Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Utah, Petitioner v. Morris Thomas Mullins
Supreme Court briefMar 5, 2026
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No. ________
_________________________________________________
In the Supreme Court of the United States
__________________________________________________________________________________
STATE OF UTAH,
Petitioner,
v.
MORRIS T. MULLINS,
Respondent.
__________________________________________________________________________________
On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari
to the Supreme Court of the State of Utah
__________________________________________________________________________________
Petition for a Writ of Certiorari
____________________________________________________________________________________
Derek Brown
Utah Attorney General
Stanford E. Purser
Utah Solicitor General
Counsel of Record
David Simpson
Deputy Solicitor General
Jeffrey D. Mann
Assistant Solicitor General
160 E. 300 S., 5th floor
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
(801) 366-0533
spurser@agutah.gov
Counsel for Petitioner
i
Question Presented
Whether a sentencing court can impose a sentence of life without parole on a juvenile murderer
even if the court finds that the juvenile is not permanently incorrigible or at least suggests that the
juvenile is capable of change and reform.
ii
Parties to the Proceeding
All parties appear in the caption of the case on the
cover page.
Related Proceedings
State v. Mullins, No. 20200149-SC, Utah Supreme
Court, 2025 UT 57, ––P.3d––. Judgment entered November 20, 2025. Rehearing petition denied December
5, 2025.
Mullins v. Cook, No. 2:17-cv-01248-TC, United
States District Court for the District of Utah. On
Rhines stay.
Mullins v. State, No. 17060085, Sixth Judicial District Court of Utah. Judgment entered February 13,
2020.
State v. Mullins, No. 20040161-SC, Utah Supreme
Court, 2005 UT 43, 116 P.3d 374. Judgment entered
July 8, 2005.
Mullins v. State, No. 040913656, Sixth Judicial
District Court of Utah. Judgment entered September
14, 2004.
Mullins v. State, No. 020600297, Sixth Judicial
District Court of Utah. Judgment entered October 2,
2002.
State v. Mullins, No. 011600140, Sixth Judicial
District Court of Utah. Judgment entered May 2,
2002.
iii
Table of Contents
Question Presented...................................................... i
Parties to the Proceeding ...........................................ii
Related Proceedings....................................................ii
Table of Authorities .................................................... v
Opinion Below ............................................................. 1
Jurisdiction ................................................................. 1
Constituitonal Provision Involved ............................. 1
Statement of the Case ................................................ 2
A. Mullins pleads guilty to aggravated
murder committed as a juvenile. .................. 2
B. Mullins is sentenced to life without parole
based on the court’s consideration of
relevant factors, including his age, under
Utah’s discretionary sentencing scheme. ..... 3
C. Mullins challenges his sentence as illegal
under Miller v. Alabama. .............................. 5
D. A divided Utah Supreme Court vacates
Mullins’s sentence. ........................................ 5
Argument .................................................................... 8
The Court Should Resolve the Split of Authority
on Whether the Eighth Amendment Prohibits
Life Without Parole When a Juvenile is Capable
of Change. ................................................................. 8
A. Lower courts are split on how to reconcile
this
Court’s
holdings
in
Miller,
Montgomery, and Jones. .............................. 11
iv
B. The Utah Supreme Court’s divided
opinion presents an ideal vehicle to
resolve the split of authority. ...................... 20
C. Resolving the split of authority is a matter
of profound national importance................. 22
Conclusion ................................................................. 23
Table of Appendices
Appendix A: Amended Opinion of the Supreme
Court of the State of Utah, Filed
November 20, 2025............................. 1a
Appendix B: Sentencing Hearing Transcript,
May 1, 2002 ...................................... 66a
Appendix C: Memorandum Decision and Order
Denying Mullins’s Motion to Correct
Illegal Sentence .............................. 117a
v
Table of Authorities
Federal Cases
Helm v. Thornell,
112 F.4th 674 (9th Cir. 2024) ............................... 16
Jones v. Mississippi,
593 U.S. 98 (2021) ......................... 5, 8, 9, 10, 12, 16
Miller v. Alabama,
567 U.S. 460 (2012) ................................... 5, 8, 9, 17
Montgomery v. Louisiana,
577 U.S. 190 (2016) ........5, 6, 8, 9, 10, 11, 14, 15, 22
Roper v. Simmons,
543 U.S. 551 (2005) ................................................. 3
United States v. Briones,
35 F.4th 1150 (9th Cir. 2021) ......................... 15, 16
United States v. Delgado,
971 F.3d 144 (2nd Cir. 2020) .......................... 13, 14
United States v. Grant,
9 F.4th 186 (3rd Cir. 2021) ................................... 15
Walker v. Cromwell,
140 F.4th 878 (7th Cir. 2025) ......................... 19, 20
State Cases
Commonwealth v. Felder,
269 A.3d 1232 (Penn. 2022) .................................. 17
vi
Conley v. State,
183 N.E.3d 276 (Ind. 2022) ................................... 18
Davis v. State,
415 P.3d 666 (Wyo. 2018) ...................................... 14
Elliott v. State,
653 S.W.3d 776 (Ark. 2022) .................................. 18
Fletcher v. State,
532 P.3d 286 (Alaska Ct. App. 2023) .................... 13
Harned v. Amsberry,
499 P.3d 825 (Or. Ct. App. 2021) .......................... 20
Homes v. State,
859 S.E.2d 475 (Ga. 2021) ..................................... 18
Johnson v. State,
396 So.3d 1073 (Miss. 2024) ................................. 17
Malvo v. State,
281 A.3d 758 (Md. 2022) ....................................... 12
People v. Taylor,
987 N.W.2d 132 (Mich. 2022)................................ 13
People v. Wilson,
220 N.E.3d 1068 (Ill. 2023) ................................... 17
Phon v. Commonwealth,
545 S.W.3d 284 (Ken. 2018) .................................. 16
State ex rel. Mitchell v. Cooper,
535 P.3d 3 (Ariz. 2023) .......................................... 16
vii
State v. Keefe,
512 P.3d 741 (Mont. 2022) .................................... 18
State v. Kelliher,
873 S.E.2d 366 (N.C. 2022) ............................. 12, 13
State v. McInnis,
962 N.W.2d 874 (Minn. 2021) ............................... 14
State v. Morris,
222 N.E.3d 568 (Ohio 2022) .................................. 18
State v. Sims,
912 S.E.2d 767 (N.C. 2025) ................................... 13
State v. Smart,
889 S.E.2d 573 (S.C. 2023) .................................... 17
State v. Walker, 2022 WL 1574255
(Wis. Ct. App. Jan. 25, 2022) ................................ 18
White v. State,
499 P.3d 762 (Okla. 2021) ..................................... 19
Williams v. State,
500 P.3d 1182 (Kan. 2021) .................................... 19
Wynn v. State,
354 So.3d 1007 (Ala. Crim. App. 2021) ................ 18
Federal Statutes
28 U.S.C. § 1257.......................................................... 1
viii
State Statutes
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-207 (West 2001) .............. 3, 21
State Rules
Utah R. Crim. P. 22 ........................................ 5, 21, 22
1
Opinion Below
The opinion of the Utah Supreme Court is reported
at 2025 UT 57, –– P.3d ––, and attached as Pet. App.
1a–65a (Appendix A).
Jurisdiction
The Utah Supreme Court entered judgment on November 20, 2025. The court denied the State’s petition
for rehearing on December 5, 2025. This Court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1257(a).
Constituitonal Provision Involved
The Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution states: “Excessive bail shall not be required,
nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual
punishments inflicted.”
2
Statement of the Case
A. Mullins pleads guilty to aggravated murder committed as a juvenile. 1
In 2001, just weeks before his eighteenth birthday,
Respondent Morris Mullins raped and killed 78-yearold Amy Davis in her home. R1–2, 5, 57. Davis’s body
was found the next day; she “had been sexually assaulted, struck on the side of the head with blunt
force, and suffocated” with a pillow. R125.
Police soon identified Mullins as the suspect in
part because he was a suspect in a case in Arizona that
also involved the sexual assault and homicide of an
elderly woman in her home. R6, 135, 739–40. 2
The State of Utah charged Mullins as an adult
with one count of aggravated murder and one count of
rape. R1–2. In exchange for dismissing the rape
charge, Mullins pleaded guilty to aggravated murder,
admitting that “while committing the offense of burglary, [he] knowingly caused the death of Amy Davis.”
R56–64.
1 Mullins pleaded guilty before even a preliminary hearing
was held. These facts are taken from the probable cause statement, witness statements, the sentencing transcript, and related
record documents.
2 Mullins later pleaded guilty to the Arizona murder. See Ben
Winslow, Richfield Woman’s Killer Guilty in Arizona Murder,
Deseret
News
(June
12,
2007)
https://www.deseret.com/2007/6/12/20024179/richfield-womans-killer-guilty-in-arizona-murder (last visited Mar. 2, 2026).
3
B. Mullins is sentenced to life without parole
based on the court’s consideration of relevant factors, including his age, under
Utah’s discretionary sentencing scheme.
Under Utah’s discretionary sentencing scheme for
the capital felony of aggravated murder, the court
could impose a sentence of either 20 years to life or life
without parole based on its consideration of aggravating and mitigating factors, including “the youth of the
defendant at the time of the crime.” Utah Code Ann. §
76-3-207 (West 2001). 3
Consistent with Utah law, the trial court held a
sentencing hearing in 2002 during which it considered
the State’s and Mullins’s submissions and arguments
on the aggravating and mitigating factors. Pet. App.
66a–116a (Appendix B). The State’s case for life without parole included evidence about the planned and
heinous crime, Utah and Arizona police reports, Mullins’s time in jail involving property destruction and
assaults on inmates and police officers, and his continued physical and verbal sexual deviancy. Pet. App.
88a–95a; see R125–254.
Mullins argued for a chance for parole. Pet. App. at
95a–113a. He relied heavily on a sentencing evaluation from a clinical and forensic psychologist that
identified and analyzed in detail several mitigating
factors, including Mullins’s age and immaturity, intellectual disabilities and academic deficiencies, physical
3 The State agreed not to seek capital punishment, a penalty
this Court would not prohibit for juvenile offenders until three
years later. See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 578 (2005).
4
and sexual abuse as a child, family dysfunction, and
related familial factors. R259–311.
The court asked if defense counsel was “trying to
assess the level of hope for the future you hold out for
Mr. Mullins,” and remarked that it didn’t “see anything in [the psychologist]’s report on how to assess
hope for change.” Pet. App. 110a. Defense counsel responded that he was unaware of any “standardized
scale to assess hope to change,” and admitted “[w]e
cannot predict” whether change was possible. Id. at
110a–111a. But if Mullins were to experience “true
change” after many years in prison, the board of pardons should be able to make that determination. Id. at
111a–112a.
The court was “satisfied” with “the recommendations of counsel,” “the reports,” and “the statements
made by the family members,” and the court “appreciate[d] the work” of the psychologist. Id. at 113a–114a.
The court recognized that Mullins’s life was “chaotic”
and he experienced a poor upbringing, but when all
the considerations were balanced together, the court
decided that the appropriate sentence was “life imprisonment without the possibility of parole.” Id. at
114a.
The court then addressed Mullins directly, stating:
“[I]f you’re gonna be with us for a long time and have
a chance to change, I hope—not under the present circumstances—I’m hoping that you’ll find some way to
be productive.” Id. at 115a.
5
C. Mullins challenges his sentence as illegal
under Miller v. Alabama.
More than a decade after sentencing, Mullins filed
a motion to correct an illegal sentence under rule
22(e), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, asserting
that his sentence was illegal under Miller v. Alabama,
567 U.S. 460 (2012). R451–55.
Mullins argued Miller’s holding—that mandatory
life-without-parole sentences for juveniles violated the
Eighth Amendment—made his sentence unconstitutional because there was “no record indicating that the
court took into consideration [his] youth” and other
factors. R454. And he asserted that Miller “mandates
that there be a finding on the record . . . to support the
judgment of life without parole.” R786.
The district court denied the motion. Pet. App.
117a–120a (Appendix C). It ruled that the sentencing
court did not err when it imposed Mullins’s life-without-parole sentence because the court “considered mitigating factors” and Miller “does not require a sentencer to make findings on the record.” Id. at 119a–
120a.
After having his time to appeal reinstated, Mullins
appealed the denial of his rule 22(e) motion. R708–09.
D. A divided Utah Supreme Court vacates
Mullins’s sentence.
The majority. In a 3-2 decision, the Utah Supreme Court vacated Mullins’s juvenile life-withoutparole (JLWOP) sentence based on the majority’s interpretation of Miller and its progeny—Montgomery v.
Louisiana, 577 U.S. 190 (2016) and Jones v. Mississippi, 593 U.S. 98 (2021)—and how that precedent
6
applied to the sentencing court’s statement about
Mullins’s “chance to change.” Pet. App. 2a–3a, 34a–
52a.
In the majority’s view, the Miller line of cases established a categorical bar to imposing JLWOP on a
class of juvenile offenders: “if a child is capable of
change and reform—that is, is not incorrigible—a
JLWOP sentence is disproportionate and unconstitutional.” Id. at 43a.
With that interpretation of the law, the majority
“turn[ed] to the facts of Mullins’s case.” Id. at 44a.
First, the majority concluded that because there was
no “affirmative factual finding that Mullins was capable of change,” the majority could not “declare Mullins’s sentence unconstitutional as a matter of law[.]”
Id. at 45a; see also id. at 51a (“[W]e can only speculate
as to whether Mullins is one of the rare individuals
‘whose crimes reflect irreparable corruption.’” (quoting Montgomery, 577 U.S. at 209)).
But the majority believed the sentencing court
“may have implicitly” made such a finding based on
the court’s “comment suggesting some ‘hope’ that Mullins might have ‘a chance to change.’” Id. at 46a. And
a JLWOP sentence was “incompatible with a suggestion that Mullins could change.” Id.; see also id.
(“While we cannot say that Mullins is the type of juvenile offender for whom JLWOP is categorically disproportionate . . . the court’s comments raise significant
concerns that Mullins may fall into that category.”).
The majority therefore remanded the case so the
sentencing court could “determine the appropriate
sentence here, considering Mullins’s youth as required by the Eighth Amendment, consistent with
Miller and this opinion.” Id. at 51a.
7
The dissent. Two justices dissented from the majority’s interpretation of Miller and its progeny. Id. at
52a–65a. The dissent recognized that the Miller line
of cases “has sent mixed messages about when a juvenile can be sentenced to JLWOP without violating the
Eighth Amendment.” Id. at 53a; see id. at 54a–58a
(discussing the Miller trilogy and concluding they “are
difficult to reconcile”); see id. at 61a–64a (citing lower
court cases split over those mixed messages).
But in the dissent’s view, it was “bound to follow
the Supreme Court’s most recent pronouncement in
Jones.” Id. at 59a. And the dissent understood Jones
to mean that if a sentencing court “had discretion to
impose a lesser sentence” and “was free to consider all
mitigating factors, including Mullins’s youth and attendant circumstances,” that was “all the Miller line
of cases requires.” Id. at 53a; see id. at 59a–60a (recognizing that “Jones creates confusion”).
Thus, even a finding of permanent incorrigibility
would not “preclude a JLOWP sentence” because “a
JLWOP sentence is not categorically unconstitutional
when imposed on a juvenile who the court views as
redeemable.” Id. at 61a, 64a. It was therefore unnecessary “to decipher the sentencing court’s remark
about ‘a chance to change,’” because “[e]ven if the sentencing court believed that Mullins had the capacity
to change, it would not render Mullins’s sentence unconstitutional.” Id. at 65a.
8
Argument
The Court Should Resolve the Split of Authority
on Whether the Eighth Amendment Prohibits
Life Without Parole When a Juvenile is Capable
of Change.
In Miller v. Alabama, the Court held “that mandatory life-without-parole sentences for juveniles violate
the Eighth Amendment.” 567 U.S. at 470. That’s because “children are constitutionally different from
adults for purposes of sentencing” in many ways, including their “capacity for change.” Id. at 471–74. And
“mandatory penalty schemes . . . prevent the sentencer from taking account of these central considerations.” Id. at 474.
Then, in Montgomery v. Louisiana, the Court held
that Miller announced a substantive rule of constitutional law that applied retroactively. 577 U.S. at 206–
10. In so doing, the Court appeared to contradict Miller. Whereas the Court in Miller made clear that its
holding “does not categorically bar a penalty for a
class of offenders,” 567 U.S. at 483, the Court in Montgomery declared that Miller did just the opposite: “it
rendered life without parole an unconstitutional penalty for a ‘class of defendants because of their status’—
that is, juvenile offenders whose crimes reflect the
transient immaturity of youth,” 577 U.S. at 208 (citation omitted). Noting this inconsistency, a three-justice dissent accused the majority of “not applying Miller, but rewriting it.” Montgomery, 577 U.S. at 224–25
(Scalia, J., dissenting).
Just five years later, the Court granted certiorari
in Jones v. Mississippi, “[i]n light of disagreement in
state and federal courts about how to interpret Miller
and Montgomery.” 593 U.S. at 104. There, the Court
9
answered only whether a sentencing court “must
make a finding of permanent incorrigibility.” Id. at
101. The Court held that Miller and Montgomery were
at least in agreement on that point: “a finding of fact
regarding a child’s incorrigibility . . . is not required”
before imposing JLWOP. Id. at 104–05 (quoting Montgomery, 577 U.S. at 211).
But by limiting its holding to only whether a finding regarding incorrigibility was “required,” the Court
did not squarely resolve the inconsistency in Miller
and Montgomery about what sentencing courts may
do when there is a finding that a juvenile is capable of
change. Id. at 113.
If anything, Jones compounded the confusion. On
one hand, the Court declared that Miller “mandated
‘only that a sentencer follow a certain process—considering an offender’s youth and attendant circumstances—before imposing’ a life-without-parole sentence.” Id. at 101 (quoting Miller, 567 U.S. at 483). But
on the other hand, it recited a contradictory “key paragraph from Montgomery”: “That Miller did not impose a formal factfinding requirement does not leave
States free to sentence a child whose crime reflects
transient immaturity to life without parole. To the
contrary, Miller established that this punishment is
disproportionate under the Eighth Amendment.” Id.
at 106 n.2 (quoting Montgomery, 577 U.S. at 211).
Later, the Court again emphasized the contradiction. First, it described Miller as clearly stating that
the “decision does not categorically bar a penalty for a
class of offenders or type of crime,” rather, it simply
“held that a sentencer must have discretion to consider youth before imposing a life-without-parole sentence.” Id. at 108–09 (quoting Miller, 567 U.S. at 483).
10
But then it also stated that “Montgomery was clear”
that the discretionary sentencing procedure “is necessary to separate those juveniles who may be sentenced
to life without parole from those who may not.” Id. at
111 (quoting Montgomery, 577 U.S. at 210) (emphasis
added).
A divided Court in Jones disagreed on what this all
meant. The majority claimed it “carefully follows both
Miller and Montgomery” without overruling either of
them. Id. at 118. A three-justice dissent contended
that the majority “distort[ed]” those cases “beyond
recognition.” Id. at 133 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
While Justice Thomas believed that “the decisions
cannot be reconciled” because of the contradiction, and
that the majority “[o]verrule[d] Montgomery in substance but not in name.” Id. at 123–27 (Thomas, J.,
concurring in the judgment). To the majority, it was
merely a “good-faith disagreement . . . over how to interpret Miller and Montgomery.” Id. at 118.
Regardless of how one describes the inconsistency,
lower courts are left to pick up the pieces and try to fit
them together. Several years after Jones, state and
federal courts are split on the question presented here:
can a sentencing court still impose JLWOP even if the
court explicitly or implicitly finds the juvenile defendant is capable of change and reform?
The confusion has resulted in a deep and persistent split of authority that cannot be resolved without
this Court’s intervention. And the question is at the
heart of the divided Utah Supreme Court decision
here, making this case an ideal vehicle to address it.
11
A. Lower courts are split on how to reconcile
this Court’s holdings in Miller, Montgomery, and Jones.
The inconsistency between Miller, Montgomery,
and Jones has created a split among lower courts. 4
1. Several courts read Miller and its progeny as
completely barring JLWOP for juveniles who are not
permanently incorrigible.
The Utah Supreme Court, as noted, falls in this
camp. Pet. App. 43a (reading Miller, Montgomery, and
Jones to mean that “if a child is capable of change and
reform—that is, is not incorrigible—a JLWOP sentence is disproportionate and unconstitutional”). The
court noted “a sentencing court has no obligation to
make an on-the-record finding of permanent incorrigibility before imposing a JLWOP sentence,” but if a
sentencing court does find “that a juvenile offender
can change, a JLWOP sentence is unconstitutional.”
Id. 5
So even though the sentencing court considered
Mullins’s youth as part of the discretionary sentencing
proceeding, the Utah Supreme Court still vacated his
JLWOP sentence out of concern that Mullins was not
incorrigible. Id. at 44a–52a.
4 This includes courts that have held, or at least assumed
without deciding, that Miller and its progeny apply to “de-facto”
JWLOP sentences—lengthy terms of years that are likely to last
most if not all of a juvenile’s life before parole eligibility.
5 The majority recognized that other state courts “are divided
over the proper interpretation of these difficult cases.” Pet. App.
43a (citing cases).
12
A minority of other jurisdictions—Alaska, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, North Carolina, Wyoming, and the Second Circuit—agree with the Utah
Supreme Court majority.
Maryland’s highest court, after reviewing the decisions in Miller, Montgomery, and Jones, believed this
“Court did not have occasion to address a situation in
which a sentencing court finds that a crime was the
result of the offender’s transient immaturity but nonetheless sentences the offender to life without parole.”
Malvo v. State, 281 A.3d 758, 765 (Md. 2022). Pointing
to Jones’s careful effort not to overrule either Miller or
Montgomery and its quotation of Montgomery’s “key
paragraph,” Maryland concluded that “an offender
deemed corrigible cannot constitutionally be sentenced to life without the possibility of parole.” Id.
(quoting Jones, 593 U.S. at 106 n.2).
The Supreme Court of North Carolina ruled similarly. It concluded that “the Eighth Amendment categorically prohibits a sentencing court from sentencing
any juvenile to life without parole if the sentencing
court has found the juvenile to be ‘neither incorrigible
nor irredeemable.’” State v. Kelliher, 873 S.E.2d 366,
380 (N.C. 2022); see id. (“Jones does not alter the substantive Eighth Amendment rule announced in Miller
and Montgomery which forbids a sentencing court
from sentencing redeemable juveniles to life without
parole.”). And because the sentencing court “affirmatively found that [the juvenile defendant] was ‘neither
13
incorrigible nor irredeemable,’ he could not constitutionally receive [that] sentence.” Id. at 370. 6
The Alaska Court of Appeals believed that the “categorization of juvenile offenders into two groups—the
‘transient immaturity’ juveniles for whom a sentence
of life without parole would violate the Eighth Amendment and the ‘irreparable corruption’ juveniles whose
life without parole sentences would not violate the
Eighth Amendment—survives Jones.” Fletcher v.
State, 532 P.3d 286, 307 (Alaska Ct. App. 2023). So
“sentencing a juvenile offender whose crime reflects
transient immaturity to life without parole violates”
both the Alaska and “the federal constitution.” Id.
The Supreme Court of Michigan likewise concluded, one year after Jones, that “Miller’s substantive
holding is that LWOP is an excessive sentence for children whose crimes reflect transient immaturity.” People v. Taylor, 987 N.W.2d 132, 139 (Mich. 2022); see
id. at 139–44 (discussing Michigan statute enacted “to
implement that substantive guarantee” by creating
presumption that a juvenile defendant “has engaged
in criminality because of transient immaturity, not irreparable corruption,” which prosecutors must rebut
before JLWOP may be imposed).
And the Second Circuit understood Montgomery to
impose a flat ban: “a life-without-parole sentence is
permissible only for ‘the rarest of juvenile offenders’—
specifically, ‘those whose crimes reflect permanent incorrigibility’ and ‘irreparable corruption.’” United
6 But see State v. Sims, 912 S.E.2d 767, 780 (N.C. 2025) (“[A]
sentencing court must simply consider youth and its attendant
circumstances in light of the defendant’s crime. Miller requires
no more.”)
14
States v. Delgado, 971 F.3d 144, 158 (2nd Cir. 2020)
(quoting Montgomery, 577 U.S. at 209). And even
though the sentencing court implicitly considered the
defendant’s youth along with all other statutory sentencing factors, the Second Circuit still reversed his
JLWOP sentence because the district court did not
give “deliberate consideration” of his youth. Id. at
159. 7
Other courts have similarly interpreted the Miller
trilogy as drawing an Eighth Amendment line between transient immaturity and irreparable corruption. See State v. McInnis, 962 N.W.2d 874, 882 n.3
(Minn. 2021) (stating that although Jones does not require a finding of permanent incorrigibility, a Miller
hearing is where “a district court determines whether
a juvenile is irreparably corrupt”); Davis v. State, 415
P.3d 666, 682 (Wyo. 2018) (holding, pre-Jones, that
under Miller, the State had the burden to prove “beyond a reasonable doubt that the juvenile offender is
irreparably corrupt”).
2. In contrast, a majority of courts agree that even
corrigible juvenile offenders may be sentenced to
JLWOP, because Jones requires only that a sentencing court consider the offender’s youth and has discretion to impose a lesser sentence.
The Mullins dissent, as noted, read literally
Jones’s holding “that permanent incorrigibility is not
‘an eligibility criterion’ for JLWOP and that ‘a State’s
discretionary sentencing system is both constitutionally necessary and constitutionally sufficient.’” Pet.
7 Although decided before Jones, this appears to be the Sec-
ond Circuit’s last word on the matter as it has not decided another JLWOP case since Jones.
15
App. 59a (quoting Jones, 593. U.S. at 105, 107–09). In
other words, “all the Miller line of cases requires” is
the freedom to consider “youth and attendant circumstances” and the “discretion to impose a lesser sentence” than life without parole. Id. at 53a. That’s true
regardless of a sentencing court’s commentary about
the juvenile’s capacity for change and even for “a juvenile who the court views as redeemable.” Id. at 64a–
65a.
At least sixteen other jurisdictions—Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, Georgia, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas,
Mississippi, Montana, Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Wisconsin, and the Third and
Ninth Circuits—agree with the Mullins dissent that
consideration of youth is all that Miller and its progeny require, regardless of the juvenile’s corrigibility
status.
Indeed, the Third Circuit squarely held that “individualized consideration is all that Miller requires.”
United States v. Grant, 9 F.4th 186, 197 (3rd Cir.
2021). So even though the sentencing court “made a
gratuitous corrigibility finding” it “does not invalidate
[the juvenile’s] sentence.” Id. at 198; see id. at 197
(“gratuitous[]” finding “that a defendant is corrigible”
may give rise to “an as-applied Eighth Amendment
claim based on disproportionality”); see also id at 209,
212 (Greenway, J., concurring) (observing that Jones
“does not resolve the question of what happens when
an affirmative finding of corrigibility has been made”).
The Ninth Circuit referred to Montgomery’s statement that JLWOP is unconstitutional “for all but . . .
those whose crimes reflect permanent incorrigibility”
as dicta. United States v. Briones, 35 F.4th 1150,
1153–54 (9th Cir. 2021) (quoting Montgomery, 577
16
U.S. at 208–09). 8 And it held that special analysis of
evidence of rehabilitation and capacity for change
“that would rule out permanent incorrigibility” was
unnecessary because it would amount to an implicit
finding, which “Jones flatly rejected.” Id. at 1158 & n.5
(quotation simplified); see also Helm v. Thornell, 112
F.4th 674, 687 (9th Cir. 2024) (Jones clarified that
“Miller requires a ‘discretionary sentencing procedure,’ but it does not require that a state court’s
weighing of the mitigating factors associated with
youth be conducted in accordance with any particular
substantive criteria of incorrigibility” (quoting Jones,
593 U.S. at 120–21)).
The Supreme Court of Arizona, overruling its preJones precedent, rejected the contention that “a juvenile life-without-parole sentence that is the product of
‘transient immaturity’ is unconstitutional under Miller.” State ex rel. Mitchell v. Cooper, 535 P.3d 3, 13
(Ariz. 2023). The court’s “review of Miller and its progeny demonstrates that ‘transient immaturity’ is not a
substantive component of Miller.” Id. at 14. Sentencing courts need not distinguish between juveniles on
either side of the corrigibility line. Id. at 14–15.
The Mississippi Supreme Court held that even if
the evidence showed that a juvenile’s “rehabilitation
is not only possible but likely,” such a conclusion “does
not undermine the trial court’s determination that
[the juvenile’s] life sentence should be without parole”
8 The Kentucky Supreme Court, before Jones, also concluded
that the language in Miller and Montgomery “about the ‘rare’ juvenile offender whose crimes merit LWOP,” was merely “dicta
and guidance.” Phon v. Commonwealth, 545 S.W.3d 284, 294
(Ken. 2018).
17
when weighed against other factors. Johnson v. State,
396 So.3d 1073, 1082 (Miss. 2024).
The Illinois Supreme Court overruled its pre-Jones
precedent “holding that a juvenile offender’s discretionary life sentence does not comport with the
[E]ighth [A]mendment unless the sentencing court
first makes a finding of permanent incorrigibility” because it was “directly at odds with the holding in
Jones.” People v. Wilson, 220 N.E.3d 1068, 1077 (Ill.
2023). The court upheld the defendant’s JLWOP sentence even though the sentencing court acknowledged
both an absence of evidence that he was “going to turn
[his] life around,” and also the chance that he “can
prove [the court] wrong” while in prison. Id. at 1078.
And the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania also relied on Jones to reverse its prior understanding of Miller and Montgomery “that a juvenile homicide offender
cannot constitutionally receive a sentence of life without parole unless he or she is proven to be permanently incorrigible.” Commonwealth v. Felder, 269
A.3d 1232, 1246 (Penn. 2022). It now holds that “the
authority of a sentencing court to impose life-withoutparole sentence on a juvenile homicide offender is circumscribed only . . . by Miller’s command to ‘consider
the mitigating qualities of youth.’” Id. at 1245 (quoting
Miller, 567 U.S. at 476). Thus, “no viable Miller claim
exists” as long as the court had discretion to consider
youth and impose a lesser sentence than JLWOP. Id.
at 1243.
Many other courts have reached similar conclusions about how to interpret the Miller trilogy. See
State v. Smart, 889 S.E.2d 573, 576 (S.C. 2023) (statements from Miller discussing “juveniles who do not deserve [JLWOP] and those who do . . . . were not meant
18
to suggest a presumption against life without parole
or that any burden must be placed on the State”); Elliott v. State, 653 S.W.3d 776, 780 (Ark. 2022) (holding
that when jury is deciding between JLWOP and lesser
punishments “a jury instruction on the issue of permanent incorrigibility or irretrievable depravity was
not required”); Conley v. State, 183 N.E.3d 276, 284
(Ind. 2022) (recognizing that in some cases “even considering the notable differences between juveniles and
adults, the juvenile’s crimes are so reprehensible and
heinous that an LWOP sentence would be appropriate”); State v. Keefe, 512 P.3d 741, 747 (Mont. 2022)
(“Miller and its progeny do not stand for the proposition that a juvenile homicide offender is constitutionally entitled to any specific term of years if found not
to be irreparably corrupt.”); State v. Morris, 222
N.E.3d 568, 571 (Ohio 2022) (holding “assessing that
a defendant is permanently incorrigible is not the
same thing as considering a defendant’s youth as a
mitigating factor”; “there is no basis to conflate the
two concepts” and Jones requires only the latter);
State v. Walker, 2022 WL 1574255, *2 (Wis. Ct. App.
Jan. 25, 2022) (unpublished) (holding de-facto JLWOP
sentence “not contrary to Miller or Montgomery” despite sentencing court’s “expressed ‘hope’” for change
in future because “the sentencing court gave more
weight to other factors” than to “Walker’s age and its
attendant circumstances”); Wynn v. State, 354 So.3d
1007, 1037 (Ala. Crim. App. 2021) (concluding Jones
“made it clear that irreparable corruption is not the
determining factor of the constitutionality of a sentence”); Homes v. State, 859 S.E.2d 475, 479–80 (Ga.
2021) (affirming JLWOP because youth was considered despite sentencing court saying both that
JLWOP was “only deserving” when court “doesn’t feel
19
there’s any redeeming part to an individual,” and that
the court “regret[ed] it”); Williams v. State, 500 P.3d
1182, 1184–87 (Kan. 2021) (rejecting lower court ruling that youth was not “adequately” considered at preMiller sentencing because Jones requires only discretionary sentencing without imposing specific method
for considering or weighing youth); White v. State, 499
P.3d 762, 769 (Okla. 2021) (“Jones makes clear that
[permanent incorrigibility] is neither an eligibility factor nor a factual predicate to a life-without-parole sentence but, instead, is a mere sentencing factor.”).
3. Still other courts that were not required to reconcile Miller, Montgomery, and Jones to decide the
cases before them, have expressed confusion about the
inconsistencies.
The Seventh Circuit considered a habeas petition
challenging the Wisconsin Court of Appeals’ application of Miller, Montgomery, and Jones. Walker v.
Cromwell, 140 F.4th 878, 881–82 (7th Cir. 2025). The
juvenile contended that the sentencing judge, by “express[ing] ‘hope’ that [the juvenile] would be able to
develop healthy relationships and grow as a person
while he was incarcerated,” acknowledged that the juvenile “was capable of reform” and therefore could not
be sentenced to “de facto life without parole.” Id. at
883–84, 892 n.4.
The Seventh Circuit believed “the shifting rationales of Miller, Montgomery, and Jones” had “left unsettled whether the Eighth Amendment categorically
forbids life without parole for corrigible juvenile homicide offenders.” Id. at 888. The court reasoned: “Even
if no factual finding of permanent incorrigibility is required, it does not necessarily follow that a sentencing
judge could find a juvenile homicide offender capable
20
of change and still sentence him to life without parole.” Id. at 892. But because the case was brought under habeas review, the court merely concluded that
the state court’s application of those cases was not unreasonable because the law “simply is not clear.” Id.
at 892–93.
And the Oregon Court of Appeals, citing the fact
that “Jones expressly did not overrule Miller and
Montgomery,” believed it “somewhat unclear under
what circumstances we would conclude that a sentencing court failed to adequately consider a juvenile
offender’s youth.” Harned v. Amsberry, 499 P.3d 825,
832 (Or. Ct. App. 2021) (emphasis added). And the
court specifically noted cases—similar to Mullins’s—
where sentencing occurred before Miller when courts
were not “clearly on notice to consider youth.” Id.
B. The Utah Supreme Court’s divided opinion presents an ideal vehicle to resolve the
split of authority.
This case squarely presents an ideal vehicle to address the nationwide confusion and split of authority
left unresolved after Jones.
First, this case directly addresses the legal question presented and underscores the ongoing divergent
views about the correct answer. As stated, the Utah
Supreme Court divided 3-2 over the issue—how to reconcile Miller, Montgomery, and Jones when there is a
finding, or at least a suggestion, that a juvenile is capable of change. The majority and dissenting opinions
each took a side, identified supporting jurisdictions,
and explained their rationale. The issue has been teed
up perfectly—and has been percolating around the
country long enough—for the Court to resolve the split
of authority.
21
This case also presents an ideal vehicle factually.
Mullins was sentenced under a discretionary statutory scheme. The sentencing court had discretion to
impose a lesser sentence—life with parole—in lieu of
JLWOP. Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-207(4)(c) (West 2001).
The statute specifically identified “the youth of the defendant at the time of the crime” as a mitigating circumstance. Id. § 76-3-207(3)(e). And that factor was
addressed in the psychologist’s in-depth report that
specifically discussed Mullins’s age and immaturity
and related factors, R259–311, as well as in Mullins’s
arguments at the hearing, Pet. App. 95a–113a.
If the Mullins dissent—along with the majority of
other jurisdictions in agreement—correctly reasoned
that consideration of youth is all that Miller and its
progeny require, regardless of a juvenile’s corrigibility
status, then Mullins’s sentence was lawfully imposed,
and this Court can simply reverse the Utah Supreme
Court.
On the other hand, if the Mullins majority is correct—that an implicit finding that a juvenile is capable of change and reform prohibits a JLWOP sentence—then this Court can affirm. Either way, answering the question presented will squarely resolve
this case while also providing an answer that other
courts can easily apply to future cases. 9
9 The Utah Supreme Court vacated Mullins’s sentence under
a prior version of rule 22(e), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure,
on the ground that Mullins’s sentence was “imposed in an illegal
manner.” Pet. App. 47a; see Utah R. Crim. P. 22(e) (2013). But
the basis for the majority’s conclusion—and the dissent’s disagreement—was the majority’s interpretation and application of
Miller, Montgomery, and Jones, without which the court would
22
C. Resolving the split of authority is a matter
of profound national importance.
Answering the question presented is nationally
important. Juveniles unfortunately continue to commit murder. Many states still permit and impose
JLWOP for that heinous crime. And sentences long
since imposed, like Mullins’s, continue to be challenged under Miller, Montgomery, and Jones. The confusion and inconsistency about how to reconcile these
important cases will keep festering and spreading in
the future unless and until this Court addresses the
issue head on.
Granting certiorari will provide the Court the
much-needed opportunity to set the record straight
about the availability of JLWOP for juvenile murderers when sentencing courts find explicitly or implicitly
that a juvenile has the capacity for change.
not have vacated the conviction under the rule. Pet. App. 37a–
43a. So the application of the state rule of procedure does not
present a state-law vehicle problem. Indeed, this Court granted
certiorari in Montgomery after the petitioner’s motion to correct
an illegal sentence under Louisiana’s version of rule 22(e). See
Montgomery, 577 U.S. at 195–96.
23
Conclusion
The Court should grant the petition for writ of
certiorari to resolve the split of authority concerning
the Eighth Amendment standard for imposing
JLWOP on juvenile murders.
Respectfully submitted,
Derek Brown
Utah Attorney General
Stanford E. Purser
Utah Solicitor General
Counsel of Record
David Simpson
Deputy Solicitor General
Jeffrey D. Mann
Assistant Solicitor General
160 E. 300 S., 5th floor
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
(801) 366-0533
spurser@agutah.gov
Counsel for Petitioner
Dated: March 5, 2026
APPENDIX
i
TABLE OF APPENDICES
Page
APPENDIX A — AMENDED OPINION OF
THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE
OF UTAH, FILED NOVEMBER 20, 2025 . . . . . . . . 1a
APPENDIX B — SENTENCING HEARING
TRANSCRIPT, MAY 1, 2002 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66a
APPENDIX C — MEMORANDUM DECISION
A ND ORDER DEN Y ING MOTION TO
C OR R EC T I LL EG A L SEN T ENCE ,
FILED NOVEMBER 1, 2016 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117a
1a
Appendix AOPINION OF THE
APPENDIX A — AMENDED
SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH,
FILED NOVEMBER 20, 2025
AMENDED OPINION*
2025 UT 57
IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Appellee,
v.
MORRIS THOMAS MULLINS,
Appellant.
No. 20200149
Heard October 18, 2023
Filed November 20, 2025
On Direct Appeal
* The State filed a petition for rehearing after we published our
original opinion, and we called for a response. We grant the petition
for the limited purpose of clarifying our analysis in paragraphs 2,
24–26, 37, 86, and Part II.F generally. We modify internal crossreferences accordingly. The dissent has made concomitant changes
in paragraphs 87, 103, and 112. In all other respects the petition is
denied.
2a
Appendix A
Sixth District Court, Sevier County
The Honorable Marvin D. Bagley
No. 011600140
Chief Justice Durrant authored the opinion of the
Court, in which A ssociate Chief Justice Pearce and
Justice Petersen joined.
Justice Hagen authored an opinion concurring in part
and dissenting in part, in which Justice Pohlman
joined.
Chief Justice Durrant, opinion of the Court:
INTRODUCTION
¶1 Morris Mullins pled guilty to aggravated murder
and was sentenced to life without parole (LWOP).
Because he was seventeen years old when he committed
the crime, this is a juvenile life without parole (JLWOP)
sentence. Now, at age forty and having already spent
more than two decades in prison, Mullins challenges his
sentence as unconstitutional. He brings seven state and
federal constitutional challenges, among them that his
sentence was cruel and unusual in violation of the Eighth
Amendment to the United States Constitution and article
I, section 9 of the Utah Constitution.
¶2 We do not reach three of Mullins’s claims because
they were not properly brought under rule 22(e) of the
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. Of the claims we
do reach, we conclude that Mullins succeeds on only
3a
Appendix A
one. After Mullins was sentenced, the United States
Supreme Court decided a series of cases concluding that
it is unconstitutional to sentence juvenile offenders who
are not permanently incorrigible to JLWOP. Here, we
conclude that, because the record contains ambiguous
comments by the sentencing court indicating a significant
risk that the court misapprehended its constitutional
obligation to properly consider Mullins’s youth, the court
imposed the sentence in an illegal manner under rule 22(e).
Accordingly, we vacate Mullins’s sentence and remand his
case to the district court for resentencing.
BACKGROUND
¶3 In May 2001, Mullins killed a seventy-eight-yearold widow, Amy Davis, in her home. Mullins was seventeen
at the time. The State charged him as an adult with rape
and aggravated murder. Mullins pled guilty to aggravated
murder in exchange for the State dropping the rape charge
and taking the death penalty off the table.
¶4 At sentencing, the parties presented dueling
evidence about whether Mullins should receive JLWOP or
life with the possibility of parole. The prosecution focused
on the heinousness of Mullins’s crime and on his actions
and statements in jail that indicated a continuing desire
to inflict violence on women for pleasure. Several of the
victim’s family members testified about the impact of the
killing, asking the court to impose JLWOP.
¶5 The defense presented mitigating evidence, largely
based on a psychological evaluation conducted by a clinical
4a
Appendix A
and forensic psychologist. Defense counsel remarked
that Mullins had “the most profoundly dysfunctional
upbringing and rearing and family life that . . . members
of the defense team ha[d] ever seen, and that says a lot.”
He stated that Mullins’s removal from that dysfunctional
environment gave him “some hope that Mr. Mullins c[ould]
turn things around.” Counsel also stated that Mullins
had been discouraged from interacting with anyone
outside his small and dysfunctional community, had an
IQ well below average, suffered physical abuse by his
parents, witnessed severe alcohol abuse by his parents,
struggled with impulsivity, and was taught and rewarded
for antisocial behavior as a child.
¶6 At the end of the hearing, the district court
sentenced Mullins from the bench to JLWOP. The judge
stated that he had read the submitted reports, heard the
family members’ statements, and listened to counsel’s
arguments. The judge recognized that Mullins’s life had
been “chaotic” so far, but, upon balancing “the family’s
requests and Mr. Mullins’[s] request and the need to send
a message,” the judge determined that JLWOP was the
requisite punishment. The judge concluded the hearing
by addressing Mullins directly, stating: “[I]f you’re gonna
be with us for a long time and have a chance to change, I
hope—not under the present circumstances—I’m hoping
you’ll find some way to be productive.”
¶7 More than a decade later, in April 2013, Mullins
filed a pro se motion to correct an illegal sentence under
rule 22(e) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure in
the district court. He based his challenge on “new law”
5a
Appendix A
created in Miller v. Alabama, in which the United States
Supreme Court held that mandatory JLWOP violated the
Eighth Amendment because it did not allow a sentencing
judge to consider the juvenile’s “lessened culpability and
greater capacity for change.”1 Mullins’s petition asserted
that (1) his JLWOP sentence was unconstitutional because
there was “no record indicating that the court took
into consideration [his] youth”; and (2) because it was
unconstitutional to sentence him to the death penalty, it
was also unconstitutional for the State to offer to take
the death penalty off the table “in exchange for [him]
pleading guilty to aggravated murder.” Mullins also
generally discussed Miller and the line of cases leading
to that decision. 2
¶8 The district court appointed counsel to argue
Mullins’s 22(e) motion. The State stipulated to the
appointment, so long as counsel did not “change the
issue in dispute or expand the scope of the litigation.”
At the motion hearing, Mullins’s counsel relied on
Mullins’s original petition to argue that the court did not
appropriately consider Mullins’s youth as required by
Miller. He also argued that the court should have made
specific findings as to Mullins’s incorrigibility. The State
countered that Mullins “may [have been] a juvenile at the
time he committed the crime, but the process was followed
1. 567 U.S. 460, 465 (2012) (cleaned up); see also Tison v.
Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 156 (1987) (“[T]he more purposeful is the
criminal conduct, the more serious is the offense”).
2. See Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010); Roper v.
Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005); Miller, 567 U.S. 460.
6a
Appendix A
and he was a juvenile who was in adult court and he was
treated like an adult.” Regardless, the State argued, the
sentencing scheme was discretionary, so Miller did not
apply.
¶9 In November 2016, the district court denied
Mullins’s motion. It characterized his claims as follows:
(1) JLWOP is categorically unconstitutional, and (2) a
sentencing court must justify its sentence with findings
on the record. The court then rejected both arguments
based on Miller and State v. Houston. 3 Under the Utah
Rules of Appellate Procedure, Mullins had thirty days to
file a direct appeal.
¶10 In May 2018, well after the thirty-day cutoff
period, new counsel for Mullins petitioned the district
court to reinstate the time to appeal the denial of his
22(e) motion. Mullins asserted that his previous appointed
counsel had been constitutionally ineffective. Specifically,
he stated that his previous attorney told him that he would
appeal if the court denied his 22(e) motion. But when the
district court denied the motion, previous counsel did not
appeal or tell Mullins of the denial, which, Mullins argued,
led to his untimely appeal. The State stipulated to the
motion to reinstate the time to appeal, and the district
court granted it. In February 2020, Mullins appealed the
denial of his 22(e) motion. We retained the case to hear
the appeal directly.
3. See Miller, 567 U.S. 460; State v. Houston, 2015 UT 40, ¶¶ 32,
52–63, 353 P.3d 55.
7a
Appendix A
STANDARD OF REVIEW
¶11 Mullins brings his challenges under rule 22(e) of
the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, which governs
challenges to illegal sentences. We review district court
decisions on challenges to illegal sentences “for correctness
and grant[] no deference to the district court.”4
¶12 Mullins also raises some challenges to his sentence
that he did not raise before the district court. We treat
those claims as new 22(e) claims and reach them for the
first time in this appeal. 5
ANALYSIS
¶13 Mullins raises seven claims on appeal, arguing that
(1) the sentencing court violated the Sixth Amendment
to the United States Constitution when it increased
the minimum sentence based on judicial factfinding;
(2) the sentencing statute was unconstitutionally vague;
(3) imposing a JLWOP sentence on an intellectually
impaired juvenile violates the Eighth Amendment to
the United States Constitution; (4) imposing JLWOP
on an intellectually impaired juvenile violates article I,
section 9 of the Utah Constitution; (5) JLWOP sentences
are categorically unconstitutional under article I,
section 9 of the Utah Constitution; (6) JLWOP sentences
are categorically unconstitutional under the Eighth
Amendment to the United States Constitution; and
4. State v. Houston, 2015 UT 40, ¶ 16, 353 P.3d 55.
5. See infra ¶¶ 39, 46, 51, 55.
8a
Appendix A
(7) a JLWOP sentence was unconstitutional under the
Eighth Amendment as applied to his case.
¶14 As a threshold issue, we must determine whether
the legal vehicle Mullins uses to challenge his sentence,
rule 22(e) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, allows
us to reach the merits of his claims. As explained below,
amendments to rule 22(e) during the pendency of the
current litigation complicate that analysis. We begin by
discussing how each version of rule 22(e) operates. We then
analyze Mullins’s claims under the appropriate version of
the rule and ultimately vacate Mullins’s JLWOP sentence
based on his as-applied Eighth Amendment claim.
I.
ANALYSIS UNDER RULE 22(e) OF THE UTAH
RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
¶15 Mullins brings his claims under rule 22(e) of the
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. This subparagraph
of rule 22 governs when a court must correct a convicted
criminal defendant’s sentence. In 2019, we changed the
rule’s language significantly. Because the two versions
of the rule operate differently, the first step in our 22(e)
analysis asks which version of the rule applies to each
of Mullins’s seven claims—some brought in his original
motion and others brought for the first time on appeal.
We outline the framework for making this determination
first. We then identify the requirements for bringing a
challenge under each version of the rule.
9a
Appendix A
A.
We Evaluate Each Claim Based on the Version
of Rule 22(e) in Effect When the Claim Was
First Raised
¶16 Mullins filed his original 22(e) motion in 2013
under the rule as it existed at that time (old rule).6 But he
did not appeal the district court’s denial of that motion
until 2020, after changes to the rule had taken effect (new
rule).7 He argues that because he filed his original 22(e)
motion before the rule changed, all claims—even those
the State argues were raised for the first time on appeal,
after the amendment took effect—should be subject to
the old rule.
¶17 The State sees this issue differently. It argues that
all of Mullins’s claims should be subject to the new rule.
According to the State’s logic, because none of Mullins’s
claims on appeal were included in his original motion, we
should treat his appeal as the equivalent of a new 22(e)
motion and apply the new rule to all his claims on appeal.
¶18 The law governing appellate review of a legal event
is “the law as it exists at the time of the event regulated
by the law in question.”8 This “analysis may be applied
6. See Utah R. Crim. P. 22(e) (2013).
7. See id. (2020). Because the rule has not been amended since
Mullins filed his appeal in 2020, we refer to the current version
throughout our analysis. See id. (2025).
8. State v. Clark, 2011 UT 23, ¶ 13, 251 P.3d 829.
10a
Appendix A
to either statutes or rules.” 9 Thus when determining
which version of a rule applies, the relevant questions are
“what ‘event’ is being regulated by the [rule] in question
and, further, when that event occurred.”10 The State
and Mullins disagree about what the regulated event is.
Mullins believes the regulated event is filing a 22(e) motion.
In other words, Mullins argues that because he filed his
original motion when the old rule was in effect, that rule
should govern all claims before us now, even claims not
raised below. The State believes that the regulated event is
raising a 22(e) claim. So the State contends that any claims
not presented in the original rule 22(e) motion should be
governed by the new rule. We agree with the State.
¶19 When a law or rule regulates a substantive right,
the relevant event is the parties’ “underlying primary
conduct.”11 When the relevant law regulates procedure,
the relevant event is the “underlying procedural act.”12
Both parties assume that rule 22(e) is procedural, and,
without deciding the issue, we follow their lead. Because
we assume rule 22(e) is procedural, the “regulated event”
is the underlying procedural act that the rule governs.
9. Beaver Cnty. v. Utah State Tax Comm’n, 2010 UT 50, ¶ 10
n.5, 254 P.3d 158.
10. O’Connor v. Labor Comm’n, 2020 UT App 49, ¶ 11, 463
P.3d 85.
11. Jones v. Mackey Price Thompson & Ostler, 2020 UT 25,
¶ 49, 469 P.3d 879 (cleaned up).
12. Id. (cleaned up).
11a
Appendix A
¶20 At first blush, the relevant procedural event
appears to be the filing of a 22(e) motion, as Mullins
suggests. But under both versions of the rule, a defendant
may sometimes bring a challenge for the first time on
appeal.13 This means that Mullins’s interpretation fails
because not all rule 22(e) challenges will stem from a 22(e)
motion. The relevant “regulated event,” then, is raising
the individual claim that challenges a sentence, as the
State argues.
¶21 As applied to this case, this means that any claims
brought in Mullins’s original motion—before the rule
was amended—are governed by the old rule. Any claims
brought for the first time on appeal—after the rule was
amended—are governed by the new rule. Mullins filed
his original motion pro se in 2013. The district court then
appointed him counsel for argument. But the court limited
the scope of the arguments appointed counsel could make
to only those contained in Mullins’s original motion. We
thus look to both Mullins’s pro se motion and his counsel’s
arguments at the motion hearing to understand which
claims Mullins brought in his original motion and which
claims are therefore governed by the old rule.
13. See State v. Houston, 2015 UT 40, ¶ 20, 353 P.3d 55 (holding
that under the old rule, an appellate court may vacate an illegal
sentence based on an argument raised for the first time on appeal);
see also infra ¶¶ 29–31, 36 (explaining that under the new rule, a
defendant may raise an unpreserved challenge to a sentence on
appeal if a preservation exception applies).
12a
Appendix A
B. The Old Rule and the New Rule Impose Distinct
Requirements
¶22 Having established that we apply the version of
rule 22(e) in effect when the defendant first raised each
claim, we now explain the requirements of the old rule
and the new rule.
¶23 The old rule provided: “The court may correct
an illegal sentence, or a sentence imposed in an illegal
manner, at any time.”14 Generally, we will not hear an
argument that an appellant did not first raise before
the district court. 15 But, because of the “sweeping
language” of the old rule,16 we have held that the typical
“preservation rules do not apply in the context of [an old
rule] challenge.”17 So we may still hear a challenge brought
14. Utah R. Crim. P. 22(e) (2013). We held in State v. Candedo
that the old rule “is sufficiently broad” to permit challenges based on
“constitutional violations that threaten the validity of the sentence.”
2010 UT 32, ¶ 14, 232 P.3d 1008, superseded by rule on other grounds
as stated in State v. Robinson, 2023 UT 25, ¶¶ 17–18, 540 P.3d
614. “[I]f an offender’s sentence is unconstitutional, the sentence
is not authorized by the judgment of conviction, and is therefore
illegal.” Id. ¶ 13 (cleaned up). This court may reach the merits of a
constitutional challenge under the old rule so long as the defendant
“raises an articulable basis for challenging the constitutionality of
[the] sentence,” id. ¶ 14, and the claim satisfies the reviewability
requirement, discussed below, see infra ¶¶ 24–27.
15. State v. Johnson, 2017 UT 76, ¶ 15, 416 P.3d 443.
16. Candedo, 2010 UT 32, ¶ 9 (cleaned up).
17. Houston, 2015 UT 40, ¶ 20.
13a
Appendix A
under the old rule “even if the issue is raised for the first
time on appeal.”18
¶24 Despite falling within an exception to our
traditional preservation rules, claims brought under the
old rule must still satisfy another requirement. Out of
concerns about abuse and in pursuit of judicial economy,
we narrowed the scope and type of claims that could be
brought under the old rule by requiring a 22(e) challenge
to be “facial.”19 We defined “facial” in State v. Houston to
mean that the challenge must seek to correct a defect in
the sentence in a way that does not require further factual
development in the district court. 20 This requirement
served two purposes. First, it worked to keep out “factintensive challenge[s] to the legality of a sentencing
proceeding asserted long after the time for raising
[such challenges] in the initial trial or direct appeal” had
expired. 21 Second, it allowed us to consider only claims
that we could decide based on the record and arguments
before us, thus avoiding the lengthy and inefficient process
of remanding a case to district court for factfinding before
the legality of the sentence could be decided. 22
18. State v. Brooks, 908 P.2d 856, 860 (Utah 1995).
19. See State v. Prion, 2012 UT 15, ¶¶ 20–22, 274 P.3d 919;
Houston, 2015 UT 40, ¶ 27.
20. 2015 UT 40, ¶¶ 26–27; see also Prion, 2012 UT 15, ¶ 22.
21. Houston, 2015 UT 40, ¶ 23 (cleaned up).
22. See id. ¶ 27.
14a
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¶25 Though we used the terms “facial” and “asapplied” in Houston, a close inspection of our caselaw
shows that in this context, the terms vary from their
traditional meaning. 23 Under the traditional definition, a
facial challenge asserts that a statute “always operates
unconstitutionally.”24 In contrast, “as-applied” traditionally
means a challenge to a statute only in “application to a
particular party.”25 In Houston, we used the terms “facial”
and “as-applied” to merely illustrate the difference
between the types of analyses we intended to include in and
exclude from the scope of the old rule. More precisely, the
old rule excludes claims that would require us to remand
a case for further factual development before determining
the legality of the sentence or to resolve factual disputes
ourselves. 26 Instead, under the old rule, we may consider
only claims that raise “purely legal question[s]” in which
the “pertinent facts are undisputed.” 27
¶26 Ultimately, the old rule allows review only of
defects that “could easily be corrected without the need
for factual development in the original trial court.” 28
We acknowledge that the use of the terms “facial” and
23. See id. ¶ 26–27.
24. Archuleta v. State, 2020 UT 62, ¶ 35 n.3, 472 P.3d 950
(cleaned up).
25. Id. (cleaned up).
26. See Houston, 2015 UT 40, ¶ 27.
27. Id. (cleaned up).
28. Id. ¶ 24 (cleaned up).
15a
Appendix A
“as-applied” in this slightly different context invites
confusion. For clarity, in interpreting claims under the
old rule, we will recharacterize the requirement as one
of “reviewability”: the old rule bars challenges that an
appellate court cannot resolve without further factual
development or factfinding while permitting challenges
that are legal or resolvable based on the existing record
before the appellate court. 29
¶27 Under this definition, some claims that qualify as
“as-applied” in the traditional sense will require further
development of the record for us to make an informed
29. We note that while the reviewability requirement limits
the types of illegal sentences a court may consider and correct,
the reviewability requirement does not mean that further factual
development will never be required after an appellate court has
“correct[ed]” an illegal sentence by vacating it. In some cases, the
proper sentence will be clear, so an appellate court may vacate
the illegal sentence and order a new one entered immediately.
In other cases, the record and the law may show that the current
sentence is illegal but not dictate the proper sentence. In those
cases, an appellate court may vacate the sentence and remand for
resentencing, including further factual development if needed.
To interpret the reviewability requirement otherwise would
prevent appellate courts from correcting sentences “imposed in an
illegal manner,” see Utah R. Crim. P. 22(e) (2013)—cases in which
the ultimate sentence might in fact have been permissible but the
underlying sentencing proceedings were illegal. The only remedy
in most such cases is remand for resentencing under the proper
procedure, including additional fact-finding if necessary. We
therefore conclude that the need for further factual development
after the illegal sentence has been corrected by vacatur does not bar
an appellate court from considering otherwise reviewable claims.
16a
Appendix A
decision; the old rule excludes those fact-intensive claims.
But other claims that would traditionally be defined as
“as-applied” will require no further factual development
and may be resolved by us on the undisputed facts in the
record; the old rule permits us to hear those claims. 30
¶28 Having established the requirements of the old
rule, we turn to the new rule. We hold that the two key
features of the old rule—the preservation exception and
the reviewability requirement—do not carry over to the
new rule for several reasons.
¶29 First, we address preservation. The old rule was
silent on how a defendant could request the correction of an
illegal sentence. It provided only that a court could correct
30. Houston at first appears to support using the traditional
definition of “facial” and “as-applied.” See 2015 UT 40, ¶ 26. There,
we implied that all as-applied challenges are, in fact, challenges to
the “underlying conviction that rule 22(e) does not allow. See id. We
looked to State v. Telford, suggesting that in Telford we rejected
an as-applied claim solely because it was as-applied. See id. (citing
State v. Telford, 2002 UT 51, ¶ 7, 48 P.3d 228 (per curiam), superseded
by rule as stated in Robinson, 2023 UT 25, ¶¶ 19, 23)). But upon a
careful reading of Telford, it becomes apparent that we did not hold
in that case that all as-applied challenges attack the underlying
conviction. Instead, we based our rejection of the as-applied claim
in Telford solely on the ground that the claim challenged the
underlying conviction, not the sentence. See 2002 UT 51, ¶ 7. This
type of challenge is independently prohibited by the old rule. See
id.; Utah R. Crim. P. 22(e) (2013). So Telford does not illuminate the
contours of the reviewability requirement. And a better reading of
our caselaw as a whole supports the reviewability requirement as
articulated in this opinion.
17a
Appendix A
an illegal sentence “at any time.” 31 But subparagraph (e)
(3) of the new rule imposes new procedural requirements
for bringing a 22(e) challenge. 32 It states that “[a] motion
under” several provisions of the rule “must be filed no
later than one year from the date the facts supporting the
claim could have been discovered”; under other provisions
a motion “may be filed at any time.”33 Whereas the old
rule made no mention of a motion, 34 the new rule dictates
that claims be brought by motion. 35 Because rule 22(e)
is found in the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure—the
rules governing “criminal proceedings” in most nonappellate courts of this state—we read subparagraph (e)
(3) to govern motions filed with the district court. 36 The
new rule thus provides that a defendant may bring a 22(e)
challenge by filing a motion with the district court within
the given time parameters.
¶30 With the new rule requirement that a defendant
first file a 22(e) motion with the district court, we find it
appropriate to apply our traditional preservation rules
on appeal. Those traditional preservation rules include
several exceptions that, in limited circumstances, allow
a defendant to bring challenges directly to an appellate
31. Utah R. Crim. P. 22(e) (2013).
32. Id. R. 22(e)(3) (2025).
33. Id. (emphasis added).
34. See id. R. 22(e) (2013).
35. Id. R. 22(e)(3) (2025).
36. See id. R. 1(b), (c).
18a
Appendix A
court. 37 In sum, under the new rule, if a defendant seeks
to raise on appeal a challenge to his sentence that he did
not raise in his 22(e) motion before the district court, we
will hear the unpreserved issue only if the defendant can
show that an exception to preservation applies.
¶31 We pause to recognize that when Mullins appealed
the denial of his 22(e) motion, we had not yet established
that a 22(e) challenge under the new rule brought for the
first time on appeal would be subject to our preservation
requirements. Because of the unique circumstances
of Mullins’s case, we will not require him to show an
exception to preservation for us to hear his claims under
the new rule. Our inquiry into which version of rule 22(e)
applies to each of Mullins’s claims largely mirrors a
preservation inquiry. As a result, once we have determined
that the new rule applies to any of his claims, we will not
require Mullins to separately show that a preservation
exception also applies. But because this court does not
typically find facts, 38 in Mullins’s case we will reach only
claims that we can resolve on the record before us. And
we put future defendants who challenge their sentences as
illegal on notice that they will need to show a preservation
exception applies for any new 22(e) challenges brought for
the first time on appeal.
37. See generally State v. Flora, 2020 UT 2, ¶ 9, 459 P.3d 975
(“This court has recognized three distinct exceptions to preservation:
plain error, ineffective assistance of counsel, and exceptional
circumstances.” (cleaned up)).
38. See Carpenter v. Riverton City, 2004 UT 68, ¶ 4, 103 P.3d
127 (per curiam) (“Because this court does not conduct evidentiary
hearings . . . , it simply is not in a position to arrive at a legal ruling
that is dependent on the resolution of disputed facts.”).
19a
Appendix A
¶32 Next, we consider whether the reviewability
requirement from the old rule applies under the new
rule—and conclude that it does not. Under the old
rule, a defendant needed only to show that a claim was
reviewable to establish that it was cognizable. But the
new rule imposes several textual requirements that the
old rule did not. As relevant here, the new rule requires
that a motion relying upon new caselaw must be based
on a new rule established by a binding appellate court. 39
The defendant must also show that the binding new rule
was not “dictated by precedent existing at the time the
defendant’s conviction or sentence became final.”40
¶33 We imposed the reviewability requirement under
the old rule to prevent abuse and to promote judicial
economy. But because the language of the new rule places
different requirements on defendants in district court, we
no longer need to impose this additional hurdle on appeal,
for the reasons we explain below.
¶34 In contrast with the broad language of the old rule,
the new rule defines what constitutes an illegal sentence.
Subparagraph (e)(1) identifies “six specific categories of
sentences that require correction,” and subparagraph (e)
(2) authorizes correction of an illegal sentence “only if the
39. Utah R. Crim. P. 22(e)(2) (2025).
40. Id. Because the State does not challenge any precedent
on which Mullins relies based on the new rule’s second factor, we
assume for this opinion that if Mullins shows that a rule or ruling was
established after he was sentenced, it was not dictated by precedent
that existed at the time his sentence became final.
20a
Appendix A
alleged constitutional violation is grounded in a rule or
ruling that was established or issued after the defendant’s
‘sentence became final.’”41 Because of this new language,
the rule “shrank in scope,” limiting the categories of
sentences that a court could correct.42 As a result, it is
more difficult to engage in the type of abuse that raised
concerns under the old rule.
¶35 Further, the new rule promotes judicial economy
by requiring defendants to bring their 22(e) challenge
before the district court in the first instance. There, the
district court will be able to determine the relevant facts
before we are asked to review the challenge on appeal.
And if a defendant brings an unpreserved 22(e) challenge
before us for the first time on appeal, that defendant must
invoke an exception to preservation.43 This preservation
requirement serves the same judicial-economy purpose as
the reviewability requirement, so we hold that defendants
need not separately show that their challenge is purely
legal or resolvable on the record.
¶36 In sum, based on the text of the rules, the
requirements of the old and new rules are different.
Under the old rule, traditional preservation rules did not
apply to 22(e) challenges and defendants could not bring
fact-intensive claims incapable of resolution on the record.
41. Robinson, 2023 UT 25, ¶ 23 (quoting Utah R. Crim. P. 22(e)
(2) (2019)).
42. Id. ¶ 22.
43. See supra ¶¶ 29–31.
21a
Appendix A
Under the new rule, however, a defendant must file a 22(e)
motion with the district court within the time constraints
outlined in the rule. Because the rule requires defendants
to file in the district court, traditional preservation rules
apply to unpreserved 22(e) challenges on appeal. Thus,
defendants raising a claim on appeal for the first time
must show that an exception to preservation applies. We
now apply this framework to each of Mullins’s claims.
II. MULLINS’S SEVEN CLAIMS
¶37 Mullins raises seven claims on appeal: (1) the
sentencing court violated the Sixth Amendment to the
United States Constitution when it increased the minimum
sentence based on judicial factfinding; (2) the sentencing
statute is unconstitutionally vague; (3) imposing a JLWOP
sentence on an intellectually impaired juvenile violates the
Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution; (4)
imposing JLWOP on an intellectually impaired juvenile
violates article I, section 9 of the Utah Constitution; (5)
JLWOP sentences are categorically unconstitutional under
article I, section 9 of the Utah Constitution; (6) JLWOP
sentences are categorically unconstitutional under the
Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution;
and (7) a JLWOP sentence was unconstitutional under
the Eighth Amendment as applied to Mullins’s case. We
reject Mullins’s first six claims. But we conclude that the
judge’s statements on the record here renders Mullins’s
JLWOP sentence one imposed in an illegal manner. We
thus vacate Mullins’s sentence based on his seventh claim
and remand for resentencing in the district court.
22a
Appendix A
A.
The Sentencing Judge Did Not Violate the
Sixth Amendment
¶38 On appeal, Mullins argues that his JLWOP
sentence violates the Sixth Amendment. He asserts that the
sentencing statute required the sentencing judge to engage
in unconstitutional factfinding about whether JLWOP is
“appropriate” rather than requiring that a jury unanimously
find the sentence “appropriate” beyond a reasonable doubt.44
¶39 We first ask which rule applies to this claim. In his
original motion, Mullins challenged the constitutionality
of his sentence only under the Eighth Amendment. He
never mentioned the Sixth Amendment. So the new rule
applies to this claim. The State concedes that this claim
meets all the requirements of the new rule and does not
require further factual development.45 Accordingly, we
proceed to the merits of the claim.
44. See Utah C ode § 76-3-207(4)(c) (2001). The sentencing
statute has since been amended several times and re-numbered; the
relevant provision as modified is now housed in subsection (5). See
id. § 76-3-207(5)(c) (2025). We refer throughout this opinion to the
2001 version unless otherwise noted. See State v. Clark, 2011 UT 23,
¶ 13, 251 P.3d 829 (“[W]e apply the law as it exists at the time of the
event regulated by the law in question.”).
45. As we noted above, because we announce for the first time
today that our traditional preservation rules apply under the new rule,
we do not require Mullins to prove a preservation exception exists for
us to hear his claims under the new rule. Supra ¶ 31. Out of concerns
about judicial economy and judicial competence, however, we limit our
review in Mullins’s case only to claims reviewable without further factual
development. Supra ¶ 31. We emphasize, however, that the judicially
imposed reviewability requirement applied to claims under the old rule
does not apply to future claims brought under the new rule. See supra ¶ 33.
23a
Appendix A
¶40 The Sixth Amendment to the United States
Constitution guarantees individuals accused of a crime
the right to a trial “by an impartial jury.”46 Taken “in
conjunction with the Due Process Clause,” this right
“requires that each element of a crime be proved to the
jury beyond a reasonable doubt.”47 “The touchstone for
determining whether a fact must be found by a jury
beyond a reasonable doubt is whether the fact constitutes
an element or ingredient of the charged offense.”48
¶41 In Apprendi v. New Jersey, the United States
Supreme Court established that “[o]ther than the fact of
a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for
a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum” is an
element of the crime that “must be submitted to a jury.”49
Then, in Alleyne v. United States, the Court extended
this rule to facts that increase a mandatory minimum
penalty.50 But these cases “do[] not mean that any fact that
influences judicial discretion must be found by a jury.”51
Nor do they mean that juries must find the facts “used to
46. U.S. Const. amend. VI.
47. Alleyne v. United States, 570 U.S. 99, 104 (2013)
(plurality opinion); see also United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506,
510 (1995).
48. Alleyne, 570 U.S. at 107 (plurality opinion) (cleaned up).
49. 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000).
50. 570 U.S. at 103, 111–12.
51. See id. at 116.
24a
Appendix A
guide judicial discretion in selecting a punishment within
limits fixed by law.”52
¶42 At the time of Mullins’s sentencing, Utah Code
subsection 76-3-207(4)(c) read, in relevant part: “The
penalty of life in prison without parole shall only be
imposed if the [sentencing judge] determines that the
sentence of life in prison without parole is appropriate.”53
Mullins argues that, because the sentencing court “has
discretion to impose LWOP only if it first” finds that
“LWOP is appropriate,” the court must make a factual
finding beyond those facts admitted in a plea bargain. He
contends that “LWOP can be imposed only after post-plea
factual findings: that aggravators exist; that LWOP is
appropriate.” And for the court to make those findings,
he argues, violates Alleyne.
¶43 We explained in State v. Houston that this
provision of the sentencing statute did not violate the
Sixth Amendment. 54 In that case, the defendant pled
52. Id. at 113 n.2 (cleaned up).
53. Utah Code § 76-3-207(4)(c) (2001). The statute uses “jury” in
this provision but also indicates that when it uses “jury,” “sentencing
judge” may be substituted if the sentencing proceeding does not
occur before a jury. Utah Code § 76-3-207(4)(a) (2001) (“The court
or jury, as the case may be, shall retire to consider the penalty.”).
54. 2015 UT 40, ¶¶ 30–32, 353 P.3d 55. By the time Houston
was sentenced, the statute had been amended and re-numbered to
place the operative provision in subsection (5). Compare Utah
Code § 76-3-207(4)(c) (2001) with Utah Code § 76-2-207(5)(c) (2008).
But the “appropriate[ness]” finding was identical between the two
versions of the statute.
25a
Appendix A
guilty to aggravated murder, punishable by “either life
with the possibility of parole or LWOP.”55 This meant
that “[t]here were no factual findings to be made by a
jury, only a determination that LWOP would or would
not be appropriate.”56 And although we decided this issue
in Houston based solely on Apprendi, the logic remains
unchanged under Alleyne.
¶44 When Mullins pled guilty to aggravated murder,
the court did not and could not make any factual findings
that would have “produced a higher range” of sentences
beyond those already permitted by subsection 76-3207(4).57 So Alleyne does not apply. Mullins’s plea exposed
him to the possibility of two sentences: life with the
possibility of parole and LWOP. 58 In choosing between
those two options, the judge merely exercised “broad
sentencing discretion” within the available statutory
sentencing range.59 Accordingly, we conclude that Mullins’s
sentencing process did not violate the Sixth Amendment.
55. Houston, 2015 UT 40, ¶ 32.
56. Id.
57. See Alleyne, 570 U.S. at 116; Utah Code § 76-3-207(4)(a)
(2001).
58. Utah Code § 76-3-207(4)(a) (2001).
59. See Alleyne, 570 U.S. at 116; see also Houston, 2015 UT
40, ¶ 32 (“By pleading guilty to aggravated murder, [Defendant]
admitted all the facts relevant to the offense and became subject to
any sentence authorized under Utah law. Under Utah’s sentencing
statute, a juvenile defendant guilty of aggravated murder can be
sentenced to either life with the possibility of parole or LWOP.”).
26a
Appendix A
B. Utah Code Subsection 76-3-207(4) (2001) Is Not
Unconstitutionally Vague
¶45 Mullins next argues that the sentencing statute is
unconstitutionally vague in violation of due process.60 At
the time of Mullins’s sentencing, section 76-3-207 required
a judge or jury to determine that it was “appropriate” to
sentence an offender to LWOP.61 Mullins argues that the
statute is vague because it does not sufficiently define
“appropriate” or convey the constitutional importance of
a juvenile’s youth in that determination.62
¶46 As with his Sixth Amendment claim, Mullins did
not mention constitutional vagueness in his original 22(e)
motion. Again, he only discussed the Eighth Amendment.
Accordingly, the new rule applies to this claim. And
again, the State concedes that Mullins’s vagueness claim
complies with the requirements of the new rule and does
not require further factual development, so we reach it
on the merits.63
¶47 Sentencing statutes are unconstitutionally
vague “if they do not state with sufficient clarity the
consequences of violating a given criminal statute.” 64
60. See Utah Code § 76-3-207(4) (2001).
61. See id. § 76-3-207(4)(a), (c) (2001).
62. See id.
63. See supra ¶¶ 31, 39 n.45.
64. State v. Perea, 2013 UT 68, ¶ 111, 322 P.3d 624 (quoting
United States v. Batchelder, 442 U.S. 114, 123 (1979)).
27a
Appendix A
Sentencing judges have long been afforded wide discretion
in determining sentences, but such discretion does not
render a sentencing statute unconstitutional.65 Section 763-207 governs sentencing for capital felonies. Under the
version of the statute applicable at the time of Mullins’s
sentencing in 2001, a court could impose LWOP only if it
found that LWOP was “appropriate.”66
¶48 Both parties acknowledge that we ruled on the
vagueness of section 76-3-207 in Houston.67 The State
argues that Houston is controlling and dispositive. But
Mullins contends that our reasoning in Houston was
“not very compelling” because the statute “provides no
meaningful guidance about how to weigh [aggravating and
mitigating] factors against each other.” Specifically, the
statute does not identify the constitutional significance of a
defendant’s youth in the “appropriateness” consideration.
As a result, he implicitly asks us to overturn our decision
in Houston. Mullins does not, however, engage in the
appropriate analysis for such a request.68 As such, we
decline to overturn Houston.
¶49 Additionally, Mullins argues that the federal
legal landscape has changed since we decided Houston;
65. Id. ¶¶ 114, 117.
66. Utah Code § 76-3-207(4)(a), (c) (2001).
67. See 2015 UT 40, ¶¶ 47–48.
68. See Eldridge v. Johndrow, 2015 UT 21, ¶¶ 20–41, 345 P.3d
553 (describing the framework through which this court considers
whether to overrule its own precedents).
28a
Appendix A
he specifically contends that the United States Supreme
Court’s holding in Johnson v. United States abrogates
our holding in Houston.69 In Johnson, the Court found
unconstitutionally vague a mandatory sentencing scheme
for offenders with prior convictions for violent crimes.70
The statutory scheme’s residual clause imposed a
sentencing enhancement if the prior conviction “involve[d]
conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical
injury to another.” 71 The Court explained that the statute
required courts to determine how much risk qualifies as
“serious potential risk” and then apply it to the judge’s
“imagined ordinary case.” 72 This intersection of a vague
term being given meaning by an abstract and “wideranging” analysis led the Court to declare the statute
unconstitutionally vague.73
¶50 But as the State points out, the Cour t’s
determination in Johnson turned on the combination
of the “imagined ordinary case” analysis and the
vagueness of the term “serious potential risk.” 74 That
case presented two layers of potential ambiguity that,
together, violated due process. By contrast, the sentencing
69. See Johnson v. United States, 576 U.S. 591 (2015).
70. Id. at 593–94, 602, 604.
71. 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii), invalidated by Johnson, 576
U.S. 591.
72. Johnson, 576 U.S. at 597–98 (cleaned up).
73. Id. at 596–97.
74. See id. at 596–98 (cleaned up).
29a
Appendix A
statute here requires no judicial imagination and offers
specific mitigating and aggravating factors to guide the
judge’s determination of “appropriateness” in each case.75
Therefore, Johnson does not abrogate Houston, and our
holding that Utah Code section 76-3-207 is constitutional
stands.
C.
We Do Not Reach Whether Imposing JLWOP
on an Intellectually Disabled Juvenile Is
Categorically Unconstitutional Under the
Federal and Utah Constitutions
¶51 Mullins next claims that it was unconstitutional
under both the federal and state constitutions to sentence
him to JLWOP because two United States Supreme
Court decisions,76 when taken together, prohibit imposing
JLWOP on intellectually disabled juveniles. Mullins did
not mention his intellectual disability in his original
motion, and he likewise failed to mention the main case
on which he relies for this argument, Atkins v. Virginia.77
Thus, the new rule applies to this claim.
¶52 The State argues that Mullins failed to show that
his claim is based on “a rule established or ruling issued
by” a binding court, as the new rule requires.78 Instead,
75. See Utah Code § 76-3-207(3)–(4) (2001).
76. See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002); Graham v.
Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010).
77. 536 U.S. 304.
78. See Utah R. Crim. P. 22(e)(2) (2025).
30a
Appendix A
Mullins “cobbl[ed] together two existing but unrelated
rules.”
¶53 The State has a point. Mullins presents two
cases that independently established new rules. The
Court in Atkins established that intellectually disabled
individuals cannot be sentenced to capital punishment.79
And the Court in Graham v. Florida established that
juveniles who have not committed homicide cannot be
sentenced to JLWOP. 80 In the latter case, the Court stated
that JLWOP “share[s] some characteristics with death
sentences that are shared by no other sentences.”81 But
it does not support the claim that Mullins now makes:
that all JLWOP sentences should be treated as capital
punishment in all circumstances. So Mullins’s claim would
require us to determine whether JLWOP is equivalent to
capital punishment. If we must decide that now, the rule
is not already established. And subparagraph (e)(2) of the
new rule requires that a challenge to an illegal sentence
be based on “a rule established or ruling issued by” a
binding court. 82
¶54 Mullins also makes no attempt to show that
his proposed rule is based on new, binding caselaw
interpreting the Utah Constitution. So we do not reach
his claim under the Utah Constitution either.
79. 536 U.S. at 321.
80. 560 U.S. at 82.
81. Id. at 69.
82. Utah R. Crim. P. 22(e)(2) (2025).
31a
Appendix A
D.
We Do Not Reach Whether JLWOP Sentences
Are Categorically Unconstitutional Under
Article I, Section 9 of the Utah Constitution
¶55 Mullins’s f ifth claim also challenges the
constitutionality of JLWOP generally, this time solely
under article I, section 9 of the Utah Constitution. He
argues that under today’s national consensus, a sentence
of JLWOP is cruel and unusual. But Mullins never referred
to the Utah Constitution in his original motion; he referred
only to United States Supreme Court cases. Because he
brings his current claim under the Utah Constitution, the
new rule applies.
¶56 Mullins’s claim does not meet the requirements
of the new rule, however, because it is not based on a “a
rule established or ruling issued” by a binding appellate
court. 83 We previously rejected an almost identical
constitutional challenge to JLWOP in Houston. 84 Mullins
argues that the national consensus has changed since
we decided that case. But in doing so, he identifies no
precedent from a controlling Utah court indicating that
the national consensus has changed. His argument, then,
is not premised on a rule or ruling issued by a controlling
court. As such, we do not reach the merits of this claim. 85
83. See id.
84. 2015 UT 40, ¶¶ 64–68.
85. In the alternative, Mullins argues that the Utah Constitution
requires a sentencing court to make an on-the-record finding of
permanent incorrigibility—a procedural requirement rejected by the
United States Supreme Court under the United States Constitution.
32a
Appendix A
E. JLWOP Is Not Categorically Unconstitutional
Under the Eighth Amendment to the United
States Constitution
¶57 Mullins next asks us to overturn another aspect
of our decision in Houston and hold that a sentence of
JLWOP is, without exception, unconstitutional under the
Eighth Amendment’s prohibition of cruel and unusual
punishment. Because this claim fails on its merits under
either version of rule 22(e), we need not ask which rule
applies nor whether the claim meets the requirements of
that rule.
¶58 Courts assess claims of cruel and unusual
punishment under the United States Constitution by
looking to the “evolving standards of decency that mark
the progress of a maturing society.” 86 This standard
requires us to consider whether a punishment is
proportionate to a crime based on “a national consensus
against the sentencing practice at issue” and an exercise
of the court’s “independent judgment.”87
See Jones v. Mississippi, 593 U.S. 98, 101 (2021); see also infra
¶¶ 71–72. As with his claim that JLWOP is categorically forbidden by
the Utah Constitution, Mullins asks us to declare a new rule, rather
than rely on binding precedent from this court or the United States
Supreme Court. We therefore may not reach the merits of his claim
under the new rule. See Utah R. Crim. P. 22(e)(2) (2025).
86. Graham, 560 U.S. at 58 (cleaned up).
87. Id. at 61.
33a
Appendix A
¶59 In Houston, we addressed this same argument
and declined to hold that JLWOP was categorically
unconstitutional. 88 We based our analysis on binding
United States Supreme Court precedent and explained
that although “juveniles represent a unique class
warranting special considerations in sentencing[,] . . . the
unique characteristics of youth are accounted for, both by
Utah law and through federal constitutional protections.”89
We also noted that “a great majority of states . . . permit
LWOP sentences for juveniles” and declined to “conclude
that the ‘national consensus’ favors the prohibition of
LWOP for juveniles convicted of homicide.” 90
¶60 Mullins argues that the national consensus on
JLWOP has sufficiently evolved since Houston for us to
revisit the matter, given the decrease from thirty-nine
states allowing JLWOP to twenty-five plus the District
of Columbia. But he provides little evidence of changes
in actual sentencing practices, an essential factor in the
national consensus analysis when the legislative data are
inconclusive.91
88. 2015 UT 40, ¶¶ 52–63.
89. Id. ¶ 60.
90. Id. ¶ 62 (noting that, as of 2010, thirty-nine states allowed
LWOP sentences for juvenile offenders convicted of homicide).
91. See Graham, 560 U.S. at 61, 66 (stating that a court
considers “indicia of society’s standards, as expressed in legislative
enactments and state practice” and basing its holding, in part, on
the fact that “life without parole sentences for juveniles convicted
of nonhomicide crimes [are] as rare [in practice] as other sentencing
practices found to be cruel and unusual” (cleaned up)).
34a
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¶61 In our view, a decrease from thirty-nine states
permitting JLWOP by statute to twenty-five, without any
information on actual sentencing practices, is not so great
an evolution as to overcome the United States Supreme
Court’s established precedent, which the Court endorsed
as recently as 2021.92 Although states are trending away
from permitting JLWOP, we agree with the State that,
taken alone, half of the states plus the District of Columbia
banning JLWOP do not a national consensus make. Again,
we decline to overturn Houston.
F.
Mullins’s Sentence Was Imposed in an Illegal
Manner Under Rule 22(e)
¶62 Mullins’s final claim is that a JLWOP sentence was
unconstitutional under the Eighth Amendment as applied
to his case. Mullins argues that under Miller v. Alabama
and its progeny, as someone whose crimes reflected
transient immaturity, he could not constitutionally be
sentenced to JLWOP. 93 He further argues that the
sentencing court “recognized that Mr. Mullins could still
change”—a fact that should have precluded a JLWOP
sentence under the standards set forth in Miller and
subsequent cases.
¶63 Mullins adequately raised this claim in his original
motion and argument to the district court, so we consider
92. See Jones, 593 U.S. 98.
93. See 567 U.S. 460 (2012); Montgomery v. Louisiana, 577
U.S. 190 (2016); Jones, 593 U.S. 98.
35a
Appendix A
it under the old rule.94 Our reviewability requirement,
however, bars part of his argument. 95 In particular,
Mullins asserts that “the undisputed record establishes
that [his] crime reflected the transient immaturity of
his youth.” He claims that the record shows a complete
absence of moral guidance in his childhood home and that
his parents affirmatively encouraged criminal behavior.
While the record shows that his childhood was likely
deeply traumatic, crime caused by a traumatic past is
not the same as crime caused by youthful immaturity.
And without further factual development, we cannot say
whether Mullins’s crime was actually the result of his
youth. Under our precedents for the old rule, we cannot
engage in such a fact-intensive inquiry and thus cannot
address this aspect of Mullins’s claim.96
¶64 We do consider, however, Mullins’s argument
that the judge improperly sentenced him to JLWOP
even though he “recognized that Mr. Mullins could still
change.” Though this argument has factual underpinnings,
it raises questions we can answer on the record before us.
94. Mullins’s motion cited Miller, arguing that a judge must
“have the opportunity to consider mitigating circumstances before
imposing” JLWOP, and the record did not indicate that “the court
took into consideration the defendant’s youth” or “the possibility of
rehabilitation.” See Noor v. State, 2019 UT 3, ¶ 51 n.64, 435 P.3d
221 (“[A] party acting pro se should be accorded every consideration
that may be reasonably indulged because of his lack of technical
knowledge of law and procedure.” (cleaned up)).
95. See Houston, 2015 UT 40, ¶¶ 24–26; supra ¶¶ 24–27.
96. See Houston, 2015 UT 40, ¶¶ 18, 27; supra ¶¶ 24–27.
36a
Appendix A
The parties do not dispute the contents of the transcripts
of the sentencing hearing or the original 22(e) motion
hearing, and a fresh look at the case by the district court
would not shed any additional light on what the sentencing
court considered or concluded when sentencing Mullins.
Because we would not need to find any facts outside the
record, nor would we need to rely on any disputed facts
in the record to analyze this claim, we conclude that this
aspect of Mullins’s claim is within the scope of the old rule.
¶65 Mullins’s claim turns on recent federal caselaw
emphasizing the constitutional differences between
adults and juveniles and declaring certain penalties
disproportionate when applied to juveniles. The Eighth
Amendment requires that punishment be proportionate
“to both the offender and the offense.” 97 Proportionality
“requires consideration of the culpability of the offenders
at issue in light of their crimes and characteristics, along
with the severity of the punishment in question.”98 Under
that framework, a sentencing court must account for a
juvenile’s “lessened culpability and greater capacity for
change” as compared to that of an adult.99 In Miller v.
Alabama, the United States Supreme Court declared
that mandator y JLWOP sentencing schemes are
unconstitutional because they prohibit that accounting.100
97. Miller, 567 U.S. at 469; see also U.S. Const. amend. VIII.
98. Graham, 560 U.S. at 67.
99. Miller, 567 U.S. at 465 (cleaned up).
100. See id. at 465, 475–77.
37a
Appendix A
¶66 Drawing on Roper v. Simmons and Graham v.
Florida, the Court in Miller emphasized that “children
are different.”101 Youth both “lessen[s] a child’s moral
culpability and enhance[s] the prospect that, as the years
go by and neurological development occurs, [the child’s]
deficiencies will be reformed.”102 The Court reasoned that
the characteristics of youth render ordinary penological
justifications less rational.103 Because youth lessens
an offender’s culpability for their actions, however
horrible, “the case for retribution is not as strong with
a minor as with an adult.”104 Similarly, deterrence is less
effective because children’s “immaturity, recklessness,
and impetuosity . . . make them less likely to consider
potential punishment” in making decisions.105 A lifetime
sentence is generally justified by concluding that an
offender will be a perpetual danger to others if released
from prison—but such a conclusion requires finding the
offender “incorrigible,” and “incorrigibility is inconsistent
with youth.”106 Finally, while the criminal justice system
ordinarily aims to rehabilitate offenders, any LWOP
101. Id. at 480; see also Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551,
578 (2005) (declaring the death penalty for juvenile offenders
unconstitutional); Graham, 560 U.S. at 82 (declaring JLWOP
unconstitutional for non-homicide juvenile offenders).
102. Miller, 567 U.S. at 472 (cleaned up).
103. Id. at 472–73 (citing Roper, 543 U.S. 551; Graham, 560
U.S. 48).
104. Id. at 472 (cleaned up) (quoting Graham, 560 U.S. at 71).
105. Id.
106. Id. at 472–73 (cleaned up).
38a
Appendix A
sentence “forswears altogether the rehabilitative ideal”
and instead rests on “an irrevocable judgment about an
offender’s value and place in society.”107 That immutable
judgment is “at odds with a child’s capacity for change.”108
Because a JLWOP sentence could not serve these
legitimate functions in an ordinary case, the sentence is
disproportionate for most juvenile offenders.109
¶67 The Court in Miller did “not categorically bar
a penalty for a class of offenders or type of crime,”
instead “mandat[ing] only that a sentencer follow a
certain process—considering an offender’s youth and
attendant characteristics—before imposing” JLWOP.110
But the Court concluded by stating that given “children’s
diminished culpability and heightened capacity for change,
we think appropriate occasions for sentencing juveniles
to this harshest possible penalty will be uncommon.”111
¶68 A few years later, in State v. Houston, this
court held that the Utah sentencing scheme allowing a
court to impose JLWOP was facially constitutional.112
Relying on Miller and related federal precedents, the
court determined that “the Eighth Amendment does not
107. Id. at 473 (cleaned up).
108. Id.
109. Id. at 479–80.
110. Id. at 483.
111. Id. at 479.
112. 2015 UT 40, ¶¶ 52–53; see also Utah Code § 76-3-207 (2008).
39a
Appendix A
prohibit the imposition of LWOP for a juvenile homicide
offender.”113 And Utah’s “statutory scheme enable[d] the
kind of individualized sentencing determination that
the Supreme Court has deemed necessary for serious
offenses.”114 In sum, because the sentencing statute did
not mandate a JLWOP sentence and instead granted
discretion to the sentencer to impose a lesser sentence,
it did not, on its face, violate the Eighth Amendment.115
¶69 A year later, in Montgomery v. Louisiana, the
United States Supreme Court held that Miller applies
retroactively to juveniles who were sentenced to JLWOP
before the Court decided Miller.116 To find the rule
retroactive, the Court concluded that Miller announced a
substantive constitutional rule, as opposed to a procedural
one.117 The Court recognized that Miller had a procedural
component, requiring a discretionary sentencing scheme
that allows a sentencer to consider youth as a factor before
imposing a JLWOP sentence.118 But “[p]rotection against
disproportionate punishment is the central substantive
guarantee of the Eighth Amendment and goes far beyond
the manner of determining a defendant’s sentence.”119 And
113. Houston, 2015 UT 40, ¶ 55.
114. Id. ¶ 61.
115. Id. ¶¶ 61–63.
116. 577 U.S. at 206–12.
117. Id. at 209.
118. Id. at 209–10.
119. Id. at 206 (emphasis added).
40a
Appendix A
“mandatory life-without-parole sentences for children
pose too great a risk of disproportionate punishment.”120
¶70 The Court clarified that Miller went further than
simply requiring a sentencing court to weigh a defendant’s
youth. 121 Miller “established that the penological
justifications for life without parole collapse in light of ‘the
distinctive attributes of youth.’”122 Thus, “[e]ven if a court
considers a child’s age before sentencing him or her to a
lifetime in prison, that sentence still violates the Eighth
Amendment for a child whose crime reflects ‘unfortunate
yet transient immaturity.’”123 Because Miller barred
JLWOP for all but the rarest offenders, it “rendered life
without parole an unconstitutional penalty for . . . juvenile
offenders whose crimes reflect the transient immaturity of
youth”—a substantive, and thus retroactive, constitutional
protection.124
¶71 The Supreme Court next heard a JLWOP case in
Jones v. Mississippi.125 Jones considered whether Miller
120. Id. at 208 (cleaned up).
121. Id.
122. Id. (quoting Miller, 567 U.S. at 472).
123. Id. (quoting Miller, 567 U.S. at 479).
124. Id. at 208–09 (“Like other substantive rules, Miller is
retroactive because it necessarily carries a significant risk that a
defendant—here, the vast majority of juvenile offenders—faces a
punishment that the law cannot impose upon him.” (cleaned up)).
125. 593 U.S. 98.
41a
Appendix A
required a sentencer to “make a separate factual finding
that the defendant is permanently incorrigible” or to
otherwise include an implicit finding of incorrigibility on
the record.126 The Court clarified that a sentencing court
must consider “youth as a sentencing factor akin to a
mitigating circumstance” under the Court’s death penalty
jurisprudence.127 Relying on language from Montgomery
declaring that a sentencer need not make an express
factual finding of incorrigibility, the Court rejected Jones’s
effort to overturn his JLWOP sentence.128
¶72 In its language, the Court in Jones seemed to
step back from the broadest reading of both Miller and
Montgomery, stating that under those cases “a State’s
discretionary sentencing system is both constitutionally
necessary and constitutionally sufficient.”129 But the
Court also expressly declined to overrule Miller or
Montgomery,130 instead framing the question it resolved
as merely whether to adopt “an additional constitutional
requirement that the sentencer must make a finding of
permanent incorrigibility before sentencing a murderer
126. Id. at 101.
127. Id. at 108.
128. Id. at 101.
129. Id. at 105.
130. Id. at 118 (“Today’s decision does not overrule Miller
or Montgomery.”); see also id. at 144 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting)
(“[S]entencers should hold this Court to its word: Miller and
Montgomery are still good law.”).
42a
Appendix A
under 18 to life without parole.”131 The Court repeatedly
reiterated that clear language in Miller and Montgomery
dictated its answer to that question: that no such finding
was required.132 And the Court quoted in a footnote a
“key paragraph” from Montgomery, stating that the
absence of “a formal factfinding requirement does not
leave States free to sentence a child whose crime reflects
transient immaturity to life without parole.”133 So while
we read Jones to establish that a sentencing court need
not consider youth in any particular way, Jones does not
excuse sentencing courts of the obligation to properly
consider youth before imposing a JLWOP sentence.
¶73 Having reviewed the relevant precedents, we
turn now to Mullins’s principal argument. He asserts that
his JLWOP sentence was unconstitutional because the
sentencing court in his case affirmatively “recognized that
[he] could still change” but then sentenced him to JLWOP.
Though this court and the United States Supreme Court
have both recognized that JLWOP is constitutionally
permissible in some cases, neither court has declared that
it is permissible in all cases, nor considered the specific
claim Mullins raises here.134
131. Id. at 119 (majority opinion) (emphasis added).
132. Id. at 109–10, 113, 119.
133. Id. at 106 n.2 (quoting Montgomery, 577 U.S. at 211).
134. See id. at 115; Miller, 567 U.S. at 483; Houston, 2015 UT
40, ¶ 55. In fact, the United States Supreme Court in Jones expressly
declined to explore whether a sentencer who refused to consider a
defendant’s youth would violate that youth’s Eighth Amendment
43a
Appendix A
¶74 We agree with Mullins that if a sentencing
court affirmatively finds that a juvenile offender
can change, a JLWOP sentence is unconstitutional.
“[T]he characteristics of youth, and the way they weaken
rationales for punishment, can render a life-withoutparole sentence disproportionate.”135 And under Miller
and its progeny, if a child is capable of change and
reform—that is, is not incorrigible—a JLWOP sentence
is disproportionate and unconstitutional.136 A sentencing
court has no obligation to make an on-the-record finding
of permanent incorrigibility before imposing a JLWOP
sentence.137 But a contrary finding bars the court from
imposing JLWOP.138
right. 593 U.S. at 115 n.7; see also id. at 120 (declining to consider
“any as-applied Eighth Amendment claim of disproportionality”);
id. at 144 n.6 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (noting that a juvenile asapplied claim “should be controlled by this Court’s holding that
sentencing a child whose crime reflects transient immaturity to life
without parole is disproportionate under the Eighth Amendment”
(cleaned up)).
135. Miller, 567 U.S. at 473.
136. Montgomery, 577 U.S. at 211.
137. See Jones, 593 U.S. at 113.
138. See Montgomery, 577 U.S. at 211; Jones, 593 U.S. at 119
(expressly declining to overrule Montgomery). Our sister courts
are divided over the proper interpretation of these difficult cases.
Compare, e.g., State v. Kelliher, 873 S.E.2d 366, 380 (N.C. 2022) (“[C]
onsistent with Miller, Montgomery, and Jones, we conclude that the
Eighth Amendment categorically prohibits a sentencing court from
sentencing any juvenile to life without parole if the sentencing court
has found the juvenile to be neither incorrigible nor irredeemable.”
44a
Appendix A
¶75 We now turn to the facts of Mullins’s case. At
sentencing, Mullins’s counsel emphasized that he was
asking the court to “simply allow the Board of Pardons . . .
some discretion at some time in the very distant future
to be able to make a decision about whether or not
parole is even a possibility for Mr. Mullins.” Counsel
highlighted that Mullins “never had a chance at a normal
life” due to his “profoundly dysfunctional upbringing.”
And counsel argued that because Mullins came from a
“dysfunctional horrific environment,” removing him from
that environment would create a meaningful opportunity
for him to learn and change.
¶76 Following counsel’s arguments and admission of
a psychological report, the sentencing judge stated, “If
you’re trying to assess the level of hope for the future
you hold out for Mr. Mullins, I don’t see anything in [the
psychological] report on how to assess hope for change.”
In response, counsel declared, “I don’t want to say that
hope for change is irrelevant, but it almost doesn’t matter
(cleaned up)), and Malvo v. State, 281 A.3d 758, 765 (Md. 2022)
(addressing “a situation in which a sentencing court finds that a crime
was the result of the offender’s transient immaturity but nonetheless
sentences the offender to life without parole” and concluding that
“an offender deemed corrigible cannot constitutionally be sentenced
to” JLWOP), with People v. Wilson, 220 N.E.3d 1068, 1077 (Ill. 2023)
(“[N]o viable Miller claim exists, so long as the [JLWOP] sentence is
not mandatory ” (cleaned up)), and Commonwealth v. Felder, 269
A.3d 1232, 1243 (Pa. 2022) (same). It is clear from these cases that
reasonable jurists—including our dissenting colleagues here—may
disagree with our reading. Still, we believe this reading is the most
appropriate application of Eighth Amendment principles and federal
caselaw.
45a
Appendix A
what we hope”—instead putting sole responsibility for
evaluating Mullins’s ability to change on the Board of
Pardons and Parole. Counsel further stated that “[w]e
cannot predict what Mr. Mullins himself will do by way
of coming to a realiz[ation] inside himself to change.”
The judge then imposed a JLWOP sentence, stating
that “when I balance . . . the family’s requests and Mr.
Mullins’[s] request and the need to send a message,”
JLWOP was appropriate. Wrapping up the hearing, the
judge opined, “I sincerely hope it’s the right judgment,
Mr. Mullins, and if you’re gonna be with us for a long
time and have a chance to change, I hope—not under the
present circumstances—I’m hoping that you’ll find some
way to be productive.”
¶77 Mullins argues that the judge’s comments show
that “the judge was not convinced beyond a reasonable
doubt that Mr. Mullins could never change.” On that basis,
he requests that his sentence be modified to make him
eligible for parole.
¶78 We cannot say that we agree. The record does
not show an affirmative factual finding that Mullins was
capable of change—the showing necessary for us to
declare Mullins’s sentence unconstitutional as a matter
of law and immediately modify his sentence to permit the
possibility of parole.
¶79 Even still, the sentencing court’s comments and
the context in which they were delivered raise significant
ambiguity as to whether a JLWOP sentence was “imposed
46a
Appendix A
in an illegal manner” here.139 We agree with Mullins that
the court here both contemplated his ability to change—
one of the important features of youth—and may have
implicitly concluded that Mullins had a capacity to change.
After the judge’s statement that he did not know how to
judge capacity for change, and counsel’s arguments that
the issue was better left to the Board of Pardons and
Parole, and hardly relevant for the sentencing judge,
the judge did not conclude the hearing. Rather, in the
context of considering whether to leave discretion to
the Board of Pardons and Parole, the judge made his
comment suggesting some “hope” that Mullins might
have a “chance to change.” The judge then affirmatively
sentenced Mullins to JLWOP—a sentence incompatible
with a suggestion that Mullins could change.
¶80 While we cannot say that Mullins is the type
of juvenile offender for whom JLWOP is categorically
disproportionate—the sentencing court did not make that
finding, and this court cannot evaluate that question in
the first instance—the court’s comments raise significant
concerns that Mullins may fall into that category. The
court’s comments also raise significant concerns that it
misapprehended its constitutional obligation to consider
youth in the proper manner under the retroactive reach
of Miller and its progeny. Indeed, the comments appear
to contemplate leaving the full consideration of Mullins’s
youth to the Board of Pardons and Parole, making it
unclear whether the court was appropriately assessing
Mullins’s youth in its decision to impose a JLWOP
sentence.
139. See Utah R. Crim. P. 22(e) (2013).
47a
Appendix A
¶81 Given that “a lifetime in prison is a disproportionate
sentence for all but the rarest of children,”140 the court’s
statements undermine our confidence that JLWOP was an
appropriate and constitutional sentence and that the court
properly undertook the constitutional task before it—to
consider Mullins’s “youth and attendant characteristics”
themselves.141 Accordingly, the court’s comments lead us
to conclude that Mullins’s sentence “pose[s] too great a
risk of disproportionate punishment” here.142 We therefore
hold that Mullins’s sentence was “imposed in an illegal
manner” under the old rule 22(e).
¶82 The fact that Mullins was sentenced before
Miller and its progeny were issued strengthens our
conclusion because the sentencing court lacked notice
of the constitutional import of Mullins’s youth.143 When
the court sentenced Mullins in 2002, controlling caselaw
did not indicate that juveniles should receive special
consideration when being sentenced. Indeed, sentencing
140. Montgomery, 577 U.S. at 195 (emphasis added).
141. Miller, 567 U.S. at 483.
142. Montgomery, 577 U.S. at 208 (cleaned up).
143. See, e.g., State v. Null, 836 N.W.2d 41, 76 (Iowa 2013)
(similarly noting that the district court lacked “the benefit of Miller”
during sentencing, and providing an opportunity to reconsider the
appropriate sentence for a juvenile upon remand); Malvo, 281 A.3d
at 772 (vacating a JLWOP sentence when a judge’s ambiguous
comments suggested he had not weighed the defendant’s youth and
ability to change, emphasizing that defendant was sentenced before
Miller and that the court need not “presume that a sentencing judge
is clairvoyant”).
48a
Appendix A
a juvenile to death—a more severe punishment than
JLWOP—was still constitutionally permissible.144 And the
United States Supreme Court had rejected the argument
that juveniles were different from adults because they
have “less developed cognitive skills,” are “less mature
and responsible,” and are “less morally blameworthy.”145
Additionally, the Court stated that juvenile transfer
statutes146 adequately “ensure individualized consideration
of the maturity and moral responsibility” of a juvenile
“before they are even held to stand trial as adults.”147 In
other words, the Court allowed for the possibility that
a juvenile’s individual maturity and responsibility need
not be considered at all during sentencing. If even the
death penalty for juveniles served legitimate penological
goals under controlling caselaw, and constitutional law
did not yet mandate individualized consideration of youth
at sentencing, then there is no basis to assume that a
sentencing court at that time would have understood the
constitutional rights implicated by sentencing a youth to
JLWOP.
¶83 In contrast, Miller and Montgomery marked
a turning point, together making clear that a JLWOP
144. See Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 380 (1989),
overruled by Roper, 543 U.S. 551.
145. Stanford, 492 U.S. at 377–79.
146. Transfer statutes “allow[] or mandate[] the trial of a
juvenile as an adult in a criminal court for a criminal act.” Transfer
Statute, Black’s Law Dictionary (12th ed. 2024).
147. Stanford, 492 U.S. at 375.
49a
Appendix A
sentence is disproportionate for juvenile defendants
who possess the capacity to change.148 Under Miller, a
sentencing court must consider a juvenile’s youth and its
attendant characteristics.149 “[I]mposition of a State’s most
severe penalties on juvenile offenders cannot proceed as
though they were not children.”150 The sentencing court
must have the opportunity to consider the “mitigating
qualities of youth,” such as “immaturity, impetuosity,
and failure to appreciate risks and consequences” as well
as the peer pressures and the familial environment that
surround the juvenile.151 The fact that the sentencing court
did not have the benefit of this caselaw, combined with its
ambiguous remarks about Mullins’s prospects for change
in the context of considering whether to allow the Board of
Pardons and Parole to make that determination, suggests
“too great a risk of disproportionate punishment” here.152
It is “unclear at best whether [Mullins’s] sentencing
proceeding complied with the Eighth Amendment.”153
Viewed as a whole, the sentencing record raises significant
148. Miller, 567 U.S. at 479–80; Montgomery, 577 U.S. at
209–10 (recognizing Miller’s “substantive holding that life without
parole is an excessive sentence for children whose crimes reflect
transient immaturity”).
149. See 567 U.S. at 465, 470–80.
150. Id. at 474.
151. Id. at 476–77 (cleaned up).
152. See id. at 479.
153. See Malvo, 281 A.3d at 773 (“In our view, the legality of a
sentence under the Eighth Amendment is not a topic for this Court’s
speculation.”).
50a
Appendix A
concerns about the constitutionality of Mullins’s
sentence and the sentencing court’s apprehension of the
constitutional task before it. Accordingly, we hold that
Mullins’s sentence was imposed in an illegal manner under
the old rule 22(e). We therefore vacate Mullins’s sentence
and remand for resentencing proceedings consistent with
Miller and its progeny.154
¶84 We turn then to the question of remedy. Mullins
requests that this court “correct [his] sentence by giving
him the chance to seek parole.” And, indeed, the United
States Supreme Court has suggested that simply enabling
a defendant to seek parole may be an appropriate path
under Miller.155 We therefore do not fault Mullins for
seeking that remedy. But the Court left to the states to
determine whether resentencing or mere parole eligibility
is appropriate when a juvenile’s sentencing process
violated the Eighth Amendment.156 As we have noted, in
instances where the record reflects an affirmative finding
that a juvenile is capable of change—in other words, not
permanently incorrigible—or that the crime was the result
of transient immaturity, JLWOP is unconstitutionally
disproportionate. In such cases, a resentencing proceeding
in which the sentencing court could again impose JLWOP
would be inappropriate.
154. See Miller, 567 U.S. at 474, 479, 489; Jones, 593 U.S. at
111–12 (noting that appropriate sentencing proceedings under Miller
“help[] ensure that life-without-parole sentences are imposed only in
cases where that sentence is appropriate in light of the defendant’s
age”).
155. See Montgomery, 577 U.S. at 212.
156. See id.
51a
Appendix A
¶85 Here, however, the record does not reflect such an
unambiguous finding. Accordingly, we can only speculate
as to whether Mullins is one of the rare individuals “whose
crimes reflect irreparable corruption.”157 But the court’s
comments at Mullins’s sentencing raise a significant risk
that Mullins may be one of those individuals and that
the court did not properly consider that possibility. We
therefore leave it to the sentencing court on remand to
determine the appropriate sentence here, considering
Mullins’s youth as required by the Eighth Amendment,
consistent with Miller and this opinion.158
CONCLUSION
¶86 Mullins brings seven claims in his challenge to his
sentence. We either reject or do not reach six of his seven
claims. As to his final claim, Mullins argues that although
the court considered his youth and suggested he could
change, the court nevertheless sentenced him to JLWOP,
which was disproportionate under the Eighth Amendment.
We hold that the sentencing court’s ambiguous comments
on the record about Mullins’s capacity for change renders
Mullins’s JLWOP sentence one imposed in an illegal
manner under rule 22(e). Although the sentencing court
appeared to consider Mullins’s youth, it did so in the
context of considering whether to leave the Board of
Pardons and Parole the discretion to assess Mullins’s
ability to change and without understanding youth’s
full constitutional import, as set forth in Miller and its
157. Id. at 209.
158. See generally Miller, 567 U.S. 460.
52a
Appendix A
progeny. This, taken together with the court’s suggestion
that Mullins might have the capacity for change, raises
significant concerns about the constitutionality of Mullins’s
sentence, leading us to conclude that the sentence was
imposed in an illegal manner. Accordingly, we vacate
Mullins’s sentence and remand to the district court for
resentencing proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Justice Hagen, concurring in part and dissenting in
part from the Opinion of the Court:
¶87 We join the opinion of the court, except as to the
majority’s holding in Part II.F that Mullins’s sentence
violates the Eighth Amendment. The majority concludes
that Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012), and its
progeny hold that “if a child is capable of change and
reform, that is, is not incorrigible, a JLWOP sentence is
disproportionate and unconstitutional.” Supra ¶ 74. Based
on that interpretation of the governing law, the majority
reasons that “if a sentencing court affirmatively finds
that a juvenile offender can change, a JLWOP sentence
is unconstitutional.” Supra ¶ 74. Although the sentencing
court did not make such a finding here, the majority
concludes that the court’s statement about Mullins’s
“chance to change” creates “significant ambiguity as to
whether a JLWOP sentence was ‘imposed in an illegal
manner’” under rule 22(e) and requires resentencing.
Supra ¶ 79.
53a
Appendix A
¶88 We disagree with the premise of the majority’s
holding. In our reading, Miller and its progeny stand for
the narrower proposition that, to comply with the Eighth
Amendment, a sentencing judge must have discretion to
impose a non-JLWOP sentence based on an individualized
assessment of the unique circumstances presented in the
case. Although the United States Supreme Court has sent
mixed messages about when a juvenile can be sentenced to
JLWOP without violating the Eighth Amendment, its most
recent pronouncement on this issue was perfectly clear:
“In a case involving an individual who was under 18 when
he or she committed a homicide, a State’s discretionary
sentencing system is both constitutionally necessary and
constitutionally sufficient.” Jones v. Mississippi, 593 U.S.
98, 105 (2021).
¶89 When Mullins was sentenced, the district court
had discretion to impose a lesser sentence. And, in making
that determination, the court was free to consider all
mitigating factors, including Mullins’s youth and attendant
circumstances. That is all the Miller line of cases requires.
¶90 Beginning in 2005, the Court decided a series of
cases that recognized that “youth matters in sentencing.”
See id. First, in Roper v. Simmons, the Court held that
sentencing a juvenile offender to death violated the Eighth
Amendment. 543 U.S. 551, 578 (2005). Five years later,
in Graham v. Florida, the Court held that a JLWOP
sentence for crimes other than homicide also violated the
Eighth Amendment. 560 U.S. 48, 82 (2010). These cases
“establish[ed] that children are constitutionally different
from adults for purposes of sentencing” due to their
54a
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“diminished culpability and greater prospects for reform.”
Miller, 567 U.S. at 471.
¶91 In Miller, the Court confronted the question
of whether imposing mandatory JLWOP on juvenile
homicide offenders violated the Eighth Amendment. See
id. at 465. The Court looked to two lines of cases—the
Roper and Graham cases categorically banning certain
punishments for classes of juvenile offenders, and its
adult death penalty cases “requiring that sentencing
authorities consider the characteristics of a defendant and
the details of his offense before sentencing him to death.”
Id. at 470. The Court concluded that “Graham, Roper, and
our individualized sentencing decisions make clear that
a judge or jury must have the opportunity to consider
mitigating circumstances before imposing the harshest
possible penalty for juveniles.” Id. at 489. Because JLWOP
is the harshest penalty available for juvenile homicide
offenders, the Court held that sentencing schemes that
require mandatory JLWOP violate the Eighth Amendment
because they “preclude a sentencer from taking account
of an offender’s age and the wealth of characteristics and
circumstances attendant to it.” Id. at 476.
¶92 A few years later, the Court was tasked with
deciding whether the rule it announced in Miller was
retroactive. See Montgomery v. Louisiana, 577 U.S. 190
(2016). Under the Court’s precedent, “a new constitutional
rule of criminal procedure does not apply, as a general
matter, to convictions that were final when the new rule
was announced.” Id. at 198. But “new substantive rules of
constitutional law” are retroactive. Id. So the question was
55a
Appendix A
whether Miller announced a procedural rule requiring
individualized sentencing before imposing a JLWOP
sentence or a substantive rule prohibiting JLWOP for a
particular class of juveniles. See id. at 206–12.
¶93 A discerning reader of the Miller decision would
have assumed that it announced a procedural rule.
After all, Miller said as much: “Our decision does not
categorically bar a penalty for a class of offenders or type
of crime—as, for example, we did in Roper or Graham.
Instead, it mandates only that a sentencer follow a certain
process—considering an offender’s youth and attendant
characteristics—before imposing a particular penalty.”
Miller, 567 U.S. at 483.
¶94 Yet the Montgomer y court asserted that
“Miller . . . did more than require a sentencer to consider
a juvenile offender’s youth before imposing life without
parole.” Montgomery, 577 U.S. at 208. Over a sharp
dissent that accused the majority of rewriting Miller, see
generally id. at 224 (Scalia, J., dissenting), the Court held
that Miller announced a substantive rule:
Even if a court considers a child’s age before
sentencing him or her to a lifetime in prison, that
sentence still violates the Eighth Amendment
for a child whose crime reflects unfortunate
yet transient immaturity. Because Miller
determined that sentencing a child to life
without parole is excessive for all but the
rare juvenile offender whose crime reflects
irreparable corruption, it rendered life without
56a
Appendix A
parole an unconstitutional penalty for a class
of defendants because of their status—that
is, juvenile offenders whose crimes reflect the
transient immaturity of youth.
Id. at 208 (majority opinion) (cleaned up). The Court
acknowledged that Miller did not require a sentencing
court to make a factual finding of incorrigibility, but
it explained that the lack of “a formal factfinding
requirement does not leave States free to sentence a
child whose crime reflects transient immaturity to life
without parole. To the contrary, Miller established that
this punishment is disproportionate under the Eighth
Amendment.” Id. at 211.
¶95 If Montgomery had been the Supreme Court’s
last word on the subject, we would readily agree with the
majority that JLWOP is categorically disproportionate
in violation of the Eighth Amendment for juveniles whose
crimes reflect the transient immaturity of youth rather
than permanent incorrigibility. But the Supreme Court
has since retreated from Montgomery’s interpretation
of Miller. It is at this point that our interpretation of the
governing caselaw diverges from that of the majority.
¶96 In Jones v. Mississippi, the Court was squarely
confronted with the question of whether, before imposing
a JLWOP sentence, a sentencer must make an express
factual finding of permanent incorrigibility or “must at
least provide an on-the-record sentencing explanation
with an implicit finding of permanent incorrigibility.” 593
U.S. at 113 (cleaned up). The Court held that no express
57a
Appendix A
or implicit finding of permanent incorrigibility is needed
before imposing JLWOP because Miller requires only a
“discretionary sentencing procedure” to comport with the
Eighth Amendment. Id. at 110. The Court explained that
“Miller declined to characterize permanent incorrigibility
as . . . an eligibility criterion,” and instead treated “youth
as a sentencing factor akin to a mitigating circumstance.”
Id. at 108. Just as “th[e] Court has required for the
individualized consideration of mitigating circumstances
in capital cases,” id., Miller requires individualized
sentencing because mandatory JLWOP “poses too great
a risk of disproportionate punishment,” id. at 110 (cleaned
up). But like the consideration of mitigating factors in
capital cases, the Eighth Amendment does not require
that the sentencer weigh the mitigating circumstances in
any particular way or make “an implicit finding regarding
those mitigating circumstances.” Id. at 116.
¶97 The Court concluded that Jones’s JLWOP
sentence complied with Miller “because the sentence
was not mandatory and the trial judge had discretion to
impose a lesser punishment in light of Jones’s youth.” Id.
at 120. The trial judge was not required to find—even
implicitly—that the crime was a result of permanent
incorrigibility as opposed to the transient immaturity of
youth. Id. at 118.
¶98 Both the concurrence and the dissent criticized
the majority’s opinion as irreconcilable with Montgomery.
See id. at 121–29 (Thomas, J., concurring); id. at 129–51
(Sotomayor, J., dissenting). The majority acknowledged
the tension between “the procedural function of Miller’s
rule” and Montgomery’s holding “that the Miller rule
58a
Appendix A
was substantive for retroactivity purposes,” id. at 110
(majority opinion), but it insisted that it was not overruling
Montgomery because Montgomery’s holding—that Miller
applies retroactively on collateral review—remains intact,
id. at 118. And, the majority pointed out, Montgomery had
“unequivocally stated that ‘Miller did not impose a formal
factfinding requirement’ and added that ‘a finding of fact
regarding a child’s incorrigibility . . . is not required.’” Id.
at 104–05 (quoting Montgomery, 577 U.S. at 211).
¶99 As for Montgomery’s assertion that Miller barred
JLWOP “for all but the rarest of juvenile offenders . . . whose
crimes reflect permanent incorrigibility,” Montgomery,
577 U.S. at 209, the Jones majority characterized Miller
as merely acknowledging “that a discretionary sentencing
procedure would help make life-without-parole sentences
relatively rare,” as borne out by statistics from those
states with discretionary JLWOP, Jones, 593 U.S. at 112.
According to the majority, Miller required only that “a
sentencer must have discretion to consider youth before
imposing a [JLWOP] sentence,” and “Montgomery did
not purport to add to Miller’s requirements.” Id. at 109.
¶100 Despite the Court’s insistence that Jones did
not overrule Montgomery, the two cases are difficult to
reconcile. While Montgomery read Miller as imposing a
substantive rule that rendered JLWOP unconstitutional
for all but the rare juvenile offender “whose crimes reflect
irreparable corruption,” Montgomery, 577 U.S. at 209,
Jones held that Miller “mandated only that a sentencer
follow a certain process—considering an offender’s
youth and attendant characteristics—before imposing a
[JLWOP] sentence,” Jones, 593 U.S. at 101 (cleaned up).
59a
Appendix A
¶101 As we see it, the substantive rule recognized in
Montgomery did not survive Jones’s subsequent holding
that permanent incorrigibility is not “an eligibility
criterion” for JLWOP and that “a State’s discretionary
sentencing system is both constitutionally necessary and
constitutionally sufficient.” Jones, 593 U.S. at 105, 107–09.
And we are bound to follow the Supreme Court’s most
recent pronouncement in Jones. Cf. In re Adoption of J.S.,
2014 UT 51, ¶ 49, 358 P.3d 1009 (explaining that where
“two lines of cases are unquestionably incompatible . . . our
most recent pronouncement is the law, and has overtaken
any prior contrary statement”).
¶102 Although Jones expressly declined to overrule
the holdings in Miller and Montgomery, it described
those untouched holdings narrowly: “Miller held that a
State may not impose a mandatory life-without-parole
sentence on a murderer under 18. Today’s decision does
not disturb that holding. Montgomery later held that
Miller applies retroactively on collateral review. Today’s
decision likewise does not disturb that holding.” Jones,
593 U.S. at 118. So when Jones says it is not overruling
the holding in Montgomery, we read that as leaving
intact Montgomery’s ultimate holding that Miller is
retroactive—that is, a defendant sentenced to mandatory
JLWOP prior to Miller is entitled to resentencing under
a discretionary sentencing scheme—not its assertion that
it is unconstitutional to impose a JLWOP sentence on a
juvenile who is not permanently incorrigible.159
159. To be sure, Jones creates confusion by quoting a “key
paragraph” from Montgomery, stating that the absence of “a formal
factfinding requirement does not leave States free to sentence a
child whose crime reflects transient immaturity to life without
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Appendix A
¶103 This interpretation of Jones is where we part ways
with the majority. The majority recognizes that, under
Jones, “[a] sentencing court has no obligation to make an
on-the-record finding of permanent incorrigibility before
imposing a JLWOP sentence,” but holds that “a contrary
finding bars the court from imposing JLWOP.” Supra ¶ 74.
¶104 The majority’s reasoning assumes that a JLWOP
sentence is constitutional only if the juvenile is, in fact,
permanently incorrigible. In other words, it assumes
that the sentencing judge is required to find permanent
incorrigibility and Jones merely holds that the court has
no duty to make that finding on the record. But we do not
read Jones so narrowly.
¶105 In our view, Jones does not merely hold that
no express factual finding or on-the-record explanation
is required; it holds that no finding of permanent
incorrigibility is required at all. Jones squarely rejects
the idea that permanent incorrigibility in JLWOP cases
is “an eligibility criterion akin to sanity or a lack of
intellectual disability” in death penalty cases. 593 U.S.
at 107. Instead, it explains that the defendant’s youth
is a “mitigating factor” that can be weighed differently
by different judges “given the mix of all the facts and
circumstances in a specific case.” Id. at 109, 115. Not only
parole. To the contrary, Miller established that this punishment
is disproportionate under the Eighth Amendment.” Jones v.
Mississippi, 593 U.S. 98, 106 n.2 (2021) (quoting Montgomery
v. Louisiana, 577 U.S. 190, 211 (2016)). But the quoted language
cannot be squared with the express holding in Jones that permanent
incorrigibility is not “an eligibility criterion.” Id. at 107–08.
61a
Appendix A
does it reject a formal factfinding requirement, id. at 106,
but it also rejects the idea that permanent incorrigibility
is “a factual prerequisite” to imposing a JLWOP sentence,
id. at 109 n.3 (“If permanent incorrigibility were a factual
prerequisite to a life-without-parole sentence, this Court’s
Sixth Amendment precedents might require that a jury,
not a judge, make such a finding.”).
¶106 We cannot square the majority’s holding in this
case with Jones’s clear pronouncement that permanent
incorrigibility is not an eligibility criterion for JLWOP.
The rule that the majority adopts—that JLWOP is not
permitted where the sentencing court has found the
juvenile redeemable—is merely the flip side of the rule
Jones expressly rejects—that JLWOP sentences are
permitted only where a court has found the juvenile
irredeemable. If permanent incorrigibility is not an
eligibility criterion or factual prerequisite, there is no
reason why a contrary finding would preclude a JLWOP
sentence.
¶107 We acknowledge that the majority’s holding
finds support in decisions from two other state supreme
courts, but we likewise disagree with the way those
decisions treat permanent incorrigibility as an eligibility
criterion in the wake of Jones. Those cases similarly
vacated JLWOP sentences where the record suggested
that the sentencing court did not believe the defendant
to be permanently incorrigible. Specifically, the North
Carolina Supreme Court vacated a JLWOP sentence
where the sentencing court made an express finding that
the juvenile was “neither incorrigible nor irredeemable.”
62a
Appendix A
State v. Kelliher, 873 S.E.2d 366, 380 (N.C. 2022) (cleaned
up). And Maryland’s high court vacated a JLWOP sentence
where it was unclear whether the sentencing judge viewed
the defendant as “the rare juvenile offender whose crime
reflects irreparable corruption.” Malvo v. State, 281 A.3d
758, 772 (Md. 2022) (cleaned up). 160
¶108 Both opinions were 4–3 decisions in which the
courts split over the proper interpretation of the Supreme
Court’s JLWOP caselaw. The majority opinions read those
cases to mean that the Eighth Amendment categorically
prohibits imposing a JLWOP sentence on a juvenile who
is not incorrigible. See Kelliher, 873 S.E.2d at 380; Malvo,
281 A.3d at 765. But the dissenting opinions pointed
out that “the most recent iteration of that line of cases,
[the Jones opinion], unequivocally holds that all that
is procedurally required prior to [imposing a JLWOP
sentence] is an individualized sentencing proceeding in
which the court has discretion to sentence the offender to
less than life without the possibility of parole.” Malvo, 281
A.3d at 806 (Hotten, J., dissenting); see also Kelliher, 873
S.E.2d at 401 (Newby, C.J., dissenting) (explaining that,
under Jones, “a sentence is constitutionally permissible so
long as the trial court is permitted to consider the juvenile
defendant’s age and attendant characteristics”). Under the
160. When Malvo v. State was decided on August 6, 2022,
the state’s highest court was called the Court of Appeals of Maryland.
See Malvo v. State, 281 A.3d 758 (Md. 2022); see also Md. Const.
art. IV, pt. I, § 1 (1867). Effective December 14, 2022, the court was
renamed the Maryland Supreme Court. See Md. Const. art. IV, pt. I,
§ 1; see also S.B. 666, 2021 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Md. 2021); H.B.
885, 2021 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Md. 2021).
63a
Appendix A
dissenting justices’ reading of Jones, whether JLWOP “is
constitutionally sufficient under the Eighth Amendment
depends upon the presence [of a] discretionary sentencing
procedure. It is decisively not, as the majority holds,
whether the sentencing court, at least implicitly, found
the juvenile to be incorrigible.” Malvo, 281 A.3d at 809
(Hotten, J., dissenting) (cleaned up); see also Kelliher, 873
S.E.2d at 401 (Newby, C.J., dissenting) (asserting that “a
trial court need not determine that a juvenile defendant is
incorrigible or irredeemable before using its discretion to
sentence the defendant to life imprisonment without the
possibility of parole”).
¶109 “Other courts have understood Jones similarly
and have concluded that no viable Miller claim exists, so
long as the sentence is not mandatory—that is so long as
the sentencer has discretion to consider the mitigating
qualities of youth and impose a lesser punishment.” People
v. Wilson, 220 N.E.3d 1068, 1077 (Ill. 2023) (cleaned up)
(citing cases); see also Fletcher v. State, 532 P.3d 286,
305 (Alaska Ct. App. 2023) (holding that Jones forecloses
any federal constitutional claim under Miller so long
as the defendant was sentenced under a discretionary
sentencing scheme). Those courts agree that “under the
current state of Eighth Amendment law as expressed by
Jones, ‘a State’s discretionary sentencing system is both
constitutionally necessary and constitutionally sufficient.’”
Commonwealth v. Felder, 269 A.3d 1232, 1243 (Pa. 2022)
(quoting Jones, 593 U.S. at 105).
¶110 Indeed, some courts that had interpreted
Miller and Montgomery to restrict JLWOP sentences
64a
Appendix A
to permanently incorrigible youth have now overruled
those opinions in light of Jones. For example, the Illinois
Supreme Court overruled its prior holding “that a juvenile
offender’s discretionary life sentence does not comport
with the [E]ighth [A]mendment unless the sentencing
court first makes a finding of permanent incorrigibility”
because that holding “is directly at odds with the holding
in Jones—specifically, that additional findings are not
required, in that a discretionary sentencing scheme
that allows a court to consider youth and its attendant
characteristics is constitutionally sufficient.” Wilson,
220 N.E.3d at, 1076–77 (cleaned up) (overruling People v.
Holman, 91 N.E.3d 849 (Ill. 2017)). The Supreme Court
of Pennsylvania also overruled its prior decision that had
interpreted Montgomery to “permit the imposition of
a life-without-parole sentence upon a juvenile offender
only if the crime committed is indicative of the offender’s
permanent incorrigibility” because that understanding
“has been abrogated by the High Court’s decision in
Jones.” Felder, 269 A.3d at 1243 (cleaned up) (overruling
Commonwealth v. Batts, 163 A.3d 410 (Pa. 2017)).
¶111 We read Jones similarly. Because permanent
incorrigibility is not an eligibility criterion, a JLWOP
sentence is not categorically unconstitutional when
imposed on a juvenile who the court views as redeemable.
Jones also disavowed the notion that a sentencer must
weigh a juvenile’s youth and attendant characteristics in
any particular way. Jones, 593 U.S. at 115. Instead, all
that the Eighth Amendment requires is that the sentencer
have discretion to consider youth as a mitigating factor. Id.
65a
Appendix A
¶112 In this case, Mullins received the individualized
sentencing that the Eighth Amendment requires. See
State v. Houston, 2015 UT 40, ¶ 61, 353 P.3d 55 (concluding
that Utah’s discretionary JLWOP sentencing scheme
comported with Miller). The sentencing court had
discretion to impose a lesser sentence if it determined
that a JLWOP sentence was not appropriate. See Utah
Code § 76-3-207(4)(c)–(d) (2001). Among other things, the
court could consider evidence regarding “the defendant’s
character, background, history, mental and physical
condition” and “any other facts in aggravation or mitigation
of the penalty that the court consider[ed] relevant to the
sentence.” Id. § 76-3-207(2)(a)(ii), (iv) (2001). In particular,
the governing statute’s non-exclusive list of mitigating
circumstances included “the youth of the defendant at the
time of the crime.” Id. § 76-3-207(3)(e) (2001).
¶113 There is no need for us to decipher the sentencing
court’s remark about “a chance to change.” Even if the
sentencing court believed that Mullins had the capacity
to change, it would not render Mullins’s sentence
unconstitutional. The sentencing court had discretion
to impose a lesser sentence based on an individualized
assessment of all relevant circumstances, including
Mullins’s youth. Mullins’s capacity to change was simply
one mitigating factor that the court had discretion to
weigh, along with all other factors, in determining whether
JLWOP was appropriate. Because the Supreme Court
has held that “a State’s discretionary sentencing system
is both constitutionally necessary and constitutionally
sufficient,” Jones, 593 U.S. at 105, Mullins’s sentence was
not imposed in an illegal manner. We would therefore
affirm his sentence.
66a
B
APPENDIX B —Appendix
SENTENCING
HEARING
TRANSCRIPT, MAY 1, 2002
IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SEVIER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
CASE NO. 011600140 FS
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,
VS.
MORRIS T. MULLINS,
Defendant.
BEFORE THE HONORABLE DAVID L. MOWER
SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT UTAH
STATE COURTS COMPLEX
REPORTER’S TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS
MAY 1, 2002
REPORTED BY:
Joseph M. Liddell, CSR, RPR
SENTENCING
Filed March 29, 2004
[INDEX INTENTIONALLY OMITTED]
67a
Appendix B
[4]TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS
THE COURT: Thank you all and good morning,
ladies and gentlemen. It’s May the 1st, 2002. It’s just
after 9:00 a.m. I see Mr. Brown here with Mr. Evans. Mr.
Moffatt and Mr. Bradshaw, Mr. Mullins, and Mr. Hummel.
Mr. Moffatt, I think today’s the day for sentencing in
this case. Any reason not to have the sentencing hearing
today?
MR. MOFFATT: Judge, we know of no reason.
We have submitted to the Court both, Mr. Brown and
I assume, the stipulation, certain documents for your
review. We have submitted to you, ah, in total, ah, a report
with vitae authorized by Dr. Mark Cunningham. He is our
forensic psychologist who has assisted us assessing Mr.
Mullins for the recommendations. It’s my understanding,
Judge, that you have that information. I’ve given to the
Court, this morning, clean copies of those documents,
including addenda addressing the issue of malingering.
We would ask the Court to make those a formal part of
the record in this case.
THE COURT: And Mr. Brown, before I respond to
Mr. Moffat’s request, you’re ready to have a sentencing
hearing today?
MR. BROWN:
Yes.
THE COURT: Let’s have a little preview of what you
[5]would expect. Are you going to call witnesses today?
68a
Appendix B
MR. BROWN: I don’t anticipate calling witnesses. I
have a number of family members of the victim who desire
to be heard, and the Court should hear them. I have also
submitted information for the Court’s, ah, perusal and, ah,
we anticipate that we will be discussing that information
at some length. And, ah, I do have a videotape that’s gonna
take approximately 25 or 30 minutes that we want the
Court to view. Other than that, I don’t intend to have any
witnesses, other than the statements of the victim’s family.
THE COURT: Okay. And Mr. Moffat, are you going
to be calling any witnesses today?
MR. MOFFATT: Judge, we will not be calling
witnesses; and Mr. Mullins may want to address the court
and limit comments to the Court, if that’s all right.
THE COURT:
Okay. Let’s talk about documents.
MR. BRADSHAW: Judge, I wonder, before we begin,
I wonder if it’s possible to get Mr. Mullins unshackled in
front. It’s right uncomfortable to sit shackled behind.
THE COURT:
Mr. Brown?
MR. BROWN:
That’s fine.
THE COURT: Can we have somebody take care of
that? Do we have a Transportation Officer here? Would
you, please.
Thank you.
69a
Appendix B
Ah, yesterday the clerk bought me a document that’s
[6]got Mr. Brown’s name on it. It’s called Plaintiff’s
Pre-sentence Information Submitted, which I’ve read.
And the clerk also brought, ah, some documents that
included a CD from Mark D. Cunningham and a document
entitled “Provisional Capital Sentencing Evaluation and
Mitigation.” And I read those things.
And today Mr. Moffat gave me a document, a letter
from his office, April 9th, 2002, attached. It’s entitled
“Addendum To Provisional Capital Sentencing Regarding
Mitigation,” which I have not read.
Mr. Brown, are there other documents besides that?
MR. BROWN:
No.
THE COURT:
Mr. Moffat?
MR. MOFFATT:
No, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Okay. So Mr. Moffat, the fact that I
haven’t read the two-page addendum, are you gonna walk
me through that when it’s your turn to speak?
MR. MOFFATT: I can, Your Honor. Yes. I don’t
know if the Court intends to rule directly from the Bench
or if the Court is gonna take some time to consider.
Whenever you have an opportunity to review that, we
would appreciate it. I’ll do my best to tell you about it.
THE COURT:
Okay. Then let’s keep going.
70a
Appendix B
Mr. Brown, usually the State goes first, and I’m
assuming you’re planning on that. So would you like to
make a [7]recommendation?
MR. BROWN: Your Honor, what we would like to
do is we’d like to have those family members of the victim
who desire to make a statement make that statement first,
and then I’ll make my recommendations to the Court. I
discussed that matter with counsel and they agreed that
that would be appropriate.
THE COURT: Now there’s only two choices
available today; right?
MR. BROWN:
That’s correct.
THE COURT: And do either one of those sentences
include a potential fine?
MR. BROWN: Ah, well I’m sure they do include a
potential fine; I don’t think the word requesting any fine,
and so that shouldn’t be at issue.
THE COURT: So the two choices would be life, or
life without parole.
MR. BROWN:
That’s correct.
THE COURT: Okay. How many family members
want to speak yet? Do you know?
71a
Appendix B
MR. BROWN: I don’t know. But I know that one of
them that does desire to speak is Merridee Torgerson;
that we should take her first and then I think that maybe
three or four other family members, maybe more, desire
to be heard.
VICTIM’S FAMILY STATEMENTS
[8]THE COURT:
here?
Okay. Mrs. Torgerson, are you
MZ. TORGERSON:
THE COURT:
Yes.
Good morning.
MZ. TORGERSON:
Thank you.
THE COURT: I was listening to Mr. Brown. I don’t
think I quite caught your first name. What is it.
MZ. TORGERSON: My name is Meridee Torgerson.
THE COURT:
Say your first name.
MZ. TORGERSON:
THE COURT:
Meridee.
How about spelling that for me.
MZ. TORGERSON:
MR. MULLINS:
How do I spell it?
Um-hm.
72a
Appendix B
MZ. TORGERSON:
THE COURT:
Where do you live, Mrs. Torgerson?
MZ. TORGERSON:
Nevada.
THE COURT:
Mrs. Davis?
M-e-r-r-i-d-e-e.
I live in Battle Mountain,
And are you -- were you related to
MZ. TORGERSON:
I’m Amy Davis’s daughter.
THE COURT: Okay. Ah, did Amy have other
children, besides you?
MZ. TORGERSON: Yes, she did. I have three
brothers. Ronald, Berdell, and Bill.
THE COURT:
Are they hear?
MZ. TORGERSON:
THE COURT:
Ronald.
Yes, they are.
Ronald, where are you? Hello,
[9]And Berdell? Good morning.
And I forgot the last name already.
MZ. TORGERSON:
THE COURT:
Bill.
Bill. There you go. Hello, Bill.
73a
Appendix B
MZ. Torgerson, you wanted to make a statement, so
please go ahead.
MZ. TORGERSON: Okay. What I would give for one
more time to be able to pick up the telephone and say, “Hi,
Mom. What are you doing?”
“Oh, I’m just sitting in my chair relaxing me to get
that little brush of adrenaline.”
She’s always ready for me to one more time be able to
wrap my arms around her and whisper in her ear, “Mom, I
love you.” Morris Mullins has stolen this from my brothers
and me. He has stolen a mother, her love, her kindness,
her advice.
Morris Mullins has stolen from our children a loving
and caring grandmother, all of her special little shared
secret confidences. I’m always getting this one thing that
was so important to them at their time of life. He has
stolen from our grandchildren a woman who loved every
one of those little people in their special way. Every single
holiday they received a note and a dollar bill in the mail.
I see their little faces light up with so much excitement.
You couldn’t have traded this dollar for something of great
great value.
[10]I could stand here for so long and talk about my
mother, but this is not about my mother. This is about
Morris Mullins. It does not matter whether she was a
good person or not. It does not matter whether she had
one more hour or maybe more years to live on this earth.
74a
Appendix B
Morris Mullins made a decision. It was not his decision
to make. This is God’s decision.
For almost a year now we have been hearing about
Morris Mullins and Morris Mullins’s rights. I would like
to know what right did he have to step on my mother’s
property? What right did he have to enter her home?
What right did he have to hit her to beat her to suffocate
her and then beguile her body? Maybe it’s time that we
stop and considered someone else’s rights and honor them.
My brothers in life entered into a plea with the State of
Utah. I feel in my heart it was a very foolish decision. Had
we been allowed more time, I don’t think we would have
agreed to that decision. I think my Aunt Ruth May says
it best. It’s God’s responsibility to forgive Morris Mullins.
It’s our responsibility for him to attend that meeting. That
kind of sums up my feelings.
Every day people come up to me and they say,
“Merridee, I know how you feel. I understand. I’m sorry.”
Your sorry? You guys don’t have a clue. By the grace of God
hopefully your experience spared getting to experience
this, [11]this sleepless nights, the terrible dreams, the
trying to hold your emotions in check to the point your
throat is so sore and raw you can’t speak. That knot of
pain inside that never goes away. It never melts.
My brothers and I will never be able to go back to
the happy carefree lives we had before this. Sometimes I
wonder if we will even be able to survive.
75a
Appendix B
We plead with the Court, please do not give Morris
Mullins parole. No parole. Never, none.
Do we want to allow him the opportunity to abuse one
of our elderly? Do we want to allow him the opportunity
to torment more families and put them to anguish? Do we
want to allow him the opportunity to terrorize another
community? I really don’t think that’s what we want.
We ask the Court to consider if this was your wife,
your mother, your daughter, your sister, how would you
feel? We, Amy Davis, request life without parole.
Thank you.
THE COURT: Thank you, Mrs. Torgerson. Mrs.
Torgerson, do you know if there are other family members
what want to speak?
MZ. TORGERSON:
I believe my brother.
MR. RON DAVIS: Your Honor, I would like to speak.
MZ. TORGERSON: And there’s two granddaughters,
I believe.
[12]THE COURT:
Torgerson’s brothers.
MR. RON DAVIS:
THE COURT:
Um-hm. This is one of Mrs.
Yes, Your Honor.
Tell me your name again.
76a
Appendix B
MR. RON DAVIS:
oldest son.
THE COURT:
Where do you live in, Mr. Davis?
MR. RON DAVIS:
Snow College South.
THE COURT:
My name is Ron Davis, Amy’s
I live in Joseph. I TEACH at the
Um-hm.
MR. RON DAVIS:
Um --
THE COURT: Tell me a little bit about Amy’s
posterity -- four children.
MR. RON DAVIS: Well actually there’s four living
children. There are two that are also deceased.
THE COURT:
Um-hm.
MR. RON DAVIS: Ah, I cannot give you statistics,
sir. I -- there’s, ah, extensive grandchildren, ah, greatgrandchildren, ah, there, most of which are in court. Not
the great-great or the great-grandchildren so much, but
all of the grandchildren are here and all of the children
are here.
THE COURT:
So Amy had six children.
MR. RON DAVIS:
THE COURT:
Yes. She had six children.
Two have deceased?
77a
Appendix B
[13]MR. RON DAVIS:
THE COURT:
Uh-huh.
Did each of those six have a family?
MR. RON DAVIS: Ah, no. Two -- the two that are
deceased, deceased quite young -THE COURT:
I see.
MR. RON DAVIS -- and so the four -- the four of us
that survived, we do have families. Yes.
THE COURT: Okay. And -- and you live in Joseph
and you teach at Snow College South and you wanted to
say something, so go ahead.
MR. RON DAVIS: Yes. Ah, basically I would just
like to say that I don’t know, sir, exactly what kind of an
oath you took when you took this office when you was
elected to this office. Ah, I’m pretty sure that it probably
goes something like what we see on the side of most police
cars across the United States. Ah, there’s the city. A lot
of times, always police, -THE COURT:
Um-hm.
MR. RON DAVIS -- and a lot of times, to protect and
serve. Ah, I’m sure that this was --would be the basis of
your -- of your oath of office, too.
THE COURT:
Would you like to know what it is?
78a
Appendix B
MR. RON DAVIS:
Yes, I would.
THE COURT: I’ll tell you. Ah, the oath is this. I
do solemnly swear to support, obey, and defend the [14]
Constitution of the United States and the Constitution of
this state, and to discharge the duties of my office with
fidelity.
MR. RON DAVIS: I’m a little surprised. I probably
thought you would read it word-for-word. But at any rate,
to get back at what I want to say was that I think that like
any -- elected official, police officer, I think you kind of
stake claim to your territory. Ah, you look upon us people
as your people to serve and protect. And I just basically
would like to say that the brothers and sisters, the sons
and daughters, the grandsons and granddaughters, and
great-grandsons and great-granddaughters and your
extended community that you serve, ah, I don’t think that
there’s any of us that would not ask -- well no, beg you,
please do not turn this -- this Satan worshipper or Satan
-- not worshipper, but well, I -- I feel like he’s a disciple
of Satan. Please don’t turn him loose on the world again.
Ah, he needs the sentence the maximum that you
can sentence him to, under this plea bargain agreement,
without a parole. We cannot let this thing walk the face of
the earth again. We’ve got to keep him incarcerated for
the rest of his natural life. I hope that you will see it that
way and that’s about all I got to say.
THE COURT:
Thank you.
79a
Appendix B
MR. RON DAVIS:
THE COURT:
Thank you for your time.
Thank you, Mr. Davis.
[15]Excuse me. Are there other members of the family
who wanted to speak?
MZ. FORTUNE:
I would, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Hello. Good morning. Come up, if you
would. Thank you. Tell me who you are.
MZ. FORTUNE: My name is Meridon Fortune and
I Merridee Torgerson’s oldest daughter.
THE COURT: Hello, Mrs. Fortune. So is your first
name spelled the same as your mother’s name.
MZ. FORTUNE: Well I couldn’t comprehend the
two R’s so I dropped one. So it’s M-e-r-i-d-o-n.
THE COURT:
And your last name is Fortune.
MZ. FORTUNE:
THE COURT:
Just like having a fortune.
MZ. FORTUNE:
THE COURT:
That’s right.
I do.
Where do you live?
MZ. FORTUNE:
I live in Battle Mountain, Nevada.
80a
Appendix B
THE COURT:
so go ahead.
Okay. You wanted to say something,
MZ. FORTUNE: I -- I do. As you know, my father
is Marion Fortune and I am Amy Davis’s granddaughter
and I have a little girl at home who I have named after
my grandmother.
And my grandmother’s a wonderful lady and I could
go on like my mother and tell you all of the fun, wonderful
things about her, but one of the biggest reasons I named
my daughter after [16]her was that my grandmother was
a great teacher.
My grandmother taught, um, the concept -- concept
to my mother that for every choice we make, there is a
consequence. My mother taught that same lesson to me
and I’m trying to instill that in my young daughter.
On May 2nd, 2001, Morris Mullins made a choice that
day. He made the choice to murder my grandmother and
for his choice there is a consequence. My grandmother
has taught me this lesson through my mother.
I beg the Court that you will reinforce this valuable
lesson that my grandmother has instilled in her family.
Please sentence him to life in prison without parole and
set an example for Amy Davis’s great grandchildren to
see that yes, there is a consequence for every choice that
we make.
Thank you.
81a
Appendix B
THE COURT:
Thank you, Mrs. Torgerson.
Was there someone else what wanted to speak? Hello.
Come up, if you would, please. Good morning. Who are
you?
MZ. HAMILTON:
I’m Rhonda Hamilton.
THE COURT: How do you spell your name, Rhonda?
MZ. HAMILON:
THE COURT:
Where do you live, Mrs. Hamilton?
MZ. HAMILTON:
THE COURT:
R-o-n-d-a H-a-m-i-l-t-o-n.
I live in Wyoming.
And are you related to Amy Davis?
[17 ] M Z . H A M ILT ON:
granddaughter.
THE COURT:
Ye s . I ’m her olde st
So you’re -- you come from Ron?
MZ. HAMILTON:
Ron is my father.
THE COURT: And you live in Wyoming. What
KIND of work do you do?
MZ. HAMILTON:
my precious things.
THE COURT:
I’m a homemaker. I take care of
How am children do you have?
82a
Appendix B
MZ. HAMILTON:
THE COURT:
And you wanted to say something.
MZ. HAMILTON:
THE COURT:
I have two.
Yes.
Go ahead.
MZ. HAMILTON: Amy -- Amy Miriam Norris
Davis was one of the most wonderful people I have ever
had the privilege of knowing. She was a very gentle and
kind person. She cared deeply about her family and
friends.
Grandma Amy was very devoted to her family. She
made it her business to see to it that each one of us was
taken care of always. We have missed her so very deeply
this past year. She would do anything in her power to
see to it that our needs were met, and that usually meant
putting our needs above her own. She was a very unselfish
person. She would give until she had no more left in, if it
meant that someone else to benefit.
I have yet to meet a person who knew my grandmother
[18]who didn’t go on and on about what a beautiful,
wonderful sweet, kind and loving person she was. Both
in her life and now that she’s gone, people have said this
to me.
She was a person who loved much. She had contact
with every single family member and she always knew
how we all were, every day.
83a
Appendix B
As a child, I remember spending summers at
grandma’s house. Grandma had a wonderful way of
making y
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