Opposition Brief — RMS of Georgia, LLC, dba Choice Refrigerants, Petitioner v. Environmental Protection Agency, et al.

No. 25-1079

In the Supreme Court of the United States

RMS OF GEORGIA, LLC, D/B/A CHOICE REFRIGERANTS,

PETITIONER

v.

ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, ET AL.

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

BRIEF FOR THE FEDERAL RESPONDENTS

IN OPPOSITION

D. JOHN SAUER

Solicitor General

Counsel of Record

ADAM R.F. GUSTAFSON

Principal Deputy Assistant

Attorney General

ROBERT N. STANDER

Deputy Assistant

Attorney General

DANIEL J. MARTIN

Senior Attorney

Department of Justice

Washington, D.C. 20530-0001

SupremeCtBriefs@usdoj.gov

(202) 514-2217

QUESTION PRESENTED

The American Innovation and Manufacturing Act of

2020 (AIM Act), 42 U.S.C. 7675, creates a regulatory

program to phase down the production and consumption of hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs) in the United

States. The statute prescribes percentage reduction

targets by specific years, mandates a cap-and-trade

program that uses a statutory formula to establish an

allowance baseline, and prohibits the production or importation of HFCs without a corresponding allowance.

The United States Environmental Protection Agency

(EPA) is required to implement this program by allocating allowances within the statutory confines set by

Congress. EPA’s final rule allocated allowances for the

years 2024 through 2028 based on each market participant’s historical production and consumption of HFCs.

Petitioner challenged that rule on the ground that the

AIM Act’s allowance-allocation provision unconstitutionally delegates legislative power. The question presented is as follows:

Whether Congress violated the nondelegation doctrine by enacting a statute that phases down the production and consumption of HFCs through a cap-andtrade program and instructs EPA to allocate allowances

for production and consumption, which EPA implemented based on each industry participant’s historical

production and consumption.

(I)

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

Opinion below .................................................................................. 1

Jurisdiction ...................................................................................... 1

Statement ......................................................................................... 2

Argument ......................................................................................... 8

Conclusion ...................................................................................... 17

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases:

A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States,

295 U.S. 495 (1935) ............................................................... 12

American Power & Light Co. v. SEC,

329 U.S. 90 (1946) ................................................................. 12

Black v. Cutter Labs., 351 U.S. 292 (1956) ........................... 15

Federal Power Comm’n v. Hope Natural Gas Co.,

320 U.S. 591 (1944) ............................................................... 12

Gundy v. United States, 588 U.S. 128 (2019) ................ 13, 15

FCC v. Consumers’ Research,

606 U.S. 656 (2025) ............................................... 8-10, 13, 16

Heating, Air Conditioning & Refrigeration

Distribs. Int’l v. EPA, 71 F.4th 59 (D.C. Cir. 2023)........... 6

J. W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States,

276 U.S. 394 (1928) ......................................................... 10, 13

Mexichem Fluor, Inc. v. EPA,

866 F.3d 451 (D.C. Cir. 2017),

cert. denied, 586 U.S. 918 (2018)..................................... 2, 14

National Ass’n of Home Builders v. Defenders of

Wildlife, 551 U.S. 644 (2007) ............................................... 15

National Broad. Co. v. United States,

319 U.S. 190 (1943) ............................................................... 12

Panama Ref. Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935) ................... 12

(III)

IV

Cases—Continued:

Page

Parker Drilling Mgmt. Servs., Ltd. v. Newton,

587 U.S. 601 (2019) ............................................................... 14

United States v. Grimaud, 220 U.S. 506 (1911) .................. 16

United States v. Hayes, 555 U.S. 415 (2009) ....................... 15

Whitman v. American Trucking Ass’ns, Inc.,

531 U.S. 457 (2001) ............................................. 10, 12, 13, 16

Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414 (1944) ........................ 12

Statutes, regulations, and rule:

American Innovation and Manufacturing Act of 2020:

Pub. L. No. 116-260, Div. S, § 103, 134 Stat. 2255

(42 U.S.C. 7675) ............................................................. 2

42 U.S.C. 7675 .................................................................. 2, 8

42 U.S.C. 7675(b)(2) .......................................................... 11

42 U.S.C. 7675(e)(1) ............................................................ 5

42 U.S.C. 7675(e)(1)(A)-(D)(i) .......................................... 14

42 U.S.C. 7675(e)(1)(B) ....................................................... 4

42 U.S.C. 7675(e)(1)(C) ....................................................... 4

42 U.S.C. 7675(e)(2)(A) ....................................................... 3

42 U.S.C. 7675(e)(2)(B) ....................................................... 4

42 U.S.C. 7675(e)(2)(C) ................................................... 4, 5

42 U.S.C. 7675(e)(2)(D)(ii) .................................................. 4

42 U.S.C. 7675(e)(3) ...................................................... 5, 14

42 U.S.C. 7675(e)(3)(A) ..................................... 4, 10, 11, 13

42 U.S.C. 7675(e)(3)(B) ............................................... 10, 11

42 U.S.C. 7675(e)(4)(B)(i) ............................................. 5, 11

42 U.S.C. 7675(e)(4)(B)(iv) ............................................... 11

42 U.S.C. 7675(e)(4)(B)(iv)(I)................................... 5, 7, 11

42 U.S.C. 7675(g)(1) ............................................................ 4

42 U.S.C. 7675(k)(1)(C)....................................................... 3

Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. 7401 et seq. ...................................... 2

V

Statutes, regulations, and rule—Continued:

Page

Tit. III, 42 U.S.C. 7601 et seq.:

42 U.S.C. 7607 ................................................................ 3

Tit. VI, 42 U.S.C. 7671 et seq. ............................ 3, 6, 14, 15

42 U.S.C. 7671(2)(A)-(C) ............................................. 14

42 U.S.C. 7671c(a) ....................................................... 14

42 U.S.C. 7671c(c)........................................................ 14

42 U.S.C. 7671d(b)(1) .................................................. 14

42 U.S.C. 7671d(c) ....................................................... 14

40 C.F.R.:

Section 84.13(a) .................................................................... 6

Section 84.19 ........................................................................ 4

Sup. Ct. R. 10(a) ......................................................................... 9

Miscellaneous:

86 Fed. Reg. 55,116 (Oct. 5, 2021) ....................................... 5-7

88 Fed. Reg. 46,836 (July 20, 2023) ..................................... 6, 7

90 Fed. Reg. 52,391 (Nov. 10, 2025) ........................................ 7

Promoting American Innovation and Jobs:

Legislation to Phase Down Hydrofluorocarbons:

Hearing on H.R. 5544 Before the Subcomm. on

Environment & Climate Change of the House

Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 116th Cong.,

1st Sess. (2020) ...................................................................... 15

In the Supreme Court of the United States

No. 25-1079

RMS OF GEORGIA, LLC, D/B/A CHOICE REFRIGERANTS,

PETITIONER

v.

ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, ET AL.

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

BRIEF FOR THE FEDERAL RESPONDENTS

IN OPPOSITION

OPINION BELOW

The opinion of the court of appeals (Pet. App. 1-27)

is reported at 146 F.4th 1126.

JURISDICTION

The judgment of the court of appeals was entered on

August 1, 2025. A petition for rehearing was denied on

September 30, 2025 (Pet. App. 28-29). On January 22,

2026, the Chief Justice extended the time within which

to file a petition for a writ of certiorari to and including

February 27, 2026, and the petition was filed on that

date. This Court’s jurisdiction is invoked under 28

U.S.C. 1254(1).

(1)

2

STATEMENT

Petitioner filed a petition for review in the United

States Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, challenging a final rule promulgated by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to implement a provision of the

American Innovation and Manufacturing Act of 2020

(AIM Act), 42 U.S.C. 7675. See Pet. App. 2-3. The court

of appeals denied the petition. Id. at 21.

1. “In the 1980s, an international movement developed to combat depletion of the ozone layer.” Mexichem Fluor, Inc. v. EPA, 866 F.3d 451, 454 (D.C. Cir.

2017) (Kavanaugh, J.), cert. denied, 586 U.S. 918 (2018).

Those efforts culminated in an international agreement

to “regulate the production and use of a variety of

ozone-depleting substances,” which Congress implemented by “add[ing] a new Title VI to the Clean Air

Act” that “require[d] manufacturers * * * to phase out

their use of [most] ozone-depleting substances by 2015.”

Ibid.; see Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. 7401 et seq. To comply

with the resulting phaseout requirements, some manufacturers switched to using hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs),

which “do not deplete the ozone layer.” 866 F.3d at 455.

Certain stakeholders then argued that HFCs should

also be phased out in favor of further substitutes. Ibid.

EPA lacked statutory authority to phase down the production and importation of HFCs under the CAA, however, because HFCs “are not ozone-depleting substances covered by Title VI of the Clean Air Act,” but

instead are “potential substitutes for ozone-depleting

substances.” Ibid.

To address that gap in statutory coverage, Congress

enacted and President Trump signed the AIM Act to

mandate a phasedown of HFCs. See Pub. L. No. 116260, Div. S, § 103, 134 Stat. 2255 (42 U.S.C. 7675). The

3

AIM Act incorporated several provisions of the Clean

Air Act, including its general procedural and judicialreview mechanisms, 42 U.S.C. 7607 and 7675(k)(1)(C),

and it was largely modeled on analogous Title VI provisions that had been enacted to phase out the ozone-depleting substances that HFCs came to replace. See 42

U.S.C. 7675(k)(1)(C) (providing that regulations “promulgated * * * pursuant to this section [shall be treated]

as though this section were expressly included in title

VI of th[e Clean Air] Act”).

The AIM Act (1) required EPA to phase down the

production and consumption of specified HFCs through

an allocation-and-trading (otherwise known as “capand-trade”) program; (2) required EPA to promulgate

certain regulations relating to the management of these

HFCs and their substitutes; and (3) authorized EPA to

facilitate the transition to new technologies through additional sector-based restrictions. Pet. App. 4-6. Pursuant to the statutory phasedown requirement, Congress directed EPA to promulgate, through notice-andcomment rulemaking, final rules that would govern the

allocation of allowances for HFC production and consumption up to the statutory caps. Id. at 5-6. Within

that regulatory plan, Congress gave EPA limited discretion over the distribution of allowances, provided

that the agency allocated them pursuant to the prescribed baseline and reduction schedule and accounted

for the mandatory allowances set aside for certain enumerated uses. Ibid.

a. The AIM Act prohibits any person from producing or importing regulated HFCs without an allowance

issued for use in a particular calendar year. 42 U.S.C.

7675(e)(2)(A). The number of allowances available each

4

year is determined by a statutory formula. 42 U.S.C.

7675(e)(2)(C).

Congress’s program takes the form of stepwise percentage reductions in the production and consumption

(including importation) of HFCs from pre-statutory

baseline levels down to 15% of those levels by 2036. 42

U.S.C. 7675(e)(2)(C). To effectuate that plan, the AIM

Act directs EPA to first determine the baselines, with

statutory language specifying what is to be calculated,

including historical levels of production and consumption of HFCs in the United States.

42 U.S.C.

7675(e)(1)(B) and (C). Congress next provided a schedule for a gradual phasedown of production and consumption relative to those baselines.

42 U.S.C.

7675(e)(2)(C). The statute directs EPA to “ensure that

the annual quantity of all regulated substances produced or consumed in the United States does not exceed” the quantity permitted by the statutory

phasedown schedule. 42 U.S.C. 7675(e)(2)(B).

b. Congress further instructed EPA to establish, by

rule, “an allowance allocation and trading program” to

achieve that phasedown. 42 U.S.C. 7675(e)(3)(A) and

(B). Under the statute, an allowance is a limited authorization for the production or consumption of regulated

HFCs, 42 U.S.C. 7675(e)(2)(D)(ii), and it is transferrable according to regulations to be promulgated by the

same deadline as the overall allocation-and-trading program, 42 U.S.C. 7675(g)(1); see 40 C.F.R. 84.19.

The AIM Act mandates that, for at least the first five

years of the allocation-and-trading program, EPA must

allocate “the full quantity of allowances necessary,

based on projected, current, and historical trends, for

the production or consumption” of HFCs related to six

specific applications, including certain semiconductor

5

uses and mission-critical military purposes. 42 U.S.C.

7675(e)(4)(B)(iv)(I). After that initial five-year period

has elapsed, EPA must review these applications and

consider, in light of criteria set forth in the statute,

whether to renew the applicants’ priority allowance access, up to the full life of the program. Ibid. The Act

also authorizes EPA to identify other applications that

should receive priority allowance access if those applications meet the enumerated statutory criteria. 42

U.S.C. 7675(e)(4)(B)(i).

2. a. As Congress had directed, see 42 U.S.C.

7675(e)(3), EPA promulgated its rule for the allocationand-trading program in the fall of 2021. See 86 Fed.

Reg. 55,116 (Oct. 5, 2021) (Framework Rule). The

Framework Rule began by applying the statutory formulas to set the production and consumption baselines

against which the required HFC phasedown would be

measured. Id. at 55,118; see 42 U.S.C. 7675(e)(1). The

Rule next applied the percentage in the statutory

phasedown schedule (e.g., 90% for 2022 and 2023) to

those baselines to determine the allowances that would

be available for each calendar year. 86 Fed. Reg. at

55,118, 55,144; see 42 U.S.C. 7675(e)(2)(C).

The Framework Rule then established an allocationand-trading program, as the AIM Act stipulated. EPA

provided notice of its proposal and solicited public comment on how to structure that program (along with

other aspects of the Rule). After reviewing input from

regulated parties and other members of the public,

EPA established three types of allowances: applicationspecific allowances, consumption allowances, and production allowances. 86 Fed. Reg. at 55,142. The Rule

provided that application-specific allowances could be

used only for the six specific applications enumerated in

6

the statute (or later added by EPA through the process

mandated by Congress). Ibid.; 40 C.F.R. 84.13(a).

EPA also set out its methodology for allocating the

allowances for calendar years 2022 and 2023. 86 Fed.

Reg. at 55,118. First, end users in the six statutorily

specified applications would receive application-specific

allowances. Id. at 55,148. Next, EPA would set aside a

small number of allowances for which a limited set of

users that would not otherwise qualify for allowances—

“new market entrants”—could apply. Id. at 55,15555,156. The remaining allowances would go into a general allowance pool. Id. at 55,147. Adhering to the structure of the predecessor Title VI phaseout, EPA provided

that whatever allowances remained for that general

pool would be allocated to historical market participants

that remained active in the HFC business, based on

their relative market share before enactment of the

AIM Act. Id. at 55,144-55,147.

b. In December 2021, petitioner challenged the

Framework Rule by filing a petition for review in the

United States Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit.

See Pet. for Review, RMS of Georgia, LLC v. EPA, No.

21-1253 (D.C. Cir. Dec. 6, 2021). The court of appeals

rejected petitioner’s nondelegation challenge because

that challenge had not been raised during the comment

period on the Rule. See Heating, Air Conditioning &

Refrigeration Distribs. Int’l v. EPA, 71 F.4th 59, 64-65

(D.C. Cir. 2023).

c. The Framework Rule governed allocations for

only the first two years of the phasedown, 2022 and

2023. In 2023, EPA undertook a new rulemaking (the

one at issue here), which maintained the allocation-andtrading approach from the original Rule. See 88 Fed.

Reg. 46,836 (July 20, 2023) (2024-2028 Rule). As with

7

the Framework Rule, the 2024-2028 Rule provided that

allowances would be allocated first to the uses identified

by Congress in the AIM Act for “the full quantity of allowances necessary, based on projected, current, and

historical trends, for the production or consumption” of

HFCs. 42 U.S.C. 7675(e)(4)(B)(iv)(I); see 88 Fed. Reg.

at 46,840. The remaining general-pool allowances would

again be issued to active historical market participants

based on their relative market share before enactment,

with accommodations for entities that received allowances as new market entrants. 88 Fed. Reg. at 46,850.

Since promulgating the 2024-2028 Rule, EPA has issued calendar-year allowances in separate annual actions. The number of allowances available to the general pool varies from year to year based on how many

allowances must be allocated for application-specific

uses. In the most recent annual allocation, 5.9% of consumption allowances were earmarked for such uses.

See 90 Fed. Reg. 52,391 (Nov. 20, 2025).

3. Certain entities that received allowances under

EPA’s allocation-and-trading program petitioned for

review of the 2024-2028 Rule in the D.C. Circuit.

Among those was petitioner, which “argue[d] that Congress violated the nondelegation doctrine when it granted

the EPA authority to allocate use allowances, and that

the EPA unconstitutionally exercised legislative power

when it promulgated the 2024 Rule.” Pet. App. 2.

The court of appeals denied the petitions for review.

Pet. App. 12-21. The court first rejected a challenge to

petitioner’s standing to seek judicial relief. The court

held that a decision in petitioner’s favor would redress

petitioner’s alleged injuries because, if Congress’s directive to establish an allowance-allocation system were

“invalidated,” the overall phasedown schedule could not

8

“remain operative” because “the interrelated subparts

of [the statute] are not severable.” Id. at 10-11.

On the merits, the court of appeals determined that

the AIM Act “does not unconstitutionally delegate legislative power because it sufficiently constrains the

EPA’s discretion to allocate HFC allowances.” Pet.

App. 12. The court derived the appropriate nondelegation test from, inter alia, this Court’s decision in FCC

v. Consumers’ Research, 606 U.S. 656 (2025), which applied “the intelligible-principle standard [that] has focused [the] nondelegation doctrine for a century,” id. at

673. See Pet. App. 14, 16. Reviewing the pertinent text

of Section 7675, the court of appeals explained that the

AIM Act “directs the EPA’s regulatory authority ‘to a

particular subject matter . . . in a particular industry’—

i.e., the allocation of a capped number of allowances for

the production and consumption of HFCs.” Id. at 19 (citation omitted). The court also examined the context of

the broader statutory plan, including the “predecessor

cap-and-trade programs” on which the AIM Act was

modeled. Id. at 16-17. The court concluded that “Congress intended that the EPA would implement the AIM

Act by allocating allowances in an orderly, marketbased fashion, as it did when implementing cap-andtrade programs under Title VI” of the Clean Air Act.

Id. at 18. The court concluded on these bases that “[t]he

AIM Act plainly does not give the EPA the sort of unbounded discretion that renders a statute unconstitutional.” Id. at 20.

The court of appeals subsequently denied a petition

for rehearing. Pet. App. 28-29.

ARGUMENT

Petitioner contends (Pet. 14-34) that, by according

EPA limited discretion to allocate some AIM Act

9

allowances, Congress effected an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power. The court of appeals correctly rejected that argument, and its decision does not

conflict with any decision of this Court or of another

court of appeals. In crafting the AIM Act, Congress

made the relevant policy decisions, and Congress both

bounded and channeled the narrow discretion it afforded EPA in establishing the method of allocation

within the cap-and-trade program. That statutory plan

“easily passe[d] muster,” Pet. App. 15, under “the

longstanding ‘intelligible principle’ test set forth by this

Court’s precedents,” FCC v. Consumers’ Research, 606

U.S. 656, 698 (2025) (Kavanaugh, J., concurring), and

there is no sound reason to revisit a test that this Court

considered and applied just last year. Further review

is not warranted.

1. This case meets none of the usual criteria for certiorari. Sup. Ct. R. 10(a). Petitioner does not assert

that any circuit conflict exists on the question presented, and no court other than the D.C. Circuit has

considered the AIM Act’s constitutionality or rendered

a contrary application of the nondelegation doctrine as

to any similar statute. Nor did the court of appeals decide a novel question of federal law that warrants this

Court’s immediate intervention. Rather, the court below simply applied the longstanding “intelligible principle” test, which this Court itself applied just last year to

reject a nondelegation challenge in Consumers’ Research, supra.

2. The court of appeals’ decision is correct. Congress does not impermissibly delegate legislative power

when it “ ‘vest[s] discretion’ in executive agencies to implement and apply the laws it has enacted—for example, by deciding on ‘the details of [their] execution.’ ”

10

Consumers’ Research, 606 U.S. at 672 (citation omitted;

second set of brackets in original); see J. W. Hampton,

Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 406 (1928).

When Congress leaves implementation of a statute to

an agency, it must supply an “intelligible principle,”

Hampton, 276 U.S. at 409, meaning that Congress must

“ma[k]e clear both ‘the general policy’ that the agency

must pursue and ‘the boundaries of [its] delegated authority,’” Consumers’ Research, 606 U.S. at 673 (citation omitted; second set of brackets in original). Under

the intelligible-principle standard, “the degree of

agency discretion that is acceptable varies according to

the scope of the power congressionally conferred.”

Ibid. (quoting Whitman v. American Trucking Ass’ns,

531 U.S. 457, 475 (2001)). Where that test is satisfied,

courts “will not disturb [Congress’s] grant of authority.” Ibid. The below court faithfully applied those

precedents here, see Pet. App. 13-14, and it correctly

held that “the AIM Act easily passes muster,” id. at 15.

a. The AIM Act “clearly delineate[d] the general

policy, the public agency which is to apply it, and the

boundaries of this delegated authority.” Pet. App. 1314 (citing Consumers’ Research, 606 U.S. at 673). Specifically, Congress identified the HFC compounds to be

phased down from a specified baseline according to a

detailed schedule; prohibited HFC production and importation without an allowance; and directed EPA to establish, through rulemaking, an allocation-and-trading

program that would accomplish the “phasing down [of]

production * * * [and] consumption of regulated substances in the United States.” 42 U.S.C. 7675(e)(3)(A)

and (B). That statutory plan plainly embodies “an intelligible principle to which [EPA] * * * is directed to conform.” Hampton, 276 U.S. at 409.

11

Petitioner isolates and challenges one aspect of this

detailed statutory plan—“how to allocate the [nonmandatory] allowances the AIM Act establishes”—

which petitioner contends has been left to EPA’s

“boundless discretion.” Pet. 20. But Congress defined

“allowance[s],” 42 U.S.C. 7675(b)(2), and explicitly required that sufficient allowances be allocated to certain

enumerated applications, 42 U.S.C. 7675(e)(4)(B)(iv), and

to further applications meeting the statutory criteria, 42

U.S.C. 7675(e)(4)(B)(i). It was also Congress, not EPA,

that directed the establishment of “an allowance allocation and trading program in accordance with this section” and “in accordance with the [phasedown] schedule.” 42 U.S.C. 7675(e)(3)(A) and (B) (emphases added).

The latter directives foreclose petitioner’s nondelegation challenge. Congress’s reference to “this section”—which encompasses the AIM Act as a whole—obligated EPA to allocate allowances so as to “phas[e]

down the production * * * [and] consumption” of HFCs

from pre-enactment baselines according to the statutory schedule. 42 U.S.C. 7675(e)(3)(A) and (B). That

exercise necessarily takes account of the state of HFC

production and consumption in the pre-enactment marketplace. See Pet. App. 16 (“A natural way to allocate

the allowances to achieve th[e statutory phasedown]

purpose is to rely on the market participants’ historical

market share.”). The statutory language repeatedly

confirms this connection between EPA’s allocating authority and the agency’s assessment of the pre-enactment marketplace—including, notably, by instructing

the agency to provide mandatory allocations “based on

projected, current, and historical trends.” 42 U.S.C.

7675(e)(4)(B)(iv)(I); cf. 42 U.S.C. 7675(e)(4)(B)(i) (instructing EPA to consider, inter alia, “overall economic

12

costs and environmental impacts compared to historical

trends” when determining whether to “allocate a quantity of allowances” for certain nonmandatory “[e]ssential uses”).

The AIM Act thus both limits EPA’s discretion by

establishing a phasedown schedule anchored to a statutory baseline and channels that discretion by requiring

the agency to take account of the pre-enactment marketplace when implementing the statutory plan. The

statute bears no resemblance to the National Industrial

Recovery Act provisions that the Court previously held

invalid under the nondelegation doctrine. Whereas the

provision at issue in A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v.

United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935), “conferred authority

to regulate the entire economy,” American Trucking,

531 U.S. at 474, the AIM Act confers authority to conduct an inexhaustive phasedown of a narrow class of

specifically identified chemicals. And while the provision at issue in Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S.

388 (1935), “provided literally no guidance for the exercise of discretion,” American Trucking, 531 U.S. at 474,

the AIM Act requires EPA to allocate a capped number

of allowances, subject to express statutory set-asides,

on a fixed phasedown schedule, in accordance with the

overall statutory plan.*

The delegation here is substantially narrower than in many statutes that the Court has previously upheld against nondelegation

challenges. See, e.g., American Power & Light Co. v. SEC, 329 U.S.

90, 104 (1946) (upholding delegation to prevent “unfair[] or inequitabl[e]” distribution of voting power among security holders); Yakus

v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 420 (1944) (upholding delegation to

the Price Administrator to fix commodity prices that, “in his judgment, will be generally fair and equitable”); Federal Power Comm’n

v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591, 600 (1944) (upholding delegation to determine “just and reasonable” rates); National Broad.

*

13

Indeed, EPA’s duty to allocate allowances “in accordance with this section,” 42 U.S.C. 7675(e)(3)(A), reflects a classically executive act of implementing, not

creating, the law. The fact that the Act tasked EPA

with filling in certain particulars of the allocation-andtrading program does not render it an unconstitutional

delegation of authority. Rather, Congress acts within

its constitutional ambit when it sets out a “ ‘general policy’ ” and leaves to the appropriate agency the responsibility of “address[ing] * * * narrow, technical issue[s]”

that arise in the implementation of that policy. Consumers’ Research, 606 U.S. at 673 (citation omitted); accord, e.g., American Trucking, 531 U.S. at 475 (“[E]ven

in sweeping regulatory schemes we have never demanded * * * that statutes provide a ‘determinate criterion.’ ”); Hampton, 276 U.S. at 406 (“Congress has

found it frequently necessary to use officers of the executive branch, within defined limits, to secure the exact effect intended by its acts of legislation, by vesting

discretion in such officers to * * * direct[] the details

of [their] execution.”).

b. Although the statutory text alone is sufficient to

supply the requisite intelligible principle here, “consider[ing that text] alongside its context, purpose, and

history” eliminates any doubt as to the AIM Act’s constitutionality. Gundy v. United States, 588 U.S. 128,

136 (2019) (plurality opinion). The history of statutorily

mandated phasedowns of similar manmade chemicals

confirms the boundaries of EPA’s discretion. See Pet.

App. 16-21.

Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 225-226 (1943) (upholding delegation to regulate as “public interest, convenience, or necessity” require).

14

As discussed, see pp. 2-3, supra, Congress enacted

the AIM Act—including its directive that EPA establish

and administer a cap-and-trade phasedown for HFCs—

against the recent historical backdrop of EPA’s capand-trade phaseout of ozone-depleting substances under Title VI of the Clean Air Act. See 42 U.S.C. 7671 et

seq. Indeed, Congress enacted the AIM Act shortly after the D.C. Circuit determined that EPA could not

simply incorporate HFCs into the same replacement regime used for ozone-depleting substances because

“HFCs are not ozone-depleting substances” under Title

VI. Mexichem Fluor, Inc. v. EPA, 866 F.3d 451, 455

(D.C. Cir. 2017) (Kavanaugh, J.), cert. denied, 586 U.S.

918 (2018). And the statutes bear unmistakable similarities, from Congress’s use of “baseline” years to set caps

and phaseout schedules, compare 42 U.S.C. 7671(2)(A)(C), 7671c(a), 7671d(b)(1), with 42 U.S.C. 7675(e)(1)(A)(D)(i); to its directive that EPA allocate allowances “in

accordance with” the rest of the statute, compare 42

U.S.C. 7671c(c), 7671d(c), with 42 U.S.C. 7675(e)(3).

“Based on the strong similarity between the programs created by the AIM Act and Title VI,” the court

of appeals found it “evident that Congress expected the

EPA to implement the HFC cap-and-trade program in

a manner that tracked the successful predecessor programs for [ozone-depleting substances].” Pet. App. 17.

And because “those predecessor programs allocated allowances according to market share,” id. at 17-18, EPA

appropriately assessed and anchored its allocations under the successor statute to shares in the HFC market.

See Parker Drilling Mgmt. Servs., Ltd. v. Newton, 587

U.S. 601, 611 (2019) (“It is a commonplace of statutory

interpretation that ‘Congress legislates against the

backdrop of existing law.’ ”) (citation omitted).

15

Petitioner fails to rebut this contextual evidence, focusing (Pet. 23-24) instead on two references to “legislative history” in the court of appeals’ opinion. See Pet.

App. 17 (citing Promoting American Innovation and

Jobs: Legislation to Phase Down Hydrofluorocarbons:

Hearing on H.R. 5544 Before the Subcomm. on Environment & Climate Change of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 116th Cong., 1st Sess. 2, 7 (2020));

id. at 21 (same). Of course, this Court “reviews judgments, not statements in opinions.” Black v. Cutter

Labs., 351 U.S. 292, 297 (1956). There is no reason to

conclude that the disposition below rested on these two

citations to a committee report rather than on the several pages the court spent analyzing and comparing enacted statutory language. See Pet. App. 16-20. As for

the court’s comparison between predecessor and successor statutes, petitioner does not dispute that such

statutory history remains an appropriate interpretive

tool. See National Ass’n of Home Builders v. Defenders of Wildlife, 551 U.S. 644, 666 (2007) (“It is a fundamental canon of statutory construction that the words

of a statute must be read in their context and with a view

to their place in the overall statutory scheme.”) (citation

and internal quotation marks omitted); Gundy, 588 U.S.

at 141 (“[B]eyond context and structure, the Court often

looks to ‘history [and] purpose’ to divine the meaning of

language.”) (citation omitted; second set of brackets in

original).

In any event, here “[t]he text, context, purpose, and

what little there is of drafting history all point in the

same direction,” United States v. Hayes, 555 U.S. 415,

429 (2009): Congress approved of EPA’s market-sharebased implementation of the Title VI phaseout and expected the agency to undertake a parallel approach to

16

the HFC phasedown. That was a permissible exercise

of legislative power. This Court “ha[s] ‘almost never

felt qualified to second-guess Congress regarding the

permissible degree of policy judgment that can be left

to those executing or applying the law.’ ” American

Trucking, 531 U.S. at 474-475 (citation omitted). And

no reason exists to do so where, as here, the implementing agency has not only a principle but a precedent to

follow.

3. Finally, this Court should decline petitioner’s alternative request (Pet. 29-34) to revisit the intelligibleprinciple standard in this case. Since “the beginning of

the Government,” Congress has enacted “general provisions” that confer substantial policymaking discretion

upon the Executive Branch. United States v. Grimaud,

220 U.S. 506, 517 (1911). And the intelligible-principle

test “has focused [this Court’s] nondelegation doctrine

for a century.” Consumers’ Research, 606 U.S. at 673.

Just last Term, the Court again applied that standard

and rejected the invitation to “apply a different test” to

a nondelegation challenge. Ibid. While “there of course

can be difficult questions about how to apply the intelligible principle test to particular statutes,” id. at 704

(Kavanaugh, J., concurring), petitioner identifies no legal or factual development in the last year that would

support abandonment of that longstanding approach

now. Nor does the AIM Act—which would pass muster

under either the intelligible-principle test or any other

standard that Members of this Court have articulated—

provide an appropriate occasion for reconsideration of

those precedents.

17

CONCLUSION

The petition for a writ of certiorari should be denied.

Respectfully submitted.

D. JOHN SAUER

Solicitor General

ADAM R.F. GUSTAFSON

Principal Deputy Assistant

Attorney General

ROBERT N. STANDER

Deputy Assistant

Attorney General

DANIEL J. MARTIN

Senior Attorney

MAY 2026