Amicus Curiae Brief — Markwayne Mullin, Secretary, Department of Homeland Security, et al., Petitioners v. Dahlia Doe, et al.
Supreme Court briefApr 13, 2026
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No. 25-1084
IN THE
Supreme Court of the United States
__________________
DONALD J. TRUMP, PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, et
al.,
Petitioners,
v.
FRITZ EMMANUEL LESLEY MIOT, et al.,
Respondents.
__________________
On Writ of Certiorari Before Judgment to the United
States Court of Appeals for District of Columbia Circuit
__________________
BRIEF OF MÉDECINS SANS FRONTIÈRES
USA, INC. D/B/A DOCTORS WITHOUT
BORDERS USA AS AMICUS CURIAE
IN SUPPORT OF RESPONDENTS
__________________
Khala James
COVINGTON & BURLING LLP
Salesforce Tower
415 Mission Street, Ste 5400
San Francisco, CA 94104
(415) 591-6000
Jeffrey E. Sandberg
Counsel of Record
Abby C. Wright
Larissa Davis
Matthew C. Quallen
COVINGTON & BURLING LLP
One CityCenter
850 Tenth Street NW
Washington, D.C. 20001
(202) 662-6000
jsandberg@cov.com
Counsel for Amicus Curiae
i
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ....................................... ii
INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE ............................1
INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY ..........................2
ARGUMENT ...............................................................4
I. Haiti Is Suffering a Widespread Humanitarian
Crisis.......................................................................4
A. Violence Is Inescapable for Those Living in
Haiti. .................................................................5
1. Armed Groups Subject Communities to
Sweeping and Indiscriminate Daily Acts
of Violence....................................................8
2. Armed Groups Employ Sexual Violence
to Expand Their Control. ..........................15
B. Haiti Faces Complex Public Health
Emergencies. ...................................................21
1. Haiti Cannot Provide Adequate Health
Services to Its Citizens. .............................22
2. Severe Disease Outbreaks Threaten
Haiti’s People. ............................................25
II. The District Court’s Stay Protects Haitian
TPS Holders. ........................................................27
CONCLUSION ..........................................................28
ii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Page(s)
Center for Strategic & Int’l Stud. (CSIS),
Haiti Embarks on Another Rocky Political Transition (Feb. 9, 2026)............................... 7
Dánica Coto, Human Rights Watch Details
Deaths from Police Drone Attacks in
Haiti, Associated Press (Mar. 10, 2026) ........... 12
Fed. Aviation Admin., Notice to Airmen
(NOTAM) KICZ/A0024-26 (Mar. 2, 2026) .......... 4
Gangs Set Fire to Haiti’s National Soccer
Training Center in Croix-des-Bouquets,
Haitian Times (Feb. 4, 2026) ............................ 10
Global Initiative Against Transnational
Organized Crime,
From Criminal Governance to
Community Fragmentation: Addressing
Haiti’s Escalating Crisis (Sept. 18, 2025) .......... 6
Christopher Hernandez-Roy & Juliana
Rubio, CSIS, CSIS Briefs:
The Gender-Based Violence Crisis in
Haiti (Sept. 2024) .............................................. 15
Human Rights Watch, World Report 2026:
Events of 2025 (2026) .................. 5, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11
Immigration & Refugee Board of Canada,
Haiti: Treatment of Haitians Nationals
Who Return to Haiti (Aug. 14, 2025) ................ 11
iii
Int’l Comm. of the Red Cross, Haiti: Making
Impossible Choices in a Health-Care
System on the Verge of Collapse (Oct. 23,
2025) .................................................................. 22
Int’l Crisis Grp., Locked in Transition:
Politics and Violence in Haiti (Feb. 19,
2025) .................................................................... 6
Int’l Crisis Grp., Undoing Haiti’s Deadly
Gang Alliance (Dec. 15, 2025) .............. 6, 8, 9, 10
Int’l Rescue Comm., Haiti’s Gang Violence
Crisis: What to Know and How to Help
(Feb. 12, 2026) ..................................................... 3
Caroline Kapp, The Devastating Use of
Sexual Violence as a Weapon of War:
Three New UN Reports Detail Atrocities
in Ethiopia, Haiti, and Ukraine, Think
Global Health (Nov. 2, 2022) ............................ 18
Médicins Sans Frontières (MSF):
Closed Ports, Empty Shelves: Haiti
Urgently Needs Medical Supplies (May
21, 2024) ............................................................ 24
Haiti: Escalating Violence in Bel Air,
Port-au-Prince (Jan. 8, 2026) ........................ 5, 14
Haiti in Crisis: What to Know (Jan. 23,
2025) .................................................................... 2
Medical Supplies Arrive in Haiti After
Three-Month Disruption (June 21, 2024) ......... 24
iv
Port-au-Prince: Over 100 Patients
Admitted in Just Two Weeks as Violence
Escalates (Jan. 22, 2026) .............. 14, , 15, 22, 23
Press Release, MSF Announces
Permanent Closure of Our Turgeau
Emergency Centre in Port-au-Prince
(Oct. 15, 2025) ................................................... 14
Press Release, MSF Outraged by Police
Attack on Ambulance and Execution of
Patients in Haiti (Nov. 13, 2024) ...................... 13
Sexual and Gender-Based Violence in
Port-Au-Prince, Haiti
(Jan. 2026) ................................... 8, 15, 16, 19, 20
A US Judicial Ruling on Temporary
Protected Status Reflects Haiti’s
Deepening Crisis (Feb. 3, 2026) .................... 3, 27
Where We Work: Haiti (2025) ........................... 13
Guy Metayer, Criminal Gangs in Haiti and
Power Structure, 13 Class, Race & Corp.
Power 1 (2025) ..................................................... 8
Rachel Opota et al., UNICEF, A Silent
Crisis: The Long Healing Process of
Survivors of Sexual Violence in Haiti
(June 26, 2025) .................................................. 21
v
Sec’y of State Marco Rubio, Press Release,
Terrorist Designations of Viv Ansanm
and Gran Grif (May 2, 2025) ............................ 10
Ruth Seifert, The Second Front: The Logic
of Sexual Violence in Wars, 19 Women’s
Stud. Int’l Forum (1996) ................................... 18
UN Children’s Fund (UNICEF), Haiti’s
Children Under Siege: The Staggering
Rise of Child Abuse and Recruitment by
Armed Groups (Feb. 7, 2025) ...................... 16, 17
UN Children’s Fund (UNICEF),
Humanitarian Situation Report No. 8:
Haiti (Jan. 24, 2026) ........................................... 5
UN Int’l Org. for Migration (IOM), Violence
Triggers Record Displacements in Portau-Prince: Over 60,000 People in a
Month (Mar. 18, 2025) ...................................... 27
UN Integrated Off. in Haiti (BINUH),
Quarterly Report on the Human Rights
Situation in Haiti (January-March 2025)
(Apr. 30, 2025) ..................................................... 9
UN Integrated Off. in Haiti (BINUH),
Quarterly Report on the Human Rights
Situation in Haiti (April-June 2025)
(Aug. 1, 2025) .................................. 12, 15, 18, 19
UN Integrated Off. in Haiti (BINUH),
Quarterly Report on the Human Rights
Situation in Haiti (October-December
2025) (Jan. 30, 2026) ........................................... 9
vi
UN Integrated Off. in Haiti (BINUH) & UN
Off. of the High Comm’r for Human
Rights (OHCHR), Intensification of
Violence in Lower Artibonite, the Center
Department, and Regions Located East
of the Metropolitan Area of Port-auPrince: Major Risk for Haiti and the
Caribbean Subregion (Jul. 2025) ........................ 9
UN Integrated Off. in Haiti & UN Off. of
the High Comm’r for Human Rights
(OHCHR), Sexual Violence in Port-auPrince: A Weapon Used by Gangs to
Instill Fear (Oct. 2022).......................... 18, 20, 21
UN Off. for the Coordination of
Humanitarian Affs. (OCHA), Haiti
Humanitarian Needs and Response
Plan: Executive Summary (Dec. 2025) ............... 3
UN Off. of the High Comm’r for Human
Rights (OHCHR), Press Release, Haiti:
UN Human Rights Chief Alarmed by
Widening Violence As Gangs Expand
Reach (June 13, 2025) ..................................... 7, 8
UN Off. of the High Comm’r for Human
Rights (OHCHR), Restoring Dignity: A
Global Call to End the Violence in Haiti
(Apr. 7, 2025) ....................................................... 7
UN Off. on Drugs & Crime (UNODC), Tenth
Quarterly Report Under Security Council
Resolution 2692, Doc. No. S/2026/32
(Jan. 16, 2026) ................................. 7, 8, 9, 11, 12
vii
UN Population Fund (UNFPA), Addressing
Gender-Based Violence in Haiti (Jun.
2023) .................................................................. 16
UN Sec. Council, UN Integrated Off. in
Haiti, Report of the Secretary General,
Doc. No. S/2026/31 (Jan. 15,
2026) ............................................ 9, 10, 11, 12, 18
U.S. Dep’t of State, Haiti Travel Advisory
(2025) ................................................................... 4
US Extends Ban on Commercial Flight to
Haiti’s Capital Due to Gang Violence,
Associated Press (Mar. 4, 2026) ......................... 4
1
INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE1
Médecins Sans Frontières (“MSF”), also known as
Doctors Without Borders, is an independent,
international humanitarian organization that
provides medical assistance to people affected by
armed conflict, epidemics, disasters, and exclusion
from healthcare.2 MSF was created in the belief that
all people should have access to medical care
regardless of gender, race, religion, creed, political
affiliation, or national boundaries. Since its founding
in 1971, MSF has grown to an organization of more
than 67,000 staff. In 2024 alone, it provided 16.5
million outpatient consultations and admitted nearly
1.7 million patients to MSF facilities in seventy-five
countries. In recognition of its pioneering
humanitarian work, MSF was awarded the Nobel
Peace Prize in 1999.
MSF has engaged in extensive operations in Haiti
for thirty-five years, as the country has faced repeated
natural disasters, armed violence, political upheaval,
and public health crises. MSF currently runs seven
active projects in Haiti, including trauma centers;
primary medical and psychological care facilities;
water, sanitation, and hygiene services; maternity
care; and support for recent victims of sexual violence.
MSF has more than 1,800 full-time staff in Haiti with
1 This brief was not authored in whole or in part by counsel for
any party, and no person or entity, other than Amicus, its
members, or its counsel, made a monetary contribution to the
preparation or submission of this brief.
2 MSF comprises twenty-four associations based in countries
around the world. One of those associations is Médecins Sans
Frontières USA, Inc. d/b/a Doctors Without Borders USA.
2
recent annual expenditures of €48.3 million ($57.0
million USD).
MSF has an interest in this proceeding because it
is uniquely situated to provide this Court with realworld insight into the urgent challenges facing
persons living in Haiti. Few humanitarian
organizations operate in the country in the same
manner as MSF, and none can match its longstanding
role in providing medical services. MSF emphasizes—
in the strongest possible terms—that Haitian
nationals living in the United States cannot safely
return to Haiti.
INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY
Haiti is currently among the most dangerous
places to live in the world. In the past four years, the
country has collapsed into widespread conflict. Dozens
of armed groups vie for control, collectively taking
over nearly all of Port-au-Prince and steadily expanding to areas outside the capital. These armed groups
use violence of all kinds, including heavy weapon attacks and sexual assault, as tools to terrorize and
control the communities in which they operate. Meanwhile, a resurgent cholera epidemic, recent natural
disasters (including another destructive hurricane in
October 2025), and widespread internal displacement
have contributed to an unprecedented public health
crisis in Haiti.3
As MSF’s CEO recently explained, “[h]umanitarian conditions in Haiti have not improved—they’re
3 See generally MSF, Haiti in Crisis: What to Know (Jan. 23,
2025), https://perma.cc/67NX-ZVSU.
3
actually getting worse.”4 Over the past year, MSF has
witnessed violence and public health crises overwhelm the country. MSF has cared for thousands of
Haitians who were victims of armed conflict, assault,
collective rape, and other violence, yet has not come
close to meeting the total need. The Haitian government, for its part, has no meaningful capacity to
protect its own citizens, much less to facilitate the safe
return and resettlement of nationals currently living
abroad.
MSF’s on-the-ground experience reflects that,
without question, Haiti is not a place to which TPS
holders can safely return. If immediately forced to go
back to Haiti, more than 350,000 TPS holders will face
life-threatening harm from violence, displacement,
and health crises. Some number of those forcibly returned men, women, and children will almost
certainly be killed, while many more will be seriously
injured, sexually assaulted, or compelled to join
armed groups to survive. Individuals returning from
the United States are subject to particular risk, as
they are often the direct targets of kidnapping for ransom and other violent crime.
4 MSF, A US Judicial Ruling on Temporary Protected Status Re-
flects
Haiti's
Deepening
Crisis
(Feb.
3,
2026),
https://perma.cc/YK76-CA7H [hereinafter MSF, February 2026
Statement]; see also Int’l Rescue Comm., Haiti’s Gang Violence
Crisis: What to Know and How to Help (Feb. 12, 2026),
https://perma.cc/5D24-2BYM (agreeing that “Haiti is facing one
of the world’s most severe humanitarian crises”); UN Off. for the
Coordination of
Humanitarian Affs.
(OCHA),
Haiti
Humanitarian Needs and Response Plan: Executive Summary 3
(Dec. 2025), https://www.unocha.org/attachments/9fa04d0c17c9-4fea-b6fd-5f0719234ab4/HTI_HNRP2026_Executive
Summary_EN_20251218.pdf
(agreeing
that
“Haiti’s
humanitarian crisis continues to worsen at an alarming pace”).
4
It is no surprise that the U.S. Department of State
warns against travel to Haiti in the strongest terms
possible: “[d]o not travel to Haiti due to kidnapping, crime, terrorist
activity,
civil
unrest,
and limited health care.”5 Indeed, in light of rampant
instability, the U.S. government does not currently allow commercial aircraft to fly to Port-au-Prince at all.6
The district court, reviewing the administrative
record, accurately described Haiti as “a country in
chaos and crisis.” J.A. 685. MSF submits this brief to
provide the Court with its firsthand experience of current conditions in Haiti, to explain the grave danger
that TPS holders will face if they are immediately
forced to return, and to urge this Court to leave undisturbed the district court’s order) staying the
termination of TPS status for Haiti.
ARGUMENT
I. Haiti
Is
Suffering
Humanitarian Crisis.
a
Widespread
Haiti is engulfed in violence, disease, and social instability. Amicus curiae MSF’s healthcare facilities
U.S. Dep’t of State, Haiti Travel Advisory (2025),
https://perma.cc/FGP8-ADZ8 (emphasis omitted); see id. (advising travelers to, among other things, “[e]stablish a proof of life
protocol with your loved ones . . . so that if you are taken hostage,
your loved ones can . . . be sure that you are alive,” and to “[l]eave
DNA samples with your medical provider in case it is necessary
for your family to access them”).
6 US Extends Ban on Commercial Flight to Haiti’s Capital Due
to Gang Violence, Associated Press (Mar. 4, 2026),
https://perma.cc/2357-7JBJ; Fed. Aviation Admin., Notice to Airmen
(NOTAM)
KICZ/A0024-26
(Mar.
2,
2026),
https://perma.cc/ZBV9-YBQD.
5
5
are routinely filled with victims of shootings, stabbings, burns, and sexual assault. Failing
infrastructure, extensive internal displacement, and
armed conflict make it difficult to render care, and
MSF staff and volunteers themselves struggle to
maintain their own safety. MSF’s medical convoys
have been attacked by armed groups and state actors
alike, and its staff have been held hostage by hourslong crossfires outside its facilities.7
In addition to the rampant violence, recurrent disease outbreaks are at among the worst levels in
memory. From every perspective, “Haiti’s multidimensional political, economic, humanitarian, and
human rights crisis” has only grown worse.8
A. Violence Is Inescapable for Those Living
in Haiti.
Since the assassination of Haitian President
Jovenel Moïse in 2021, a near-total breakdown of
Haiti’s government has left a power vacuum in which
dozens of armed groups now compete for control of the
7 See, e.g., MSF, Haiti: Escalating Violence in Bel Air, Port-au-
Prince (Jan. 8, 2026), https://perma.cc/5867-95RK (reporting recent incident in which the building used for MSF’s medical
activities in the Bel Air neighborhood “became a battlefield amid
intense fighting between an armed group and the Haitian National Police,” with “community volunteers . . . trapped there for
several hours before managing to escape”).
8 Human Rights Watch, World Report 2026: Events of 2025, at
198 (2026), https://perma.cc/K6BX-MJY2 [hereinafter HRW,
World Report 2026]; see also UN Children’s Fund (UNICEF), Humanitarian Situation Report No. 8: Haiti 1 (Jan. 24, 2026),
https://perma.cc/J6SX-HZ7L (“In 2025, Haiti descended into its
darkest chapter yet.”).
6
island nation.9 In early 2024, a loosely organized coalition of armed groups calling itself “Viv Ansanm”
besieged Haiti’s capital, Port-au-Prince, triggering the
then-prime minister to resign.10 Armed groups have
since gained control of all roads in and out of Port-auPrince and have carried out attacks on the airport,
forcing a stop to regular air travel.11 MSF staff observe that “[p]eople are fleeing in large numbers” to
escape not only gun violence, but also “kamikaze
drone” attacks causing mass civilian killings.12
The government has lost control. Political leaders
cannot reach basic agreements on how to proceed.13
Although Haiti again has a prime minister (following
expiration of a Transitional Presidential Council mandate last month), his power is severely limited, and
Int’l Crisis Grp., Undoing Haiti’s Deadly Gang Alliance 1-2
(Dec. 15, 2025), https://perma.cc/RRX6-P7LM [hereinafter ICG,
Deadly Gang Alliance Report]. Although often described as
“gangs,” these groups are essentially armed, criminal militias,
many equipped with weapons as powerful as those commonly
possessed by state actors. See, e.g., Global Initiative Against
Transnational Organized Crime, From Criminal Governance to
Community Fragmentation: Addressing Haiti's Escalating Crisis
(Sept. 18, 2025), https://perma.cc/54DG-FNP7.
10 ICG, Deadly Gang Alliance Report, supra, at i, 5-7.
11 Id. at i, 14-15.
12 Statement by MSF project staff. All quotations from MSF staff
are on file with counsel of record.
13 See, e.g., Int’l Crisis Grp., Locked in Transition: Politics and
Violence in Haiti 28 (Feb. 19, 2025) (explaining that “Haiti is paralysed” and that “[e]arly hope that an inclusive transitional
government would quickly tackle the country’s rampant insecurity … has faded”).
9
7
the country has no sitting legislature.14 National elections have not been held since 2016 and have
repeatedly been postponed due to violence and civil instability.15 In the meantime, “[a]rmed gangs have
consolidated into federated coalitions that exercise
control or influence over significant parts of the national territory,” funding their operations through
“arms and drug trafficking, fuel smuggling, migrant
exploitation, extortion and other unlawful activities.”16
The scale and scope of violence have only gotten
worse. The conflict, originally concentrated in Portau-Prince, has radiated outward throughout the nation. Violence—both by armed groups and their
opponents—kills and injures tens of thousands of people each year. William O’Neill, the UN High
Commissioner’s Designated Expert on Haiti, stated in
2025 that “[h]uman rights violations and abuses have
reached a scale and intensity that [he has] never seen
before in Haiti.”17
14 See Center for Strategic & Int’l Stud. (CSIS), Haiti Embarks
on Another Rocky Political Transition (Feb. 9, 2026),
https://perma.cc/F2YJ-KA8T.
15 HRW, World Report 2026, supra, at 202.
16 UN Off. on Drugs & Crime (UNODC), Tenth Quarterly Report
Under Security Council Resolution 2692, Doc. No. S/2026/32, ¶ 3
(Jan. 16, 2026) [hereinafter UNODC, January 2026 Report]; see
also Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime,
Brokers and Patrons: Unstitching Gangs From Haiti’s Political
Fabric (Mar. 2026), https://perma.cc/Y2BZ-BWE9 [hereinafter
GITOC Report].
17 UN Off. of the High Comm’r for Human Rights (OHCHR),
Restoring Dignity: A Global Call to End the Violence in Haiti
(Apr. 7, 2025), https://www.ohchr.org/en/stories/2025/04/restoring-dignity-global-call-end-violence-haiti; see also UN OHCHR,
Press Release, Haiti: UN Human Rights Chief Alarmed by
8
And as discussed in a recent MSF report, brutal
sexual violence has come to pervade the conflict, with
women and girls of all ages raped in collective attacks.18
1. Armed Groups Subject Communities to
Sweeping and Indiscriminate Daily
Acts of Violence.
As the district court recognized, Haiti is “a country
in full-blown conflict.” J.A. 686 (citation and internal
quotation marks omitted). Armed groups—and the
various security and vigilante forces trying to stop
them—have created pervasive internal violence that,
but for its lack of organization, would readily be described as civil war.19 Armed groups currently control
an estimated 90% of Port-au-Prince and much of its
surroundings.20 These groups target specific neighborhoods and key transportation routes that connect
to the capital, enabling the groups to operate illegal
Widening Violence As Gangs Expand Reach (June 13, 2025),
https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2025/06/haiti-un-human-rights-chief-alarmed-widening-violence-gangs-expandreach (“UN Human Rights Chief Volker Türk said today that the
human rights crisis in Haiti has plummeted to a new low[.]”).
18 See MSF, Sexual and Gender-Based Violence in Port-AuPrince, Haiti (Jan. 2026), https://perma.cc/9LQD-RLN6 [hereinafter MSF, Sexual and Gender Violence Report].
19 ICG, Deadly Gang Alliance Report, supra, at i, 2-3, 6-7; see also
Guy Metayer, Criminal Gangs in Haiti and Power Structure, 13
Class, Race & Corp. Power 1 (2025).
20 UNODC, January 2026 Report, supra, ¶ 6 & map 1; HRW,
World Report 2026, supra, at 199.
9
checkpoints, engage in extortion, and control the flow
of food and supplies.21 AB
These armed groups are also actively spreading beyond the capital.22 In the Artibonite and Centre
Departments, armed groups have swept in and “targeted key highways, coastal municipalities[,] and
strategic land border crossings.”23 In entering a new
area, armed groups engage in brutal, often indiscriminate showings of force by killing, assaulting, or
forcibly displacing thousands of residents.24 They also
“embrace[] a scorched-earth approach,” destroying
21 UNODC, January 2026 Report, supra, ¶ 8; ICG, Deadly Gang
Alliance Report, supra, at 11; UN, Quarterly Report on the Human Rights Situation in Haiti (January-March 2025), at 5-6
(Apr. 30, 2025) https://perma.cc/76M6-G9VJ; UN OHCHR, Situation of Human Rights in Haiti, Doc. No. A/HRC/61/74, ¶¶ 1415 (Mar. 23, 2026), https://perma.cc/W2J9-T2N8 [hereinafter
OHCHR March 2026 Report].
22 UN Sec. Council, UN Integrated Off. in Haiti (BINUH), Report
of the Secretary General, Doc. No. S/2026/31 ¶¶ 13-16 (Jan. 15,
2026) [hereinafter UN Integrated Office in Haiti, January 2026
Report]; OHCHR March 2026 Report, supra, ¶ 5; GITOC Report,
supra, at 4, 8-10 (discussing armed groups’ creation of “franchises” throughout the country).
23 UNODC, January 2026 Report, supra, ¶ 11 & map 2; see also
UN Integrated Off. in Haiti (BINUH), UN Off. of the High
Comm’r for Human Rights (OHCHR), Intensification of Violence
in Lower Artibonite, the Center Department, and Regions Located
East of the Metropolitan Area of Port-au-Prince: Major Risk for
Haiti and the Caribbean Subregion 4 (Jul. 2025),
https://perma.cc/SR2Q-76ZH.
24 See, e.g., HRW, World Report 2026, supra, at 198 (explaining
that armed groups’ violence “is deployed strategically not only to
extract rents, but also to expand influence, contest authority in
areas under formal State administration[,] and enforce coercive
systems of criminal control”); UN, Quarterly Report on the Human Rights Situation in Haiti (October-December 2025), at 10-11
(Jan. 30, 2026), https://perma.cc/L6R5-ZMMS.
10
homes, schools, hospitals, and public buildings during
their campaigns.25 As the U.S. Secretary of State has
acknowledged, these armed groups effectively seek to
create “a gang-controlled state where illicit trafficking
and other criminal activities operate freely and terrorize Haitian citizens.” J.A. 676 (citation omitted).26
Reflecting the armed groups’ expanding reach, a
January 2026 report by the UN Integrated Office in
Haiti noted a sharp increase in killings outside Portau-Prince.27 Between January and November 2025,
authorities reported almost 2,000 homicides in the
outlying departments of Artibonite and Centre, or
roughly double the corresponding figure in 2024.28
Armed groups recently massacred dozens of people in
eight rural towns in the Artibonite department.29 According to some analysts, Haiti now has the “highest
homicide rate in the world.”30
Kidnapping is an ever-present threat. As armed
groups jockey for resources and control, individuals
25 ICG, Deadly Gang Alliance Report 14; see, e.g., Gangs Set Fire
to Haiti’s National Soccer Training Center in Croix-des-Bouquets, Haitian Times (Feb. 4, 2026), https://perma.cc/J67F-J5A6
(reporting on armed groups’ intentional destruction of the FIFA
Goal Center, “one of the country’s most important institutions for
youth development”).
26 See Sec’y of State Marco Rubio, Press Release, Terrorist
Designations of Viv Ansanm and Gran Grif (May 2, 2025),
https://perma.cc/4ZZR-45YA.
27 UN Integrated Office in Haiti, January 2026 Report, supra, ¶¶
3, 13, 15.
28 Id. ¶ 14.
29 André Paultre & Frances Robles, Dozens Killed in Haiti Massacre as International Force Trickles In, N.Y. Times (Apr. 4,
2026), https://perma.cc/T4YX-977M.
30 HRW, World Report 2026, supra, at 198.
11
throughout the country are at risk of being captured
for ransom, extorted, or having their property destroyed.31 As plaintiffs in this case have observed and
others have documented, the threat of ransom kidnapping is particularly high for persons who have spent
time in the United States; armed groups perceive returnees as having access to substantial amounts of
money and specifically single them out as targets for
threats and violence.32
Those who oppose the armed groups further contribute to the violent chaos.33 Numerous private
security companies and vigilante “self-defense” organizations “function outside formal structures” and
beyond government control.34 Innocent bystanders
are routinely hit by stray bullets and killed or injured
by explosive drones used in private and government
31 UN Integrated Office in Haiti, January 2026 Report, supra, ¶
15.
32 See Decl. of Fritz Emmanuel Lesly Miot (“Miot Decl.”) at 4-5,
Miot v. Trump, No. 25-CV-02471 (D.D.C.) (Dkt. 81-2); Decl. of
Rudolph Civil at 3 (Dkt. 81-3); Decl. of Marcia Merline Laguerre
(“Laguerre Decl.”) at 6-7 (Dkt. 81-5); Decl. of Vilbrun Dorsainvil
at 7-8 (Dkt. 81-6); accord, e.g., Immigration & Refugee Board of
Canada, Haiti: Treatment of Haitians Nationals Who Return to
Haiti (Aug. 14, 2025), https://perma.cc/7SC3-WPFZ (reporting
interviews with multiple Haitians reflecting that “society views
returnees who have lived abroad for an extended period of time
as wealthy,” which “puts them at risk to be held for ransom by
either criminal groups or individual criminals”).
33 Statement by MSF coordination staff, Haiti; HRW, World Report 2026, supra, at 198; OHCHR March 2026 Report, supra, ¶
7; GITOC Report, supra, at 4 (identifying “tripartite configuration in which gangs, armed vigilante brigades[,] and state forces
compete”).
34 UNODC, January 2026 Report, supra, ¶ 29.
12
attacks.35 Government forces themselves engage in intentional violence: in just one quarter of 2025, police
summarily executed at least 46 people without due
process,36 and an “extremely high” number of people
have been killed or injured by police operations.37
Armed groups, in turn, respond in increasingly organized ways, “routinely unit[ing] against Haitian and
international security forces, pooling personnel, firepower and logistics.”38
Given this intense, chaotic violence, Haiti is one of
the most dangerous places in the world for MSF’s
teams to operate. Armed groups and their opponents
alike operate without apparent regard for MSF’s medical and humanitarian mission. Accounts from
medical staff at MSF’s trauma hospital in Tabarre,
who treated victims of the September 2025 “kamikaze” drone attack in the Simon Pelé neighborhood,
reveal a pattern of Haitian police stopping ambulances for extended periods of time, increasing the
likelihood that victims will succumb to their injuries:
35 UN Integrated Off. in Haiti, Quarterly Report on the Human
Rights Situation in Haiti (April-June 2025), at 13 (Aug. 1, 2025),
https://perma.cc/7BY4-RBU4 [hereinafter UN Quarterly Report
on Human Rights in Haiti (Q2 2025)]; UN Integrated Office in
Haiti, January 2026 Report, supra, ¶ 17; OHCHR March 2026
Report, supra, ¶ 6; GITOC Report, supra, at 18-19; see Dánica
Coto, Human Rights Watch Details Deaths from Police Drone Attacks in Haiti, Associated Press (Mar. 10, 2026),
https://perma.cc/447T-Z8BW (reporting that “[d]rones operated
by Haitian security forces and private contractors have killed at
least 1,243 people and injured 738 others”).
36 UN Quarterly Report on Human Rights in Haiti (Q2 2025), supra, at 13.
37 Id. at 12; UN Integrated Office in Haiti, January 2026 Report,
supra, ¶ 22.
38 UNODC, January 2026 Report, supra, ¶ 7.
13
The first victim of [the drone] attack was
a patient between 30 and 40 years old;
she had extensive wounds to her limbs
(right arm and right leg). She was conscious but showed signs of hemorrhagic
shock and also had an abdominal wound.
During her transfer to Tabarre (MSF
hospital), the police stopped the ambulance for more than twenty minutes. The
Haitian National Police (PNH) then inspected the vehicle, searching for
suspected gang members, while she was
inside. The staff of the Haitian State Ambulance (CAN) were also subjected to
verbal abuse during this time. The
woman inside unfortunately died.39
In another incident, a second ambulance transferring a child and parents was stopped by police for 15
to 18 minutes, endangering the patients.40 And on one
particularly egregious occasion, police and members
of self-defense groups attacked an MSF ambulance,
executed two MSF patients, and tear-gassed MSF
medical staff.41
As a result, MSF sometimes must suspend, or even
permanently close, operations at facilities to ensure
39 Protection of Civilians in Haiti: Drones (MSF internal docu-
ment); Testimony of Simon Pelé (Oct. 17, 2025) (MSF internal
document).
40 Id.
41 MSF, Where We Work: Haiti (2025), https://perma.cc/2D8W58DT; see also MSF, Press Release, MSF Outraged by Police Attack on Ambulance and Execution of Patients in Haiti (Nov. 13,
2024),
https://www.msf.org/haiti-msf-outraged-attack-ambulance-and-execution-patients.
14
the safety of its staff, volunteers, and patients.42 Indeed, for over a year, MSF has been unable to operate
its own ambulance service due to repeated threats and
attacks on MSF vehicles.43 Given the near-complete
lack of safe emergency transport, “many critically injured patients arrive late” and with “worsened
injuries because they were unable to access care earlier.”44
The violence has only grown worse in recent
months. “Despite severe constraints people face trying
to access care, MSF teams have recorded a marked increase in patients with violence-related injuries.”45 As
MSF recently reported, in the first two weeks of January 2026 alone, MSF treated more than 100 people
injured by violence at MSF’s hospital in the Drouillard
neighborhood of Port-au-Prince, including 66 with
gunshot wounds.46 That two-week figure alone “far exceed[ed] the monthly average” for gunshot wound
admissions at the same hospital in 2025.47 “The trend
42 See, e.g., MSF, Press Release, MSF Announces Permanent Clo-
sure of Our Turgeau Emergency Centre in Port-au-Prince (Oct.
15, 2025), https://www.msf.org/msf-announces-permanent-closure-our-turgeau-emergency-centre-port-au-prince; MSF, Haiti:
Escalating Violence in Bel Air, Port-au-Prince (Jan. 8, 2026),
https://perma.cc/5867-95RK (reflecting January 2026 further
suspension of “all [of MSF’s] activities in Bel Air until further
notice”).
43 MSF, Port-au-Prince: Over 100 Patients Admitted in Just Two
Weeks
as
Violence
Escalates
(Jan.
22,
2026),
https://perma.cc/VZ36-3DP6 [hereinafter MSF, Over 100 Patients Admitted in Just Two Weeks].
44 Id.
45 Id.
46 Id.
47 Id.
15
[of violence] shows no sign of slowing” in 2026, “highlighting the persistence and intensity of violence in
the capital.”48
2. Armed Groups Employ Sexual Violence to Expand Their Control.
Armed groups in Haiti are increasingly using organized sexual violence as a tool of combat and social
domination.49 As the UN has reported, and MSF likewise has witnessed, these groups have “systematically
resorted to gang rape” to “subjugate residents living
in areas under their control.”50 Armed groups frequently “have a stronger intelligence system” than the
government, and they use “extensive[]” premeditated
targeting to maintain control in these areas.51The severity of sexual violence in Haiti cannot be overstated.
Since opening a dedicated Port-au-Prince sexual violence clinic in 2015, MSF has treated more than
17,000 survivors, 98% percent of whom are women
and girls.52 And the numbers are increasing at an
alarming rate: “The number of survivors of sexual and
48 Id.
49 MSF defines sexual violence as “any unwanted sexual contact
without consent using force or coercion.” MSF, Sexual and Gender Violence Report, supra, at 3. MSF defines gender-based
violence “any harmful act that is perpetrated against a person’s
will, threats of such acts, coercion, and other deprivations of freedom based on socially ascribed gender differences between males
and females.” Id. This brief refers to both forms of violence as
“sexual violence.”
50 UN Quarterly Report on Human Rights in Haiti (Q2 2025), supra, at 3, 15; see also OHCHR March 2026 Report, ¶¶ 4, 10.
51 Christopher Hernandez-Roy & Juliana Rubio, CSIS, CSIS
Briefs: The Gender-Based Violence Crisis in Haiti (Sept. 2024),
https://perma.cc/7FL7-RKNK [hereinafter CSIS, Gender-Based
Violence Report].
52 MSF, Sexual and Gender Violence Report, supra, at 2.
16
gender-based violence who receive care at the clinic
has almost tripled from an average of 95 admissions
per month in 2021 to more than 250 in 2025,” according to MSF’s current head of mission in Haiti.53 Even
those extreme numbers seriously understate the scope
of the problem, given chronic underreporting of sexual
assault.54
Demonstrating the weaponized nature of sexual
assault, sexual violence involving armed perpetrators
has significantly increased. Prior to 2022, attacks involving armed perpetrators accounted for roughly
35% of the MSF clinic’s cases, but after 2022, that
number grew to 57%.55 MSF data reflect that instances of sexual violence occurring during broader
attacks on families or communities has increased
nearly fivefold since 2022.56 Now more than ever, even
children are targeted: according to UNICEF reporting, Haiti has witnessed a 1,000% increase in sexual
violence against minors between 2023 and 2025.57
53 Statement by Diana Manilla Arroyo, MSF Head of Mission.
54 The number of sexual and gender-based violence survivors in
all of Haiti vastly exceeds those who have been able to seek treatment through MSF. For instance, Haiti’s Single Health
Information System recorded 16,470 cases of sexual and genderbased violence in 2022 alone. UN Population Fund (UNFPA), Addressing Gender-Based Violence in Haiti (Jun. 2023),
https://perma.cc/N2FK-57K6. But underreporting makes determining the true extent of such violence “impossible” to know. Id.
55 MSF, Sexual and Gender Violence Report, supra, at 9-11.
56 Id. at 11 (citations omitted).
57 UNICEF, Haiti’s Children Under Siege: The Staggering Rise of
Child Abuse and Recruitment by Armed Groups (Feb. 7, 2025),
https://www.unicef.org/lac/en/press-releases/haitis-children-under-siege-staggering-rise-child-recruitment-armed-groups
[hereinafter UNICEF, Haiti’s Children Under Siege].
17
Sexual violence involving multiple perpetrators is
also now routine. From 2020 to 2021, 30% of the cases
in MSF’s Port-au-Prince clinic had involved multiple
perpetrators, but that number climbed to 58% between 2022 and 2025.58 On average, each such attack
has involved three perpetrators, but over 100 survivors were attacked by ten or more perpetrators.59 The
problem has only grown worse: a UN report addressing the second quarter of 2025 found that collective
rapes accounted for 85% of all sexual violence cases in
Haiti.60 In a majority of cases for which MSF provides
healthcare and treatment to female victims of sexual
assault, the victims were assaulted by multiple armed
perpetrators, and in many instances the victims had
previously suffered other such attacks.61
That sexual violence has essentially become a
weapon of war is demonstrated by a shift in the profile
of perpetrators and their targets. In prior years, sexual violence was usually committed by perpetrators
known to victims, such as intimate partners.62 Although MSF continues to see such cases, they are now
surpassed by the number of cases involving members
of armed groups.63 The demographics of sexual assault survivors has shifted as well; the age
58 Id. at 9.
59 Id. at 11.
60 Id. at 15; see also UN Integrated Office in Haiti, January 2026
Report, supra, ¶ 50 (reflecting that “[c]ollective rape remained
the predominant violation” in latter parts of 2025).
61 UNICEF, Haiti’s Children Under Siege, supra, at 13. Psychological scars remain long after an attack, particularly since many
women face community stigma after being sexually assaulted.
See id. at 1, 2, 12, 15-20.
62 Id. at 9.
63 Id.
18
distribution of survivors has become more even across
all age groups, with attacks on women aged fifty to
eighty years old increasing sevenfold since 2022.64
As armed groups spread, sexual violence follows.65
Studies by the UN and the Haitian NGO Nègès
Mawon found that rape often accompanies looting,
murder, and the destruction of property.66 Armed
groups target women and girls because they “hold the
families and community together,” and “physical and
emotional destruction [of women and girls] aims at destroying social and cultural stability.”67 Armed groups
thereby not only acquire physical territory but also
maintain psychological control.68
Horrific stories abound. As one example, in 2025,
five women and two men encountered an armed group
ransacking and vandalizing a car dealership.69 Multiple members of the armed group raped the women
64 Id.
65 Rampant sexual violence is a characteristic of countries expe-
riencing violent internal conflict or civil war. See, e.g., Caroline
Kapp, The Devastating Use of Sexual Violence as a Weapon of
War: Three New UN Reports Detail Atrocities in Ethiopia, Haiti,
and Ukraine, Think Global Health (Nov. 2, 2022),
https://perma.cc/UAK2-AVNB.
66 Id.
67 Ruth Seifert, The Second Front: The Logic of Sexual Violence
in Wars, 19 Women’s Stud. Int’l Forum 35, 39 (1996),
https://perma.cc/Q3HD-BQYG.
68 See UN Integrated Off. in Haiti (BINUH) & UN Off. of the High
Comm’r for Human Rights (OHCHR), Sexual Violence in Portau-Prince: A Weapon Used by Gangs to Instill Fear (Oct. 2022),
https://perma.cc/5ENV-J7SX [hereinafter BINUH & OHCHR,
Joint Report on Sexual Violence].
69 UN Quarterly Report on Human Rights in Haiti (Q2 2025), supra, at 7.
19
before shooting them dead.70 On another occasion in
May 2025, the UN reported that members of an armed
group raped, shot, and burned the bodies of two
women residing in one Port-au-Prince neighborhood
after the women allegedly visited another neighborhood that the armed group had declared to be off
limits.71 On another occasion, women were raped for
days by multiple armed groups during a five-week
blockage of a major national road.72
Accounts from women treated by MSF make plain
the pain and suffering that this weaponized use of sexual violence has caused:
Since that day [on which I was raped], I
have found myself living on the streets.
They took my son . . . as well as his father. Since then, I have had no news of
them. I am on the streets with my four
children. I have nothing left, no one . . . .
When I returned to my house, they had
burned everything down. I had a son who
owned a motorbike taxi . . . it was burned
as well. My entire future is gone; sometimes, I even feel like hurting myself, but
my daughter always comforts me.
Woman, age 51.73
It was truly a tragedy. I had to flee my
home without being able to take anything with me. When I returned home to
70 Id.
71 UN Quarterly Report on Human Rights in Haiti (Q2 2025), supra, at 8.
72 CSIS, Gender-Based Violence Report, supra.
73 MSF, Sexual and Gender Violence Report, supra, at 12.
20
collect clothes for my children, I came
across an armed man who was there, in
the hallway. Immediately, he called a
group of armed men who joined him.
They raped me, beat me, and threatened
to kill me. I didn’t know if I was going to
live or die, terrified at the thought of
leaving my children behind. Woman, age
41.74
Survivor accounts documented by other humanitarian organizations similarly reveal the brutality
and viciousness of the ongoing sexual violence in
Haiti:
Rose, a mother of four and five-months
pregnant, was severely beaten and
raped, in the presence of her children, by
three heavily armed masked men. The
latter had forced their way into her home
during an attack launched against the
residents of [her neighborhood] . . . . Earlier that day, Rose’s husband had been
shot dead by members of the same gang.
Before leaving, the armed individuals set
her house ablaze, forcing Rose and her
children to sleep out in the open in a public space for many nights.75
[H]eavily armed gang members forced
their way into Marie’s home in Cité Soleil. After her husband was executed
with a gunshot to the head, the armed
74 Id.
75 BINUH & OHCHR, Joint Report on Sexual Violence, supra, at
3.
21
men forced her to lay on top of his dead
body, and then they raped her one after
the other in the presence of her children.
After the attack, the assailants set her
house ablaze. She and her children had
time to get out of the house before it was
completely burned down, together with
the body of her husband.76
After surviving sexual violence, many women flee,
only to face the risk of additional sexual violence in
makeshift camps for internally displaced persons:
“One night, I was lying somewhere in the camp when
I suddenly felt someone touch me. I stood up, surprised, and saw three men surrounding me. I
screamed, but no one came to help me. All three raped
me.”77
B. Haiti Faces Complex
Emergencies.
Public
Health
The rampant violence just described alone demonstrates that it is not safe for TPS holders to return to
Haiti. But Haiti also faces public-health emergencies
that independently make it a gravely dangerous place
to live. Haiti’s healthcare system has collapsed, at the
same time the country is facing a resurgence of cholera at levels unseen elsewhere in the Western
Hemisphere.
76 Id. at 9.
77 Rachel Opota et al., UNICEF, A Silent Crisis: The Long Healing Process of Survivors of Sexual Violence in Haiti (June 26,
2025), https://www.unicef.org/haiti/en/stories/silent-crisis.
22
1. Haiti Cannot Provide Adequate Health
Services to Its Citizens.
Haiti’s healthcare system has almost entirely
fallen apart. Armed groups pillage pharmacies, clinics, and hospitals, “leaving these areas with little
access to essential medicines.”78 Purposeful attacks
and looting between 2023 and 2025 have struck important healthcare facilities such as St. Francis de
Salles Hospital, Bernard Mevs Hospital, Hôpital Sanatorium, and the National Faculty of Medicine and
Pharmacy.79 Since the start of these attacks, “70% of
the capital’s public health facilities have closed, depriving 4.4 million people of access to health care.”80
Even where healthcare facilities remain operating,
they often cannot be accessed due to the facility’s location, fear of violence, or lack of funds.81 First,
“[t]here are very few hospitals run by the Haitian
state; most hospital facilities are private, and people
do not have enough money to pay.”82 The dearth of accessible healthcare extends well beyond Port-auPrince. For instance, MSF’s facility in Port-à-Piment
“is now one of the few facilities offering comprehensive
care” in the southern part of the country, and the only
78 Statement by Jean Marc Biquet, MSF Head of Mission.
79 Id.; see also MSF, Over 100 Patients Admitted in Just Two
Weeks, supra.
80 Int’l Comm. of the Red Cross, Haiti: Making Impossible
Choices in a Health-Care System on the Verge of Collapse (Oct.
23, 2025), https://perma.cc/9PNH-SXRN.
81 Statement by MSF psychologist, Mental Health Team, Port-àPiment, Haiti.
82 Id.
23
one in that region offering hospital services for newborns.83
Second, the presence of armed groups effectively
limits the ability of people to travel for treatment.84
Injured patients must “cross long barricades, navigate
blocked roads, and pass through neighborhoods under
fire to reach one of the few hospitals still operational.”85 And “[f]ear is a major barrier to life-saving
care.”86 As described by Betsie Lewis, MSF’s Humanitarian Affairs Manager in Haiti:
Over the past nine months, I have spoken with more than 50 Haitian
colleagues, patients, and community
members across the North, West, and
South of the country. What has struck
me most is the depth of psychological
strain people must endure simply to survive daily life. For patients and staff
alike, fear shapes every step of the decision-making process: whether to leave
home, accept a referral, travel at night,
or remain in medical care. As a result,
people increasingly self-restrict their
movements, even when services exist,
weighing the risk of seeking care against
the risk of not returning home alive.87
83 Statement by MSF project coordinator, Port-à-Piment, Haiti.
84 Statement by MSF Health Promotion Staff, Cité Soleil, Haiti.
85 MSF, Port-au-Prince: Over 100 Patients Admitted in Just Two
Weeks, supra.
86 Statement by advisor to MSF Head of Mission.
87 Statement by Betsie Lewis, MSF Humanitarian Affairs
Manager, Haiti.
24
In fact, “an average of 40% of [MSF] patients refuse necessary referrals to hospitals in other parts of
the city, out of fear of being caught in crossfire or accused of belonging to an armed group. This includes
elderly people and women with children.”88
Ongoing conflict similarly limits access to crucial
medical supplies. For example, in summer 2024,
armed violence prevented supplies from reaching
Port-au-Prince for three months, disrupting access
not only to basic supplies but also other crucial medicines like HIV treatment.89
MSF’s on-the-ground experience confirms that the
health-related fears expressed by plaintiffs are wellfounded. Many TPS holders would be particularly
vulnerable to illness or death if forced to return to
Haiti. As Mr. Miot explained, returning to Haiti
“would likely sooner or later be a death sentence”
because he has Type 1 diabetes, and reliable access to
insulin cannot be guaranteed.90 The same is true for
Ms. Noble, who suffers from spinal tuberculosis.
Returning her to Haiti, where she has no known
family and has not lived since she was two years old,
means sending her to a country that “has no
functional health care system to treat [her] health
issues.”91
88 Statement by advisor to MSF Head of Mission, Haiti.
89 MSF, Medical Supplies Arrive in Haiti After Three-Month Disruption (June 21, 2024), https://perma.cc/W7VS-GLBN; MSF,
Closed Ports, Empty Shelves: Haiti Urgently Needs Medical Supplies (May 21, 2024), https://perma.cc/EKS7-SQ6N.
90 Miot Decl. at 4-5.
91 Decl. of Marlene Gail Noble at 6 (Dkt. 81-4); see also Laguerre
Decl. at 7.
25
2. Severe Disease Outbreaks Threaten
Haiti’s People.
Haitians suffer from numerous communicable diseases that do not exist in the United States—most
notably, cholera. Cholera is caused by a bacterial infection of Vibrio cholerae, usually ingested through
water contaminated with fecal matter, which disrupts
the intestinal lining and produces severe diarrhea.
The resulting dehydration and loss of electrolytes can
trigger organ failure, disrupt heart rhythms, and lead
to hypovolemic shock and cardiovascular collapse.
Following the 2010 earthquake, Haiti experienced
what was then the worst cholera outbreak worldwide
in modern history, sickening more than 800,000 Haitians and killing approximately 10,000. Responding to
that outbreak required a sustained, international effort. MSF, for example, mobilized more than 1,150
international and Haitian staff to operate 21 temporary cholera treatment centers throughout Haiti.
Through that global effort, the first cholera outbreak
was eventually contained, but not until 2019—nine
years after it started.
Unfortunately, the conditions for widespread disease soon returned. As a result of recent violence,
roughly 12 percent of Haiti’s population—1.4 million
people—has been displaced from their homes, double
the figure recorded one year earlier.92 Many of these
displaced persons now reside in spontaneous, makeshift sites around Port-au-Prince and elsewhere.
These makeshift communities are overcrowded and
lack access to clean water and basic sanitation. As
MSF’s head of mission explained: “Stagnant water,
92 See, e.g., OHCHR March 2026 Report, ¶¶ 16, 48.
26
broken sewage lines, and the accumulation of trash
across the city create ideal conditions for outbreaks to
spread whenever the rains come.”
Cholera is now again resurgent. In 2022, MSF
opened three cholera treatment centers, which immediately reached full capacity, and distributed millions
of liters of clean water. Nonetheless, as of November
2025, the current epidemic has sickened more than
90,000 Haitians—a third of them children under the
age of nine—and has led to thousands of deaths. In a
two-month period between September and November
2025, a single outbreak in one neighborhood in Portau-Prince resulted in almost 400 cases and more than
a dozen fatalities.
Cholera outbreaks require prompt hospitalization.
With quick access to proper care, it is an easily treated
disease. Without such care, cholera can turn deadly in
a matter of hours. But, as explained, Haiti’s public
healthcare system is essentially non-functional, and
Haitians risk grave personal harm simply by seeking
to travel from one neighborhood or community to another for treatment.
Preventative efforts have proven equally difficult.
To respond to the 2010-2019 cholera epidemic, Haitians and international organizations, including MSF,
undertook a decade-long campaign involving administering oral vaccines, conducting laboratory testing
and diarrheal disease surveillance, expanding access
to clean water and sanitation, deploying over 10,000
volunteers trained on hygiene and sanitation practices, and opening almost 300 cholera treatment
centers. Those systematic interventions were possible
because Haiti at that time possessed a more functional government with comparatively little violence.
27
But similarly systematic interventions are not possible in Haiti today: the government controls only
limited territory; aid workers cannot easily access violence-plagued areas; patients cannot reach hospitals
or are too afraid to travel to them; and necessary medical supplies cannot reliably enter Haiti, meaning
rates of cholera and other transmittable diseases are
likely only to worsen.
II. The District Court’s Stay Protects Haitian
TPS Holders.
As the district court rightly concluded, Haiti is not
“on the brink of recovery” but rather is “a nation deep
in crisis.” J.A. 680, 687. Or as the UN’s Secretary-General put it just months ago: “The people of Haiti are in
a perfect storm of suffering.” J.A. 687 n.29 (alteration
omitted). Conditions remain dire, especially as
“armed conflict is only intensifying in residential areas.”93 Humanitarian organizations have little to no
spare capacity available to help care for returning
TPS holders.94 Extinguishing the district court’s stay
would likely mean death, injury, sexual assault, and
other profound harms for thousands of people forced
to return to Haiti. In MSF’s view, “[e]nding protected
status could not come at a worse time.”95
93 MSF, February 2026 Statement, supra.
94 See e.g., UN Int’l Org. for Migration (IOM), Violence Triggers
Record Displacements in Port-au-Prince: Over 60,000 People in a
Month (Mar. 18, 2025), https://perma.cc/8BGF-9C6Z (explaining
that “[r]esources are stretched thin, and humanitarian needs far
exceed the current response capacity”).
95 MSF, February 2026 Statement, supra.
28
CONCLUSION
MSF works in conflict zones, in areas stricken by
natural disasters, and throughout parts of the world
where epidemics routinely claim lives. Haiti has
suffered the peril of all three. From MSF’s first-hand
experience, it can confirm that current conditions in
Haiti prevent TPS holders from returning to the
country in safety.
Absent temporary protected status, TPS holders
may face immediate removal to Haiti. Once there,
they will face an extremely high risk of violence,
including kidnapping, rape, mutilation, and murder.
TPS holders may also become victims of one of the
country’s public health epidemics or die in the absence
of a functional healthcare system. This fate looms
large, particularly for individuals with pre-existing
medical conditions.
For the foregoing reasons, MSF respectfully urges
the Court not to disturb the district court’s stay of the
termination of TPS status for Haiti.
29
Respectfully submitted,
Jeffrey E. Sandberg
Counsel of Record
Abby C. Wright
Larissa Davis
Matthew C. Quallen
COVINGTON & BURLING LLP
One CityCenter
850 Tenth Street NW
Washington, D.C. 20001
(202) 662-6000
jsandberg@cov.com
Khala James
COVINGTON & BURLING LLP
Salesforce Tower
415 Mission Street, Ste 5400
San Francisco, CA 94104
(415) 591-6000
Counsel for Amicus Curiae
April 13, 2026
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.