Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Nicholas Honchariw, Trustee, Honchariw Family Trust, Petitioner v. County of Stanislaus, California
Supreme Court briefMar 9, 2026
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No. 25In the
Supreme Court of the United States
NICHOLAS HONCHARIW, TRUSTEE,
HONCHARIW FAMILY TRUST,
Petitioner,
v.
COUNTY OF STANISLAUS,
Respondent.
On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the
United States Court of A ppeals for the Ninth Circuit
PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
Nicholas Honchariw
Attorney at Law
1033 South Carson Street
Carson City, NV 89701
(415) 225-3048
nh@nhpart.com
Counsel for Petitioner
120987
A
(800) 274-3321 • (800) 359-6859
i
QUESTIONS PRESENTED
Whether an approved vesting tentative map which
conferred a statutory vested right to finalize a subdivision
upon substantial compliance with the conditions of
approval is property protected by the Takings Clause?
Whether a claim of taking of rights under an approved
vesting tentative map is tested with regard to the vesting
tentative map in and of itself or with regard to the overall
property encompassing the subdivision?
ii
LIST OF ALL PARTIES
The party to the judgment from which review is
sought is Petitioner Nicholas Honchariw, Trustee of
the Honchariw Family Trust U/A/D March 8, 1991, as
amended. He was a party in all proceedings below.
Respondent is the County of Stanislaus.
iii
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
QUESTIONS PRESENTED . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . i
LIST OF ALL PARTIES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ii
TABLE OF CONTENTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iii
TABLE OF APPENDICES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . v
TABLE OF CITED AUTHORITIES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vi
PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI . . . . . . . 1
OPINIONS BELOW . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
JURISDICTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
CONST I T U T IONA L A N D STAT U T ORY
PROVISIONS AT ISSUE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
STATEMENT OF THE CASE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
A. Factual Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
B. State Court Procedure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
C. Federal Court Procedure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION . . . . 11
iv
Table of Contents
Page
I.
Honchariw’s taking claim is based on
the County’s taking of his statutory
vest ed proper ty r ights under V TM
2006-06 and his associated rights under
the Anti-NIMBY Law . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
II. Honc h a r i w h a d a ve st e d pr op e r t y
right in VTM 2006-06 protected by the
Takings Clause in and of itself . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
v
TABLE OF APPENDICES
Page
A P PEN DI X A — M EMOR A N DU M OF
T H E U N I T ED S TAT E S C OU RT OF
APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT,
FILED DECEMBER 9, 2025 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1a
A PPEN DI X B — OR DER OF T H E
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR T H E E A S T ER N DI S T RIC T OF
CALIFORNIA, DATED AUGUST 21, 2024
AND FILED AUGUST 22, 2024 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7a
vi
TABLE OF CITED AUTHORITIES
Page
CASES
Andrus v. Allard,
444 U.S. 51 (1979) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20, 21
Beck Development Co., Inc. v.
Southern Pacific Transportation Company,
44 C.A.4th 1160 (1996) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Bowers v. Whitman,
671 F.3d 906 (9th Cir. 2012) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22-25
City of Oakland v. Oakland Raiders,
32 C.3d 60 (1982) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
Honchariw, Ttee v. County of Stanislaus,
200 C.A.4th 1066 (2011) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2, 6, 13, 14, 17
Honchariw, Ttee v. County of Stanislaus,
51 C.A.5th 243 (2020) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3, 10, 15-17
Horne v. Department of Agric.,
576 U.S. 351 (2015) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass’n v.
DeBenedictis,
480 U.S. 470 (1987) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20, 21, 24
Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City,
438 U.S. 104 (1978) . . . . . . . . . . 4, 11, 12, 20, 21, 24-26
vii
Cited Authorities
Page
Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co.,
467 U.S. 986 (1984) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4, 5, 18-20, 25
Zeyen v. Bonneville Joint District,
114 F.4th 1129 (9th Cir. 2024) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
U.S. Const. amend. V . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
STATUTES
28 U.S.C. § 1254(1) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
28 U.S.C. § 1331 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
42 U.S.C. § 1983 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Cal. Gov’t C. § 66473 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Cal. Gov’t C. § 66474.1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Cal. Gov’t C. § 66498(a) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18, 24
Cal. Gov’t C. § 65589.5 . . . . . . . . . . . . 2, 5, 6, 13, 17, 24, 26
1
PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
Nicholas Honchariw, Trustee of the Honchariw Family
Trust U/A/D March 8, 1991, as amended, respectfully
requests that this Court issue a writ of certiorari to review
the judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit.
OPINIONS BELOW
The Memorandum Opinion of the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals is unpublished. It is attached hereto
as Appendix (App.) A. The Order Granting Defendant’s
Motion for Summary Judgment of the district court is
reported at Honchariw, Ttee v. County of Stanislaus,
No. 1:21-cv-00801-SKO (E.D.Cal. August 22 2024). It is
attached hereto as App. B.
JURISDICTION
The lower court had jurisdiction over this case
under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and the Fifth
Amendment to the United States Constitution. The Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit entered final judgment on
December 9 2025. App. A at 1. This Court has jurisdiction
under 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1).
CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY
PROVISIONS AT ISSUE
The Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution
provides, “nor shall private property be taken for public
use, without just compensation.” U.S. Const. amend. V.
2
INTRODUCTION
After denial in 2009, in 2012 the County approved
Honchariw’s vesting tentative map 2006-06 (“VTM 200606”) for subdivision of a portion of his 33 acres of rural
land into 3 5-acre lots, 4 1-acre lots, one ½-acre already
improved lot, and a 13-acre remainder pursuant to review
under mandate ordered by the California Fifth District
Court of Appeals under the California Anti-NIMBY Law.
Honchariw, Ttee v. County of Stanislaus, 200 C.A.4th
1066, 1075 (2011) (“Honchariw, Ttee 2011”). Approval of a
vesting tentative map conferred a statutory vested right
to finalize the subdivision by substantial compliance with
the conditions of approval.
In 2016 Honchariw submitted his proposed final map
for VTM 2006-06 with plans and specs for improvements
required by the conditions of approval to the County to
finalize the subdivision in substantial compliance with
the conditions of approval. But the County demanded
that he add a municipal-sized fire suppression system to
the water line extension that he was required to design
and construct for the local Knights Ferry Community
Services District (“KFCSD”) water system to serve the
proposed 4 1-acre lots, which were within the district,
with municipal-sized 1000 gallon-per-minute (“gpm”) fire
flows. No such requirement was included in his conditions
of approval. The conditions of approval provided that
fire suppression was to be addressed by the KFCSD in
accordance with its usual rural fire standards. The County
had no authority to impose additional requirements. The
demand was infeasible and stopped the project in its tracks
after years of time, money and effort, spent at significant
investment risk. The project could not bear the cost of a
3
municipal-sized fire suppression system to serve 4 rural
1-acre lots and Honchariw had no ability to supply water
at 1000 gpm while the KFCSD system only supplied 50
gpm for the line extension.
Honchariw sought another writ of mandate to compel
withdrawal of the demand. In Honchariw, Ttee v. County
of Stanislaus, 51 C.A.5th 243 (2020) (“Honchariw, Ttee
2020”), the Fifth District held that the County violated
Honchariw’s statutory vested rights to finalize his
subdivision.
The Fifth District affirmed that the County had a
statutory ministerial duty to approve his proposed plans
and specs for the water line extension if they were in
substantial compliance with the requirements of VTM
2006-06. The Fifth District recognized that the County
had provided for Honchariw to rely upon KFCSD for
both domestic and fire suppression water and held that
the County had “unambiguously” delegated exclusive
authority for design of the extension, including fire
suppression, to KFCSD. If, as determined, the plans
and specs complied with KFCSD rules, they had to be
approved. While public safety is of course a legitimate
public purpose, having exercised its discretionary
authority to provide for fire suppression at approval of
VTM 2006-06 in the conditions of approval by delegation
to KFCSD, the County had no basis to demand more
years later.
Honchariw’s writ petition was granted, and the
County was forced to accept his proposed plans and
specs as approved by KFCSD for water improvements,
including for fire suppression, and his right to rely upon
4
KFCSD water, in 2021. Since the demands brought the
project to a halt for almost 5 years, Honchariw filed this
action for compensation for a temporary regulatory taking
of his rights under VTM 2006-06 and / or damages for a
deprivation of substantive due process. The County moved
for summary judgment, and the district court granted
the motion.
In granting the County’s motion for summary judgment
as to the taking claim, the district court did not recognize
Honchariw’s vested property interest in VTM 2006-06 as
a property right itself constitutionally protected under
the Takings Clause, instead treating it as just another
strand of the bundle of rights comprising ownership of real
property. As just another strand, a taking claim would only
be addressed with reference to the property as a whole
under well-established law. The district court applied the
Penn Central factors to the property as a whole as though
this was just another instance of a run-of-the-mill denial
of a subdivision application under the broad discretionary
authority accorded a local agency. This ineluctably doomed
his claim. The property as a whole did not suffer a loss
in value sufficient to state a taking claim under wellestablished law—Honchariw might otherwise develop his
property with another application, and he retained a usable
13-acre remainder. The County eviscerated his rights under
VTM 2006-06.
Application of the Penn Central factors with respect
to his rights in VTM 2006-06 rather than his property
as a whole would mandate a finding of a taking. While
all of the Penn Central factors would be satisfied, the
complete taking of VTM 2006-06 compelled a finding of a
taking under Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986
5
(1984), as an interference with Honchariw’s investmentbacked expectations. Ruckelshaus found that this factor
overwhelmed the other Penn Central factors and by itself
mandated a finding of a taking.
Petitioner argues that the district court and then
the Ninth Circuit erred in not recognizing that his right
to finalize VTM 2006-06 was a vested property right
protected by the Takings Clause in and of itself, not with
regard to his property as a whole.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. Factual Background
In 2009 the County denied Honchariw’s application
for approval of VTM 2006-06 in the face of strong
NIMBY opposition to its four 1-acre lots. In doing so, it
overrode the findings of its Planning Department that the
project complied with all local zoning and general plan
requirements, met all local requirements for subdivision,
and its recommendation for approval. The Board of
Supervisors applied its broad discretionary powers under
the local version of the California Subdivision Map Act to
“find” that the project site was “unsuitable”. It rejected
Honchariw’s demand to apply the California “Anti-NIMBY
Law”, Cal. Gov. C. § 65589.5 et al, requiring approval of
a residential subdivision which complied with all zoning
and general plan requirements unless an agency made
“written findings supported by substantial evidence on the
record” that the project would have a “specific, adverse
impact upon the public health or safety” and that “there is
no feasible method to satisfactorily mitigate or avoid the
adverse impact . . . other than disapproval. . . .”
6
Honchariw filed a petition for writ to overturn the
disapproval, but the Stanislaus County Superior Court
rejected the petition on the basis of the County’s new
assertion—repudiating the finding of the Planning
Department—that the project did not comply with general
plan and zoning requirements because the proposed
lots were not connected to the KFCSD water system.
In Honchariw, Ttee 2011, the Fifth District Court of
Appeals held in a unanimous published opinion that the
disapproval was an unlawful abuse of discretion. The
Fifth District found the language of the statute “clear
and unambiguous”. 200 C.A.4th at 1073. Pointedly it
found that the County’s critical representation to the
trial court that Honchariw failed to comply with local
water connection requirements was wholly specious—the
court saw “nothing in this record which would support a
conclusion that” Honchariw’s project did not comply with
the requirement of County Code section 20.52.210 that
“lots of a subdivision shall be connected to a public water
system . . . ”, recognizing that “[l]ots of a subdivision
cannot be connected to a public water system until those
‘lots of a subdivision’ exist.” Id. at 1080. No lots existed
until lots were approved and additional steps completed.
The court recognized that “[Honchariw] has consistently
asserted that if the project were approved . . . [he] would
connect the lots as required by the County ordinance”.
Id. at 1080-81.
Pursuant to the Fifth District’s order, the trial court
issued its writ, and, upon reconsideration, the Board of
Supervisors was unable to find any basis to disapprove the
project under the Anti-NIMBY Law and finally approved
it in May 2012. In ordinary course, the approval of VTM
2006-06 carried conditions of approval. The relevant ones
7
in this action addressed extension and functionality of the
KFCSD water system. Because the four 1-acre lots were
within the KFCSD district, Honchariw had to connect
those lots to the system under County Code § 20.52.210
and seek water service from KFCSD. (The three 5-acre
lots were outside the district and would rely upon wells.)
Since water connection requirements were a central
issue in Honchariw’s successful litigation, the Planning
Department’s 2012 Action Agenda Summary for VTM
2006-06 prepared by the Planning Department for the
Board identified water service as a “core issue” in its
analysis of the application and its preparation of proposed
conditions of approval for the Board.
The inadequacies of the KFCSD system were wellknown. It was and remains a small antiquated rural system
serving the unincorporated community of Knights Ferry
(population 92) with 65 users. Its distribution facilities
were severely limited, with only 150 gpm pumps at the
storage tank, well under standard fire flows of 1000 gpm
for municipal water districts, with flows diminishing to
50 gpm over small main lines to the foot of the Honchariw
property. At its terminus at the foot of the property, the
water main was only 2”, not the 8” demanded for extension
by the County. To connect the four 1-acre lots would
require the design and construction of an uphill extension
of the water main over 1000’ with booster pumps.
In anticipation of the Board’s re-hearing of his
application pursuant to the Fifth District decision, County
planning staff met with KFCSD. KFCSD confirmed that
it had water capacity and that service would be available
upon extension of the water line to the four new 1-acre lots.
The Planning Department accordingly drafted conditions
8
of approval providing for fire as well as domestic water
service for the four 1-acre lots within the district to be
obtained from KFCSD under applicable KFCSD rules,
regulations, standards and ordinances and delegated
responsibility for the water line extension to KFCSD.
Customized fire flow requirements would be designed
case-by-case as new houses were built upon the lots
based upon a number of variables, eg, their size, type
of construction, type of in-structure sprinklers, water
storage (eg, pools or tanks), etc. As expressly referenced
in the Action Agenda Summary, this approach to fire
flows in rural and suburban areas in which adequate and
reliable water systems did not exist was authorized by the
California Fire Code (24 Cal. Code Regs., Title 24, Part
9), which had been adopted by the County (County Code
§ 16.55.010) without relevant change (see § 16.55.040).
In 2015, Honchariw submitted a request to KFCSD
for water service for the 4 1-acre lots, secured a “will
serve letter”, and reached agreement with KFCSD for
the water line extension, including primary and back-up
booster pumps to supply water uphill to the four 1-acre
lots together with a 2000 gallon stainless steel pressurized
storage tank. With its incoming flows of only 50 gpm
to the foot of the property, KFCSD requested that the
booster pumps be limited to 60 gpm and buffered with a
pressurized storage tank in order to avoid draining the
system.
Honchariw had plans prepared accordingly, with a 60
gpm booster pump, a 60-gpm back-up pump, a 2000-gallon
pressurized storage tank, and risers for the future
attachment of hydrants, and submitted them to the County
9
Department of Public Works upon submitting his proposed
final map to the County in April 2016. The proposed final
map and plans and specs were in substantial compliance
with the conditions of approval of VTM 2006-06.
But the County rejected his plans. It demanded
that he design and construct a full municipal-sized fire
suppression system with fire flows “based on functional
fire hydrants” of 1000 gpm for 2 hours, refusing to
recognize that it had accepted the alternative fire flow
and water supply measures provided in the Fire Code
and in the County Fire Directive for substandard systems
such as the KFCSD system at approval of VTM 2006-06.
This required a pumping station larger than the KFCSD
pumping station, with primary and back-up 1000 gpm
pumps, with massive back-up on-site power generators
with fuel storage in case of power outage, and water flows
at 1000 gpm. Since KFCSD could not supply 1000 gpm,
the County declared that Honchariw would have to supply
them himself and would need to construct storage tanks
for two hours of fire flows of 1000 gpm, or 120,000 gallons.
The demands were out of the blue. Nowhere in the
conditions of approval was there any requirement of a
municipal-sized fire suppression system; municipal fire
flows were never even mentioned in the Action Agenda
Summary or at the hearing by anyone; KFCSD testified
that it operated at 50 gpm and wanted to stay at that level.
The County’s demands rendered VTM 2006-06
infeasible. Honchariw’s best quote for the improvements
demanded by the County was for over $500,000 over
and above the costs of the water line extension of over
$300,000. Yet the County’s own appraiser here estimated
10
the value of the four 1-acre lots at not more than $100,000
each, or $400,000 in total.
After over a decade, and significant costs of time,
money and effort, the project was stone-cold dead. VTM
2006-06 was rendered worthless.
B. State Court Procedure
Accordingly Honchariw filed a petition for writ of
mandate in August 2017 to compel withdrawal of the
County’s demand for a municipal-sized fire suppression
system. It was denied by the superior court on the basis
that the County was within its discretion to interpret
the conditions of approval to require the municipal-sized
fire suppression system since it was a “matter of life and
death”.
Honchariw appealed. In June 2020, the Fifth District
reversed and ordered the trial court to issue its writ
to enjoin the County’s demands in accordance with its
opinion. Honchariw, Ttee 2020.
Upon remand, the superior court vacated its judgment
in July 2020 and issued a writ of mandate. Upon issuance
of the writ, the County in 2021 finally approved a final map
and the proposed plans and specs prepared in accordance
with KFCSD’s requirements and abandoned its demand
for a municipal-sized fire suppression system.
Since Honchariw had to bear significant costs from
the delay and the trust was deprived of sales proceeds
and absorbed extra costs for the entire period of the
demands, Honchariw filed a supplemental and amended
11
complaint for damages. Under California procedural
requirements, Honchariw had to secure the writ before
seeking compensation for a taking or damages for a
deprivation of due process.
C. Federal Court Procedure
The County removed the action to the United States
District Court, Eastern District, on May 17 2021. The
County filed a Motion to Dismiss December 3 2021. The
motion was granted November 7 2022 with leave to amend.
Honchariw filed a First Amended Complaint November
28 2022. The County again filed a Motion to Dismiss on
December 22 2022. The motion was granted April 13 2023
with leave to amend. Honchariw filed a Second Amended
Complaint May 3 2023. The County again filed a Motion
to Dismiss on May 16 2023. The court denied the Motion
on July 18 2023.
On May 28 2024, the County filed its Motion for
Summary Judgment. The Motion was granted and
judgment entered August 22 2024.
A notice of appeal to the Ninth Circuit was timely filed
by Honchariw on September 20 2024. The Ninth Circuit
issued its Memorandum Opinion on December 9 2025
affirming the district court judgment.
REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION
Both the district court and the Ninth Circuit
smothered Honchariw’s claim of a taking of his rights
under VTM 2006-06 under the blanket rule stated in Penn
Central. The district court quoted Penn Central:
12
“‘Taking’ jurisprudence does not divide a single
parcel into discrete segments and attempt
to determine whether rights in a particular
segment have been entirely abrogated. In
deciding whether a particular governmental
action has effected a taking, this Court focuses
rather on the character of the action and the
nature and extent of the interference with
rights in the parcel as a whole. . . .” 438 U.S. at
130-31 (emphasis added). “
App. B at 20a. The district court rotely treated his claim
as simply a claim for interference with just one of the many
strands of ownership comprising the bundle of rights of
ownership of his property. It noted:
“[p]laintiff does not cite, and the Court
has not found, any legal authority finding a
statutory entitlement to real estate development
constitutes a property interest cognizable apart
from the underlying land for takings purposes.”
App. B at 22a-23a. The Ninth Circuit affirmed, echoing
the district court’s reasoning. Honchariw was in no
different position than if he were challenging an initial
disapproval of an initial subdivision application. While
the blanket Penn Central rule remains fundamental in
takings jurisprudence, it should be recognized by the
Court explicitly that any strand which is itself a vested
property right is protected by the Takings Clause in and
of itself and any claim of taking is tested with regard to
the right itself, not with regard to the underlying parcel
as a whole. Absent such explicit recognition, such vested
rights can be simply extinguished without compensation.
13
I.
Honchariw’s taking claim is based on the County’s
taking of his statutory vested property rights under
VTM 2006-06 and his associated rights under the
Anti-NIMBY Law.
After the County’s disapproval of VTM 2006-06
in 2009, Honchariw established his statutory rights to
develop his property as a residential subdivision under
the California Housing Accountability Act (known as the
“Anti-NIMBY Law”) in Honchariw, Ttee 2011. The court
explained:
“Government Code Section 65589.5 is known
as the Housing Accountability Act (see sec
65589.5, subd. (o)), and has been referred to
colloquially as the ‘Anti-NIMBY law’. The
purpose of the statute is to limit the ability
of local governments ‘to reject or make
infeasible housing developments . . . without a
thorough analysis of the economic, social and
environmental effects of the action. . . .’ (Sec
65589.5, subd. (b)). Subdivision (j) of the statute
provides that ‘[w]hen a proposed housing
development complies with applicable, objective
general plan and zoning standards, including
design review standards, in effect at the time
that the housing development’s application
is determined to be complete,’ a local agency
which ‘proposes to disapprove the project . . .
shall base its decision regarding the proposed
housing development upon written findings
supported by substantial evidence on the record
that . . . (1) [t]he housing development would have
a specific, adverse impact upon the public health
14
or safety unless the project is disapproved’ and
‘(2) [t]here is no feasible method to satisfactorily
mitigate or avoid the adverse impact . . . other
than disapproval of the housing development
project. . . .” (Italics added)
200 C.A.4th at 1068-69. The Fifth District ordered
issuance of a writ ordering reconsideration of the
application. Unable to cite any specific, adverse impact
upon public health or safety, the Board was compelled to
approve VTM 2006-06 and did so upon re-hearing in 2012.
Upon approval, Honchariw had statutory vested rights
to finalize VTM 2006-06 with approval and recordation of
a final map on the basis of substantial compliance with its
terms and conditions. Cal. Gov. C. § 66474.1. Approval was
a ministerial act. The County could not impose further
demands. In Beck Development Co., Inc. v. Southern
Pacific Transportation Company, 44 C.A.4th 1160, 1199
(1996), the court explained:
“The approval of a tentative map gives the
subdivider certain rights with respect to
approval of a final map. Thus, a final map
may not be disapproved if it is in substantial
compliance with a previously approved tentative
map. (Gov. Code Sec. 66474.1). A nd only
those requirements and conditions that were
applicable to the subdivision at the time of
approval of the tentative map may be considered
with respect to the final map. (Gov. Code Sec.
66473) In other words, the time for a local
agency to take action with respect to a proposed
subdivision is when the tentative map is under
15
consideration and, provided the final map is in
substantial compliance with the tentative map
and any conditions attached on its approval, the
approval of the final map becomes a ministerial
act. (See Youngblood v. Board of Supervisors
(1978) 22 Cal.3d 644, 656.)”
Upon issuance of a “will serve” letter from KFCSD,
the conditions of approval required Honchariw to
construct a water line extension to the four 1-acre lots as
prescribed by KFCSD in accordance with its applicable
rules and regulations. Domestic and fire suppression
water would be provided by KFCSD. The County has
never questioned that Honchariw was not required to
include a municipal-sized fire suppression system in his
water line extension under any local ordinance, standard,
or policy applicable upon approval in 2012. The County
could demand a municipal-sized fire suppression system
only if authorized by the conditions of approval.
“[A] final map shall be disapproved only for
failure to meet or perform requirements
or conditions which were applicable to the
subdivision at the time of approval of the
tentative map.”
Cal. Gov. C. § 66473. Honchariw, Ttee 2020 explained:
“The vesting tentative map statute was enacted
to ‘establish a procedure for the approval of
tentative maps that will provide statutorily
vested rights to a subdivider’ (Sec. 66498,
subd. (a)) and to ‘insure that local requirements
governing the development of a proposed
16
subdivision are established in accordance
with Section 66498.1 when a local agency
approves or conditionally approves a vesting
tentative map.’ (Sec. 66498.9, subd. (b).) The
Legislature declared that ‘[t]he private sector
should be able to rely upon an approved vesting
tentative map prior to expending resources and
incurring liabilities without the risk of having
the project frustrated by subsequent action by
the approving local agency. . . .’ (Sec. 66498.9,
subd. (b).)
51 C.A. 5th at 254. The Fifth District recognized:
“An approach that fails to protect the objectively
reasonable expectations of the applicant would
undermine the purpose of the vesting tentative
map statute. (See Sec. 66498.9, subd. (b).)”
Id. It held that the County’s demands for a municipalsized fire suppression system were beyond Honchariw’s
objectively reasonable expectations under the conditions
of approval and thus violated Honchariw’s vested rights.
The court expressly determined that the County had no
authority in any case to impose its own demands. Noting
that the conditions of approval required Honchariw to
“cause all public improvements required by KFCSD to be
completed and accepted for public use”, the court found
that “[t]his clause is unambiguously limited to public
improvements required by KFCSD. As a result, the clause
does not support the imposition of requirements by other
entities”. 51 C.A.5th in unpublished Part III. The County
was barred from superimposing its own demands. The
court summarized:
17
“In summary, an objective interpretation of the
language in the conditions of approval leads
to the conclusion that the County delegated
to KFCSD the determinations about the fire
suppression water service that would need to
be in place prior to the approval of the final
subdivision map. The fact County personnel
regret this choice and now offer rational
arguments for imposing requirements beyond
those required by KFCSD prior to approving
the final map is not a justification for altering
the conditions of approval as drafted.”
Id. The court remanded for determination whether
Honchariw’s plans were approved by KFCSD and ordered
the County, as a ministerial duty, to approve such plans.
Upon remand, Honchariw established that his plans were
approved by KFCSD, and the County finally withdrew its
demands. The County had violated its ministerial duty to
approve Honchariw’s plans in 2016.
In doing so, it also violated his rights under the AntiNIMBY Law. As recognized in Honchariw, Ttee 2011,
the Anti-NIMBY Law barred a local agency not only
from rejecting but also from “making infeasible” housing
developments absent substantial evidence of a specific,
adverse impact upon public health or safety that could not
be satisfactorily mitigated. The Action Agenda Summary
itself had recognized that the determination of fire flow
and fire suppression requirements could—and would—be
made under Chapter 5 of the Fire Code at permitting and
construction of new structures. Because a municipal-sized
fire suppression system would make the project infeasible,
and there were officially-accepted ways to mitigate fire
18
dangers, the County could not have imposed a requirement
for municipal-size fire suppression infrastructure in 2012,
and it could not do so in 2017. Indeed, the three 5-acre lots
immediately adjacent to the four 1-acre lots were approved
for residential development under VTM 2006-06 without
any public water system at all, just on the basis of these
same officially-accepted ways to mitigate fire dangers.
II. Honchariw had a vested property right in VTM
2006-06 protected by the Takings Clause in and of
itself.
Under Cal. Gov. C. § 66498.1(b) (formerly § 66498(a)),
Honchariw enjoyed vested property rights in VTM 2006-06:
“When a local agency approves or conditionally
approves a vesting tentative map, that approval
shall confer a vested right to proceed with
development. . . .”
As vested property rights expressly conferred by statute,
Honchariw’s rights to finalize his subdivision were
entitled to the protection of the Takings Clause of the
U.S. Constitution and the Takings clause of the California
Constitution.
The Supreme Court addressed the question what
rights constitute a property interest protected by the
Takings Clause in Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467
U.S. 986 (1984). Monsanto had collected health, safety,
and environmental data protected as trade secrets by
Missouri law and submitted it to the EPA. The threshold
question identified by the Court was whether Monsanto
had a property interest protected by the Takings Clause
19
against public use by the EPA. In answering the question,
the Court was:
“mindful of the basic axiom that ““[p]roperty
interests . . . are not created by the Constitution.
Rather, they are created and their dimensions
are defined by existing rules or understandings
that stem from an independent source such as
state law.”” Webb’s Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc.
v. Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155, 161 (1980), quoting
Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577
(1972).”
Id. at 1001. The Court recognized:
“That intangible property rights protected by
state law are deserving of the protection of the
Takings Clause has long been implicit in the
thinking of the Court.”
Id. at 1003. The Court concluded:
“We therefore hold that, to the extent that
Monsanto has an interest in its health, safety,
and environmental data cognizable as a trade
secret under Missouri law, that property right
is protected by the Takings Clause of the Fifth
Amendment.”
Id. at 1003-1004.
Since Honchariw’s rights under VTM 2006-06 were
expressly created and recognized by California law, they
similarly were property protected by the Takings Clause.
20
This is true whether the rights are categorized as real
or personal property rights, including intangible rights.
In Horne v. Department of Agric., 576 U.S. 351 (2015),
the Supreme Court traced the history leading to the
adoption of the Takings Clause to demonstrate that the
term “private property” includes both real and personal
property, which may be tangible (see Andrus v. Allard,
444 U.S. 51, 65 (1979), cited by the Court) or intangible
personal property (see Ruckelshaus, 467 U.S. at 1000,
also cited).
The California Supreme Court in City of Oakland
v. Oakland Raiders, 32 C.3d 60 (1982) canvassed the
application of the California takings clause to intangible
personal property. In doing so, it confirmed that the
California takings clause also extended to real and
personal property, including intangible property. Noting
that “numerous . . . decisions both federal and state have
expressly acknowledged that intangible assets are subject
to condemnation”, the court declared that “neither the
federal nor the State Constitution distinguishes between
property which is real or personal, tangible or intangible”.
Id. at 68.
Nevertheless the district court ruled that case law
precludes a finding that a “statutory entitlement to
real estate development constitutes a property interest
cognizable apart from the underlying land for takings
purposes”, citing Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass’n v.
DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470 (1987), itself citing Penn
Central and Andrus. App. B at 22a-23a. It then applied the
Penn Central tests to Honchariw’s property as a whole.
The court of appeal affirmed this ruling.
21
But their citations are off the mark. Honchariw does
not challenge the holdings. They are simply inapposite.
While each did reject an attempt to categorize a claim
except with regard to the underlying parcel of real
property as a whole, each claim was founded upon a single
strand of the bundle of rights comprising ownership
which—in and of itself—did not rise to the level of a vested
property interest protected by state law. In Penn Central
itself, the right at issue was the right to develop air space.
Penn Central enjoyed no statutory vested rights to develop
the air space above its terminal. The right to develop air
space was simply one of many strands in its bundle of
rights. In Andrus, similarly, the property owners had no
cognizable vested interest protected by state law, simply
a single strand of a bundle of rights. While state law
recognized a “support estate” in Keystone, the support
rights were similarly just one strand in the traditional
bundle of rights. Nowhere did plaintiff claim a statutory
vested right.
If Honchariw were claiming a taking based on
disapproval of a subdivision application under the
discretionary authority usually conferred upon local
agency, his claim would be but for taking of a single
strand in his bundle of rights which was not itself a vested
property right. A Penn Central analysis with respect to his
property as a whole—as performed by the district court
here—would be appropriate. But Honchariw’s taking
claim should be reviewed on the basis of his vested rights
under VTM 2006-06, not on the basis of the property as a
whole. The County’s demand effected a complete taking
of his vested rights.
22
That individual strands of ownership may be vested
property interests which are themselves protected by
the Takings Clause has been recognized. The Ninth
Circuit recognized that a land use right can itself become
protected under the Takings Clause by vesting in Bowers
v. Whitman, 671 F.3d 905 (9th Cir. 2012). Oregon voters
had adopted “Measure 37” in 2004 to provide that
government compensate land owners for the reduction
in market value resulting from any land use regulations
restricting use regardless whether the regulations
effected a taking. The government could avoid payment
by granting a waiver from the regulations. By 2007, the
legislature extinguished Measure 37. Land owners who
had applied for but not received compensation under
Measure 37 sought, inter alia, just compensation for a
taking. The Ninth Circuit set forth its framework for
analysis:
“‘We use a two-step analysis to determine
whether a [constitutional] ‘taking’ has occurred:
first, we determine whether the subject matter
is ‘property within the meaning of the Fifth
Amendment and, second, we establish whether
there has been a taking of that property for
which compensation is due’. [Citations omitted]
‘Property interests . . . are not created by the
Constitution. Rather they are created and their
dimensions are defined by existing rules or
understandings that stem from an independent
source such as state law rules that secure certain
benefits and that support claims of entitlement
to those benefits’. [Citations omitted]
23
In some cases, the Supreme Cour t has
r e cog n i z e d pr op er t y r ight s t hat wer e
constitutionally protected, such that they
were safeguarded by due process, but still not
vested, and thus the government could take
away these interests so long as it provided
proper procedures. [Citations omitted] But in
other cases, constitutionally protected property
rights were held to have been vested and thus
became cognizable under the Takings Clause,
such that the government could not remove the
right without providing just compensation. See
United States v. Sioux Nation, 448 U.S. 371,
414-15, 424 (1980) (holding that the government
could not enact legislation to take back land it
had expressly given to the Sioux Nation without
committing a constitutional taking); Webb’s
Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith, 449
U.S. 155, 164-65 (1980) (holding that the state’s
confiscation of the interest on interpleader
funds was a constitutional taking); Lynch v.
United States, 292 U.S. 571, 576 (1934) (holding
that the government could not avoid payment
of its commitment to pay disability and life
insurance by enacting a statute repealing the
laws granting the benefit without committing
a constitutional taking). . . .”
Id. at 912-13. Accord Zeyen v. Bonneville Joint District,
114 F.4th 1129 (9th Cir. 2024).
While holding that the property interests under
Measure 37 were not constitutionally protected by the
24
Takings Clause, the Ninth Circuit recognized that vested
rights could qualify:
“To the extent that the property interest
provided under Measure 37 was merely a
right to particular land uses, it is analogous
to a zoning permit. It is well established that
there is ‘no federal Constitutional right to
be free from changes in the land use laws’.
[Citations omitted] Therefore, an interest in
a particular land use does not constitute a
protected property interest, unless the interest
has vested in equity based on principles of
detrimental reliance.”
Id. at 915. “Vesting” distinguishes an approved vesting
tentative map which confers a vested right to finalize
a development from rights which are just unvested
strands in the bundle of ownership rights, such as “air
rights” in Penn Central, “support rights” in Keystone,
or rights to subdivide land generally. Approval of VTM
2006-06 in May 2012 conferred a vested right under Cal.
Gov. C. § 66498.1(b) (formerly § 66498(a)) to finalize his
subdivision, and Honchariw incurred significant costs of
time, money, and effort to finalize the subdivision. This
has been undisputed.
Honchariw was completely deprived of his statutory
vested right to finalize VTM 2006-06 under Cal. Gov. C.
§ 66498.1(b) (formerly § 66498(a)) (and, since the County
“made” the project “infeasible”, under the Anti-NIMBY
Law). The deprivation was complete and by its terms
permanent, not a temporary moratorium. If the County
had directly rescinded the approval for VTM 2006-06,
25
there could be no question that this would constitute a
complete taking of a vested protected property right
under the Bowers analysis. It would be irrelevant that the
underlying property retained meaningful value. It would
be irrelevant that Honchariw could file an application for
another subdivision. The only question would be the value
of his lost rights.
The Penn Central factors would provide an appropriate
framework of analysis if applied with regard to his vested
property right in VTM 2006-06 itself, not with regard to
the property as a whole. This would flip the conclusions of
the district court and the Ninth Circuit. Indeed, one factor
by itself—the County’s interference with his reasonable
investment-backed expectations evidenced by VTM 200606—compels a finding of a taking. This is the directive
of Ruckelshaus. With regard to certain trade secrets,
the Federal government had guaranteed to Monsanto an
extensive measure of confidentiality and exclusive use.
The Court elaborated:
“This explicit government guarantee formed
the basis of a reasonable investment-backed
expectation. If EPA . . . were now to disclose
trade secret data . . . EPA’s actions would
frustrate Monsanto’s reasonable investmentbacked expectations. . . .”
467 U.S. at 1005. Identifying the salient factors for its
analysis as “the character of the governmental action,
its economic impact, and its interference with reasonable
investment-backed expectations” per Penn Central, the
Court stated:
26
“It is to the last of these three factors that we
now direct our attention, for we find that the
force of this factor is so overwhelming . . . that
it disposes of the taking question. . . .”
Id. Here the application for, and approval of, VTM 200606—a subdivision designed for the sale of custom lots—
provides the basis for a reasonable investment-backed
expectation. Thus it similarly disposes of the taking
question. But the other factors support a determination
of a taking as well. While the lower courts here found
insufficient economic impact with regard to the value
of the Honchariw property as a whole, VTM 2006-06
itself lost all of its economic value. While the lower
courts found the character of the governmental action
with regard to Honchariw’s property as a whole to be a
misguided attempt to regulate land use for the legitimate
purpose of fire safety, even if misconceived, its character
with regard to VTM 2006-06 was a unilateral demand
“unambiguously” beyond its authority in blatant violation
of Honchariw’s vested rights under VTM 2006-06 and the
Anti-NIMBY Law prohibition against rendering a housing
development “infeasible”.
Because the County withdrew its demands pursuant
to the writ secured by Honchariw, ultimately the
confiscation was only temporary, but he completely lost
his right to finalize VTM 2006-06 and the ability to offer
and sell his lots for an extended period while bearing
carrying costs. The County’s demands brought to a dead
stop a project with vested statutory rights underway since
before Honchariw’s application in 2006. He is entitled to
compensation for damages arising from the delay.
27
CONCLUSION
The Court should grant the Petition for Writ of
Certiorari.
DATED: March 9, 2026
Respectfully submitted,
Nicholas Honchariw
Attorney at Law
1033 South Carson Street
Carson City, NV 89701
(415) 225-3048
nh@nhpart.com
Counsel for Petitioner
APPENDIX
i
TABLE OF APPENDICES
Page
A P PEN DI X A — M EMOR A N DU M OF
T H E U N I T ED S TAT E S C OU RT OF
APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT,
FILED DECEMBER 9, 2025 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1a
A PPEN DI X B — OR DER OF T H E
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR T H E E A S T ER N DI S T RIC T OF
CALIFORNIA, DATED AUGUST 21, 2024
AND FILED AUGUST 22, 2024 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7a
1a
A
APPENDIX A —Appendix
MEMORANDUM
OF THE
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE
NINTH CIRCUIT, FILED DECEMBER 9, 2025
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
NICHOLAS HONCHARIW, TRUSTEE,
HONCHARIW FAMILY TRUST,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
COUNTY OF STANISLAUS,
Defendant-Appellee.
No. 24-5788
D.C. No. 1:21-cv-00801-SKO
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of California
Sheila K. Oberto, Magistrate Judge, Presiding
Submitted December 3, 2025**
San Francisco, California
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not
precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes that this case is suitable
for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
2a
Appendix A
Before: RAWLINSON and SANCHEZ, Circuit Judges,
and ROSENTHAL,*** District Judge.
Nicholas Honchariw, trustee, appeals the district
court’s summary judgment for the County of Stanislaus
over a land use dispute. Honchariw had tried to finalize a
property subdivision that the County alleged did not comply
with plans it had previously approved. We have jurisdiction
under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we review the district court’s
summary judgment ruling de novo. See Johnson v. Barr,
79 F.4th 996, 998-99 (9th Cir. 2023). We affirm.
1. Honchariw argues that the County’s interpretation
of the conditions of approval on his vesting tentative
subdivision map, and the resulting delays in finalizing the
subdivision of his property, amounted to an uncompensated
taking. “Where the government ‘physically acquires
private property for a public use,’ a ‘per se’ taking has
occurred.” Pharm. Rsch. & Mfrs. of Am. v. Stolfi, 153 F.4th
795, 833 (9th Cir. 2025) (quoting Cedar Point Nursery v.
Hassid, 594 U.S. 139, 147-48, 141 S. Ct. 2063, 210 L. Ed. 2d
369 (2021)). “But where the government ‘instead imposes
regulations that restrict an owner’s ability to use his own
property,’ courts ‘appl[y] the flexible test developed in’”
Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New York,
438 U.S. 104, 98 S. Ct. 2646, 57 L. Ed. 2d 631 (1978). Id.
Honchariw asserts that the relevant property interest
was his “statutory vested rights” in his tentative map and
that the County’s actions that delayed the finalization of
*** The Honorable Lee H. Rosenthal, United States District
Judge for the Southern District of Texas, sitting by designation.
3a
Appendix A
his subdivision plans interfered with those rights and
resulted in a per se taking. However, a court may not
extract one “strand” out of a “bundle” of property rights
and analyze it separately. Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S.
51, 66, 100 S. Ct. 318, 62 L. Ed. 2d 210 (1979); see also
Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass’n v. DeBenedictis, 480
U.S. 470, 500, 107 S. Ct. 1232, 94 L. Ed. 2d 472 (1987)
(the Supreme Court’s takings jurisprudence “forecloses
reliance on . . . legalistic distinctions within a bundle
of property rights”). The relevant property interest is
Honchariw’s parcel as a whole and it must be analyzed
under Penn Central. See Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council,
Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 331,
122 S. Ct. 1465, 152 L. Ed. 2d 517 (2002).
Under Penn Central, three factors determine whether
government action constitutes a regulatory taking: (1)
“[t]he economic impact of the regulation on the claimant,”
(2) “the extent to which the regulation has interfered with
distinct investment-backed expectations,” and (3) “the
character of the governmental action.” Penn Cent. Transp.
Co., 438 U.S. at 124. As to the first factor, the record shows
that the value of Honchariw’s property after the alleged
taking was comparable to its original value. That is not
sufficient for a taking. See Colony Cove Props., LLC v. City
of Carson, 888 F.3d 445, 451 (9th Cir. 2018) (explaining
that courts are loath to find a taking where diminution
of value is less than 50 percent and have found no taking
even where diminution is between 75 and 92.5 percent).
4a
Appendix A
The second factor similarly does not weigh in
Honchariw’s favor because there was insufficient
interference with his investment-backed expectations.
The kind of delays he encountered are “a normal part of
the development process.” Landgate, Inc. v. California
Coastal Comm’n, 17 Cal. 4th 1006, 1030, 73 Cal. Rptr.
2d 841, 953 P.2d 1188 (1998). Honchariw had only an
“expectation, but not an assurance” that he would be able
to subdivide the property when he acquired it. MacLeod
v. Santa Clara Cnty., 749 F.2d 541, 548 (9th Cir. 1984)
(rejecting the argument that a taking occurred when
the government denied an owner’s permit to “exploit
his property by pursuing a particular project” that he
believed “would be available for development”).
Third, the “character” of the County’s action also
weighs against finding a taking. Requiring fire safety
equipment generally does not “amount to a physical
invasion.” Bridge Aina Le’a, LLC v. Land Use Comm’n,
950 F.3d 610, 635-36 (9th Cir. 2020) (cleaned up); see
Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458
U.S. 419, 440, 102 S. Ct. 3164, 73 L. Ed. 2d 868 (1982)
(holding that regulations that require “smoke detectors,
fire extinguishers, and the like” are not physical takings).
The record also does not show that the County “single[d]
out” Honchariw “from similarly situated landowners.”
Bridge Aina Le’a, 950 F.3d at 636. And even if this factor
weighed in Honchariw’s favor, it is not a sufficient basis
on its own for finding a taking. Id.
5a
Appendix A
2. Honchariw also arg ues that the County’s
interpretations of the conditions of approval violated
substantive due process. “To state a substantive due
process claim, the plaintiff must show as a threshold
matter that a state actor deprived it of a constitutionally
protected life, liberty or property interest.” Shanks
v. Dressel, 540 F.3d 1082, 1087 (9th Cir. 2008). In the
permitting context, “only egregious official conduct can
be said to be arbitrary,” and the conduct “must amount
to an abuse of power lacking any reasonable justification
in the service of a legitimate governmental objective.” Id.
at 1088 (cleaned up).
The record shows no abuse of power sufficient for
a substantive due process claim. Although the parties
disagreed in state court as to the meaning of the conditions
of approval, the County’s interpretation was reasonable.
See Brittain v. Hansen, 451 F.3d 982, 996 (9th Cir.
2006) (“Substantive due process secures individuals
from arbitrary government action that rises to the
level of egregious conduct, not from reasonable, though
possibly erroneous, legal interpretation.” (cleaned up)).
Honchariw does not dispute that County had a legitimate
interest in fire safety, instead arguing that it acted with
“no authority” to impose additional conditions before
approving his final map. This argument is undercut by
his concession that the official in charge of reviewing the
tentative map for compliance with the conditions acted
in good faith.
6a
Appendix A
Although Honchariw endured delay and aggravation
in the development process, he did not meet his “heavy
burden” of demonstrating that the County’s actions
violated his substantive due process rights. Halverson
v. Skagit Cnty., 42 F.3d 1257, 1262 (9th Cir. 1994). The
district court did not err in granting summary judgment
to the County on this claim.
AFFIRMED.
7a
Appendix
B UNITED STATES
APPENDIX B — ORDER
OF THE
DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT
OF CALIFORNIA, DATED AUGUST 21, 2024 AND
FILED AUGUST 22, 2024
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
Case No. 1:21-cv-00801-SKO
(Doc. 61)
NICHOLAS HONCHARIW, TRUSTEE,
HONCHARIW FAMILY TRUST,
Plaintiff,
v.
COUNTY OF STANISLAUS,
Defendant.
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
I.
INTRODUCTION
Plaintiff Nicholas Honchariw (“Plaintiff”), in his
capacity as trustee for the Honchariw Family Trust,
brings this action against Defendant County of Stanislaus
(“the County”) alleging causes of action under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 for a temporary taking and denial of due process
under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the
8a
Appendix B
United States Constitution, and Article I, Sections 7 and
19 of the California Constitution. (Doc. 44.)1 On May 28,
2024, the County filed a motion for summary judgment.
(Doc. 61.) Pursuant to stipulation (Doc. 60), Plaintiff filed
his opposition on July 2, 2024 (Doc. 63)2 , and the County
replied on July 23, 2024 (Doc. 64). After reviewing the
parties’ papers, the matter was deemed suitable for
decision without oral argument pursuant to Local Rule
230(g), and the Court vacated the hearing set for August
7, 2024. (Doc. 65.)
For the reasons set forth below, the County’s motion
for summary judgment will be granted. 3
1. The operative pleading is Plaintiff’s Second Amended
Complaint (“SAC”). (Doc. 44.)
2. In the absence of prejudice, which the County has not
shown, the Court has considered Plaintiff’s opposition in its
entirety despite it exceeding the 25-page limit. (See Doc. 56 at 4.)
3. The parties consented to the jurisdiction of a U.S.
Magistrate Judge for all purposes. (See Doc. 28.)
9a
Appendix B
II. SUMMARY OF RELEVANT EVIDENCE4
A.
The Property
At all times relevant to this action, the property at
issue in the litigation (“Property”) comprised 33 acres in
unincorporated Stanislaus County, near the community
of Knights Ferry, California. (Doc. 61-1, JSUF ¶ 1.) The
Property was subject to different zoning designations
and included a 13-acre area with a historical zoning
designation to the east, and a 20-acre area with an
agricultural zoning designation to the west. (Id.) The
Property includes a three-bedroom house with a living
room, kitchen, one full bath, an attic, and a full basement.
(Id. ¶ 2.) In approximately 2008, Plaintiff renovated the
house, including installing new electrical and plumbing
systems, remodeling the kitchen and bathroom, and
renovating the septic system. (Id.)
4. The evidence adduced by the parties in conjunction
with this motion comprises: (i) the parties’ Joint Statement of
Undisputed Facts (“JSUF”) (Doc. 61-1); (ii) the County’s Separate
Statement of Undisputed Facts (“Def.’s SSUF”) (Doc. 61-2); (iii)
Declaration of Angela Freitas (“Freitas Decl.”) (Doc. 61-3); (iv)
Declaration of Frederic Clark (“Clark Decl.”) (Doc. 61-4); (v)
Declaration of Jeremy Ballard (“Ballard Decl.”) (Doc. 61-5);
(vi) Declaration of Matthew D. Zinn (“Zinn Decl.”) (Doc. 61-6);
(vii) Declaration of David Wraa (“Wraa Decl.”) (Doc. 61-7); (viii)
exhibits to the foregoing declarations (Doc. 61-8); (ix) Declaration
of Plaintiff Nicholas Honchariw (“Honchariw Decl.”) (Doc. 63-1);
and (x) Plaintiff’s Response to the County’s Separate Statement
of Undisputed Facts (“Plt.’s Resp. to Def.’s SSUF”) (Doc. 63-2).
The summary of relevant evidence is distilled from these sources.
10a
Appendix B
Plaintiff’s predecessor-in-interest, Reverend Iwan
Honchariw, acquired the Property in 1973. (Doc. 61-1,
JSUF ¶ 3.) Reverend Honchariw purchased the Property
as a long-term investment, which he intended to operate
and develop while using the small house as his residence.
(Id. ¶ 5.) The Property had been operated for years as
a family resort. (Id.) Reverend Honchariw had longerterm plans to subdivide the Property into multiple small
residential lots in the eastern area with historic zoning
and residential lots in the western area with agricultural
zoning. (Id.) In 1991, Reverend Honchariw transferred the
Property to the Honchariw Family Trust (“Trust”). (Id.
¶ 3.) Plaintiff became the successor trustee of the Trust
in 1992. (Id.)
B. Application to Subdivide the Property
In 2006, Plaintiff filed an application with the County
for a “Vesting Tentative Subdivision Map” (“VTSM”)
under the California Subdivision Map Act, Cal. Gov’t
Code § 64410 et seq.,5 proposing to subdivide the Property
5. The Subdiv ision Map Act (“Act”) requi res ever y
subdivision of land, with few exceptions, to be approved by
the local government. See Witt Home Ranch, Inc. v. Cty. of
Sonoma, 165 Cal. App. 4th 543, 551 (2008). The Act ensures local
governments have “the power to regulate the manner in which
their communities grow” and necessary improvements are made
before new development is built. Id. The Act provides a two-step
process for review of proposed subdivisions creating five or more
parcels. See Cal. Gov’t Code § 66426. The applicant first submits
either a tentative map or vesting tentative map depicting the
proposed subdivision. Id. §§ 66424.5, 66452. The local government
may approve the map, conditionally approve it, or disapprove it. Id.
11a
Appendix B
into eight lots and a remainder.6 (Doc. 61-1, JSUF ¶ 6.)
Specifically, the VTSM provided that the Property be
divided into three five-acre lots in the western portion
of the Property; four one-acre lots on the north side of
the Property; and one river-front half-acre lot including
the existing house at the corner of the property nearest
Knights Ferry, with balance of the Property consisting
of a large remainder. (Id. ¶ 10.)
The County’s Board of Supervisors (“Board”) denied
the VTSM in 2009. (Doc. 61-1, JSUF ¶ 7.) Plaintiff filed a
petition for writ of mandate and complaint in state court to
overturn the denial. (Id. ¶ 8.) The superior court denied the
petition, but the appellate court reversed and ordered reconsideration of the VTSM under the California Housing
Accountability Act. (Id.)
C.
Conditional Approval of the VTSM
In 2012, the Board approved the VTSM, subject to
conditions of approval (“Conditions of Approval”). (Doc.
§§ 66452.1, 66452.2. The applicant then prepares a detailed final
map for approval, including depiction of required infrastructure
and improvements to serve the new lots in the subdivision. Id.
§§ 66456, 66457; Witt Home Ranch, 165 Cal. App. 4th at 551.
The subdivider must ensure the final map is consistent with the
tentative map and complies with the conditions of approval of
the tentative map. Cal. Gov’t Code §§ 66458(a). The map is then
considered by the local legislative body, id. § 66457(a), here the
County Board of Supervisors, for final approval.
6. The Court has previously taken judicial notice of the
VTSM. (See Doc. 41 at 2 n.4.)
12a
Appendix B
61-1, JSUF ¶ 9.) The Conditions of Approval included
three conditions (numbers 24, 25, and 40) addressing
improvements related to water service for domestic and
fire suppression purposes for the four one-acre lots.7 (Id.
7. Conditions of Approval numbers 24, 25, and 40 read as
follows:
24. Prior to recording the “Final” Subdivision Map.
the applicant shall contact the Knights Ferry
Community Services District (KFCSD) and submit
a written application to obtain water service
(domestic & fire suppression) for all lots within
the Community Services District boundaries,
in accordance with all applicable KFCSD rules,
regulations, standards, and ordinances, and shall
cause all public improvements required by KFCSD
to be completed and accepted for public use.
25. Prior to recording the “Final” Subdivision
Map, water service provided by the Knights
Ferry Community Services District, shall be
established, constructed and operational for the
four (4) proposed 1-Acre Lots, identified as being
Lots No. 4-7 on the [VTSM], and the designated
“Remainder” parcel.
[. . .]
40. Fire hydrants shall be extended to serve any new
structures. on parcels within the Community
Services District boundaries, with no structure
residing further than 1000 feet from a hydrant
or as required by Knights Ferry Community
Services District ordinance, whichever provides
a higher level of fire protection.
(Doc. 61-3, Freitas Decl. ¶ 5; Doc. 61-8, Ex. 4.)
13a
Appendix B
¶ 11.) The three five-acre lots would be served by their own
wells, and the remainder had an existing water connection.
(Id. ¶ 12.) That water connection was to the Knights
Ferry Community Services District (“KFCSD”) water
system, a small antiquated rural system with substandard
distribution facilities. (Id. ¶ 13.)
In April 2016, Plaintiff submitted plans to the County
showing proposed infrastructure and improvements to
address the Conditions of Approval for the VSTM. (Doc.
61-1, JSUF ¶ 15.) The plans were based upon connection
to, and reliance upon water from, KFCSD. (Id.) At the
request of KFCSD, he provided stub-outs for hydrants
instead of hydrants themselves. Unless and until KFCSD’s
water system was upgraded, the water system could not
provide normal flows. (Id.)
The County responded in November 2016 in a letter
that cited several deficiencies in the plans, including
Plaintiff’s failure to “provide calculations to show that
pressure and flow conditions [for fire suppression] are
met.” (Doc. 61-1, JSUF ¶ 16.) Plaintiff then re-submitted
plans and met with County staff. (Id. ¶ 17.)
D.
Disagreement over the Conditions of Approval
for the VTSM
In early 2017, it became clear that Plaintiff and County
staff disagreed about the meaning of the Conditions of
Approval related to fire suppression infrastructure for the
four one-acre lots on the VTSM. (Doc. 61-1, JSUF ¶ 18.)
Plaintiff took the position that the Conditions of Approval
14a
Appendix B
required him to design infrastructure—including fire
hydrants—sufficient to handle fire suppression flows
should KFCSD upgrade its system to be able to supply
them. (Id. ¶ 19.) Further, he took the position that the
actual fire suppression requirements—and the source of
water to meet them—would be resolved by lot owners at
the building permit stage. (Id.)
The County took the position that Conditions of
Approval’s requirement for fire hydrants “to serve any
new structures” (see fn.5, supra) meant that Plaintiff
was required to design and construct (or bond for the
construction of) functioning fire hydrants, including a
water supply capable of providing fire suppression flows,
prior to final map approval in order to protect the future
residents of the subdivision from life safety hazards,
including wildfire. (Doc. 61-1, JSUF ¶ 20; Doc. 63-2, Plt.’s
Resp. to Def.’s SSUF ¶ 4.)
In August 2017, Plaintiff filed another petition for writ
of mandate and complaint in state court relating to the
disagreement over the conditions of approval related to
fire suppression for the four one-acre lots on the VTSM.
(Doc. 61-1, JSUF ¶ 21.) The superior court denied the
petition in early 2018. (Id. ¶ 22.) The court of appeals
reversed, and the superior court issued a writ of mandate
on April 15, 2021. 8 (Id. ¶¶ 23-24.) Two weeks later, the
County withdrew its fire suppression demands for the
VTSM. (Id.¶ 25.)
8. This Court has previously taken judicial notice of the facts
and proceedings in Honchariw v. Cty. of Stanislaus, 51 Cal. App.
5th 243 (2020). (See Doc. 29 at 2 n.3; Doc. 41 at 2 n.4.)
15a
Appendix B
E. The County Approves a Final Parcel Map for
the Property
To date, Plaintiff has not submitted a final version
of the VTSM for approval or made (or bond for) any
improvements required by the Conditions of Approval.
(Doc. 61-1, JSUM ¶ 26.) Instead, while the state court
litigation was pending in 2019, Plaintiff applied for a
“vesting tentative parcel map” that would create three
five-acre lots on the western portion of the Property
and an approximately 18-acre remainder. 9 (Id. ¶ 27.)
The County approved Plaintiff’s final parcel map for the
Property in 2023. (Id. ¶ 28.)
In July 2023, Plaintiff sold the three five-acre lots to
a single buyer for $1.15 million. (Doc. 61-1, JUSF ¶ 29.)
After the purchase, the buyer applied to the County for,
and the County approved, a merger of two of the five-acre
parcels into one ten-acre parcel. (Id. ¶ 30.) The value of
the approximately 18-acre remainder retained by Plaintiff
following the sale of 15 acres in 2023 retains “significant
value.”10 (Doc. 63-2, Plt.’s Resp. to Def.’s SSUF ¶ 8.)
9. A subdivider seeking to create four or fewer new parcels
submits a “parcel map,” rather than a subdivision map. Cal. Gov’t
Code § 66426. “Parcel map procedures are considerably simpler,
and parcel maps can usually be processed far more quickly than
[subdivision] maps.” Curtin, et al., California Subdivision M ap Act
and the Development P rocess § 3.9 (Con’t Ed. Bar 2d ed. 2023));
see also Cal. Gov’t Code § 66411.1 (limiting improvements that
may be required in parcel maps).
10. As of March 2017, the value of the remainder was
appraised at $780,000. (Doc. 63-2, Plt.’s Resp. to Def.’s SSUF ¶ 9.)
16a
Appendix B
F.
Plaintiff Files the Present Suit for Damages
Following the superior court’s issuance of the writ of
mandate in 2021, Plaintiff filed a supplemental complaint
in the state court asserting three state and federal claims
arising from the County’s rejection of the VTSM for his
failure to comply with the Conditions of Approval. Plaintiff
alleged (1) a violation of California Government Code
§ 815.6; (2) inverse condemnation and temporary taking
under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the
U.S. Constitution; Article I, Section 19 of the California
Constitution; and 42 U.S.C. § 1983; and (3) denial of
his substantive due process rights under the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution; Article
1, Section 7 of the California Constitution; and 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983. (Doc. 1 at 237-45.) The County removed the action
to this Court in May 2021. (See Doc. 1.)
The County filed three motions to dismiss. (Docs.
15, 35, 45.) The Court granted the first two motions,
dismissing Honchariw’s state law claim without leave to
amend, and twice dismissing the takings and substantive
due process claims with leave to amend. (Docs. 29, 41.)
The Court denied the County’s third motion to dismiss
directed to Plaintiff ’s Second Amended Complaint
(“SAC”). (Doc. 51.)
III. LEGAL STANDARD
Summa r y judg ment is appropr iate when the
pleadings, disclosure materials, discovery, and any
affidavits provided establish that “there is no genuine
17a
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dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled
to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A
material fact is one that may affect the outcome of the case
under the applicable law. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby,
Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A dispute is genuine “if the
evidence is such that a reasonable [factfinder] could return
a verdict in favor of the nonmoving party.” Id.
The party seeking summary judgment “always bears
the initial responsibility of informing the district court of
the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of
the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories,
and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any,
which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine
issue of material fact.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477
U.S. 317, 323 (1986) (internal quotation marks omitted).
The exact nature of this responsibility, however, varies
depending on whether the issue on which summary
judgment is sought is one in which the movant or the
nonmoving party carries the ultimate burden of proof. See
Soremekun v. Thrifty Payless, Inc., 509 F.3d 978, 984 (9th
Cir. 2007). If the movant will have the burden of proof at
trial, it must demonstrate, with affirmative evidence, that
“no reasonable trier of fact could find other than for the
moving party.” Id. By contrast, if the nonmoving party
will have the burden of proof at trial, “the movant can
prevail merely by pointing out that there is an absence
of evidence to support the nonmoving party’s case.” Id.
(citing Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323).
If the movant satisfies its initial burden, then the
nonmoving party must go beyond the allegations in its
18a
Appendix B
pleadings to “show a genuine issue of material fact by
presenting affirmative evidence from which a [factfinder]
could find in [its] favor.” FTC v. Stefanchik, 559 F.3d
924, 929 (9th Cir. 2009) (emphasis in original). “[B]ald
assertions or a mere scintilla of evidence” will not suffice
in this respect. Id. at 929; see also Matsushita Electric
Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586
(1986) (“When the moving party has carried its burden
under Rule 56(c), its opponent must do more than simply
show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the
material facts.”) (footnote omitted). “Where the record
taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to
find for the non-moving party, there is no ‘genuine issue
for trial.’” Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587 (quoting First Nat.
Bank of Ariz. v. Cities Serv. Co., 391 U.S. 253, 289 (1968)).
In resolving a summary judgment motion, “the
court does not make credibility determinations or weigh
conflicting evidence.” Soremekun, 509 F.3d at 984. That
remains the province of the fact finder. See Anderson, 477
U.S. at 255. Instead, “[t]he evidence of the non-movant
is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to
be drawn in his favor.” Id. Inferences, however, are not
drawn out of the air; the nonmoving party must produce a
factual predicate from which the inference may reasonably
be drawn. See Richards v. Nielsen Freight Lines, 602
F. Supp. 1224, 1244-45 (E.D. Cal. 1985), aff’d, 810 F.2d
898 (9th Cir. 1987).
19a
Appendix B
IV. DISCUSSION
A.
Plaintiff Cannot Prevail on His Regulatory
Takings Claim under Penn Central
As this Court has previously held (see Docs. 29, 41,
51), Plaintiff’s regulatory takings claim is governed
by the Supreme Court’s decision in Penn Central
Transportation Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104
(1978) (“Penn Central”). Under Penn Central, three
factors are of “particular significance” in determining
whether a regulatory taking has occurred: (1) “[t]he
economic impact of the regulation on the claimant;” (2)
“the extent to which the regulation has interfered with
distinct investment-backed expectations;” and (3) “the
character of the governmental action.” Penn Central, 438
U.S. at 124. “‘Government hardly could go on if to some
extent values incident to property could not be diminished
without paying for every such change in the general law,’
. . . and this Court has accordingly recognized, in a wide
variety of contexts, that government may execute laws
or programs that adversely affect recognized economic
values.” Id. (quoting Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393,
413 (1922)). “The first and second Penn Central factors are
the primary factors.” Bridge Aina Le’a, LLC v. Land Use
Comm’n, 950 F.3d 610, 630 (9th Cir. 2020) (citing Lingle
v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 538-39 (2005)).
However, Penn Central sets forth no “set formula” to
determine whether a regulatory action is “‘functionally
equivalent to the classic taking.’” Guggenheim v. City
of Goleta, 638 F.3d 1111, 1120 (9th Cir. 2010). Instead,
the outcome of the inquiry “depends largely upon the
20a
Appendix B
particular circumstances in the case at hand.” Bridge
Aina Le’a, LLC, 950 F.3d at 630 (internal quotations
omitted).
1.
The Relevant Property is the Property as
a Whole
As an initial matter, the parties disagree as to the
relevant property right at issue in this case. The County
contends that a takings inquiry must focus on Plaintiff’s
right in the entire parcel, that is, all 33 acres of the
Property. (Doc. 61 at 19-20; Doc. 64 at 4-5.) Plaintiff
asserts instead that the “property” taken by the County
is the “right to finalize his subdivision” of a portion of the
Property as set forth in the VTSM, which he contends
is protected by the Housing Accountability Act and the
Subdivision Map Act. (Doc. 63 at 16-23.)
As explained in Penn Central,
“Taking” jurisprudence does not divide a single
parcel into discrete segments and attempt
to determine whether rights in a particular
segment have been entirely abrogated. In
deciding whether a particular governmental
action has effected a taking, this Court focuses
rather both on the character of the action and on
the nature and extent of the interference with
rights in the parcel as a whole. . . .
438 U.S. at 130-31 (emphasis added). See Tahoe-Sierra
Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Plan. Agency, 535 U.S.
21a
Appendix B
302, 326-27 (2002) (Penn Central did . . . make it clear that
even though multiple factors are relevant in the analysis of
regulatory takings claims, in such cases we must focus on
‘the parcel as a whole.’”). See also Murr v. Wisconsin, 582
U.S. 383, 396 (2017) (“[T]he Court has declined to limit the
parcel in an artificial manner to the portion of property
targeted by the challenged regulation.”); Andrus v.
Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 65-66 (1979) (“At least where an owner
possesses a full ‘bundle’ of property rights, the destruction
of one ‘strand’ of the bundle is not a taking, because the
aggregate must be viewed in its entirety.”). Following
this legal authority, this Court previously held in this case
that to determine whether a taking has occurred, it must
evaluate the “economic impact to Plaintiff’s property as
a whole.” (Doc. 41 at 9 (emphasis added).)
Plaintiff has provided no basis to depart from the law
of the case as to this issue.11.He attempts to distinguish
Penn Central’s “parcel-as-a-whole” rule by pointing to
state statutes that allegedly “protect” his right to finalize
the subdivision of a portion of the Property, but none of the
cases on which he relies supports this distinction. (See Doc.
63 at 20-21.) Plaintiff cites Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto, 467
11. See Huynh v. Harasz, No. 14-CV-02367-LHK, 2016 WL
2757219, at *21 (N.D. Cal. May 12, 2016) (applying the “law of the
case” doctrine to preclude summary judgment on legal issues
previously decided by a court on a motion to dismiss) (citing
Bollinger v. Oregon, 172 F. App’x 770, 771 (9th Cir. 2006)). See
also Morgan v. Haviland, No. 2:09-CV-2155 WBS KJN, 2011 WL
6153602, at *6 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 9, 2011) (“While defendant raises
these arguments in the context of a summary judgment motion
rather than a motion to dismiss, it has presented no grounds for
departing from the law of the case.”).
22a
Appendix B
U.S. 986 (1984), and City of Oakland v. Oakland Raiders,
32 Cal. 3d 60 (1982), but those cases involved discrete
intangible personal property interests—trade secrets
and contractual rights in an NFL team, respectively—
not rights to use real property. Ruckelshaus, 467 U.S. at
1001-03; City of Oakland, 32 Cal. 3d at 66-67.
Plaintiff’s reliance on North Pacifica LLC v. City of
Pacifica, 234 F. Supp. 2d 1053 (N.D. Cal. 2002), is equally
unavailing. (See Doc. 63 at 21.) That case concerned
whether the plaintiff had pleaded a cognizable property
interest under the Housing Accountability Act sufficient
to support a substantive due process—not takings—claim.
234 F. Supp. 2d at 1059-60. The court further considered
whether the plaintiff’s due process claim was preempted
by the Taking Clause, found that it was, and dismissed the
claim on grounds of ripeness. Id. at 1061-66. Nowhere did
North Pacifica consider, much less hold, that the Housing
Accountability Act (or any other statute) gave rise to a
protected property interest for the purposes of a takings
claim. And, because North Pacifica did not concern a
takings claim in the first instance, it did not address or
distinguish either Penn Central or the “parcel-as-a-whole”
rule.12
Plaintiff does not cite, and the Court has not found,
any legal authority finding a statutory entitlement to
12. In fact, the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s
determination that the plaintiff’s substantive due process was
preempted, holding that the court “incorrectly treat[ed] it as a
takings claim.” N. Pacifica LLC v. City of Pacifica, 526 F.3d 478,
480, 484-85 (9th Cir. 2008).
23a
Appendix B
real estate development constitutes a property interest
cognizable apart from the underlying land for takings
purposes. In fact, case law suggests the contrary. See, e.g.,
Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass’n v. DeBenedictis, 480
U.S. 470, 500 (1987) (rejecting takings claim where state
law created a “distinct segment of property,” observing
that “[i]t is clear . . . that our takings jurisprudence
forecloses reliance on such legalistic distinctions within
a bundle of property rights.”) (citing Penn Central, 438
U.S. at 130, and Andrus, 444 U.S. at 65-66). Cf. The Park
at Cross Creek, LLC v. City of Malibu, 12 Cal. App. 5th
1196, 1209 (2017) (A land use permit “is not a personal
interest. It does not attach to the permittee; rather, [it]
creates a right that runs with the land.”).
The Court w ill therefore not revisit its prior
determination based on pertinent, Supreme Court case
authority, that the property interest at issue here is
Plaintiff’s right in the entire 33 acres of the Property, and
not his right in the subdivision of a portion of it.
2.
There is No Triable Question of Fact as to
Economic Impact to the Property
As to the first “primary” Penn Central factor, Plaintiff
has not presented sufficient evidence from which a finder
of fact could conclude that the economic impact to the
Property, when construed as a whole, rose to the level of
an unconstitutional taking by the County.
Economic impact “is determined by comparing the
total value of the affected property before and after the
24a
Appendix B
government action.” Colony Cove Properties, LLC v.
City of Carson, 888 F.3d 445, 450 (9th Cir. 2018) (citing
MHC Fin. Ltd. P’ship v. City of San Rafael, 714 F.3d
1118, 1127 (9th Cir. 2013)); see Keystone Bituminous Coal
Ass’n, 480 U.S. at 497 (“[O]ur test for regulatory taking
requires us to compare the value that has been taken
from the property with the value that remains in the
property. . . .”). “Not every diminution in property value
caused by a government regulation rises to the level of
an unconstitutional taking.” Colony Cove, 888 F.3d at 451;
see MacLeod v. Santa Clara Cnty., 749 F.2d 541, 548 (9th
Cir. 1984) (“The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that
mere diminution in value, standing alone, cannot establish
a taking.”) (citing Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 131). Although
there is “no litmus test [that] determines whether a
taking occurred,” the Ninth Circuit has made clear that
diminution in property value “ranging from 75% to 92.5%
does not constitute a taking,” and it is “aware of no case
in which a court has found a taking where diminution in
value was less than 50 percent.” Id. (citations omitted). See
also Bridge Aina Le’a, LLC, 950 F.3d at 631 (“[O]ur value
comparison again aims ‘to identify regulatory actions
that are functionally equivalent to the classic taking in
which government directly appropriates private property
or ousts the owners from his domain.’”) (quoting Lingle,
544 U.S. at 539).
Here, Plaintiff concedes that “[t]he value of the
Property at the end of the alleged taking was comparable
to the value of the Property at the start of the alleged
taking.” (Doc. 63-2, Plt.’s Resp. to Def.’s SSUF ¶ 17
(emphasis added).) Consistent with this concession, the
25a
Appendix B
undisputed evidence demonstrates that the difference in
the value of the Property as a whole between the time the
County rejected the VTSM for Plaintiff’s failure to comply
with its fire suppression demands and the withdrawal
of those demands (after which Plaintiff abandoned the
VTSM and successfully obtained a final parcel map
from the County) was $820,000, representing only 29.8%
diminution in value. (See Doc. 64 at 6. See also Doc. 61-1,
JSUF ¶ 29; Doc. 63-1, Honchariw Decl. ¶ 64; Doc. 63-2,
Plt.’s Resp. to Def.’s SSUF ¶¶ 9, 12.) Such diminution in
value falls substantially below that which the Ninth Circuit
requires to establish a taking. See Colony Cove, 888 F.3d
at 451. There is therefore no triable question of fact as
to the economic impact to the Property by the County’s
rejection of the VTSM.
3.
Plaintiff Has Not Adduced Evidence
of the County’s Interference with Any
Reasonable Distinct Investment-Backed
Expectations
Plaintiff also has not adduced any evidence as to
the second “primary” Penn Central factor, i.e., that the
County’s rejection of the VTSM interfered with Plaintiff’s
“investment-backed expectations.” Such expectations
must be “objectively reasonable.” Colony Cove, 888 F.3d at
452. In addition, “what is relevant and important in judging
reasonable expectations is the regulatory environment at
the time of the acquisition of the property.” Bridge Aina
Le’a, LLC, 950 F.3d at 634 (internal quotations and citation
omitted); see Pakdel v. City & Cnty. of San Francisco, 636
F. Supp. 3d 1065, 1076 (N.D. Cal. 2022) (“[T]his factor must
26a
Appendix B
consider the extent to which the challenged regulation
departs from or extends beyond past or conceivable future
regulatory developments.”).
Plaintiff contends that the County interfered with
his “entitlement to finalize his residential development
in substantial compliance with the terms and conditions
attached to [the VTSM]” (Doc. 63 at 24), but such
expectation was not objectively reasonable at the time the
Property was acquired in 1992.13 See Colony Cove, 888
F.3d at 452 (“[A] purported distinct investment-backed
expectation must be objectively reasonable” in order “to
form the basis for a taking claim.”). At that time, Plaintiff
had no entitlement to the finalization of the VTSM, as the
undisputed facts show it was not submitted for approval
to the County until 14 years later, in 2006.
As for approval of a tentative subdivision map
generally (a necessary step in the process of subdividing
13. Plaintiff also could not have reasonably expected the
County to approve the VTSM without delay associated with
litigation concerning the Conditions of Approval, as such litigation
“is a normal part of the regulatory process.” Landgate, Inc. v.
California Coastal Comm’n, 17 Cal. 4th 1006, 1030, 953 P.2d 1188,
1203 (1998). See Loewenstein v. City of Lafayette, 103 Cal. App.
4th 718, 737, 127 Cal. Rptr. 2d 79, 93 (2002) (“A landowner can have
no reasonable expectation that there will be no delays or bona fide
differences of opinion in the application process for development
permits. Sometimes the application process must detour to the
court process to resolve a genuine disagreement.”). Cf. TahoeSierra Preservation Council, 535 U.S. at 335 (“[N]ormal delays
in obtaining building permits, changes in zoning ordinances,
variances, and the like . . . have long been considered permissible
exercises of the police power” that do not require compensation.).
27a
Appendix B
property in California, Cal. Gov’t Code § 64410 et seq.),
such approval was and is a matter within the County’s
discretion. See Youngblood v. Bd. of Supervisors, 22 Cal.
3d 644, 655-56 (1978) (whether and upon what conditions
to approve a proposed subdivision based on a tentative
map a “discretionary decision”). As such, at the time he
acquired the Property in 1992, Plaintiff would have had
an “expectation, but not an assurance” that a tentative
subdivision map would be approved. See MacLeod, 749
F.2d at 548. Under these circumstances, such expectancy
is not reasonable. See id.; Furey v. City of Sacramento,
592 F. Supp. 463 (E.D. Cal. 1984), aff’d, 780 F.2d 1448
(9th Cir. 1986). See also Evans Creek, LLC v. City of
Reno, No. 21-16620, 2022 WL 14955145, at *2 (9th Cir.
Oct. 26, 2022) (noting the city’s discretion to annex the
property under Nevada law cuts against the plaintiff’s
economic expectations); Collins v. Cnty. of Monterey,
No. 22-CV-02560-NC, 2023 WL 5743236, at *7 (N.D. Cal.
Aug. 18, 2023) (“The closest Collins comes to a reasonable
expectation are the recommendations to approve the
rezone issued by County planning staff. However, any
such expectation is quickly dispelled by the applicable
regulatory backdrop and uncertain nature of the political
process.”), aff’d, No. 23-16153, 2024 WL 3066046 (9th
Cir. June 20, 2024); Diller v. Schenk, No. CIV.A. C-8320043WAI, 1986 WL 1788, at *19 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 6, 1986)
(“[E]ven investment-backed expectations may not be
reasonable if their fruition depends on discretionary
acts by governmental authorities, i.e., acts, like issuing
building permits, whose future performance cannot be
assured.”) (citing Furey and MacLeod).
28a
Appendix B
The undisputed facts show that the County’s rejection
of the VTSM did not interfere with any reasonable
expectations held at the time of the acquisition of the
Property. Plaintiff acquired the Property in Trust as a
successor trustee from his relative, Reverend Honchariw,
who purchased it as a “long-term investment” that was
expected to operate as a “family resort” and ultimately
be subdivided into residential lots. (Doc. 61-1, JUSF ¶¶ 3,
5. See also Doc. 63 at 23.) Notwithstanding the County’s
rejection of the VTSM, Plaintiff was able to realize
those expectations. While the litigation over the VTSM
was pending in state court, Plaintiff applied for, and the
County approved, a final parcel map that divided the
Property into three five-acre lots and an approximately
18-acre remainder. (Id. ¶ 27, 28.) Plaintiff thereafter sold
the lots for $1.15 million and retained “significant value”
in the remainder. (Id. ¶ 29; Doc. 63-2, Plt.’s Resp. to Def.’s
SSUF ¶ 8.)
In sum, Plaintiff has failed to present evidence from
which a finder of fact could reasonably conclude that the
County interfered with any reasonable investment-backed
expectations at the time the Property was acquired. The
undisputed evidence shows otherwise.
4.
Plaintiff Has Not Shown that the Character
of the County’s Action Supports a Taking
Plaintiff has not met his burden of establishing that
the character of the County’s rejection of the VTSM
supports a finding by a factfinder that a taking occurred.
He first points to the “unlawful” nature of the County’s fire
29a
Appendix B
suppression demands (Doc. 63 at 25-26), but the alleged
impermissibility of the County’s actions cannot form the
basis of a takings (as opposed to a substantive due process)
claim. Lingle, 544 U.S. at 543 (“[I]f a government action is
found to be impermissible . . . that is the end of the inquiry.
No amount of compensation can authorize such action. . . .
Whatever the merits of that claim, it does not sound under
the Takings Clause.”). See Small Prop. Owners of San
Francisco v. City & Cnty. of San Francisco, 141 Cal. App.
4th 1388, 1409 (2006) (“The appropriate question for the
third prong of a regulatory takings analysis . . . is the
nature rather than the merit of the governmental action.)
(emphasis in the original). Accord S. Grande View Dev.
Co., Inc. v. City of Alabaster, Alabama, 1 F.4th 1299, 131112 (11th Cir. 2021) (Lingle changed the type of inquiry
permitted in a just compensation claim, and abrogated our
earlier precedent permitting an inquiry into the rationale
behind the regulation.”); S. Nassau Bldg. Corp. v. Town
Bd. of Town of Hempstead, 624 F. Supp. 3d 261, 277-78
(E.D.N.Y. 2022) (“[T]he character-of-the-governmentalaction inquiry does not incorporate ‘a means-ends test
[that] asks, in essence, whether a regulation of private
property is effective in achieving some legitimate
public purpose. . . . Nor does it ‘probe[] the regulation’s
underlying validity.’”) (quoting Lingle, 544 U.S. at 543).
Plaintiff next contends that the County’s fire
suppression demands “entailed a physical take-over
and seizure of some of [his] property.” (Doc. 63 at 26.)
While “[a] ‘taking’ may more readily be found when the
interference with property can be characterized as a
physical invasion by government,” MHC Fin. Ltd. P’ship,
30a
Appendix B
714 F.3d at 1128 (quoting Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124),
Plaintiff has not shown that the County’s requirement
to provide a fire suppression system on a portion of his
Property is akin to a “physical invasion” of the Property
as a whole. See Norman v. United States, 63 Fed. Cl.
231, 286-87 (2004) (rejecting argument that regulatory
imposition was “akin to a physical taking of 220.85 acres
of land,” finding that “[i]n light of the entire 2280-acre
relevant parcel, plaintiffs’ overall bundle of property
rights was not diminished with respect to the larger parcel
at issue.”), aff’d, 429 F.3d 1081 (Fed. Cir. 2005). In fact,
courts have found regulations requiring the installation
of fire suppression measures such as sprinkler systems
do not constitute a taking under Penn Central. See, e.g.,
Dyke v. Vill. of Alsip, No. 18 C 06112, 2019 WL 13247925,
at *2 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 6, 2019) (“Defendants’ enforcement of
the zoning ordinance which requires certain properties
to maintain fire sprinklers falls far short of a regulatory
taking.”), aff’d sub nom. Van Dyke v. Vill. of Alsip, 819
F. App’x 431 (7th Cir. 2020); Cf. Loretto v. Teleprompter
Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 440 (contrasting
the government’s “power to require landlords to comply
with building codes and provide . . . smoke detectors, fire
extinguishers, and the like” with regulations that “require
the landlord to suffer the physical occupation of a portion
of his building by a third party.”).
5.
The Penn Central Factors Do Not Support
a Finding that a Taking Occurred
Even were the “character of the governmental action”
factor to weigh in favor of Plaintiff, it “is not alone a
31a
Appendix B
sufficient basis to find that a taking occurred.” Bridge
Aina Le’a, LLC, 950 F.3d at 636. Plaintiff has not met
his burden of establishing a genuine issue of material
fact that the County’s rejection of the VTSM due to its
fire suppression demands was an unconstitutional taking
under Penn Central. Instead, as set forth above, the
undisputed evidence demonstrates that the two primary
Penn Central factors weigh strongly against a finding
that a taking occurred. Accordingly, the Court will grant
summary judgment in favor of the County on Plaintiff’s
takings claim.
B. The County is Entitled to Summary Judgment
on Plaintiff’s Substantive Due Process Claim
1.
Plaintiff Must Meet the “Exceedingly
High Burden” of Demonstrating the
County’s Conduct was “Egregious”
In an action like this one, challenging land use action,
“the ‘irreducible minimum’ of a substantive due process
claim . . . is failure to advance any legitimate governmental
purpose.” Shanks v. Dressel, 540 F.3d 1082, 1088 (9th Cir.
2008) (quoting North Pacifica LLC v. City of Pacifica,
526 F.3d 478, 484 (9th Cir. 2008)). A plaintiff bears an
“exceedingly high burden” required to show that the state
actor “behaved in a constitutionally arbitrary fashion.” Id.
at 1088. As the Ninth Circuit explained, “[w]hen executive
action . . . is at issue, only ‘egregious official conduct can
be said to be arbitrary in the constitutional sense’: it must
amount to an ‘abuse of power’ lacking any ‘reasonable
justification in the service of a legitimate governmental
32a
Appendix B
objective.’” Id. (quoting Cty. of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523
U.S. 833, 846 (1998)).
Plaintiff does not dispute that the County’s acts at
issue are “executive” (as opposed to “legislative”) in
nature.14 Instead, he contends that he need not meet the
“exceedingly high burden” of showing the County engaged
in “egregious official conduct” required by Shanks, because
the County owed him a “ministerial duty” to approve the
VTSM and thus “had no right to take ‘executive’ action.”
(Doc. 63 at 29.) In so doing, Plaintiff is attempting to draw
a distinction between “ministerial” and “executive” acts,
for which he cites no legal authority in support.15 In fact,
14. The law of substantive due process distinguishes between
governmental acts that are “legislative” and those that are
“executive” in character. Gunter v. N. Wasco Cnty. Sch. Dist. Bd.
of Educ., 577 F. Supp. 3d 1141, 1153 (D. Or. 2021) (“As a threshold
matter for evaluating a substantive due process claim, the Court
must determine whether Plaintiffs are alleging that they have been
harmed by an ‘executive’ or a ‘legislative’ act.”) (citing Lewis, 523
U.S. at 846). “Executive action generally involves ‘a specific act
of a governmental officer that is at issue.’” Gunter, 577 F. Supp.
3d at 1153 (quoting Lewis, 523 U.S. at 846). “Legislative acts, on
the other hand, generally apply to a larger segment of—if not all
of—society; laws and broad-ranging executive regulations are
the most common examples.” Gunther, 577 F. Supp. 3d at 1153
(quoting McKinney v. Pate, 20 F.3d 1550, 1557 n.9 (11th Cir. 1994)).
15. Plaintiff’s cited cases (Doc. 63 at 26-27) are directed
to the issue of whether state law can create a constitutionally
protected property interest—an essential element of a due process
claim. See, e.g., Gerhart v. Lake Cnty., Mont., 637 F.3d 1013, 1019
(9th Cir. 2011) (“To succeed on [his substantive due process]
claim, Gerhart must first demonstrate that he was deprived of a
constitutionally protected property interest. We hold that Gerhart
33a
Appendix B
“ministerial or administrative activities of members of
the executive branch” are “executive” acts. Gunter, 577
F. Supp. 3d at 1153. Accord McKinney, 20 F.3d at 1557.
As such, they are subject to the egregiousness standard,
Lewis, 523 U.S. at 846, which is an “exceedingly high
burden” to meet, Samson v. City of Bainbridge Island,
683 F.3d 1051, 1058 (9th Cir. 2012).
2.
Plaintiff Has Not Met This Burden
Plaintiff has failed to present sufficient material facts
from which a finder of fact reasonably could conclude
that the County “behaved in a constitutionally arbitrary
fashion.” Shanks, 540 F.3d at 1088. Plaintiff contends
that the County’s rejection of the VTSM was an “abuse
of power” lacking “any reasonable justification in the
service of a legitimate governmental objective” because it
“acted in violation of state law designed to prevent exactly
cannot make this threshold showing.”) (internal citations omitted);
Groten v. California, 251 F.3d 844, 849-50 (9th Cir. 2001) (“We
must determine whether Groten, as a first-time applicant for a
temporary appraiser’s license, had a property interest protected
by the Due Process Clause.”); Foss v. Nat’l Marine Fisheries
Serv., 161 F.3d 584, 588 (9th Cir. 1998) (“The threshold question is
whether Foss has a constitutionally protectible property interest
in acquiring an IFQ permit. . . .”); Parks v. Watson, 716 F.2d 646,
656 (9th Cir. 1983) (“Before Klamath can prevail on [its procedural
due process claims], however, it must demonstrate the threshold
requirement of a constitutionally cognizable right. . . . [W]e must
determine whether Klamath, as a vacation petitioner, had such
an interest protected by the due process clause.”). The County
does not challenge the existence of a constitutionally protected
property interest in this case. (See Doc. 64 at 11 n.7.)
34a
Appendix B
what it did.” (Doc. 63 at 29.) But a violation of state law
(even if committed in this case) alone does not establish a
substantive due process claim. Samson, 683 F.3d at 1060
(“It is axiomatic . . . that not every violation of state law
amounts to an infringement of constitutional rights.”)
(citing Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 700 (1976)).
Nor does the fact that the appellate court ultimately
concluded the County had “misinterpreted” the Conditions
of Approval of the VTSM. (See Doc. 63 at 30, 31, 32-33
(citing Honchariw v. Cty. of Stanislaus, 51 Cal. App. 5th
243 (2020), Doc. 1 at 144-74).) “Official decisions that rest
on an erroneous legal interpretation are not necessarily
constitutionally arbitrary.” Shanks, 540 F.3d at 1089. See
Brittain v. Hansen, 451 F.3d 982, 996 (9th Cir. 2006)
(“[S]ubstantive due process secures individuals from
‘arbitrary’ government action that rises to the level of
‘egregious conduct,’ not from reasonable, though possibly
erroneous, legal interpretation.”); Sinaloa Lake Owners
Ass’n v. City of Simi Valley, 864 F.2d 1475, 1486 (9th Cir.
1989) (Errors of judgment, mistaken actions, or even
misguided actions do not violate due process.). In fact,
there can be no substantive due process violation “if it is
‘at least fairly debatable’ that the government’s conduct
is rationally related to a legitimate interest.” Flint v.
Cnty. of Kauai, 521 F. Supp. 3d 978, 995 (D. Haw. 2021)
(quoting Kawaoka v. City of Arroyo Grande, 17 F.3d
1227, 1238 (9th Cir. 1994)). See also Halverson v. Skagit
Cnty., 42 F.3d 1257, 1262 (9th Cir. 1994) (explaining that
plaintiffs in substantive due process claims “shoulder [the]
heavy burden” of demonstrating “the irrational nature
of the County’s actions by showing that the County could
35a
Appendix B
have had no legitimate reason for its decision”). Under
these circumstances, courts “do not require that the
government’s action actually advance its stated purposes,
but merely look to see whether the government could
have had a legitimate reason for acting as it did.” Wedges/
Ledges of California, Inc. v. City of Phoenix, 24 F.3d 56,
66 (9th Cir. 1994) (emphasis in original).
Here, Plaintiff cannot meet his “heavy burden” of
demonstrating that the County’s rejection of the VTSM
was devoid of a legitimate governmental interest. Plaintiff
claims that the County had “no justification” for their
fire suppression demands (Doc. 63 at 29), but at the same
time does not dispute that County staff were “acutely
aware that wildfires posed a significant risk to rural
and semi-rural communities at the time of the dispute
over the meaning of the [C]onditions of [A]pproval” and
believed that requiring Plaintiff, not KFCSD, to “provide
functioning fire hydrants, including a water supply capable
of providing fire suppression flows” prior to approval of the
VTSM was “in order to protect the future residents of the
subdivision from life safety hazards, including wildfire.”
(Doc. 63-2, Plt.’s Resp. to Def.’s SSUF ¶¶ 4-5.) The trial
court in Honchariw v. County of Stanislaus expressly
emphasized the County’s interest in fire safety, noting
that the parties’ dispute over the Conditions of Approval
“involves a clear issue of public safety: fire suppression. . . .
This dispute is not about esthetics; it is a life or death
concern.” (Doc. 1 at 66.) The appellate court, which sided
with Plaintiff, nevertheless also acknowledged the County’s
“safety concerns related to fire.” (See Honchariw v. Cty.
of Stanislaus, 51 Cal. App. 5th 243 (2020), Doc. 1 at 133.)
36a
Appendix B
Plaintiff’s proffered statements made by County
personnel that KFCSD would supply the water for fire
suppression (see Doc. 63-1, Honchariw Decl. ¶¶ 48-49)
also fail to create a genuine issue of material fact as
to whether the County “could have had a legitimate
reason” for insisting that Plaintiff do so instead. This
is particularly true in view of the uncontroverted
evidence that the KFCSD water system was “small” and
“antiquated,” with “substandard” distribution facilities
that produced “well under standard fire flows of 1000 gpm
for residential subdivision systems served by municipal
water districts.” (Doc. 63-1, JSUF ¶13.) It is therefore “at
least fairly debatable” that the County’s fire suppression
demands, even if legally erroneous, were rationally related
to the legitimate interest in protecting the subdivision’s
residents against wildfires.
In this way both Bateson v. Geisse and Ali v. City
of Los Angeles, relied on by Plaintiff (see Doc. 63 at 27,
32), are inapposite. In Bateson, the city council voted
not to issue a building permit even though the applicant
had satisfied all the requirements for the permit. 857
F.2d 1300, 1302 (9th Cir. 1988). It did so despite the
city attorney’s warning that the decision would almost
certainly be overturned in court and would expose the city
to substantial civil liability. Id. The Ninth Circuit held that
the city council’s vote was an “arbitrary administration of
the local regulations, which single[d] out one individual to
be treated discriminatorily” and constituted a deprivation
of substantive due process. Id. at 1303. In Bateson, it was
undisputed that a condominium development complied
with the zoning classification applicable to Bateson’s
37a
Appendix B
property; in this case, the meaning of the Conditions of
Approval related to fire suppression infrastructure was
unsettled at the time the County rejected the VTSM.
Further, Plaintiff has not adduced any evidence of bad
faith by the County in this case. To the contrary, it is
undisputed that Frederic Clark, the County staff member
responsible for reviewing the VTSM for compliance with
the Conditions of Approval, interpreted those conditions
“in good faith”; that he “had no interest in obstructing
the project”; and that “[n]obody at the County suggested
to [him] that he obstruct the project.” (Doc. 63-2, Plt.’s
Resp. to Def.’s SSUF ¶¶ 3, 14-16.)
In Ali, the appellate court observed that because
the illegality of the City’s action was apparent from case
authority existing before the City initially withheld the
permit, its position was “‘so unreasonable from a legal
standpoint’ . . . as to be arbitrary, not in furtherance of
any legitimate governmental objective, and for no other
purpose than to delay any development. . . .” 77 Cal. App.
4th 246, 255 (1999). Here, the County’s rejection of the
VTSM was not objectively unreasonable, particularly
given its argument regarding the purpose of the
Conditions of Approval was endorsed by the trial court
in Honchariw v. Cty. of Stanislaus. See Allegretti & Co.
v. Cnty. of Imperial, 138 Cal. App. 4th 1261, 1284 (2006)
(distinguishing Ali).
Because Plaintiff has failed to meet his “exceedingly
high burden” of putting forth evidence sufficient to
establish a substantive due process violation, the Court
38a
Appendix B
finds that the County is entitled to summary judgment
on this claim.16
V. CONCLUSION AND ORDER
For the foregoing reasons, Defendant County of
Stanislaus’s motion for summary judgment (Doc. 61)
is GRANTED. Judgment shall be entered in favor of
Defendant. The Clerk of Court is directed to vacate any
pending deadlines and to close this case.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: August 21, 2024
/s/ Sheila K. Oberto
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
16. Plaintiff asserts that the County has demonstrated a
“history of obstruction” related to the VTSM, and specifically
points to the Board’s “unlawful disapproval” of the VTSM in 2009.
(See Doc. 63 at 33-34.) But, as noted above, Plaintiff concedes
that, at least as to the present dispute that is relevant here,
County staff “had no interest in obstructing the project” and
that “[n]obody at the County suggested” that Plaintiff’s project
be “obstruct[ed.]” (Doc. 63-2, Plt.’s Resp. to Def.’s SSUF ¶¶ 3,
14-16.) Regarding the Board’s 2009 denial of the VTSM, it is not
before the Court, and Plaintiff’s attempt to assert a substantive
due process claim related to it was unsuccessful. See Honchariw
v. Cnty. of Stanislaus, 530 F. Supp. 3d 939, 952 (E.D. Cal. 2021)
(granting motion for judgment on the pleadings), aff’d, No. 2115801, 2022 WL 522287 (9th Cir. Feb. 22, 2022). The Court will
not revisit that ruling here.
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