Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Gregory Hanna, Petitioner v. Department of Labor, Administrative Review Board, et al.
Supreme Court briefMar 2, 2026
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APPENDIX TABLE OF CONTENTS
OPINIONS AND ORDERS
Opinion, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit (October 1, 2025) .................................... 1a
Judgment, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit (October 1, 2025) .................................... 5a
Decision and Order, U.S. Department of
Labor Administrative Review Board
(March 19, 2024) ................................................. 6a
Decision and Order, U.S. Department of
Labor Office of Administrative Law Judges
(December 21, 2022) ......................................... 23a
REHEARING ORDER
Order Denying Petition for Rehearing, U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
(December 2, 2025) ........................................... 46a
OTHER DOCUMENTS
Complainant-Appellant’s Memorandum of
Points and Authorities in Support of Appeal
(March 13, 2023) ............................................... 47a
Response Brief of Global Nuclear Fuel-Americas,
LLC (May 9, 2023) ............................................ 75a
Complainant-Appellant’s Reply to Defendant
Global Nuclear Fuel-Americas, LLC’s
Response Brief (June 1, 2023)........................ 125a
Brief of the Acting Secretary of Labor
(September 5, 2024)........................................ 140a
APPENDIX TABLE OF CONTENTS (Cont.)
Letter from Occupational Safety and Health
Administration (October 19, 2023) ................ 160a
Reply Brief of Petitioner to the Response Brief
of the U.S. Department of Labor
(October 25, 2024) .......................................... 164a
App.1a
OPINION, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
(OCTOBER 1, 2025)
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
________________________
GREGORY HANNA,
Petitioner,
v.
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF LABOR,
ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD; GLOBAL
NUCLEAR FUEL AMERICAS LLC,
Respondents.
________________________
No. 24-1435
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
United States Department of Labor,
Administrative Review Board. (2023-0015)
Before: DIAZ, Chief Judge, and WYNN and HARRIS,
Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
The Energy Reorganization Act of 1974 provides
employees with a cause of action when discharged in
retaliation for reporting nuclear safety concerns. 42
U.S.C. § 5851. Yet Congress conditioned that right
App.2a
on timeliness: a retaliation complaint must be filed with
the Occupational Safety and Health Administration
(“OSHA”) within 180 days of the alleged violation. See
id. § 5851(b)(1); 29 C.F.R. § 24.103(c). However, “[t]he
time for filing [such] a complaint may be tolled for
reasons warranted by applicable case law.” 29 C.F.R.
§ 24.103(d)(2).
Here, after Gregory Hanna’s former employer,
Global Nuclear Fuel-Americas, LLC (“GNF”), terminated him in 2017, he filed a complaint with OSHA
alleging that GNF terminated him in retaliation for
raising significant safety concerns. But Hanna did not
file his complaint until after the statutory 180-day
deadline had passed.
Rejecting Hanna’s tolling arguments, OSHA, an
Administrative Law Judge, and the Administrative
Review Board (“Board”) each dismissed the complaint
as untimely. “We review the [Board]’s decision pursuant
to the Administrative Procedure Act. Under that framework, we may only disturb the [Board]’s decision if it
was arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or
otherwise not in accordance with law.” Peck v. U.S.
Dep’t of Lab., Admin. Rev. Bd., 996 F.3d 224, 228 (4th
Cir. 2021) (cleaned up). As relevant here, “[w]e
review an agency’s decision to deny equitable tolling
for abuse of discretion.” Prince v. Solis, 487 F. App’x
773, 774 (4th Cir. 2012) (per curiam); see Am. Bankers
Ins. Grp., Inc. v. Long, 453 F.3d 623, 629 (4th Cir.
2006).
Before this Court, Hanna contends that he can
invoke equitable estoppel because GNF lulled him
into thinking his termination would be reversed. But
Hanna does not dispute the Board’s conclusion that
GNF “did not actively or intentionally lull [him] into
App.3a
forgoing his right[]” to file a timely OSHA complaint,
which the Board concluded was “supported by
substantial evidence and unchallenged on appeal.” J.A.
976–77 (emphasis added).* Instead, he relies on Board
case law permitting tolling where “the [employer]’s
conduct, innocent or not, reasonably induced the
plaintiff not to file suit within the limitations period.”
In re Hyman v. KD Res., ARB No. 09-076, ALJ No.
2009-SOX-020, 2010 WL 1260209, at *4 (A.R.B. Mar.
31, 2010) (emphasis added). However, our own case
law forecloses Hanna’s argument.
“The separation of powers doctrine requires
administrative agencies to follow the law of the circuit
whose courts have jurisdiction over the cause of action.
In the absence of a controlling decision by the Supreme
Court, the respective courts of appeals express the law
of the circuit.” Hyatt v. Heckler, 807 F.2d 376, 379 (4th
Cir. 1986). And, in the precise context of an Energy
Reorganization Act retaliation complaint, we have
held that an employee may not invoke equitable
estoppel “[a]bsent evidence that the employer acted to
deceive the employee as to the existence of its claim or
otherwise to mislead or coerce the employee into not
filing a claim in a timely fashion.” English v.
Whitfield, 858 F.2d 957, 963 (4th Cir. 1988). We
further clarified that “an employee’s hope for a
continuing employment relationship” and “even an
employer’s confirmation of that hope” is not enough to
invoke equitable estoppel “absent some indication
that the promise was a quid-pro-quo for the employee’s
forbearance in filing a claim.” Id. (cleaned up).
* “J.A.” refers to the Joint Appendix filed by the parties in this
matter.
App.4a
Thus, Hanna’s argument for estoppel—that GNF
lulled him into a false sense of security by “le[ading]
[him] to believe that it was quite possible he could
continue to work at GNF if he followed proper procedure” and pursued internal appeals of his termination, Opening Br. at 18—is foreclosed by English.
Accordingly, we deny the petition for review. We
dispense with oral argument because the facts and
legal contentions are adequately presented in the
materials before this Court and argument would not
aid the decisional process.
PETITION DENIED
App.5a
JUDGMENT, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
(OCTOBER 1, 2025)
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
________________________
GREGORY HANNA,
Petitioner,
v.
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF LABOR,
ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD; GLOBAL
NUCLEAR FUEL AMERICAS LLC,
Respondents.
________________________
No. No. 24-1435
(2023-0015)
JUDGMENT
In accordance with the decision of this court, the
petition for review is denied.
This judgment shall take effect upon issuance of
this court’s mandate in accordance with Fed. R. App.
P. 41.
/s/ Nwamaka Anowi
Clerk
App.6a
DECISION AND ORDER,
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR
ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD
(MARCH 19, 2024)
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR
ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD
200 CONSTITUTION AVE. NW
WASHINGTON, DC 20210-0001
________________________
IN THE MATTER OF:
GREGORY HANNA,
Complainant,
v.
GLOBAL NUCLEAR FUEL AMERICAS, LLC,
Respondent.
________________________
ARB Case No. 2023-0015
ALJ Case No. 2020-ERA-00002
Chief ALJ Stephen R. Henley
Before: WARREN and ROLFE,
Administrative Appeals Judges.
DECISION AND ORDER
WARREN, Administrative Appeals Judge:
This case arises from a complaint filed by
Gregory Hanna (Complainant) against his employer,
App.7a
Global Nuclear Fuel-Americas, LLC (Respondent),
alleging retaliation in violation of the whistleblower
protections of the Energy Reorganization Act (ERA)
and its implementing regulations.1 After issuing a
show cause order asking the parties to brief why the
case should not be dismissed for failure to comply with
the time limits for filing an ERA-retaliation claim and
conducting an evidentiary hearing on the matter, the
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) dismissed the case.
For the following reasons, the Board affirms the ALJ’s
Decision and Order Dismissing the Complaint as
Untimely Filed (D. & O.).
Background
Respondent hired Complainant as a shop support
operator at its Wilmington, North Carolina plant on
August 6, 2012.2
On May 31, 2017, Complainant met with his
manager, John Berger (Berger), and Respondent’s
Human Resources Manager, Ana Garriga (Garriga),
and received a termination letter dated June 1, 2017.3
Berger advised Complainant that he committed a
Category 1 offense for allegedly leaving his worksite
without permission and his employment was
terminated effective immediately.4
1 42 U.S.C. § 5851; 29 C.F.R. Part 24 (2023).
2 D. & O. at 3.
3 Id. The termination letter advised Complainant that his
“employment with the General Electronic Company is terminated
effective immediately, due to this failure to comply with Company
policies.” Id. at 4.
4 Id. at 4. The termination letter explained that Complainant
committed a Category I work rule violation by “leaving the work-
App.8a
Garriga advised Complainant that he could
pursue an internal appeal if he disagreed with the
termination and provided him with a hard copy of
Respondent’s Employee Appeals Procedure, HEP-51.5
She discussed Respondent’s internal appeals process
with him, which consisted of three levels: first, an
appeal with Complainant’s direct supervisor; second,
an appeal with Complainant’s second-level manager;
and third, an appeal to the Plant Manager or a Peer
Panel.6 Garriga informed Complainant that if he
pursued an internal appeal regarding his termination,
he would not be paid, but he would continue to receive
some benefits during the appeal process.7
From June 1, 2017, through July 20, 2017, Complainant received weekly deposits from Respondent
reflecting his salary earned through June 1, 2017, and
accrued and unused vacation, personal time, and
unused floating holidays.8 Respondent usually made
these payments in a lump sum but made weekly
payments to Complainant per his request.9
site or being off plant premises without permission while registered
as working.” Id.; JX 16.
5 Respondent’s Response Brief (Resp. Br.) at 3; Complainant’s
Brief (Comp. Br.) at 8; JX 21 is a hard copy of Respondent’s
Employee Appeals Procedure, HEP-51.
6 D. & O. at 4; Resp. Br. at 3-4; Comp. Br. at 9.
7 D. & O. at 4; Resp. Br. at 3-4.
8 D. & O. at 5. On January 1, 2018, Complainant was placed on
a leave of absence to continue receiving health benefits during
the pendency of his claim. Id. at 7.
9 Id. at 5.
App.9a
On June 1, 2017, and July 17, 2017, Complainant
requested photographs from Respondent to use during
the internal appeals process.10 Garriga provided the
photographs to Complainant within days of his requests
on June 5, 2017, and July 18, 2017, respectively.11
On June 7, 2017, Complainant telephoned and
spoke with someone at the North Carolina Department
of Labor’s Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(NC EEOC).12 During the telephone conversation,
Complainant communicated his belief that Respondent
discriminated against him due to his disability and
wrongfully terminated him.13 But Complainant did
not claim his termination was in retaliation for raising
workplace safety concerns, nor did he discuss ERA
whistleblower protections, and no evidence suggests
that, following the call, NC EEOC opened an investigation or made a referral to another federal or state
agency.14
On June 9, 2017, Complainant filed his first appeal
through Respondent’s internal appeals process with
his immediate supervisor, who declined to overturn
the termination.15 On July 10, 2017, Complainant
10 Id.
11 Id.
12 Id. Complainant contends that he has a communication
disability and requires assistance in understanding and
participating in written and oral communication. Id. at 5 n.8.
13 Id. at 5. Complainant also discussed his workplace safety
concerns. Id.
14 Id.
15 Resp. Br. at 4.
App.10a
filed his second appeal through the internal appeals
process with his second-level manager, who denied it
on July 17, 2017.16
On July 19, 2017, Complainant filed a written
concern with Respondent’s Ombuds Program17 voicing
technical safety concerns and asserting that the termination of his employment was in retaliation for raising
safety issues.18 Respondent then hired an outside law
firm to investigate Complainant’s Ombuds complaint.19
Complainant contends that he contacted the U.S.
Department of Labor’s Occupational Safety and
Health Administration (OSHA) in November of 2017
and left a voicemail detailing the circumstances of the
termination of his employment.20
16 D. & O. at 5; Resp. Br. at 4.
17 Unlike Respondent’s internal appeals process that allowed for
employees to appeal their termination through management, the
Ombuds Program used an independent investigator hired to
conduct his or her own investigation and provide management
with recommendations regarding various concerns raised by
employees. Tr. at 86, 96, 100, 146, 152; Resp. Br. at 5; Comp. Br.
at 12.
18 D. & O. at 5; Resp. Br. at 4-5. Section 4.5 of the Employee
Appeals Procedure, HEP-51, specifically provides that “employees
should decide which review process to use . . . it is not appropriate
to use the GE Ombuds process and the appeals process
concurrently.” Resp. Br. at 4-5; JX 21.
19 D. & O. at 6; Resp. Br. at 5. Tim Matthews (a partner at the
outside law firm Respondent hired) debriefed Complainant on
the results of the investigation on December 22, 2017. D. & O. at
6 n.10.
20 D. & O. at 6. The ALJ found that this telephone call did not
occur as “there [wa]s no written record of th[e] call, despite a
App.11a
On December 8, 2017, Complainant filed a
complaint with OSHA alleging that Respondent fired
him on or about June 1, 2017, in retaliation for
reporting safety concerns and refusing to perform
unsafe tasks.21
Procedural Background
On October 24, 2019, OSHA issued a final determination letter dismissing the December 8, 2017
complaint.22 It found that Complainant filed it after
the 180-day deadline for filing had expired and did not
present any credible evidence to justify equitable
tolling.23 Complainant filed objections and a request
for hearing on November 12, 2019.24
On December 2, 2019, the ALJ issued an Order to
Show Cause regarding why Complainant’s claim
should not be dismissed for not filing a timely complaint
set by 29 C.F.R. § 24.103(d)(2).25 Complainant filed a
diligent search by OSHA personnel[.]” Id. An OSHA
“Memorandum to File” dated October 8, 2019, details the efforts
OSHA made to substantiate the telephone call, but no records
documented a call by Complainant or on his behalf to OSHA.
Respondent Global Nuclear Fuel-Americas, LLC’s Reply Brief to
Chief Administrative Law Judge Henley’s Order to Show Cause
(Feb. 7, 2020), Exhibit 24.
21 Id. at 1-2.
22 Id. at 2.
23 Id.
24 Id.
25 Id. As a threshold matter, we note that a mandatory claim
processing regulation, not a statutory jurisdictional requirement,
establishes the regulatory time limits in 29 C.F.R. § 24.103(d)(2)
and that the time limits in the statute at 42 U.S.C. § 5851(b)(2)
likewise are not jurisdictional. See Fort Bend Cnty., Tex. v. Davis,
App.12a
response to the show cause order on January 6, 2020,
and Respondent filed a response brief on February 7,
2020.26
On February 8, 2020, the ALJ issued a Notice of
Limited Pretrial Hearing notifying the parties that a
hearing was appropriate to determine whether
Complainant’s complaint should be dismissed as
untimely filed.27 The ALJ held an evidentiary hearing
587 US-, 139 S. Ct. 1843, 1849 (2019); Moreb v. Kerry Inc., ARB
No. 2023-0048, ALJ No. 2023-FDA-00014, slip op. at 4-5 (ARB
Dec. 14, 2023). As such, the parties must properly raise timeliness
as an affirmative defense for those limits to come into play or
they normally will be waived or forfeited. Fort Bend Cnty, Tex.,
587 U.S.-, 139 S. Ct. 1843 at 1849; Moreb, ARB No. 2023 0048,
slip op. at 5. While the ALJ thus erred by raising Complainant’s
alleged noncompliance sua sponte without first requiring Respondent to raise it as an affirmative defense (see Moreb, ARB No.
2023-0048, slip op. at 5), the error does not require remand.
Respondent unquestionably has sufficiently raised and developed
a timeliness defense at every stage of the administrative process
including raising several arguments in its initial filing at the
ALJ level in response to the show cause order. Under these
circumstances, the defense can categorically be said to have not
been forfeited or waived below. Hamer v. Neighborhood Hous.
Servs. of Chi., 583 U.S. 17, 20 fn. 1 (2017) (“Forfeiture is the
failure to make the timely assertion of a right; waiver is the
intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right.”)
(citations omitted); Woodson v. Allstate Ins. Co., 855 F.3d 628,
635 (4th Cir. 2017) (statute of limitations defense not waived or
forfeited where timely raised and developed). Remand therefore
would serve no purpose.
26 D. & O. at 2.
27 Id.
App.13a
on the issue on October 29, 2020, and the parties later
filed timely post-hearing briefs.28
On December 12, 2022, the ALJ issued a Decision
and Order Dismissing the Complaint as Untimely
Filed. The ALJ found: (1) the 180-day statutory filing
period began to run on June 1, 2017, and Complainant
had until November 28, 2017 to file his ERA-retaliation
complaint with OSHA; (2) Complainant filed his ERAretaliation complaint with OSHA on December 8,
2017; and (3) Complainant did not establish a basis to
equitably toll the filing deadline.29
This appeal followed.
Jurisdiction and Standard of Review
Congress authorized the Secretary of Labor to
issue final agency decisions with respect to claims of
discrimination and retaliation filed under the ERA. 30
The Secretary of Labor has delegated to the Board the
authority to review ALJ decisions.31 The ARB reviews
questions of law presented on appeal de novo, but is
bound by the ALJ’s factual determinations as long as
28 Id. at 3. The ALJ bifurcated the hearing, with the October 29,
2020 proceedings limited to receiving evidence, including witness
testimony, on whether Complainant’s complaint should be
dismissed as untimely filed. Id. at 2.
29 Id. at 10, 14.
30 42 U.S.C. § 5851; Clem v. Comput. Scis. Corp., ARB No. 20200025, ALJ Nos. 2015-ERA-00003,-00004, slip op. at 13 (ARB Mar.
10, 2021) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 5851).
31 Secretary’s Order No. 01-2020 (Delegation of Authority and
Assignment of Responsibility to the Administrative Review
Board (Secretary’s discretionary review of ARB decisions)), 85
Fed. Reg. 13186 (Mar. 6, 2020).
App.14a
they are supported by substantial evidence.
“[S]ubstantial evidence is a ‘term of art’ used throughout administrative law” denoting “more than a mere
scintilla” but only “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion.”32
Discussion
1.
Substantial Evidence Supports the ALJ’s
Decision That Complainant’s Complaint Was
Untimely
A complainant pursuing a whistleblower claim
under the ERA must meet certain deadlines.33 Any
employee who believes he has been discharged or
otherwise discriminated against in violation of the
ERA “may, within 180 days after such violation occurs,”
file a complaint with the Secretary of Labor.34 The
implementing regulation further specifies that such
an employee may file “within 180 days after an alleged
violation of the [ERA] occurs (i.e., when the retaliatory
decision has been both made and communicated to the
complainant).”35
The Board has found that the statutes of limitation
in whistleblower cases begin to run on the date an
employee receives “final, definitive, and unequivocal
32 Biestek v. Berryhill, 587 US-, 139 S. Ct. 1148, 1154 (2019)
(citations omitted).
33 42 U.S.C. § 5851(b)(1); 29 C.F.R. § 24.103(d)(2).
34 42 U.S.C. § 5851(b)(1).
35 29 C.F.R. § 24.103(d)(2).
App.15a
notice” of an adverse employment decision. 36 The
claim accrues on “[t]he date that an employer communicates a decision to implement such a decision,
rather than the date the consequences of the decision
are felt.”37
The ALJ in this case found that the June 1, 2017
termination letter, received by Complainant on May
31, 2017, was final, unequivocal, and unambiguous
notice of termination, clearly stating: “[y]our employment with the General Electric Company is terminated
effective immediately.”38 As the ALJ found, the letter
put Complainant on notice of his termination.39 As the
ALJ further noted, during their May 31, 2017 meeting,
Berger explicitly told Complainant that his
36 Mehrotra v. Gen. Elec. Co., ARB No. 2022-0060, ALJ No. 2017SOX-00014, slip op. at 5 (ARB Sept. 21, 2023) (quoting Bauche v.
Masimo Corp., ARB No. 2022-0035, ALJ No. 2022-SOX-00010,
slip op. at 7 (ARB Sept. 27, 2022)); see also Larrick v. Bechtel
Nat’l, Inc., ARB No. 2017-0053, ALJ No. 2017-ERA-00004, slip op.
at 3 (ARB Feb. 20, 2020) (citing to Swenk v. Exelon Generation
Co., ARB No. 2004-0028, ALJ No. 2003-ERA-00030, slip op. at 4
(ARB Apr. 28, 2005)).
37 Mehrotra, ARB No. 2022-0060, slip op. at 5 (citing Delaware
State College v. Ricks (Ricks), 449 U.S. 250, 258 (1980) (holding
that the statute of limitations starts on the date the employee
receives notice of imminent discharge because “the proper focus
is on the time of the discriminatory act, not the point at which
the consequences of the act become painful”)) (other citations
omitted).
38 D. & O. at 9-10.
39 See Larrick, ARB 2017-0053, slip op. at 3 (“‘Final’ and ‘definitive’
notice denotes communication that is decisive or conclusive, i.e.
leaving no further chance for action, discussion, or change.”).
App.16a
employment was terminated, effective immediately.40
Thus, Complainant received final and unequivocal
notice of his June 1, 2017 termination on May 31,
2017.41
Since Complainant filed his complaint on December 8, 2017,42 substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s
conclusion that the complaint was untimely.
2.
Hanna Did Not Coherently Argue to the ALJ
That Respondent Lulled Him into Inaction to
Justify Equitable Estoppel—Regardless, the
ALJ’s Reasonable Factual Findings Foreclose
the Argument
Under statutes where the filing period is not
jurisdictional, the requirement is subject to “waiver,”
“equitable estoppel,” and “equitable tolling.”43 Tolling
40 D. & O. at 4.
41 Although the ALJ stated that Complainant’s employment was
terminated on June 1, 2017 (at D. & O. at 10), his findings and
analysis (at D. & O. at 9) support May 31, 2017 as the date
Complainant received notice of termination. Regardless, any error
on this issue would be harmless as using either date would still
make Complainant’s December 8, 2017 filing date untimely.
42 Complainant argued that he timely filed his whistleblower
claim under the ERA because he left a voicemail with OSHA on
or about November 24, 2017. Tr. at 69-70. The ALJ determined
that the factual evidence did not establish that Complainant filed
a complaint with OSHA in November 2017, and substantial
evidence, consisting of testimony to the effect that there was no
record of any call by Complainant to OSHA in November 2017
after a diligent search for one, supports his factual finding.
43 Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 455 U.S. 385, 393-94
(1982); accord Wilkins v. United States, 598 U.S.152, 161 (2023)
(citation omitted); see also Boechler, P.C. v. Comm’r of Internal
Revenue, 596 U.S. 199, 209 n.1 (2022) (equitable tolling is not
App.17a
and estoppel are two distinct doctrines:44 “Equitable
tolling focuses on the [employee-complainant’s]
excusable ignorance of the employer’s discriminatory
act. Equitable estoppel, in contrast, examines the
[employer or other] defendant’s conduct and the
extent to which the [complainant] has been induced to
refrain from exercising his rights.”45 Complainant’s
appeal concerns only the latter.
Equitable estoppel applies when an employee
“does not make a timely filing due to his reasonable
reliance on his employer’s misleading or confusing
representations or conduct.” 46 While deliberate
attempts to mislead “generally” will justify its
application, “it is [ultimately] immaterial whether the
employer engaged in intentional misconduct;” the
“issue is whether the employer’s conduct, innocent or
not, reasonably induced the employee not to file suit
within the limitations period.”47 Fundamentally, “[i]t
is only necessary to show that the person estopped, by
limited to Article III courts) (citations omitted).
44 Mehrotra, ARB No. 2022-0060, slip op. at 8 (citing Martin v.
Paragon Foods, ARB No. 2022-0058, ALJ No. 2021-FDA-00001,
slip op. at 8 (ARB June 8, 2023)).
45 Id.
46 Mehrotra, ARB No. 2022-0060, slip op. at 8 (citing Droog v.
Ingersoll-Rand Hussman, ARB No. 2011-0075, ALJ No. 2011CER-00001, slip op. at 3 n.6 (ARB Sept. 13, 2012)).
47 Jenkins v. CSX Transp., Inc., ARB No. 2013-0029, ALJ No.
2012-FRS-00073, slip op. at 7 (ARB May 15, 2014); see also Hyman
v. KD Res., ARB No. 2009-0076, ALJ No. 2009-SOX-00020, slip
op. at 7 (ARB Mar. 31, 2010) (citation omitted).
App.18a
his statements or conduct, misled another to his
prejudice.”48
Complainant limits this appeal to a single issue:
while accepting the ALJ sufficiently determined
Respondent did not actively mislead Complainant, he
contends the ALJ erred by not determining whether
Respondent’s “actions, intentional or not, lulled [him]
into missing the filing deadline.”49 We find that
remaining argument foreclosed for two independently
dispositive reasons: 1) Complainant did not sufficiently
raise it to the ALJ; and 2) even if he had, the ALJ’s
permissible findings of fact preclude its application.
First, Complainant (at most) only obliquely
referenced being unintentionally lulled into inaction
below; he never set forth an actual argument presenting
it. While Complainant contends that he expressly
raised and developed the issue, the only items he cites
on appeal as evidence are isolated hearing transcript
pages without any context or explanation.50
Significantly, Complainant does not identify any portion
of his extensive post-hearing brief addressing the
matter. Indeed, as Respondent points out, Complainant’s new inducement argument directly conflicts
with his previous positions that he timely filed a
48 Jenkins, ARB No. 2013-0029, slip op. at 7.
49 Comp. Br. at 21. We affirm the ALJ’s finding that Respondent
did not actively or intentionally lull Complainant into forgoing
his rights as it is supported by substantial evidence and
unchallenged on appeal. See Litt v. Republic Servs. of S. Nev., ARB
No. 2008-0130, ALJ No. 2006-STA-00014, slip op. at 7 (ARB Aug.
30, 2010) (affirming an ALJ finding of no knowledge as supported
by substantial evidence and unchallenged on appeal).
50 Id.
App.19a
verbal complaint with OSHA and another timely
complaint in the wrong forum—two positions that the
ALJ rejected and that Complainant has not
appealed.51 Counter to Complainant’s primary contention on appeal, an ALJ cannot err by failing to address
an argument not made to him. And under wellestablished precedent, the Board does not generally
consider arguments a party raises for the first time on
appeal.52
Second, even if Complainant had properly raised
the argument, the facts as the ALJ found them belie
any suggestion that Respondent lulled Complainant
into forgoing his rights. Complainant contends that if
the ALJ “considered lulling as a basis for tolling” he
would have found the internal and external appeals
processes, and Respondent’s continued payment of
wages and benefits Complainant earned before his
termination, induced him into believing he would be
reinstated.53
But that simply is not the case. The ALJ did
consider each of those factors and definitively found
they would not induce a reasonable person into thinking he was not terminated or that he would inevitably
51 Resp. Br. at 12.
52 Bauche, ARB No. 2022-0035, slip op. at 8 n.35 (“The Board
does not generally consider arguments raised for the first time
on appeal . . . nor evidence submitted for the first time on appeal.”);
Privler v. CSX Transp., Inc., ARB No. 2018-0071, ALJ No. 2018
FRS-00021, slip op. at 3 (ARB Mar. 24, 2020) (citing Carter v.
Champion Bus, Inc., ARB No. 2005-0076, ALJ No. 2005-SOX00023, slip op. at 7 (ARB Sept. 29, 2006).
53 Comp. Br. at 23-29.
App.20a
be reinstated. With regard to his initial termination
and the internal appeals process, the ALJ found:
. . . the June 1, 2017 written notice of
termination, delivered to Complainant on
May 31, 2017, was final, unequivocal, and
unambiguous, clearly stating: ‘[y]our employment with the General Electric Company is
terminated effective immediately.’ I find no
indication that Respondent, either verbally
or in writing, communicated anything to the
contrary. Instead, the evidence establishes
that Respondent consistently and unmistakably communicated to Complainant on May
31, 2017 and throughout the internal appeals
period, that he was fired effective June 1,
2017.[54]
The ALJ similarly found Complainant’s “Ombud’s
concerns” did not “suspend the date of his termination
or otherwise alter his status with the company.”55
The ALJ also determined that Respondent informed Complainant he would continue to have access
to his benefits if he pursued an internal appeal and
that it did not affect his termination.56 The payments
that Complainant received from June 1 through July
20, 2017, reflected his salary earned through June 1,
2017, in addition to accrued and unused vacation,
personal time, and unused floating holidays. According
to the ALJ, they did not in any way reflect any work
performed by Complainant after June 1, 2017, or
54 D. & O. at 9.
55 Id.
56 Id.
App.21a
otherwise imply a continued working relationship.57
Indeed, during the appeals process, the ALJ found
Complainant himself acknowledged his termination,
stating “I believe my termination is without merit and
should be reversed.”58 Substantial evidence supports
the ALJ’s factual findings that Complainant knew he
was fired on June 1, 2017 and that continued receipt
of pay and health benefits while participating in
Respondent’s internal appeals process did not
suspend the effective date of termination.59
It is impossible to reconcile those findings with
Complainant’s new argument that Respondent’s
“actions were sufficient to lull [him] into a position he
would not have otherwise taken.”60 Complainant, in
effect, simply asks us to reweigh the evidence in his
favor, something our standard of review does not
permit. Instead, when substantial evidence supports
the ALJ’s factual findings—as it does here—we must
affirm.61
CONCLUSION
Accordingly, we AFFIRM the ALJ’s Decision and
Order Dismissing the Complaint as Untimely Filed.
57 Id. at 4 (“Complainant has not performed any work for
Respondent since June 1, 2017.”).
58 Id. at 5.
59 Id. at 10.
60 Comp. Br. at 29.
61 See Clem v. Comput. Scis. Corp., ARB No. 2020-0025, slip op.
at 16 (The Board will uphold the ALJ’s factual findings if
substantial evidence supports the conclusion).
App.22a
SO ORDERED.
/s/ Ivey S. Warren
Administrative Appeals Judge
/s/ Jonathan Rolfe
Administrative Appeals Judge
App.23a
DECISION AND ORDER,
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR
OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGES
(DECEMBER 21, 2022)
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR
OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGES
Washington, DC
________________________
IN THE MATTER OF:
GREGORY HANNA,
Complainant,
v.
GLOBAL NUCLEAR FUEL AMERICAS, LLC,
Respondent.
________________________
OALJ Case No.: 2020-ERA-00002
OSHA Case No.: 4-3750-18-030
Chief ALJ Stephen R. Henley
Before: Stephen R. HENLEY,
Chief Administrative Law Judge.
DECISION AND ORDER DISMISSING THE
COMPLAINT AS UNTIMELY FILED
This proceeding arises under the employee
protection provisions of the Energy Reorganization
Act of 1974 (“ERA” or “the Act”), 42 U.S.C. § 5851 and
App.24a
the implementing regulations found at 29 C.F.R. Part
24.
Procedural Background
Gregory Hanna (“Complainant”) filed a complaint
with the Department of Labor’s Occupational Safety
and Health Administration (“OSHA”) on December 8,
2017, alleging that his employer, Global Nuclear FuelAmericas, LLC1 (“Respondent” or “GNF-A”), fired him
on or about June 1, 2017 in retaliation for reporting
safety concerns and refusing to perform unsafe tasks.
On October 24, 2019, a Regional Supervisory
Investigator with OSHA issued a determination letter
dismissing the complaint, finding Complainant filed it
after the 180-day deadline had expired and that he
had “not provided any credible evidence to justify
equitable tolling.”2 On November 12, 2019, Complainant appealed the determination and requested a
hearing before the Office of Administrative Law Judges
(“OALJ”).
Because it appeared that Complainant filed his
complaint with OSHA some 10 days after the statutory
filing deadline expired, I issued an Order to Show
Cause on December 2, 2019 requiring Complainant to
1 Global Nuclear Fuel-Americas, LLC., a GE-led joint venture, is
a leading supplier of boiling water reactor fuel and fuel-related
engineering services and operates in the State of North Carolina.
https://www.bloomberg.com/profile/company/0287218D
2 The statute provides that “[a]ny employee who believes that he
has been discharged or otherwise discriminated against by any
person in violation of [the statute] may, within 180 days after
such violation occurs, file (or have any person file on his behalf)
a complaint with the Secretary of Labor . . . alleging such
discharge or discrimination.” 42 U.S.C. § 5851(b)(1).
App.25a
provide a written statement explaining why this
matter should not be dismissed for failing to file a
timely complaint and, if appropriate, describe why he
believed equitable tolling of the limitations period
might be applicable.
Complainant submitted a lengthy filing on
January 6, 2020, much of which attempted to litigate
the merits of his underlying claim of retaliation.
Respondent’s counsel filed a comprehensive reply on
February 7, 2020.
On February 8, 2020, I issued Notice of Limited
Pretrial Hearing, finding that there appeared to be a
genuine dispute, in part, as to the nature, scope and
type of contacts Complainant may have had with
other federal and state agencies and whether such
contacts might qualify as “filing a complaint” under the
regulations or toll or even extend the filing deadline.
Under the circumstances, dismissal of Mr. Hanna’s
complaint on summary decision without the opportunity to present evidence on the limited issue of
timeliness would have been premature.3
Accordingly, I found that bifurcation of the
hearing was appropriate, with the first part limited to
receiving evidence, to include witness testimony, on
whether Mr. Hanna’s complaint should be dismissed as
untimely filed. The parties were informed that only
3 See Hukman v. U.S. Airways, Inc., ARB No. 2018-0048, ALJ
No. 2015-AIR-00003, PDF at 7 (ARB Jan. 16, 2020) (observing
that “it is seldom in the interests of procedural due process or the
‘ends of justice’ for an ALJ to reduce the available means of proof
and increase the trial burden upon a self-represented litigant,
whatever the perceived increase in judicial efficiency to be
derived from such measures.”).
App.26a
after resolving this issue would the tribunal consider
proceeding to a hearing on the merits.4
On October 29, 2020, the tribunal convened a
limited pre-trial hearing via video conference to receive
evidence on the timeliness of the OSHA complaint, to
include whether the deadline should be tolled or
extended. At the hearing, I admitted Joint Exhibits
(“JX”) 1-64 into evidence. (Tr. 6). Complainant filed
his post-hearing brief on March 1, 2021 (Comp. Br.)5
4 As a self-represented complainant apparently lacking formal
legal expertise, I have afforded Mr. Hanna “with a degree of
adjudicative latitude” in this case. Hyman v. KD Resources, ARB
No. 09 076, ALJ No. 2009-SOX-00020, PDF at 8 (ARB Mar. 28,
2010) (citing Ubinger v. CAE Int’l, ARB No. 07-083, ALJ No. 2007SOX-00036, PDF at 6 (ARB Aug. 27, 2008)). However, while a
self-represented litigant, such as Mr. Hanna, may be held to a
lesser standard than that of legal counsel in procedural matters,
the burden of establishing the basis for equitable tolling of a
filing deadline is no less. See Flener v. H.K. Cupp, Inc., Case No.
90-STA-42, PDF at 3 n. 2 (Sec’y Oct. 10, 1991). In other words,
as the complaining party, it is Mr. Hanna’s burden to
demonstrate why equitable principles should be applied to toll
the limitations period in this case. Wilson v. Sec’y, Dep’t of
Veterans Affairs, 65 F.3d 402, 404 (5th Cir. 1995).
Additionally, despite efforts to focus Mr. Hanna on the narrow
issue of timeliness, the tribunal has found it difficult to determine
exactly what he believes are the precise bases for equitable
tolling. Due, in part, to the volume of paper he has filed with the
tribunal, most of which is unrelated to the issue of timeliness, it
remains unclear what specific arguments and events Mr. Hanna
relies on to support his position that equitable tolling is
warranted. Given these challenges, this decision addresses Mr.
Hanna’s arguments to the best of the tribunal’s understanding.
5 Complainant submitted seventeen new exhibits with his Reply
Brief. Respondent objects to the admission of these exhibits but
itself provided two rebuttal exhibits. Though not all the exhibits
address the narrow issue of timeliness, for completeness, the
App.27a
and Respondent filed its post-hearing brief on April 1,
2021 (Resp. Br.). Complainant replied on April 26,
2021. As more fully explained below, as I find
Complainant did not file it before the limitations
period expired, and he has not established a basis to
support equitable tolling, the December 8, 2017 OSHA
complaint is dismissed.
Essential Findings of Fact
Gregory Hanna was hired as a shop support
operator at Global Nuclear Fuel-Americas’ (“GNF-A”)
Wilmington, North Carolina plant on or about August
6, 2012.
On May 31, 2017, Complainant met in person
with his manager, John Berger, and Ana Garriga,
Human Resources Manager for GNF-A, and was given
a termination letter, dated June 1, 2017.6 The letter
stated, in part:
After an investigation, multiple work rule
violations were noted, as listed below.
● Category I work rule violation: For employees
paid by the hour, leaving the work-site or
being off plant premises without permission
while registered as working. This occurred
twice. Category I violations represent actions
that will not be tolerated and are grounds for
immediate dismissal.
tribunal admits Complainant’s seventeen exhibits (CX) and
Respondents two rebuttal exhibits (RX).
6 While dated June 1, 2017, Complainant and Respondent agree
that Complainant received the letter on May 31, 2017. (Tr. 9;
Tr. 140).
App.28a
● Category II work rule violation: Being
disruptive, including initiating or spreading
false rumors or information.
Your employment with the General Electric
Company is terminated effective immediately, due to
this failure to comply with Company policies.
[Emphasis added.]
If you feel you have any reason to dispute your
termination, you are reminded that you are subject to
the provisions of the Wilmington Employee Appeals
Procedure, HEP-51 (see enclosure).
You will be contacted by mail to resolve your
Benefits and COBRA Insurance conversion information
or you can contact the Insurance Continuation Center
at 1-800-242-7419 or COBRA at 1-800-877-7994. If
you participated in the Company Retirement Savings
Plan (RSP), you can contact them directly on their tollfree number (1-800-432-4313) to resolve the account
status. RSP will have your updated status within two
weeks and will then be able to resolve your accounts.
During the meeting, Berger told Complainant
that he had committed a Category 1 offense and that
his employment was terminated effective immediately.
Ms. Garriga explained to Complainant that he would
continue to receive some benefits and also explained
the company’s internal appeals process but that he
was in an unpaid situation.7
7 Ms. Garriga testified that Complainant should have received
his last paycheck, to include accrued vacation and sick leave, by
late June or early July 2019. Ms. Garriga also stated that, as of
the date of the October 29, 2020 hearing, Complainant was still
receiving health benefits. Ms. Garriga explained that Respondent
had not discontinued health benefits because Complainant’s
App.29a
Complainant has not performed any work for
Respondent since June 1, 2017.
Complainant received weekly deposits from GNFA from June 1, 2017 through July 20, 2017, reflecting
his salary earned through June 1, 2017 and accrued
and unused vacation, personal time, and unused
floating holidays. Though typically paid in a lump
sum, the weekly payments were at Complainant’s
request.
On June 1, 2017, and July 17, 2017, Complainant
requested photographs that he wanted to use during
the internal appeals process. Ms. Garriga replied on
June 5, 2017 with some of the requested photographs,
but denied others as unrelated to the basis for his
termination. On July 17, 2017, Complainant again
requested photographs, which Ms. Garriga emailed to
him on July 18, 2017.
On June 7, 2017, with the assistance of a Ms.
McDonald,8 Complainant telephoned the North Carolina Department of Labor’s Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (“NC EEOC”). During a 38minute call with a NC EEOC employee, Complainant
relayed his belief that he was wrongfully terminated
from GNF-A, submitting he was being discriminated
against because of a disability. Complainant also discussed that he had raised workplace safety concerns;
however, Complainant did not allege during this call
that his termination was in retaliation for raising
appeal process is ongoing.
8 Complainant states that he has a communication disability
and requires assistance in understanding and participating in
written and oral communication. Ms. McDonald helped in this
regard.
App.30a
these workplace safety complaints or generally describe
the ERA whistleblower protections and there is no
written record of the phone call. There is no evidence
that the NC EEOC opened an investigation after
Complainant’s phone call or made a referral to
another federal or state agency.
On June 9, 2017, Complainant filed the first
appeal of his termination through the GNF-A Ombuds
process, stating “I believe my termination is without
merit and should be reversed.” A month later, on July
10, 2017, Complainant submitted the second appeal of
his termination through Respondent’s Ombuds office,
stating “[t]he termination letter should be rescinded
and I should be allowed to return to work
immediately.” The second appeal was denied on July
17, 2017. In a third communication with the Ombuds
Program on July 19, 2017, Complainant acknowledged
that GNF-A had given him a letter “terminating [his]
employment for a Category I violation” and claimed
that “[a]ll of this is being done in retaliation for raising
the safety issue.”
On July 28, 2017, Mariana Monteiro, an employee
in the GE Ombuds program, contacted Complainant,
stating:
Again, I wanted to thank you for bringing
your concern to our attention. We are
immediately undertaking an investigation,
and you will shortly be contacted by the
investigators. In accordance with normal
practice, I have requested that the appeal
you have filed with the plant manager be
held in abeyance while the investigation is
conducted. Formal notification of this action
will be sent to you from HR. Similarly I have
App.31a
asked that your status remain unchanged
during the pendency of the investigation.
Complainant responded that same day:
Thank you for your letter of today’s date. I
appreciate the update on the investigation. I
would like to let you know that while I
appreciate the matter being held in abeyance,
I need to let you know that I am not being
paid and things are getting very difficult for
me financially. Is it possible for you to connect
with HR and reinstate my pay during this
time period?
Ms. Monteiro responded to Complainant’s question
regarding his pay:
It was very nice to connect with you on the
phone and I truly appreciate you understanding that for payroll and pay related
matters you need to go to your local HR. I
also appreciate your willingness to talk
directly to our investigator – if necessary –
despite the document you produce is very
clear, the investigator might need to seek
some clarification. With your permission, I
will pass along your telephone.
Shortly after Ms. Monteiro informed Complainant
that an investigation was being opened with respect
to his second Ombuds concern, Tim Matthews was
appointed to lead the investigation.
Mr. Matthews reached out to Complainant via
email on September 26, 2017 to schedule an interview.
Complainant responded to Mr. Matthews and stated
that he was going to Florida to help with recovery from
App.32a
Hurricane Irma.9 Mr. Matthews and Complainant
eventually met for an interview on October 27, 2017.10
While Complainant submits he contacted OSHA in
November 2017 and left a voicemail detailing the
circumstances of his termination, there is no written
record of this call, despite a diligent search by OSHA
personnel, and I find it did not happen. Instead,
Complainant’s first contact with OSHA occurred when
he filed a formal retaliation complaint on December 8,
2017. This December 8, 2017 on-line complaint does
not reference a November 2017 phone call or voicemail.
OSHA’s electronic filing system was operational
throughout the period June 1, 2017 through December
8, 2017. Supporting documentation is not necessary to
file the initial complaint.
William Peterson, the OSHA investigator assigned
to Complainant’s case, first talked to Complainant on
December 11, 2017.
GNF-A placed Complainant on a leave of absence
on January 1, 2018 so that he could continue receiving
health benefits during the pendency of this litigation.
This administrative status did not change the effective
date of his termination, which remained June 1, 2017.
Complainant consistently engaged in activities of
daily living throughout the period June 1, 2017
through December 8, 2017.
9 Complainant testified that he was in Florida for 14 days.
10 Complainant was debriefed on the results of Mr. Matthews’s
investigation on December 22, 2017.
App.33a
LEGAL FRAMEWORK
To invoke the employee protection provisions of
the ERA, an employee is required to file a complaint
with OSHA “within 180 days after an alleged violation
of the Act occurs (i.e., when the retaliatory decision
has been both made and communicated to the complainant).” 29 U.S.C. § 24.103(d)(2).11 The “filing period
begins to run on the date that the complainant receives
a “final, definitive, and unequivocal notice of the
adverse employment action.” Rollins v. Am. Airlines,
ARB No. 04-140, ALJ No. 2004-AIR-00009, slip op. at
3 (ARB Apr. 3, 2007). “Final and definitive notice
means communication that is decisive or conclusive,
leaving no room for further action, discussion, or
change. Unequivocal means unambiguous.” McManus
v. Tetra Tech Constr. Inc., ARB No. 16-023, ALJ No.
2016-SOX-00012, PDF at 3 (ARB Dec. 19, 2017).
However, the limitations period for filing a
complaint under the ERA is not jurisdictional and is
subject to equitable modification.
The Department of Labor’s Administrative Review
Board (“ARB”) has found equitable tolling of the filing
deadlines appropriate in at least four circumstances:
(i) where the “respondent has actively misled the complainant regarding the cause of action”; (ii) when “the
plaintiff has in some extraordinary way been
prevented from filing his or her action,” such as a
debilitating illness, injury, or natural disaster; (iii)
11 The implementing regulation also provides that the date of
filing is “[t]he date of the postmark, facsimile transmittal, e-mail
communication, telephone call, hand-delivery, delivery to a
third-party commercial carrier, or in-person filing at an OSHA
office.” 29 C.F.R. § 24.103(d)(1).
App.34a
when “complainant has raised the precise statutory
claim in issue but has done so in the wrong forum”;
and (iv) where the “respondent’s own acts or omissions
have lulled the complainant into foregoing prompt
attempts to vindicate his or her rights.” Brofford v.
PNC Investments, LLC, ARB No. 2018-03, ALJ No.
2017-CFP-00002, slip op. at 2 (ARB Feb. 14, 2019).
This list, however, is not exhaustive and the ARB has
also made clear that other situations may also warrant
equitable tolling. See, e.g., Woods v. Boeing-South
Carolina, ARB No. 11-067, ALJ No. 2011-AIR-00009,
slip op. at 8 (ARB Dec. 10, 2012).
However, “[e]quitable tolling is granted sparingly
and only upon a showing that extraordinary circumstances prevented a timely filing.” Lugg v. Lear
Corporation, ARB No. 2022-0008, OALJ No. 2021-SOX00022, slip op. at 4 (ARB May 19, 2022). Additionally,
complainants must be reasonably diligent in pursing
their rights throughout the filing period, including
before and after a potential extraordinary circumstance. Lugg, ARB No. 2022-0008 at *7; U.S. v. Henry,
No. 2:17-CR-00180, 2020 WL 7332657, at *4 (W.D. Pa.
Dec. 14, 2020).
DISCUSSION
I base my decision on all of the evidence, relevant
controlling statutory and regulatory authority, and the
arguments of the parties.12
12 In Austin v. BNSF Railway Co., ARB No. 17-024, ALJ No.
2016-FRS-00013 (ARB Mar. 11, 2019) (per curiam), the ARB
noted than an administrative law judge (“ALJ”) need not include
a summary of the record in the Decision and Order, as it is
assumed that the ALJ reviewed and considered the entire record
App.35a
When Did the Filing Period Begin?
Complainant disputes the date from which the
statutory filing period should begin to run. Complainant
avers that Respondent’s notice of termination was not
clear and definitive, and that “the grounds for
termination were almost immediately modified, and
the termination was never acted upon.” (Compl.
Post-Hearing Reply Br. at 6). Complainant contends
that the June 1, 2017 dismissal was “a sham termination.” (Compl. Br. at 18-19). To support this assertion,
Complainant argues that he continued to receive
money from Respondent after June 1, 2017 and that,
to date, he still receives employee benefits, including
health care benefits.13 (Compl. Post-Hearing Reply
in making his or her decision. The ARB stated that what is more
helpful for its review of whether the ALJ’s findings of fact are
supported by substantial evidence of record is a tightly focused
set of findings of fact. Accordingly, in this Decision and Order I
focus specifically on findings of fact pertinent to the issues in
dispute. I have, however, reviewed and considered the entire
record.
13 It appears that, at certain points, Complainant conflates his
argument that the filing period should not begin to run on June
1, 2017 with his argument that he was actively misled or lulled
by Respondent. (See Compl. Br. at 6-7). However, in a section of
his brief titled “Termination and Complaint,” Complainant
states:
These actions and omission were clear to Mr. Hanna as further
retaliation and therefore the time to file his complaint should
commence at the end of July 2017. There wasn’t any final or
unequivocal notice of termination, and the act of stopping his pay
in July 2017, is when he felt an adverse action. There was no
indication prior to this.
App.36a
Br. at 6-7).14 Complainant does not offer a specific
date from which the statutory filing deadline should
begin to run, but does concede that his pay stopped
about a month and a half after his meeting with Ms.
Garriga and Mr. Berger. (Compl. Br. at 12).
I find the June 1, 2017 written notice of termination, delivered to Complainant on May 31, 2017,
was final, unequivocal, and unambiguous, clearly
stating: “[y]our employment with the General Electric
Company is terminated effective immediately.” I find no
indication that Respondent, either verbally or in
writing, communicated anything to the contrary.
Instead, the evidence establishes that Respondent
consistently and unmistakably communicated to
Complainant on May 31, 2017 and throughout the
internal appeals period, that he was fired effective June
1, 2017. In other words, GNF-A’s internal appeals
process, the temporary receipt of back pay and the
continued receipt of health benefits, and the request
for and receipt of photographs in June and July 2017
did not act to suspend the effective date of Complainant’s termination from GNF-A.
Complainant still receives health benefits, even
through the date of this decision, only because his
appeal is ongoing, not because he remains employed
by GNF-A. The weekly payments he received from
(Compl. Br. at 10). As such, I will treat the arguments Complainant
makes regarding his pay, benefits, and employment status as
arguments about the date the statutory filing period should begin.
14 Complainant submitted bank statements showing that he
received weekly payments from Respondent between June 8,
2017 and July 20, 2017. Complainant also submitted what appears
to be documentation that he continues to receive benefits from
Respondent.
App.37a
GNF-A from June 1 through July 20, 2017 were for
wages he earned up to June 1, 2017 and for payment
of his unused vacation and personal time.15 These
payments were made weekly, rather than in a lump
sum, at Complainant’s request. That Complainant
continues to receive health benefits and received pay
through July 20, 2017 does not mean he remains a
company employee and does not alter the June 1, 2017
date of termination.
Additionally, the finality of the dismissal was not
affected by Complainant’s submission of internal
company appeals and Ombuds concerns, which did not
act to suspend the effective date of his termination or
otherwise alter his status with the company. Nor was
it rendered ambiguous by Complainant’s continued
receipt of health benefits and final pay and reimbursement for accrued pay.
In sum, neither GNF-A’s internal appeals process
nor the continued receipt of pay and health benefits
acted to suspend the effective date of Complainant’s
termination. Additionally, Complainant knew he was
fired on June 1, 2017, and was told the reasons why.
He did not need to wait for the photographs in order
to file his complaint.16 I find the 180-day statutory
filing period began to run on June 1, 2017, meaning
15 Respondent also submitted an affidavit of Ms. Garriga in
which she explained that, after his termination, Complainant
agreed to receive his payments for “unused vacation time, unused
personal business/personal illness time, and unused floating
holidays” in weekly payments, rather than one lump sum. (RX 2).
16 In fact, despite possessing the photographs in July 2017,
Complainant still did not file his OSHA complaint until
December 8, 2017.
App.38a
Complainant had until November 28, 2017 to file his
ERA retaliation complaint.
When Was the Complaint Filed?
Complainant posits two instances before December
8, 2017 that he contends should constitute the filing
of his ERA retaliation complaint. First, Complainant
relies on the June 7, 2017 telephone call with the North
Carolina Department of Labor/Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”). 17 Second, Complainant contends that he left a voicemail with the
U.S. Department of Labor, Occupational Safety and
Health Administration (“OSHA”) on or about November
24, 2017.
November 2017 Voicemail With OSHA
I find that Complainant did not file a complaint
with OSHA in November 2017, and that Complainant
first filed his ERA retaliation complaint with OSHA
on December 8, 2017.
Although Complainant testified that he filed a
timely complaint via voicemail with OSHA on or about
November 24, 2017,18 he acknowledges that his phone
records do not reflect this call. Additionally, the OSHA
17 Though Complainant argues that he timely filed by calling
the EEOC, an ERA retaliation complaint is properly filed only
with the U.S. Department of Labor’s Occupational Safety and
Health Administration. See 29 C.F.R. 24.103(c). However, as
explained above, a complaint filed elsewhere may warrant
equitable tolling. Accordingly, I will discuss this call in the section
below pertaining to equitable tolling based on mistakenly filing
in the wrong forum.
18 The record reflects that Complainant gave several different
dates in November as the date he left a voicemail for OSHA.
App.39a
investigator’s
detailed
activity/telephone
log
pertaining to Complainant’s OSHA file does not
reflect any communication with Complainant prior to
December 8, 2017. The December 8, 2017 entry states
“Complaint was filed 12/08/2018.”19
The memorandum for the file regarding telephonic
interviews between Complainant and the OSHA
investigator also indicates that a complaint was not
filed before December 8, 2017. The investigator details
that Complainant stated during a Closing Conference
that he called “DOL” November 22 or November 23,
2017 and left a voice message, and that Complainant
reported that he had provided phone records in a
position statement previously filed with OSHA. The
investigator detailed diligent, yet unsuccessful, efforts
to locate a record of the call to OSHA in November
2017.20
Based on the foregoing, I find that Complainant
first filed his complaint with OSHA on December 8,
2017. However, while outside the 180-day limitations
19 This date appears to be a typo – the “Date” column specifies
that the date of the entry/activity was December 8, 2017.
20 The investigator reviewed the phone records provided by
Complainant, checked OSHA’s own daily record of cases and
complaints for the weeks of November 20 and 27, 2017, and
reviewed his emails for that period. He found no references to a
call from Complainant. In this regard, given the volume of calls
that Complainant reports having made during this period, as
well as his confusion regarding possible courses of action, it is
certainly possible that he left a voicemail with some other
government agency during this time period, but the evidence
does not support Complainant’s assertion that he left a voicemail
with OSHA.
App.40a
period, the statute and regulations do provide that the
time for filing a complaint may be tolled.
Equitable Tolling
Complainant posits three main reasons why the
filing period should be tolled in his case. He first
contends that GNF-A actively misled him regarding
his cause of action and whether he had filed a complaint; second, he mistakenly filed the same complaint
in the wrong forum; and third, extraordinary
circumstances prevented him from filing his complaint
on time. As explained in further detail below, I find
that Complainant has not established a basis to
equitably toll the filing deadline in this case.
Actively Misled Regarding Cause of Action
Complainant asserts that Respondent actively
mislead him regarding the cause of action by withholding evidence. Specifically, he submits that Respondent withheld photographs for 41 days that show
he was onsite at the time Respondent found Complainant had been offsite.
Complainant argues that by withholding these
photographs, Respondent denied him “the ability to
understand that they were retaliating against me. . . . ”
(Tr. 12-13). Complainant alleges that Respondent was
“purposely misleading [him] on the basis for [his]
termination.” (Tr. 29.) As such, Complainant contends
that equitable tolling is warranted because Respondents
actively misled him regarding the cause of action.
Invocation of equitable estoppel on this ground
requires a showing that an employee’s failure to file in
a timely fashion is the consequence either of a
deliberate design by the employer or of actions that
App.41a
the employer should unmistakably have understood
would cause the employee to delay filing his charge.
English v. Whitfield, 585 F.2d 957 (4th Cir. 1988).
“[U]nless the employer has acted deliberately to
deceive, mislead or coerce the employee into not
filing a claim in a timely manner, equitable estoppel
will not apply.” Tracy v. Consolidated Edison Co., No
1989-CAA-00001, slip op. at 5 (Sec’y July 8, 1992);
Woods, ARB No. 11-067.
Complainant was specifically told he was fired
and given a written explanation why on May 31, 2017,
but asserts that he did not realize he was actually fired
in retaliation for raising workplace safety concerns until
he received photographs on July 18, 2017. However,
it appears that Complainant requested photographs
on two occasions;21 first, on June 1, 2017 when he
informed Ms. Garriga that he planned to appeal his
termination, and second, on July 17, 2017 when he
was preparing for another appeal. Ms. Garriga replied
to Complainant’s first request for photographs on June
5, 2017 and to his second request for photographs on
July 18, 2017, or well before the November 28, 2017
deadline to file his OSHA retaliation complaint.
Regardless, Complainant did not need the
photographs to file his complaint. Even if he did,
Respondent replied to Complainant’s request for photographs and did not mislead him regarding the reason
for the termination or the cause of action. Complainant
21 Complainant first requested “pictures and times from the
security gate for my vehicle entering and exiting for those dates
in question,” and he later requested “any and all videos or photos
from the plan site on 2/16 which show what I was wearing that
day.” (See Resp. OTSC Br. Exhibit 17; RX-1).
App.42a
has not established a basis for equitable tolling on this
ground.
Mistakenly Filed in Wrong Forum
Complainant also posits that he filed the precise
statutory claim in the wrong forum when he called the
NC EEOC and spoke with an agency employee on
June 7, 2017.
Based on the evidence in the record, Complainant
did make a call to the EEOC and described a wrongful
termination based on a belief he was being discriminated against for his speech and hearing disabilities. However, Complainant did not tell the
EEOC that he believed he was fired in retaliation for
raising nuclear safety concerns. In fact, Complainant’s
own testimony suggests that he was not aware that
his termination was related to complaints of workplace
safety until after the date of the EEOC call. Additionally, Complainant has provided no written
evidence of the oral complaint filed with the EEOC on
June 7, 2017, and there is no indication that an investigation was even opened.
Beyond Complainant’s general description of the
call and the phone record corroborating that a call to
the EEOC was made, there is no evidence to support
Complainant’s assertion that he filed the precise
statutory claim at issue in the wrong forum. Because
Complainant did not clearly identify that he was filing
a retaliation claim with the EEOC, Complainant has
not demonstrated equitable tolling on this ground.
App.43a
Extraordinary Circumstances
Complainant further suggests that extraordinary
circumstances warrant equitable tolling. First, that
his medical conditions warrant equitable tolling because
he often requires assistance to communicate, including
to make calls and write letters. However, and consistent
with an ability to engage in activities of daily living
throughout, Complainant has offered no proof that his
disabilities, to include PTSD and, speech and hearing
limitations, prevented him from understanding his legal
rights or timely vindicating those rights; asserting
only that his disability has made pursuing his legal
rights more challenging. A blanket assertion that a
medical condition prevents timely filing does not
support equitable tolling.
Second, at the end of September, Hurricane
Irma struck and Complainant spent two weeks in
Florida putting a roof on his father’s house. He
submits the 14 days he was there should be tolled
because he was without cell service or internet and
was unable to pursue his claim during this period.
Natural disasters may be grounds for equitable
tolling. See Yarema v. Carrier Enterprise LLC, OALJ
Case No. 2018-SOX-00007 (Aug. 20, 2018); see also
School Dist. Of City of Allentown v. Marshall, 657 F.2d
16, 19-20 (3d Cir. 1981). However, in this case,
Complainant was not personally affected by a natural
disaster, rather, and albeit a noble gesture, he voluntarily traveled to another state to provide hurricane
relief. Regardless, he would have returned to North
Carolina by mid-October, still some 45 days before the
filing deadline lapsed, and has offered no explanation
why he was prevented from filing upon his return. In
other words, to invoke equitable tolling, Complainant
App.44a
must have been reasonably diligent in pursuing his
rights not only while the alleged impediment to
filing caused by the asserted extraordinary
circumstance existed but also before and after, up to
the time of actual filing of the complaint.22 The bottom
line is that Complainant has not explained why the
extraordinary circumstances he alleges made it
impossible for him to timely file his complaint in this
case.
Other Reasons
Finally, Complainant generally avers that “it
would be unconscionable to enforce the limitation
period” and would result in “a grave injustice.” (Compl.
Post-Hearing Reply Br. at 11). Complainant’s belief
that an injustice will follow if the filing deadline is not
tolled does not warrant equitable tolling. Equitable
tolling is an extraordinary remedy and is not a method
to preserve a claim “out of a vague sympathy for
particular litigants.” Billings v. Tennessee Valley
Authority, 1986-ERA-00038 (Sec’y June 28, 1990),
quoting Baldwin County Welcome Center v. Brown,
466 U.S. 147, 152 (1984), and also citing Barnes v.
Hillhaven Rehabilitation & Convalescent Center, 686
F. Supp. 311, 314 (N.D. Ga. 1988). Assuming due
process and fundamental fairness may equitably toll
a filing deadline, Complainant has not established
circumstances warranting such action in this case.
22 See Garcia v. United States, No. 2:21-cv-00322 (W.D. Wa., Aug.
4, 2021).
App.45a
CONCLUSION
Gregory Hanna filed his OSHA complaint on
December 8, 2017. For the complaint to be timely, some
retaliatory act must have occurred on or after June 10,
2017. The act alleged in the OSHA complaint is
Complainant’s termination, which occurred on June 1,
2017. Since I have found no basis for tolling the
limitations period, Mr. Hanna’s complaint alleging a
violation of the Energy Reorganization Act’s employee
protection provisions is untimely.
Order
Based on the foregoing, Complainant did not
timely file his complaint with OSHA and I find that he
has not made the “particularly strong showing”
necessary to warrant equitable tolling of the time limits
for filing ERA whistleblower claims. Accordingly, I
hereby DISMISS the December 8, 2017 OSHA
complaint as time-barred.
SO ORDERED.
/s/ Stephen R. Henley
Chief Administrative Law Judge
App.46a
ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR
REHEARING, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
(DECEMBER 2, 2025)
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
________________________
GREGORY HANNA,
Petitioner,
v.
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF LABOR,
ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD; GLOBAL
NUCLEAR FUEL AMERICAS LLC,
Respondents.
________________________
No. No. 24-1435
(2023-0015)
ORDER
The petition for rehearing en banc was circulated
to the full court. No judge requested a poll under Fed.
R. App. P. 40. The court denies the petition for
rehearing en banc.
/s/ Nwamaka Anowi
Clerk
App.47a
COMPLAINANT-APPELLANT’S
MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND
AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF APPEAL
(MARCH 13, 2023)
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR
ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD
________________________
GREGORY HANNA,
Complainant-Appellant,
v.
GLOBAL NUCLEAR FUEL AMERICAS, LLC,
Respondent-Appellee.
________________________
ARB Case No. 2023-0015
OALJ Case No. 2020-ERA-00002
John T. Harrington
R. Scott Oswald
John T. Harrington
The Employment Law Group, P.C.
1717 K St. NW Suite 1110
Washington, D.C. 20006
(202) 261-2830
(202) 261-2835 (facsimile)
soswald@employmentlawgroup.com
tharrington@employmentlawgroup.com
Counsel for Complainant-Appellant
App.48a
Introduction
Complainant-Appellant Gregory Hanna, by and
through undersigned counsel, pursuant to 29 C.F.R.
§§ 24.110(a)-(e) and 29 C.F.R. §§ 26, et seq., submits
for this Board’s consideration his Memorandum of
Points and Authorities in Support of Appeal.
The Administrative Law Judge incorrectly found
there was no basis for tolling the Energy Reorganization
Act’s 180-day deadline as to Hanna’s whistleblower
complaint with OSHA. The ALJ failed to consider that
Respondent-Appellee Global Nuclear Fuel-Americas,
LLC misled Hanna and lulled Hanna, either
intentionally or unintentionally, through its inconsistent actions and statements, into believing he would
eventually be reinstated. Had the ALJ considered
this argument, as properly raised by Hanna, the ALJ
should have found that Hanna is entitled to equitable
relief in the form of equitable tolling. For the foregoing
reasons, Hanna timely appeals the ALJ’s decision and
requests this Board vacate the ALJ’s decision and
remand for a hearing on the merits.
Statement of Jurisdiction
Pursuant to 29 C.F.R. §§ 24 et seq., Hanna filed
his initial Energy Reorganization Act (ERA) complaint
with the Occupational Health and Safety Administration (OSHA) on December 8, 2017, alleging GNF
retaliated against him when it put him on administrative leave and subsequently terminated him in
violation of 42 U.S.C. § 5851. On October 24, 2019,
OSHA dismissed the complaint, finding Hanna had
filed it ten days after the 180-day deadline. On
November 12, 2019, Hanna timely filed objections to
the decision and requested a hearing before the Office
App.49a
of Administrative Law Judges in accordance with 29
C.F.R. § 24.106 and 29 C.F.R. §§ 18 et seq.
On December 2, 2019, Administrative Law Judge
Stephen R. Henley issued an Order to Show Cause as
to why Hanna’s Complaint should not be dismissed for
failure to timely file with OSHA. Following Hanna’s
January 6, 2020, Response and GNF’s February 7,
2020, Reply, ALJ Henley issued a Notice of Pretrial
Hearing, finding there was a genuine dispute as to
whether Hanna’s or GNF’s actions would toll or
extend the filing deadline. The ALJ bifurcated this
hearing such that one hearing’s sole focus would be
whether Hanna’s OSHA complaint was timely.
On October 29, 2020, a pre-trial hearing was
conducted via video-conference. Hanna and GNF filed
post-hearing briefs on March 1, 2021, and April 1,
2021, respectively. Hanna filed a Reply to GNF’s PostHearing brief on April 26, 2021. On December 21,
2022, ALJ Henley found Hanna did not timely file his
complaint with OSHA and did not establish a
sufficient justification for equitable tolling. On that
basis, the ALJ dismissed Hanna’s December 8, 2017,
OSHA complaint as time-barred.
On January 5, 2023, Hanna timely filed a
Petition for Review of ALJ Henley’s Decision and
Order. Following the Board’s January 12, 2023, Notice
of Appeal and Briefing Schedule, Counsel for Petitioner
submitted an Unopposed Motion for an Extension to
Submit Petitioner’s Initial Appeal Brief on January
30, 2023. This Motion was granted on February 3,
2023, extending the deadline for the present brief to
March 13, 2023. Accordingly, this Board has jurisdiction
to review this matter pursuant to 29 C.F.R. §§ 24.110
(a)-(e) and 29 C.F.R. §§ 26, et seq.
App.50a
Statement of the Issues
1. Did the Administrative Law Judge err by
failing to consider that GNF may have misled and
lulled Hanna into not filing a complaint, and Hanna
may thus be entitled to tolling?
2. Did GNF’s actions regarding its internal appeals
system mislead Hanna and lull Hanna into a false
sense of security?
3. Did GNF’s actions regarding its ombudsman
process mislead Hanna and lull Hanna into a false
sense of security?
4. Did GNF’s actions regarding its external
investigation mislead Hanna and lull Hanna into a
false sense of security?
5. Did GNF’s administrative actions mislead
Hanna and lull Hanna into a false sense of security?
Statement of the Case
In the interest of the Board’s time and judicial
efficiency, and in accordance with FRAP 28 and the
Board’s January 12, 2023, Notice of Appeal and Order
Establishing Briefing Schedule, Hanna provides the
following narrative factual summary and provides all
citations and record exhibits listed within the
accompanying Appendix.
A.
Hanna Participated in Protected Activity
When He Reported a Violation of Safety
Procedures Resulting in Injury to Both
Himself and Others
Hanna was hired as a Flexible Fuel Operator at
Global Nuclear Fuel-Americas, owned and operated
App.51a
by General Electric Company,1 in 2012. Appx79 80. In
2015, Hanna was promoted to an Incinerator
Operator. Id. In this role, he assisted in the burning
of nuclear materials using an incinerator located at
the GE Hitachi Site in Wilmington, North Carolina.2
Appx61; Appx165.
In the early morning hours of January 25, 2017,
a high-level radiation alarm sounded on a GNF Area
Engineer’s laptop. Appx163. In response, the Area
Engineer (with the approval of his supervisor, the
Area Manager), requested that Hanna and other
incinerator operators return to the GNF site to diagnose the issue and complete whatever repairs might
be necessary. Id. This same equipment issue had
happened before, and the incinerator operators
determined it was necessary to replace and reconnect
fallen “sock filters” of the incinerator. Id. Sock filters,
kept inside the “bag house” of the incinerator, are
filters designed to keep radioactive ash and particulates
from entering the atmosphere and surrounding areas.
Appx163-164. These filters are thus coated by the
radioactive material they are designed to catch.
Appx164.
1 Hanna was employed at Global Nuclear Fuel-Americas during
all relevant time periods discussed, as were relevant decisionmakers such as John Mathews (supervisor), John Berger
(manager), and Ana Garriga (HR Representative). Global Nuclear
Fuel-Americas is a subsidiary of the General Electric Company.
Appx9. All references in the record to “GE” includes GNF.
Appx373 at 125:11-15.
2 The Wilmington site is the headquarters for several GE
business, including GNF and GE-Hitachi. GNF makes the fuel
used at the nuclear reactors at GE-Hitachi. Appx9-10.
App.52a
But the January 25, 2017, sock filter repair
lacked basic safety precautions. For example, there
was no RAD Team in the room (a radiological protection
team). The RAD team is responsible for approving the
maintenance and monitoring exposure levels of the
workers as the maintenance occurs. Id. Not only is the
RAD team necessary to oversee nuclear safety and
prevent accidental exposure, but it is also
responsible for distributing the proper personal
protective equipment. Id. Hanna later discovered that
the work order supposedly issued for this repair had
expired more than a year earlier. Appx61.
Because of these failures, Hanna and the other
incinerators were likely exposed to excessively high
levels of radiation. Appx164. Hanna left the incinerator
building covered in radioactive ash. Appx97. But
despite several of the employees developing severe
rashes resulting in blisters and scars, none of Hanna’s
coworkers were willing to report this egregious violation
of safety protocols because being in a confined space
without supervision or proper PPE was an “immediately
fire-able offense.” Appx164-165; Appx119; Appx197-223.
These fireable offenses, termed “Category I” offenses,
include “[v]iolations of health, safety, security, environmental policies or government regulations or noncompliance acts that could cause significant consequences.” Appx237.
The same day (January 25, 2017), Hanna asked
to speak with his supervisor John Mathews. Appx61.
Hanna reported to Mathews that employees working
in the incinerator building were at risk because the
equipment being used was not functioning properly
and the employees were being exposed to uranium
powder and ash. Id. Additionally, Hanna reported to
App.53a
Mathews that they had been asked to perform the
work without a valid work order, had likely been
exposed to excessive radiation, and that there was no
RAD team in place during the repairs. Appx164.
Mathews said he would address the issue, assured
Hanna that Hanna and the other employees had done
nothing wrong, and would keep Hanna informed as to
the corrective actions taken. Appx61; Appx117-18.
Within the next few days, Hanna and his peers were
directed to “never do that again” and were “retrained on work order procedures,” along with
Mathews, his manager John Berger, and the Area
Engineer who had initially requested that Hanna and
the other incinerators repair the sock filters. Appx164.
B.
GNF Suspended Hanna and Placed Him on
Administrative Leave; and Then Told Him He
Was Terminated Two Months After He
Raised His Safety Concerns.
At or around the same time as the hazardous
incinerator repair, GE Hitachi was preparing for a
Nuclear Regulatory Commission audit scheduled on
April 3, 2017. Appx61. Hanna had assisted in the preaudit report and was slated to conduct a portion of the
tour for the NRC. Id. However, on March 31, 2017
(four days before the NRC audit and two months after
Hanna reported safety concerns), Hanna was told by
Mathews and Berger that he was suspended with pay,
effective immediately, pending an investigation. Id.
GNF alleged Hanna had committed the “Category I”
offense of leaving the plant site during his shift.3
Appx61-62.
3 While out of the scope of the present brief, Hanna maintains he
never left the plant site during work hours and this justification is
App.54a
During his suspension, Hanna repeatedly
contacted GNF requesting to return to work. Each
time, he was told he was not being punished but
needed to stay out “just a few more days.” Appx165.
On April 5, 2017, Hanna reported to the GE Corporate
Ombudsman4 a total of twelve issues he was experiencing at GNF, including that he was being retaliated against for reporting the January 25, 2017,
incinerator issue. Appx51. Less than a month later, on
May 2, 2017, Ombudsperson Karen Williams issued an
investigatory report regarding what purported to be a
thorough investigation of all twelve concerns (pared
down to three main issues, one of which was GNF’s
retaliation for Hanna’s safety concerns). Appx551553. The report concluded that all of Hanna’s
allegations were unsubstantiated. Id.
Hanna remained suspended with pay until May
31, 2017, when he was called to a meeting at GNF
with Berger and Human Resources representative
Ana Garriga. Appx165. At the meeting, Berger gave
Hanna a letter (dated the following day, June 1, 2017)
informing him he was terminated effective
immediately due to his “failure to comply with Company
policies.” Appx53. Specifically, the letter alleged he
had left the work site while “on the clock” two times
in January and February 2017.5 Id. The letter said
not only pretextual but demonstrably false.
4 As a GE subsidiary, GNF employees were directed to use
corporate GE Ombuds.
5 The letter also lists a Category II offense which Garriga later
told Hanna was not the basis for his termination but was
incorporated into the letter for “completeness.” Appx558 at
17:30-17:40.
App.55a
that if Hanna desired to appeal his termination, he
was “subject to the provisions of the Wilmington
Employee Appeals Procedure.” Id. Further, the letter
said he would be “contacted by mail to resolve [his]
benefits and COBRA Insurance conversion information”
and the Company Retirement Savings Plan would
have updated his “status” in the company within two
weeks, after which he would have to call to resolve the
“account status.” Id.
After Berger informed Hanna that he was
terminated, Berger left the room so Hanna could
“figure out his options [moving] forward” with Garriga.
Appx558 at 17:00-20. Garriga explained that Hanna
could appeal the termination and described the three
steps outlined in GNF policy: 1) appeal with a supervisor; 2) appeal with a manager; and 3) peer panel or
print manager direct appeal. Id. at 20:00-21:00. GNF
also offered Hanna a severance agreement (one month’s
pay) if he agreed not to appeal. Id. at 21:00-22;
Appx188. Garriga told Hanna that if Hanna appealed,
he would not be paid either salary or severance but
would be kept as an “active employee on unpaid
suspension” on GNF’s system so he could access his
benefits. Appx558 at 24:00-25:00. She also told Hanna
that the employee assistance program was still
available to him. Id. at 24:30-25:00. Garriga assured
Hanna that GNF would keep him “active” in the
system at least through June 9, 2017. Id. at 23:0023:10. Hanna immediately notified Garriga that he
intended to appeal. Id. at 25:00-25:25.
App.56a
C.
Hanna Followed the Internal Appeal Process
at GNF But Was Stopped Short by a Lengthy
Investigation
Pursuant to the Employee Appeals Procedure
HEP-51, Hanna notified Garriga that he intended to
file an appeal. Employee Appeals Procedure at 5.
Hanna then filed his first level appeal to Mathews on
June 9, 2017. Appx54; Appx170. Per GNF policy,
Mathews and Hanna met and Mathews told Hanna
his appeal was denied. Appx170. Mathews told Hanna
that Berger directed Mathews to rule against him. Id.
Hanna subsequently filed his second appeal to
Berger, who had originally terminated him. Appx56;
Appx170. Berger told Hanna he was not going to
overturn the process that Berger himself had started.
Appx56. Berger declined to review Hanna’s evidentiary
proof he had not left the plant site (provided to Hanna
by GNF only the night before this meeting, a month
and a half after Hanna’s termination), and issued a
letter less than a week later, on July 17, 2017 stating
that “[a]fter a full review of the situation, and the
points you have presented in your appeal, I conclude
that the Positive Management policy and
corresponding practice were followed properly and
consistently.” Appx461.
That same day, Hanna emailed Garriga, notifying
her that he intended to pursue a third appeal, again
requesting “any and all” evidence GNF had that
Hanna had left the work site in preparation for his
next-step appeal defense. Appx729. But Hanna’s appeal
process was abruptly cut short when he submitted a
letter raising his safety concerns to Jeff Immelt (CEO);
Susan Peters (SVP of Human Resources); Jeanne
Mathews (Executive Counsel Labor and Employment);
App.57a
and corporate ombudsperson Marianna Monteiro.
Appx85.
In this July 19, 2017, letter, Hanna reported retaliation based on his safety concerns and the major
evidentiary gaps in each of GNF’s allegations. Appx61.
Monteiro emailed Hanna on July 24, 2017, asking to
“hear from [Hanna] and test [her] understanding
before triggering an investigation.” Appx463. Monteiro
and Hanna spoke on July 28, 2017, after which Monteiro confirmed that GNF was undertaking another
investigation and “in accordance with normal practice,
[Monteiro] requested that the appeal [Hanna] filed
with the plant manager be held in abeyance while the
investigation is conducted.” Appx247. This thus ended
Hanna’s appeal process within GNF.
Monteiro further related that she had “asked that
[Hanna]’s status remain unchanged during the
pendency of the investigation.” Id. When Hanna
responded by asking if it was possible to reinstate his
pay due to his financial difficulties, Monteiro directed
him to his local human resources department, i.e.
Garriga. Id. Hanna texted Garriga within a week,
requesting he be placed back on payroll as his appeal
had been indefinitely postponed. Appx666. (“Dear
Annie: I appreciate all you have done on my pay so far.
However, the appeal has been indefinitely postponed
so I should be returned to the GNF payroll. Please
respond as soon as you can. Thank you Greg”). Despite
Monteiro’s instructions to request pay reinstatement
from Hanna’s local HR, Garriga instead said that “a
fresh investigation [is] underway” and his “status”
remained at termination pending the results.
Appx668.
App.58a
D. The Second Corporate Ombudsperson
Investigation Was Ongoing from August 2017
through December 2017, Ending Just After
the 180-Day Statutory Deadline to File with
OSHA
Following the first failed investigation in April
2017 prior to his termination, Hanna requested that
an independent, neutral third party, specifically
“someone not associated with the GEH business,”
perform the investigation into his nuclear safety
report and GNF’s subsequent retaliation. Appx63.
Monteiro initiated an investigation into Hanna’s letter,
and hired Tim Matthews as an “independent ombudsperson.” Appx172. Hanna later discovered that
Matthews actually worked for the firm representing
GNF in the current matter, Morgan Lewis (though it
is unknown whether Morgan Lewis was representing
GNF for the entire duration of Matthew’s investigation). Id.
The investigation was initiated in August 2017,
following Hanna’s conversation with Monteiro. Hanna
had still not heard from an investigator one month
later. Appx573. Hanna followed up with Monteiro on
August 29, 2017, informing her that 1) he had not
heard from an investigator; and 2) it troubled him that
the ombudsperson had revealed Hanna to be the cause
of the investigation, since Hanna believed the process
would be anonymous. Id. In response, Monteiro wrote
only that “the case is being investigated, not always
the employee that escalate[s] a concern is interviewed.
I will request an update and get back to you.” Id.
Three weeks later, on September 18, 2017, Hanna
followed up again after not hearing from Monteiro. Id.
Hanna told her he needed a status on the inves-
App.59a
tigation because he found out his job was posted,
“lead[ing him] to believe that GE never had any
intention of bringing [him] back to work.” Id. Monteiro
said she was unaware of the “developments” and again
redirected him to his local HR. Id.
Once Matthews’s investigation began, it involved
multiple interviews throughout September 2017
through the end of November 2017. Appx172. When
Matthews’s investigation finally concluded, the debrief
occurred on December 22, 2017, 23 days after the
deadline for filing with OSHA. Id. Matthews’s investigation found Hanna’s allegations to be “unsubstantiated.” Id.
E.
Hanna Continued to Receive Benefits
Throughout His Entire Appeal Process
Notably, during this time and at least through
2020, Hanna was still employed by GNF according to
his W-2s (issued by GNF). Appx674. He also received
at least one payroll deposit of $1,000 from GNF on
July 18, 2019, over two years after his purported
termination. Appx407: 6-13. As of February 2021,
Hanna was listed as a current full time employee
working the 1st shift – on leave – in GNF’s internal
system with nine years and ten months of service.
Appx655. His “estimated last day of leave” in GNF’s
internal system was January 1, 2058. Appx654.
External sources such as Vault Verify, a service that
reviews public reports for an individual’s employment
status, also confirmed that Hanna was employed at
GE at least as late as February 2021. Appx644.
And Hanna did not receive a call or any
information regarding COBRA, as Berger indicated
he would on May 31, 2017. Rather, GNF paid all of
App.60a
Hanna’s health insurance premiums through January
2018, when GNF placed Hanna on a “leave of absence.”
Appx327: 8-14. Hanna nonetheless maintained all
insurance benefits provided to GNF employees (the
“GE Health Benefits Option 1 UHC”) after January
2018, but paid the premiums himself. Appx113;
Appx230. His GNF retirement savings plan remained
open, with statements mailed every three months.
Appx572; Appx678.
F.
Hanna Filed His Complaint with OSHA on
December 8, 2017, 10 Days Past the Statutory
Deadline
Concurrent with the GNF internal appeals and
ombudsman process, Hanna searched for other avenues
to report his concerns and the retaliation for raising
those concerns. In June 2017, before filing his first
internal appeal, Hanna and his friend, Katherine
MacDonald,6 placed at least 13 calls to various agencies,
including the EEOC and the DOL. Appx681. But
Hanna was not made aware by any of these agencies
that the proper venue for filing a complaint of this
type (nuclear safety concerns and retaliation) was
with OSHA until November 2017 when he contacted
attorneys. Appx89. Hanna attempted to have a call
placed to OSHA on November 21, 2017—MacDonald
left a voicemail on his behalf but never received a
response. Id.
Hanna was able to file his formal complaint with
OSHA on December 8, 2017, 10 days after the 180-day
6 Hanna suffers from a speech impediment that can result in
others being unable to understand him. Katherine MacDonald
often assisted him during phone calls or public speaking.
App.61a
statutory deadline. Appx1. On October 24, 2019,
OSHA deemed his complaint untimely and dismissed
it. Appx148. Hanna requested a hearing at the OALJ
and the ALJ determined Hanna did not timely file his
complaint. Appx759.
Summary of the Argument
The Administrative Law Judge erred by failing to
consider that GNF lulled Hanna into not filing a
complaint. Rather than properly consider lulling and
misleading as two separate bases for tolling, the ALJ
instead combined the two bases but erred by applying
an improperly high standard. When GNF’s actions
(specifically, its internal appeals system as applied to
Hanna, its ombudsman process, its external investigation practice, and its administrative actions) are
properly considered, it is clear the Hanna was lulled
into a false sense of security. Hanna reasonably
believed that GNF intended to resolve his employment
issues and reinstall him at the nuclear site. GNF
undermined its own words and promises several times
by its own actions, providing confusing and conflicting
information related to, among others, the terms of
Hanna’s termination, his status as an employee in the
GNF system, the processes of the hired external
investigator, and even potential pay reinstatement.
To his own prejudice, Hanna trusted GNF’s actions
and thus did not seek to file a complaint with OSHA.
Standard of Review
The Administrative Review Board reviews the
ALJ’s factual conclusions under the substantial
evidence standard. 29 C.F.R. § 24.110(b). Substantial
evidence “means such relevant evidence as a reasonable
mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.”
App.62a
Clean Harbors Envtl. Servs. v. Herman, 146 F.3d 12,
21 (1st Cir. 1998) (citing Richardson v. Perales, 402
U.S. 389, 401 (1971)). The Board is “not barred from
setting aside a decision when it ‘cannot conscientiously
find that the evidence supporting that decision is
substantial, when viewed in the light that the record
in its entirety furnishes.’” Speegle v. Stone & Webster
Contr., Inc., ARB No. 06-041, 2005-ERA-6, slip op. at
7, 2009 WL 3165849 (ARB Sept. 24, 2009) (quoting
Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 47787 (1951)).
The Secretary of Labor has delegated to the
Board the authority to review ALJ decisions under
ERA and issue the agency’s final decision. Secretary’s
Order No. 02-2012 (Delegation of Authority and
Assignment of Responsibility to the Administrative
Review Board), 77 Fed. Reg. 69379 (Nov. 16, 2012). In
conducting its legal analysis, “the ARB reviews the
ALJ’s . . . legal conclusions de novo.” Speegle v. Stone
& Webster Contr., Inc., ARB No. 06-041, 2005-ERA-6,
slip op. at 5, 2009 WL 3165849 (ARB Sept. 24, 2009)
(citing 5 U.S.C. § 557(b)). Thus, the Board reviews de
novo the dismissal of a whistleblower case where the
ALJ determines that the complaint is untimely.
Jenkins v. CSX Transp., Inc., ARB No. 13-029, ALJ
No. 2012-FRA-073, slip op. at 3, 2014 WL 2536887
(ARB May 15, 2014).
App.63a
Argument
I.
Legal Standard
The 180-day limitations period imposed by the
ERA is not jurisdictional and is subject to equitable
modification. Warner v. Xcel Energy, ARB No. 08-112,
ALJ No. 2008-ERA-002, slip op. at 2, 2010 WL
1260208 (ARB Mar. 29, 2010); 42 U.S.C.A. § 5851(b)(1);
29 C.F.R. § 24.103(d)(2). The Board has established
four circumstances in which a statutory deadline may
be tolled through equitable estoppel:7 (i) where the
respondent has actively misled the complainant
regarding the cause of action; (ii) when the plaintiff
has in some extraordinary way been prevented from
filing his or her action, such as a debilitating illness,
injury, or natural disaster; (iii) when the complainant
has raised the precise statutory claim in issue but has
done so in the wrong forum; and (iv) where the
respondent’s own acts or omissions have lulled the
complainant into foregoing prompt attempts to
7 While the Record employs the terms “equitable estoppel” and
“equitable tolling” interchangeably, each is a distinct concept.
Equitable estoppel “examines the defendant’s conduct and the
extent to which the plaintiff has been induced to refrain from
exercising his rights,” while equitable tolling examines a
plaintiff’s “excusable ignorance of the employer’s discriminatory
act.” Hyman v. KD Res., LLC, ARB No. 09-076, ALJ No. 2009SOX-020, slip op. at 3, 2010 WL 1260209 (ARB Mar. 31, 2010)
(quoting Rhodes v. Guiberson Oil Tools Div., 927 F.2d 876, 878
(5th Cir. 1991)). Hanna requests that the statute of limitations
be tolled on the basis of equitable estoppel due to GNF’s
confusing actions and statements. Kale v. Combined Ins. Co. of
America, 861 F.2d 746, 752 (1st Cir. 1988) (Equitable estoppel
occurs when an employee “does not make a timely filing due to
his reasonable reliance on his employer’s misleading or confusing
representations or conduct.”).
App.64a
vindicate his rights. Hyman v. KD Res., LLC, ARB No.
09-076, ALJ No. 2009 SOX-020, slip op. at 3, 2010 WL
1260209 (ARB Mar. 31, 2010).
A respondent has actively misled the complainant
regarding the cause of action when the employee’s
failure to file was a consequence of either a deliberate
design by the employer, or actions that the employer
should unmistakably have understood would cause
the employee to delay filing his charge. English v.
Whitfield, 585 F.2d 957 (4th Cir. 1988). This factor
requires deliberate, misleading actions on behalf of
the employer. Tracy v. Consol. Edison Co., No 1989CAA00001, slip op. at 5 (Sec’y July 8, 1992) (“[U]nless
the employer has acted deliberately to deceive, mislead
or coerce the employee into not filing a claim in a
timely manner, equitable estoppel will not apply.”).
When determining whether the respondent has actively
misled the complainant, the Board conducts both a
subjective and objective inquiry: the respondent must
have acted in such a way as to be objectively misleading,
and the complainant must have subjectively held and
acted upon a reasonable belief based on the misleading
conduct. Bulls v. Chevron/Texaco, Inc., ALJ No. 2006SOX-117, slip op. at 6, 2006 WL 6576792 (ALJ Oct. 13,
2006).
The statute of limitations can also be tolled when
the complainant has been prevented from filing a
complaint due to circumstances out of their control.
Jaludi v. Citigroup, Inc., ARB No. 2021-0053, ALJ No.
2021-SOX-00014, slip op. at 1, 2021 WL 9918016
(ARB Aug. 25, 2021). These circumstances must
typically be “extraordinary,” and the complainant
must demonstrate fact-specific circumstances related
to this justification (for example, a complainant alleging
App.65a
he failed to timely file because of the COVID-19
pandemic must explain why it hindered him
individually). Lugg v. Lear Corp., ARB No. 2022-0008,
ALJ No. 2021-SOX00022, slip op. at 3, 2022 WL
18358031 (ARB May 19, 2022).
The third basis for equitable estoppel through
tolling is where the “complainant has raised the
precise statutory claim in issue but has done so in the
wrong forum.” Brofford v. PNC Invs., LLC, ARB No.
2018-03, ALJ No. 2017 CFP-00002, slip op. at 2, 2019
WL 3293934 (ARB Feb. 14, 2019). Tolling is
appropriate under this factor when a complainant
files in the wrong venue, but nonetheless effectively
put the respondent on notice that the complainant
was asserting a claim of whistleblower retaliation
under the same statutory scheme. Schafermeyer v.
Blue Grass Army Depot, ARB No. 07-082, ALJ No.
2007-CAA001, slip op. at 6-7, 2008 WL 4462995 (ARB
Sept. 30, 2008).
Finally, equitable estoppel is employed where the
“respondent’s own acts or omissions have lulled the
complainant into foregoing prompt attempts to
vindicate his or her rights.” Brofford v. PNC Invs.,
LLC, ARB No. 2018-03, ALJ No. 2017 CFP-00002, slip
op. at 2, 2019 WL 3293934 (ARB Feb. 14, 2019).
“Under this test it is immaterial whether the defendant
engaged in intentional misconduct.” Hyman, ARB No.
09-076, slip op. at 4. Tolling is appropriate when the
complainant was lulled into a false sense of security,
leading him to believe that his complaints were being
resolved by the respondent. Id. at 5.
Unlike the first factor (respondent intentionally
misled a complainant), no showing of actual fraud or
deceit on behalf of the employer is necessary; rather,
App.66a
“[i]t is only necessary to show that the person estopped,
by his statements or conduct, misled another to his
prejudice.” Humble Oil v. The Fidelity & Casualty Co.
of N.Y., 402 F.2d 893, 897-98 (4th Cir. 1968). The sole
issue is whether the respondent’s conduct, innocent or
not, lulled the plaintiff into a position he would not
have otherwise taken. Id.; see also McGregor v. La.
State Univ. Bd. of Supervisors, 3 F.3d 850, 865-66 (5th
Cir. 1993) (“The rule does not hinge on intentional
misconduct on the defendant’s part. Rather, the issue is
whether the defendant’s conduct, innocent or not,
reasonably induced the plaintiff not to file suit within
the limitations period.”).
II. The ALJ Erred in Not Considering Whether
GNF’s Actions Lulled Hanna Into Foregoing
Prompt Attempts to Vindicate His Rights
The ALJ’s holding evaluates three bases for
equitable tolling: 1) whether Hanna was actively
misled regarding the cause of action; 2) whether
Hanna mistakenly filed in the wrong forum; and 3)
whether there existed extraordinary circumstances
preventing Hanna from filing. But the ALJ did not
consider the fourth and most relevant factor: whether
GNF’s actions, intentional or not, lulled Hanna into
missing the filing deadline. In justifying why these
three bases are analyzed, the ALJ incorrectly stated
that Hanna posited only these three reasons as to why
the filing period for his OSHA complaint should be
tolled. Appx756.
The record directly contradicts this. Hanna
repeatedly addressed the “lulling” factor throughout
these proceedings, including no fewer than four times
in the December 2022 hearing alone. Appx259 at
App.67a
11:11-17; Appx265-266 at 17:20-18:18; Appx273-274
at 25:18-26:7; Appx274-274 at 26:20-27:8. In that
same hearing, opposing counsel recognized that Hanna
clearly asserted GNF lulled Hanna into failing to file.
(“Mr. Hanna’s allegations that Mr. Matthews delayed
or lulled him to the complacency . . . ”). Appx331 at
83:3-18; 83:22-25. In fact, the ALJ himself read
directly from Hanna’s brief, out loud, that Hanna
alleged Matthews “lulled” him into believing there
could be a favorable outcome of his investigation.
Appx339 at 91:10-19.
The ALJ also noted in his decision that “at certain
points, Complainant conflates his argument that the
filing period should not begin to run on June 1, 2017
with his argument that he was actively misled or
lulled by Respondent.”8 Appx753, n. 13 (emphasis
added). Yet the ALJ failed to consider whether GNF’s
actions reasonably lulled Hanna into a false sense of
security. The holding’s analysis conflates both the
“misled” and “lulled” factors under equitable estoppel,
but applies only the heightened standard of
“misleading”—that a respondent “acted deliberately to
deceive, mislead, or coerce the employee into not filing
a claim in a timely manner[.]” Tracy v. Consol. Edison
Co., No 1989-CAA-00001, slip op. at 5 (Sec’y July 8,
1992). The ALJ was mistaken in his conclusion,
ultimately, because he failed to apply the correct legal
8 At the time of his brief to the OALJ, Hanna had been
proceeding pro se. Papers filed by pro se complainants should be
construed “liberally in deference to their lack of training in the
law and with a degree of adjudicative latitude.” Trachman v.
Orkin Exterminating Co. Inc., ARB No. 01-067, ALJ No. 2000TSC003, slip op. at 6 (ARB Apr. 25, 2003) (internal quotations
omitted).
App.68a
standard to determine the applicability of equitable
estoppel.
III. GNF’s Actions Led Hanna to Believe His
Complaints Were Being Resolved Internally,
Either Through the Internal Appeals,
Ombudsman Process, External Investigation,
or Company Administrative Actions Affecting
Hanna
If the ALJ had properly considered lulling as a
basis for tolling, he would have found that GNF
reasonably induced Hanna not to file within the ERA’s
180-day statutory deadline.
A. Internal Appeals
GNF’s conduct towards Hanna began to conflict
with its statements almost immediately after Hanna
reported safety concerns. A little over a month later,
Hanna was suspended pending an investigation, during
which Hanna was repeatedly told he was not in
trouble but needed to stay out “just a few more days.”
Appx61; Appx165. Instead, this leave lasted until
Hanna was abruptly terminated, two full months
later. Appx165. Even in the termination meeting,
GNF told Hanna he was fired “effective immediately”
but was also an “active employee on unpaid status.”
Appx558 at 24:00-25:00. Garriga also told Hanna he
would remain active in the GNF system, would retain
his benefits, and would have continued access to his
retirement account. Id. at 24:00-25:00. This
information directly conflicted with the statements in
the termination letter given to Hanna by Berger.
Appx53.
App.69a
Hanna notified GNF, specifically Garriga, at that
very meeting that he intended to appeal the
termination, and Garriga then thoroughly explained
each step of the internal appeals process. Id. at 20:0021:00. This explicitly endorsed the possibility that
Hanna could eventually return to his position at GNF;
he had several opportunities to raise his concerns to
upper level management, and would keep his
benefits, access to employee resources, and 401k
contributions at least until the appeal process was
complete.
Based on the internal appeals process, Hanna
reasonably believed GNF was earnestly attempting to
resolve both his concerns regarding the safety of the
incinerator burners and their decision to terminate him.
This is demonstrable through Hanna’s continued
persistence throughout the internal appeals. He
requested to appeal on all three levels allowed by GNF
policy, and was only stopped when he also reached out
to additional GNF resources (ombudspeople). Hanna
would not have appealed, communicated, and
requested all evidence of the allegations used as the
basis for his termination if he had not believed there
was a significant possibility he could return to his
position at GNF. Hanna believed this was possible
because GNF provided conflicting information during
the internal appeal process, failing to communicate
whether there was a real possibility Hanna could get
his job back and whether he was entitled to reinstatement on the payroll.
By doing so, GNF’s conduct, innocent or not,
lulled Hanna into a position he would not have
otherwise taken. Humble Oil, 402 F.2d at 897-98. By
slowly shuffling Hanna through this internal appeals
App.70a
process (and eventually, a corporate ombudsman
process and external investigation), GNF lulled Hanna
into believing he did not need to actively seek out an
alternative forum. GNF lulled Hanna into a false
sense of security throughout the internal appeals
process and thus tolling is appropriate. Hyman, ARB
No. 09-076, slip op. at 5.
B. Ombudsman Process
Investigation
and
External
When Hanna sought out additional resources
from the second corporate ombudsperson requesting a
neutral third party, GNF halted the internal appeal
process. Appx247-248. When Hanna asked if it was
possible to reinstate his pay, Monteiro (the corporate
ombudsperson) directed him to his local human
resources department, i.e. Garriga. Appx247. Hanna
texted Garriga within a week, requesting he be placed
back on payroll as his appeal had been indefinitely
postponed. Appx666 (“Dear Annie: I appreciate all you
have done on my pay so far. However, the appeal has
been indefinitely postponed so I should be returned to
the GNF payroll. Please respond as soon as you can.
Thank you Greg”). Despite Monteiro’s instructions to
request pay reinstatement from Hanna’s local HR,
Garriga instead responded that “a fresh investigation
[is] underway” and his “status” remained at termination pending the results – in direct contradiction of
GNF’s own records. Appx654; Appx668; Appx671;
Appx673; Appx674-677.
Monteiro initiated an investigation through Tim
Matthews. But an entire month went by before Hanna
followed up with Monteiro, informing her he had not
heard from the expert; Monteiro responded that she
App.71a
would request an update. Appx573-574. Nearly three
weeks later, on September 18, 2017, Hanna once
again followed up after hearing nothing from GE,
GNF, or the investigator. In this September 18, 2017,
email (nearly two months after the investigation had
purportedly been opened), Hanna told Monteiro that
he was told his job had been posted and this “would
lead [Hanna] to believe that GE never had any
intention of bringing [him] back to work.” Appx573
(emphasis added).
This email demonstrates Hanna’s genuine,
reasonable belief that GNF was working to resolve the
issues with his employment. Hanna hoped to retain
his position and consistently worked with GNF to
achieve this and return to full time status. By pausing
the internal appeal process, cutting off a pathway
Hanna was already two-thirds down and shifting to
an ombudsperson alone—even if based on GNF
policy—it prolonged any resolution that GNF could or
would have offered. Moreover, it prolonged Hanna’s
belief that GNF was willing to offer any type of relief
“to his own prejudice.” Humble Oil, 402 F.2d at 89798. This was compounded by the extensive time from
July 28, 2017, to September 18, 2017, during which
Hanna received no substantive communication from
either GNF or Mathews regarding the status of the
investigation or potential outcomes.
C. External Investigation
Following the first failed investigation in April
2017 prior to his termination, Hanna requested an
independent, neutral third party, specifically “someone
not associated with the GEH business.” Appx63. Tim
Matthews acted as an “independent ombudsperson.”
App.72a
Appx172. Hanna later discovered Matthews worked
for the firm representing GNF in the current matter,
Morgan Lewis (though Hanna is not certain whether
Morgan Lewis was representing GNF for the entire
duration of Matthew’s investigation). Id. Once
Matthews’s investigation began, it involved multiple
interviews from September 2017 through the end of
November 2017. Id. When Matthews’s investigation
finally concluded, the debrief occurred on December
22, 2017, 23 days after the deadline for filing with
OSHA. Id. Matthews’s investigation found Hanna’s
allegations to be “unsubstantiated.” Id.
Because GNF misled Hanna by omitting the fact
that Matthews worked for GNF, Hanna wasted months
of his statutory deadline believing in good faith that
an independent investigator was performing a neutral
investigation. Even if the investigation was, in fact,
entirely neutral, Hanna may have justifiably been
mistrustful of GNF and decided to seek other avenues
for his complaint (hence, exactly why he asked for
“someone not associated with the GEH business.”).
Appx63.
D. GNF Administrative Actions
There are numerous examples of GNF administrative actions that reasonably led Hanna to believe
his issues would be resolved and he would return to
GNF. The first action that Hanna became aware of
was the continuation of his benefits.
In direct contradiction of the “termination letter,”
which indicates that both his retirement savings
account and benefits would terminate, neither did.
Appx53. Hanna did not receive any communication
regarding COBRA. Hanna’s retirement account status
App.73a
remained the same and GNF continued to contribute
to his 401k at least through 2020. Appx175-176;
Appx572; Appx678. GNF paid all the premiums on
Hanna’s healthcare through January 2018, and even
thereafter kept him on the “GE Health Benefits
Option 1 UHC.” Appx113. The shifting cost of the
insurance premium was due to Hanna’s GNF internal
status change to a “leave of absence.” Appx111. It is
unclear how an employer can put an individual on a
“leave of absence” from working and yet not employ
them. GNF also continued to contribute to Hanna’s
short-term and long-term disability and life insurance.
Appx175-176. During the October 29, 2020 OALJ
hearing, GNF’s HR representative Garriga conceded
this was an “unusual situation” and admitted that “in
most cases” all benefits stop once the appeal process
ends. Appx414-415 at 166:23-167:1; Appx417 at169:58.
Moreover, GNF reported to the United States
government that Hanna was still a full time employee
for several years after they terminated him. He
received at least one payroll deposit of $1,000 from
GNF on July 18, 2019, over two years after termination.
Appx407 at 159:6-13. While GNF claims this was a
“corporate payroll error,” how or why this (or any)
error occurred is not relevant to the lulling effect it
had on Hanna. Id. at 159:6-13. As of February 2021,
Hanna was listed as being on a current full time
employee working the 1st shift – on leave – in GNF’s
internal system with nine years and ten months of
service at GNF. Appx655; Appx674-677. His “estimated
last day of leave” in GNF’s internal system was
January 1, 2058. Appx655. Public reports also confirm
Hanna was reported to be employed at GE at least as
App.74a
late as February 2021. Appx644. While these actions
may be simple administrative oversights, “it is
immaterial whether the defendant engaged in
intentional misconduct.” Hyman, ARB No. 09-076,
slip op. at 4.
Conclusion
Given the ALJ’s failure to consider an argument
expressly made by Hanna, the ALJ’s finding that no
basis exists for tolling was error. Moreover, it is clear
that GNF’s actions were sufficient to lull Hanna into
a position he would have otherwise not taken. Hanna
respectfully requests this Board reverse and remand
the decision for a hearing on the merits.
Respectfully submitted,
/s/ John T. Harrington
R. Scott Oswald
John T. Harrington
THE EMPLOYMENT LAW GROUP, P.C.
1717 K St. NW Suite 1110
Washington, D.C. 20006
(202) 261-2830
(202) 261-2835 (facsimile)
soswald@employmentlawgroup.com
tharrington@employmentlawgroup.com
Counsel for Petitioner
App.75a
RESPONSE BRIEF OF
GLOBAL NUCLEAR FUEL-AMERICAS, LLC
(MAY 9, 2023)
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR
ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD
________________________
GREGORY HANNA, JR.,
Complainant,
v.
GLOBAL NUCLEAR FUEL AMERICAS, LLC,
Respondent.
________________________
ARB Case No. 2023-0015
OALJ Case No. 2020-ERA-00002
Charles C. Thebaud, Jr.
Charles C. Thebaud, JR. LLC
1629 K Street NW, Suite 300
Washington, DC 20006
(202) 827-9746 (Office)
(202) 744-5223 (Cell)
(540) 592-3079 (Home Office)
chuck@charlesthebaud.com
Counsel for Global Nuclear Fuel-Americas, LLC
App.76a
Introduction
In accordance with the briefing schedule issued
by the U.S. Department of Labor Administrative
Review Board (“ARB” or “Board”) on March 20, 2023,
Respondent, Global Nuclear Fuel-Americas, LLC
(“GNF-A”), submits this Response Brief.
In his pleadings and testimony before Chief
Administrative Law Judge Stephen R. Henley, the
Complainant, Gregory Hanna, urged the Chief Judge
to equitably toll the statute of limitations for a variety
of reasons. In Complainant’s Memorandum of Points
and Authorities in Support of Appeal (“Complainant’s
Initial Brief”), he has abandoned his prior
contentions. Mr. Hanna now asserts that the Board
should apply the principle of equitable estoppel and toll
the statute of limitations because, allegedly, GNF-A
“misled Hanna and lulled Hanna . . . into believing he
would eventually be reinstated.” (Complainant’s
Initial Brief, at 1.)
Nothing in the Complainant’s Initial Brief, or in
the record, as a whole, supports the tolling of the 180day statute of limitations under section 211 of the
Energy Reorganization Act, 42 U.S.C. § 5851, (“ERA”)
for any reason. The facts and the applicable law
require the Board to affirm the Decision and Order
Dismissing the Complaint As Untimely, issued by the
Chief Administrative Law Judge on December 21,
2022 (“Decision and Order”).
Factual Background
According to the Complainant’s Statement of the
Issues, the primary issue before the Board is whether
GNF-A somehow “misled and lulled” Mr. Hanna into
a “false sense of security,” causing him to miss the
App.77a
statutory deadline for the submittal of a claim under
section 211 of the ERA. (Complainant’s Initial Brief,
at 3.) Nevertheless, Complainant provides an extensive
discussion of his version of the merits of his complaint.
(See Complainant’s Initial Brief at 4-9.)
A.
Overview of the Facts Associated with the
Merits
GNF-A disagrees with virtually all of the alleged
facts, as well as the conclusion that Mr. Hanna was
the victim of retaliation. Because the merits of this
case were not before Chief Judge Henley and they are
not before this Board, GNF-A will not burden this
brief with the evidence refuting the merits of Mr.
Hanna’s claim. GNFA’s Position Statement to the
Occupational Safety & Health Administration
(“OSHA”) contains a detailed discussion of the relevant
facts. (See Appx. 771-799).1 In summary, the evidence
establishes that GNF-A did not place Mr. Hanna or
his peers in any jeopardy or in any unsafe condition
on January 25, 2017. Contrary to Mr. Hanna’s
assertions, neither he nor his peers received any
radiation burns or other injuries that day (or any
other day). (Appx. 376: 8-25; 377: 1-20; 437: 15-25;
438: 1-14) Moreover, Mr. Hanna did not raise any
nuclear safety, workplace safety, or personal safety
concerns with his supervisor or any other manager
1 GNF-A has submitted its complete Position Statement to
OSHA in Volume III of the Appendix. The copy of this Position
Statement submitted by Mr. Hanna in Volume I of the Appendix
(at Appx. 9, et seq,) is missing pages 13, 16-21, and 23. The
document in Volume III contains the complete GNF-A Position
Statement for ease of reference.
App.78a
that day about the work performed on January 25,
2017. (Appx. (787-790)
Unrelated to the work performed on January 25,
2017, in March 2017, one of Mr. Hanna’s peers
notified management that Mr. Hanna had left work
without authority, while “on-the-clock.” (Appx. 12-13)
An internal investigation followed and substantiated
this employee’s concern. Consistent with its policy and
past practices, GNF-A terminated Mr. Hanna’s
employment, effective June 1, 2017. (Appx 53) His
termination was entirely lawful and unrelated to any
protected activity.
B.
Overview of the Facts Associated with the
Sole Issue before the ARB
Mr. Hanna’s second-level manager, John Berger,
and his Human Resources manager, Ana Garriga, met
with Mr. Hanna on May 31, 2017, and informed him
of his termination. (Appx. 389: 21-25) They also
provided him with a letter, dated June 1, 2017, which
unequivocally stated, “Your employment with the
General Electric Company is terminated effective
immediately, due to failure to comply with Company
policies.” (Appx. 53) The letter specified that one of the
policies violated was a “Category 1” violation; namely,
on two occasions, Mr. Hanna, an hourly worker, left
the worksite without permission “while registered as
working.” (Id.) The letter noted that “Category 1
violations represent actions that will not be tolerated,
and are grounds for immediate dismissal.” (Id.) Finally,
the letter informed Mr. Hanna that, if he disagreed
with the termination, he could pursue an internal
appeal using the Wilmington Employee Appeal
Procedure, HEP-51, a copy of which Ms. Garriga
App.79a
provided to him and discussed with him. (Id.) (Appx.
394: 2-8)
During this meeting, Ms. Garriga also informed
Mr. Hanna that she was allowing his benefits to remain
in place until June 9, 2017, although she made it clear
that she was not obligated to do so, given his
termination. (Appx. 558, at 23-24 min.) During the
hearing, Ms. Garriga testified that it was not unusual
for her to continue the benefits of a newly terminated
employee to allow the person an opportunity to make
suitable arrangements going forward. (Appx. 391: 2425; 392: 1-2) Ms. Garriga also informed Mr. Hanna
that, if he pursued an internal appeal, he would
continue to have access to his benefits during the
appeal, but that he would not be paid. (Appx. 558, at
24-25 min.) At the conclusion of the meeting, Mr.
Hanna told Ms. Garriga that he wanted to appeal his
termination. (Appx. 558, at 25 min.) Ms. Garriga was
clear, however, that despite the continuation of his
benefits during his appeals, he was terminated and he
would not receive pay. (Appx. 392: 14-23) Indeed, in
addition to the unambiguous language in the
termination letter, Mr. Berger told Mr. Hanna he was
terminated once and Ms. Garriga told him three
separate times that he was terminated. (Appx. 558, at
11:48 min.; 19:35 min.; 20:19 min.; and 21:35 min.)
Consistent with Mr. Hanna’s decision to appeal
his termination, he submitted a first-level appeal to
his immediate supervisor, John Mathews, on June 9,
2017. (Appx. 54) Mr. Mathews met with Mr. Hanna,
listened to his assertions and arguments, but declined
to overturn the termination. (Appx. 439: 11-25; 440: 17) Contrary to Mr. Hanna’s assertion in his Initial
Brief, Mr. Berger did not direct Mr. Mathews to deny
App.80a
the appeal. (See Complainant’s Initial Brief at 10.) To
the contrary, Mr. Mathews tested Mr. Hanna’s
contention that he did not leave the site, but he
concluded that Mr. Hanna’s explanation “was not
remotely close” to the facts, and, as a result, he denied
Mr. Hanna’s appeal. (Appx. 439: 11-25; 440: 1-7)
One month later, on July 10, 2017, Mr. Hanna
filed his second appeal, this time with his second-level
manager, Mr. Berger. (Appx. 56) Mr. Berger also
considered Mr. Hanna’s submittal. On July 17, 2017,
however, he met with Mr. Hanna and provided him
with a letter denying his second appeal. (Appx. 461)
That letter summarized the result of Mr. Berger’s
review. “After a full review of the situation, and the
points you have presented in your appeal, I conclude
that the Positive Management Policy and corresponding
practice were followed properly and consistently. The
actions taken were justified due to the severity of the
violations. For these reasons, the decision to terminate
your employment stands.” (Appx. 461)
Mr. Hanna notified Ms. Garriga later that day,
that he wanted to pursue a final, third-level appeal.
(Appx. 729-30) Two days later, on July 19, 2017,
before he submitted any information in that final
appeal, however, Mr. Hanna changed his mind and
opted, instead, to file a concern with the GE Ombuds
Program. (Appx. 61) Section 4.5 of Employee Appeals
Procedure, HEP-51, which Ms. Garriga gave to Mr.
Hanna, and discussed with him, at his termination
meeting, specifically provides: “Employees should decide
which review process to use ‘up front’. For example, it
is not appropriate to use the GE Ombuds process and
the appeals process concurrently.” (Appx. 476; section
4.5) (Emphasis added.)
App.81a
Mr. Hanna’s Ombuds concern included various
technical safety concerns, as well as an assertion that
his termination was retaliatory. Mr. Hanna also
explicitly questioned the objectivity of the Company’s
prior investigations: “[B]ased on my experience at the
[GNFA] Wilmington facility, I had reservations about
the objectivity of any investigation.” (Appx. 62) He
also asserted that the “final step in the appeal process
is scheduled for Tuesday July 25 and I am convinced
that the review will change nothing because John
Berger wants me out.” (Appx. 63) Given Mr. Hanna’s
allegations and his expressed concern for objectivity,
the Company retained Timothy P. Matthews, a
partner at Morgan, Lewis & Bockius, LLP, to conduct an
independent, non-privileged investigation into Mr.
Hanna’s technical and employment-related concerns.
(Appx. 335: 8-24) (Timothy Matthews is not related to
Mr. Hanna’s former supervisor, John Mathews, who
conducted the first-level appeal.) On July 28, 2017,
the GE Ombuds person, Mariana Monteiro, thanked
Mr. Hanna for raising his concern and informed him
that the investigation would begin. (Appx. 247)
Mr. Matthews received his assignment on July
31, 2017 (Appx. 335: 1-6). Consistent with Ms.
Monteiro’s message to Mr. Hanna, he started working
on the investigation “immediately.” (Appx. 341: 3)
Given Mr. Hanna’s detailed written submittal to the
Ombuds Program and the existing records from Mr.
Hanna’s prior appeals, Mr. Matthews reviewed the
existing documentation and then, “very quickly in
August,” traveled to Wilmington to conduct interviews.
(Appx. 341: 3-21) After this initial field work and his
subsequent review of the materials retrieved during
his site visit, Mr. Matthews prepared to interview Mr.
App.82a
Hanna. (Appx. 342: 10-14) He contacted Mr. Hanna by
e-mail on September 26, 2017, introduced himself,
indicated that he had been engaged to conduct the
investigation, and requested an interview of Mr.
Hanna on October 2, 2017, in Wilmington, NC. (Appx.
467) Mr. Hanna declined to be interviewed because he
said he was leaving Wilmington to “lend [his]
assistance and experience to victims of the
hurricanes down in Florida and the keys [sic].” (Appx.
466-67) He concluded, “the best I can do is email you
one week before I return, to try to set up and
appointment/meeting.” (Appx. 467) Mr. Hanna’s
declination of this interview request caused a
“significant delay” in the completion of the investigation. (Appx. 342) After two weeks passed without
hearing from Mr. Hanna, Mr. Matthews reached out
again, on October 11, 2017, asking Mr. Hanna to reply
at his “earliest convenience” about his availability for an
interview later in October. (Appx. 466) (Appx. 342: 2325; 343: 1) Ultimately, Mr. Hanna made himself
available for an interview in Wilmington on October
27, 2017. (Appx. 343: 7-10)
When Mr. Hanna met with Mr. Matthews on
October 27, 2017, he gave Mr. Matthews a recently
prepared three-page, written statement. (Appx 65)
(Appx. 343: 13-24) Some of the assertions contained in
that document, as well as Mr. Hanna’s responses to
Mr. Matthews’ questions, were inconsistent with Mr.
Hanna’s prior submittals and the evidence that Mr.
Matthews had already collected. (Appx. 344: 2-17)
According to Mr. Matthews, Mr. Hanna’s interview and
his new written statement created “[e]ssentially. a
new set of facts that required [Mr. Matthews] to re-do
some of [his] interviews [and] some of his field work.
App.83a
[He] needed to go back and follow-up with managers
and co-workers that [Mr. Hanna] claimed to have
interacted with on the additional or different details.”
(Appx. 344: 13-17) Mr. Matthews explained to Mr.
Hanna that, given this new information, he would
have to conduct additional field work and that this
could impact the timing of the completion of the
investigation. (Appx. 344: 18-22) Mr. Hanna did not
object to the additional time and, according to Mr.
Matthews, he actually “expected it.” (Appx. 344: 2325; 345: 1)
Consistent with Mr. Matthews’ discussion with
Mr. Hanna, he followed up on the new information
and made an additional trip to Wilmington to conduct
more field work. In all, Mr. Matthews made four trips
to Wilmington and spent over eleven days on site – in
addition to the work he performed remotely. (Appx.
348: 1-3) After completing his field work, Mr.
Matthews spent two weeks analyzing the information
and writing his report. (Appx. 348: 9-10)
Before Mr. Matthews completed his report, Mr.
Hanna sent an e-mail to Mr. Matthews with a demand
for money on December 7, 2017, as well as an
expression of an intent to initiate legal action if his
demands were not met. Specifically, Mr. Hanna
demanded: (a) reinstatement, a $100,000 salaried
position, guaranteed employment for six years, the
removal of his second-level manager (Mr. Berger), and
receipt of all back pay; or (b) $600,000 after taxes. Mr.
Hanna wrote that the “offer” would expire in about
two hours, and, if GNF-A did not accept it, he would
file a complaint with “several government agencies
including OSHA and NRC” and that he would contact
“local and national media.” (Appx. 241-42) Mr.
App.84a
Matthews forwarded Mr. Hanna’s demand to GNF-A
and also replied to Mr. Hanna, reminding him that he
is not counsel to GNF-A, but only the independent
investigator assigned to investigate Mr. Hanna’s
concerns. (Appx. 346: 14-21) (Appx. 241) Consistent
with Mr. Matthews’ sole responsibility as the
independent investigator, he played no role in
responding substantively to Mr. Hanna’s demand.
(Appx. 346: 22-14)
On December 8, 2017, Mr. Hanna filed his ERA
complaint with OSHA, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 5851,
ten days after the expiration of the statute of
limitations. (Appx. 1-7)
After Mr. Matthews completed his report of
investigation, he conducted a telephonic debriefing
with Mr. Hanna on December 22, 2017, in which he
discussed the results of the investigation. (Appx. 347:
15-25; 348: 11-13) Mr. Matthews separately addressed
each of Mr. Hanna’s allegations, summarized what
Mr. Matthews did to investigate the allegation, and
then provided the conclusion for each allegation.
(Appx. 350: 11-17) Mr. Matthews informed Mr. Hanna
that the evidence did not substantiate any of Mr.
Hanna’s allegations. (Appx. 350: 14-17) The debriefing
occurred “as early as [Mr. Matthews] possibly could,
after completing the follow-up field work based on
[Mr. Hanna’s] interview” (Appx. 347: 25; 348: 1) and
“as quickly as [Mr. Matthews] could button up [his]
report. . . . ” (Appx. 348: 11) The timing of the debrief
“had absolutely nothing to do with any DOL or any
other statute of limitations.” (Appx. 348: 12-13)
App.85a
Overview of the Relevant Law
The United States Supreme Court and the ARB
have recognized that “equitable relief from limitations
periods is ‘typically extended . . . only sparingly’.” (Wood
v. Boeing – South Carolina, ARB Case No. 11-067,
ALJ Case No. 2011-AIR-009 (Dec. 10, 2012), at 8
(emphasis added), quoting, Irwin v. Dep’t of Veterans
Affairs, 498 U.S. 89, 96 (1990)). Similarly, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit (the
circuit in which this matter arises) has noted that
equitable tolling is available “only in those rare
instances where – due to circumstances external to a
party’s own conduct – it would be unconscionable to
enforce the limitations period against the party and
gross injustice would result.” (Harris v. Hutchinson,
209 F.3d 325, 330 (4th Cir. 2000) (emphasis added)).
Consistent with these standards and principles,
the Fourth Circuit has established a high bar for a
plaintiff seeking to extend a limitations period on the
basis of equitable estoppel. In English v. Whitfield, 858
F.2d 957 (4th Cir. 1988), the court considered whether
to apply that principle to an untimely complaint filed
by a terminated employee under the ERA. The court
held that an employee seeking to invoke equitable
estoppel must show that “‘an employee’s failure to file
in timely fashion is the consequence either of a
deliberate design by the employer or of actions that
the employer should unmistakably have understood
would cause the employee to delay filing his charge’.”
(English v. Whitfield, 858 F.2d 957, 963 (4th Cir.
1988), quoting, Price v. Litton Business Systems, Inc.,
694 F.2d 963, 965 (4th Cir. 1982)) Significantly, the
court noted that ‘“[a]n employee’s hope for . . . a
continuing employment relationship cannot toll the
App.86a
statute absent some employer conduct likely to mislead
an employee to sleeping on his rights’.” (Id., quoting,
Price v. Litton Business Systems, Inc., 694 F.2d 963,
965-66 (citations omitted) (4th Cir. 1982)) Moreover,
“even an employer’s confirmation of that hope could
not estop the employer absent some indication that the
promise was a quid-pro-quo for the employee’s
forbearance in filing a claim.” (Id., at 963) Given these
principles, the court declined to extend the statute of
limitations on the basis of equitable estoppel, even
though the employer allegedly made “repeated
assurances that permanent placement was being
sought for [the plaintiff] elsewhere in the company” and
an assertion that a company “executive” told the
plaintiff that “[the company] did not intend to fire
her.” (Id.) The court held, “this is not the type of
conduct that equitably estops under our rule.” (Id. See
also English v. Pabst Brewing Co., 828 F.2d 1047,
1049 (4th Cir. 1987), Coe v. Baltimore City Fire
Department, Civ. No. WDQ-11-1282 (D. Md.) (Feb. 21,
2013), slip op. at 9.)
Applying these principles, courts have declined to
apply equitable estoppel under facts far more
compelling than those present here. For example, in
Radbod v. Washington Suburban Sanitary Commission,
Civ. No. JFM-03-309 (D. Md. Jul. 14, 2003), slip op. at
3, the court rejected the plaintiff’s argument that
equitable estoppel applied because the employer
“misled [the plaintiff] into believing that it was
investigating his claims of discrimination and would
act as his advocate.” Likewise, in Talbot v. Mobil
Corporation, 46 F.Supp.2d 468 (E.D. Va. 1999), the
court rejected a former employee’s claim that equitable
estoppel applied even though the employer allegedly
App.87a
“gave him [a] temporary job, and at the same time,
gave him expectations in an email from his supervisor
that he would be considered for work beyond that
job. . . . ” (Id. at 473) The court determined that
equitable estoppel did not apply because there was no
indication of the required “quid-pro-quo.” (Id.)
The ARB and the Secretary of Labor have
reached similar results. For example, in Woods v.
Boeing – South Carolina, ARB Case No. 11-067, ALJ
Case No. 2100-AIR-009 (Dec. 10, 2012), the Board
noted that the courts “generally have held that unless
the employer has acted deliberately to deceive,
mislead, or coerce the employee into not filing a claim
in a timely manner, equitable estoppel will not apply.”
(Woods v. Boeing – South Carolina, ARB Case No. 11067, ALJ Case No. 2100-AIR-009 (Dec. 10, 2012) at 9,
quoting Tracy v. Consolidated Edison Co., No 1989CAA-001, slip op. at 5 (Sec’y July 8, 1992)) In Woods,
the Board noted that the use of the employer’s EEO
and Ethics procedure for addressing complaints of
harassment “falls short of the kind of evidence needed
to establish that [the employer] improperly misled or
‘induced’ [the employee] to make use of this procedure
to his detriment.” (Id. at 9) Additionally, the fact that
the internal processes did not rule in the Plaintiff’s
favor was “not sufficient for tolling purposes.” (Id.) The
Board found no evidence that the employer “attempted
to improperly induce, much less coerce, [the employee]
into forgoing the filing of an AIR 21 complaint.” (Id.)
Likewise, in Tracy v. Consolidated Edison Co.,
Case No. 89-CAA-1 (Sec’y Jul. 8, 1992), a suspended
employee alleged that, after his suspension, the
employee’s supervisor told the employee’s union representative that the company was attempting to
App.88a
resolve the issue and that the union should take no
further action. (Id. at 2) Ultimately, however, the
company did not rescind the employee’s suspension.
In rejecting the complainant’s assertion that equitable
estoppel applied, the Secretary found the evidence,
even when considered in the most favorable light for
the complainant, was “insufficient under the case law
and the prior decisions of the Secretary. . . . ” (Id. at 3)
The Secretary cited English v. Whitfield, and
concluded that the union representative’s discussions
with management and the company’s alleged statement
that “the matter was being resolved” were not sufficient
to show that the company misled the employee about
his claim. (Id. at 3) The Secretary wrote, “Courts
generally have held that unless the employer has
acted deliberately to deceive, mislead, or coerce the
employee into not filing a claim in a timely manner,
equitable estoppel will not apply.” (Id. at 3)
As discussed later in this brief, there are no
assertions in this case – and certainly no evidence –
that GNF-A ever deceived, misled, or coerced Mr.
Hanna into not filing an ERA claim in a timely
manner. Nor is there any evidence that GNF-A
created in Mr. Hanna a false sense of security that he
would be reinstated. And there is no evidence that
GNF-A ever made a promise of any sort to Mr. Hanna
as a quid-pro-quo for his forbearance in filing a claim.
App.89a
Argument
I.
Mr. Hanna’s Current Assertion Is Inconsistent
with His Prior Submittals and Testimony
In this appeal, Mr. Hanna asserted that GNF-A
lulled him into not filing a claim before the expiration
of the statutory filing deadline by creating in Mr.
Hanna a “false sense of security.” (Complainant’s
Initial Brief, at 15) Allegedly, Mr. Hanna “believed
that GNF intended to resolve his employment issues
and reinstall him at the nuclear site.” (Id.) Because he
claims that he “trusted GNF’s actions,” he “did not
seek to file a complaint with OSHA.” (Id. at 16)
Mr. Hanna’s assertions are not only inconsistent
with the facts, they are also inconsistent with his prior
submittals and testimony. Until the recent submittal
of his appeal to the Board, Mr. Hanna maintained
that: (a) he filed a timely verbal complaint with OSHA;
and (b) that he also filed a timely complaint in the
wrong forum. He told the Chief Judge in his Response
to the Show Cause Order that he verbally filed a
complaint with OSHA in November 2017, before the
expiration of the statute of limitations. (Appx. 160-61)
Mr. Hanna wrote that he “believed that he raised his
complaint of both retaliation and whistleblowing in
the proper forum – to the proper agency and well
within the appropriate timeframe.” (Appx. 167) In the
hearing, he repeated this assertion, testifying that he
called OSHA on November 24 or 25, 2017. (Appx. 318:
15-16) He cannot tell the Chief Judge that he pursued
his claim within the statute of limitations, while
simultaneously telling the Board that he missed the
filing deadline because GNF-A lulled him into
App.90a
inactivity. The
inconsistent.
two
positions
are
factually
Mr. Hanna also repeatedly told the Chief Judge
how actively he pursued his rights before the expiration
of the limitations period. For example, Mr. Hanna
wrote in his January 6, 2020, Response to the Show
Cause Order, that he spoke with various state and
federal agencies alleging retaliation only seven days
after his termination. Mr. Hanna asserted that he
“made many phone calls over a period of several
months to several agencies.” (Appx. 156) (Emphasis
added.) In his Initial Post-Hearing Brief (after the
conclusion of the limited hearing), Mr. Hanna said
that he made eleven phone calls to “various government
agencies.” (Appx. 599) More specifically, he claimed in
his Response to the Show Cause Order that he called
“the US Office of Civil Rights,” the NRC, the EEOC,
the North Carlina DOL, the Federal Bureau of
Investigation, and the New Hanover County Sherriff’s
office. (Appx. 158) Mr. Hanna said that he took “every
measure he knew to try and find the appropriate
agency to report to but none showed much
interest. . . . ” (Appx. 167) During Mr. Hanna’s 38minute call on June 7, 2017, with the EEOC, he said
that he and his friend, Ms. MacDonald, had an
“extremely detailed” discussion with the EEOC during
which Ms. MacDonald discussed the situation “from
beginning to end,” including his whistleblower concerns
and the alleged retaliation. (Appx. 158)
He testified at the limited hearing, that he
“informed [the EEOC] of everything.” (Appx. 277: 1314) In his Response to the Show Cause Order, he
asserted that he “believed this was the appropriate
forum to raise his retaliation, protected activity, dis-
App.91a
crimination, whistleblower complaint, along with his
other employment concerns.” (Appx. 158) Mr. Hanna
also claimed that this 38-minute call was “a valid
filing of his concerns. . . . ” (Appx. 179) Similarly, Mr.
Hanna told the Chief Judge in his Initial Post Hearing
Brief, that “he believed after a 38-minute phone call
with that agency that he had raised a valid
complaint.” (Appx. 593) See also Appx. 261-62; 293:78) He also testified that Ms. MacDonald followed-up with
the EEOC on Mr. Hanna’s behalf on September 23,
2017. (Appx. 307: 1-7) In describing his level of
activity, Mr. Hanna testified at the hearing that he
made “a good two dozen phone calls” and that they
were “not 30-second phone calls,” but “five, seven or
eight minute phone calls.” (Appx. 276: 16-21)
Mr. Hanna’s claimed actions – which allegedly
occurred during the time that Mr. Hanna pursued his
internal appeals and his Ombuds concern, and during
the period that he continued to receive benefits from
GNF-A – are not the actions of a person who has been
misled into believing that he should not file a timely
complaint or one who has been lulled into inactivity.
And these alleged contacts with government agencies
seeking relief are not the actions of a person who has
a “false sense of security” that the Company will
ultimately reinstate him.
Given his prior testimony and submittals claiming
that he actively challenged his termination and sought
the assistance of various government agencies, Mr.
Hanna cannot now claim that GNF-A created a false
sense of security about his reinstatement or that
GNF-A somehow lulled him into a protracted period
of inactivity, which caused him to miss the filing
deadline. Indeed, he previously claimed that he met
App.92a
the filing deadline. His current claim that he passively
waited to file a complaint because he trusted GNF-A
and that he was lulled into a false sense of security
cannot be reconciled with his earlier claims and
testimony.
II. The Evidence Does Not Support Mr. Hanna’s
Assertion that GNF-A Created a False Sense
of Security in Him or Lulled Him into
Sleeping on His Rights
Mr. Hanna claims that four GNF-A actions “led
Mr. Hanna to believe his complaints were being
resolved internally.” (Complainant’s Initial Brief, at
23) More specifically, he identified “the internal
appeals, ombudsman process, external investigation,
[and] company administrative actions” as the GNF-A
actions in question. (Id.) The facts refute Mr. Hanna’s
claim.
A. Mr. Hanna’s Use of the GNF-A Internal
Appeal Process Did Not Create in Him a
False Sense of Security or Lull Him into
Sleeping on His Rights
Mr. Hanna claims that, through his participation
in the internal appeals process, GNF-A “lulled Hanna
into believing he did not need to actively seek out an
alternative forum.” (Complainant’s Initial Brief, at
24-25) He asserts that GNF-A “slowly shuffle[ed]
Hanna through this internal appeal process” and
“fail[ed] to communicate whether there was a real
possibility Hanna could get his job back.” (Id. at 24)
These claims are false.
At the termination meeting on May 31, 2017, the
Human Resources Manager, Ms. Garriga, specifically
reminded Mr. Hanna of his right to seek relief
App.93a
outside the Company. She told him, “You may decide
at some point to go to the authorities and, you know,
put in a formal claim if you are feeling that that’s, you
know, impending.” (Appx. 558, at 19:00 min.) She also
told Mr. Hanna that “this termination is appealable”
and she provided Mr. Hanna with the procedure that
afforded him the opportunity to appeal his termination
within the Company. (Id., at 19:35 min.) (Appx. 53)
There is nothing in the record to suggest – and Mr.
Hanna has not claimed – that she addressed his
likelihood of success if he chose to appeal his
termination. Nor is there any evidence that she misled
him or that she promised him anything if he were to
use the appeals process and forego taking legal action.
She simply advised him of its availability, as she would
for any other terminated employee, and provided him
with the appeals procedure for his review and
consideration. At the end of their discussion on May
31, 2017, Mr. Hanna elected to appeal. (Appx. 558, at
25:00 min.)
Consistent with Mr. Hanna’s decision to appeal
his termination, he submitted a first-level appeal to
his immediate supervisor, John Mathews, on June 9,
2017. (Appx 54) Mr. Mathews expeditiously met with
Mr. Hanna, listened to his assertions and arguments,
but he did not overturn the termination. (Appx. 439:
11-25; 440: 1-7) Contrary to Mr. Hanna’s assertion in
his Initial Brief, Mr. Berger did not direct Mr.
Mathews to deny the appeal. (See Complainant’s
Initial Brief at 10.) In fact, Mr. Mathews tested Mr.
Hanna’s contention that he did not leave site, but he
concluded that Mr. Hanna’s explanation “was not
remotely close” to the facts, and, as a result, he denied
Mr. Hanna’s appeal. (Appx. 439: 11-25; 440: 1-7) That
App.94a
expeditious denial of Mr. Hanna’s appeal could not
possibly have created a false sense of security in Mr.
Hanna, or a reasonable belief, that he would be
reinstated.
Likewise, one month later, on July 10, 2017, Mr.
Hanna filed his second appeal with his second-level
manager, Mr. Berger. (Appx 56) Mr. Berger also
considered Mr. Hanna’s contentions and submittal.
Seven days after receiving Mr. Hanna’s appeal, Mr.
Berger met with Mr. Hanna and provided him with a
letter denying his second appeal. (Appx. 461) Again,
no reasonable employee would conclude that this
unfavorable outcome was somehow an assurance that
he would be reinstated. Indeed, there is nothing in the
record that suggests that either Mr. Mathews or Mr.
Berger said or did anything that would have led Mr.
Hanna to think that he would be reinstated or that he
should forego the submittal of a complaint to OSHA.
After Mr. Berger denied Mr. Hanna’s second-level
appeal, Mr. Hanna notified Ms. Garriga that he
wanted to pursue a third-level appeal. (Appx. 729730) That final appeal was scheduled for July 25,
2017. (Appx. 63) But, on July 19, 2017, before the final
appeal could be conducted, Mr. Hanna changed his
mind and opted, instead, to file a concern with the GE
Ombuds Program. (Appx. 61-63) As previously
discussed, Section 4.5 of Employee Appeals Procedure,
HEP-51, which Ms. Garriga gave to Mr. Hanna, and
discussed with him at his termination meeting,
specifically provides: “Employees should decide which
review process to use ‘up front’. For example, it is not
appropriate to use the GE Ombuds process and the
appeals process concurrently.” (Appx. 476, section 4.5)
(Emphasis added.)
App.95a
These facts conclusively establish that GNF-A
did not create a false sense of security in Mr. Hanna
or mislead him into believing that the appeal process
would ultimately lead to his reinstatement. Indeed,
after he received two unfavorable decisions, he abandoned the appeals process and filed an Ombuds
concern. His actions prove that he had no false sense
of security that his appeals would prevail and that he
would be reinstated.
These facts also establish that GNF-A did not
“shuffle” Mr. Hanna slowly through the appeal process.
To the contrary, it acted expeditiously and deliberately
to resolve Mr. Hanna’s appeals. In fact, if Mr. Hanna
had pursued the third-level appeal, the three-step
appeals process would have concluded soon after the
scheduled meeting on July 25, 2017, less than two
months after his termination and about four months
before the expiration of the statute of limitations on
November 28, 2017. The only reason that Mr. Hanna’s
concerns were not resolved in July 2017 was Mr.
Hanna’s decision to change course and file a new
Ombuds case. He – not GNF-A – determined the
timing.
Mr. Hanna’s assertion that GNF-A “fail[ed] to
communicate whether there was a real possibility
Hanna could get his job back” does not support a claim
of equitable estoppel. (See Complainant’s Initial Brief,
at 24) Ms. Garriga, who helped administer the appeal
process, and the two managers who considered Mr.
Hanna’s appeal, properly did not pre-judge or
comment on Mr. Hanna’s likelihood of success before
they received his contentions and heard his arguments.
Nor should they. If the Complainant’s position were
adopted by the Board, companies with internal appeals
App.96a
processes would be compelled to handicap an employee’s
appeal chances and communicate those chances to the
employee or face the possibility that their silence
provided the employee with some false sense of
security that his appeal will be successful. Obviously,
such an outcome would be counterproductive to a fair
appeal.
Finally, Mr. Hanna’s contention is contrary to
established law. Controlling case law establishes that
internal appeals or grievance processes have no
bearing on statutes of limitation. The United States
Supreme Court has held that the “grievance procedure,
by its nature, is a remedy for a prior decision, not an
opportunity to influence that decision before it is
made . . . [W]e already have held that the pendency of
a grievance, or some other method of collateral review
of an employment decision, does not toll the running
of the limitations periods.” (Delaware State College v.
Ricks, 449 U.S. 250, 261 (1980) (citing Int’l Union of
Elec., Radio & Machine Workers v. Robbins & Meyers,
Inc., 429 U.S. 229 (1976) (emphasis in original))
The ARB has followed this well-settled principle.
In Woods v. Boeing – South Carolina, ARB Case No.
11-067, ALJ Case No. 2011-AIR-009, the complainant
alleged that he was “induced into taking advantage of
several internal processes, none of which found in his
favor, but all of which culminated in the dismissal of
his harassment complaint exactly one day after the 90
day AIR filing period had run.” (Id. at 9) The Board
rejected his argument, noting “The Secretary of Labor
has ruled in an ERA case that the deadline for filing
claims is not tolled when an employee engages in the
employer’s internal review proceedings.” (Id., citing
Ackison v. Detroit Edison Co., No. 1990-ERA-038, slip
App.97a
op. at 2 (Sec’y Aug. 2, 1990)) The Board noted that the
availability and use of a company’s internal appeals
procedure “falls short of the kind of evidence needed
to establish that [the company] improperly misled or
‘induced’ [the complainant] to make use of this
procedure to his detriment. The fact that [the appeals]
did not find in [the complainant’s] favor, in and of
itself, is also not sufficient for tolling purposes.” (Id.,
at 9) The Board determined that the complainant “has
alleged no facts establishing that [the company] is in
any way responsible for the fact that [the complainant] convinced himself that he was certain to
prevail and so chose, of his own free will, not to file an
AIR 21 complaint.” (Id.) See also Leiva v. Union Pac.
R.R. Co., ALJ No. 2017-FRS-36, slip op. at 47 (May 25,
2018) (“[D]uring the pendency of a grievance or some
form of collateral review of an employment decision,
the statute of limitations is not tolled.”) (internal
citation omitted); Jenkins v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency,
ARB No. 98-146, ALJ No. 1988-SWD-2, slip op. at 14
(ARB Feb. 28, 2003)) (“It is well established that the
filing of a grievance does not operate to toll the
limitations period for filing a complaint under the
whistleblower statutes.”) (Internal citations omitted).
If Mr. Hanna’s contention were to prevail – that
his receipt of the appeals procedure and voluntary use
of the process were sufficient to “lull” him into
delaying or foregoing legal action – it would not only
be contrary to established law, it would also provide a
strong disincentive for companies to provide processes
and procedures for employees to internally appeal
discipline. The unavailability (or reduction in the
number) of internal appeal processes would serve
neither employees nor employers. Left only with
App.98a
litigation as a potential resource for the resolution of
employment disputes, employees would be compelled
to seek redress in the courts and administrative
agencies, thereby increasing demands on an already
burdened system.
In short, Mr. Hanna has provided no evidence to
suggest that anyone at GNF-A, or that the appeals
process itself, induced him into pursuing an internal
appeal and foregoing the right to file a timely complaint
with OSHA. He alone made that decision. His voluntary
use of the GNF-A appeal process does not support a
determination that equitable estoppel somehow tolled
the running of the limitations period.
B. Mr. Hanna’s Communications with the
Ombuds Program Did Not Create in Him
a False Sense of Security or Lull Him into
Sleeping on His Rights
Mr. Hanna alleges that through his voluntary
participation in the Ombuds Program, GNF-A somehow
misled him to believe that he would be reinstated,
thereby causing him to miss the ERA filing deadline.
(Complainant’s Initial Brief, at 25-27) To support this
assertion, Mr. Hanna notes that the Corporate
Ombuds person, Ms. Monteiro, referred him to his
local Human Resources manager when Mr. Hanna
requested reinstatement of his pay. (Id., at 25) The
facts establish that Ms. Garriga, the Human Resources
manager, made it clear to Mr. Hanna that he was
terminated and that neither his pay nor his employment were going to be reinstated during the Ombuds
investigation.
On July 28, 2017, Ms. Monteiro sent an e-mail to
Mr. Hanna advising him that she “requested that the
App.99a
appeal you have filed with the plant manager [the
third-level appeal] be held in abeyance while the
investigation is conducted.” (Appx. 248) As previously
discussed, Ms. Monteiro’s message to Mr. Hanna was
consistent with the governing procedure, which provides
that an employee should decide “up front” whether to
pursue an internal appeal or an Ombuds concern.
(Appx. 476) That was not new information to Mr.
Hanna. Ms. Garriga provided him with the procedure
at his May 31, 2017, termination meeting and explained
that point to him.
In that same July 28, 2017, e-mail exchange with
Mr. Hanna, Ms. Montiero wrote, “Similarly, I have
asked that your status remain unchanged during the
pendency of the investigation.” (Appx. 248) Of course,
he was terminated effective June 1, 2017, and he
remained terminated in July 2017. Indeed, he had
just lost both appeals. Interestingly, during his
appeals, Mr. Hanna was clear on his terminated status.
In his first appeal, he submitted a written statement
acknowledging that Mr. Berger told him he “was being
terminated for a Class I Offense,” and he argued that
his “termination is without merit and should be
reversed.” (Appx. 54-55) Similarly, in his second
appeal, Mr. Hanna acknowledged receiving a
“termination letter,” and he asked that it be “rescinded.” (Appx. 60) (And, as previously noted, Mr. Berger
and Ms. Garriga told Mr. Hanna four times during the
termination meeting that he was terminated.)
Notwithstanding the clarity of the outcome of the
appeals, on July 28, 2017, Mr. Hanna asked Ms.
Monteiro to contact Human Resources and “reinstate
his pay.” (Appx. 247) Because Mr. Hanna had not been
reinstated and because Ms. Monteiro lacked any
App.100a
authority to reinstate either his employment or his
pay, she replied that he needed to contact his Human
Resources organization to address his request. (Id.) Ms.
Garriga confirmed in her testimony that Ms. Monteiro
did not change Mr. Hanna’s status; nor did Ms.
Monteiro have the authority to do so. (Appx. 403: 2225; 404: 1-25) On August 8, 2017, Mr. Hanna sent a
text message to Ms. Garriga saying (incorrectly), “It is
my understanding that Ge [sic] corporate is now
taking a fresh look at everything, and that I should be
re-instated to pre-June 1 status during the new
investigation.” (Appx. 669) Ms. Garriga corrected him
almost immediately in a text message replying, “your
status remains at termination pending the results of
the [Ombuds] investigation.” (Appx. 668) (Emphasis
added.)) Even in the unlikely event that Mr. Hanna
were somehow confused by Ms. Monteiro’s July 28,
2017, e-mail about his status remaining “unchanged”
during the Ombuds investigation, Ms. Garriga’s
follow-up message removed any doubt. He was
terminated effective June 1, 2017. He remained
terminated during his two unsuccessful appeals and
the subsequent Ombuds investigation. Consequently,
he would not receive pay. Nothing in this exchange
supports a claim that GNF-A misled Mr. Hanna or
created in him a false sense of security that he had
been, or would be, reinstated. Indeed, GNF-A clearly
told him, verbally and in writing, on May 31, 2017,
that he was terminated effective June 1, 2017, and
Ms. Garriga reinforced that same message on August
8, 2017, when she denied Mr. Hanna’s baseless request
that he be reinstated to his “pre-June 1 status.”
Mr. Hanna clearly understood his terminated
status. Indeed, nothing had changed since he received
App.101a
his June 1, 2017, termination letter, which told him
unambiguously that his “employment with the General
Electric Company was being terminated effective
immediately.” (Appx. 53)
Clearly, he was not “lulled” into thinking that he
was, or would be, reinstated. On September 18, 2017,
after Mr. Hanna’s July 28, 2017, e-mail exchange with
Ms. Monteiro and after Ms. Garriga’s confirmation of his
termination, Mr. Hanna wrote again to Ms. Monteiro
arguing that he had been “terminated under false
pretenses” and he noted that he had heard that his job
position had been posted. (Appx. 573) Without
question, he understood he was terminated. He again
asked “for G.E. corporate to have G.E. Nuclear reinstate
me to pre-June 1 status.” (Appx. 573) Ms. Monteiro
replied, “I am not aware of any of the developments
you described[.] The best way to manage those are
directly with your HR representative[.]” (Appx. 573)
This exchange confirms that Mr. Hanna understood
precisely that he had been terminated. Nothing in
these exchanges supports a conclusion that GNF-A
misled Mr. Hanna about his terminated status or
created in him a false sense of security that he would
be reinstated such that he should not file a complaint
under the ERA.
C. The Independent Ombuds Investigation
Did Not Create a False Sense of Security
in Mr. Hanna or Lull Him into Sleeping
on His Rights
Mr. Hanna claims that the independent Ombuds
investigation conducted by Mr. Matthews caused
Mr. Hanna to “waste[] months of his statutory deadline believing in good faith that an independent
App.102a
investigator was performing a neutral investigation.”
(Complainant’s Initial Brief, at 27) He alleges that
“GNF misled Hanna by omitting the fact that Matthews
worked for GNF.” (Id.) He also complains about the
length of Mr. Matthews’ investigation and the timing
of his debriefing. (Id.)
Mr. Hanna’s allegations are baseless and do not
support the application of equitable estoppel.
(1) Mr. Matthews’ Independence
In Mr. Matthews’ first communication with Mr.
Hanna, he included his firm’s name, address, phone
number, and web site, in addition to Mr. Matthews’ email address and contact information. (Appx. 467) Mr.
Matthews was open and transparent about his
position and his organization. Additionally, Mr.
Matthews made it clear in that same e-mail that he
had been “engaged by GE’s Ombuds program” to
conduct the investigation into Mr. Hanna’s concern.
(Id.) There was simply nothing inaccurate or misleading
about Mr. Matthews’ communication.
Indeed, Mr. Matthews testified at the hearing
that he conducted a non-privileged investigation into
Mr. Hanna’s Ombuds concerns (Appx. 335: 22-24) and
at no time did anyone from the Company impose any
restrictions or conditions on his investigation. (Appx.
335: 25. 336: 1-3) Nor did anyone attempt to influence
the outcome of the investigation. (Appx. 336: 4-6) To
the contrary, the Company hired Mr. Matthews
because he was independent of the Company, as Mr.
Hanna had specifically requested when he submitted
his concern to the Company’s Ombuds Program.
(Appx. 63) Mr. Matthews “worked for” GNF-A, as Mr.
Hanna alleges, only in the sense that he was hired by
App.103a
the Company to conduct the independent Ombuds
investigation that Mr. Hanna specifically requested.
Contrary to Mr. Hanna’s insinuation, Mr. Matthews
was not serving as counsel to GNF-A or its parent
company, GE, when he conducted the investigation.
As he accurately told Mr. Hanna in his initial e-mail,
his sole responsibility was to perform an independent
investigation.
(2) The Timing of the Investigation
Mr. Hanna also complains about the duration of
Mr. Matthews’ investigation, noting that his debriefing
occurred after the passage of the limitations period.
(Complainant’s Initial Brief, at 27) As the earlier
factual discussion demonstrates, there is no credible
evidence that Mr. Matthews purposefully delayed his
investigation or that the running of the statute of
limitations played any role in his investigation. In
fact, Mr. Matthews confirmed in his testimony that it
played no role whatsoever. (Appx. 348: 12-13)
The timeline of Mr. Matthews’ investigation
establishes that he diligently investigated Mr. Hanna’s
concerns. The GE Ombuds Program hired Mr.
Matthews on July 31, 2017. (Appx. 335: 4-6) He
“immediately” began work. (Appx. 341: 3) Mr. Matthews
reviewed a host of prior documents related to the prior
investigations, including statements by Mr. Hanna,
and he conducted a number of on-site interviews in
Wilmington, starting in early August. (Appx. 341: 2021) After reviewing the relevant files and documents
and after conducting the initial field work, Mr.
Matthews reached out to Mr. Hanna on September 26,
2017, (more than two months prior to the expiration
of the statute of limitations period), to schedule an
App.104a
interview with him. (Appx. 341: 3-25; 342: 1-14) Mr.
Hanna told Mr. Matthews that he could not meet with
him because he was going to Florida to perform repair
work after a hurricane. (Appx. 342: 15-20) Hearing
nothing from Mr. Hanna for two weeks, Mr. Matthews
reached out again and asked for an interview. (Appx.
342: 23-25; 343: 1-6) Mr. Hanna ultimately made
himself available for an interview on October 27,
2017. (Appx. 343: 7-10) During the interview, Mr.
Hanna provided yet another written statement and
discussed new facts, which caused Mr. Matthews to
conduct additional field work and interviews. (Appx.
344: 2-17) As Mr. Matthews testified at the hearing,
Mr. Hanna’s statements that day “differed from
multiple statements he had given the Company in
prior investigations,” which provided a “new set of
facts,” and caused Mr. Matthews to conduct additional
field work and interviews. (Appx. 344: 6-7, 13-15) On
October 31, 2017, Mr. Matthews’ father passed away,
which caused him to be unavailable for some time.
(Appx. 366: 5-6) To follow-up on the new information
provided by Mr. Hanna in his interview, Mr.
Matthews travelled again to Wilmington in the end
of November to complete his field work. (Appx. 348:
3-6) Over the course of his investigation, he made four
separate trips to Wilmington to conduct interviews
and investigate Mr. Hanna’s concerns. (Appx. 348: 23) He then spent two weeks analyzing all the data and
information collected and writing his report. (Appx.
348: 9-10) Mr. Matthews debriefed Mr. Hanna on the
results, “as early as possible after completing the
follow-up field work based on [Mr. Hanna’s] interview.”
(Appx. 347: 24-25; 348: 1) As Mr. Matthews explained
to Mr. Hanna on cross-examination: “The investigation
took the time it took because the field work had to
App.105a
happen again because in our interview, you provided
yet another version of those same facts about the
incinerator and the like, and about where you were.”
(Appx. 367: 7-11)
There is simply no credible evidence that Mr.
Matthews delayed his investigation in any way or for
any reason, much less that he delayed it to lull Mr.
Hanna into sleeping on his rights.
(3) Mr. Hanna’s Alleged “False Sense of
Security”
In any case, Mr. Hanna’s al
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