Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Timothy Carver, Petitioner v. United States

APPENDIX TABLE OF CONTENTS

OPINIONS AND ORDERS

Opinion, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth

Circuit (February 26, 2025) ............................... 1a

Judgment, U.S. District Court for the Eastern

District of Tennessee (January 30, 2024) .......... 4a

Memorandum Opinion and Order, U.S. District

Court for the Eastern District of Tennessee

(October 2, 2023) .............................................. 17a

Verdict Form, U.S. District Court for the Eastern

District of Tennessee (April 7, 2023) ............... 25a

OTHER DOCUMENTS

Notice of Defendant’s Intent to Assert Insanity

Defense (November 14, 2022) .......................... 27a

Notice of Intention to Introduce Expert Evidence

of a Mental Condition (November 10, 2022) ... 29a

Indictment, U.S. District Court for the Eastern

District of Tennessee (August 10, 2021) .......... 31a

App.1a

OPINION, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

(FEBRUARY 26, 2025)

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

________________________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

TIMOTHY CARVER,

Defendant-Appellant.

________________________

No. 24-5098

On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Tennessee

Before: MOORE, KETHLEDGE, and

BLOOMEKATZ, Circuit Judges.

OPINION

KETHLEDGE, Circuit Judge.

Timothy Carver appeals his convictions of offenses

concerning child pornography, arguing that at trial he

proved as a matter of law that he was legally insane.

We reject his arguments and affirm.

In October 2020, Carver began to exchange text

messages with an undercover FBI agent about child

App.2a

pornography. A month later, Carver sent the agent a

video that showed a boy being orally and anally

penetrated. Carver also asked the agent to send video

of a sexual encounter the agent said he had planned

with his (fictitious) stepson.

The following June, the FBI obtained a warrant

and seized Carver’s cell phones. Investigators found

more than 1,700 images and 15 videos containing

child pornography. The government indicted Carver

for producing, possessing, and distributing child pornography. At trial, Carver stipulated that his conduct

satisfied the elements of each charge, but he pled not

guilty by reason of insanity. The jury convicted him

nonetheless. Carver then moved for acquittal notwithstanding the verdict, which the district court denied.

This appeal followed.

Carver argues that the district court erred when

it rejected his post-judgment motion for acquittal.

Ordinarily, a defendant challenging the denial of a

motion for acquittal must show that no rational trier

of fact could have found each element of the crime

beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443

U.S. 307, 319 (1979). For a defendant challenging the

denial of a motion for acquittal based on an insanity

defense, the burden is even higher. To establish insanity,

a defendant must show, by clear and convincing

evidence, that he suffered from “a severe mental disease

or defect” that made him “unable to appreciate the

nature and quality or the wrongfulness of his acts.” 18

U.S.C. § 17. Here, the jury found that Carver had not

carried that burden. So we must uphold the verdict

unless every rational trier of fact would have found

that Carver had established insanity by clear and

App.3a

convincing evidence. See United States v. Taylor, 483

F. App’x 992, 994 (6th Cir. 2012).

Carver’s defense rested on the testimony of a

single expert witness, neuropsychologist Katie Spirko.

Dr. Spirko testified that she had diagnosed Carver

with a rare form of early-onset dementia, which she

said would have diminished his sexual inhibitions and

caused him to react to stimuli reflexively, without any

reflection on the wrongfulness of the conduct. And after

that sort of inappropriate behavior, Spirko testified,

someone with this condition could still show remorse

and try to conceal what they had done.

But Dr. Spirko’s testimony was not so compelling

that the jury was compelled to accept it, particularly

in light of the record as a whole. For example, Spirko

chose not to do any neuroimaging or genetic testing to

test her opinion, which—according to the Diagnostic

and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders—was

necessary to render that opinion “probable.” DSM-5,

p. 615. And though Spirko testified that the form of

dementia she had diagnosed Carver with would make

him unable to control his sexual impulses, she conceded

that he had not reacted inappropriately to any of the

pornographic images shown at trial. Moreover, Carver’s

interactions with an FBI agent showed several instances

in which Carver had postponed action in response to

relevant stimuli, which the jury could have thought

undermined Spirko’s core point. The record also included

a recorded phone call between Carver and his partner,

in which Carver joked that his memory problems were

“a good way of me getting out of” the trouble that he

was in. The jury had reason enough to reject Spirko’s

testimony here.

The district court’s judgment is affirmed.

App.4a

JUDGMENT, U.S. DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

EASTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE

(JANUARY 30, 2024)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE

GREENEVILLE DIVISION

________________________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

v.

TIMOTHY CARVER,

USM#58916-509

________________________

Case Number: 2:21-CR-00082-DCLC-CRW(1)

Before: Clifton L. CORKER,

United States District Judge.

JUDGMENT IN A CRIMINAL CASE

THE DEFENDANT:

 was found guilty on count(s) 1, 2, and 3 after a

plea of not guilty.

ACCORDINGLY, the court has adjudicated that

the defendant is guilty of the following offense(s):

App.5a

Title & Section and

Nature of Offense

Date

Count

Violation

Concluded

18 U.S.C. § 2251(a)Production of Child

Pornography

07/27/2020

1

18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(2)(A)Distribution of Child

Pornography

11/12/2020

2

18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(5)(8)

05/23/2021

and 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(b)(2)Possession of Child

Pornography Which

Involved a Prepubescent

Minor or Minor Who had

not Attained 12 Years of Age

3

The defendant is sentenced as provided in pages

2 through 7 of this judgment. The sentence is imposed

pursuant to the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 and 18

U.S.C. § 3553.

IT IS ORDERED that the defendant shall notify

the United States Attorney for this district within 30

days of any change of name, residence, or mailing

address until all fines, restitution, costs, and special

assessments imposed by this judgment are fully paid.

If ordered to pay restitution, the defendant shall

notify the court and the United States attorney of any

material change in the defendant’s economic circumstances.

App.6a

January 25, 2024

Date of Imposition of Judgment

/s/ Clifton L. Corker

Signature of Judicial Officer

Clifton L. Corker

United States District Judge

Name and Title of Judicial Officer

January 25, 2024

Date

App.7a

IMPRISONMENT

The defendant is hereby committed to the custody

of the Federal Bureau of Prisons to be imprisoned for

a total term of:

300 months, as to Count One, 120 months as

to Count Two and 40 months as to Count

Three to run consecutively for a net effective

sentence of 460 months.

 The court makes the following recommendations to the Bureau of Prisons:

1.

Participate in Bureau of Prisons’ Sex

Offender Treatment Program.

2.

Receive a physical health evaluation and a

mental health evaluation, with any needed

treatment, while in the custody of the

Bureau of Prisons.

3.

Be afforded a full range of educational and

vocational programs offered by the Bureau of

Prisons.

4.

Designation to

Lexington, KY.

the

federal

facility

at

 The defendant is remanded to the custody of

the United States Marshal.

SUPERVISED RELEASE

Upon release from imprisonment, you will be

placed on supervised release for a term of Life, as to

each count, for a net effective term of Life.

App.8a

MANDATORY CONDITIONS

1. You must not commit another federal, state or

local crime.

2. You must not unlawfully possess a controlled

substance.

3. You must refrain from any unlawful use of a

controlled substance. You must submit to one drug

test within 15 days of release from imprisonment and

at least two periodic drug tests thereafter, as determined by the court.



The above drug testing condition is suspended, based on the court’s determination that you pose a low risk of future

substance abuse. (check if applicable)

4.  181 You must make restitution in

accordance with 18 U.S.C. §§ 3663 and 3663A

or any other statute authorizing a sentencing

of restitution.

5.  181 You must cooperate in the collection of

DNA as directed by the probation officer.

6.  181 You must comply with the requirements of the Sex Offender Registration and

Notification Act (34 U.S.C. § 20901, et seq.) as

directed by the probation officer, the Bureau of

Prisons, or any state sex offender registration

agency in which you reside, work, are a

student, or were convicted of a qualifying

offense.

You must comply with the standard conditions

that have been adopted by this court as well as with

any other conditions on the attached page.

App.9a

STANDARD CONDITIONS OF SUPERVISION

As part of your supervised release, you must

comply with the following standard conditions of

supervision. These conditions are imposed because

they establish the basic expectations for your behavior

while on supervision and identify the minimum tools

needed by probation officers to keep informed, report

to the court about, and bring about improvements in

your conduct and condition.

1.

You must report to the probation office in the

federal judicial district where you are

authorized to reside within 72 hours of your

release from imprisonment, unless the

probation officer instructs you to report to a

different probation office or within a

different time frame.

2.

After initially reporting to the probation

office, you will receive instructions from the

court or the probation officer about how and

when you must report to the probation

officer, and you must report to the probation

officer as instructed.

3.

You must not knowingly leave the federal

judicial district where you are authorized to

reside without first getting permission from

the court or the probation officer.

4.

You must answer truthfully the questions

asked by your probation officer.

5.

You must live at a place approved by the

probation officer. If you plan to change where

you live or anything about your living arrangements (such as the people you live with), you

App.10a

must notify the probation officer at least

10 days before the change. If notifying the

probation officer in advance is not possible

due to unanticipated circumstances, you

must notify the probation officer within 72

hours of becoming aware of a change or

expected change.

6.

You must allow the probation officer to visit

you at any time at your home or elsewhere,

and you must permit the probation officer to

take any items prohibited by the conditions

of your supervision that he or she observes

in plain view.

7.

You must work full time (at least 30 hours

per week) at a lawful type of employment,

unless the probation officer excuses you from

doing so. If you do not have full-time

employment you must try to find full-time

employment, unless the probation officer

excuses you from doing so. If you plan to

change where you work or anything about

your work (such as your position or your job

responsibilities), you must notify the probation

officer at least 10 days before the change. If

notifying the probation officer at least 10

days in advance is not possible due to unanticipated circumstances, you must notify the

probation officer within 72 hours of becoming

aware of a change or expected change.

8.

You must not communicate or interact with

someone you know is engaged in criminal

activity. If you know someone has been convicted of a felony, you must not knowingly

communicate or interact with that person

App.11a

without first getting the permission of the

probation officer.

9.

If you are arrested or questioned by a law

enforcement officer, you must notify the

probation officer within 72 hours.

10. You must not own, possess, or have access to

a firearm, ammunition, destructive device,

or dangerous weapon (i.e., anything that was

designed, or was modified for, the specific

purpose of causing bodily injury or death to

another person such as nunchakus or tasers).

11. You must not act or make any agreement

with a law enforcement agency to act as a

confidential human source or informant

without first getting the permission of the

court.

12. If the probation officer determines that you

pose a risk to another person (including

an organization), the probation officer may

require you to notify the person about the

risk and you must comply with that

instruction. The probation officer may

contact the person and confirm that you have

notified the person about the risk.

13. You must follow the instructions of the

probation officer related to the conditions of

supervision.

SPECIAL CONDITIONS OF SUPERVISION

You shall comply with the following special

conditions established under Standing Order

15-06; that is conditions SO-15-06(1); SO-15-

App.12a

06(2); SO-15-06(3); SO-15-06(4); SO-15-06(5);

SO-15-06(6); SO-15-06(8); SO-15-06(9); SO-1506(10); SO-15-06(11); SO-15-06(12); SO-1506(13).

In addition, you shall comply with the following

special conditions:

1. You shall participate in a program of mental

health treatment, as directed by the probation

officer, until such time as you are released

from the program by the probation officer. You

shall waive all rights to confidentiality regarding

mental health treatment in order to allow

release of information to the supervising

United States Probation Officer and to authorize

open communication between the probation

officer and the mental health treatment

provider.

2. You shall submit your person, property, house,

residence, vehicle, papers, [computers (as

defined in 18 U.S.C. § 1030(e)(1)), other electronic communications or data storage devices

or media,] or office, to a search conducted by a

United States probation officer or designee.

Failure to submit to a search may be grounds

for revocation of release. You shall warn any

other occupants that the premises may be

subject to searches pursuant to this condition.

An officer may conduct a search pursuant to

this condition only when reasonable suspicion

exists that you have violated a condition of

your supervision and that the areas to be

searched contain evidence of this violation.

Any search must be conducted at a reasonable

time and in a reasonable manner.

App.13a

3. You shall provide the probation officer with

access to any requested financial information.

4. You shall not incur new credit charges on

existing accounts or apply for additional lines

of credit without permission of the probation

officer until the total amount of the financial

penalties have been paid in full. In addition,

you shall not enter into any contractual

agreements which obligate funds without the

permission of the probation officer.

5. You shall pay any financial penalty that is

imposed by this judgment. Any amount that

remains unpaid at the commencement of the

term of supervised release shall be paid on a

monthly basis at the amount of at least 10% of

your net monthly income.

CRIMINAL MONETARY PENALTIES

The defendant must pay the total criminal

monetary penalties under the Schedule of Payments

sheet of this judgment.

TOTALS

Assessment

$300.00

Restitution

$24,000.00

Fine

$.00

AVAA Assessment*

$.00

* Amy, Vicky, and Andy Child Pornography Victim Assistance

Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-299.

App.14a

JVTA Assessment**

$15,000.00

 The defendant must make restitution (including

community restitution) to the following payees

in the amount listed below.

If the defendant makes a pai1ial payment, each

payee shall receive an approximately proportioned

payment, unless specified otherwise in the priority

order or percentage payment column below. However,

pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3664(i), all nonfederal victims

must be paid before the United States is paid.

Restitution of $24,000.00 to:

AS

$3,000.00

ASS

$3,000.00

CS

$3,000.00

MF2

$3,000.00

SHS

$3,000.00

SWSS

$3,000.00

** Justice for Victims of Trafficking Act of 2015, Pub. L. No. 11422.

*** Findings for the total amount of losses are required under

Chapters 109A, 110, 110A, and 113A of Title 18 for offenses

committed on or after September 13, 1994, but before April 23,

1996.

App.15a

TS

$3,000.00

VS

$3,000.00

The defendant must pay interest on restitution

and a fine of more than $2,500, unless the restitution

or fine is paid in full before the fifteenth day after the

date of the judgment, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3612(f).

All of the payment options under the Schedule of

Payments sheet of this judgment may be subject to

penalties for delinquency and default, pursuant to 18

U.S.C. § 3612(g).

 The court determined that the defendant does

not have the ability to pay interest and it is

ordered that:



the interest requirement is waived

for the



restitution

SCHEDULE OF PAYMENTS

Having assessed the defendant’s ability to pay,

payment of the total criminal monetary penalties is

due as follows:

A  181 Lump sum payment of $39,300.00 due

immediately

 in accordance with

 F below; or

F  Special instructions regarding the payment

of criminal monetary penalties:

App.16a

The government may enforce the full amount of

restitution ordered at any time, pursuant to Title 18

U.S.C. §§ 3612, 3613, and 3664(m).

Unless the court has expressly ordered otherwise,

if this judgment imposes imprisonment, payment of

criminal monetary penalties is due during imprisonment. All criminal monetary penalties, except those

payments made through the Federal Bureau of

Prisons’ Inmate Financial Responsibility Program, are

made to U.S. District Court, 220 West Depot Street,

Suite 200, James H. Quillen United States Courthouse,

Greeneville, TN 37743. Payments shall be in the form

of a check or a money order, made payable to U.S.

District Court, with a notation of the case number

including defendant number.

The defendant shall receive credit for all payments

previously made toward any criminal monetary penalties imposed.

 The defendant agrees to forfeit the property as

outlined in the Preliminary Order of Forfeiture

filed on 5/2/2023 as Document 84.

Payments shall be applied in the following order:

(1) assessment, (2) restitution principal, (3) restitution interest, (4) AVAA assessment, (5) fine principal,

(6) fine interest, (7) community restitution, (8) JVTA

Assessment, (9) penalties, and (10) costs, including

cost of prosecution and court costs.

App.17a

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER,

U.S. DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

EASTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE

(OCTOBER 2, 2023)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE

GREENEVILLE DIVISION

________________________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff,

v.

TIMOTHY CARVER,

Defendant

________________________

2:21-CR-00082-DCLC-CRW

Before: Clifton L. CORKER,

United States District Judge.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

This matter is before the Court on Defendant

Timothy Carver’s Renewed Motion for Judgment of

Acquittal [Doc. 81]. The Government filed a Response

in opposition [Doc. 95]. The Motion is now ripe for

disposition. For the reasons stated below, Carver’s

Renewed Motion for Judgment of Acquittal is DENIED.

App.18a

I.

Background

On August 10, 2021, a grand jury returned a

three-count indictment against Carver, charging him

with production (Count One), distribution (Count Two),

and possession (Count Three) of child pornography

[Doc. 7, pgs. 1-2]. Carver pleaded not guilty by reason

of insanity [Doc. 9; Doc. 32, pg. 1; Doc. 88, pg. 18].

The Court conducted a jury trial on April 4, 2023,

during which the Government presented uncontroverted evidence that: (1) Carver sent a video file depicting child pornography to an undercover agent from the

Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”) on November

12, 2020, via the chat messaging app “Telegram” [Doc.

88, pgs. 76, 78, 124-25]; (2) Carver’s cell phone contained

a video file created on May 23, 2021, depicting child

pornography involving a prepubescent minor [Doc. 88,

pgs. 147, 149; Doc. 89, pgs. 3, 5-7]; and (3) Carver’s cell

phone contained 23 images and 3 videos of child

pornography depicting Carver and Carver’s then 2year-old grandson, which were produced between July

2019 and July 2020 [Doc. 89, pgs. 7, 14-20]. At the

close of the Government’s proof, Carver orally moved

for a judgment of acquittal, which the Court denied

[Doc. 89, pgs. 81-84].

In support of his insanity defense, Carver

presented the expert testimony of neuropsychologist

Katie Osborne Spirko, PsyD [Doc. 89, pgs. 101-03],

that, at the time of the offense conduct, Carver

suffered from a behavioral variant of frontotemporal

dementia (“BVFTD”) that rendered him “incapable of

understanding what he was doing or that it was

wrong” [Doc. 90, pg. 60]. Carver renewed his motion

for a judgment of acquittal, which the Court took under

advisement until after the Government’s rebuttal

App.19a

[Doc. 90, pg. 180]. The Government presented rebuttal

evidence [See Doc. 90, pgs. 181-204], after which the

Court overruled Carver’s renewed motion [Doc. 91,

pgs. 79-80].

The jury returned a verdict of guilty on all three

counts [Doc. 73, pgs. 1-2; Doc. 91, pgs. 78-79]. Carver

thereafter filed a Renewed Motion for Judgment of

Acquittal [Doc. 81; see Fed. R. Crim. P. 29(c)(1)], followed

by a Supplement after the trial transcripts were filed

[Doc. 93]. The Government filed a Response [Doc. 95].

II. Legal Standard

A defendant may move for a judgment of acquittal

on any offense for which there is insufficient evidence

to sustain a conviction. Fed. R. Crim. P. 29(a). Ordinarily, the Court must determine whether, viewing the

evidence and drawing all reasonable inferences therefrom in the prosecution’s favor, “any rational trier of

fact could have found the essential elements of the

crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” United States v.

Ray, 803 F.3d 244, 262 (6th Cir. 2015). But in the

context of the insanity defense, the Court must

instead determine whether “no reasonable trier of fact

could have failed to find the defendant’s criminal

insanity at the time of the offense established by clear

and convincing evidence.” United States v. Taylor, 483

F. App’x 992, 994 (6th Cir. 2012) (internal quotation

marks omitted). Put differently, was the evidence “so

one-sided that any decision except a finding of not

guilty by reason of mental defect must be cast aside?”

United States v. Waagner, 319 F.3d 962, 965 (7th Cir.

2003). In undertaking this review, the Court neither

weighs the evidence nor judges witness credibility.

United States v. Talley, 164 F.3d 989, 996 (6th Cir. 1999).

App.20a

III. Analysis

Carver moves for a judgment of acquittal on the

sole ground that Dr. Spirko’s expert testimony clearly

and convincingly established that he was insane at

the time of the offense [Doc. 81, ¶ 7; see Doc. 93, ¶¶ 29, 15]. The Government responds that the jury reasonably could have rejected Dr. Spirko’s BVFTD diagnosis because of her subjective methodology and lack

of diagnostic imaging, Carver’s appearance and

demeanor during trial, and his conduct in his business

during the time of the incident offenses, the amount

of payment she received for her testimony, and the

likelihood that Carver had manipulated the testing

procedure [Doc. 95, pg. 7]. The Government argues

that the jury could also reasonably have found that

Carver was nevertheless able to appreciate the nature

and wrongfulness of his conduct because of Carver’s

admissions, Carver’s ability to perform two jobs and

maintain a household, the lack of lay witness testimony corroborating Carver’s symptoms, and Carver’s

efforts to hide his offense conduct [Doc. 95, pgs. 7-8].

To succeed on an insanity defense, the defendant

must prove by clear and convincing evidence that, at

the time of the offense conduct: “(1) he suffered from a

severe mental disease or defect, and (2) he was unable

to appreciate the nature and quality or the wrongfulness of his acts as a result of that mental disease or

defect.” United States v. Black, 739 F.3d 931, 933 (6th

Cir. 2014) (citing 18 U.S.C. § 17).

Initially, it is necessary to understand what

BVFTD is. Dr. Spirko testified that BVFTD is a progressive neurodegenerative disease that starts in the

orbitofrontal lobe of the brain and first manifests as

one of three changes in personality: (1) hyper-aggress-

App.21a

iveness; (2) hypersexuality; and (3) disorganized

functioning [Doc. 89, pgs. 116, 126-29]. One of its core

symptoms is “stimulus boundedness,” the inability of

the frontal lobe to inhibit automatic responses of the

limbic system to stimulation [See Doc. 89, pgs. 122,

132]. But the individual is nevertheless able to appreciate the nature and quality of actions he undertook

while under stimulation boundedness after-the-fact

[Doc. 89, pgs. 135, 157].

The Court begins with Dr. Spirko’s testimony. Dr.

Spirko formed her opinion, in part, from information

obtained from interviewing Carver, his sons, and his

long-term partner Matthew Adams and reviewing the

Government’s interview summaries of Carver’s

supervisor and coworker from Averitt Express Trucking

Company [See Doc. 89, pgs. 141, 149, 160; Doc. 90, pg.

34]. Other than observing Carver, the purpose of the

interviews was to determine a baseline of Carver’s

behavior and personality before the offense conduct

[See Doc. 90, pgs. 37-38, 49, 58, 67, 144-45, 150-51].

But the only source of Carver’s pre-offense baseline

propensity for pedophilia and child pornography was

Carver himself, who the jury could have found incredible

given that the evidence showed Carver had lied to the

FBI about having Telegram on his phone, molesting

his grandson, seeking out child pornography, and

quitting child pornography despite having accessed

child pornography ten days earlier [Doc. 89, pg. 3; see

also Gov’t. Exh. 6 at 08:00-08:04, 15:40-16:10, 19:2619:39, 20:19-20:27, 20:56-21:00, 33:27-33:36, 50:3551:06; Govt’ Exh. 8 at 19:35-20:10]. The only evidence

of compulsive behavior outside of the offense conduct

was Adams, who joked on a recorded jail call with

Carver about the memory loss BVFTD could cause

App.22a

[Gov. Exh. 19 at 00:21-00:28], discussed the substance

of some of his statements to Dr. Spirko [Id. at 00:5001:36], and cautioned against discussing the likelihood

of success at trial [Id. at 01:48-02:03]. And there was

also a conflict between the degree of personality changes

described by Carver’s sons, Adams, and Carver’s

coworker and supervisor and those of Carver’s boss,

his long-time coworker, and his associate at the real

estate group [Doc. 90, pgs. 182, 184, 187-90, 193-94].

A rational juror could have discounted the reliability

of Dr. Spirko’s diagnostic opinion based on the credibility

and reliability of the underlying interview data.

The Government’s cross-examination also elicited

testimony from which the jury could reasonably have

doubted the reliability of Dr. Spirko’s methodology. In

particular, Dr. Spirko testified that some diagnostic

criteria have an imaging component, without which

BVFTD cannot be diagnosed to a degree beyond

“possible” [Doc. 90, pgs. 157, 167-68, 170]. This includes

the American Psychology Association’s Diagnostic

and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders [Doc. 90,

pgs. 168, 170-71]. But Dr. Spirko refrained from

neuroimaging tests because “if you find something, it

supports the diagnosis; but if you don’t, it doesn’t

refute it; so I think it would be misleading to the jury

to present that because it could help him but not really

hurt him” [Doc. 90, pg. 158].

Even if the jury accepted that Carver had BVFTD

at the time of the offense conduct, the jury reasonably

could have found that Carver was nevertheless able to

appreciate the nature and quality or wrongness of his

actions. Consider Dr. Spirko’s description of stimulation

boundedness: “you can’t not” act on the compulsion

[Doc. 89, pg. 135] and cannot consider the social appro-

App.23a

priateness of the behavior while under stimulation,

“similar to a dog humping someone’s leg” [Id., pg. 157].

A rational juror reasonably could have found that

description at odds with messages Carver sent the

undercover FBI agent suggesting he could control his

sexual behavior. Thus, Carver exhibited a degree of

inhibition inconsistent with the severity to which

Dr. Spirko testified was common with the diagnosis

[Doc. 88, pgs. 87-88]. Relatedly, when the FBI agent

attempted to set up Carver by asking him to travel to

West Virginia to witness child sexual abuse, Carver

showed control by declining the invitation [Doc. 88,

pgs. 117-18]. Indeed, in contrast to Dr. Spirko’s testimony, Carver made various comments suggesting he

knew the wrongfulness of his conduct: (1) he asked the

undercover agent how he kept the abuse of his stepson

from his wife [Doc. 88, pg. 62]; (2) he agreed that

photos of child pornography should exclude faces [Doc.

88, pg. 72]; (3) he claimed that “when I share stuff I

delete right after” [Doc. 88, pg. 81; see also Doc. 88,

pg. 75]; (4) he instructed the undercover agent, “just

don’t show yourself and never show faces” [Doc. 88, pg.

104]; and (5) he advised the undercover agent that

“there would be no evidence” if they used a private

chat during a video call because “once [yo]u hang up

its [sic] not there” [Doc. 88, pg. 103]. And Carver told

the FBI he had resisted acting upon requests to take

pictures of his grandson [Gov’t Exh. 8 at 11:54-12:01].

All told, the evidence was not so one-sided as to

preclude a rational juror from reaching any verdict

other than not guilty by reason of insanity. A rational

juror, faced with the evidence presented at trial, reasonably could have found that Carver failed clearly and

convincingly prove insanity.

App.24a

IV. Conclusion

For the reasons discussed above, Carver’s Motion

[Doc. 81] is DENIED.

SO ORDERED:

/s/ Clifton L. Corker

United States District Judge

App.25a

VERDICT FORM, U.S. DISTRICT COURT FOR

THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE

(APRIL 7, 2023)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE

GREENEVILLE DIVISION

________________________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff,

v.

TIMOTHY CARVER,

Defendant

________________________

2:21-CR-00082-DCLC-CRW

Before: Clifton L. CORKER,

United States District Judge.

VERDICT FORM

We, the members of the jury, find unanimously

from all the evidence as follows:

1. As to Count One of the Indictment charging

a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2251(a)(1) and (e) (using a

minor to engage in sexually explicit conduct to produce

a visual depiction), we find the defendant TIMOTHY

CARVER:

 GUILTY

App.26a

2. As to Count Two of the Indictment charging

a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(2)(A) and (b)(1)

(distributing child pornography), we find the defendant TIMOTHY CARVER:

 GUILTY

3. As to Count Three of the Indictment charging

a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(5)(B) and (b)(2)

(possession of child pornography), we find the defendant TIMOTHY CARVER:

 GUILTY

3A. Do you, the members of the jury, find beyond

a reasonable doubt that the image which contained

child pornography involved a prepubescent minor or

minor who had not attained 12 years of age?

 YES

SO SAY WE ALL.

/s/XXX

Foreperson

Dated: 7 Apr 23

X

App.27a

NOTICE OF DEFENDANT’S INTENT TO

ASSERT INSANITY DEFENSE

(NOVEMBER 14, 2022)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE

AT GREENEVILLE

________________________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

v.

TIMOTHY CARVER,

Defendant.

________________________

Case No. 2:21-CR-82

NOTICE OF DEFENDANT’S INTENT TO

ASSERT INSANITY DEFENSE

The Defendant, Timothy Carver (“Mr. Carver”),

by and through undersigned counsel, pursuant to Rule

12.2(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure,

provides notice of his intention to assert an insanity

defense. In accordance with Rule 12.2(a), Mr. Carver,

through the undersigned counsel, has provided counsel

for the Government with written notice of the same.

Respectfully submitted this 14th day of November,

2022, by the following:

App.28a

/s/ Corey B. Shipley

BPR No. 032772

Collins Shipley, PLLC

102 S. Main Street

Greeneville, TN 37743

Phone: (423) 972-4388

Fax:

(423) 972-4387

/s/ Curt Collins

BPR No. 030111

Collins Shipley, PLLC

102 S. Main Street

Greeneville, TN 37743

Phone: (423) 972-4388

Fax:

(423) 972-4387

Email: curt@collinsshipley.com

/s/ T. Hunter Shelton

BPR No. 038375

Collins Shipley, PLLC

102 S. Main Street

Greeneville, TN 37743

Phone: (423) 972-4388

Fax:

(423) 972-4387

Email: hunter@collinsshipley.com

Counsel for Mr. Carver

App.29a

NOTICE OF INTENTION

TO INTRODUCE EXPERT EVIDENCE

OF A MENTAL CONDITION

(NOVEMBER 10, 2022)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE

AT GREENEVILLE

________________________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

v.

TIMOTHY CARVER,

Defendant.

________________________

Case No. 2:21-CR-82

NOTICE OF INTENTION

TO INTRODUCE EXPERT EVIDENCE

OF A MENTAL CONDITION

The Defendant, Timothy Carver (“Mr. Carver”),

by and through undersigned counsel, pursuant to Rule

12.2(b) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure,

provides notice of his intention to introduce expert

evidence relating to a mental disease or defect or

mental condition bearing specifically on the issue of

Mr. Carver’s guilt. In accordance with Rule 12.2(b), Mr.

Carver, through the undersigned counsel, has provided

counsel for the Government with written notice of the

same.

App.30a

Respectfully submitted this 10th day of November,

2022, by the following:

/s/ Corey B. Shipley

BPR No. 032772

Collins Shipley, PLLC

102 S. Main Street

Greeneville, TN 37743

Phone: (423) 972-4388

Fax:

(423) 972-4387

/s/ Curt Collins

BPR No. 030111

Collins Shipley, PLLC

102 S. Main Street

Greeneville, TN 37743

Phone: (423) 972-4388

Fax:

(423) 972-4387

Email: curt@collinsshipley.com

/s/ T. Hunter Shelton

BPR No. 038375

Collins Shipley, PLLC

102 S. Main Street

Greeneville, TN 37743

Phone: (423) 972-4388

Fax:

(423) 972-4387

Email: hunter@collinsshipley.com

Counsel for Mr. Carver

App.31a

INDICTMENT, U.S. DISTRICT COURT FOR

THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE

(AUGUST 10, 2021)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE

GREENEVILLE DIVISION

________________________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

v.

TIMOTHY CARVER,

________________________

No. 2:21-CR-82

Before: Clifton L. CORKER,

United States District Judge.

COUNT ONE

The Grand Jury charges that on or about July 27,

2020, in the Eastern District of Tennessee, the defendant, TIMOTHY CARVER, did knowingly employ,

use, persuade, induce, entice, and coerce a minor to

engage in sexually explicit conduct for the purpose of

producing any visual depiction of such conduct, using

materials that have been mailed, shipped, and transported in and affecting interstate and foreign commerce

by any means, including by computer;

[18 U.S.C. § 2251(a) and (e)]

App.32a

COUNT TWO

The Grand Jury further charges on or about

November 12, 2020, in the Eastern District of Tennessee

and elsewhere, the defendant, TIMOTHY CARVER,

did knowingly distribute child pornography as defined

in Title 18, United States Code § 2256(8), that had

been mailed, or shipped, or transported in interstate

or foreign commerce by any means, including by

computer.

[18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(2)(A) and (b)(1)]

COUNT THREE

The Grand Jury further charges that on or about

May 23, 2021, in the Eastern District of Tennessee,

the defendant, TIMOTHY CARVER, did knowingly

possess or access with the intent to view any material

that contained an image of child pornography as

defined in Title 18, United States Code § 2256(8),

involving a prepubescent minor or a minor who had

not attained 12 years of age, that had been mailed, or

shipped, or transported in interstate or foreign

commerce by any means, including by a computer, or

were produced using materials which had been mailed

or shipped or transported using any means or facility

of interstate or foreign commerce by any means,

including by computer.

[18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(5)(B) and (b)(2)]

FORFEITURE ALLEGATIONS

1. The allegations set forth in Counts One, Two,

and Three are re-alleged and incorporated herein by

reference for the purpose of alleging forfeiture pursuant

to Title 18, United States Code, Section 2253.

App.33a

2. Pursuant to Title 18, United States Code, Section 2253, upon conviction of an offense in violation of

Title 18, United States Code, Section 2251 and/or

2252A, defendant TIMOTHY CARVER shall forfeit to

the United States of America the defendant’s interest

in the following:

a.

Any visual depiction described in Title 18,

United States Code, Sections 2251, 2251A,

2252, 2252A, or 2260, or any book, magazine,

periodical, film, videotape, or other matter

which contains any such visual depiction,

which was produced, transported, mailed,

shipped or received in violation of Title 18,

United States Code, Chapter 110;

b.

Any property, real or personal, constituting

or traceable to gross profits or other proceeds

obtained from the offenses; and

c.

Any property, real or personal, used or

intended to be used to commit or to promote

the commission of the offenses.

3. The properties to be forfeited include, but are

not limited to the following, which were seized from

TIMOTHY CARVER pursuant to a federal search

warrant at his residence on or about 144 Leedy Lane,

Jonesborough, Tennessee, June 8, 2021.

1)

Samsung Galaxy S21 black phone, Model

SM-G998U, IMEI: 353388681353688.

4. If any of the property described above, as a

result of any act or omission of the defendant: (a)

cannot be located upon the exercise of due diligence;

(b) has been transferred or sold to, or deposited with,

a third party; (c) has been placed beyond the juris-

App.34a

diction of the Court; (d) has been substantially diminished in value; or (e) has been commingled with other

property which cannot be divided without difficulty,

the United States of America shall be entitled to

forfeiture of substitute property pursuant to Title 21,

United States Code, Section 853(p), as incorporated by

Title 18, United States Code, Section 2253(b).

A TRUE BILL:

/s/X

Foreperson

XXX

FRANCIS M. HAMILTON, III

Acting United States Attorney

BY: /s/ Emily M. Swecker

Assistant United States Attorney