Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Utah, Petitioner v. Morris Thomas Mullins

Supreme Court briefMar 5, 2026

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No. ________

_________________________________________________

In the Supreme Court of the United States

__________________________________________________________________________________

STATE OF UTAH,

Petitioner,

v.

MORRIS T. MULLINS,

Respondent.

__________________________________________________________________________________

On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari

to the Supreme Court of the State of Utah

__________________________________________________________________________________

Petition for a Writ of Certiorari

____________________________________________________________________________________

Derek Brown

Utah Attorney General

Stanford E. Purser

Utah Solicitor General

Counsel of Record

David Simpson

Deputy Solicitor General

Jeffrey D. Mann

Assistant Solicitor General

160 E. 300 S., 5th floor

Salt Lake City, UT 84111

(801) 366-0533

spurser@agutah.gov

Counsel for Petitioner

i

Question Presented

Whether a sentencing court can impose a sentence of life without parole on a juvenile murderer

even if the court finds that the juvenile is not permanently incorrigible or at least suggests that the

juvenile is capable of change and reform.

ii

Parties to the Proceeding

All parties appear in the caption of the case on the

cover page.

Related Proceedings

State v. Mullins, No. 20200149-SC, Utah Supreme

Court, 2025 UT 57, ––P.3d––. Judgment entered November 20, 2025. Rehearing petition denied December

5, 2025.

Mullins v. Cook, No. 2:17-cv-01248-TC, United

States District Court for the District of Utah. On

Rhines stay.

Mullins v. State, No. 17060085, Sixth Judicial District Court of Utah. Judgment entered February 13,

2020.

State v. Mullins, No. 20040161-SC, Utah Supreme

Court, 2005 UT 43, 116 P.3d 374. Judgment entered

July 8, 2005.

Mullins v. State, No. 040913656, Sixth Judicial

District Court of Utah. Judgment entered September

14, 2004.

Mullins v. State, No. 020600297, Sixth Judicial

District Court of Utah. Judgment entered October 2,

2002.

State v. Mullins, No. 011600140, Sixth Judicial

District Court of Utah. Judgment entered May 2,

2002.

iii

Table of Contents

Question Presented...................................................... i

Parties to the Proceeding ...........................................ii

Related Proceedings....................................................ii

Table of Authorities .................................................... v

Opinion Below ............................................................. 1

Jurisdiction ................................................................. 1

Constituitonal Provision Involved ............................. 1

Statement of the Case ................................................ 2

A. Mullins pleads guilty to aggravated

murder committed as a juvenile. .................. 2

B. Mullins is sentenced to life without parole

based on the court’s consideration of

relevant factors, including his age, under

Utah’s discretionary sentencing scheme. ..... 3

C. Mullins challenges his sentence as illegal

under Miller v. Alabama. .............................. 5

D. A divided Utah Supreme Court vacates

Mullins’s sentence. ........................................ 5

Argument .................................................................... 8

The Court Should Resolve the Split of Authority

on Whether the Eighth Amendment Prohibits

Life Without Parole When a Juvenile is Capable

of Change. ................................................................. 8

A. Lower courts are split on how to reconcile

this

Court’s

holdings

in

Miller,

Montgomery, and Jones. .............................. 11

iv

B. The Utah Supreme Court’s divided

opinion presents an ideal vehicle to

resolve the split of authority. ...................... 20

C. Resolving the split of authority is a matter

of profound national importance................. 22

Conclusion ................................................................. 23

Table of Appendices

Appendix A: Amended Opinion of the Supreme

Court of the State of Utah, Filed

November 20, 2025............................. 1a

Appendix B: Sentencing Hearing Transcript,

May 1, 2002 ...................................... 66a

Appendix C: Memorandum Decision and Order

Denying Mullins’s Motion to Correct

Illegal Sentence .............................. 117a

v

Table of Authorities

Federal Cases

Helm v. Thornell,

112 F.4th 674 (9th Cir. 2024) ............................... 16

Jones v. Mississippi,

593 U.S. 98 (2021) ......................... 5, 8, 9, 10, 12, 16

Miller v. Alabama,

567 U.S. 460 (2012) ................................... 5, 8, 9, 17

Montgomery v. Louisiana,

577 U.S. 190 (2016) ........5, 6, 8, 9, 10, 11, 14, 15, 22

Roper v. Simmons,

543 U.S. 551 (2005) ................................................. 3

United States v. Briones,

35 F.4th 1150 (9th Cir. 2021) ......................... 15, 16

United States v. Delgado,

971 F.3d 144 (2nd Cir. 2020) .......................... 13, 14

United States v. Grant,

9 F.4th 186 (3rd Cir. 2021) ................................... 15

Walker v. Cromwell,

140 F.4th 878 (7th Cir. 2025) ......................... 19, 20

State Cases

Commonwealth v. Felder,

269 A.3d 1232 (Penn. 2022) .................................. 17

vi

Conley v. State,

183 N.E.3d 276 (Ind. 2022) ................................... 18

Davis v. State,

415 P.3d 666 (Wyo. 2018) ...................................... 14

Elliott v. State,

653 S.W.3d 776 (Ark. 2022) .................................. 18

Fletcher v. State,

532 P.3d 286 (Alaska Ct. App. 2023) .................... 13

Harned v. Amsberry,

499 P.3d 825 (Or. Ct. App. 2021) .......................... 20

Homes v. State,

859 S.E.2d 475 (Ga. 2021) ..................................... 18

Johnson v. State,

396 So.3d 1073 (Miss. 2024) ................................. 17

Malvo v. State,

281 A.3d 758 (Md. 2022) ....................................... 12

People v. Taylor,

987 N.W.2d 132 (Mich. 2022)................................ 13

People v. Wilson,

220 N.E.3d 1068 (Ill. 2023) ................................... 17

Phon v. Commonwealth,

545 S.W.3d 284 (Ken. 2018) .................................. 16

State ex rel. Mitchell v. Cooper,

535 P.3d 3 (Ariz. 2023) .......................................... 16

vii

State v. Keefe,

512 P.3d 741 (Mont. 2022) .................................... 18

State v. Kelliher,

873 S.E.2d 366 (N.C. 2022) ............................. 12, 13

State v. McInnis,

962 N.W.2d 874 (Minn. 2021) ............................... 14

State v. Morris,

222 N.E.3d 568 (Ohio 2022) .................................. 18

State v. Sims,

912 S.E.2d 767 (N.C. 2025) ................................... 13

State v. Smart,

889 S.E.2d 573 (S.C. 2023) .................................... 17

State v. Walker, 2022 WL 1574255

(Wis. Ct. App. Jan. 25, 2022) ................................ 18

White v. State,

499 P.3d 762 (Okla. 2021) ..................................... 19

Williams v. State,

500 P.3d 1182 (Kan. 2021) .................................... 19

Wynn v. State,

354 So.3d 1007 (Ala. Crim. App. 2021) ................ 18

Federal Statutes

28 U.S.C. § 1257.......................................................... 1

viii

State Statutes

Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-207 (West 2001) .............. 3, 21

State Rules

Utah R. Crim. P. 22 ........................................ 5, 21, 22

1

Opinion Below

The opinion of the Utah Supreme Court is reported

at 2025 UT 57, –– P.3d ––, and attached as Pet. App.

1a–65a (Appendix A).

Jurisdiction

The Utah Supreme Court entered judgment on November 20, 2025. The court denied the State’s petition

for rehearing on December 5, 2025. This Court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1257(a).

Constituitonal Provision Involved

The Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution states: “Excessive bail shall not be required,

nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual

punishments inflicted.”

2

Statement of the Case

A. Mullins pleads guilty to aggravated murder committed as a juvenile. 1

In 2001, just weeks before his eighteenth birthday,

Respondent Morris Mullins raped and killed 78-yearold Amy Davis in her home. R1–2, 5, 57. Davis’s body

was found the next day; she “had been sexually assaulted, struck on the side of the head with blunt

force, and suffocated” with a pillow. R125.

Police soon identified Mullins as the suspect in

part because he was a suspect in a case in Arizona that

also involved the sexual assault and homicide of an

elderly woman in her home. R6, 135, 739–40. 2

The State of Utah charged Mullins as an adult

with one count of aggravated murder and one count of

rape. R1–2. In exchange for dismissing the rape

charge, Mullins pleaded guilty to aggravated murder,

admitting that “while committing the offense of burglary, [he] knowingly caused the death of Amy Davis.”

R56–64.

1 Mullins pleaded guilty before even a preliminary hearing

was held. These facts are taken from the probable cause statement, witness statements, the sentencing transcript, and related

record documents.

2 Mullins later pleaded guilty to the Arizona murder. See Ben

Winslow, Richfield Woman’s Killer Guilty in Arizona Murder,

Deseret

News

(June

12,

2007)

https://www.deseret.com/2007/6/12/20024179/richfield-womans-killer-guilty-in-arizona-murder (last visited Mar. 2, 2026).

3

B. Mullins is sentenced to life without parole

based on the court’s consideration of relevant factors, including his age, under

Utah’s discretionary sentencing scheme.

Under Utah’s discretionary sentencing scheme for

the capital felony of aggravated murder, the court

could impose a sentence of either 20 years to life or life

without parole based on its consideration of aggravating and mitigating factors, including “the youth of the

defendant at the time of the crime.” Utah Code Ann. §

76-3-207 (West 2001). 3

Consistent with Utah law, the trial court held a

sentencing hearing in 2002 during which it considered

the State’s and Mullins’s submissions and arguments

on the aggravating and mitigating factors. Pet. App.

66a–116a (Appendix B). The State’s case for life without parole included evidence about the planned and

heinous crime, Utah and Arizona police reports, Mullins’s time in jail involving property destruction and

assaults on inmates and police officers, and his continued physical and verbal sexual deviancy. Pet. App.

88a–95a; see R125–254.

Mullins argued for a chance for parole. Pet. App. at

95a–113a. He relied heavily on a sentencing evaluation from a clinical and forensic psychologist that

identified and analyzed in detail several mitigating

factors, including Mullins’s age and immaturity, intellectual disabilities and academic deficiencies, physical

3 The State agreed not to seek capital punishment, a penalty

this Court would not prohibit for juvenile offenders until three

years later. See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 578 (2005).

4

and sexual abuse as a child, family dysfunction, and

related familial factors. R259–311.

The court asked if defense counsel was “trying to

assess the level of hope for the future you hold out for

Mr. Mullins,” and remarked that it didn’t “see anything in [the psychologist]’s report on how to assess

hope for change.” Pet. App. 110a. Defense counsel responded that he was unaware of any “standardized

scale to assess hope to change,” and admitted “[w]e

cannot predict” whether change was possible. Id. at

110a–111a. But if Mullins were to experience “true

change” after many years in prison, the board of pardons should be able to make that determination. Id. at

111a–112a.

The court was “satisfied” with “the recommendations of counsel,” “the reports,” and “the statements

made by the family members,” and the court “appreciate[d] the work” of the psychologist. Id. at 113a–114a.

The court recognized that Mullins’s life was “chaotic”

and he experienced a poor upbringing, but when all

the considerations were balanced together, the court

decided that the appropriate sentence was “life imprisonment without the possibility of parole.” Id. at

114a.

The court then addressed Mullins directly, stating:

“[I]f you’re gonna be with us for a long time and have

a chance to change, I hope—not under the present circumstances—I’m hoping that you’ll find some way to

be productive.” Id. at 115a.

5

C. Mullins challenges his sentence as illegal

under Miller v. Alabama.

More than a decade after sentencing, Mullins filed

a motion to correct an illegal sentence under rule

22(e), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, asserting

that his sentence was illegal under Miller v. Alabama,

567 U.S. 460 (2012). R451–55.

Mullins argued Miller’s holding—that mandatory

life-without-parole sentences for juveniles violated the

Eighth Amendment—made his sentence unconstitutional because there was “no record indicating that the

court took into consideration [his] youth” and other

factors. R454. And he asserted that Miller “mandates

that there be a finding on the record . . . to support the

judgment of life without parole.” R786.

The district court denied the motion. Pet. App.

117a–120a (Appendix C). It ruled that the sentencing

court did not err when it imposed Mullins’s life-without-parole sentence because the court “considered mitigating factors” and Miller “does not require a sentencer to make findings on the record.” Id. at 119a–

120a.

After having his time to appeal reinstated, Mullins

appealed the denial of his rule 22(e) motion. R708–09.

D. A divided Utah Supreme Court vacates

Mullins’s sentence.

The majority. In a 3-2 decision, the Utah Supreme Court vacated Mullins’s juvenile life-withoutparole (JLWOP) sentence based on the majority’s interpretation of Miller and its progeny—Montgomery v.

Louisiana, 577 U.S. 190 (2016) and Jones v. Mississippi, 593 U.S. 98 (2021)—and how that precedent

6

applied to the sentencing court’s statement about

Mullins’s “chance to change.” Pet. App. 2a–3a, 34a–

52a.

In the majority’s view, the Miller line of cases established a categorical bar to imposing JLWOP on a

class of juvenile offenders: “if a child is capable of

change and reform—that is, is not incorrigible—a

JLWOP sentence is disproportionate and unconstitutional.” Id. at 43a.

With that interpretation of the law, the majority

“turn[ed] to the facts of Mullins’s case.” Id. at 44a.

First, the majority concluded that because there was

no “affirmative factual finding that Mullins was capable of change,” the majority could not “declare Mullins’s sentence unconstitutional as a matter of law[.]”

Id. at 45a; see also id. at 51a (“[W]e can only speculate

as to whether Mullins is one of the rare individuals

‘whose crimes reflect irreparable corruption.’” (quoting Montgomery, 577 U.S. at 209)).

But the majority believed the sentencing court

“may have implicitly” made such a finding based on

the court’s “comment suggesting some ‘hope’ that Mullins might have ‘a chance to change.’” Id. at 46a. And

a JLWOP sentence was “incompatible with a suggestion that Mullins could change.” Id.; see also id.

(“While we cannot say that Mullins is the type of juvenile offender for whom JLWOP is categorically disproportionate . . . the court’s comments raise significant

concerns that Mullins may fall into that category.”).

The majority therefore remanded the case so the

sentencing court could “determine the appropriate

sentence here, considering Mullins’s youth as required by the Eighth Amendment, consistent with

Miller and this opinion.” Id. at 51a.

7

The dissent. Two justices dissented from the majority’s interpretation of Miller and its progeny. Id. at

52a–65a. The dissent recognized that the Miller line

of cases “has sent mixed messages about when a juvenile can be sentenced to JLWOP without violating the

Eighth Amendment.” Id. at 53a; see id. at 54a–58a

(discussing the Miller trilogy and concluding they “are

difficult to reconcile”); see id. at 61a–64a (citing lower

court cases split over those mixed messages).

But in the dissent’s view, it was “bound to follow

the Supreme Court’s most recent pronouncement in

Jones.” Id. at 59a. And the dissent understood Jones

to mean that if a sentencing court “had discretion to

impose a lesser sentence” and “was free to consider all

mitigating factors, including Mullins’s youth and attendant circumstances,” that was “all the Miller line

of cases requires.” Id. at 53a; see id. at 59a–60a (recognizing that “Jones creates confusion”).

Thus, even a finding of permanent incorrigibility

would not “preclude a JLOWP sentence” because “a

JLWOP sentence is not categorically unconstitutional

when imposed on a juvenile who the court views as

redeemable.” Id. at 61a, 64a. It was therefore unnecessary “to decipher the sentencing court’s remark

about ‘a chance to change,’” because “[e]ven if the sentencing court believed that Mullins had the capacity

to change, it would not render Mullins’s sentence unconstitutional.” Id. at 65a.

8

Argument

The Court Should Resolve the Split of Authority

on Whether the Eighth Amendment Prohibits

Life Without Parole When a Juvenile is Capable

of Change.

In Miller v. Alabama, the Court held “that mandatory life-without-parole sentences for juveniles violate

the Eighth Amendment.” 567 U.S. at 470. That’s because “children are constitutionally different from

adults for purposes of sentencing” in many ways, including their “capacity for change.” Id. at 471–74. And

“mandatory penalty schemes . . . prevent the sentencer from taking account of these central considerations.” Id. at 474.

Then, in Montgomery v. Louisiana, the Court held

that Miller announced a substantive rule of constitutional law that applied retroactively. 577 U.S. at 206–

10. In so doing, the Court appeared to contradict Miller. Whereas the Court in Miller made clear that its

holding “does not categorically bar a penalty for a

class of offenders,” 567 U.S. at 483, the Court in Montgomery declared that Miller did just the opposite: “it

rendered life without parole an unconstitutional penalty for a ‘class of defendants because of their status’—

that is, juvenile offenders whose crimes reflect the

transient immaturity of youth,” 577 U.S. at 208 (citation omitted). Noting this inconsistency, a three-justice dissent accused the majority of “not applying Miller, but rewriting it.” Montgomery, 577 U.S. at 224–25

(Scalia, J., dissenting).

Just five years later, the Court granted certiorari

in Jones v. Mississippi, “[i]n light of disagreement in

state and federal courts about how to interpret Miller

and Montgomery.” 593 U.S. at 104. There, the Court

9

answered only whether a sentencing court “must

make a finding of permanent incorrigibility.” Id. at

101. The Court held that Miller and Montgomery were

at least in agreement on that point: “a finding of fact

regarding a child’s incorrigibility . . . is not required”

before imposing JLWOP. Id. at 104–05 (quoting Montgomery, 577 U.S. at 211).

But by limiting its holding to only whether a finding regarding incorrigibility was “required,” the Court

did not squarely resolve the inconsistency in Miller

and Montgomery about what sentencing courts may

do when there is a finding that a juvenile is capable of

change. Id. at 113.

If anything, Jones compounded the confusion. On

one hand, the Court declared that Miller “mandated

‘only that a sentencer follow a certain process—considering an offender’s youth and attendant circumstances—before imposing’ a life-without-parole sentence.” Id. at 101 (quoting Miller, 567 U.S. at 483). But

on the other hand, it recited a contradictory “key paragraph from Montgomery”: “That Miller did not impose a formal factfinding requirement does not leave

States free to sentence a child whose crime reflects

transient immaturity to life without parole. To the

contrary, Miller established that this punishment is

disproportionate under the Eighth Amendment.” Id.

at 106 n.2 (quoting Montgomery, 577 U.S. at 211).

Later, the Court again emphasized the contradiction. First, it described Miller as clearly stating that

the “decision does not categorically bar a penalty for a

class of offenders or type of crime,” rather, it simply

“held that a sentencer must have discretion to consider youth before imposing a life-without-parole sentence.” Id. at 108–09 (quoting Miller, 567 U.S. at 483).

10

But then it also stated that “Montgomery was clear”

that the discretionary sentencing procedure “is necessary to separate those juveniles who may be sentenced

to life without parole from those who may not.” Id. at

111 (quoting Montgomery, 577 U.S. at 210) (emphasis

added).

A divided Court in Jones disagreed on what this all

meant. The majority claimed it “carefully follows both

Miller and Montgomery” without overruling either of

them. Id. at 118. A three-justice dissent contended

that the majority “distort[ed]” those cases “beyond

recognition.” Id. at 133 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).

While Justice Thomas believed that “the decisions

cannot be reconciled” because of the contradiction, and

that the majority “[o]verrule[d] Montgomery in substance but not in name.” Id. at 123–27 (Thomas, J.,

concurring in the judgment). To the majority, it was

merely a “good-faith disagreement . . . over how to interpret Miller and Montgomery.” Id. at 118.

Regardless of how one describes the inconsistency,

lower courts are left to pick up the pieces and try to fit

them together. Several years after Jones, state and

federal courts are split on the question presented here:

can a sentencing court still impose JLWOP even if the

court explicitly or implicitly finds the juvenile defendant is capable of change and reform?

The confusion has resulted in a deep and persistent split of authority that cannot be resolved without

this Court’s intervention. And the question is at the

heart of the divided Utah Supreme Court decision

here, making this case an ideal vehicle to address it.

11

A. Lower courts are split on how to reconcile

this Court’s holdings in Miller, Montgomery, and Jones.

The inconsistency between Miller, Montgomery,

and Jones has created a split among lower courts. 4

1. Several courts read Miller and its progeny as

completely barring JLWOP for juveniles who are not

permanently incorrigible.

The Utah Supreme Court, as noted, falls in this

camp. Pet. App. 43a (reading Miller, Montgomery, and

Jones to mean that “if a child is capable of change and

reform—that is, is not incorrigible—a JLWOP sentence is disproportionate and unconstitutional”). The

court noted “a sentencing court has no obligation to

make an on-the-record finding of permanent incorrigibility before imposing a JLWOP sentence,” but if a

sentencing court does find “that a juvenile offender

can change, a JLWOP sentence is unconstitutional.”

Id. 5

So even though the sentencing court considered

Mullins’s youth as part of the discretionary sentencing

proceeding, the Utah Supreme Court still vacated his

JLWOP sentence out of concern that Mullins was not

incorrigible. Id. at 44a–52a.

4 This includes courts that have held, or at least assumed

without deciding, that Miller and its progeny apply to “de-facto”

JWLOP sentences—lengthy terms of years that are likely to last

most if not all of a juvenile’s life before parole eligibility.

5 The majority recognized that other state courts “are divided

over the proper interpretation of these difficult cases.” Pet. App.

43a (citing cases).

12

A minority of other jurisdictions—Alaska, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, North Carolina, Wyoming, and the Second Circuit—agree with the Utah

Supreme Court majority.

Maryland’s highest court, after reviewing the decisions in Miller, Montgomery, and Jones, believed this

“Court did not have occasion to address a situation in

which a sentencing court finds that a crime was the

result of the offender’s transient immaturity but nonetheless sentences the offender to life without parole.”

Malvo v. State, 281 A.3d 758, 765 (Md. 2022). Pointing

to Jones’s careful effort not to overrule either Miller or

Montgomery and its quotation of Montgomery’s “key

paragraph,” Maryland concluded that “an offender

deemed corrigible cannot constitutionally be sentenced to life without the possibility of parole.” Id.

(quoting Jones, 593 U.S. at 106 n.2).

The Supreme Court of North Carolina ruled similarly. It concluded that “the Eighth Amendment categorically prohibits a sentencing court from sentencing

any juvenile to life without parole if the sentencing

court has found the juvenile to be ‘neither incorrigible

nor irredeemable.’” State v. Kelliher, 873 S.E.2d 366,

380 (N.C. 2022); see id. (“Jones does not alter the substantive Eighth Amendment rule announced in Miller

and Montgomery which forbids a sentencing court

from sentencing redeemable juveniles to life without

parole.”). And because the sentencing court “affirmatively found that [the juvenile defendant] was ‘neither

13

incorrigible nor irredeemable,’ he could not constitutionally receive [that] sentence.” Id. at 370. 6

The Alaska Court of Appeals believed that the “categorization of juvenile offenders into two groups—the

‘transient immaturity’ juveniles for whom a sentence

of life without parole would violate the Eighth Amendment and the ‘irreparable corruption’ juveniles whose

life without parole sentences would not violate the

Eighth Amendment—survives Jones.” Fletcher v.

State, 532 P.3d 286, 307 (Alaska Ct. App. 2023). So

“sentencing a juvenile offender whose crime reflects

transient immaturity to life without parole violates”

both the Alaska and “the federal constitution.” Id.

The Supreme Court of Michigan likewise concluded, one year after Jones, that “Miller’s substantive

holding is that LWOP is an excessive sentence for children whose crimes reflect transient immaturity.” People v. Taylor, 987 N.W.2d 132, 139 (Mich. 2022); see

id. at 139–44 (discussing Michigan statute enacted “to

implement that substantive guarantee” by creating

presumption that a juvenile defendant “has engaged

in criminality because of transient immaturity, not irreparable corruption,” which prosecutors must rebut

before JLWOP may be imposed).

And the Second Circuit understood Montgomery to

impose a flat ban: “a life-without-parole sentence is

permissible only for ‘the rarest of juvenile offenders’—

specifically, ‘those whose crimes reflect permanent incorrigibility’ and ‘irreparable corruption.’” United

6 But see State v. Sims, 912 S.E.2d 767, 780 (N.C. 2025) (“[A]

sentencing court must simply consider youth and its attendant

circumstances in light of the defendant’s crime. Miller requires

no more.”)

14

States v. Delgado, 971 F.3d 144, 158 (2nd Cir. 2020)

(quoting Montgomery, 577 U.S. at 209). And even

though the sentencing court implicitly considered the

defendant’s youth along with all other statutory sentencing factors, the Second Circuit still reversed his

JLWOP sentence because the district court did not

give “deliberate consideration” of his youth. Id. at

159. 7

Other courts have similarly interpreted the Miller

trilogy as drawing an Eighth Amendment line between transient immaturity and irreparable corruption. See State v. McInnis, 962 N.W.2d 874, 882 n.3

(Minn. 2021) (stating that although Jones does not require a finding of permanent incorrigibility, a Miller

hearing is where “a district court determines whether

a juvenile is irreparably corrupt”); Davis v. State, 415

P.3d 666, 682 (Wyo. 2018) (holding, pre-Jones, that

under Miller, the State had the burden to prove “beyond a reasonable doubt that the juvenile offender is

irreparably corrupt”).

2. In contrast, a majority of courts agree that even

corrigible juvenile offenders may be sentenced to

JLWOP, because Jones requires only that a sentencing court consider the offender’s youth and has discretion to impose a lesser sentence.

The Mullins dissent, as noted, read literally

Jones’s holding “that permanent incorrigibility is not

‘an eligibility criterion’ for JLWOP and that ‘a State’s

discretionary sentencing system is both constitutionally necessary and constitutionally sufficient.’” Pet.

7 Although decided before Jones, this appears to be the Sec-

ond Circuit’s last word on the matter as it has not decided another JLWOP case since Jones.

15

App. 59a (quoting Jones, 593. U.S. at 105, 107–09). In

other words, “all the Miller line of cases requires” is

the freedom to consider “youth and attendant circumstances” and the “discretion to impose a lesser sentence” than life without parole. Id. at 53a. That’s true

regardless of a sentencing court’s commentary about

the juvenile’s capacity for change and even for “a juvenile who the court views as redeemable.” Id. at 64a–

65a.

At least sixteen other jurisdictions—Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, Georgia, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas,

Mississippi, Montana, Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Wisconsin, and the Third and

Ninth Circuits—agree with the Mullins dissent that

consideration of youth is all that Miller and its progeny require, regardless of the juvenile’s corrigibility

status.

Indeed, the Third Circuit squarely held that “individualized consideration is all that Miller requires.”

United States v. Grant, 9 F.4th 186, 197 (3rd Cir.

2021). So even though the sentencing court “made a

gratuitous corrigibility finding” it “does not invalidate

[the juvenile’s] sentence.” Id. at 198; see id. at 197

(“gratuitous[]” finding “that a defendant is corrigible”

may give rise to “an as-applied Eighth Amendment

claim based on disproportionality”); see also id at 209,

212 (Greenway, J., concurring) (observing that Jones

“does not resolve the question of what happens when

an affirmative finding of corrigibility has been made”).

The Ninth Circuit referred to Montgomery’s statement that JLWOP is unconstitutional “for all but . . .

those whose crimes reflect permanent incorrigibility”

as dicta. United States v. Briones, 35 F.4th 1150,

1153–54 (9th Cir. 2021) (quoting Montgomery, 577

16

U.S. at 208–09). 8 And it held that special analysis of

evidence of rehabilitation and capacity for change

“that would rule out permanent incorrigibility” was

unnecessary because it would amount to an implicit

finding, which “Jones flatly rejected.” Id. at 1158 & n.5

(quotation simplified); see also Helm v. Thornell, 112

F.4th 674, 687 (9th Cir. 2024) (Jones clarified that

“Miller requires a ‘discretionary sentencing procedure,’ but it does not require that a state court’s

weighing of the mitigating factors associated with

youth be conducted in accordance with any particular

substantive criteria of incorrigibility” (quoting Jones,

593 U.S. at 120–21)).

The Supreme Court of Arizona, overruling its preJones precedent, rejected the contention that “a juvenile life-without-parole sentence that is the product of

‘transient immaturity’ is unconstitutional under Miller.” State ex rel. Mitchell v. Cooper, 535 P.3d 3, 13

(Ariz. 2023). The court’s “review of Miller and its progeny demonstrates that ‘transient immaturity’ is not a

substantive component of Miller.” Id. at 14. Sentencing courts need not distinguish between juveniles on

either side of the corrigibility line. Id. at 14–15.

The Mississippi Supreme Court held that even if

the evidence showed that a juvenile’s “rehabilitation

is not only possible but likely,” such a conclusion “does

not undermine the trial court’s determination that

[the juvenile’s] life sentence should be without parole”

8 The Kentucky Supreme Court, before Jones, also concluded

that the language in Miller and Montgomery “about the ‘rare’ juvenile offender whose crimes merit LWOP,” was merely “dicta

and guidance.” Phon v. Commonwealth, 545 S.W.3d 284, 294

(Ken. 2018).

17

when weighed against other factors. Johnson v. State,

396 So.3d 1073, 1082 (Miss. 2024).

The Illinois Supreme Court overruled its pre-Jones

precedent “holding that a juvenile offender’s discretionary life sentence does not comport with the

[E]ighth [A]mendment unless the sentencing court

first makes a finding of permanent incorrigibility” because it was “directly at odds with the holding in

Jones.” People v. Wilson, 220 N.E.3d 1068, 1077 (Ill.

2023). The court upheld the defendant’s JLWOP sentence even though the sentencing court acknowledged

both an absence of evidence that he was “going to turn

[his] life around,” and also the chance that he “can

prove [the court] wrong” while in prison. Id. at 1078.

And the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania also relied on Jones to reverse its prior understanding of Miller and Montgomery “that a juvenile homicide offender

cannot constitutionally receive a sentence of life without parole unless he or she is proven to be permanently incorrigible.” Commonwealth v. Felder, 269

A.3d 1232, 1246 (Penn. 2022). It now holds that “the

authority of a sentencing court to impose life-withoutparole sentence on a juvenile homicide offender is circumscribed only . . . by Miller’s command to ‘consider

the mitigating qualities of youth.’” Id. at 1245 (quoting

Miller, 567 U.S. at 476). Thus, “no viable Miller claim

exists” as long as the court had discretion to consider

youth and impose a lesser sentence than JLWOP. Id.

at 1243.

Many other courts have reached similar conclusions about how to interpret the Miller trilogy. See

State v. Smart, 889 S.E.2d 573, 576 (S.C. 2023) (statements from Miller discussing “juveniles who do not deserve [JLWOP] and those who do . . . . were not meant

18

to suggest a presumption against life without parole

or that any burden must be placed on the State”); Elliott v. State, 653 S.W.3d 776, 780 (Ark. 2022) (holding

that when jury is deciding between JLWOP and lesser

punishments “a jury instruction on the issue of permanent incorrigibility or irretrievable depravity was

not required”); Conley v. State, 183 N.E.3d 276, 284

(Ind. 2022) (recognizing that in some cases “even considering the notable differences between juveniles and

adults, the juvenile’s crimes are so reprehensible and

heinous that an LWOP sentence would be appropriate”); State v. Keefe, 512 P.3d 741, 747 (Mont. 2022)

(“Miller and its progeny do not stand for the proposition that a juvenile homicide offender is constitutionally entitled to any specific term of years if found not

to be irreparably corrupt.”); State v. Morris, 222

N.E.3d 568, 571 (Ohio 2022) (holding “assessing that

a defendant is permanently incorrigible is not the

same thing as considering a defendant’s youth as a

mitigating factor”; “there is no basis to conflate the

two concepts” and Jones requires only the latter);

State v. Walker, 2022 WL 1574255, *2 (Wis. Ct. App.

Jan. 25, 2022) (unpublished) (holding de-facto JLWOP

sentence “not contrary to Miller or Montgomery” despite sentencing court’s “expressed ‘hope’” for change

in future because “the sentencing court gave more

weight to other factors” than to “Walker’s age and its

attendant circumstances”); Wynn v. State, 354 So.3d

1007, 1037 (Ala. Crim. App. 2021) (concluding Jones

“made it clear that irreparable corruption is not the

determining factor of the constitutionality of a sentence”); Homes v. State, 859 S.E.2d 475, 479–80 (Ga.

2021) (affirming JLWOP because youth was considered despite sentencing court saying both that

JLWOP was “only deserving” when court “doesn’t feel

19

there’s any redeeming part to an individual,” and that

the court “regret[ed] it”); Williams v. State, 500 P.3d

1182, 1184–87 (Kan. 2021) (rejecting lower court ruling that youth was not “adequately” considered at preMiller sentencing because Jones requires only discretionary sentencing without imposing specific method

for considering or weighing youth); White v. State, 499

P.3d 762, 769 (Okla. 2021) (“Jones makes clear that

[permanent incorrigibility] is neither an eligibility factor nor a factual predicate to a life-without-parole sentence but, instead, is a mere sentencing factor.”).

3. Still other courts that were not required to reconcile Miller, Montgomery, and Jones to decide the

cases before them, have expressed confusion about the

inconsistencies.

The Seventh Circuit considered a habeas petition

challenging the Wisconsin Court of Appeals’ application of Miller, Montgomery, and Jones. Walker v.

Cromwell, 140 F.4th 878, 881–82 (7th Cir. 2025). The

juvenile contended that the sentencing judge, by “express[ing] ‘hope’ that [the juvenile] would be able to

develop healthy relationships and grow as a person

while he was incarcerated,” acknowledged that the juvenile “was capable of reform” and therefore could not

be sentenced to “de facto life without parole.” Id. at

883–84, 892 n.4.

The Seventh Circuit believed “the shifting rationales of Miller, Montgomery, and Jones” had “left unsettled whether the Eighth Amendment categorically

forbids life without parole for corrigible juvenile homicide offenders.” Id. at 888. The court reasoned: “Even

if no factual finding of permanent incorrigibility is required, it does not necessarily follow that a sentencing

judge could find a juvenile homicide offender capable

20

of change and still sentence him to life without parole.” Id. at 892. But because the case was brought under habeas review, the court merely concluded that

the state court’s application of those cases was not unreasonable because the law “simply is not clear.” Id.

at 892–93.

And the Oregon Court of Appeals, citing the fact

that “Jones expressly did not overrule Miller and

Montgomery,” believed it “somewhat unclear under

what circumstances we would conclude that a sentencing court failed to adequately consider a juvenile

offender’s youth.” Harned v. Amsberry, 499 P.3d 825,

832 (Or. Ct. App. 2021) (emphasis added). And the

court specifically noted cases—similar to Mullins’s—

where sentencing occurred before Miller when courts

were not “clearly on notice to consider youth.” Id.

B. The Utah Supreme Court’s divided opinion presents an ideal vehicle to resolve the

split of authority.

This case squarely presents an ideal vehicle to address the nationwide confusion and split of authority

left unresolved after Jones.

First, this case directly addresses the legal question presented and underscores the ongoing divergent

views about the correct answer. As stated, the Utah

Supreme Court divided 3-2 over the issue—how to reconcile Miller, Montgomery, and Jones when there is a

finding, or at least a suggestion, that a juvenile is capable of change. The majority and dissenting opinions

each took a side, identified supporting jurisdictions,

and explained their rationale. The issue has been teed

up perfectly—and has been percolating around the

country long enough—for the Court to resolve the split

of authority.

21

This case also presents an ideal vehicle factually.

Mullins was sentenced under a discretionary statutory scheme. The sentencing court had discretion to

impose a lesser sentence—life with parole—in lieu of

JLWOP. Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-207(4)(c) (West 2001).

The statute specifically identified “the youth of the defendant at the time of the crime” as a mitigating circumstance. Id. § 76-3-207(3)(e). And that factor was

addressed in the psychologist’s in-depth report that

specifically discussed Mullins’s age and immaturity

and related factors, R259–311, as well as in Mullins’s

arguments at the hearing, Pet. App. 95a–113a.

If the Mullins dissent—along with the majority of

other jurisdictions in agreement—correctly reasoned

that consideration of youth is all that Miller and its

progeny require, regardless of a juvenile’s corrigibility

status, then Mullins’s sentence was lawfully imposed,

and this Court can simply reverse the Utah Supreme

Court.

On the other hand, if the Mullins majority is correct—that an implicit finding that a juvenile is capable of change and reform prohibits a JLWOP sentence—then this Court can affirm. Either way, answering the question presented will squarely resolve

this case while also providing an answer that other

courts can easily apply to future cases. 9

9 The Utah Supreme Court vacated Mullins’s sentence under

a prior version of rule 22(e), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure,

on the ground that Mullins’s sentence was “imposed in an illegal

manner.” Pet. App. 47a; see Utah R. Crim. P. 22(e) (2013). But

the basis for the majority’s conclusion—and the dissent’s disagreement—was the majority’s interpretation and application of

Miller, Montgomery, and Jones, without which the court would

22

C. Resolving the split of authority is a matter

of profound national importance.

Answering the question presented is nationally

important. Juveniles unfortunately continue to commit murder. Many states still permit and impose

JLWOP for that heinous crime. And sentences long

since imposed, like Mullins’s, continue to be challenged under Miller, Montgomery, and Jones. The confusion and inconsistency about how to reconcile these

important cases will keep festering and spreading in

the future unless and until this Court addresses the

issue head on.

Granting certiorari will provide the Court the

much-needed opportunity to set the record straight

about the availability of JLWOP for juvenile murderers when sentencing courts find explicitly or implicitly

that a juvenile has the capacity for change.

not have vacated the conviction under the rule. Pet. App. 37a–

43a. So the application of the state rule of procedure does not

present a state-law vehicle problem. Indeed, this Court granted

certiorari in Montgomery after the petitioner’s motion to correct

an illegal sentence under Louisiana’s version of rule 22(e). See

Montgomery, 577 U.S. at 195–96.

23

Conclusion

The Court should grant the petition for writ of

certiorari to resolve the split of authority concerning

the Eighth Amendment standard for imposing

JLWOP on juvenile murders.

Respectfully submitted,

Derek Brown

Utah Attorney General

Stanford E. Purser

Utah Solicitor General

Counsel of Record

David Simpson

Deputy Solicitor General

Jeffrey D. Mann

Assistant Solicitor General

160 E. 300 S., 5th floor

Salt Lake City, UT 84111

(801) 366-0533

spurser@agutah.gov

Counsel for Petitioner

Dated: March 5, 2026

APPENDIX

i

TABLE OF APPENDICES

Page

APPENDIX A — AMENDED OPINION OF

THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE

OF UTAH, FILED NOVEMBER 20, 2025 . . . . . . . . 1a

APPENDIX B — SENTENCING HEARING

TRANSCRIPT, MAY 1, 2002 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66a

APPENDIX C — MEMORANDUM DECISION

A ND ORDER DEN Y ING MOTION TO

C OR R EC T I LL EG A L SEN T ENCE ,

FILED NOVEMBER 1, 2016 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117a

1a

Appendix AOPINION OF THE

APPENDIX A — AMENDED

SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH,

FILED NOVEMBER 20, 2025

AMENDED OPINION*

2025 UT 57

IN THE SUPREME COURT

OF THE STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,

Appellee,

v.

MORRIS THOMAS MULLINS,

Appellant.

No. 20200149

Heard October 18, 2023

Filed November 20, 2025

On Direct Appeal

* The State filed a petition for rehearing after we published our

original opinion, and we called for a response. We grant the petition

for the limited purpose of clarifying our analysis in paragraphs 2,

24–26, 37, 86, and Part II.F generally. We modify internal crossreferences accordingly. The dissent has made concomitant changes

in paragraphs 87, 103, and 112. In all other respects the petition is

denied.

2a

Appendix A

Sixth District Court, Sevier County

The Honorable Marvin D. Bagley

No. 011600140

Chief Justice Durrant authored the opinion of the

Court, in which A ssociate Chief Justice Pearce and

Justice Petersen joined.

Justice Hagen authored an opinion concurring in part

and dissenting in part, in which Justice Pohlman

joined.

Chief Justice Durrant, opinion of the Court:

INTRODUCTION

¶1 Morris Mullins pled guilty to aggravated murder

and was sentenced to life without parole (LWOP).

Because he was seventeen years old when he committed

the crime, this is a juvenile life without parole (JLWOP)

sentence. Now, at age forty and having already spent

more than two decades in prison, Mullins challenges his

sentence as unconstitutional. He brings seven state and

federal constitutional challenges, among them that his

sentence was cruel and unusual in violation of the Eighth

Amendment to the United States Constitution and article

I, section 9 of the Utah Constitution.

¶2 We do not reach three of Mullins’s claims because

they were not properly brought under rule 22(e) of the

Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. Of the claims we

do reach, we conclude that Mullins succeeds on only

3a

Appendix A

one. After Mullins was sentenced, the United States

Supreme Court decided a series of cases concluding that

it is unconstitutional to sentence juvenile offenders who

are not permanently incorrigible to JLWOP. Here, we

conclude that, because the record contains ambiguous

comments by the sentencing court indicating a significant

risk that the court misapprehended its constitutional

obligation to properly consider Mullins’s youth, the court

imposed the sentence in an illegal manner under rule 22(e).

Accordingly, we vacate Mullins’s sentence and remand his

case to the district court for resentencing.

BACKGROUND

¶3 In May 2001, Mullins killed a seventy-eight-yearold widow, Amy Davis, in her home. Mullins was seventeen

at the time. The State charged him as an adult with rape

and aggravated murder. Mullins pled guilty to aggravated

murder in exchange for the State dropping the rape charge

and taking the death penalty off the table.

¶4 At sentencing, the parties presented dueling

evidence about whether Mullins should receive JLWOP or

life with the possibility of parole. The prosecution focused

on the heinousness of Mullins’s crime and on his actions

and statements in jail that indicated a continuing desire

to inflict violence on women for pleasure. Several of the

victim’s family members testified about the impact of the

killing, asking the court to impose JLWOP.

¶5 The defense presented mitigating evidence, largely

based on a psychological evaluation conducted by a clinical

4a

Appendix A

and forensic psychologist. Defense counsel remarked

that Mullins had “the most profoundly dysfunctional

upbringing and rearing and family life that . . . members

of the defense team ha[d] ever seen, and that says a lot.”

He stated that Mullins’s removal from that dysfunctional

environment gave him “some hope that Mr. Mullins c[ould]

turn things around.” Counsel also stated that Mullins

had been discouraged from interacting with anyone

outside his small and dysfunctional community, had an

IQ well below average, suffered physical abuse by his

parents, witnessed severe alcohol abuse by his parents,

struggled with impulsivity, and was taught and rewarded

for antisocial behavior as a child.

¶6 At the end of the hearing, the district court

sentenced Mullins from the bench to JLWOP. The judge

stated that he had read the submitted reports, heard the

family members’ statements, and listened to counsel’s

arguments. The judge recognized that Mullins’s life had

been “chaotic” so far, but, upon balancing “the family’s

requests and Mr. Mullins’[s] request and the need to send

a message,” the judge determined that JLWOP was the

requisite punishment. The judge concluded the hearing

by addressing Mullins directly, stating: “[I]f you’re gonna

be with us for a long time and have a chance to change, I

hope—not under the present circumstances—I’m hoping

you’ll find some way to be productive.”

¶7 More than a decade later, in April 2013, Mullins

filed a pro se motion to correct an illegal sentence under

rule 22(e) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure in

the district court. He based his challenge on “new law”

5a

Appendix A

created in Miller v. Alabama, in which the United States

Supreme Court held that mandatory JLWOP violated the

Eighth Amendment because it did not allow a sentencing

judge to consider the juvenile’s “lessened culpability and

greater capacity for change.”1 Mullins’s petition asserted

that (1) his JLWOP sentence was unconstitutional because

there was “no record indicating that the court took

into consideration [his] youth”; and (2) because it was

unconstitutional to sentence him to the death penalty, it

was also unconstitutional for the State to offer to take

the death penalty off the table “in exchange for [him]

pleading guilty to aggravated murder.” Mullins also

generally discussed Miller and the line of cases leading

to that decision. 2

¶8 The district court appointed counsel to argue

Mullins’s 22(e) motion. The State stipulated to the

appointment, so long as counsel did not “change the

issue in dispute or expand the scope of the litigation.”

At the motion hearing, Mullins’s counsel relied on

Mullins’s original petition to argue that the court did not

appropriately consider Mullins’s youth as required by

Miller. He also argued that the court should have made

specific findings as to Mullins’s incorrigibility. The State

countered that Mullins “may [have been] a juvenile at the

time he committed the crime, but the process was followed

1. 567 U.S. 460, 465 (2012) (cleaned up); see also Tison v.

Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 156 (1987) (“[T]he more purposeful is the

criminal conduct, the more serious is the offense”).

2. See Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010); Roper v.

Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005); Miller, 567 U.S. 460.

6a

Appendix A

and he was a juvenile who was in adult court and he was

treated like an adult.” Regardless, the State argued, the

sentencing scheme was discretionary, so Miller did not

apply.

¶9 In November 2016, the district court denied

Mullins’s motion. It characterized his claims as follows:

(1) JLWOP is categorically unconstitutional, and (2) a

sentencing court must justify its sentence with findings

on the record. The court then rejected both arguments

based on Miller and State v. Houston. 3 Under the Utah

Rules of Appellate Procedure, Mullins had thirty days to

file a direct appeal.

¶10 In May 2018, well after the thirty-day cutoff

period, new counsel for Mullins petitioned the district

court to reinstate the time to appeal the denial of his

22(e) motion. Mullins asserted that his previous appointed

counsel had been constitutionally ineffective. Specifically,

he stated that his previous attorney told him that he would

appeal if the court denied his 22(e) motion. But when the

district court denied the motion, previous counsel did not

appeal or tell Mullins of the denial, which, Mullins argued,

led to his untimely appeal. The State stipulated to the

motion to reinstate the time to appeal, and the district

court granted it. In February 2020, Mullins appealed the

denial of his 22(e) motion. We retained the case to hear

the appeal directly.

3. See Miller, 567 U.S. 460; State v. Houston, 2015 UT 40, ¶¶ 32,

52–63, 353 P.3d 55.

7a

Appendix A

STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶11 Mullins brings his challenges under rule 22(e) of

the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, which governs

challenges to illegal sentences. We review district court

decisions on challenges to illegal sentences “for correctness

and grant[] no deference to the district court.”4

¶12 Mullins also raises some challenges to his sentence

that he did not raise before the district court. We treat

those claims as new 22(e) claims and reach them for the

first time in this appeal. 5

ANALYSIS

¶13 Mullins raises seven claims on appeal, arguing that

(1) the sentencing court violated the Sixth Amendment

to the United States Constitution when it increased

the minimum sentence based on judicial factfinding;

(2) the sentencing statute was unconstitutionally vague;

(3) imposing a JLWOP sentence on an intellectually

impaired juvenile violates the Eighth Amendment to

the United States Constitution; (4) imposing JLWOP

on an intellectually impaired juvenile violates article I,

section 9 of the Utah Constitution; (5) JLWOP sentences

are categorically unconstitutional under article I,

section 9 of the Utah Constitution; (6) JLWOP sentences

are categorically unconstitutional under the Eighth

Amendment to the United States Constitution; and

4. State v. Houston, 2015 UT 40, ¶ 16, 353 P.3d 55.

5. See infra ¶¶ 39, 46, 51, 55.

8a

Appendix A

(7) a JLWOP sentence was unconstitutional under the

Eighth Amendment as applied to his case.

¶14 As a threshold issue, we must determine whether

the legal vehicle Mullins uses to challenge his sentence,

rule 22(e) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, allows

us to reach the merits of his claims. As explained below,

amendments to rule 22(e) during the pendency of the

current litigation complicate that analysis. We begin by

discussing how each version of rule 22(e) operates. We then

analyze Mullins’s claims under the appropriate version of

the rule and ultimately vacate Mullins’s JLWOP sentence

based on his as-applied Eighth Amendment claim.

I.

ANALYSIS UNDER RULE 22(e) OF THE UTAH

RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

¶15 Mullins brings his claims under rule 22(e) of the

Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. This subparagraph

of rule 22 governs when a court must correct a convicted

criminal defendant’s sentence. In 2019, we changed the

rule’s language significantly. Because the two versions

of the rule operate differently, the first step in our 22(e)

analysis asks which version of the rule applies to each

of Mullins’s seven claims—some brought in his original

motion and others brought for the first time on appeal.

We outline the framework for making this determination

first. We then identify the requirements for bringing a

challenge under each version of the rule.

9a

Appendix A

A.

We Evaluate Each Claim Based on the Version

of Rule 22(e) in Effect When the Claim Was

First Raised

¶16 Mullins filed his original 22(e) motion in 2013

under the rule as it existed at that time (old rule).6 But he

did not appeal the district court’s denial of that motion

until 2020, after changes to the rule had taken effect (new

rule).7 He argues that because he filed his original 22(e)

motion before the rule changed, all claims—even those

the State argues were raised for the first time on appeal,

after the amendment took effect—should be subject to

the old rule.

¶17 The State sees this issue differently. It argues that

all of Mullins’s claims should be subject to the new rule.

According to the State’s logic, because none of Mullins’s

claims on appeal were included in his original motion, we

should treat his appeal as the equivalent of a new 22(e)

motion and apply the new rule to all his claims on appeal.

¶18 The law governing appellate review of a legal event

is “the law as it exists at the time of the event regulated

by the law in question.”8 This “analysis may be applied

6. See Utah R. Crim. P. 22(e) (2013).

7. See id. (2020). Because the rule has not been amended since

Mullins filed his appeal in 2020, we refer to the current version

throughout our analysis. See id. (2025).

8. State v. Clark, 2011 UT 23, ¶ 13, 251 P.3d 829.

10a

Appendix A

to either statutes or rules.” 9 Thus when determining

which version of a rule applies, the relevant questions are

“what ‘event’ is being regulated by the [rule] in question

and, further, when that event occurred.”10 The State

and Mullins disagree about what the regulated event is.

Mullins believes the regulated event is filing a 22(e) motion.

In other words, Mullins argues that because he filed his

original motion when the old rule was in effect, that rule

should govern all claims before us now, even claims not

raised below. The State believes that the regulated event is

raising a 22(e) claim. So the State contends that any claims

not presented in the original rule 22(e) motion should be

governed by the new rule. We agree with the State.

¶19 When a law or rule regulates a substantive right,

the relevant event is the parties’ “underlying primary

conduct.”11 When the relevant law regulates procedure,

the relevant event is the “underlying procedural act.”12

Both parties assume that rule 22(e) is procedural, and,

without deciding the issue, we follow their lead. Because

we assume rule 22(e) is procedural, the “regulated event”

is the underlying procedural act that the rule governs.

9. Beaver Cnty. v. Utah State Tax Comm’n, 2010 UT 50, ¶ 10

n.5, 254 P.3d 158.

10. O’Connor v. Labor Comm’n, 2020 UT App 49, ¶ 11, 463

P.3d 85.

11. Jones v. Mackey Price Thompson & Ostler, 2020 UT 25,

¶ 49, 469 P.3d 879 (cleaned up).

12. Id. (cleaned up).

11a

Appendix A

¶20 At first blush, the relevant procedural event

appears to be the filing of a 22(e) motion, as Mullins

suggests. But under both versions of the rule, a defendant

may sometimes bring a challenge for the first time on

appeal.13 This means that Mullins’s interpretation fails

because not all rule 22(e) challenges will stem from a 22(e)

motion. The relevant “regulated event,” then, is raising

the individual claim that challenges a sentence, as the

State argues.

¶21 As applied to this case, this means that any claims

brought in Mullins’s original motion—before the rule

was amended—are governed by the old rule. Any claims

brought for the first time on appeal—after the rule was

amended—are governed by the new rule. Mullins filed

his original motion pro se in 2013. The district court then

appointed him counsel for argument. But the court limited

the scope of the arguments appointed counsel could make

to only those contained in Mullins’s original motion. We

thus look to both Mullins’s pro se motion and his counsel’s

arguments at the motion hearing to understand which

claims Mullins brought in his original motion and which

claims are therefore governed by the old rule.

13. See State v. Houston, 2015 UT 40, ¶ 20, 353 P.3d 55 (holding

that under the old rule, an appellate court may vacate an illegal

sentence based on an argument raised for the first time on appeal);

see also infra ¶¶ 29–31, 36 (explaining that under the new rule, a

defendant may raise an unpreserved challenge to a sentence on

appeal if a preservation exception applies).

12a

Appendix A

B. The Old Rule and the New Rule Impose Distinct

Requirements

¶22 Having established that we apply the version of

rule 22(e) in effect when the defendant first raised each

claim, we now explain the requirements of the old rule

and the new rule.

¶23 The old rule provided: “The court may correct

an illegal sentence, or a sentence imposed in an illegal

manner, at any time.”14 Generally, we will not hear an

argument that an appellant did not first raise before

the district court. 15 But, because of the “sweeping

language” of the old rule,16 we have held that the typical

“preservation rules do not apply in the context of [an old

rule] challenge.”17 So we may still hear a challenge brought

14. Utah R. Crim. P. 22(e) (2013). We held in State v. Candedo

that the old rule “is sufficiently broad” to permit challenges based on

“constitutional violations that threaten the validity of the sentence.”

2010 UT 32, ¶ 14, 232 P.3d 1008, superseded by rule on other grounds

as stated in State v. Robinson, 2023 UT 25, ¶¶ 17–18, 540 P.3d

614. “[I]f an offender’s sentence is unconstitutional, the sentence

is not authorized by the judgment of conviction, and is therefore

illegal.” Id. ¶ 13 (cleaned up). This court may reach the merits of a

constitutional challenge under the old rule so long as the defendant

“raises an articulable basis for challenging the constitutionality of

[the] sentence,” id. ¶ 14, and the claim satisfies the reviewability

requirement, discussed below, see infra ¶¶ 24–27.

15. State v. Johnson, 2017 UT 76, ¶ 15, 416 P.3d 443.

16. Candedo, 2010 UT 32, ¶ 9 (cleaned up).

17. Houston, 2015 UT 40, ¶ 20.

13a

Appendix A

under the old rule “even if the issue is raised for the first

time on appeal.”18

¶24 Despite falling within an exception to our

traditional preservation rules, claims brought under the

old rule must still satisfy another requirement. Out of

concerns about abuse and in pursuit of judicial economy,

we narrowed the scope and type of claims that could be

brought under the old rule by requiring a 22(e) challenge

to be “facial.”19 We defined “facial” in State v. Houston to

mean that the challenge must seek to correct a defect in

the sentence in a way that does not require further factual

development in the district court. 20 This requirement

served two purposes. First, it worked to keep out “factintensive challenge[s] to the legality of a sentencing

proceeding asserted long after the time for raising

[such challenges] in the initial trial or direct appeal” had

expired. 21 Second, it allowed us to consider only claims

that we could decide based on the record and arguments

before us, thus avoiding the lengthy and inefficient process

of remanding a case to district court for factfinding before

the legality of the sentence could be decided. 22

18. State v. Brooks, 908 P.2d 856, 860 (Utah 1995).

19. See State v. Prion, 2012 UT 15, ¶¶ 20–22, 274 P.3d 919;

Houston, 2015 UT 40, ¶ 27.

20. 2015 UT 40, ¶¶ 26–27; see also Prion, 2012 UT 15, ¶ 22.

21. Houston, 2015 UT 40, ¶ 23 (cleaned up).

22. See id. ¶ 27.

14a

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¶25 Though we used the terms “facial” and “asapplied” in Houston, a close inspection of our caselaw

shows that in this context, the terms vary from their

traditional meaning. 23 Under the traditional definition, a

facial challenge asserts that a statute “always operates

unconstitutionally.”24 In contrast, “as-applied” traditionally

means a challenge to a statute only in “application to a

particular party.”25 In Houston, we used the terms “facial”

and “as-applied” to merely illustrate the difference

between the types of analyses we intended to include in and

exclude from the scope of the old rule. More precisely, the

old rule excludes claims that would require us to remand

a case for further factual development before determining

the legality of the sentence or to resolve factual disputes

ourselves. 26 Instead, under the old rule, we may consider

only claims that raise “purely legal question[s]” in which

the “pertinent facts are undisputed.” 27

¶26 Ultimately, the old rule allows review only of

defects that “could easily be corrected without the need

for factual development in the original trial court.” 28

We acknowledge that the use of the terms “facial” and

23. See id. ¶ 26–27.

24. Archuleta v. State, 2020 UT 62, ¶ 35 n.3, 472 P.3d 950

(cleaned up).

25. Id. (cleaned up).

26. See Houston, 2015 UT 40, ¶ 27.

27. Id. (cleaned up).

28. Id. ¶ 24 (cleaned up).

15a

Appendix A

“as-applied” in this slightly different context invites

confusion. For clarity, in interpreting claims under the

old rule, we will recharacterize the requirement as one

of “reviewability”: the old rule bars challenges that an

appellate court cannot resolve without further factual

development or factfinding while permitting challenges

that are legal or resolvable based on the existing record

before the appellate court. 29

¶27 Under this definition, some claims that qualify as

“as-applied” in the traditional sense will require further

development of the record for us to make an informed

29. We note that while the reviewability requirement limits

the types of illegal sentences a court may consider and correct,

the reviewability requirement does not mean that further factual

development will never be required after an appellate court has

“correct[ed]” an illegal sentence by vacating it. In some cases, the

proper sentence will be clear, so an appellate court may vacate

the illegal sentence and order a new one entered immediately.

In other cases, the record and the law may show that the current

sentence is illegal but not dictate the proper sentence. In those

cases, an appellate court may vacate the sentence and remand for

resentencing, including further factual development if needed.

To interpret the reviewability requirement otherwise would

prevent appellate courts from correcting sentences “imposed in an

illegal manner,” see Utah R. Crim. P. 22(e) (2013)—cases in which

the ultimate sentence might in fact have been permissible but the

underlying sentencing proceedings were illegal. The only remedy

in most such cases is remand for resentencing under the proper

procedure, including additional fact-finding if necessary. We

therefore conclude that the need for further factual development

after the illegal sentence has been corrected by vacatur does not bar

an appellate court from considering otherwise reviewable claims.

16a

Appendix A

decision; the old rule excludes those fact-intensive claims.

But other claims that would traditionally be defined as

“as-applied” will require no further factual development

and may be resolved by us on the undisputed facts in the

record; the old rule permits us to hear those claims. 30

¶28 Having established the requirements of the old

rule, we turn to the new rule. We hold that the two key

features of the old rule—the preservation exception and

the reviewability requirement—do not carry over to the

new rule for several reasons.

¶29 First, we address preservation. The old rule was

silent on how a defendant could request the correction of an

illegal sentence. It provided only that a court could correct

30. Houston at first appears to support using the traditional

definition of “facial” and “as-applied.” See 2015 UT 40, ¶ 26. There,

we implied that all as-applied challenges are, in fact, challenges to

the “underlying conviction that rule 22(e) does not allow. See id. We

looked to State v. Telford, suggesting that in Telford we rejected

an as-applied claim solely because it was as-applied. See id. (citing

State v. Telford, 2002 UT 51, ¶ 7, 48 P.3d 228 (per curiam), superseded

by rule as stated in Robinson, 2023 UT 25, ¶¶ 19, 23)). But upon a

careful reading of Telford, it becomes apparent that we did not hold

in that case that all as-applied challenges attack the underlying

conviction. Instead, we based our rejection of the as-applied claim

in Telford solely on the ground that the claim challenged the

underlying conviction, not the sentence. See 2002 UT 51, ¶ 7. This

type of challenge is independently prohibited by the old rule. See

id.; Utah R. Crim. P. 22(e) (2013). So Telford does not illuminate the

contours of the reviewability requirement. And a better reading of

our caselaw as a whole supports the reviewability requirement as

articulated in this opinion.

17a

Appendix A

an illegal sentence “at any time.” 31 But subparagraph (e)

(3) of the new rule imposes new procedural requirements

for bringing a 22(e) challenge. 32 It states that “[a] motion

under” several provisions of the rule “must be filed no

later than one year from the date the facts supporting the

claim could have been discovered”; under other provisions

a motion “may be filed at any time.”33 Whereas the old

rule made no mention of a motion, 34 the new rule dictates

that claims be brought by motion. 35 Because rule 22(e)

is found in the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure—the

rules governing “criminal proceedings” in most nonappellate courts of this state—we read subparagraph (e)

(3) to govern motions filed with the district court. 36 The

new rule thus provides that a defendant may bring a 22(e)

challenge by filing a motion with the district court within

the given time parameters.

¶30 With the new rule requirement that a defendant

first file a 22(e) motion with the district court, we find it

appropriate to apply our traditional preservation rules

on appeal. Those traditional preservation rules include

several exceptions that, in limited circumstances, allow

a defendant to bring challenges directly to an appellate

31. Utah R. Crim. P. 22(e) (2013).

32. Id. R. 22(e)(3) (2025).

33. Id. (emphasis added).

34. See id. R. 22(e) (2013).

35. Id. R. 22(e)(3) (2025).

36. See id. R. 1(b), (c).

18a

Appendix A

court. 37 In sum, under the new rule, if a defendant seeks

to raise on appeal a challenge to his sentence that he did

not raise in his 22(e) motion before the district court, we

will hear the unpreserved issue only if the defendant can

show that an exception to preservation applies.

¶31 We pause to recognize that when Mullins appealed

the denial of his 22(e) motion, we had not yet established

that a 22(e) challenge under the new rule brought for the

first time on appeal would be subject to our preservation

requirements. Because of the unique circumstances

of Mullins’s case, we will not require him to show an

exception to preservation for us to hear his claims under

the new rule. Our inquiry into which version of rule 22(e)

applies to each of Mullins’s claims largely mirrors a

preservation inquiry. As a result, once we have determined

that the new rule applies to any of his claims, we will not

require Mullins to separately show that a preservation

exception also applies. But because this court does not

typically find facts, 38 in Mullins’s case we will reach only

claims that we can resolve on the record before us. And

we put future defendants who challenge their sentences as

illegal on notice that they will need to show a preservation

exception applies for any new 22(e) challenges brought for

the first time on appeal.

37. See generally State v. Flora, 2020 UT 2, ¶ 9, 459 P.3d 975

(“This court has recognized three distinct exceptions to preservation:

plain error, ineffective assistance of counsel, and exceptional

circumstances.” (cleaned up)).

38. See Carpenter v. Riverton City, 2004 UT 68, ¶ 4, 103 P.3d

127 (per curiam) (“Because this court does not conduct evidentiary

hearings . . . , it simply is not in a position to arrive at a legal ruling

that is dependent on the resolution of disputed facts.”).

19a

Appendix A

¶32 Next, we consider whether the reviewability

requirement from the old rule applies under the new

rule—and conclude that it does not. Under the old

rule, a defendant needed only to show that a claim was

reviewable to establish that it was cognizable. But the

new rule imposes several textual requirements that the

old rule did not. As relevant here, the new rule requires

that a motion relying upon new caselaw must be based

on a new rule established by a binding appellate court. 39

The defendant must also show that the binding new rule

was not “dictated by precedent existing at the time the

defendant’s conviction or sentence became final.”40

¶33 We imposed the reviewability requirement under

the old rule to prevent abuse and to promote judicial

economy. But because the language of the new rule places

different requirements on defendants in district court, we

no longer need to impose this additional hurdle on appeal,

for the reasons we explain below.

¶34 In contrast with the broad language of the old rule,

the new rule defines what constitutes an illegal sentence.

Subparagraph (e)(1) identifies “six specific categories of

sentences that require correction,” and subparagraph (e)

(2) authorizes correction of an illegal sentence “only if the

39. Utah R. Crim. P. 22(e)(2) (2025).

40. Id. Because the State does not challenge any precedent

on which Mullins relies based on the new rule’s second factor, we

assume for this opinion that if Mullins shows that a rule or ruling was

established after he was sentenced, it was not dictated by precedent

that existed at the time his sentence became final.

20a

Appendix A

alleged constitutional violation is grounded in a rule or

ruling that was established or issued after the defendant’s

‘sentence became final.’”41 Because of this new language,

the rule “shrank in scope,” limiting the categories of

sentences that a court could correct.42 As a result, it is

more difficult to engage in the type of abuse that raised

concerns under the old rule.

¶35 Further, the new rule promotes judicial economy

by requiring defendants to bring their 22(e) challenge

before the district court in the first instance. There, the

district court will be able to determine the relevant facts

before we are asked to review the challenge on appeal.

And if a defendant brings an unpreserved 22(e) challenge

before us for the first time on appeal, that defendant must

invoke an exception to preservation.43 This preservation

requirement serves the same judicial-economy purpose as

the reviewability requirement, so we hold that defendants

need not separately show that their challenge is purely

legal or resolvable on the record.

¶36 In sum, based on the text of the rules, the

requirements of the old and new rules are different.

Under the old rule, traditional preservation rules did not

apply to 22(e) challenges and defendants could not bring

fact-intensive claims incapable of resolution on the record.

41. Robinson, 2023 UT 25, ¶ 23 (quoting Utah R. Crim. P. 22(e)

(2) (2019)).

42. Id. ¶ 22.

43. See supra ¶¶ 29–31.

21a

Appendix A

Under the new rule, however, a defendant must file a 22(e)

motion with the district court within the time constraints

outlined in the rule. Because the rule requires defendants

to file in the district court, traditional preservation rules

apply to unpreserved 22(e) challenges on appeal. Thus,

defendants raising a claim on appeal for the first time

must show that an exception to preservation applies. We

now apply this framework to each of Mullins’s claims.

II. MULLINS’S SEVEN CLAIMS

¶37 Mullins raises seven claims on appeal: (1) the

sentencing court violated the Sixth Amendment to the

United States Constitution when it increased the minimum

sentence based on judicial factfinding; (2) the sentencing

statute is unconstitutionally vague; (3) imposing a JLWOP

sentence on an intellectually impaired juvenile violates the

Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution; (4)

imposing JLWOP on an intellectually impaired juvenile

violates article I, section 9 of the Utah Constitution; (5)

JLWOP sentences are categorically unconstitutional under

article I, section 9 of the Utah Constitution; (6) JLWOP

sentences are categorically unconstitutional under the

Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution;

and (7) a JLWOP sentence was unconstitutional under

the Eighth Amendment as applied to Mullins’s case. We

reject Mullins’s first six claims. But we conclude that the

judge’s statements on the record here renders Mullins’s

JLWOP sentence one imposed in an illegal manner. We

thus vacate Mullins’s sentence based on his seventh claim

and remand for resentencing in the district court.

22a

Appendix A

A.

The Sentencing Judge Did Not Violate the

Sixth Amendment

¶38 On appeal, Mullins argues that his JLWOP

sentence violates the Sixth Amendment. He asserts that the

sentencing statute required the sentencing judge to engage

in unconstitutional factfinding about whether JLWOP is

“appropriate” rather than requiring that a jury unanimously

find the sentence “appropriate” beyond a reasonable doubt.44

¶39 We first ask which rule applies to this claim. In his

original motion, Mullins challenged the constitutionality

of his sentence only under the Eighth Amendment. He

never mentioned the Sixth Amendment. So the new rule

applies to this claim. The State concedes that this claim

meets all the requirements of the new rule and does not

require further factual development.45 Accordingly, we

proceed to the merits of the claim.

44. See Utah C ode § 76-3-207(4)(c) (2001). The sentencing

statute has since been amended several times and re-numbered; the

relevant provision as modified is now housed in subsection (5). See

id. § 76-3-207(5)(c) (2025). We refer throughout this opinion to the

2001 version unless otherwise noted. See State v. Clark, 2011 UT 23,

¶ 13, 251 P.3d 829 (“[W]e apply the law as it exists at the time of the

event regulated by the law in question.”).

45. As we noted above, because we announce for the first time

today that our traditional preservation rules apply under the new rule,

we do not require Mullins to prove a preservation exception exists for

us to hear his claims under the new rule. Supra ¶ 31. Out of concerns

about judicial economy and judicial competence, however, we limit our

review in Mullins’s case only to claims reviewable without further factual

development. Supra ¶ 31. We emphasize, however, that the judicially

imposed reviewability requirement applied to claims under the old rule

does not apply to future claims brought under the new rule. See supra ¶ 33.

23a

Appendix A

¶40 The Sixth Amendment to the United States

Constitution guarantees individuals accused of a crime

the right to a trial “by an impartial jury.”46 Taken “in

conjunction with the Due Process Clause,” this right

“requires that each element of a crime be proved to the

jury beyond a reasonable doubt.”47 “The touchstone for

determining whether a fact must be found by a jury

beyond a reasonable doubt is whether the fact constitutes

an element or ingredient of the charged offense.”48

¶41 In Apprendi v. New Jersey, the United States

Supreme Court established that “[o]ther than the fact of

a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for

a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum” is an

element of the crime that “must be submitted to a jury.”49

Then, in Alleyne v. United States, the Court extended

this rule to facts that increase a mandatory minimum

penalty.50 But these cases “do[] not mean that any fact that

influences judicial discretion must be found by a jury.”51

Nor do they mean that juries must find the facts “used to

46. U.S. Const. amend. VI.

47. Alleyne v. United States, 570 U.S. 99, 104 (2013)

(plurality opinion); see also United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506,

510 (1995).

48. Alleyne, 570 U.S. at 107 (plurality opinion) (cleaned up).

49. 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000).

50. 570 U.S. at 103, 111–12.

51. See id. at 116.

24a

Appendix A

guide judicial discretion in selecting a punishment within

limits fixed by law.”52

¶42 At the time of Mullins’s sentencing, Utah Code

subsection 76-3-207(4)(c) read, in relevant part: “The

penalty of life in prison without parole shall only be

imposed if the [sentencing judge] determines that the

sentence of life in prison without parole is appropriate.”53

Mullins argues that, because the sentencing court “has

discretion to impose LWOP only if it first” finds that

“LWOP is appropriate,” the court must make a factual

finding beyond those facts admitted in a plea bargain. He

contends that “LWOP can be imposed only after post-plea

factual findings: that aggravators exist; that LWOP is

appropriate.” And for the court to make those findings,

he argues, violates Alleyne.

¶43 We explained in State v. Houston that this

provision of the sentencing statute did not violate the

Sixth Amendment. 54 In that case, the defendant pled

52. Id. at 113 n.2 (cleaned up).

53. Utah Code § 76-3-207(4)(c) (2001). The statute uses “jury” in

this provision but also indicates that when it uses “jury,” “sentencing

judge” may be substituted if the sentencing proceeding does not

occur before a jury. Utah Code § 76-3-207(4)(a) (2001) (“The court

or jury, as the case may be, shall retire to consider the penalty.”).

54. 2015 UT 40, ¶¶ 30–32, 353 P.3d 55. By the time Houston

was sentenced, the statute had been amended and re-numbered to

place the operative provision in subsection (5). Compare Utah

Code § 76-3-207(4)(c) (2001) with Utah Code § 76-2-207(5)(c) (2008).

But the “appropriate[ness]” finding was identical between the two

versions of the statute.

25a

Appendix A

guilty to aggravated murder, punishable by “either life

with the possibility of parole or LWOP.”55 This meant

that “[t]here were no factual findings to be made by a

jury, only a determination that LWOP would or would

not be appropriate.”56 And although we decided this issue

in Houston based solely on Apprendi, the logic remains

unchanged under Alleyne.

¶44 When Mullins pled guilty to aggravated murder,

the court did not and could not make any factual findings

that would have “produced a higher range” of sentences

beyond those already permitted by subsection 76-3207(4).57 So Alleyne does not apply. Mullins’s plea exposed

him to the possibility of two sentences: life with the

possibility of parole and LWOP. 58 In choosing between

those two options, the judge merely exercised “broad

sentencing discretion” within the available statutory

sentencing range.59 Accordingly, we conclude that Mullins’s

sentencing process did not violate the Sixth Amendment.

55. Houston, 2015 UT 40, ¶ 32.

56. Id.

57. See Alleyne, 570 U.S. at 116; Utah Code § 76-3-207(4)(a)

(2001).

58. Utah Code § 76-3-207(4)(a) (2001).

59. See Alleyne, 570 U.S. at 116; see also Houston, 2015 UT

40, ¶ 32 (“By pleading guilty to aggravated murder, [Defendant]

admitted all the facts relevant to the offense and became subject to

any sentence authorized under Utah law. Under Utah’s sentencing

statute, a juvenile defendant guilty of aggravated murder can be

sentenced to either life with the possibility of parole or LWOP.”).

26a

Appendix A

B. Utah Code Subsection 76-3-207(4) (2001) Is Not

Unconstitutionally Vague

¶45 Mullins next argues that the sentencing statute is

unconstitutionally vague in violation of due process.60 At

the time of Mullins’s sentencing, section 76-3-207 required

a judge or jury to determine that it was “appropriate” to

sentence an offender to LWOP.61 Mullins argues that the

statute is vague because it does not sufficiently define

“appropriate” or convey the constitutional importance of

a juvenile’s youth in that determination.62

¶46 As with his Sixth Amendment claim, Mullins did

not mention constitutional vagueness in his original 22(e)

motion. Again, he only discussed the Eighth Amendment.

Accordingly, the new rule applies to this claim. And

again, the State concedes that Mullins’s vagueness claim

complies with the requirements of the new rule and does

not require further factual development, so we reach it

on the merits.63

¶47 Sentencing statutes are unconstitutionally

vague “if they do not state with sufficient clarity the

consequences of violating a given criminal statute.” 64

60. See Utah Code § 76-3-207(4) (2001).

61. See id. § 76-3-207(4)(a), (c) (2001).

62. See id.

63. See supra ¶¶ 31, 39 n.45.

64. State v. Perea, 2013 UT 68, ¶ 111, 322 P.3d 624 (quoting

United States v. Batchelder, 442 U.S. 114, 123 (1979)).

27a

Appendix A

Sentencing judges have long been afforded wide discretion

in determining sentences, but such discretion does not

render a sentencing statute unconstitutional.65 Section 763-207 governs sentencing for capital felonies. Under the

version of the statute applicable at the time of Mullins’s

sentencing in 2001, a court could impose LWOP only if it

found that LWOP was “appropriate.”66

¶48 Both parties acknowledge that we ruled on the

vagueness of section 76-3-207 in Houston.67 The State

argues that Houston is controlling and dispositive. But

Mullins contends that our reasoning in Houston was

“not very compelling” because the statute “provides no

meaningful guidance about how to weigh [aggravating and

mitigating] factors against each other.” Specifically, the

statute does not identify the constitutional significance of a

defendant’s youth in the “appropriateness” consideration.

As a result, he implicitly asks us to overturn our decision

in Houston. Mullins does not, however, engage in the

appropriate analysis for such a request.68 As such, we

decline to overturn Houston.

¶49 Additionally, Mullins argues that the federal

legal landscape has changed since we decided Houston;

65. Id. ¶¶ 114, 117.

66. Utah Code § 76-3-207(4)(a), (c) (2001).

67. See 2015 UT 40, ¶¶ 47–48.

68. See Eldridge v. Johndrow, 2015 UT 21, ¶¶ 20–41, 345 P.3d

553 (describing the framework through which this court considers

whether to overrule its own precedents).

28a

Appendix A

he specifically contends that the United States Supreme

Court’s holding in Johnson v. United States abrogates

our holding in Houston.69 In Johnson, the Court found

unconstitutionally vague a mandatory sentencing scheme

for offenders with prior convictions for violent crimes.70

The statutory scheme’s residual clause imposed a

sentencing enhancement if the prior conviction “involve[d]

conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical

injury to another.” 71 The Court explained that the statute

required courts to determine how much risk qualifies as

“serious potential risk” and then apply it to the judge’s

“imagined ordinary case.” 72 This intersection of a vague

term being given meaning by an abstract and “wideranging” analysis led the Court to declare the statute

unconstitutionally vague.73

¶50 But as the State points out, the Cour t’s

determination in Johnson turned on the combination

of the “imagined ordinary case” analysis and the

vagueness of the term “serious potential risk.” 74 That

case presented two layers of potential ambiguity that,

together, violated due process. By contrast, the sentencing

69. See Johnson v. United States, 576 U.S. 591 (2015).

70. Id. at 593–94, 602, 604.

71. 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii), invalidated by Johnson, 576

U.S. 591.

72. Johnson, 576 U.S. at 597–98 (cleaned up).

73. Id. at 596–97.

74. See id. at 596–98 (cleaned up).

29a

Appendix A

statute here requires no judicial imagination and offers

specific mitigating and aggravating factors to guide the

judge’s determination of “appropriateness” in each case.75

Therefore, Johnson does not abrogate Houston, and our

holding that Utah Code section 76-3-207 is constitutional

stands.

C.

We Do Not Reach Whether Imposing JLWOP

on an Intellectually Disabled Juvenile Is

Categorically Unconstitutional Under the

Federal and Utah Constitutions

¶51 Mullins next claims that it was unconstitutional

under both the federal and state constitutions to sentence

him to JLWOP because two United States Supreme

Court decisions,76 when taken together, prohibit imposing

JLWOP on intellectually disabled juveniles. Mullins did

not mention his intellectual disability in his original

motion, and he likewise failed to mention the main case

on which he relies for this argument, Atkins v. Virginia.77

Thus, the new rule applies to this claim.

¶52 The State argues that Mullins failed to show that

his claim is based on “a rule established or ruling issued

by” a binding court, as the new rule requires.78 Instead,

75. See Utah Code § 76-3-207(3)–(4) (2001).

76. See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002); Graham v.

Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010).

77. 536 U.S. 304.

78. See Utah R. Crim. P. 22(e)(2) (2025).

30a

Appendix A

Mullins “cobbl[ed] together two existing but unrelated

rules.”

¶53 The State has a point. Mullins presents two

cases that independently established new rules. The

Court in Atkins established that intellectually disabled

individuals cannot be sentenced to capital punishment.79

And the Court in Graham v. Florida established that

juveniles who have not committed homicide cannot be

sentenced to JLWOP. 80 In the latter case, the Court stated

that JLWOP “share[s] some characteristics with death

sentences that are shared by no other sentences.”81 But

it does not support the claim that Mullins now makes:

that all JLWOP sentences should be treated as capital

punishment in all circumstances. So Mullins’s claim would

require us to determine whether JLWOP is equivalent to

capital punishment. If we must decide that now, the rule

is not already established. And subparagraph (e)(2) of the

new rule requires that a challenge to an illegal sentence

be based on “a rule established or ruling issued by” a

binding court. 82

¶54 Mullins also makes no attempt to show that

his proposed rule is based on new, binding caselaw

interpreting the Utah Constitution. So we do not reach

his claim under the Utah Constitution either.

79. 536 U.S. at 321.

80. 560 U.S. at 82.

81. Id. at 69.

82. Utah R. Crim. P. 22(e)(2) (2025).

31a

Appendix A

D.

We Do Not Reach Whether JLWOP Sentences

Are Categorically Unconstitutional Under

Article I, Section 9 of the Utah Constitution

¶55 Mullins’s f ifth claim also challenges the

constitutionality of JLWOP generally, this time solely

under article I, section 9 of the Utah Constitution. He

argues that under today’s national consensus, a sentence

of JLWOP is cruel and unusual. But Mullins never referred

to the Utah Constitution in his original motion; he referred

only to United States Supreme Court cases. Because he

brings his current claim under the Utah Constitution, the

new rule applies.

¶56 Mullins’s claim does not meet the requirements

of the new rule, however, because it is not based on a “a

rule established or ruling issued” by a binding appellate

court. 83 We previously rejected an almost identical

constitutional challenge to JLWOP in Houston. 84 Mullins

argues that the national consensus has changed since

we decided that case. But in doing so, he identifies no

precedent from a controlling Utah court indicating that

the national consensus has changed. His argument, then,

is not premised on a rule or ruling issued by a controlling

court. As such, we do not reach the merits of this claim. 85

83. See id.

84. 2015 UT 40, ¶¶ 64–68.

85. In the alternative, Mullins argues that the Utah Constitution

requires a sentencing court to make an on-the-record finding of

permanent incorrigibility—a procedural requirement rejected by the

United States Supreme Court under the United States Constitution.

32a

Appendix A

E. JLWOP Is Not Categorically Unconstitutional

Under the Eighth Amendment to the United

States Constitution

¶57 Mullins next asks us to overturn another aspect

of our decision in Houston and hold that a sentence of

JLWOP is, without exception, unconstitutional under the

Eighth Amendment’s prohibition of cruel and unusual

punishment. Because this claim fails on its merits under

either version of rule 22(e), we need not ask which rule

applies nor whether the claim meets the requirements of

that rule.

¶58 Courts assess claims of cruel and unusual

punishment under the United States Constitution by

looking to the “evolving standards of decency that mark

the progress of a maturing society.” 86 This standard

requires us to consider whether a punishment is

proportionate to a crime based on “a national consensus

against the sentencing practice at issue” and an exercise

of the court’s “independent judgment.”87

See Jones v. Mississippi, 593 U.S. 98, 101 (2021); see also infra

¶¶ 71–72. As with his claim that JLWOP is categorically forbidden by

the Utah Constitution, Mullins asks us to declare a new rule, rather

than rely on binding precedent from this court or the United States

Supreme Court. We therefore may not reach the merits of his claim

under the new rule. See Utah R. Crim. P. 22(e)(2) (2025).

86. Graham, 560 U.S. at 58 (cleaned up).

87. Id. at 61.

33a

Appendix A

¶59 In Houston, we addressed this same argument

and declined to hold that JLWOP was categorically

unconstitutional. 88 We based our analysis on binding

United States Supreme Court precedent and explained

that although “juveniles represent a unique class

warranting special considerations in sentencing[,] . . . the

unique characteristics of youth are accounted for, both by

Utah law and through federal constitutional protections.”89

We also noted that “a great majority of states . . . permit

LWOP sentences for juveniles” and declined to “conclude

that the ‘national consensus’ favors the prohibition of

LWOP for juveniles convicted of homicide.” 90

¶60 Mullins argues that the national consensus on

JLWOP has sufficiently evolved since Houston for us to

revisit the matter, given the decrease from thirty-nine

states allowing JLWOP to twenty-five plus the District

of Columbia. But he provides little evidence of changes

in actual sentencing practices, an essential factor in the

national consensus analysis when the legislative data are

inconclusive.91

88. 2015 UT 40, ¶¶ 52–63.

89. Id. ¶ 60.

90. Id. ¶ 62 (noting that, as of 2010, thirty-nine states allowed

LWOP sentences for juvenile offenders convicted of homicide).

91. See Graham, 560 U.S. at 61, 66 (stating that a court

considers “indicia of society’s standards, as expressed in legislative

enactments and state practice” and basing its holding, in part, on

the fact that “life without parole sentences for juveniles convicted

of nonhomicide crimes [are] as rare [in practice] as other sentencing

practices found to be cruel and unusual” (cleaned up)).

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¶61 In our view, a decrease from thirty-nine states

permitting JLWOP by statute to twenty-five, without any

information on actual sentencing practices, is not so great

an evolution as to overcome the United States Supreme

Court’s established precedent, which the Court endorsed

as recently as 2021.92 Although states are trending away

from permitting JLWOP, we agree with the State that,

taken alone, half of the states plus the District of Columbia

banning JLWOP do not a national consensus make. Again,

we decline to overturn Houston.

F.

Mullins’s Sentence Was Imposed in an Illegal

Manner Under Rule 22(e)

¶62 Mullins’s final claim is that a JLWOP sentence was

unconstitutional under the Eighth Amendment as applied

to his case. Mullins argues that under Miller v. Alabama

and its progeny, as someone whose crimes reflected

transient immaturity, he could not constitutionally be

sentenced to JLWOP. 93 He further argues that the

sentencing court “recognized that Mr. Mullins could still

change”—a fact that should have precluded a JLWOP

sentence under the standards set forth in Miller and

subsequent cases.

¶63 Mullins adequately raised this claim in his original

motion and argument to the district court, so we consider

92. See Jones, 593 U.S. 98.

93. See 567 U.S. 460 (2012); Montgomery v. Louisiana, 577

U.S. 190 (2016); Jones, 593 U.S. 98.

35a

Appendix A

it under the old rule.94 Our reviewability requirement,

however, bars part of his argument. 95 In particular,

Mullins asserts that “the undisputed record establishes

that [his] crime reflected the transient immaturity of

his youth.” He claims that the record shows a complete

absence of moral guidance in his childhood home and that

his parents affirmatively encouraged criminal behavior.

While the record shows that his childhood was likely

deeply traumatic, crime caused by a traumatic past is

not the same as crime caused by youthful immaturity.

And without further factual development, we cannot say

whether Mullins’s crime was actually the result of his

youth. Under our precedents for the old rule, we cannot

engage in such a fact-intensive inquiry and thus cannot

address this aspect of Mullins’s claim.96

¶64 We do consider, however, Mullins’s argument

that the judge improperly sentenced him to JLWOP

even though he “recognized that Mr. Mullins could still

change.” Though this argument has factual underpinnings,

it raises questions we can answer on the record before us.

94. Mullins’s motion cited Miller, arguing that a judge must

“have the opportunity to consider mitigating circumstances before

imposing” JLWOP, and the record did not indicate that “the court

took into consideration the defendant’s youth” or “the possibility of

rehabilitation.” See Noor v. State, 2019 UT 3, ¶ 51 n.64, 435 P.3d

221 (“[A] party acting pro se should be accorded every consideration

that may be reasonably indulged because of his lack of technical

knowledge of law and procedure.” (cleaned up)).

95. See Houston, 2015 UT 40, ¶¶ 24–26; supra ¶¶ 24–27.

96. See Houston, 2015 UT 40, ¶¶ 18, 27; supra ¶¶ 24–27.

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Appendix A

The parties do not dispute the contents of the transcripts

of the sentencing hearing or the original 22(e) motion

hearing, and a fresh look at the case by the district court

would not shed any additional light on what the sentencing

court considered or concluded when sentencing Mullins.

Because we would not need to find any facts outside the

record, nor would we need to rely on any disputed facts

in the record to analyze this claim, we conclude that this

aspect of Mullins’s claim is within the scope of the old rule.

¶65 Mullins’s claim turns on recent federal caselaw

emphasizing the constitutional differences between

adults and juveniles and declaring certain penalties

disproportionate when applied to juveniles. The Eighth

Amendment requires that punishment be proportionate

“to both the offender and the offense.” 97 Proportionality

“requires consideration of the culpability of the offenders

at issue in light of their crimes and characteristics, along

with the severity of the punishment in question.”98 Under

that framework, a sentencing court must account for a

juvenile’s “lessened culpability and greater capacity for

change” as compared to that of an adult.99 In Miller v.

Alabama, the United States Supreme Court declared

that mandator y JLWOP sentencing schemes are

unconstitutional because they prohibit that accounting.100

97. Miller, 567 U.S. at 469; see also U.S. Const. amend. VIII.

98. Graham, 560 U.S. at 67.

99. Miller, 567 U.S. at 465 (cleaned up).

100. See id. at 465, 475–77.

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Appendix A

¶66 Drawing on Roper v. Simmons and Graham v.

Florida, the Court in Miller emphasized that “children

are different.”101 Youth both “lessen[s] a child’s moral

culpability and enhance[s] the prospect that, as the years

go by and neurological development occurs, [the child’s]

deficiencies will be reformed.”102 The Court reasoned that

the characteristics of youth render ordinary penological

justifications less rational.103 Because youth lessens

an offender’s culpability for their actions, however

horrible, “the case for retribution is not as strong with

a minor as with an adult.”104 Similarly, deterrence is less

effective because children’s “immaturity, recklessness,

and impetuosity . . . make them less likely to consider

potential punishment” in making decisions.105 A lifetime

sentence is generally justified by concluding that an

offender will be a perpetual danger to others if released

from prison—but such a conclusion requires finding the

offender “incorrigible,” and “incorrigibility is inconsistent

with youth.”106 Finally, while the criminal justice system

ordinarily aims to rehabilitate offenders, any LWOP

101. Id. at 480; see also Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551,

578 (2005) (declaring the death penalty for juvenile offenders

unconstitutional); Graham, 560 U.S. at 82 (declaring JLWOP

unconstitutional for non-homicide juvenile offenders).

102. Miller, 567 U.S. at 472 (cleaned up).

103. Id. at 472–73 (citing Roper, 543 U.S. 551; Graham, 560

U.S. 48).

104. Id. at 472 (cleaned up) (quoting Graham, 560 U.S. at 71).

105. Id.

106. Id. at 472–73 (cleaned up).

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Appendix A

sentence “forswears altogether the rehabilitative ideal”

and instead rests on “an irrevocable judgment about an

offender’s value and place in society.”107 That immutable

judgment is “at odds with a child’s capacity for change.”108

Because a JLWOP sentence could not serve these

legitimate functions in an ordinary case, the sentence is

disproportionate for most juvenile offenders.109

¶67 The Court in Miller did “not categorically bar

a penalty for a class of offenders or type of crime,”

instead “mandat[ing] only that a sentencer follow a

certain process—considering an offender’s youth and

attendant characteristics—before imposing” JLWOP.110

But the Court concluded by stating that given “children’s

diminished culpability and heightened capacity for change,

we think appropriate occasions for sentencing juveniles

to this harshest possible penalty will be uncommon.”111

¶68 A few years later, in State v. Houston, this

court held that the Utah sentencing scheme allowing a

court to impose JLWOP was facially constitutional.112

Relying on Miller and related federal precedents, the

court determined that “the Eighth Amendment does not

107. Id. at 473 (cleaned up).

108. Id.

109. Id. at 479–80.

110. Id. at 483.

111. Id. at 479.

112. 2015 UT 40, ¶¶ 52–53; see also Utah Code § 76-3-207 (2008).

39a

Appendix A

prohibit the imposition of LWOP for a juvenile homicide

offender.”113 And Utah’s “statutory scheme enable[d] the

kind of individualized sentencing determination that

the Supreme Court has deemed necessary for serious

offenses.”114 In sum, because the sentencing statute did

not mandate a JLWOP sentence and instead granted

discretion to the sentencer to impose a lesser sentence,

it did not, on its face, violate the Eighth Amendment.115

¶69 A year later, in Montgomery v. Louisiana, the

United States Supreme Court held that Miller applies

retroactively to juveniles who were sentenced to JLWOP

before the Court decided Miller.116 To find the rule

retroactive, the Court concluded that Miller announced a

substantive constitutional rule, as opposed to a procedural

one.117 The Court recognized that Miller had a procedural

component, requiring a discretionary sentencing scheme

that allows a sentencer to consider youth as a factor before

imposing a JLWOP sentence.118 But “[p]rotection against

disproportionate punishment is the central substantive

guarantee of the Eighth Amendment and goes far beyond

the manner of determining a defendant’s sentence.”119 And

113. Houston, 2015 UT 40, ¶ 55.

114. Id. ¶ 61.

115. Id. ¶¶ 61–63.

116. 577 U.S. at 206–12.

117. Id. at 209.

118. Id. at 209–10.

119. Id. at 206 (emphasis added).

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Appendix A

“mandatory life-without-parole sentences for children

pose too great a risk of disproportionate punishment.”120

¶70 The Court clarified that Miller went further than

simply requiring a sentencing court to weigh a defendant’s

youth. 121 Miller “established that the penological

justifications for life without parole collapse in light of ‘the

distinctive attributes of youth.’”122 Thus, “[e]ven if a court

considers a child’s age before sentencing him or her to a

lifetime in prison, that sentence still violates the Eighth

Amendment for a child whose crime reflects ‘unfortunate

yet transient immaturity.’”123 Because Miller barred

JLWOP for all but the rarest offenders, it “rendered life

without parole an unconstitutional penalty for . . . juvenile

offenders whose crimes reflect the transient immaturity of

youth”—a substantive, and thus retroactive, constitutional

protection.124

¶71 The Supreme Court next heard a JLWOP case in

Jones v. Mississippi.125 Jones considered whether Miller

120. Id. at 208 (cleaned up).

121. Id.

122. Id. (quoting Miller, 567 U.S. at 472).

123. Id. (quoting Miller, 567 U.S. at 479).

124. Id. at 208–09 (“Like other substantive rules, Miller is

retroactive because it necessarily carries a significant risk that a

defendant—here, the vast majority of juvenile offenders—faces a

punishment that the law cannot impose upon him.” (cleaned up)).

125. 593 U.S. 98.

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Appendix A

required a sentencer to “make a separate factual finding

that the defendant is permanently incorrigible” or to

otherwise include an implicit finding of incorrigibility on

the record.126 The Court clarified that a sentencing court

must consider “youth as a sentencing factor akin to a

mitigating circumstance” under the Court’s death penalty

jurisprudence.127 Relying on language from Montgomery

declaring that a sentencer need not make an express

factual finding of incorrigibility, the Court rejected Jones’s

effort to overturn his JLWOP sentence.128

¶72 In its language, the Court in Jones seemed to

step back from the broadest reading of both Miller and

Montgomery, stating that under those cases “a State’s

discretionary sentencing system is both constitutionally

necessary and constitutionally sufficient.”129 But the

Court also expressly declined to overrule Miller or

Montgomery,130 instead framing the question it resolved

as merely whether to adopt “an additional constitutional

requirement that the sentencer must make a finding of

permanent incorrigibility before sentencing a murderer

126. Id. at 101.

127. Id. at 108.

128. Id. at 101.

129. Id. at 105.

130. Id. at 118 (“Today’s decision does not overrule Miller

or Montgomery.”); see also id. at 144 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting)

(“[S]entencers should hold this Court to its word: Miller and

Montgomery are still good law.”).

42a

Appendix A

under 18 to life without parole.”131 The Court repeatedly

reiterated that clear language in Miller and Montgomery

dictated its answer to that question: that no such finding

was required.132 And the Court quoted in a footnote a

“key paragraph” from Montgomery, stating that the

absence of “a formal factfinding requirement does not

leave States free to sentence a child whose crime reflects

transient immaturity to life without parole.”133 So while

we read Jones to establish that a sentencing court need

not consider youth in any particular way, Jones does not

excuse sentencing courts of the obligation to properly

consider youth before imposing a JLWOP sentence.

¶73 Having reviewed the relevant precedents, we

turn now to Mullins’s principal argument. He asserts that

his JLWOP sentence was unconstitutional because the

sentencing court in his case affirmatively “recognized that

[he] could still change” but then sentenced him to JLWOP.

Though this court and the United States Supreme Court

have both recognized that JLWOP is constitutionally

permissible in some cases, neither court has declared that

it is permissible in all cases, nor considered the specific

claim Mullins raises here.134

131. Id. at 119 (majority opinion) (emphasis added).

132. Id. at 109–10, 113, 119.

133. Id. at 106 n.2 (quoting Montgomery, 577 U.S. at 211).

134. See id. at 115; Miller, 567 U.S. at 483; Houston, 2015 UT

40, ¶ 55. In fact, the United States Supreme Court in Jones expressly

declined to explore whether a sentencer who refused to consider a

defendant’s youth would violate that youth’s Eighth Amendment

43a

Appendix A

¶74 We agree with Mullins that if a sentencing

court affirmatively finds that a juvenile offender

can change, a JLWOP sentence is unconstitutional.

“[T]he characteristics of youth, and the way they weaken

rationales for punishment, can render a life-withoutparole sentence disproportionate.”135 And under Miller

and its progeny, if a child is capable of change and

reform—that is, is not incorrigible—a JLWOP sentence

is disproportionate and unconstitutional.136 A sentencing

court has no obligation to make an on-the-record finding

of permanent incorrigibility before imposing a JLWOP

sentence.137 But a contrary finding bars the court from

imposing JLWOP.138

right. 593 U.S. at 115 n.7; see also id. at 120 (declining to consider

“any as-applied Eighth Amendment claim of disproportionality”);

id. at 144 n.6 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (noting that a juvenile asapplied claim “should be controlled by this Court’s holding that

sentencing a child whose crime reflects transient immaturity to life

without parole is disproportionate under the Eighth Amendment”

(cleaned up)).

135. Miller, 567 U.S. at 473.

136. Montgomery, 577 U.S. at 211.

137. See Jones, 593 U.S. at 113.

138. See Montgomery, 577 U.S. at 211; Jones, 593 U.S. at 119

(expressly declining to overrule Montgomery). Our sister courts

are divided over the proper interpretation of these difficult cases.

Compare, e.g., State v. Kelliher, 873 S.E.2d 366, 380 (N.C. 2022) (“[C]

onsistent with Miller, Montgomery, and Jones, we conclude that the

Eighth Amendment categorically prohibits a sentencing court from

sentencing any juvenile to life without parole if the sentencing court

has found the juvenile to be neither incorrigible nor irredeemable.”

44a

Appendix A

¶75 We now turn to the facts of Mullins’s case. At

sentencing, Mullins’s counsel emphasized that he was

asking the court to “simply allow the Board of Pardons . . .

some discretion at some time in the very distant future

to be able to make a decision about whether or not

parole is even a possibility for Mr. Mullins.” Counsel

highlighted that Mullins “never had a chance at a normal

life” due to his “profoundly dysfunctional upbringing.”

And counsel argued that because Mullins came from a

“dysfunctional horrific environment,” removing him from

that environment would create a meaningful opportunity

for him to learn and change.

¶76 Following counsel’s arguments and admission of

a psychological report, the sentencing judge stated, “If

you’re trying to assess the level of hope for the future

you hold out for Mr. Mullins, I don’t see anything in [the

psychological] report on how to assess hope for change.”

In response, counsel declared, “I don’t want to say that

hope for change is irrelevant, but it almost doesn’t matter

(cleaned up)), and Malvo v. State, 281 A.3d 758, 765 (Md. 2022)

(addressing “a situation in which a sentencing court finds that a crime

was the result of the offender’s transient immaturity but nonetheless

sentences the offender to life without parole” and concluding that

“an offender deemed corrigible cannot constitutionally be sentenced

to” JLWOP), with People v. Wilson, 220 N.E.3d 1068, 1077 (Ill. 2023)

(“[N]o viable Miller claim exists, so long as the [JLWOP] sentence is

not mandatory ” (cleaned up)), and Commonwealth v. Felder, 269

A.3d 1232, 1243 (Pa. 2022) (same). It is clear from these cases that

reasonable jurists—including our dissenting colleagues here—may

disagree with our reading. Still, we believe this reading is the most

appropriate application of Eighth Amendment principles and federal

caselaw.

45a

Appendix A

what we hope”—instead putting sole responsibility for

evaluating Mullins’s ability to change on the Board of

Pardons and Parole. Counsel further stated that “[w]e

cannot predict what Mr. Mullins himself will do by way

of coming to a realiz[ation] inside himself to change.”

The judge then imposed a JLWOP sentence, stating

that “when I balance . . . the family’s requests and Mr.

Mullins’[s] request and the need to send a message,”

JLWOP was appropriate. Wrapping up the hearing, the

judge opined, “I sincerely hope it’s the right judgment,

Mr. Mullins, and if you’re gonna be with us for a long

time and have a chance to change, I hope—not under the

present circumstances—I’m hoping that you’ll find some

way to be productive.”

¶77 Mullins argues that the judge’s comments show

that “the judge was not convinced beyond a reasonable

doubt that Mr. Mullins could never change.” On that basis,

he requests that his sentence be modified to make him

eligible for parole.

¶78 We cannot say that we agree. The record does

not show an affirmative factual finding that Mullins was

capable of change—the showing necessary for us to

declare Mullins’s sentence unconstitutional as a matter

of law and immediately modify his sentence to permit the

possibility of parole.

¶79 Even still, the sentencing court’s comments and

the context in which they were delivered raise significant

ambiguity as to whether a JLWOP sentence was “imposed

46a

Appendix A

in an illegal manner” here.139 We agree with Mullins that

the court here both contemplated his ability to change—

one of the important features of youth—and may have

implicitly concluded that Mullins had a capacity to change.

After the judge’s statement that he did not know how to

judge capacity for change, and counsel’s arguments that

the issue was better left to the Board of Pardons and

Parole, and hardly relevant for the sentencing judge,

the judge did not conclude the hearing. Rather, in the

context of considering whether to leave discretion to

the Board of Pardons and Parole, the judge made his

comment suggesting some “hope” that Mullins might

have a “chance to change.” The judge then affirmatively

sentenced Mullins to JLWOP—a sentence incompatible

with a suggestion that Mullins could change.

¶80 While we cannot say that Mullins is the type

of juvenile offender for whom JLWOP is categorically

disproportionate—the sentencing court did not make that

finding, and this court cannot evaluate that question in

the first instance—the court’s comments raise significant

concerns that Mullins may fall into that category. The

court’s comments also raise significant concerns that it

misapprehended its constitutional obligation to consider

youth in the proper manner under the retroactive reach

of Miller and its progeny. Indeed, the comments appear

to contemplate leaving the full consideration of Mullins’s

youth to the Board of Pardons and Parole, making it

unclear whether the court was appropriately assessing

Mullins’s youth in its decision to impose a JLWOP

sentence.

139. See Utah R. Crim. P. 22(e) (2013).

47a

Appendix A

¶81 Given that “a lifetime in prison is a disproportionate

sentence for all but the rarest of children,”140 the court’s

statements undermine our confidence that JLWOP was an

appropriate and constitutional sentence and that the court

properly undertook the constitutional task before it—to

consider Mullins’s “youth and attendant characteristics”

themselves.141 Accordingly, the court’s comments lead us

to conclude that Mullins’s sentence “pose[s] too great a

risk of disproportionate punishment” here.142 We therefore

hold that Mullins’s sentence was “imposed in an illegal

manner” under the old rule 22(e).

¶82 The fact that Mullins was sentenced before

Miller and its progeny were issued strengthens our

conclusion because the sentencing court lacked notice

of the constitutional import of Mullins’s youth.143 When

the court sentenced Mullins in 2002, controlling caselaw

did not indicate that juveniles should receive special

consideration when being sentenced. Indeed, sentencing

140. Montgomery, 577 U.S. at 195 (emphasis added).

141. Miller, 567 U.S. at 483.

142. Montgomery, 577 U.S. at 208 (cleaned up).

143. See, e.g., State v. Null, 836 N.W.2d 41, 76 (Iowa 2013)

(similarly noting that the district court lacked “the benefit of Miller”

during sentencing, and providing an opportunity to reconsider the

appropriate sentence for a juvenile upon remand); Malvo, 281 A.3d

at 772 (vacating a JLWOP sentence when a judge’s ambiguous

comments suggested he had not weighed the defendant’s youth and

ability to change, emphasizing that defendant was sentenced before

Miller and that the court need not “presume that a sentencing judge

is clairvoyant”).

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Appendix A

a juvenile to death—a more severe punishment than

JLWOP—was still constitutionally permissible.144 And the

United States Supreme Court had rejected the argument

that juveniles were different from adults because they

have “less developed cognitive skills,” are “less mature

and responsible,” and are “less morally blameworthy.”145

Additionally, the Court stated that juvenile transfer

statutes146 adequately “ensure individualized consideration

of the maturity and moral responsibility” of a juvenile

“before they are even held to stand trial as adults.”147 In

other words, the Court allowed for the possibility that

a juvenile’s individual maturity and responsibility need

not be considered at all during sentencing. If even the

death penalty for juveniles served legitimate penological

goals under controlling caselaw, and constitutional law

did not yet mandate individualized consideration of youth

at sentencing, then there is no basis to assume that a

sentencing court at that time would have understood the

constitutional rights implicated by sentencing a youth to

JLWOP.

¶83 In contrast, Miller and Montgomery marked

a turning point, together making clear that a JLWOP

144. See Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 380 (1989),

overruled by Roper, 543 U.S. 551.

145. Stanford, 492 U.S. at 377–79.

146. Transfer statutes “allow[] or mandate[] the trial of a

juvenile as an adult in a criminal court for a criminal act.” Transfer

Statute, Black’s Law Dictionary (12th ed. 2024).

147. Stanford, 492 U.S. at 375.

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Appendix A

sentence is disproportionate for juvenile defendants

who possess the capacity to change.148 Under Miller, a

sentencing court must consider a juvenile’s youth and its

attendant characteristics.149 “[I]mposition of a State’s most

severe penalties on juvenile offenders cannot proceed as

though they were not children.”150 The sentencing court

must have the opportunity to consider the “mitigating

qualities of youth,” such as “immaturity, impetuosity,

and failure to appreciate risks and consequences” as well

as the peer pressures and the familial environment that

surround the juvenile.151 The fact that the sentencing court

did not have the benefit of this caselaw, combined with its

ambiguous remarks about Mullins’s prospects for change

in the context of considering whether to allow the Board of

Pardons and Parole to make that determination, suggests

“too great a risk of disproportionate punishment” here.152

It is “unclear at best whether [Mullins’s] sentencing

proceeding complied with the Eighth Amendment.”153

Viewed as a whole, the sentencing record raises significant

148. Miller, 567 U.S. at 479–80; Montgomery, 577 U.S. at

209–10 (recognizing Miller’s “substantive holding that life without

parole is an excessive sentence for children whose crimes reflect

transient immaturity”).

149. See 567 U.S. at 465, 470–80.

150. Id. at 474.

151. Id. at 476–77 (cleaned up).

152. See id. at 479.

153. See Malvo, 281 A.3d at 773 (“In our view, the legality of a

sentence under the Eighth Amendment is not a topic for this Court’s

speculation.”).

50a

Appendix A

concerns about the constitutionality of Mullins’s

sentence and the sentencing court’s apprehension of the

constitutional task before it. Accordingly, we hold that

Mullins’s sentence was imposed in an illegal manner under

the old rule 22(e). We therefore vacate Mullins’s sentence

and remand for resentencing proceedings consistent with

Miller and its progeny.154

¶84 We turn then to the question of remedy. Mullins

requests that this court “correct [his] sentence by giving

him the chance to seek parole.” And, indeed, the United

States Supreme Court has suggested that simply enabling

a defendant to seek parole may be an appropriate path

under Miller.155 We therefore do not fault Mullins for

seeking that remedy. But the Court left to the states to

determine whether resentencing or mere parole eligibility

is appropriate when a juvenile’s sentencing process

violated the Eighth Amendment.156 As we have noted, in

instances where the record reflects an affirmative finding

that a juvenile is capable of change—in other words, not

permanently incorrigible—or that the crime was the result

of transient immaturity, JLWOP is unconstitutionally

disproportionate. In such cases, a resentencing proceeding

in which the sentencing court could again impose JLWOP

would be inappropriate.

154. See Miller, 567 U.S. at 474, 479, 489; Jones, 593 U.S. at

111–12 (noting that appropriate sentencing proceedings under Miller

“help[] ensure that life-without-parole sentences are imposed only in

cases where that sentence is appropriate in light of the defendant’s

age”).

155. See Montgomery, 577 U.S. at 212.

156. See id.

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Appendix A

¶85 Here, however, the record does not reflect such an

unambiguous finding. Accordingly, we can only speculate

as to whether Mullins is one of the rare individuals “whose

crimes reflect irreparable corruption.”157 But the court’s

comments at Mullins’s sentencing raise a significant risk

that Mullins may be one of those individuals and that

the court did not properly consider that possibility. We

therefore leave it to the sentencing court on remand to

determine the appropriate sentence here, considering

Mullins’s youth as required by the Eighth Amendment,

consistent with Miller and this opinion.158

CONCLUSION

¶86 Mullins brings seven claims in his challenge to his

sentence. We either reject or do not reach six of his seven

claims. As to his final claim, Mullins argues that although

the court considered his youth and suggested he could

change, the court nevertheless sentenced him to JLWOP,

which was disproportionate under the Eighth Amendment.

We hold that the sentencing court’s ambiguous comments

on the record about Mullins’s capacity for change renders

Mullins’s JLWOP sentence one imposed in an illegal

manner under rule 22(e). Although the sentencing court

appeared to consider Mullins’s youth, it did so in the

context of considering whether to leave the Board of

Pardons and Parole the discretion to assess Mullins’s

ability to change and without understanding youth’s

full constitutional import, as set forth in Miller and its

157. Id. at 209.

158. See generally Miller, 567 U.S. 460.

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Appendix A

progeny. This, taken together with the court’s suggestion

that Mullins might have the capacity for change, raises

significant concerns about the constitutionality of Mullins’s

sentence, leading us to conclude that the sentence was

imposed in an illegal manner. Accordingly, we vacate

Mullins’s sentence and remand to the district court for

resentencing proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Justice Hagen, concurring in part and dissenting in

part from the Opinion of the Court:

¶87 We join the opinion of the court, except as to the

majority’s holding in Part II.F that Mullins’s sentence

violates the Eighth Amendment. The majority concludes

that Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012), and its

progeny hold that “if a child is capable of change and

reform, that is, is not incorrigible, a JLWOP sentence is

disproportionate and unconstitutional.” Supra ¶ 74. Based

on that interpretation of the governing law, the majority

reasons that “if a sentencing court affirmatively finds

that a juvenile offender can change, a JLWOP sentence

is unconstitutional.” Supra ¶ 74. Although the sentencing

court did not make such a finding here, the majority

concludes that the court’s statement about Mullins’s

“chance to change” creates “significant ambiguity as to

whether a JLWOP sentence was ‘imposed in an illegal

manner’” under rule 22(e) and requires resentencing.

Supra ¶ 79.

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Appendix A

¶88 We disagree with the premise of the majority’s

holding. In our reading, Miller and its progeny stand for

the narrower proposition that, to comply with the Eighth

Amendment, a sentencing judge must have discretion to

impose a non-JLWOP sentence based on an individualized

assessment of the unique circumstances presented in the

case. Although the United States Supreme Court has sent

mixed messages about when a juvenile can be sentenced to

JLWOP without violating the Eighth Amendment, its most

recent pronouncement on this issue was perfectly clear:

“In a case involving an individual who was under 18 when

he or she committed a homicide, a State’s discretionary

sentencing system is both constitutionally necessary and

constitutionally sufficient.” Jones v. Mississippi, 593 U.S.

98, 105 (2021).

¶89 When Mullins was sentenced, the district court

had discretion to impose a lesser sentence. And, in making

that determination, the court was free to consider all

mitigating factors, including Mullins’s youth and attendant

circumstances. That is all the Miller line of cases requires.

¶90 Beginning in 2005, the Court decided a series of

cases that recognized that “youth matters in sentencing.”

See id. First, in Roper v. Simmons, the Court held that

sentencing a juvenile offender to death violated the Eighth

Amendment. 543 U.S. 551, 578 (2005). Five years later,

in Graham v. Florida, the Court held that a JLWOP

sentence for crimes other than homicide also violated the

Eighth Amendment. 560 U.S. 48, 82 (2010). These cases

“establish[ed] that children are constitutionally different

from adults for purposes of sentencing” due to their

54a

Appendix A

“diminished culpability and greater prospects for reform.”

Miller, 567 U.S. at 471.

¶91 In Miller, the Court confronted the question

of whether imposing mandatory JLWOP on juvenile

homicide offenders violated the Eighth Amendment. See

id. at 465. The Court looked to two lines of cases—the

Roper and Graham cases categorically banning certain

punishments for classes of juvenile offenders, and its

adult death penalty cases “requiring that sentencing

authorities consider the characteristics of a defendant and

the details of his offense before sentencing him to death.”

Id. at 470. The Court concluded that “Graham, Roper, and

our individualized sentencing decisions make clear that

a judge or jury must have the opportunity to consider

mitigating circumstances before imposing the harshest

possible penalty for juveniles.” Id. at 489. Because JLWOP

is the harshest penalty available for juvenile homicide

offenders, the Court held that sentencing schemes that

require mandatory JLWOP violate the Eighth Amendment

because they “preclude a sentencer from taking account

of an offender’s age and the wealth of characteristics and

circumstances attendant to it.” Id. at 476.

¶92 A few years later, the Court was tasked with

deciding whether the rule it announced in Miller was

retroactive. See Montgomery v. Louisiana, 577 U.S. 190

(2016). Under the Court’s precedent, “a new constitutional

rule of criminal procedure does not apply, as a general

matter, to convictions that were final when the new rule

was announced.” Id. at 198. But “new substantive rules of

constitutional law” are retroactive. Id. So the question was

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Appendix A

whether Miller announced a procedural rule requiring

individualized sentencing before imposing a JLWOP

sentence or a substantive rule prohibiting JLWOP for a

particular class of juveniles. See id. at 206–12.

¶93 A discerning reader of the Miller decision would

have assumed that it announced a procedural rule.

After all, Miller said as much: “Our decision does not

categorically bar a penalty for a class of offenders or type

of crime—as, for example, we did in Roper or Graham.

Instead, it mandates only that a sentencer follow a certain

process—considering an offender’s youth and attendant

characteristics—before imposing a particular penalty.”

Miller, 567 U.S. at 483.

¶94 Yet the Montgomer y court asserted that

“Miller . . . did more than require a sentencer to consider

a juvenile offender’s youth before imposing life without

parole.” Montgomery, 577 U.S. at 208. Over a sharp

dissent that accused the majority of rewriting Miller, see

generally id. at 224 (Scalia, J., dissenting), the Court held

that Miller announced a substantive rule:

Even if a court considers a child’s age before

sentencing him or her to a lifetime in prison, that

sentence still violates the Eighth Amendment

for a child whose crime reflects unfortunate

yet transient immaturity. Because Miller

determined that sentencing a child to life

without parole is excessive for all but the

rare juvenile offender whose crime reflects

irreparable corruption, it rendered life without

56a

Appendix A

parole an unconstitutional penalty for a class

of defendants because of their status—that

is, juvenile offenders whose crimes reflect the

transient immaturity of youth.

Id. at 208 (majority opinion) (cleaned up). The Court

acknowledged that Miller did not require a sentencing

court to make a factual finding of incorrigibility, but

it explained that the lack of “a formal factfinding

requirement does not leave States free to sentence a

child whose crime reflects transient immaturity to life

without parole. To the contrary, Miller established that

this punishment is disproportionate under the Eighth

Amendment.” Id. at 211.

¶95 If Montgomery had been the Supreme Court’s

last word on the subject, we would readily agree with the

majority that JLWOP is categorically disproportionate

in violation of the Eighth Amendment for juveniles whose

crimes reflect the transient immaturity of youth rather

than permanent incorrigibility. But the Supreme Court

has since retreated from Montgomery’s interpretation

of Miller. It is at this point that our interpretation of the

governing caselaw diverges from that of the majority.

¶96 In Jones v. Mississippi, the Court was squarely

confronted with the question of whether, before imposing

a JLWOP sentence, a sentencer must make an express

factual finding of permanent incorrigibility or “must at

least provide an on-the-record sentencing explanation

with an implicit finding of permanent incorrigibility.” 593

U.S. at 113 (cleaned up). The Court held that no express

57a

Appendix A

or implicit finding of permanent incorrigibility is needed

before imposing JLWOP because Miller requires only a

“discretionary sentencing procedure” to comport with the

Eighth Amendment. Id. at 110. The Court explained that

“Miller declined to characterize permanent incorrigibility

as . . . an eligibility criterion,” and instead treated “youth

as a sentencing factor akin to a mitigating circumstance.”

Id. at 108. Just as “th[e] Court has required for the

individualized consideration of mitigating circumstances

in capital cases,” id., Miller requires individualized

sentencing because mandatory JLWOP “poses too great

a risk of disproportionate punishment,” id. at 110 (cleaned

up). But like the consideration of mitigating factors in

capital cases, the Eighth Amendment does not require

that the sentencer weigh the mitigating circumstances in

any particular way or make “an implicit finding regarding

those mitigating circumstances.” Id. at 116.

¶97 The Court concluded that Jones’s JLWOP

sentence complied with Miller “because the sentence

was not mandatory and the trial judge had discretion to

impose a lesser punishment in light of Jones’s youth.” Id.

at 120. The trial judge was not required to find—even

implicitly—that the crime was a result of permanent

incorrigibility as opposed to the transient immaturity of

youth. Id. at 118.

¶98 Both the concurrence and the dissent criticized

the majority’s opinion as irreconcilable with Montgomery.

See id. at 121–29 (Thomas, J., concurring); id. at 129–51

(Sotomayor, J., dissenting). The majority acknowledged

the tension between “the procedural function of Miller’s

rule” and Montgomery’s holding “that the Miller rule

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Appendix A

was substantive for retroactivity purposes,” id. at 110

(majority opinion), but it insisted that it was not overruling

Montgomery because Montgomery’s holding—that Miller

applies retroactively on collateral review—remains intact,

id. at 118. And, the majority pointed out, Montgomery had

“unequivocally stated that ‘Miller did not impose a formal

factfinding requirement’ and added that ‘a finding of fact

regarding a child’s incorrigibility . . . is not required.’” Id.

at 104–05 (quoting Montgomery, 577 U.S. at 211).

¶99 As for Montgomery’s assertion that Miller barred

JLWOP “for all but the rarest of juvenile offenders . . . whose

crimes reflect permanent incorrigibility,” Montgomery,

577 U.S. at 209, the Jones majority characterized Miller

as merely acknowledging “that a discretionary sentencing

procedure would help make life-without-parole sentences

relatively rare,” as borne out by statistics from those

states with discretionary JLWOP, Jones, 593 U.S. at 112.

According to the majority, Miller required only that “a

sentencer must have discretion to consider youth before

imposing a [JLWOP] sentence,” and “Montgomery did

not purport to add to Miller’s requirements.” Id. at 109.

¶100 Despite the Court’s insistence that Jones did

not overrule Montgomery, the two cases are difficult to

reconcile. While Montgomery read Miller as imposing a

substantive rule that rendered JLWOP unconstitutional

for all but the rare juvenile offender “whose crimes reflect

irreparable corruption,” Montgomery, 577 U.S. at 209,

Jones held that Miller “mandated only that a sentencer

follow a certain process—considering an offender’s

youth and attendant characteristics—before imposing a

[JLWOP] sentence,” Jones, 593 U.S. at 101 (cleaned up).

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¶101 As we see it, the substantive rule recognized in

Montgomery did not survive Jones’s subsequent holding

that permanent incorrigibility is not “an eligibility

criterion” for JLWOP and that “a State’s discretionary

sentencing system is both constitutionally necessary and

constitutionally sufficient.” Jones, 593 U.S. at 105, 107–09.

And we are bound to follow the Supreme Court’s most

recent pronouncement in Jones. Cf. In re Adoption of J.S.,

2014 UT 51, ¶ 49, 358 P.3d 1009 (explaining that where

“two lines of cases are unquestionably incompatible . . . our

most recent pronouncement is the law, and has overtaken

any prior contrary statement”).

¶102 Although Jones expressly declined to overrule

the holdings in Miller and Montgomery, it described

those untouched holdings narrowly: “Miller held that a

State may not impose a mandatory life-without-parole

sentence on a murderer under 18. Today’s decision does

not disturb that holding. Montgomery later held that

Miller applies retroactively on collateral review. Today’s

decision likewise does not disturb that holding.” Jones,

593 U.S. at 118. So when Jones says it is not overruling

the holding in Montgomery, we read that as leaving

intact Montgomery’s ultimate holding that Miller is

retroactive—that is, a defendant sentenced to mandatory

JLWOP prior to Miller is entitled to resentencing under

a discretionary sentencing scheme—not its assertion that

it is unconstitutional to impose a JLWOP sentence on a

juvenile who is not permanently incorrigible.159

159. To be sure, Jones creates confusion by quoting a “key

paragraph” from Montgomery, stating that the absence of “a formal

factfinding requirement does not leave States free to sentence a

child whose crime reflects transient immaturity to life without

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¶103 This interpretation of Jones is where we part ways

with the majority. The majority recognizes that, under

Jones, “[a] sentencing court has no obligation to make an

on-the-record finding of permanent incorrigibility before

imposing a JLWOP sentence,” but holds that “a contrary

finding bars the court from imposing JLWOP.” Supra ¶ 74.

¶104 The majority’s reasoning assumes that a JLWOP

sentence is constitutional only if the juvenile is, in fact,

permanently incorrigible. In other words, it assumes

that the sentencing judge is required to find permanent

incorrigibility and Jones merely holds that the court has

no duty to make that finding on the record. But we do not

read Jones so narrowly.

¶105 In our view, Jones does not merely hold that

no express factual finding or on-the-record explanation

is required; it holds that no finding of permanent

incorrigibility is required at all. Jones squarely rejects

the idea that permanent incorrigibility in JLWOP cases

is “an eligibility criterion akin to sanity or a lack of

intellectual disability” in death penalty cases. 593 U.S.

at 107. Instead, it explains that the defendant’s youth

is a “mitigating factor” that can be weighed differently

by different judges “given the mix of all the facts and

circumstances in a specific case.” Id. at 109, 115. Not only

parole. To the contrary, Miller established that this punishment

is disproportionate under the Eighth Amendment.” Jones v.

Mississippi, 593 U.S. 98, 106 n.2 (2021) (quoting Montgomery

v. Louisiana, 577 U.S. 190, 211 (2016)). But the quoted language

cannot be squared with the express holding in Jones that permanent

incorrigibility is not “an eligibility criterion.” Id. at 107–08.

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Appendix A

does it reject a formal factfinding requirement, id. at 106,

but it also rejects the idea that permanent incorrigibility

is “a factual prerequisite” to imposing a JLWOP sentence,

id. at 109 n.3 (“If permanent incorrigibility were a factual

prerequisite to a life-without-parole sentence, this Court’s

Sixth Amendment precedents might require that a jury,

not a judge, make such a finding.”).

¶106 We cannot square the majority’s holding in this

case with Jones’s clear pronouncement that permanent

incorrigibility is not an eligibility criterion for JLWOP.

The rule that the majority adopts—that JLWOP is not

permitted where the sentencing court has found the

juvenile redeemable—is merely the flip side of the rule

Jones expressly rejects—that JLWOP sentences are

permitted only where a court has found the juvenile

irredeemable. If permanent incorrigibility is not an

eligibility criterion or factual prerequisite, there is no

reason why a contrary finding would preclude a JLWOP

sentence.

¶107 We acknowledge that the majority’s holding

finds support in decisions from two other state supreme

courts, but we likewise disagree with the way those

decisions treat permanent incorrigibility as an eligibility

criterion in the wake of Jones. Those cases similarly

vacated JLWOP sentences where the record suggested

that the sentencing court did not believe the defendant

to be permanently incorrigible. Specifically, the North

Carolina Supreme Court vacated a JLWOP sentence

where the sentencing court made an express finding that

the juvenile was “neither incorrigible nor irredeemable.”

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Appendix A

State v. Kelliher, 873 S.E.2d 366, 380 (N.C. 2022) (cleaned

up). And Maryland’s high court vacated a JLWOP sentence

where it was unclear whether the sentencing judge viewed

the defendant as “the rare juvenile offender whose crime

reflects irreparable corruption.” Malvo v. State, 281 A.3d

758, 772 (Md. 2022) (cleaned up). 160

¶108 Both opinions were 4–3 decisions in which the

courts split over the proper interpretation of the Supreme

Court’s JLWOP caselaw. The majority opinions read those

cases to mean that the Eighth Amendment categorically

prohibits imposing a JLWOP sentence on a juvenile who

is not incorrigible. See Kelliher, 873 S.E.2d at 380; Malvo,

281 A.3d at 765. But the dissenting opinions pointed

out that “the most recent iteration of that line of cases,

[the Jones opinion], unequivocally holds that all that

is procedurally required prior to [imposing a JLWOP

sentence] is an individualized sentencing proceeding in

which the court has discretion to sentence the offender to

less than life without the possibility of parole.” Malvo, 281

A.3d at 806 (Hotten, J., dissenting); see also Kelliher, 873

S.E.2d at 401 (Newby, C.J., dissenting) (explaining that,

under Jones, “a sentence is constitutionally permissible so

long as the trial court is permitted to consider the juvenile

defendant’s age and attendant characteristics”). Under the

160. When Malvo v. State was decided on August 6, 2022,

the state’s highest court was called the Court of Appeals of Maryland.

See Malvo v. State, 281 A.3d 758 (Md. 2022); see also Md. Const.

art. IV, pt. I, § 1 (1867). Effective December 14, 2022, the court was

renamed the Maryland Supreme Court. See Md. Const. art. IV, pt. I,

§ 1; see also S.B. 666, 2021 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Md. 2021); H.B.

885, 2021 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Md. 2021).

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Appendix A

dissenting justices’ reading of Jones, whether JLWOP “is

constitutionally sufficient under the Eighth Amendment

depends upon the presence [of a] discretionary sentencing

procedure. It is decisively not, as the majority holds,

whether the sentencing court, at least implicitly, found

the juvenile to be incorrigible.” Malvo, 281 A.3d at 809

(Hotten, J., dissenting) (cleaned up); see also Kelliher, 873

S.E.2d at 401 (Newby, C.J., dissenting) (asserting that “a

trial court need not determine that a juvenile defendant is

incorrigible or irredeemable before using its discretion to

sentence the defendant to life imprisonment without the

possibility of parole”).

¶109 “Other courts have understood Jones similarly

and have concluded that no viable Miller claim exists, so

long as the sentence is not mandatory—that is so long as

the sentencer has discretion to consider the mitigating

qualities of youth and impose a lesser punishment.” People

v. Wilson, 220 N.E.3d 1068, 1077 (Ill. 2023) (cleaned up)

(citing cases); see also Fletcher v. State, 532 P.3d 286,

305 (Alaska Ct. App. 2023) (holding that Jones forecloses

any federal constitutional claim under Miller so long

as the defendant was sentenced under a discretionary

sentencing scheme). Those courts agree that “under the

current state of Eighth Amendment law as expressed by

Jones, ‘a State’s discretionary sentencing system is both

constitutionally necessary and constitutionally sufficient.’”

Commonwealth v. Felder, 269 A.3d 1232, 1243 (Pa. 2022)

(quoting Jones, 593 U.S. at 105).

¶110 Indeed, some courts that had interpreted

Miller and Montgomery to restrict JLWOP sentences

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Appendix A

to permanently incorrigible youth have now overruled

those opinions in light of Jones. For example, the Illinois

Supreme Court overruled its prior holding “that a juvenile

offender’s discretionary life sentence does not comport

with the [E]ighth [A]mendment unless the sentencing

court first makes a finding of permanent incorrigibility”

because that holding “is directly at odds with the holding

in Jones—specifically, that additional findings are not

required, in that a discretionary sentencing scheme

that allows a court to consider youth and its attendant

characteristics is constitutionally sufficient.” Wilson,

220 N.E.3d at, 1076–77 (cleaned up) (overruling People v.

Holman, 91 N.E.3d 849 (Ill. 2017)). The Supreme Court

of Pennsylvania also overruled its prior decision that had

interpreted Montgomery to “permit the imposition of

a life-without-parole sentence upon a juvenile offender

only if the crime committed is indicative of the offender’s

permanent incorrigibility” because that understanding

“has been abrogated by the High Court’s decision in

Jones.” Felder, 269 A.3d at 1243 (cleaned up) (overruling

Commonwealth v. Batts, 163 A.3d 410 (Pa. 2017)).

¶111 We read Jones similarly. Because permanent

incorrigibility is not an eligibility criterion, a JLWOP

sentence is not categorically unconstitutional when

imposed on a juvenile who the court views as redeemable.

Jones also disavowed the notion that a sentencer must

weigh a juvenile’s youth and attendant characteristics in

any particular way. Jones, 593 U.S. at 115. Instead, all

that the Eighth Amendment requires is that the sentencer

have discretion to consider youth as a mitigating factor. Id.

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Appendix A

¶112 In this case, Mullins received the individualized

sentencing that the Eighth Amendment requires. See

State v. Houston, 2015 UT 40, ¶ 61, 353 P.3d 55 (concluding

that Utah’s discretionary JLWOP sentencing scheme

comported with Miller). The sentencing court had

discretion to impose a lesser sentence if it determined

that a JLWOP sentence was not appropriate. See Utah

Code § 76-3-207(4)(c)–(d) (2001). Among other things, the

court could consider evidence regarding “the defendant’s

character, background, history, mental and physical

condition” and “any other facts in aggravation or mitigation

of the penalty that the court consider[ed] relevant to the

sentence.” Id. § 76-3-207(2)(a)(ii), (iv) (2001). In particular,

the governing statute’s non-exclusive list of mitigating

circumstances included “the youth of the defendant at the

time of the crime.” Id. § 76-3-207(3)(e) (2001).

¶113 There is no need for us to decipher the sentencing

court’s remark about “a chance to change.” Even if the

sentencing court believed that Mullins had the capacity

to change, it would not render Mullins’s sentence

unconstitutional. The sentencing court had discretion

to impose a lesser sentence based on an individualized

assessment of all relevant circumstances, including

Mullins’s youth. Mullins’s capacity to change was simply

one mitigating factor that the court had discretion to

weigh, along with all other factors, in determining whether

JLWOP was appropriate. Because the Supreme Court

has held that “a State’s discretionary sentencing system

is both constitutionally necessary and constitutionally

sufficient,” Jones, 593 U.S. at 105, Mullins’s sentence was

not imposed in an illegal manner. We would therefore

affirm his sentence.

66a

B

APPENDIX B —Appendix

SENTENCING

HEARING

TRANSCRIPT, MAY 1, 2002

IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT

IN AND FOR SEVIER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

CASE NO. 011600140 FS

STATE OF UTAH,

Plaintiff,

VS.

MORRIS T. MULLINS,

Defendant.

BEFORE THE HONORABLE DAVID L. MOWER

SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT UTAH

STATE COURTS COMPLEX

REPORTER’S TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS

MAY 1, 2002

REPORTED BY:

Joseph M. Liddell, CSR, RPR

SENTENCING

Filed March 29, 2004

[INDEX INTENTIONALLY OMITTED]

67a

Appendix B

[4]TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS

THE COURT: Thank you all and good morning,

ladies and gentlemen. It’s May the 1st, 2002. It’s just

after 9:00 a.m. I see Mr. Brown here with Mr. Evans. Mr.

Moffatt and Mr. Bradshaw, Mr. Mullins, and Mr. Hummel.

Mr. Moffatt, I think today’s the day for sentencing in

this case. Any reason not to have the sentencing hearing

today?

MR. MOFFATT: Judge, we know of no reason.

We have submitted to the Court both, Mr. Brown and

I assume, the stipulation, certain documents for your

review. We have submitted to you, ah, in total, ah, a report

with vitae authorized by Dr. Mark Cunningham. He is our

forensic psychologist who has assisted us assessing Mr.

Mullins for the recommendations. It’s my understanding,

Judge, that you have that information. I’ve given to the

Court, this morning, clean copies of those documents,

including addenda addressing the issue of malingering.

We would ask the Court to make those a formal part of

the record in this case.

THE COURT: And Mr. Brown, before I respond to

Mr. Moffat’s request, you’re ready to have a sentencing

hearing today?

MR. BROWN:

Yes.

THE COURT: Let’s have a little preview of what you

[5]would expect. Are you going to call witnesses today?

68a

Appendix B

MR. BROWN: I don’t anticipate calling witnesses. I

have a number of family members of the victim who desire

to be heard, and the Court should hear them. I have also

submitted information for the Court’s, ah, perusal and, ah,

we anticipate that we will be discussing that information

at some length. And, ah, I do have a videotape that’s gonna

take approximately 25 or 30 minutes that we want the

Court to view. Other than that, I don’t intend to have any

witnesses, other than the statements of the victim’s family.

THE COURT: Okay. And Mr. Moffat, are you going

to be calling any witnesses today?

MR. MOFFATT: Judge, we will not be calling

witnesses; and Mr. Mullins may want to address the court

and limit comments to the Court, if that’s all right.

THE COURT:

Okay. Let’s talk about documents.

MR. BRADSHAW: Judge, I wonder, before we begin,

I wonder if it’s possible to get Mr. Mullins unshackled in

front. It’s right uncomfortable to sit shackled behind.

THE COURT:

Mr. Brown?

MR. BROWN:

That’s fine.

THE COURT: Can we have somebody take care of

that? Do we have a Transportation Officer here? Would

you, please.

Thank you.

69a

Appendix B

Ah, yesterday the clerk bought me a document that’s

[6]got Mr. Brown’s name on it. It’s called Plaintiff’s

Pre-sentence Information Submitted, which I’ve read.

And the clerk also brought, ah, some documents that

included a CD from Mark D. Cunningham and a document

entitled “Provisional Capital Sentencing Evaluation and

Mitigation.” And I read those things.

And today Mr. Moffat gave me a document, a letter

from his office, April 9th, 2002, attached. It’s entitled

“Addendum To Provisional Capital Sentencing Regarding

Mitigation,” which I have not read.

Mr. Brown, are there other documents besides that?

MR. BROWN:

No.

THE COURT:

Mr. Moffat?

MR. MOFFATT:

No, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. So Mr. Moffat, the fact that I

haven’t read the two-page addendum, are you gonna walk

me through that when it’s your turn to speak?

MR. MOFFATT: I can, Your Honor. Yes. I don’t

know if the Court intends to rule directly from the Bench

or if the Court is gonna take some time to consider.

Whenever you have an opportunity to review that, we

would appreciate it. I’ll do my best to tell you about it.

THE COURT:

Okay. Then let’s keep going.

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Appendix B

Mr. Brown, usually the State goes first, and I’m

assuming you’re planning on that. So would you like to

make a [7]recommendation?

MR. BROWN: Your Honor, what we would like to

do is we’d like to have those family members of the victim

who desire to make a statement make that statement first,

and then I’ll make my recommendations to the Court. I

discussed that matter with counsel and they agreed that

that would be appropriate.

THE COURT: Now there’s only two choices

available today; right?

MR. BROWN:

That’s correct.

THE COURT: And do either one of those sentences

include a potential fine?

MR. BROWN: Ah, well I’m sure they do include a

potential fine; I don’t think the word requesting any fine,

and so that shouldn’t be at issue.

THE COURT: So the two choices would be life, or

life without parole.

MR. BROWN:

That’s correct.

THE COURT: Okay. How many family members

want to speak yet? Do you know?

71a

Appendix B

MR. BROWN: I don’t know. But I know that one of

them that does desire to speak is Merridee Torgerson;

that we should take her first and then I think that maybe

three or four other family members, maybe more, desire

to be heard.

VICTIM’S FAMILY STATEMENTS

[8]THE COURT:

here?

Okay. Mrs. Torgerson, are you

MZ. TORGERSON:

THE COURT:

Yes.

Good morning.

MZ. TORGERSON:

Thank you.

THE COURT: I was listening to Mr. Brown. I don’t

think I quite caught your first name. What is it.

MZ. TORGERSON: My name is Meridee Torgerson.

THE COURT:

Say your first name.

MZ. TORGERSON:

THE COURT:

Meridee.

How about spelling that for me.

MZ. TORGERSON:

MR. MULLINS:

How do I spell it?

Um-hm.

72a

Appendix B

MZ. TORGERSON:

THE COURT:

Where do you live, Mrs. Torgerson?

MZ. TORGERSON:

Nevada.

THE COURT:

Mrs. Davis?

M-e-r-r-i-d-e-e.

I live in Battle Mountain,

And are you -- were you related to

MZ. TORGERSON:

I’m Amy Davis’s daughter.

THE COURT: Okay. Ah, did Amy have other

children, besides you?

MZ. TORGERSON: Yes, she did. I have three

brothers. Ronald, Berdell, and Bill.

THE COURT:

Are they hear?

MZ. TORGERSON:

THE COURT:

Ronald.

Yes, they are.

Ronald, where are you? Hello,

[9]And Berdell? Good morning.

And I forgot the last name already.

MZ. TORGERSON:

THE COURT:

Bill.

Bill. There you go. Hello, Bill.

73a

Appendix B

MZ. Torgerson, you wanted to make a statement, so

please go ahead.

MZ. TORGERSON: Okay. What I would give for one

more time to be able to pick up the telephone and say, “Hi,

Mom. What are you doing?”

“Oh, I’m just sitting in my chair relaxing me to get

that little brush of adrenaline.”

She’s always ready for me to one more time be able to

wrap my arms around her and whisper in her ear, “Mom, I

love you.” Morris Mullins has stolen this from my brothers

and me. He has stolen a mother, her love, her kindness,

her advice.

Morris Mullins has stolen from our children a loving

and caring grandmother, all of her special little shared

secret confidences. I’m always getting this one thing that

was so important to them at their time of life. He has

stolen from our grandchildren a woman who loved every

one of those little people in their special way. Every single

holiday they received a note and a dollar bill in the mail.

I see their little faces light up with so much excitement.

You couldn’t have traded this dollar for something of great

great value.

[10]I could stand here for so long and talk about my

mother, but this is not about my mother. This is about

Morris Mullins. It does not matter whether she was a

good person or not. It does not matter whether she had

one more hour or maybe more years to live on this earth.

74a

Appendix B

Morris Mullins made a decision. It was not his decision

to make. This is God’s decision.

For almost a year now we have been hearing about

Morris Mullins and Morris Mullins’s rights. I would like

to know what right did he have to step on my mother’s

property? What right did he have to enter her home?

What right did he have to hit her to beat her to suffocate

her and then beguile her body? Maybe it’s time that we

stop and considered someone else’s rights and honor them.

My brothers in life entered into a plea with the State of

Utah. I feel in my heart it was a very foolish decision. Had

we been allowed more time, I don’t think we would have

agreed to that decision. I think my Aunt Ruth May says

it best. It’s God’s responsibility to forgive Morris Mullins.

It’s our responsibility for him to attend that meeting. That

kind of sums up my feelings.

Every day people come up to me and they say,

“Merridee, I know how you feel. I understand. I’m sorry.”

Your sorry? You guys don’t have a clue. By the grace of God

hopefully your experience spared getting to experience

this, [11]this sleepless nights, the terrible dreams, the

trying to hold your emotions in check to the point your

throat is so sore and raw you can’t speak. That knot of

pain inside that never goes away. It never melts.

My brothers and I will never be able to go back to

the happy carefree lives we had before this. Sometimes I

wonder if we will even be able to survive.

75a

Appendix B

We plead with the Court, please do not give Morris

Mullins parole. No parole. Never, none.

Do we want to allow him the opportunity to abuse one

of our elderly? Do we want to allow him the opportunity

to torment more families and put them to anguish? Do we

want to allow him the opportunity to terrorize another

community? I really don’t think that’s what we want.

We ask the Court to consider if this was your wife,

your mother, your daughter, your sister, how would you

feel? We, Amy Davis, request life without parole.

Thank you.

THE COURT: Thank you, Mrs. Torgerson. Mrs.

Torgerson, do you know if there are other family members

what want to speak?

MZ. TORGERSON:

I believe my brother.

MR. RON DAVIS: Your Honor, I would like to speak.

MZ. TORGERSON: And there’s two granddaughters,

I believe.

[12]THE COURT:

Torgerson’s brothers.

MR. RON DAVIS:

THE COURT:

Um-hm. This is one of Mrs.

Yes, Your Honor.

Tell me your name again.

76a

Appendix B

MR. RON DAVIS:

oldest son.

THE COURT:

Where do you live in, Mr. Davis?

MR. RON DAVIS:

Snow College South.

THE COURT:

My name is Ron Davis, Amy’s

I live in Joseph. I TEACH at the

Um-hm.

MR. RON DAVIS:

Um --

THE COURT: Tell me a little bit about Amy’s

posterity -- four children.

MR. RON DAVIS: Well actually there’s four living

children. There are two that are also deceased.

THE COURT:

Um-hm.

MR. RON DAVIS: Ah, I cannot give you statistics,

sir. I -- there’s, ah, extensive grandchildren, ah, greatgrandchildren, ah, there, most of which are in court. Not

the great-great or the great-grandchildren so much, but

all of the grandchildren are here and all of the children

are here.

THE COURT:

So Amy had six children.

MR. RON DAVIS:

THE COURT:

Yes. She had six children.

Two have deceased?

77a

Appendix B

[13]MR. RON DAVIS:

THE COURT:

Uh-huh.

Did each of those six have a family?

MR. RON DAVIS: Ah, no. Two -- the two that are

deceased, deceased quite young -THE COURT:

I see.

MR. RON DAVIS -- and so the four -- the four of us

that survived, we do have families. Yes.

THE COURT: Okay. And -- and you live in Joseph

and you teach at Snow College South and you wanted to

say something, so go ahead.

MR. RON DAVIS: Yes. Ah, basically I would just

like to say that I don’t know, sir, exactly what kind of an

oath you took when you took this office when you was

elected to this office. Ah, I’m pretty sure that it probably

goes something like what we see on the side of most police

cars across the United States. Ah, there’s the city. A lot

of times, always police, -THE COURT:

Um-hm.

MR. RON DAVIS -- and a lot of times, to protect and

serve. Ah, I’m sure that this was --would be the basis of

your -- of your oath of office, too.

THE COURT:

Would you like to know what it is?

78a

Appendix B

MR. RON DAVIS:

Yes, I would.

THE COURT: I’ll tell you. Ah, the oath is this. I

do solemnly swear to support, obey, and defend the [14]

Constitution of the United States and the Constitution of

this state, and to discharge the duties of my office with

fidelity.

MR. RON DAVIS: I’m a little surprised. I probably

thought you would read it word-for-word. But at any rate,

to get back at what I want to say was that I think that like

any -- elected official, police officer, I think you kind of

stake claim to your territory. Ah, you look upon us people

as your people to serve and protect. And I just basically

would like to say that the brothers and sisters, the sons

and daughters, the grandsons and granddaughters, and

great-grandsons and great-granddaughters and your

extended community that you serve, ah, I don’t think that

there’s any of us that would not ask -- well no, beg you,

please do not turn this -- this Satan worshipper or Satan

-- not worshipper, but well, I -- I feel like he’s a disciple

of Satan. Please don’t turn him loose on the world again.

Ah, he needs the sentence the maximum that you

can sentence him to, under this plea bargain agreement,

without a parole. We cannot let this thing walk the face of

the earth again. We’ve got to keep him incarcerated for

the rest of his natural life. I hope that you will see it that

way and that’s about all I got to say.

THE COURT:

Thank you.

79a

Appendix B

MR. RON DAVIS:

THE COURT:

Thank you for your time.

Thank you, Mr. Davis.

[15]Excuse me. Are there other members of the family

who wanted to speak?

MZ. FORTUNE:

I would, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Hello. Good morning. Come up, if you

would. Thank you. Tell me who you are.

MZ. FORTUNE: My name is Meridon Fortune and

I Merridee Torgerson’s oldest daughter.

THE COURT: Hello, Mrs. Fortune. So is your first

name spelled the same as your mother’s name.

MZ. FORTUNE: Well I couldn’t comprehend the

two R’s so I dropped one. So it’s M-e-r-i-d-o-n.

THE COURT:

And your last name is Fortune.

MZ. FORTUNE:

THE COURT:

Just like having a fortune.

MZ. FORTUNE:

THE COURT:

That’s right.

I do.

Where do you live?

MZ. FORTUNE:

I live in Battle Mountain, Nevada.

80a

Appendix B

THE COURT:

so go ahead.

Okay. You wanted to say something,

MZ. FORTUNE: I -- I do. As you know, my father

is Marion Fortune and I am Amy Davis’s granddaughter

and I have a little girl at home who I have named after

my grandmother.

And my grandmother’s a wonderful lady and I could

go on like my mother and tell you all of the fun, wonderful

things about her, but one of the biggest reasons I named

my daughter after [16]her was that my grandmother was

a great teacher.

My grandmother taught, um, the concept -- concept

to my mother that for every choice we make, there is a

consequence. My mother taught that same lesson to me

and I’m trying to instill that in my young daughter.

On May 2nd, 2001, Morris Mullins made a choice that

day. He made the choice to murder my grandmother and

for his choice there is a consequence. My grandmother

has taught me this lesson through my mother.

I beg the Court that you will reinforce this valuable

lesson that my grandmother has instilled in her family.

Please sentence him to life in prison without parole and

set an example for Amy Davis’s great grandchildren to

see that yes, there is a consequence for every choice that

we make.

Thank you.

81a

Appendix B

THE COURT:

Thank you, Mrs. Torgerson.

Was there someone else what wanted to speak? Hello.

Come up, if you would, please. Good morning. Who are

you?

MZ. HAMILTON:

I’m Rhonda Hamilton.

THE COURT: How do you spell your name, Rhonda?

MZ. HAMILON:

THE COURT:

Where do you live, Mrs. Hamilton?

MZ. HAMILTON:

THE COURT:

R-o-n-d-a H-a-m-i-l-t-o-n.

I live in Wyoming.

And are you related to Amy Davis?

[17 ] M Z . H A M ILT ON:

granddaughter.

THE COURT:

Ye s . I ’m her olde st

So you’re -- you come from Ron?

MZ. HAMILTON:

Ron is my father.

THE COURT: And you live in Wyoming. What

KIND of work do you do?

MZ. HAMILTON:

my precious things.

THE COURT:

I’m a homemaker. I take care of

How am children do you have?

82a

Appendix B

MZ. HAMILTON:

THE COURT:

And you wanted to say something.

MZ. HAMILTON:

THE COURT:

I have two.

Yes.

Go ahead.

MZ. HAMILTON: Amy -- Amy Miriam Norris

Davis was one of the most wonderful people I have ever

had the privilege of knowing. She was a very gentle and

kind person. She cared deeply about her family and

friends.

Grandma Amy was very devoted to her family. She

made it her business to see to it that each one of us was

taken care of always. We have missed her so very deeply

this past year. She would do anything in her power to

see to it that our needs were met, and that usually meant

putting our needs above her own. She was a very unselfish

person. She would give until she had no more left in, if it

meant that someone else to benefit.

I have yet to meet a person who knew my grandmother

[18]who didn’t go on and on about what a beautiful,

wonderful sweet, kind and loving person she was. Both

in her life and now that she’s gone, people have said this

to me.

She was a person who loved much. She had contact

with every single family member and she always knew

how we all were, every day.

83a

Appendix B

As a child, I remember spending summers at

grandma’s house. Grandma had a wonderful way of

making y

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