e., acts, like issuing

building permits, whose future performance cannot be

assured.”) (citing Furey and MacLeod).

28a

Appendix B

The undisputed facts show that the County’s rejection

of the VTSM did not interfere with any reasonable

expectations held at the time of the acquisition of the

Property. Plaintiff acquired the Property in Trust as a

successor trustee from his relative, Reverend Honchariw,

who purchased it as a “long-term investment” that was

expected to operate as a “family resort” and ultimately

be subdivided into residential lots. (Doc. 61-1, JUSF ¶¶ 3,

5. See also Doc. 63 at 23.) Notwithstanding the County’s

rejection of the VTSM, Plaintiff was able to realize

those expectations. While the litigation over the VTSM

was pending in state court, Plaintiff applied for, and the

County approved, a final parcel map that divided the

Property into three five-acre lots and an approximately

18-acre remainder. (Id. ¶ 27, 28.) Plaintiff thereafter sold

the lots for $1.15 million and retained “significant value”

in the remainder. (Id. ¶ 29; Doc. 63-2, Plt.’s Resp. to Def.’s

SSUF ¶ 8.)

In sum, Plaintiff has failed to present evidence from

which a finder of fact could reasonably conclude that the

County interfered with any reasonable investment-backed

expectations at the time the Property was acquired. The

undisputed evidence shows otherwise.

4.

Plaintiff Has Not Shown that the Character

of the County’s Action Supports a Taking

Plaintiff has not met his burden of establishing that

the character of the County’s rejection of the VTSM

supports a finding by a factfinder that a taking occurred.

He first points to the “unlawful” nature of the County’s fire

29a

Appendix B

suppression demands (Doc. 63 at 25-26), but the alleged

impermissibility of the County’s actions cannot form the

basis of a takings (as opposed to a substantive due process)

claim. Lingle, 544 U.S. at 543 (“[I]f a government action is

found to be impermissible . . . that is the end of the inquiry.

No amount of compensation can authorize such action. . . .

Whatever the merits of that claim, it does not sound under

the Takings Clause.”). See Small Prop. Owners of San

Francisco v. City & Cnty. of San Francisco, 141 Cal. App.

4th 1388, 1409 (2006) (“The appropriate question for the

third prong of a regulatory takings analysis . . . is the

nature rather than the merit of the governmental action.)

(emphasis in the original). Accord S. Grande View Dev.

Co., Inc. v. City of Alabaster, Alabama, 1 F.4th 1299, 131112 (11th Cir. 2021) (Lingle changed the type of inquiry

permitted in a just compensation claim, and abrogated our

earlier precedent permitting an inquiry into the rationale

behind the regulation.”); S. Nassau Bldg. Corp. v. Town

Bd. of Town of Hempstead, 624 F. Supp. 3d 261, 277-78

(E.D.N.Y. 2022) (“[T]he character-of-the-governmentalaction inquiry does not incorporate ‘a means-ends test

[that] asks, in essence, whether a regulation of private

property is effective in achieving some legitimate

public purpose. . . . Nor does it ‘probe[] the regulation’s

underlying validity.’”) (quoting Lingle, 544 U.S. at 543).

Plaintiff next contends that the County’s fire

suppression demands “entailed a physical take-over

and seizure of some of [his] property.” (Doc. 63 at 26.)

While “[a] ‘taking’ may more readily be found when the

interference with property can be characterized as a

physical invasion by government,” MHC Fin. Ltd. P’ship,

30a

Appendix B

714 F.3d at 1128 (quoting Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124),

Plaintiff has not shown that the County’s requirement

to provide a fire suppression system on a portion of his

Property is akin to a “physical invasion” of the Property

as a whole. See Norman v. United States, 63 Fed. Cl.

231, 286-87 (2004) (rejecting argument that regulatory

imposition was “akin to a physical taking of 220.85 acres

of land,” finding that “[i]n light of the entire 2280-acre

relevant parcel, plaintiffs’ overall bundle of property

rights was not diminished with respect to the larger parcel

at issue.”), aff’d, 429 F.3d 1081 (Fed. Cir. 2005). In fact,

courts have found regulations requiring the installation

of fire suppression measures such as sprinkler systems

do not constitute a taking under Penn Central. See, e.g.,

Dyke v. Vill. of Alsip, No. 18 C 06112, 2019 WL 13247925,

at *2 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 6, 2019) (“Defendants’ enforcement of

the zoning ordinance which requires certain properties

to maintain fire sprinklers falls far short of a regulatory

taking.”), aff’d sub nom. Van Dyke v. Vill. of Alsip, 819

F. App’x 431 (7th Cir. 2020); Cf. Loretto v. Teleprompter

Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 440 (contrasting

the government’s “power to require landlords to comply

with building codes and provide . . . smoke detectors, fire

extinguishers, and the like” with regulations that “require

the landlord to suffer the physical occupation of a portion

of his building by a third party.”).

5.

The Penn Central Factors Do Not Support

a Finding that a Taking Occurred

Even were the “character of the governmental action”

factor to weigh in favor of Plaintiff, it “is not alone a

31a

Appendix B

sufficient basis to find that a taking occurred.” Bridge

Aina Le’a, LLC, 950 F.3d at 636. Plaintiff has not met

his burden of establishing a genuine issue of material

fact that the County’s rejection of the VTSM due to its

fire suppression demands was an unconstitutional taking

under Penn Central. Instead, as set forth above, the

undisputed evidence demonstrates that the two primary

Penn Central factors weigh strongly against a finding

that a taking occurred. Accordingly, the Court will grant

summary judgment in favor of the County on Plaintiff’s

takings claim.

B. The County is Entitled to Summary Judgment

on Plaintiff’s Substantive Due Process Claim

1.

Plaintiff Must Meet the “Exceedingly

High Burden” of Demonstrating the

County’s Conduct was “Egregious”

In an action like this one, challenging land use action,

“the ‘irreducible minimum’ of a substantive due process

claim . . . is failure to advance any legitimate governmental

purpose.” Shanks v. Dressel, 540 F.3d 1082, 1088 (9th Cir.

2008) (quoting North Pacifica LLC v. City of Pacifica,

526 F.3d 478, 484 (9th Cir. 2008)). A plaintiff bears an

“exceedingly high burden” required to show that the state

actor “behaved in a constitutionally arbitrary fashion.” Id.

at 1088. As the Ninth Circuit explained, “[w]hen executive

action . . . is at issue, only ‘egregious official conduct can

be said to be arbitrary in the constitutional sense’: it must

amount to an ‘abuse of power’ lacking any ‘reasonable

justification in the service of a legitimate governmental

32a

Appendix B

objective.’” Id. (quoting Cty. of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523

U.S. 833, 846 (1998)).

Plaintiff does not dispute that the County’s acts at

issue are “executive” (as opposed to “legislative”) in

nature.14 Instead, he contends that he need not meet the

“exceedingly high burden” of showing the County engaged

in “egregious official conduct” required by Shanks, because

the County owed him a “ministerial duty” to approve the

VTSM and thus “had no right to take ‘executive’ action.”

(Doc. 63 at 29.) In so doing, Plaintiff is attempting to draw

a distinction between “ministerial” and “executive” acts,

for which he cites no legal authority in support.15 In fact,

14. The law of substantive due process distinguishes between

governmental acts that are “legislative” and those that are

“executive” in character. Gunter v. N. Wasco Cnty. Sch. Dist. Bd.

of Educ., 577 F. Supp. 3d 1141, 1153 (D. Or. 2021) (“As a threshold

matter for evaluating a substantive due process claim, the Court

must determine whether Plaintiffs are alleging that they have been

harmed by an ‘executive’ or a ‘legislative’ act.”) (citing Lewis, 523

U.S. at 846). “Executive action generally involves ‘a specific act

of a governmental officer that is at issue.’” Gunter, 577 F. Supp.

3d at 1153 (quoting Lewis, 523 U.S. at 846). “Legislative acts, on

the other hand, generally apply to a larger segment of—if not all

of—society; laws and broad-ranging executive regulations are

the most common examples.” Gunther, 577 F. Supp. 3d at 1153

(quoting McKinney v. Pate, 20 F.3d 1550, 1557 n.9 (11th Cir. 1994)).

15. Plaintiff’s cited cases (Doc. 63 at 26-27) are directed

to the issue of whether state law can create a constitutionally

protected property interest—an essential element of a due process

claim. See, e.g., Gerhart v. Lake Cnty., Mont., 637 F.3d 1013, 1019

(9th Cir. 2011) (“To succeed on [his substantive due process]

claim, Gerhart must first demonstrate that he was deprived of a

constitutionally protected property interest. We hold that Gerhart

33a

Appendix B

“ministerial or administrative activities of members of

the executive branch” are “executive” acts. Gunter, 577

F. Supp. 3d at 1153. Accord McKinney, 20 F.3d at 1557.

As such, they are subject to the egregiousness standard,

Lewis, 523 U.S. at 846, which is an “exceedingly high

burden” to meet, Samson v. City of Bainbridge Island,

683 F.3d 1051, 1058 (9th Cir. 2012).

2.

Plaintiff Has Not Met This Burden

Plaintiff has failed to present sufficient material facts

from which a finder of fact reasonably could conclude

that the County “behaved in a constitutionally arbitrary

fashion.” Shanks, 540 F.3d at 1088. Plaintiff contends

that the County’s rejection of the VTSM was an “abuse

of power” lacking “any reasonable justification in the

service of a legitimate governmental objective” because it

“acted in violation of state law designed to prevent exactly

cannot make this threshold showing.”) (internal citations omitted);

Groten v. California, 251 F.3d 844, 849-50 (9th Cir. 2001) (“We

must determine whether Groten, as a first-time applicant for a

temporary appraiser’s license, had a property interest protected

by the Due Process Clause.”); Foss v. Nat’l Marine Fisheries

Serv., 161 F.3d 584, 588 (9th Cir. 1998) (“The threshold question is

whether Foss has a constitutionally protectible property interest

in acquiring an IFQ permit. . . .”); Parks v. Watson, 716 F.2d 646,

656 (9th Cir. 1983) (“Before Klamath can prevail on [its procedural

due process claims], however, it must demonstrate the threshold

requirement of a constitutionally cognizable right. . . . [W]e must

determine whether Klamath, as a vacation petitioner, had such

an interest protected by the due process clause.”). The County

does not challenge the existence of a constitutionally protected

property interest in this case. (See Doc. 64 at 11 n.7.)

34a

Appendix B

what it did.” (Doc. 63 at 29.) But a violation of state law

(even if committed in this case) alone does not establish a

substantive due process claim. Samson, 683 F.3d at 1060

(“It is axiomatic . . . that not every violation of state law

amounts to an infringement of constitutional rights.”)

(citing Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 700 (1976)).

Nor does the fact that the appellate court ultimately

concluded the County had “misinterpreted” the Conditions

of Approval of the VTSM. (See Doc. 63 at 30, 31, 32-33

(citing Honchariw v. Cty. of Stanislaus, 51 Cal. App. 5th

243 (2020), Doc. 1 at 144-74).) “Official decisions that rest

on an erroneous legal interpretation are not necessarily

constitutionally arbitrary.” Shanks, 540 F.3d at 1089. See

Brittain v. Hansen, 451 F.3d 982, 996 (9th Cir. 2006)

(“[S]ubstantive due process secures individuals from

‘arbitrary’ government action that rises to the level of

‘egregious conduct,’ not from reasonable, though possibly

erroneous, legal interpretation.”); Sinaloa Lake Owners

Ass’n v. City of Simi Valley, 864 F.2d 1475, 1486 (9th Cir.

1989) (Errors of judgment, mistaken actions, or even

misguided actions do not violate due process.). In fact,

there can be no substantive due process violation “if it is

‘at least fairly debatable’ that the government’s conduct

is rationally related to a legitimate interest.” Flint v.

Cnty. of Kauai, 521 F. Supp. 3d 978, 995 (D. Haw. 2021)

(quoting Kawaoka v. City of Arroyo Grande, 17 F.3d

1227, 1238 (9th Cir. 1994)). See also Halverson v. Skagit

Cnty., 42 F.3d 1257, 1262 (9th Cir. 1994) (explaining that

plaintiffs in substantive due process claims “shoulder [the]

heavy burden” of demonstrating “the irrational nature

of the County’s actions by showing that the County could

35a

Appendix B

have had no legitimate reason for its decision”). Under

these circumstances, courts “do not require that the

government’s action actually advance its stated purposes,

but merely look to see whether the government could

have had a legitimate reason for acting as it did.” Wedges/

Ledges of California, Inc. v. City of Phoenix, 24 F.3d 56,

66 (9th Cir. 1994) (emphasis in original).

Here, Plaintiff cannot meet his “heavy burden” of

demonstrating that the County’s rejection of the VTSM

was devoid of a legitimate governmental interest. Plaintiff

claims that the County had “no justification” for their

fire suppression demands (Doc. 63 at 29), but at the same

time does not dispute that County staff were “acutely

aware that wildfires posed a significant risk to rural

and semi-rural communities at the time of the dispute

over the meaning of the [C]onditions of [A]pproval” and

believed that requiring Plaintiff, not KFCSD, to “provide

functioning fire hydrants, including a water supply capable

of providing fire suppression flows” prior to approval of the

VTSM was “in order to protect the future residents of the

subdivision from life safety hazards, including wildfire.”

(Doc. 63-2, Plt.’s Resp. to Def.’s SSUF ¶¶ 4-5.) The trial

court in Honchariw v. County of Stanislaus expressly

emphasized the County’s interest in fire safety, noting

that the parties’ dispute over the Conditions of Approval

“involves a clear issue of public safety: fire suppression. . . .

This dispute is not about esthetics; it is a life or death

concern.” (Doc. 1 at 66.) The appellate court, which sided

with Plaintiff, nevertheless also acknowledged the County’s

“safety concerns related to fire.” (See Honchariw v. Cty.

of Stanislaus, 51 Cal. App. 5th 243 (2020), Doc. 1 at 133.)

36a

Appendix B

Plaintiff’s proffered statements made by County

personnel that KFCSD would supply the water for fire

suppression (see Doc. 63-1, Honchariw Decl. ¶¶ 48-49)

also fail to create a genuine issue of material fact as

to whether the County “could have had a legitimate

reason” for insisting that Plaintiff do so instead. This

is particularly true in view of the uncontroverted

evidence that the KFCSD water system was “small” and

“antiquated,” with “substandard” distribution facilities

that produced “well under standard fire flows of 1000 gpm

for residential subdivision systems served by municipal

water districts.” (Doc. 63-1, JSUF ¶13.) It is therefore “at

least fairly debatable” that the County’s fire suppression

demands, even if legally erroneous, were rationally related

to the legitimate interest in protecting the subdivision’s

residents against wildfires.

In this way both Bateson v. Geisse and Ali v. City

of Los Angeles, relied on by Plaintiff (see Doc. 63 at 27,

32), are inapposite. In Bateson, the city council voted

not to issue a building permit even though the applicant

had satisfied all the requirements for the permit. 857

F.2d 1300, 1302 (9th Cir. 1988). It did so despite the

city attorney’s warning that the decision would almost

certainly be overturned in court and would expose the city

to substantial civil liability. Id. The Ninth Circuit held that

the city council’s vote was an “arbitrary administration of

the local regulations, which single[d] out one individual to

be treated discriminatorily” and constituted a deprivation

of substantive due process. Id. at 1303. In Bateson, it was

undisputed that a condominium development complied

with the zoning classification applicable to Bateson’s

37a

Appendix B

property; in this case, the meaning of the Conditions of

Approval related to fire suppression infrastructure was

unsettled at the time the County rejected the VTSM.

Further, Plaintiff has not adduced any evidence of bad

faith by the County in this case. To the contrary, it is

undisputed that Frederic Clark, the County staff member

responsible for reviewing the VTSM for compliance with

the Conditions of Approval, interpreted those conditions

“in good faith”; that he “had no interest in obstructing

the project”; and that “[n]obody at the County suggested

to [him] that he obstruct the project.” (Doc. 63-2, Plt.’s

Resp. to Def.’s SSUF ¶¶ 3, 14-16.)

In Ali, the appellate court observed that because

the illegality of the City’s action was apparent from case

authority existing before the City initially withheld the

permit, its position was “‘so unreasonable from a legal

standpoint’ . . . as to be arbitrary, not in furtherance of

any legitimate governmental objective, and for no other

purpose than to delay any development. . . .” 77 Cal. App.

4th 246, 255 (1999). Here, the County’s rejection of the

VTSM was not objectively unreasonable, particularly

given its argument regarding the purpose of the

Conditions of Approval was endorsed by the trial court

in Honchariw v. Cty. of Stanislaus. See Allegretti & Co.

v. Cnty. of Imperial, 138 Cal. App. 4th 1261, 1284 (2006)

(distinguishing Ali).

Because Plaintiff has failed to meet his “exceedingly

high burden” of putting forth evidence sufficient to

establish a substantive due process violation, the Court

38a

Appendix B

finds that the County is entitled to summary judgment

on this claim.16

V. CONCLUSION AND ORDER

For the foregoing reasons, Defendant County of

Stanislaus’s motion for summary judgment (Doc. 61)

is GRANTED. Judgment shall be entered in favor of

Defendant. The Clerk of Court is directed to vacate any

pending deadlines and to close this case.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: August 21, 2024

/s/ Sheila K. Oberto

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

16. Plaintiff asserts that the County has demonstrated a

“history of obstruction” related to the VTSM, and specifically

points to the Board’s “unlawful disapproval” of the VTSM in 2009.

(See Doc. 63 at 33-34.) But, as noted above, Plaintiff concedes

that, at least as to the present dispute that is relevant here,

County staff “had no interest in obstructing the project” and

that “[n]obody at the County suggested” that Plaintiff’s project

be “obstruct[ed.]” (Doc. 63-2, Plt.’s Resp. to Def.’s SSUF ¶¶ 3,

14-16.) Regarding the Board’s 2009 denial of the VTSM, it is not

before the Court, and Plaintiff’s attempt to assert a substantive

due process claim related to it was unsuccessful. See Honchariw

v. Cnty. of Stanislaus, 530 F. Supp. 3d 939, 952 (E.D. Cal. 2021)

(granting motion for judgment on the pleadings), aff’d, No. 2115801, 2022 WL 522287 (9th Cir. Feb. 22, 2022). The Court will

not revisit that ruling here.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

A word about cookies

We need a few to keep you signed in and the library working. The rest help us see which pages people use and where they get stuck. They stay off unless you say yes.