Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Gregory Hanna, Petitioner v. Department of Labor, Administrative Review Board, et al.

Supreme Court briefMar 2, 2026

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APPENDIX TABLE OF CONTENTS

OPINIONS AND ORDERS

Opinion, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth

Circuit (October 1, 2025) .................................... 1a

Judgment, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth

Circuit (October 1, 2025) .................................... 5a

Decision and Order, U.S. Department of

Labor Administrative Review Board

(March 19, 2024) ................................................. 6a

Decision and Order, U.S. Department of

Labor Office of Administrative Law Judges

(December 21, 2022) ......................................... 23a

REHEARING ORDER

Order Denying Petition for Rehearing, U.S.

Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit

(December 2, 2025) ........................................... 46a

OTHER DOCUMENTS

Complainant-Appellant’s Memorandum of

Points and Authorities in Support of Appeal

(March 13, 2023) ............................................... 47a

Response Brief of Global Nuclear Fuel-Americas,

LLC (May 9, 2023) ............................................ 75a

Complainant-Appellant’s Reply to Defendant

Global Nuclear Fuel-Americas, LLC’s

Response Brief (June 1, 2023)........................ 125a

Brief of the Acting Secretary of Labor

(September 5, 2024)........................................ 140a

APPENDIX TABLE OF CONTENTS (Cont.)

Letter from Occupational Safety and Health

Administration (October 19, 2023) ................ 160a

Reply Brief of Petitioner to the Response Brief

of the U.S. Department of Labor

(October 25, 2024) .......................................... 164a

App.1a

OPINION, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

(OCTOBER 1, 2025)

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

________________________

GREGORY HANNA,

Petitioner,

v.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF LABOR,

ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD; GLOBAL

NUCLEAR FUEL AMERICAS LLC,

Respondents.

________________________

No. 24-1435

On Petition for Review of an Order of the

United States Department of Labor,

Administrative Review Board. (2023-0015)

Before: DIAZ, Chief Judge, and WYNN and HARRIS,

Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

The Energy Reorganization Act of 1974 provides

employees with a cause of action when discharged in

retaliation for reporting nuclear safety concerns. 42

U.S.C. § 5851. Yet Congress conditioned that right

App.2a

on timeliness: a retaliation complaint must be filed with

the Occupational Safety and Health Administration

(“OSHA”) within 180 days of the alleged violation. See

id. § 5851(b)(1); 29 C.F.R. § 24.103(c). However, “[t]he

time for filing [such] a complaint may be tolled for

reasons warranted by applicable case law.” 29 C.F.R.

§ 24.103(d)(2).

Here, after Gregory Hanna’s former employer,

Global Nuclear Fuel-Americas, LLC (“GNF”), terminated him in 2017, he filed a complaint with OSHA

alleging that GNF terminated him in retaliation for

raising significant safety concerns. But Hanna did not

file his complaint until after the statutory 180-day

deadline had passed.

Rejecting Hanna’s tolling arguments, OSHA, an

Administrative Law Judge, and the Administrative

Review Board (“Board”) each dismissed the complaint

as untimely. “We review the [Board]’s decision pursuant

to the Administrative Procedure Act. Under that framework, we may only disturb the [Board]’s decision if it

was arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or

otherwise not in accordance with law.” Peck v. U.S.

Dep’t of Lab., Admin. Rev. Bd., 996 F.3d 224, 228 (4th

Cir. 2021) (cleaned up). As relevant here, “[w]e

review an agency’s decision to deny equitable tolling

for abuse of discretion.” Prince v. Solis, 487 F. App’x

773, 774 (4th Cir. 2012) (per curiam); see Am. Bankers

Ins. Grp., Inc. v. Long, 453 F.3d 623, 629 (4th Cir.

2006).

Before this Court, Hanna contends that he can

invoke equitable estoppel because GNF lulled him

into thinking his termination would be reversed. But

Hanna does not dispute the Board’s conclusion that

GNF “did not actively or intentionally lull [him] into

App.3a

forgoing his right[]” to file a timely OSHA complaint,

which the Board concluded was “supported by

substantial evidence and unchallenged on appeal.” J.A.

976–77 (emphasis added).* Instead, he relies on Board

case law permitting tolling where “the [employer]’s

conduct, innocent or not, reasonably induced the

plaintiff not to file suit within the limitations period.”

In re Hyman v. KD Res., ARB No. 09-076, ALJ No.

2009-SOX-020, 2010 WL 1260209, at *4 (A.R.B. Mar.

31, 2010) (emphasis added). However, our own case

law forecloses Hanna’s argument.

“The separation of powers doctrine requires

administrative agencies to follow the law of the circuit

whose courts have jurisdiction over the cause of action.

In the absence of a controlling decision by the Supreme

Court, the respective courts of appeals express the law

of the circuit.” Hyatt v. Heckler, 807 F.2d 376, 379 (4th

Cir. 1986). And, in the precise context of an Energy

Reorganization Act retaliation complaint, we have

held that an employee may not invoke equitable

estoppel “[a]bsent evidence that the employer acted to

deceive the employee as to the existence of its claim or

otherwise to mislead or coerce the employee into not

filing a claim in a timely fashion.” English v.

Whitfield, 858 F.2d 957, 963 (4th Cir. 1988). We

further clarified that “an employee’s hope for a

continuing employment relationship” and “even an

employer’s confirmation of that hope” is not enough to

invoke equitable estoppel “absent some indication

that the promise was a quid-pro-quo for the employee’s

forbearance in filing a claim.” Id. (cleaned up).

* “J.A.” refers to the Joint Appendix filed by the parties in this

matter.

App.4a

Thus, Hanna’s argument for estoppel—that GNF

lulled him into a false sense of security by “le[ading]

[him] to believe that it was quite possible he could

continue to work at GNF if he followed proper procedure” and pursued internal appeals of his termination, Opening Br. at 18—is foreclosed by English.

Accordingly, we deny the petition for review. We

dispense with oral argument because the facts and

legal contentions are adequately presented in the

materials before this Court and argument would not

aid the decisional process.

PETITION DENIED

App.5a

JUDGMENT, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

(OCTOBER 1, 2025)

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

________________________

GREGORY HANNA,

Petitioner,

v.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF LABOR,

ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD; GLOBAL

NUCLEAR FUEL AMERICAS LLC,

Respondents.

________________________

No. No. 24-1435

(2023-0015)

JUDGMENT

In accordance with the decision of this court, the

petition for review is denied.

This judgment shall take effect upon issuance of

this court’s mandate in accordance with Fed. R. App.

P. 41.

/s/ Nwamaka Anowi

Clerk

App.6a

DECISION AND ORDER,

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR

ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD

(MARCH 19, 2024)

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR

ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD

200 CONSTITUTION AVE. NW

WASHINGTON, DC 20210-0001

________________________

IN THE MATTER OF:

GREGORY HANNA,

Complainant,

v.

GLOBAL NUCLEAR FUEL AMERICAS, LLC,

Respondent.

________________________

ARB Case No. 2023-0015

ALJ Case No. 2020-ERA-00002

Chief ALJ Stephen R. Henley

Before: WARREN and ROLFE,

Administrative Appeals Judges.

DECISION AND ORDER

WARREN, Administrative Appeals Judge:

This case arises from a complaint filed by

Gregory Hanna (Complainant) against his employer,

App.7a

Global Nuclear Fuel-Americas, LLC (Respondent),

alleging retaliation in violation of the whistleblower

protections of the Energy Reorganization Act (ERA)

and its implementing regulations.1 After issuing a

show cause order asking the parties to brief why the

case should not be dismissed for failure to comply with

the time limits for filing an ERA-retaliation claim and

conducting an evidentiary hearing on the matter, the

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) dismissed the case.

For the following reasons, the Board affirms the ALJ’s

Decision and Order Dismissing the Complaint as

Untimely Filed (D. & O.).

Background

Respondent hired Complainant as a shop support

operator at its Wilmington, North Carolina plant on

August 6, 2012.2

On May 31, 2017, Complainant met with his

manager, John Berger (Berger), and Respondent’s

Human Resources Manager, Ana Garriga (Garriga),

and received a termination letter dated June 1, 2017.3

Berger advised Complainant that he committed a

Category 1 offense for allegedly leaving his worksite

without permission and his employment was

terminated effective immediately.4

1 42 U.S.C. § 5851; 29 C.F.R. Part 24 (2023).

2 D. & O. at 3.

3 Id. The termination letter advised Complainant that his

“employment with the General Electronic Company is terminated

effective immediately, due to this failure to comply with Company

policies.” Id. at 4.

4 Id. at 4. The termination letter explained that Complainant

committed a Category I work rule violation by “leaving the work-

App.8a

Garriga advised Complainant that he could

pursue an internal appeal if he disagreed with the

termination and provided him with a hard copy of

Respondent’s Employee Appeals Procedure, HEP-51.5

She discussed Respondent’s internal appeals process

with him, which consisted of three levels: first, an

appeal with Complainant’s direct supervisor; second,

an appeal with Complainant’s second-level manager;

and third, an appeal to the Plant Manager or a Peer

Panel.6 Garriga informed Complainant that if he

pursued an internal appeal regarding his termination,

he would not be paid, but he would continue to receive

some benefits during the appeal process.7

From June 1, 2017, through July 20, 2017, Complainant received weekly deposits from Respondent

reflecting his salary earned through June 1, 2017, and

accrued and unused vacation, personal time, and

unused floating holidays.8 Respondent usually made

these payments in a lump sum but made weekly

payments to Complainant per his request.9

site or being off plant premises without permission while registered

as working.” Id.; JX 16.

5 Respondent’s Response Brief (Resp. Br.) at 3; Complainant’s

Brief (Comp. Br.) at 8; JX 21 is a hard copy of Respondent’s

Employee Appeals Procedure, HEP-51.

6 D. & O. at 4; Resp. Br. at 3-4; Comp. Br. at 9.

7 D. & O. at 4; Resp. Br. at 3-4.

8 D. & O. at 5. On January 1, 2018, Complainant was placed on

a leave of absence to continue receiving health benefits during

the pendency of his claim. Id. at 7.

9 Id. at 5.

App.9a

On June 1, 2017, and July 17, 2017, Complainant

requested photographs from Respondent to use during

the internal appeals process.10 Garriga provided the

photographs to Complainant within days of his requests

on June 5, 2017, and July 18, 2017, respectively.11

On June 7, 2017, Complainant telephoned and

spoke with someone at the North Carolina Department

of Labor’s Equal Employment Opportunity Commission

(NC EEOC).12 During the telephone conversation,

Complainant communicated his belief that Respondent

discriminated against him due to his disability and

wrongfully terminated him.13 But Complainant did

not claim his termination was in retaliation for raising

workplace safety concerns, nor did he discuss ERA

whistleblower protections, and no evidence suggests

that, following the call, NC EEOC opened an investigation or made a referral to another federal or state

agency.14

On June 9, 2017, Complainant filed his first appeal

through Respondent’s internal appeals process with

his immediate supervisor, who declined to overturn

the termination.15 On July 10, 2017, Complainant

10 Id.

11 Id.

12 Id. Complainant contends that he has a communication

disability and requires assistance in understanding and

participating in written and oral communication. Id. at 5 n.8.

13 Id. at 5. Complainant also discussed his workplace safety

concerns. Id.

14 Id.

15 Resp. Br. at 4.

App.10a

filed his second appeal through the internal appeals

process with his second-level manager, who denied it

on July 17, 2017.16

On July 19, 2017, Complainant filed a written

concern with Respondent’s Ombuds Program17 voicing

technical safety concerns and asserting that the termination of his employment was in retaliation for raising

safety issues.18 Respondent then hired an outside law

firm to investigate Complainant’s Ombuds complaint.19

Complainant contends that he contacted the U.S.

Department of Labor’s Occupational Safety and

Health Administration (OSHA) in November of 2017

and left a voicemail detailing the circumstances of the

termination of his employment.20

16 D. & O. at 5; Resp. Br. at 4.

17 Unlike Respondent’s internal appeals process that allowed for

employees to appeal their termination through management, the

Ombuds Program used an independent investigator hired to

conduct his or her own investigation and provide management

with recommendations regarding various concerns raised by

employees. Tr. at 86, 96, 100, 146, 152; Resp. Br. at 5; Comp. Br.

at 12.

18 D. & O. at 5; Resp. Br. at 4-5. Section 4.5 of the Employee

Appeals Procedure, HEP-51, specifically provides that “employees

should decide which review process to use . . . it is not appropriate

to use the GE Ombuds process and the appeals process

concurrently.” Resp. Br. at 4-5; JX 21.

19 D. & O. at 6; Resp. Br. at 5. Tim Matthews (a partner at the

outside law firm Respondent hired) debriefed Complainant on

the results of the investigation on December 22, 2017. D. & O. at

6 n.10.

20 D. & O. at 6. The ALJ found that this telephone call did not

occur as “there [wa]s no written record of th[e] call, despite a

App.11a

On December 8, 2017, Complainant filed a

complaint with OSHA alleging that Respondent fired

him on or about June 1, 2017, in retaliation for

reporting safety concerns and refusing to perform

unsafe tasks.21

Procedural Background

On October 24, 2019, OSHA issued a final determination letter dismissing the December 8, 2017

complaint.22 It found that Complainant filed it after

the 180-day deadline for filing had expired and did not

present any credible evidence to justify equitable

tolling.23 Complainant filed objections and a request

for hearing on November 12, 2019.24

On December 2, 2019, the ALJ issued an Order to

Show Cause regarding why Complainant’s claim

should not be dismissed for not filing a timely complaint

set by 29 C.F.R. § 24.103(d)(2).25 Complainant filed a

diligent search by OSHA personnel[.]” Id. An OSHA

“Memorandum to File” dated October 8, 2019, details the efforts

OSHA made to substantiate the telephone call, but no records

documented a call by Complainant or on his behalf to OSHA.

Respondent Global Nuclear Fuel-Americas, LLC’s Reply Brief to

Chief Administrative Law Judge Henley’s Order to Show Cause

(Feb. 7, 2020), Exhibit 24.

21 Id. at 1-2.

22 Id. at 2.

23 Id.

24 Id.

25 Id. As a threshold matter, we note that a mandatory claim

processing regulation, not a statutory jurisdictional requirement,

establishes the regulatory time limits in 29 C.F.R. § 24.103(d)(2)

and that the time limits in the statute at 42 U.S.C. § 5851(b)(2)

likewise are not jurisdictional. See Fort Bend Cnty., Tex. v. Davis,

App.12a

response to the show cause order on January 6, 2020,

and Respondent filed a response brief on February 7,

2020.26

On February 8, 2020, the ALJ issued a Notice of

Limited Pretrial Hearing notifying the parties that a

hearing was appropriate to determine whether

Complainant’s complaint should be dismissed as

untimely filed.27 The ALJ held an evidentiary hearing

587 US-, 139 S. Ct. 1843, 1849 (2019); Moreb v. Kerry Inc., ARB

No. 2023-0048, ALJ No. 2023-FDA-00014, slip op. at 4-5 (ARB

Dec. 14, 2023). As such, the parties must properly raise timeliness

as an affirmative defense for those limits to come into play or

they normally will be waived or forfeited. Fort Bend Cnty, Tex.,

587 U.S.-, 139 S. Ct. 1843 at 1849; Moreb, ARB No. 2023 0048,

slip op. at 5. While the ALJ thus erred by raising Complainant’s

alleged noncompliance sua sponte without first requiring Respondent to raise it as an affirmative defense (see Moreb, ARB No.

2023-0048, slip op. at 5), the error does not require remand.

Respondent unquestionably has sufficiently raised and developed

a timeliness defense at every stage of the administrative process

including raising several arguments in its initial filing at the

ALJ level in response to the show cause order. Under these

circumstances, the defense can categorically be said to have not

been forfeited or waived below. Hamer v. Neighborhood Hous.

Servs. of Chi., 583 U.S. 17, 20 fn. 1 (2017) (“Forfeiture is the

failure to make the timely assertion of a right; waiver is the

intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right.”)

(citations omitted); Woodson v. Allstate Ins. Co., 855 F.3d 628,

635 (4th Cir. 2017) (statute of limitations defense not waived or

forfeited where timely raised and developed). Remand therefore

would serve no purpose.

26 D. & O. at 2.

27 Id.

App.13a

on the issue on October 29, 2020, and the parties later

filed timely post-hearing briefs.28

On December 12, 2022, the ALJ issued a Decision

and Order Dismissing the Complaint as Untimely

Filed. The ALJ found: (1) the 180-day statutory filing

period began to run on June 1, 2017, and Complainant

had until November 28, 2017 to file his ERA-retaliation

complaint with OSHA; (2) Complainant filed his ERAretaliation complaint with OSHA on December 8,

2017; and (3) Complainant did not establish a basis to

equitably toll the filing deadline.29

This appeal followed.

Jurisdiction and Standard of Review

Congress authorized the Secretary of Labor to

issue final agency decisions with respect to claims of

discrimination and retaliation filed under the ERA. 30

The Secretary of Labor has delegated to the Board the

authority to review ALJ decisions.31 The ARB reviews

questions of law presented on appeal de novo, but is

bound by the ALJ’s factual determinations as long as

28 Id. at 3. The ALJ bifurcated the hearing, with the October 29,

2020 proceedings limited to receiving evidence, including witness

testimony, on whether Complainant’s complaint should be

dismissed as untimely filed. Id. at 2.

29 Id. at 10, 14.

30 42 U.S.C. § 5851; Clem v. Comput. Scis. Corp., ARB No. 20200025, ALJ Nos. 2015-ERA-00003,-00004, slip op. at 13 (ARB Mar.

10, 2021) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 5851).

31 Secretary’s Order No. 01-2020 (Delegation of Authority and

Assignment of Responsibility to the Administrative Review

Board (Secretary’s discretionary review of ARB decisions)), 85

Fed. Reg. 13186 (Mar. 6, 2020).

App.14a

they are supported by substantial evidence.

“[S]ubstantial evidence is a ‘term of art’ used throughout administrative law” denoting “more than a mere

scintilla” but only “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a

conclusion.”32

Discussion

1.

Substantial Evidence Supports the ALJ’s

Decision That Complainant’s Complaint Was

Untimely

A complainant pursuing a whistleblower claim

under the ERA must meet certain deadlines.33 Any

employee who believes he has been discharged or

otherwise discriminated against in violation of the

ERA “may, within 180 days after such violation occurs,”

file a complaint with the Secretary of Labor.34 The

implementing regulation further specifies that such

an employee may file “within 180 days after an alleged

violation of the [ERA] occurs (i.e., when the retaliatory

decision has been both made and communicated to the

complainant).”35

The Board has found that the statutes of limitation

in whistleblower cases begin to run on the date an

employee receives “final, definitive, and unequivocal

32 Biestek v. Berryhill, 587 US-, 139 S. Ct. 1148, 1154 (2019)

(citations omitted).

33 42 U.S.C. § 5851(b)(1); 29 C.F.R. § 24.103(d)(2).

34 42 U.S.C. § 5851(b)(1).

35 29 C.F.R. § 24.103(d)(2).

App.15a

notice” of an adverse employment decision. 36 The

claim accrues on “[t]he date that an employer communicates a decision to implement such a decision,

rather than the date the consequences of the decision

are felt.”37

The ALJ in this case found that the June 1, 2017

termination letter, received by Complainant on May

31, 2017, was final, unequivocal, and unambiguous

notice of termination, clearly stating: “[y]our employment with the General Electric Company is terminated

effective immediately.”38 As the ALJ found, the letter

put Complainant on notice of his termination.39 As the

ALJ further noted, during their May 31, 2017 meeting,

Berger explicitly told Complainant that his

36 Mehrotra v. Gen. Elec. Co., ARB No. 2022-0060, ALJ No. 2017SOX-00014, slip op. at 5 (ARB Sept. 21, 2023) (quoting Bauche v.

Masimo Corp., ARB No. 2022-0035, ALJ No. 2022-SOX-00010,

slip op. at 7 (ARB Sept. 27, 2022)); see also Larrick v. Bechtel

Nat’l, Inc., ARB No. 2017-0053, ALJ No. 2017-ERA-00004, slip op.

at 3 (ARB Feb. 20, 2020) (citing to Swenk v. Exelon Generation

Co., ARB No. 2004-0028, ALJ No. 2003-ERA-00030, slip op. at 4

(ARB Apr. 28, 2005)).

37 Mehrotra, ARB No. 2022-0060, slip op. at 5 (citing Delaware

State College v. Ricks (Ricks), 449 U.S. 250, 258 (1980) (holding

that the statute of limitations starts on the date the employee

receives notice of imminent discharge because “the proper focus

is on the time of the discriminatory act, not the point at which

the consequences of the act become painful”)) (other citations

omitted).

38 D. & O. at 9-10.

39 See Larrick, ARB 2017-0053, slip op. at 3 (“‘Final’ and ‘definitive’

notice denotes communication that is decisive or conclusive, i.e.

leaving no further chance for action, discussion, or change.”).

App.16a

employment was terminated, effective immediately.40

Thus, Complainant received final and unequivocal

notice of his June 1, 2017 termination on May 31,

2017.41

Since Complainant filed his complaint on December 8, 2017,42 substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s

conclusion that the complaint was untimely.

2.

Hanna Did Not Coherently Argue to the ALJ

That Respondent Lulled Him into Inaction to

Justify Equitable Estoppel—Regardless, the

ALJ’s Reasonable Factual Findings Foreclose

the Argument

Under statutes where the filing period is not

jurisdictional, the requirement is subject to “waiver,”

“equitable estoppel,” and “equitable tolling.”43 Tolling

40 D. & O. at 4.

41 Although the ALJ stated that Complainant’s employment was

terminated on June 1, 2017 (at D. & O. at 10), his findings and

analysis (at D. & O. at 9) support May 31, 2017 as the date

Complainant received notice of termination. Regardless, any error

on this issue would be harmless as using either date would still

make Complainant’s December 8, 2017 filing date untimely.

42 Complainant argued that he timely filed his whistleblower

claim under the ERA because he left a voicemail with OSHA on

or about November 24, 2017. Tr. at 69-70. The ALJ determined

that the factual evidence did not establish that Complainant filed

a complaint with OSHA in November 2017, and substantial

evidence, consisting of testimony to the effect that there was no

record of any call by Complainant to OSHA in November 2017

after a diligent search for one, supports his factual finding.

43 Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 455 U.S. 385, 393-94

(1982); accord Wilkins v. United States, 598 U.S.152, 161 (2023)

(citation omitted); see also Boechler, P.C. v. Comm’r of Internal

Revenue, 596 U.S. 199, 209 n.1 (2022) (equitable tolling is not

App.17a

and estoppel are two distinct doctrines:44 “Equitable

tolling focuses on the [employee-complainant’s]

excusable ignorance of the employer’s discriminatory

act. Equitable estoppel, in contrast, examines the

[employer or other] defendant’s conduct and the

extent to which the [complainant] has been induced to

refrain from exercising his rights.”45 Complainant’s

appeal concerns only the latter.

Equitable estoppel applies when an employee

“does not make a timely filing due to his reasonable

reliance on his employer’s misleading or confusing

representations or conduct.” 46 While deliberate

attempts to mislead “generally” will justify its

application, “it is [ultimately] immaterial whether the

employer engaged in intentional misconduct;” the

“issue is whether the employer’s conduct, innocent or

not, reasonably induced the employee not to file suit

within the limitations period.”47 Fundamentally, “[i]t

is only necessary to show that the person estopped, by

limited to Article III courts) (citations omitted).

44 Mehrotra, ARB No. 2022-0060, slip op. at 8 (citing Martin v.

Paragon Foods, ARB No. 2022-0058, ALJ No. 2021-FDA-00001,

slip op. at 8 (ARB June 8, 2023)).

45 Id.

46 Mehrotra, ARB No. 2022-0060, slip op. at 8 (citing Droog v.

Ingersoll-Rand Hussman, ARB No. 2011-0075, ALJ No. 2011CER-00001, slip op. at 3 n.6 (ARB Sept. 13, 2012)).

47 Jenkins v. CSX Transp., Inc., ARB No. 2013-0029, ALJ No.

2012-FRS-00073, slip op. at 7 (ARB May 15, 2014); see also Hyman

v. KD Res., ARB No. 2009-0076, ALJ No. 2009-SOX-00020, slip

op. at 7 (ARB Mar. 31, 2010) (citation omitted).

App.18a

his statements or conduct, misled another to his

prejudice.”48

Complainant limits this appeal to a single issue:

while accepting the ALJ sufficiently determined

Respondent did not actively mislead Complainant, he

contends the ALJ erred by not determining whether

Respondent’s “actions, intentional or not, lulled [him]

into missing the filing deadline.”49 We find that

remaining argument foreclosed for two independently

dispositive reasons: 1) Complainant did not sufficiently

raise it to the ALJ; and 2) even if he had, the ALJ’s

permissible findings of fact preclude its application.

First, Complainant (at most) only obliquely

referenced being unintentionally lulled into inaction

below; he never set forth an actual argument presenting

it. While Complainant contends that he expressly

raised and developed the issue, the only items he cites

on appeal as evidence are isolated hearing transcript

pages without any context or explanation.50

Significantly, Complainant does not identify any portion

of his extensive post-hearing brief addressing the

matter. Indeed, as Respondent points out, Complainant’s new inducement argument directly conflicts

with his previous positions that he timely filed a

48 Jenkins, ARB No. 2013-0029, slip op. at 7.

49 Comp. Br. at 21. We affirm the ALJ’s finding that Respondent

did not actively or intentionally lull Complainant into forgoing

his rights as it is supported by substantial evidence and

unchallenged on appeal. See Litt v. Republic Servs. of S. Nev., ARB

No. 2008-0130, ALJ No. 2006-STA-00014, slip op. at 7 (ARB Aug.

30, 2010) (affirming an ALJ finding of no knowledge as supported

by substantial evidence and unchallenged on appeal).

50 Id.

App.19a

verbal complaint with OSHA and another timely

complaint in the wrong forum—two positions that the

ALJ rejected and that Complainant has not

appealed.51 Counter to Complainant’s primary contention on appeal, an ALJ cannot err by failing to address

an argument not made to him. And under wellestablished precedent, the Board does not generally

consider arguments a party raises for the first time on

appeal.52

Second, even if Complainant had properly raised

the argument, the facts as the ALJ found them belie

any suggestion that Respondent lulled Complainant

into forgoing his rights. Complainant contends that if

the ALJ “considered lulling as a basis for tolling” he

would have found the internal and external appeals

processes, and Respondent’s continued payment of

wages and benefits Complainant earned before his

termination, induced him into believing he would be

reinstated.53

But that simply is not the case. The ALJ did

consider each of those factors and definitively found

they would not induce a reasonable person into thinking he was not terminated or that he would inevitably

51 Resp. Br. at 12.

52 Bauche, ARB No. 2022-0035, slip op. at 8 n.35 (“The Board

does not generally consider arguments raised for the first time

on appeal . . . nor evidence submitted for the first time on appeal.”);

Privler v. CSX Transp., Inc., ARB No. 2018-0071, ALJ No. 2018

FRS-00021, slip op. at 3 (ARB Mar. 24, 2020) (citing Carter v.

Champion Bus, Inc., ARB No. 2005-0076, ALJ No. 2005-SOX00023, slip op. at 7 (ARB Sept. 29, 2006).

53 Comp. Br. at 23-29.

App.20a

be reinstated. With regard to his initial termination

and the internal appeals process, the ALJ found:

. . . the June 1, 2017 written notice of

termination, delivered to Complainant on

May 31, 2017, was final, unequivocal, and

unambiguous, clearly stating: ‘[y]our employment with the General Electric Company is

terminated effective immediately.’ I find no

indication that Respondent, either verbally

or in writing, communicated anything to the

contrary. Instead, the evidence establishes

that Respondent consistently and unmistakably communicated to Complainant on May

31, 2017 and throughout the internal appeals

period, that he was fired effective June 1,

2017.[54]

The ALJ similarly found Complainant’s “Ombud’s

concerns” did not “suspend the date of his termination

or otherwise alter his status with the company.”55

The ALJ also determined that Respondent informed Complainant he would continue to have access

to his benefits if he pursued an internal appeal and

that it did not affect his termination.56 The payments

that Complainant received from June 1 through July

20, 2017, reflected his salary earned through June 1,

2017, in addition to accrued and unused vacation,

personal time, and unused floating holidays. According

to the ALJ, they did not in any way reflect any work

performed by Complainant after June 1, 2017, or

54 D. & O. at 9.

55 Id.

56 Id.

App.21a

otherwise imply a continued working relationship.57

Indeed, during the appeals process, the ALJ found

Complainant himself acknowledged his termination,

stating “I believe my termination is without merit and

should be reversed.”58 Substantial evidence supports

the ALJ’s factual findings that Complainant knew he

was fired on June 1, 2017 and that continued receipt

of pay and health benefits while participating in

Respondent’s internal appeals process did not

suspend the effective date of termination.59

It is impossible to reconcile those findings with

Complainant’s new argument that Respondent’s

“actions were sufficient to lull [him] into a position he

would not have otherwise taken.”60 Complainant, in

effect, simply asks us to reweigh the evidence in his

favor, something our standard of review does not

permit. Instead, when substantial evidence supports

the ALJ’s factual findings—as it does here—we must

affirm.61

CONCLUSION

Accordingly, we AFFIRM the ALJ’s Decision and

Order Dismissing the Complaint as Untimely Filed.

57 Id. at 4 (“Complainant has not performed any work for

Respondent since June 1, 2017.”).

58 Id. at 5.

59 Id. at 10.

60 Comp. Br. at 29.

61 See Clem v. Comput. Scis. Corp., ARB No. 2020-0025, slip op.

at 16 (The Board will uphold the ALJ’s factual findings if

substantial evidence supports the conclusion).

App.22a

SO ORDERED.

/s/ Ivey S. Warren

Administrative Appeals Judge

/s/ Jonathan Rolfe

Administrative Appeals Judge

App.23a

DECISION AND ORDER,

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR

OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGES

(DECEMBER 21, 2022)

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR

OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGES

Washington, DC

________________________

IN THE MATTER OF:

GREGORY HANNA,

Complainant,

v.

GLOBAL NUCLEAR FUEL AMERICAS, LLC,

Respondent.

________________________

OALJ Case No.: 2020-ERA-00002

OSHA Case No.: 4-3750-18-030

Chief ALJ Stephen R. Henley

Before: Stephen R. HENLEY,

Chief Administrative Law Judge.

DECISION AND ORDER DISMISSING THE

COMPLAINT AS UNTIMELY FILED

This proceeding arises under the employee

protection provisions of the Energy Reorganization

Act of 1974 (“ERA” or “the Act”), 42 U.S.C. § 5851 and

App.24a

the implementing regulations found at 29 C.F.R. Part

24.

Procedural Background

Gregory Hanna (“Complainant”) filed a complaint

with the Department of Labor’s Occupational Safety

and Health Administration (“OSHA”) on December 8,

2017, alleging that his employer, Global Nuclear FuelAmericas, LLC1 (“Respondent” or “GNF-A”), fired him

on or about June 1, 2017 in retaliation for reporting

safety concerns and refusing to perform unsafe tasks.

On October 24, 2019, a Regional Supervisory

Investigator with OSHA issued a determination letter

dismissing the complaint, finding Complainant filed it

after the 180-day deadline had expired and that he

had “not provided any credible evidence to justify

equitable tolling.”2 On November 12, 2019, Complainant appealed the determination and requested a

hearing before the Office of Administrative Law Judges

(“OALJ”).

Because it appeared that Complainant filed his

complaint with OSHA some 10 days after the statutory

filing deadline expired, I issued an Order to Show

Cause on December 2, 2019 requiring Complainant to

1 Global Nuclear Fuel-Americas, LLC., a GE-led joint venture, is

a leading supplier of boiling water reactor fuel and fuel-related

engineering services and operates in the State of North Carolina.

https://www.bloomberg.com/profile/company/0287218D

2 The statute provides that “[a]ny employee who believes that he

has been discharged or otherwise discriminated against by any

person in violation of [the statute] may, within 180 days after

such violation occurs, file (or have any person file on his behalf)

a complaint with the Secretary of Labor . . . alleging such

discharge or discrimination.” 42 U.S.C. § 5851(b)(1).

App.25a

provide a written statement explaining why this

matter should not be dismissed for failing to file a

timely complaint and, if appropriate, describe why he

believed equitable tolling of the limitations period

might be applicable.

Complainant submitted a lengthy filing on

January 6, 2020, much of which attempted to litigate

the merits of his underlying claim of retaliation.

Respondent’s counsel filed a comprehensive reply on

February 7, 2020.

On February 8, 2020, I issued Notice of Limited

Pretrial Hearing, finding that there appeared to be a

genuine dispute, in part, as to the nature, scope and

type of contacts Complainant may have had with

other federal and state agencies and whether such

contacts might qualify as “filing a complaint” under the

regulations or toll or even extend the filing deadline.

Under the circumstances, dismissal of Mr. Hanna’s

complaint on summary decision without the opportunity to present evidence on the limited issue of

timeliness would have been premature.3

Accordingly, I found that bifurcation of the

hearing was appropriate, with the first part limited to

receiving evidence, to include witness testimony, on

whether Mr. Hanna’s complaint should be dismissed as

untimely filed. The parties were informed that only

3 See Hukman v. U.S. Airways, Inc., ARB No. 2018-0048, ALJ

No. 2015-AIR-00003, PDF at 7 (ARB Jan. 16, 2020) (observing

that “it is seldom in the interests of procedural due process or the

‘ends of justice’ for an ALJ to reduce the available means of proof

and increase the trial burden upon a self-represented litigant,

whatever the perceived increase in judicial efficiency to be

derived from such measures.”).

App.26a

after resolving this issue would the tribunal consider

proceeding to a hearing on the merits.4

On October 29, 2020, the tribunal convened a

limited pre-trial hearing via video conference to receive

evidence on the timeliness of the OSHA complaint, to

include whether the deadline should be tolled or

extended. At the hearing, I admitted Joint Exhibits

(“JX”) 1-64 into evidence. (Tr. 6). Complainant filed

his post-hearing brief on March 1, 2021 (Comp. Br.)5

4 As a self-represented complainant apparently lacking formal

legal expertise, I have afforded Mr. Hanna “with a degree of

adjudicative latitude” in this case. Hyman v. KD Resources, ARB

No. 09 076, ALJ No. 2009-SOX-00020, PDF at 8 (ARB Mar. 28,

2010) (citing Ubinger v. CAE Int’l, ARB No. 07-083, ALJ No. 2007SOX-00036, PDF at 6 (ARB Aug. 27, 2008)). However, while a

self-represented litigant, such as Mr. Hanna, may be held to a

lesser standard than that of legal counsel in procedural matters,

the burden of establishing the basis for equitable tolling of a

filing deadline is no less. See Flener v. H.K. Cupp, Inc., Case No.

90-STA-42, PDF at 3 n. 2 (Sec’y Oct. 10, 1991). In other words,

as the complaining party, it is Mr. Hanna’s burden to

demonstrate why equitable principles should be applied to toll

the limitations period in this case. Wilson v. Sec’y, Dep’t of

Veterans Affairs, 65 F.3d 402, 404 (5th Cir. 1995).

Additionally, despite efforts to focus Mr. Hanna on the narrow

issue of timeliness, the tribunal has found it difficult to determine

exactly what he believes are the precise bases for equitable

tolling. Due, in part, to the volume of paper he has filed with the

tribunal, most of which is unrelated to the issue of timeliness, it

remains unclear what specific arguments and events Mr. Hanna

relies on to support his position that equitable tolling is

warranted. Given these challenges, this decision addresses Mr.

Hanna’s arguments to the best of the tribunal’s understanding.

5 Complainant submitted seventeen new exhibits with his Reply

Brief. Respondent objects to the admission of these exhibits but

itself provided two rebuttal exhibits. Though not all the exhibits

address the narrow issue of timeliness, for completeness, the

App.27a

and Respondent filed its post-hearing brief on April 1,

2021 (Resp. Br.). Complainant replied on April 26,

2021. As more fully explained below, as I find

Complainant did not file it before the limitations

period expired, and he has not established a basis to

support equitable tolling, the December 8, 2017 OSHA

complaint is dismissed.

Essential Findings of Fact

Gregory Hanna was hired as a shop support

operator at Global Nuclear Fuel-Americas’ (“GNF-A”)

Wilmington, North Carolina plant on or about August

6, 2012.

On May 31, 2017, Complainant met in person

with his manager, John Berger, and Ana Garriga,

Human Resources Manager for GNF-A, and was given

a termination letter, dated June 1, 2017.6 The letter

stated, in part:

After an investigation, multiple work rule

violations were noted, as listed below.

● Category I work rule violation: For employees

paid by the hour, leaving the work-site or

being off plant premises without permission

while registered as working. This occurred

twice. Category I violations represent actions

that will not be tolerated and are grounds for

immediate dismissal.

tribunal admits Complainant’s seventeen exhibits (CX) and

Respondents two rebuttal exhibits (RX).

6 While dated June 1, 2017, Complainant and Respondent agree

that Complainant received the letter on May 31, 2017. (Tr. 9;

Tr. 140).

App.28a

● Category II work rule violation: Being

disruptive, including initiating or spreading

false rumors or information.

Your employment with the General Electric

Company is terminated effective immediately, due to

this failure to comply with Company policies.

[Emphasis added.]

If you feel you have any reason to dispute your

termination, you are reminded that you are subject to

the provisions of the Wilmington Employee Appeals

Procedure, HEP-51 (see enclosure).

You will be contacted by mail to resolve your

Benefits and COBRA Insurance conversion information

or you can contact the Insurance Continuation Center

at 1-800-242-7419 or COBRA at 1-800-877-7994. If

you participated in the Company Retirement Savings

Plan (RSP), you can contact them directly on their tollfree number (1-800-432-4313) to resolve the account

status. RSP will have your updated status within two

weeks and will then be able to resolve your accounts.

During the meeting, Berger told Complainant

that he had committed a Category 1 offense and that

his employment was terminated effective immediately.

Ms. Garriga explained to Complainant that he would

continue to receive some benefits and also explained

the company’s internal appeals process but that he

was in an unpaid situation.7

7 Ms. Garriga testified that Complainant should have received

his last paycheck, to include accrued vacation and sick leave, by

late June or early July 2019. Ms. Garriga also stated that, as of

the date of the October 29, 2020 hearing, Complainant was still

receiving health benefits. Ms. Garriga explained that Respondent

had not discontinued health benefits because Complainant’s

App.29a

Complainant has not performed any work for

Respondent since June 1, 2017.

Complainant received weekly deposits from GNFA from June 1, 2017 through July 20, 2017, reflecting

his salary earned through June 1, 2017 and accrued

and unused vacation, personal time, and unused

floating holidays. Though typically paid in a lump

sum, the weekly payments were at Complainant’s

request.

On June 1, 2017, and July 17, 2017, Complainant

requested photographs that he wanted to use during

the internal appeals process. Ms. Garriga replied on

June 5, 2017 with some of the requested photographs,

but denied others as unrelated to the basis for his

termination. On July 17, 2017, Complainant again

requested photographs, which Ms. Garriga emailed to

him on July 18, 2017.

On June 7, 2017, with the assistance of a Ms.

McDonald,8 Complainant telephoned the North Carolina Department of Labor’s Equal Employment

Opportunity Commission (“NC EEOC”). During a 38minute call with a NC EEOC employee, Complainant

relayed his belief that he was wrongfully terminated

from GNF-A, submitting he was being discriminated

against because of a disability. Complainant also discussed that he had raised workplace safety concerns;

however, Complainant did not allege during this call

that his termination was in retaliation for raising

appeal process is ongoing.

8 Complainant states that he has a communication disability

and requires assistance in understanding and participating in

written and oral communication. Ms. McDonald helped in this

regard.

App.30a

these workplace safety complaints or generally describe

the ERA whistleblower protections and there is no

written record of the phone call. There is no evidence

that the NC EEOC opened an investigation after

Complainant’s phone call or made a referral to

another federal or state agency.

On June 9, 2017, Complainant filed the first

appeal of his termination through the GNF-A Ombuds

process, stating “I believe my termination is without

merit and should be reversed.” A month later, on July

10, 2017, Complainant submitted the second appeal of

his termination through Respondent’s Ombuds office,

stating “[t]he termination letter should be rescinded

and I should be allowed to return to work

immediately.” The second appeal was denied on July

17, 2017. In a third communication with the Ombuds

Program on July 19, 2017, Complainant acknowledged

that GNF-A had given him a letter “terminating [his]

employment for a Category I violation” and claimed

that “[a]ll of this is being done in retaliation for raising

the safety issue.”

On July 28, 2017, Mariana Monteiro, an employee

in the GE Ombuds program, contacted Complainant,

stating:

Again, I wanted to thank you for bringing

your concern to our attention. We are

immediately undertaking an investigation,

and you will shortly be contacted by the

investigators. In accordance with normal

practice, I have requested that the appeal

you have filed with the plant manager be

held in abeyance while the investigation is

conducted. Formal notification of this action

will be sent to you from HR. Similarly I have

App.31a

asked that your status remain unchanged

during the pendency of the investigation.

Complainant responded that same day:

Thank you for your letter of today’s date. I

appreciate the update on the investigation. I

would like to let you know that while I

appreciate the matter being held in abeyance,

I need to let you know that I am not being

paid and things are getting very difficult for

me financially. Is it possible for you to connect

with HR and reinstate my pay during this

time period?

Ms. Monteiro responded to Complainant’s question

regarding his pay:

It was very nice to connect with you on the

phone and I truly appreciate you understanding that for payroll and pay related

matters you need to go to your local HR. I

also appreciate your willingness to talk

directly to our investigator – if necessary –

despite the document you produce is very

clear, the investigator might need to seek

some clarification. With your permission, I

will pass along your telephone.

Shortly after Ms. Monteiro informed Complainant

that an investigation was being opened with respect

to his second Ombuds concern, Tim Matthews was

appointed to lead the investigation.

Mr. Matthews reached out to Complainant via

email on September 26, 2017 to schedule an interview.

Complainant responded to Mr. Matthews and stated

that he was going to Florida to help with recovery from

App.32a

Hurricane Irma.9 Mr. Matthews and Complainant

eventually met for an interview on October 27, 2017.10

While Complainant submits he contacted OSHA in

November 2017 and left a voicemail detailing the

circumstances of his termination, there is no written

record of this call, despite a diligent search by OSHA

personnel, and I find it did not happen. Instead,

Complainant’s first contact with OSHA occurred when

he filed a formal retaliation complaint on December 8,

2017. This December 8, 2017 on-line complaint does

not reference a November 2017 phone call or voicemail.

OSHA’s electronic filing system was operational

throughout the period June 1, 2017 through December

8, 2017. Supporting documentation is not necessary to

file the initial complaint.

William Peterson, the OSHA investigator assigned

to Complainant’s case, first talked to Complainant on

December 11, 2017.

GNF-A placed Complainant on a leave of absence

on January 1, 2018 so that he could continue receiving

health benefits during the pendency of this litigation.

This administrative status did not change the effective

date of his termination, which remained June 1, 2017.

Complainant consistently engaged in activities of

daily living throughout the period June 1, 2017

through December 8, 2017.

9 Complainant testified that he was in Florida for 14 days.

10 Complainant was debriefed on the results of Mr. Matthews’s

investigation on December 22, 2017.

App.33a

LEGAL FRAMEWORK

To invoke the employee protection provisions of

the ERA, an employee is required to file a complaint

with OSHA “within 180 days after an alleged violation

of the Act occurs (i.e., when the retaliatory decision

has been both made and communicated to the complainant).” 29 U.S.C. § 24.103(d)(2).11 The “filing period

begins to run on the date that the complainant receives

a “final, definitive, and unequivocal notice of the

adverse employment action.” Rollins v. Am. Airlines,

ARB No. 04-140, ALJ No. 2004-AIR-00009, slip op. at

3 (ARB Apr. 3, 2007). “Final and definitive notice

means communication that is decisive or conclusive,

leaving no room for further action, discussion, or

change. Unequivocal means unambiguous.” McManus

v. Tetra Tech Constr. Inc., ARB No. 16-023, ALJ No.

2016-SOX-00012, PDF at 3 (ARB Dec. 19, 2017).

However, the limitations period for filing a

complaint under the ERA is not jurisdictional and is

subject to equitable modification.

The Department of Labor’s Administrative Review

Board (“ARB”) has found equitable tolling of the filing

deadlines appropriate in at least four circumstances:

(i) where the “respondent has actively misled the complainant regarding the cause of action”; (ii) when “the

plaintiff has in some extraordinary way been

prevented from filing his or her action,” such as a

debilitating illness, injury, or natural disaster; (iii)

11 The implementing regulation also provides that the date of

filing is “[t]he date of the postmark, facsimile transmittal, e-mail

communication, telephone call, hand-delivery, delivery to a

third-party commercial carrier, or in-person filing at an OSHA

office.” 29 C.F.R. § 24.103(d)(1).

App.34a

when “complainant has raised the precise statutory

claim in issue but has done so in the wrong forum”;

and (iv) where the “respondent’s own acts or omissions

have lulled the complainant into foregoing prompt

attempts to vindicate his or her rights.” Brofford v.

PNC Investments, LLC, ARB No. 2018-03, ALJ No.

2017-CFP-00002, slip op. at 2 (ARB Feb. 14, 2019).

This list, however, is not exhaustive and the ARB has

also made clear that other situations may also warrant

equitable tolling. See, e.g., Woods v. Boeing-South

Carolina, ARB No. 11-067, ALJ No. 2011-AIR-00009,

slip op. at 8 (ARB Dec. 10, 2012).

However, “[e]quitable tolling is granted sparingly

and only upon a showing that extraordinary circumstances prevented a timely filing.” Lugg v. Lear

Corporation, ARB No. 2022-0008, OALJ No. 2021-SOX00022, slip op. at 4 (ARB May 19, 2022). Additionally,

complainants must be reasonably diligent in pursing

their rights throughout the filing period, including

before and after a potential extraordinary circumstance. Lugg, ARB No. 2022-0008 at *7; U.S. v. Henry,

No. 2:17-CR-00180, 2020 WL 7332657, at *4 (W.D. Pa.

Dec. 14, 2020).

DISCUSSION

I base my decision on all of the evidence, relevant

controlling statutory and regulatory authority, and the

arguments of the parties.12

12 In Austin v. BNSF Railway Co., ARB No. 17-024, ALJ No.

2016-FRS-00013 (ARB Mar. 11, 2019) (per curiam), the ARB

noted than an administrative law judge (“ALJ”) need not include

a summary of the record in the Decision and Order, as it is

assumed that the ALJ reviewed and considered the entire record

App.35a

When Did the Filing Period Begin?

Complainant disputes the date from which the

statutory filing period should begin to run. Complainant

avers that Respondent’s notice of termination was not

clear and definitive, and that “the grounds for

termination were almost immediately modified, and

the termination was never acted upon.” (Compl.

Post-Hearing Reply Br. at 6). Complainant contends

that the June 1, 2017 dismissal was “a sham termination.” (Compl. Br. at 18-19). To support this assertion,

Complainant argues that he continued to receive

money from Respondent after June 1, 2017 and that,

to date, he still receives employee benefits, including

health care benefits.13 (Compl. Post-Hearing Reply

in making his or her decision. The ARB stated that what is more

helpful for its review of whether the ALJ’s findings of fact are

supported by substantial evidence of record is a tightly focused

set of findings of fact. Accordingly, in this Decision and Order I

focus specifically on findings of fact pertinent to the issues in

dispute. I have, however, reviewed and considered the entire

record.

13 It appears that, at certain points, Complainant conflates his

argument that the filing period should not begin to run on June

1, 2017 with his argument that he was actively misled or lulled

by Respondent. (See Compl. Br. at 6-7). However, in a section of

his brief titled “Termination and Complaint,” Complainant

states:

These actions and omission were clear to Mr. Hanna as further

retaliation and therefore the time to file his complaint should

commence at the end of July 2017. There wasn’t any final or

unequivocal notice of termination, and the act of stopping his pay

in July 2017, is when he felt an adverse action. There was no

indication prior to this.

App.36a

Br. at 6-7).14 Complainant does not offer a specific

date from which the statutory filing deadline should

begin to run, but does concede that his pay stopped

about a month and a half after his meeting with Ms.

Garriga and Mr. Berger. (Compl. Br. at 12).

I find the June 1, 2017 written notice of termination, delivered to Complainant on May 31, 2017,

was final, unequivocal, and unambiguous, clearly

stating: “[y]our employment with the General Electric

Company is terminated effective immediately.” I find no

indication that Respondent, either verbally or in

writing, communicated anything to the contrary.

Instead, the evidence establishes that Respondent

consistently and unmistakably communicated to

Complainant on May 31, 2017 and throughout the

internal appeals period, that he was fired effective June

1, 2017. In other words, GNF-A’s internal appeals

process, the temporary receipt of back pay and the

continued receipt of health benefits, and the request

for and receipt of photographs in June and July 2017

did not act to suspend the effective date of Complainant’s termination from GNF-A.

Complainant still receives health benefits, even

through the date of this decision, only because his

appeal is ongoing, not because he remains employed

by GNF-A. The weekly payments he received from

(Compl. Br. at 10). As such, I will treat the arguments Complainant

makes regarding his pay, benefits, and employment status as

arguments about the date the statutory filing period should begin.

14 Complainant submitted bank statements showing that he

received weekly payments from Respondent between June 8,

2017 and July 20, 2017. Complainant also submitted what appears

to be documentation that he continues to receive benefits from

Respondent.

App.37a

GNF-A from June 1 through July 20, 2017 were for

wages he earned up to June 1, 2017 and for payment

of his unused vacation and personal time.15 These

payments were made weekly, rather than in a lump

sum, at Complainant’s request. That Complainant

continues to receive health benefits and received pay

through July 20, 2017 does not mean he remains a

company employee and does not alter the June 1, 2017

date of termination.

Additionally, the finality of the dismissal was not

affected by Complainant’s submission of internal

company appeals and Ombuds concerns, which did not

act to suspend the effective date of his termination or

otherwise alter his status with the company. Nor was

it rendered ambiguous by Complainant’s continued

receipt of health benefits and final pay and reimbursement for accrued pay.

In sum, neither GNF-A’s internal appeals process

nor the continued receipt of pay and health benefits

acted to suspend the effective date of Complainant’s

termination. Additionally, Complainant knew he was

fired on June 1, 2017, and was told the reasons why.

He did not need to wait for the photographs in order

to file his complaint.16 I find the 180-day statutory

filing period began to run on June 1, 2017, meaning

15 Respondent also submitted an affidavit of Ms. Garriga in

which she explained that, after his termination, Complainant

agreed to receive his payments for “unused vacation time, unused

personal business/personal illness time, and unused floating

holidays” in weekly payments, rather than one lump sum. (RX 2).

16 In fact, despite possessing the photographs in July 2017,

Complainant still did not file his OSHA complaint until

December 8, 2017.

App.38a

Complainant had until November 28, 2017 to file his

ERA retaliation complaint.

When Was the Complaint Filed?

Complainant posits two instances before December

8, 2017 that he contends should constitute the filing

of his ERA retaliation complaint. First, Complainant

relies on the June 7, 2017 telephone call with the North

Carolina Department of Labor/Equal Employment

Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”). 17 Second, Complainant contends that he left a voicemail with the

U.S. Department of Labor, Occupational Safety and

Health Administration (“OSHA”) on or about November

24, 2017.

November 2017 Voicemail With OSHA

I find that Complainant did not file a complaint

with OSHA in November 2017, and that Complainant

first filed his ERA retaliation complaint with OSHA

on December 8, 2017.

Although Complainant testified that he filed a

timely complaint via voicemail with OSHA on or about

November 24, 2017,18 he acknowledges that his phone

records do not reflect this call. Additionally, the OSHA

17 Though Complainant argues that he timely filed by calling

the EEOC, an ERA retaliation complaint is properly filed only

with the U.S. Department of Labor’s Occupational Safety and

Health Administration. See 29 C.F.R. 24.103(c). However, as

explained above, a complaint filed elsewhere may warrant

equitable tolling. Accordingly, I will discuss this call in the section

below pertaining to equitable tolling based on mistakenly filing

in the wrong forum.

18 The record reflects that Complainant gave several different

dates in November as the date he left a voicemail for OSHA.

App.39a

investigator’s

detailed

activity/telephone

log

pertaining to Complainant’s OSHA file does not

reflect any communication with Complainant prior to

December 8, 2017. The December 8, 2017 entry states

“Complaint was filed 12/08/2018.”19

The memorandum for the file regarding telephonic

interviews between Complainant and the OSHA

investigator also indicates that a complaint was not

filed before December 8, 2017. The investigator details

that Complainant stated during a Closing Conference

that he called “DOL” November 22 or November 23,

2017 and left a voice message, and that Complainant

reported that he had provided phone records in a

position statement previously filed with OSHA. The

investigator detailed diligent, yet unsuccessful, efforts

to locate a record of the call to OSHA in November

2017.20

Based on the foregoing, I find that Complainant

first filed his complaint with OSHA on December 8,

2017. However, while outside the 180-day limitations

19 This date appears to be a typo – the “Date” column specifies

that the date of the entry/activity was December 8, 2017.

20 The investigator reviewed the phone records provided by

Complainant, checked OSHA’s own daily record of cases and

complaints for the weeks of November 20 and 27, 2017, and

reviewed his emails for that period. He found no references to a

call from Complainant. In this regard, given the volume of calls

that Complainant reports having made during this period, as

well as his confusion regarding possible courses of action, it is

certainly possible that he left a voicemail with some other

government agency during this time period, but the evidence

does not support Complainant’s assertion that he left a voicemail

with OSHA.

App.40a

period, the statute and regulations do provide that the

time for filing a complaint may be tolled.

Equitable Tolling

Complainant posits three main reasons why the

filing period should be tolled in his case. He first

contends that GNF-A actively misled him regarding

his cause of action and whether he had filed a complaint; second, he mistakenly filed the same complaint

in the wrong forum; and third, extraordinary

circumstances prevented him from filing his complaint

on time. As explained in further detail below, I find

that Complainant has not established a basis to

equitably toll the filing deadline in this case.

Actively Misled Regarding Cause of Action

Complainant asserts that Respondent actively

mislead him regarding the cause of action by withholding evidence. Specifically, he submits that Respondent withheld photographs for 41 days that show

he was onsite at the time Respondent found Complainant had been offsite.

Complainant argues that by withholding these

photographs, Respondent denied him “the ability to

understand that they were retaliating against me. . . . ”

(Tr. 12-13). Complainant alleges that Respondent was

“purposely misleading [him] on the basis for [his]

termination.” (Tr. 29.) As such, Complainant contends

that equitable tolling is warranted because Respondents

actively misled him regarding the cause of action.

Invocation of equitable estoppel on this ground

requires a showing that an employee’s failure to file in

a timely fashion is the consequence either of a

deliberate design by the employer or of actions that

App.41a

the employer should unmistakably have understood

would cause the employee to delay filing his charge.

English v. Whitfield, 585 F.2d 957 (4th Cir. 1988).

“[U]nless the employer has acted deliberately to

deceive, mislead or coerce the employee into not

filing a claim in a timely manner, equitable estoppel

will not apply.” Tracy v. Consolidated Edison Co., No

1989-CAA-00001, slip op. at 5 (Sec’y July 8, 1992);

Woods, ARB No. 11-067.

Complainant was specifically told he was fired

and given a written explanation why on May 31, 2017,

but asserts that he did not realize he was actually fired

in retaliation for raising workplace safety concerns until

he received photographs on July 18, 2017. However,

it appears that Complainant requested photographs

on two occasions;21 first, on June 1, 2017 when he

informed Ms. Garriga that he planned to appeal his

termination, and second, on July 17, 2017 when he

was preparing for another appeal. Ms. Garriga replied

to Complainant’s first request for photographs on June

5, 2017 and to his second request for photographs on

July 18, 2017, or well before the November 28, 2017

deadline to file his OSHA retaliation complaint.

Regardless, Complainant did not need the

photographs to file his complaint. Even if he did,

Respondent replied to Complainant’s request for photographs and did not mislead him regarding the reason

for the termination or the cause of action. Complainant

21 Complainant first requested “pictures and times from the

security gate for my vehicle entering and exiting for those dates

in question,” and he later requested “any and all videos or photos

from the plan site on 2/16 which show what I was wearing that

day.” (See Resp. OTSC Br. Exhibit 17; RX-1).

App.42a

has not established a basis for equitable tolling on this

ground.

Mistakenly Filed in Wrong Forum

Complainant also posits that he filed the precise

statutory claim in the wrong forum when he called the

NC EEOC and spoke with an agency employee on

June 7, 2017.

Based on the evidence in the record, Complainant

did make a call to the EEOC and described a wrongful

termination based on a belief he was being discriminated against for his speech and hearing disabilities. However, Complainant did not tell the

EEOC that he believed he was fired in retaliation for

raising nuclear safety concerns. In fact, Complainant’s

own testimony suggests that he was not aware that

his termination was related to complaints of workplace

safety until after the date of the EEOC call. Additionally, Complainant has provided no written

evidence of the oral complaint filed with the EEOC on

June 7, 2017, and there is no indication that an investigation was even opened.

Beyond Complainant’s general description of the

call and the phone record corroborating that a call to

the EEOC was made, there is no evidence to support

Complainant’s assertion that he filed the precise

statutory claim at issue in the wrong forum. Because

Complainant did not clearly identify that he was filing

a retaliation claim with the EEOC, Complainant has

not demonstrated equitable tolling on this ground.

App.43a

Extraordinary Circumstances

Complainant further suggests that extraordinary

circumstances warrant equitable tolling. First, that

his medical conditions warrant equitable tolling because

he often requires assistance to communicate, including

to make calls and write letters. However, and consistent

with an ability to engage in activities of daily living

throughout, Complainant has offered no proof that his

disabilities, to include PTSD and, speech and hearing

limitations, prevented him from understanding his legal

rights or timely vindicating those rights; asserting

only that his disability has made pursuing his legal

rights more challenging. A blanket assertion that a

medical condition prevents timely filing does not

support equitable tolling.

Second, at the end of September, Hurricane

Irma struck and Complainant spent two weeks in

Florida putting a roof on his father’s house. He

submits the 14 days he was there should be tolled

because he was without cell service or internet and

was unable to pursue his claim during this period.

Natural disasters may be grounds for equitable

tolling. See Yarema v. Carrier Enterprise LLC, OALJ

Case No. 2018-SOX-00007 (Aug. 20, 2018); see also

School Dist. Of City of Allentown v. Marshall, 657 F.2d

16, 19-20 (3d Cir. 1981). However, in this case,

Complainant was not personally affected by a natural

disaster, rather, and albeit a noble gesture, he voluntarily traveled to another state to provide hurricane

relief. Regardless, he would have returned to North

Carolina by mid-October, still some 45 days before the

filing deadline lapsed, and has offered no explanation

why he was prevented from filing upon his return. In

other words, to invoke equitable tolling, Complainant

App.44a

must have been reasonably diligent in pursuing his

rights not only while the alleged impediment to

filing caused by the asserted extraordinary

circumstance existed but also before and after, up to

the time of actual filing of the complaint.22 The bottom

line is that Complainant has not explained why the

extraordinary circumstances he alleges made it

impossible for him to timely file his complaint in this

case.

Other Reasons

Finally, Complainant generally avers that “it

would be unconscionable to enforce the limitation

period” and would result in “a grave injustice.” (Compl.

Post-Hearing Reply Br. at 11). Complainant’s belief

that an injustice will follow if the filing deadline is not

tolled does not warrant equitable tolling. Equitable

tolling is an extraordinary remedy and is not a method

to preserve a claim “out of a vague sympathy for

particular litigants.” Billings v. Tennessee Valley

Authority, 1986-ERA-00038 (Sec’y June 28, 1990),

quoting Baldwin County Welcome Center v. Brown,

466 U.S. 147, 152 (1984), and also citing Barnes v.

Hillhaven Rehabilitation & Convalescent Center, 686

F. Supp. 311, 314 (N.D. Ga. 1988). Assuming due

process and fundamental fairness may equitably toll

a filing deadline, Complainant has not established

circumstances warranting such action in this case.

22 See Garcia v. United States, No. 2:21-cv-00322 (W.D. Wa., Aug.

4, 2021).

App.45a

CONCLUSION

Gregory Hanna filed his OSHA complaint on

December 8, 2017. For the complaint to be timely, some

retaliatory act must have occurred on or after June 10,

2017. The act alleged in the OSHA complaint is

Complainant’s termination, which occurred on June 1,

2017. Since I have found no basis for tolling the

limitations period, Mr. Hanna’s complaint alleging a

violation of the Energy Reorganization Act’s employee

protection provisions is untimely.

Order

Based on the foregoing, Complainant did not

timely file his complaint with OSHA and I find that he

has not made the “particularly strong showing”

necessary to warrant equitable tolling of the time limits

for filing ERA whistleblower claims. Accordingly, I

hereby DISMISS the December 8, 2017 OSHA

complaint as time-barred.

SO ORDERED.

/s/ Stephen R. Henley

Chief Administrative Law Judge

App.46a

ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR

REHEARING, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

(DECEMBER 2, 2025)

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

________________________

GREGORY HANNA,

Petitioner,

v.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF LABOR,

ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD; GLOBAL

NUCLEAR FUEL AMERICAS LLC,

Respondents.

________________________

No. No. 24-1435

(2023-0015)

ORDER

The petition for rehearing en banc was circulated

to the full court. No judge requested a poll under Fed.

R. App. P. 40. The court denies the petition for

rehearing en banc.

/s/ Nwamaka Anowi

Clerk

App.47a

COMPLAINANT-APPELLANT’S

MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND

AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF APPEAL

(MARCH 13, 2023)

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR

ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD

________________________

GREGORY HANNA,

Complainant-Appellant,

v.

GLOBAL NUCLEAR FUEL AMERICAS, LLC,

Respondent-Appellee.

________________________

ARB Case No. 2023-0015

OALJ Case No. 2020-ERA-00002

John T. Harrington

R. Scott Oswald

John T. Harrington

The Employment Law Group, P.C.

1717 K St. NW Suite 1110

Washington, D.C. 20006

(202) 261-2830

(202) 261-2835 (facsimile)

soswald@employmentlawgroup.com

tharrington@employmentlawgroup.com

Counsel for Complainant-Appellant

App.48a

Introduction

Complainant-Appellant Gregory Hanna, by and

through undersigned counsel, pursuant to 29 C.F.R.

§§ 24.110(a)-(e) and 29 C.F.R. §§ 26, et seq., submits

for this Board’s consideration his Memorandum of

Points and Authorities in Support of Appeal.

The Administrative Law Judge incorrectly found

there was no basis for tolling the Energy Reorganization

Act’s 180-day deadline as to Hanna’s whistleblower

complaint with OSHA. The ALJ failed to consider that

Respondent-Appellee Global Nuclear Fuel-Americas,

LLC misled Hanna and lulled Hanna, either

intentionally or unintentionally, through its inconsistent actions and statements, into believing he would

eventually be reinstated. Had the ALJ considered

this argument, as properly raised by Hanna, the ALJ

should have found that Hanna is entitled to equitable

relief in the form of equitable tolling. For the foregoing

reasons, Hanna timely appeals the ALJ’s decision and

requests this Board vacate the ALJ’s decision and

remand for a hearing on the merits.

Statement of Jurisdiction

Pursuant to 29 C.F.R. §§ 24 et seq., Hanna filed

his initial Energy Reorganization Act (ERA) complaint

with the Occupational Health and Safety Administration (OSHA) on December 8, 2017, alleging GNF

retaliated against him when it put him on administrative leave and subsequently terminated him in

violation of 42 U.S.C. § 5851. On October 24, 2019,

OSHA dismissed the complaint, finding Hanna had

filed it ten days after the 180-day deadline. On

November 12, 2019, Hanna timely filed objections to

the decision and requested a hearing before the Office

App.49a

of Administrative Law Judges in accordance with 29

C.F.R. § 24.106 and 29 C.F.R. §§ 18 et seq.

On December 2, 2019, Administrative Law Judge

Stephen R. Henley issued an Order to Show Cause as

to why Hanna’s Complaint should not be dismissed for

failure to timely file with OSHA. Following Hanna’s

January 6, 2020, Response and GNF’s February 7,

2020, Reply, ALJ Henley issued a Notice of Pretrial

Hearing, finding there was a genuine dispute as to

whether Hanna’s or GNF’s actions would toll or

extend the filing deadline. The ALJ bifurcated this

hearing such that one hearing’s sole focus would be

whether Hanna’s OSHA complaint was timely.

On October 29, 2020, a pre-trial hearing was

conducted via video-conference. Hanna and GNF filed

post-hearing briefs on March 1, 2021, and April 1,

2021, respectively. Hanna filed a Reply to GNF’s PostHearing brief on April 26, 2021. On December 21,

2022, ALJ Henley found Hanna did not timely file his

complaint with OSHA and did not establish a

sufficient justification for equitable tolling. On that

basis, the ALJ dismissed Hanna’s December 8, 2017,

OSHA complaint as time-barred.

On January 5, 2023, Hanna timely filed a

Petition for Review of ALJ Henley’s Decision and

Order. Following the Board’s January 12, 2023, Notice

of Appeal and Briefing Schedule, Counsel for Petitioner

submitted an Unopposed Motion for an Extension to

Submit Petitioner’s Initial Appeal Brief on January

30, 2023. This Motion was granted on February 3,

2023, extending the deadline for the present brief to

March 13, 2023. Accordingly, this Board has jurisdiction

to review this matter pursuant to 29 C.F.R. §§ 24.110

(a)-(e) and 29 C.F.R. §§ 26, et seq.

App.50a

Statement of the Issues

1. Did the Administrative Law Judge err by

failing to consider that GNF may have misled and

lulled Hanna into not filing a complaint, and Hanna

may thus be entitled to tolling?

2. Did GNF’s actions regarding its internal appeals

system mislead Hanna and lull Hanna into a false

sense of security?

3. Did GNF’s actions regarding its ombudsman

process mislead Hanna and lull Hanna into a false

sense of security?

4. Did GNF’s actions regarding its external

investigation mislead Hanna and lull Hanna into a

false sense of security?

5. Did GNF’s administrative actions mislead

Hanna and lull Hanna into a false sense of security?

Statement of the Case

In the interest of the Board’s time and judicial

efficiency, and in accordance with FRAP 28 and the

Board’s January 12, 2023, Notice of Appeal and Order

Establishing Briefing Schedule, Hanna provides the

following narrative factual summary and provides all

citations and record exhibits listed within the

accompanying Appendix.

A.

Hanna Participated in Protected Activity

When He Reported a Violation of Safety

Procedures Resulting in Injury to Both

Himself and Others

Hanna was hired as a Flexible Fuel Operator at

Global Nuclear Fuel-Americas, owned and operated

App.51a

by General Electric Company,1 in 2012. Appx79 80. In

2015, Hanna was promoted to an Incinerator

Operator. Id. In this role, he assisted in the burning

of nuclear materials using an incinerator located at

the GE Hitachi Site in Wilmington, North Carolina.2

Appx61; Appx165.

In the early morning hours of January 25, 2017,

a high-level radiation alarm sounded on a GNF Area

Engineer’s laptop. Appx163. In response, the Area

Engineer (with the approval of his supervisor, the

Area Manager), requested that Hanna and other

incinerator operators return to the GNF site to diagnose the issue and complete whatever repairs might

be necessary. Id. This same equipment issue had

happened before, and the incinerator operators

determined it was necessary to replace and reconnect

fallen “sock filters” of the incinerator. Id. Sock filters,

kept inside the “bag house” of the incinerator, are

filters designed to keep radioactive ash and particulates

from entering the atmosphere and surrounding areas.

Appx163-164. These filters are thus coated by the

radioactive material they are designed to catch.

Appx164.

1 Hanna was employed at Global Nuclear Fuel-Americas during

all relevant time periods discussed, as were relevant decisionmakers such as John Mathews (supervisor), John Berger

(manager), and Ana Garriga (HR Representative). Global Nuclear

Fuel-Americas is a subsidiary of the General Electric Company.

Appx9. All references in the record to “GE” includes GNF.

Appx373 at 125:11-15.

2 The Wilmington site is the headquarters for several GE

business, including GNF and GE-Hitachi. GNF makes the fuel

used at the nuclear reactors at GE-Hitachi. Appx9-10.

App.52a

But the January 25, 2017, sock filter repair

lacked basic safety precautions. For example, there

was no RAD Team in the room (a radiological protection

team). The RAD team is responsible for approving the

maintenance and monitoring exposure levels of the

workers as the maintenance occurs. Id. Not only is the

RAD team necessary to oversee nuclear safety and

prevent accidental exposure, but it is also

responsible for distributing the proper personal

protective equipment. Id. Hanna later discovered that

the work order supposedly issued for this repair had

expired more than a year earlier. Appx61.

Because of these failures, Hanna and the other

incinerators were likely exposed to excessively high

levels of radiation. Appx164. Hanna left the incinerator

building covered in radioactive ash. Appx97. But

despite several of the employees developing severe

rashes resulting in blisters and scars, none of Hanna’s

coworkers were willing to report this egregious violation

of safety protocols because being in a confined space

without supervision or proper PPE was an “immediately

fire-able offense.” Appx164-165; Appx119; Appx197-223.

These fireable offenses, termed “Category I” offenses,

include “[v]iolations of health, safety, security, environmental policies or government regulations or noncompliance acts that could cause significant consequences.” Appx237.

The same day (January 25, 2017), Hanna asked

to speak with his supervisor John Mathews. Appx61.

Hanna reported to Mathews that employees working

in the incinerator building were at risk because the

equipment being used was not functioning properly

and the employees were being exposed to uranium

powder and ash. Id. Additionally, Hanna reported to

App.53a

Mathews that they had been asked to perform the

work without a valid work order, had likely been

exposed to excessive radiation, and that there was no

RAD team in place during the repairs. Appx164.

Mathews said he would address the issue, assured

Hanna that Hanna and the other employees had done

nothing wrong, and would keep Hanna informed as to

the corrective actions taken. Appx61; Appx117-18.

Within the next few days, Hanna and his peers were

directed to “never do that again” and were “retrained on work order procedures,” along with

Mathews, his manager John Berger, and the Area

Engineer who had initially requested that Hanna and

the other incinerators repair the sock filters. Appx164.

B.

GNF Suspended Hanna and Placed Him on

Administrative Leave; and Then Told Him He

Was Terminated Two Months After He

Raised His Safety Concerns.

At or around the same time as the hazardous

incinerator repair, GE Hitachi was preparing for a

Nuclear Regulatory Commission audit scheduled on

April 3, 2017. Appx61. Hanna had assisted in the preaudit report and was slated to conduct a portion of the

tour for the NRC. Id. However, on March 31, 2017

(four days before the NRC audit and two months after

Hanna reported safety concerns), Hanna was told by

Mathews and Berger that he was suspended with pay,

effective immediately, pending an investigation. Id.

GNF alleged Hanna had committed the “Category I”

offense of leaving the plant site during his shift.3

Appx61-62.

3 While out of the scope of the present brief, Hanna maintains he

never left the plant site during work hours and this justification is

App.54a

During his suspension, Hanna repeatedly

contacted GNF requesting to return to work. Each

time, he was told he was not being punished but

needed to stay out “just a few more days.” Appx165.

On April 5, 2017, Hanna reported to the GE Corporate

Ombudsman4 a total of twelve issues he was experiencing at GNF, including that he was being retaliated against for reporting the January 25, 2017,

incinerator issue. Appx51. Less than a month later, on

May 2, 2017, Ombudsperson Karen Williams issued an

investigatory report regarding what purported to be a

thorough investigation of all twelve concerns (pared

down to three main issues, one of which was GNF’s

retaliation for Hanna’s safety concerns). Appx551553. The report concluded that all of Hanna’s

allegations were unsubstantiated. Id.

Hanna remained suspended with pay until May

31, 2017, when he was called to a meeting at GNF

with Berger and Human Resources representative

Ana Garriga. Appx165. At the meeting, Berger gave

Hanna a letter (dated the following day, June 1, 2017)

informing him he was terminated effective

immediately due to his “failure to comply with Company

policies.” Appx53. Specifically, the letter alleged he

had left the work site while “on the clock” two times

in January and February 2017.5 Id. The letter said

not only pretextual but demonstrably false.

4 As a GE subsidiary, GNF employees were directed to use

corporate GE Ombuds.

5 The letter also lists a Category II offense which Garriga later

told Hanna was not the basis for his termination but was

incorporated into the letter for “completeness.” Appx558 at

17:30-17:40.

App.55a

that if Hanna desired to appeal his termination, he

was “subject to the provisions of the Wilmington

Employee Appeals Procedure.” Id. Further, the letter

said he would be “contacted by mail to resolve [his]

benefits and COBRA Insurance conversion information”

and the Company Retirement Savings Plan would

have updated his “status” in the company within two

weeks, after which he would have to call to resolve the

“account status.” Id.

After Berger informed Hanna that he was

terminated, Berger left the room so Hanna could

“figure out his options [moving] forward” with Garriga.

Appx558 at 17:00-20. Garriga explained that Hanna

could appeal the termination and described the three

steps outlined in GNF policy: 1) appeal with a supervisor; 2) appeal with a manager; and 3) peer panel or

print manager direct appeal. Id. at 20:00-21:00. GNF

also offered Hanna a severance agreement (one month’s

pay) if he agreed not to appeal. Id. at 21:00-22;

Appx188. Garriga told Hanna that if Hanna appealed,

he would not be paid either salary or severance but

would be kept as an “active employee on unpaid

suspension” on GNF’s system so he could access his

benefits. Appx558 at 24:00-25:00. She also told Hanna

that the employee assistance program was still

available to him. Id. at 24:30-25:00. Garriga assured

Hanna that GNF would keep him “active” in the

system at least through June 9, 2017. Id. at 23:0023:10. Hanna immediately notified Garriga that he

intended to appeal. Id. at 25:00-25:25.

App.56a

C.

Hanna Followed the Internal Appeal Process

at GNF But Was Stopped Short by a Lengthy

Investigation

Pursuant to the Employee Appeals Procedure

HEP-51, Hanna notified Garriga that he intended to

file an appeal. Employee Appeals Procedure at 5.

Hanna then filed his first level appeal to Mathews on

June 9, 2017. Appx54; Appx170. Per GNF policy,

Mathews and Hanna met and Mathews told Hanna

his appeal was denied. Appx170. Mathews told Hanna

that Berger directed Mathews to rule against him. Id.

Hanna subsequently filed his second appeal to

Berger, who had originally terminated him. Appx56;

Appx170. Berger told Hanna he was not going to

overturn the process that Berger himself had started.

Appx56. Berger declined to review Hanna’s evidentiary

proof he had not left the plant site (provided to Hanna

by GNF only the night before this meeting, a month

and a half after Hanna’s termination), and issued a

letter less than a week later, on July 17, 2017 stating

that “[a]fter a full review of the situation, and the

points you have presented in your appeal, I conclude

that the Positive Management policy and

corresponding practice were followed properly and

consistently.” Appx461.

That same day, Hanna emailed Garriga, notifying

her that he intended to pursue a third appeal, again

requesting “any and all” evidence GNF had that

Hanna had left the work site in preparation for his

next-step appeal defense. Appx729. But Hanna’s appeal

process was abruptly cut short when he submitted a

letter raising his safety concerns to Jeff Immelt (CEO);

Susan Peters (SVP of Human Resources); Jeanne

Mathews (Executive Counsel Labor and Employment);

App.57a

and corporate ombudsperson Marianna Monteiro.

Appx85.

In this July 19, 2017, letter, Hanna reported retaliation based on his safety concerns and the major

evidentiary gaps in each of GNF’s allegations. Appx61.

Monteiro emailed Hanna on July 24, 2017, asking to

“hear from [Hanna] and test [her] understanding

before triggering an investigation.” Appx463. Monteiro

and Hanna spoke on July 28, 2017, after which Monteiro confirmed that GNF was undertaking another

investigation and “in accordance with normal practice,

[Monteiro] requested that the appeal [Hanna] filed

with the plant manager be held in abeyance while the

investigation is conducted.” Appx247. This thus ended

Hanna’s appeal process within GNF.

Monteiro further related that she had “asked that

[Hanna]’s status remain unchanged during the

pendency of the investigation.” Id. When Hanna

responded by asking if it was possible to reinstate his

pay due to his financial difficulties, Monteiro directed

him to his local human resources department, i.e.

Garriga. Id. Hanna texted Garriga within a week,

requesting he be placed back on payroll as his appeal

had been indefinitely postponed. Appx666. (“Dear

Annie: I appreciate all you have done on my pay so far.

However, the appeal has been indefinitely postponed

so I should be returned to the GNF payroll. Please

respond as soon as you can. Thank you Greg”). Despite

Monteiro’s instructions to request pay reinstatement

from Hanna’s local HR, Garriga instead said that “a

fresh investigation [is] underway” and his “status”

remained at termination pending the results.

Appx668.

App.58a

D. The Second Corporate Ombudsperson

Investigation Was Ongoing from August 2017

through December 2017, Ending Just After

the 180-Day Statutory Deadline to File with

OSHA

Following the first failed investigation in April

2017 prior to his termination, Hanna requested that

an independent, neutral third party, specifically

“someone not associated with the GEH business,”

perform the investigation into his nuclear safety

report and GNF’s subsequent retaliation. Appx63.

Monteiro initiated an investigation into Hanna’s letter,

and hired Tim Matthews as an “independent ombudsperson.” Appx172. Hanna later discovered that

Matthews actually worked for the firm representing

GNF in the current matter, Morgan Lewis (though it

is unknown whether Morgan Lewis was representing

GNF for the entire duration of Matthew’s investigation). Id.

The investigation was initiated in August 2017,

following Hanna’s conversation with Monteiro. Hanna

had still not heard from an investigator one month

later. Appx573. Hanna followed up with Monteiro on

August 29, 2017, informing her that 1) he had not

heard from an investigator; and 2) it troubled him that

the ombudsperson had revealed Hanna to be the cause

of the investigation, since Hanna believed the process

would be anonymous. Id. In response, Monteiro wrote

only that “the case is being investigated, not always

the employee that escalate[s] a concern is interviewed.

I will request an update and get back to you.” Id.

Three weeks later, on September 18, 2017, Hanna

followed up again after not hearing from Monteiro. Id.

Hanna told her he needed a status on the inves-

App.59a

tigation because he found out his job was posted,

“lead[ing him] to believe that GE never had any

intention of bringing [him] back to work.” Id. Monteiro

said she was unaware of the “developments” and again

redirected him to his local HR. Id.

Once Matthews’s investigation began, it involved

multiple interviews throughout September 2017

through the end of November 2017. Appx172. When

Matthews’s investigation finally concluded, the debrief

occurred on December 22, 2017, 23 days after the

deadline for filing with OSHA. Id. Matthews’s investigation found Hanna’s allegations to be “unsubstantiated.” Id.

E.

Hanna Continued to Receive Benefits

Throughout His Entire Appeal Process

Notably, during this time and at least through

2020, Hanna was still employed by GNF according to

his W-2s (issued by GNF). Appx674. He also received

at least one payroll deposit of $1,000 from GNF on

July 18, 2019, over two years after his purported

termination. Appx407: 6-13. As of February 2021,

Hanna was listed as a current full time employee

working the 1st shift – on leave – in GNF’s internal

system with nine years and ten months of service.

Appx655. His “estimated last day of leave” in GNF’s

internal system was January 1, 2058. Appx654.

External sources such as Vault Verify, a service that

reviews public reports for an individual’s employment

status, also confirmed that Hanna was employed at

GE at least as late as February 2021. Appx644.

And Hanna did not receive a call or any

information regarding COBRA, as Berger indicated

he would on May 31, 2017. Rather, GNF paid all of

App.60a

Hanna’s health insurance premiums through January

2018, when GNF placed Hanna on a “leave of absence.”

Appx327: 8-14. Hanna nonetheless maintained all

insurance benefits provided to GNF employees (the

“GE Health Benefits Option 1 UHC”) after January

2018, but paid the premiums himself. Appx113;

Appx230. His GNF retirement savings plan remained

open, with statements mailed every three months.

Appx572; Appx678.

F.

Hanna Filed His Complaint with OSHA on

December 8, 2017, 10 Days Past the Statutory

Deadline

Concurrent with the GNF internal appeals and

ombudsman process, Hanna searched for other avenues

to report his concerns and the retaliation for raising

those concerns. In June 2017, before filing his first

internal appeal, Hanna and his friend, Katherine

MacDonald,6 placed at least 13 calls to various agencies,

including the EEOC and the DOL. Appx681. But

Hanna was not made aware by any of these agencies

that the proper venue for filing a complaint of this

type (nuclear safety concerns and retaliation) was

with OSHA until November 2017 when he contacted

attorneys. Appx89. Hanna attempted to have a call

placed to OSHA on November 21, 2017—MacDonald

left a voicemail on his behalf but never received a

response. Id.

Hanna was able to file his formal complaint with

OSHA on December 8, 2017, 10 days after the 180-day

6 Hanna suffers from a speech impediment that can result in

others being unable to understand him. Katherine MacDonald

often assisted him during phone calls or public speaking.

App.61a

statutory deadline. Appx1. On October 24, 2019,

OSHA deemed his complaint untimely and dismissed

it. Appx148. Hanna requested a hearing at the OALJ

and the ALJ determined Hanna did not timely file his

complaint. Appx759.

Summary of the Argument

The Administrative Law Judge erred by failing to

consider that GNF lulled Hanna into not filing a

complaint. Rather than properly consider lulling and

misleading as two separate bases for tolling, the ALJ

instead combined the two bases but erred by applying

an improperly high standard. When GNF’s actions

(specifically, its internal appeals system as applied to

Hanna, its ombudsman process, its external investigation practice, and its administrative actions) are

properly considered, it is clear the Hanna was lulled

into a false sense of security. Hanna reasonably

believed that GNF intended to resolve his employment

issues and reinstall him at the nuclear site. GNF

undermined its own words and promises several times

by its own actions, providing confusing and conflicting

information related to, among others, the terms of

Hanna’s termination, his status as an employee in the

GNF system, the processes of the hired external

investigator, and even potential pay reinstatement.

To his own prejudice, Hanna trusted GNF’s actions

and thus did not seek to file a complaint with OSHA.

Standard of Review

The Administrative Review Board reviews the

ALJ’s factual conclusions under the substantial

evidence standard. 29 C.F.R. § 24.110(b). Substantial

evidence “means such relevant evidence as a reasonable

mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.”

App.62a

Clean Harbors Envtl. Servs. v. Herman, 146 F.3d 12,

21 (1st Cir. 1998) (citing Richardson v. Perales, 402

U.S. 389, 401 (1971)). The Board is “not barred from

setting aside a decision when it ‘cannot conscientiously

find that the evidence supporting that decision is

substantial, when viewed in the light that the record

in its entirety furnishes.’” Speegle v. Stone & Webster

Contr., Inc., ARB No. 06-041, 2005-ERA-6, slip op. at

7, 2009 WL 3165849 (ARB Sept. 24, 2009) (quoting

Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 47787 (1951)).

The Secretary of Labor has delegated to the

Board the authority to review ALJ decisions under

ERA and issue the agency’s final decision. Secretary’s

Order No. 02-2012 (Delegation of Authority and

Assignment of Responsibility to the Administrative

Review Board), 77 Fed. Reg. 69379 (Nov. 16, 2012). In

conducting its legal analysis, “the ARB reviews the

ALJ’s . . . legal conclusions de novo.” Speegle v. Stone

& Webster Contr., Inc., ARB No. 06-041, 2005-ERA-6,

slip op. at 5, 2009 WL 3165849 (ARB Sept. 24, 2009)

(citing 5 U.S.C. § 557(b)). Thus, the Board reviews de

novo the dismissal of a whistleblower case where the

ALJ determines that the complaint is untimely.

Jenkins v. CSX Transp., Inc., ARB No. 13-029, ALJ

No. 2012-FRA-073, slip op. at 3, 2014 WL 2536887

(ARB May 15, 2014).

App.63a

Argument

I.

Legal Standard

The 180-day limitations period imposed by the

ERA is not jurisdictional and is subject to equitable

modification. Warner v. Xcel Energy, ARB No. 08-112,

ALJ No. 2008-ERA-002, slip op. at 2, 2010 WL

1260208 (ARB Mar. 29, 2010); 42 U.S.C.A. § 5851(b)(1);

29 C.F.R. § 24.103(d)(2). The Board has established

four circumstances in which a statutory deadline may

be tolled through equitable estoppel:7 (i) where the

respondent has actively misled the complainant

regarding the cause of action; (ii) when the plaintiff

has in some extraordinary way been prevented from

filing his or her action, such as a debilitating illness,

injury, or natural disaster; (iii) when the complainant

has raised the precise statutory claim in issue but has

done so in the wrong forum; and (iv) where the

respondent’s own acts or omissions have lulled the

complainant into foregoing prompt attempts to

7 While the Record employs the terms “equitable estoppel” and

“equitable tolling” interchangeably, each is a distinct concept.

Equitable estoppel “examines the defendant’s conduct and the

extent to which the plaintiff has been induced to refrain from

exercising his rights,” while equitable tolling examines a

plaintiff’s “excusable ignorance of the employer’s discriminatory

act.” Hyman v. KD Res., LLC, ARB No. 09-076, ALJ No. 2009SOX-020, slip op. at 3, 2010 WL 1260209 (ARB Mar. 31, 2010)

(quoting Rhodes v. Guiberson Oil Tools Div., 927 F.2d 876, 878

(5th Cir. 1991)). Hanna requests that the statute of limitations

be tolled on the basis of equitable estoppel due to GNF’s

confusing actions and statements. Kale v. Combined Ins. Co. of

America, 861 F.2d 746, 752 (1st Cir. 1988) (Equitable estoppel

occurs when an employee “does not make a timely filing due to

his reasonable reliance on his employer’s misleading or confusing

representations or conduct.”).

App.64a

vindicate his rights. Hyman v. KD Res., LLC, ARB No.

09-076, ALJ No. 2009 SOX-020, slip op. at 3, 2010 WL

1260209 (ARB Mar. 31, 2010).

A respondent has actively misled the complainant

regarding the cause of action when the employee’s

failure to file was a consequence of either a deliberate

design by the employer, or actions that the employer

should unmistakably have understood would cause

the employee to delay filing his charge. English v.

Whitfield, 585 F.2d 957 (4th Cir. 1988). This factor

requires deliberate, misleading actions on behalf of

the employer. Tracy v. Consol. Edison Co., No 1989CAA00001, slip op. at 5 (Sec’y July 8, 1992) (“[U]nless

the employer has acted deliberately to deceive, mislead

or coerce the employee into not filing a claim in a

timely manner, equitable estoppel will not apply.”).

When determining whether the respondent has actively

misled the complainant, the Board conducts both a

subjective and objective inquiry: the respondent must

have acted in such a way as to be objectively misleading,

and the complainant must have subjectively held and

acted upon a reasonable belief based on the misleading

conduct. Bulls v. Chevron/Texaco, Inc., ALJ No. 2006SOX-117, slip op. at 6, 2006 WL 6576792 (ALJ Oct. 13,

2006).

The statute of limitations can also be tolled when

the complainant has been prevented from filing a

complaint due to circumstances out of their control.

Jaludi v. Citigroup, Inc., ARB No. 2021-0053, ALJ No.

2021-SOX-00014, slip op. at 1, 2021 WL 9918016

(ARB Aug. 25, 2021). These circumstances must

typically be “extraordinary,” and the complainant

must demonstrate fact-specific circumstances related

to this justification (for example, a complainant alleging

App.65a

he failed to timely file because of the COVID-19

pandemic must explain why it hindered him

individually). Lugg v. Lear Corp., ARB No. 2022-0008,

ALJ No. 2021-SOX00022, slip op. at 3, 2022 WL

18358031 (ARB May 19, 2022).

The third basis for equitable estoppel through

tolling is where the “complainant has raised the

precise statutory claim in issue but has done so in the

wrong forum.” Brofford v. PNC Invs., LLC, ARB No.

2018-03, ALJ No. 2017 CFP-00002, slip op. at 2, 2019

WL 3293934 (ARB Feb. 14, 2019). Tolling is

appropriate under this factor when a complainant

files in the wrong venue, but nonetheless effectively

put the respondent on notice that the complainant

was asserting a claim of whistleblower retaliation

under the same statutory scheme. Schafermeyer v.

Blue Grass Army Depot, ARB No. 07-082, ALJ No.

2007-CAA001, slip op. at 6-7, 2008 WL 4462995 (ARB

Sept. 30, 2008).

Finally, equitable estoppel is employed where the

“respondent’s own acts or omissions have lulled the

complainant into foregoing prompt attempts to

vindicate his or her rights.” Brofford v. PNC Invs.,

LLC, ARB No. 2018-03, ALJ No. 2017 CFP-00002, slip

op. at 2, 2019 WL 3293934 (ARB Feb. 14, 2019).

“Under this test it is immaterial whether the defendant

engaged in intentional misconduct.” Hyman, ARB No.

09-076, slip op. at 4. Tolling is appropriate when the

complainant was lulled into a false sense of security,

leading him to believe that his complaints were being

resolved by the respondent. Id. at 5.

Unlike the first factor (respondent intentionally

misled a complainant), no showing of actual fraud or

deceit on behalf of the employer is necessary; rather,

App.66a

“[i]t is only necessary to show that the person estopped,

by his statements or conduct, misled another to his

prejudice.” Humble Oil v. The Fidelity & Casualty Co.

of N.Y., 402 F.2d 893, 897-98 (4th Cir. 1968). The sole

issue is whether the respondent’s conduct, innocent or

not, lulled the plaintiff into a position he would not

have otherwise taken. Id.; see also McGregor v. La.

State Univ. Bd. of Supervisors, 3 F.3d 850, 865-66 (5th

Cir. 1993) (“The rule does not hinge on intentional

misconduct on the defendant’s part. Rather, the issue is

whether the defendant’s conduct, innocent or not,

reasonably induced the plaintiff not to file suit within

the limitations period.”).

II. The ALJ Erred in Not Considering Whether

GNF’s Actions Lulled Hanna Into Foregoing

Prompt Attempts to Vindicate His Rights

The ALJ’s holding evaluates three bases for

equitable tolling: 1) whether Hanna was actively

misled regarding the cause of action; 2) whether

Hanna mistakenly filed in the wrong forum; and 3)

whether there existed extraordinary circumstances

preventing Hanna from filing. But the ALJ did not

consider the fourth and most relevant factor: whether

GNF’s actions, intentional or not, lulled Hanna into

missing the filing deadline. In justifying why these

three bases are analyzed, the ALJ incorrectly stated

that Hanna posited only these three reasons as to why

the filing period for his OSHA complaint should be

tolled. Appx756.

The record directly contradicts this. Hanna

repeatedly addressed the “lulling” factor throughout

these proceedings, including no fewer than four times

in the December 2022 hearing alone. Appx259 at

App.67a

11:11-17; Appx265-266 at 17:20-18:18; Appx273-274

at 25:18-26:7; Appx274-274 at 26:20-27:8. In that

same hearing, opposing counsel recognized that Hanna

clearly asserted GNF lulled Hanna into failing to file.

(“Mr. Hanna’s allegations that Mr. Matthews delayed

or lulled him to the complacency . . . ”). Appx331 at

83:3-18; 83:22-25. In fact, the ALJ himself read

directly from Hanna’s brief, out loud, that Hanna

alleged Matthews “lulled” him into believing there

could be a favorable outcome of his investigation.

Appx339 at 91:10-19.

The ALJ also noted in his decision that “at certain

points, Complainant conflates his argument that the

filing period should not begin to run on June 1, 2017

with his argument that he was actively misled or

lulled by Respondent.”8 Appx753, n. 13 (emphasis

added). Yet the ALJ failed to consider whether GNF’s

actions reasonably lulled Hanna into a false sense of

security. The holding’s analysis conflates both the

“misled” and “lulled” factors under equitable estoppel,

but applies only the heightened standard of

“misleading”—that a respondent “acted deliberately to

deceive, mislead, or coerce the employee into not filing

a claim in a timely manner[.]” Tracy v. Consol. Edison

Co., No 1989-CAA-00001, slip op. at 5 (Sec’y July 8,

1992). The ALJ was mistaken in his conclusion,

ultimately, because he failed to apply the correct legal

8 At the time of his brief to the OALJ, Hanna had been

proceeding pro se. Papers filed by pro se complainants should be

construed “liberally in deference to their lack of training in the

law and with a degree of adjudicative latitude.” Trachman v.

Orkin Exterminating Co. Inc., ARB No. 01-067, ALJ No. 2000TSC003, slip op. at 6 (ARB Apr. 25, 2003) (internal quotations

omitted).

App.68a

standard to determine the applicability of equitable

estoppel.

III. GNF’s Actions Led Hanna to Believe His

Complaints Were Being Resolved Internally,

Either Through the Internal Appeals,

Ombudsman Process, External Investigation,

or Company Administrative Actions Affecting

Hanna

If the ALJ had properly considered lulling as a

basis for tolling, he would have found that GNF

reasonably induced Hanna not to file within the ERA’s

180-day statutory deadline.

A. Internal Appeals

GNF’s conduct towards Hanna began to conflict

with its statements almost immediately after Hanna

reported safety concerns. A little over a month later,

Hanna was suspended pending an investigation, during

which Hanna was repeatedly told he was not in

trouble but needed to stay out “just a few more days.”

Appx61; Appx165. Instead, this leave lasted until

Hanna was abruptly terminated, two full months

later. Appx165. Even in the termination meeting,

GNF told Hanna he was fired “effective immediately”

but was also an “active employee on unpaid status.”

Appx558 at 24:00-25:00. Garriga also told Hanna he

would remain active in the GNF system, would retain

his benefits, and would have continued access to his

retirement account. Id. at 24:00-25:00. This

information directly conflicted with the statements in

the termination letter given to Hanna by Berger.

Appx53.

App.69a

Hanna notified GNF, specifically Garriga, at that

very meeting that he intended to appeal the

termination, and Garriga then thoroughly explained

each step of the internal appeals process. Id. at 20:0021:00. This explicitly endorsed the possibility that

Hanna could eventually return to his position at GNF;

he had several opportunities to raise his concerns to

upper level management, and would keep his

benefits, access to employee resources, and 401k

contributions at least until the appeal process was

complete.

Based on the internal appeals process, Hanna

reasonably believed GNF was earnestly attempting to

resolve both his concerns regarding the safety of the

incinerator burners and their decision to terminate him.

This is demonstrable through Hanna’s continued

persistence throughout the internal appeals. He

requested to appeal on all three levels allowed by GNF

policy, and was only stopped when he also reached out

to additional GNF resources (ombudspeople). Hanna

would not have appealed, communicated, and

requested all evidence of the allegations used as the

basis for his termination if he had not believed there

was a significant possibility he could return to his

position at GNF. Hanna believed this was possible

because GNF provided conflicting information during

the internal appeal process, failing to communicate

whether there was a real possibility Hanna could get

his job back and whether he was entitled to reinstatement on the payroll.

By doing so, GNF’s conduct, innocent or not,

lulled Hanna into a position he would not have

otherwise taken. Humble Oil, 402 F.2d at 897-98. By

slowly shuffling Hanna through this internal appeals

App.70a

process (and eventually, a corporate ombudsman

process and external investigation), GNF lulled Hanna

into believing he did not need to actively seek out an

alternative forum. GNF lulled Hanna into a false

sense of security throughout the internal appeals

process and thus tolling is appropriate. Hyman, ARB

No. 09-076, slip op. at 5.

B. Ombudsman Process

Investigation

and

External

When Hanna sought out additional resources

from the second corporate ombudsperson requesting a

neutral third party, GNF halted the internal appeal

process. Appx247-248. When Hanna asked if it was

possible to reinstate his pay, Monteiro (the corporate

ombudsperson) directed him to his local human

resources department, i.e. Garriga. Appx247. Hanna

texted Garriga within a week, requesting he be placed

back on payroll as his appeal had been indefinitely

postponed. Appx666 (“Dear Annie: I appreciate all you

have done on my pay so far. However, the appeal has

been indefinitely postponed so I should be returned to

the GNF payroll. Please respond as soon as you can.

Thank you Greg”). Despite Monteiro’s instructions to

request pay reinstatement from Hanna’s local HR,

Garriga instead responded that “a fresh investigation

[is] underway” and his “status” remained at termination pending the results – in direct contradiction of

GNF’s own records. Appx654; Appx668; Appx671;

Appx673; Appx674-677.

Monteiro initiated an investigation through Tim

Matthews. But an entire month went by before Hanna

followed up with Monteiro, informing her he had not

heard from the expert; Monteiro responded that she

App.71a

would request an update. Appx573-574. Nearly three

weeks later, on September 18, 2017, Hanna once

again followed up after hearing nothing from GE,

GNF, or the investigator. In this September 18, 2017,

email (nearly two months after the investigation had

purportedly been opened), Hanna told Monteiro that

he was told his job had been posted and this “would

lead [Hanna] to believe that GE never had any

intention of bringing [him] back to work.” Appx573

(emphasis added).

This email demonstrates Hanna’s genuine,

reasonable belief that GNF was working to resolve the

issues with his employment. Hanna hoped to retain

his position and consistently worked with GNF to

achieve this and return to full time status. By pausing

the internal appeal process, cutting off a pathway

Hanna was already two-thirds down and shifting to

an ombudsperson alone—even if based on GNF

policy—it prolonged any resolution that GNF could or

would have offered. Moreover, it prolonged Hanna’s

belief that GNF was willing to offer any type of relief

“to his own prejudice.” Humble Oil, 402 F.2d at 89798. This was compounded by the extensive time from

July 28, 2017, to September 18, 2017, during which

Hanna received no substantive communication from

either GNF or Mathews regarding the status of the

investigation or potential outcomes.

C. External Investigation

Following the first failed investigation in April

2017 prior to his termination, Hanna requested an

independent, neutral third party, specifically “someone

not associated with the GEH business.” Appx63. Tim

Matthews acted as an “independent ombudsperson.”

App.72a

Appx172. Hanna later discovered Matthews worked

for the firm representing GNF in the current matter,

Morgan Lewis (though Hanna is not certain whether

Morgan Lewis was representing GNF for the entire

duration of Matthew’s investigation). Id. Once

Matthews’s investigation began, it involved multiple

interviews from September 2017 through the end of

November 2017. Id. When Matthews’s investigation

finally concluded, the debrief occurred on December

22, 2017, 23 days after the deadline for filing with

OSHA. Id. Matthews’s investigation found Hanna’s

allegations to be “unsubstantiated.” Id.

Because GNF misled Hanna by omitting the fact

that Matthews worked for GNF, Hanna wasted months

of his statutory deadline believing in good faith that

an independent investigator was performing a neutral

investigation. Even if the investigation was, in fact,

entirely neutral, Hanna may have justifiably been

mistrustful of GNF and decided to seek other avenues

for his complaint (hence, exactly why he asked for

“someone not associated with the GEH business.”).

Appx63.

D. GNF Administrative Actions

There are numerous examples of GNF administrative actions that reasonably led Hanna to believe

his issues would be resolved and he would return to

GNF. The first action that Hanna became aware of

was the continuation of his benefits.

In direct contradiction of the “termination letter,”

which indicates that both his retirement savings

account and benefits would terminate, neither did.

Appx53. Hanna did not receive any communication

regarding COBRA. Hanna’s retirement account status

App.73a

remained the same and GNF continued to contribute

to his 401k at least through 2020. Appx175-176;

Appx572; Appx678. GNF paid all the premiums on

Hanna’s healthcare through January 2018, and even

thereafter kept him on the “GE Health Benefits

Option 1 UHC.” Appx113. The shifting cost of the

insurance premium was due to Hanna’s GNF internal

status change to a “leave of absence.” Appx111. It is

unclear how an employer can put an individual on a

“leave of absence” from working and yet not employ

them. GNF also continued to contribute to Hanna’s

short-term and long-term disability and life insurance.

Appx175-176. During the October 29, 2020 OALJ

hearing, GNF’s HR representative Garriga conceded

this was an “unusual situation” and admitted that “in

most cases” all benefits stop once the appeal process

ends. Appx414-415 at 166:23-167:1; Appx417 at169:58.

Moreover, GNF reported to the United States

government that Hanna was still a full time employee

for several years after they terminated him. He

received at least one payroll deposit of $1,000 from

GNF on July 18, 2019, over two years after termination.

Appx407 at 159:6-13. While GNF claims this was a

“corporate payroll error,” how or why this (or any)

error occurred is not relevant to the lulling effect it

had on Hanna. Id. at 159:6-13. As of February 2021,

Hanna was listed as being on a current full time

employee working the 1st shift – on leave – in GNF’s

internal system with nine years and ten months of

service at GNF. Appx655; Appx674-677. His “estimated

last day of leave” in GNF’s internal system was

January 1, 2058. Appx655. Public reports also confirm

Hanna was reported to be employed at GE at least as

App.74a

late as February 2021. Appx644. While these actions

may be simple administrative oversights, “it is

immaterial whether the defendant engaged in

intentional misconduct.” Hyman, ARB No. 09-076,

slip op. at 4.

Conclusion

Given the ALJ’s failure to consider an argument

expressly made by Hanna, the ALJ’s finding that no

basis exists for tolling was error. Moreover, it is clear

that GNF’s actions were sufficient to lull Hanna into

a position he would have otherwise not taken. Hanna

respectfully requests this Board reverse and remand

the decision for a hearing on the merits.

Respectfully submitted,

/s/ John T. Harrington

R. Scott Oswald

John T. Harrington

THE EMPLOYMENT LAW GROUP, P.C.

1717 K St. NW Suite 1110

Washington, D.C. 20006

(202) 261-2830

(202) 261-2835 (facsimile)

soswald@employmentlawgroup.com

tharrington@employmentlawgroup.com

Counsel for Petitioner

App.75a

RESPONSE BRIEF OF

GLOBAL NUCLEAR FUEL-AMERICAS, LLC

(MAY 9, 2023)

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR

ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD

________________________

GREGORY HANNA, JR.,

Complainant,

v.

GLOBAL NUCLEAR FUEL AMERICAS, LLC,

Respondent.

________________________

ARB Case No. 2023-0015

OALJ Case No. 2020-ERA-00002

Charles C. Thebaud, Jr.

Charles C. Thebaud, JR. LLC

1629 K Street NW, Suite 300

Washington, DC 20006

(202) 827-9746 (Office)

(202) 744-5223 (Cell)

(540) 592-3079 (Home Office)

chuck@charlesthebaud.com

Counsel for Global Nuclear Fuel-Americas, LLC

App.76a

Introduction

In accordance with the briefing schedule issued

by the U.S. Department of Labor Administrative

Review Board (“ARB” or “Board”) on March 20, 2023,

Respondent, Global Nuclear Fuel-Americas, LLC

(“GNF-A”), submits this Response Brief.

In his pleadings and testimony before Chief

Administrative Law Judge Stephen R. Henley, the

Complainant, Gregory Hanna, urged the Chief Judge

to equitably toll the statute of limitations for a variety

of reasons. In Complainant’s Memorandum of Points

and Authorities in Support of Appeal (“Complainant’s

Initial Brief”), he has abandoned his prior

contentions. Mr. Hanna now asserts that the Board

should apply the principle of equitable estoppel and toll

the statute of limitations because, allegedly, GNF-A

“misled Hanna and lulled Hanna . . . into believing he

would eventually be reinstated.” (Complainant’s

Initial Brief, at 1.)

Nothing in the Complainant’s Initial Brief, or in

the record, as a whole, supports the tolling of the 180day statute of limitations under section 211 of the

Energy Reorganization Act, 42 U.S.C. § 5851, (“ERA”)

for any reason. The facts and the applicable law

require the Board to affirm the Decision and Order

Dismissing the Complaint As Untimely, issued by the

Chief Administrative Law Judge on December 21,

2022 (“Decision and Order”).

Factual Background

According to the Complainant’s Statement of the

Issues, the primary issue before the Board is whether

GNF-A somehow “misled and lulled” Mr. Hanna into

a “false sense of security,” causing him to miss the

App.77a

statutory deadline for the submittal of a claim under

section 211 of the ERA. (Complainant’s Initial Brief,

at 3.) Nevertheless, Complainant provides an extensive

discussion of his version of the merits of his complaint.

(See Complainant’s Initial Brief at 4-9.)

A.

Overview of the Facts Associated with the

Merits

GNF-A disagrees with virtually all of the alleged

facts, as well as the conclusion that Mr. Hanna was

the victim of retaliation. Because the merits of this

case were not before Chief Judge Henley and they are

not before this Board, GNF-A will not burden this

brief with the evidence refuting the merits of Mr.

Hanna’s claim. GNFA’s Position Statement to the

Occupational Safety & Health Administration

(“OSHA”) contains a detailed discussion of the relevant

facts. (See Appx. 771-799).1 In summary, the evidence

establishes that GNF-A did not place Mr. Hanna or

his peers in any jeopardy or in any unsafe condition

on January 25, 2017. Contrary to Mr. Hanna’s

assertions, neither he nor his peers received any

radiation burns or other injuries that day (or any

other day). (Appx. 376: 8-25; 377: 1-20; 437: 15-25;

438: 1-14) Moreover, Mr. Hanna did not raise any

nuclear safety, workplace safety, or personal safety

concerns with his supervisor or any other manager

1 GNF-A has submitted its complete Position Statement to

OSHA in Volume III of the Appendix. The copy of this Position

Statement submitted by Mr. Hanna in Volume I of the Appendix

(at Appx. 9, et seq,) is missing pages 13, 16-21, and 23. The

document in Volume III contains the complete GNF-A Position

Statement for ease of reference.

App.78a

that day about the work performed on January 25,

2017. (Appx. (787-790)

Unrelated to the work performed on January 25,

2017, in March 2017, one of Mr. Hanna’s peers

notified management that Mr. Hanna had left work

without authority, while “on-the-clock.” (Appx. 12-13)

An internal investigation followed and substantiated

this employee’s concern. Consistent with its policy and

past practices, GNF-A terminated Mr. Hanna’s

employment, effective June 1, 2017. (Appx 53) His

termination was entirely lawful and unrelated to any

protected activity.

B.

Overview of the Facts Associated with the

Sole Issue before the ARB

Mr. Hanna’s second-level manager, John Berger,

and his Human Resources manager, Ana Garriga, met

with Mr. Hanna on May 31, 2017, and informed him

of his termination. (Appx. 389: 21-25) They also

provided him with a letter, dated June 1, 2017, which

unequivocally stated, “Your employment with the

General Electric Company is terminated effective

immediately, due to failure to comply with Company

policies.” (Appx. 53) The letter specified that one of the

policies violated was a “Category 1” violation; namely,

on two occasions, Mr. Hanna, an hourly worker, left

the worksite without permission “while registered as

working.” (Id.) The letter noted that “Category 1

violations represent actions that will not be tolerated,

and are grounds for immediate dismissal.” (Id.) Finally,

the letter informed Mr. Hanna that, if he disagreed

with the termination, he could pursue an internal

appeal using the Wilmington Employee Appeal

Procedure, HEP-51, a copy of which Ms. Garriga

App.79a

provided to him and discussed with him. (Id.) (Appx.

394: 2-8)

During this meeting, Ms. Garriga also informed

Mr. Hanna that she was allowing his benefits to remain

in place until June 9, 2017, although she made it clear

that she was not obligated to do so, given his

termination. (Appx. 558, at 23-24 min.) During the

hearing, Ms. Garriga testified that it was not unusual

for her to continue the benefits of a newly terminated

employee to allow the person an opportunity to make

suitable arrangements going forward. (Appx. 391: 2425; 392: 1-2) Ms. Garriga also informed Mr. Hanna

that, if he pursued an internal appeal, he would

continue to have access to his benefits during the

appeal, but that he would not be paid. (Appx. 558, at

24-25 min.) At the conclusion of the meeting, Mr.

Hanna told Ms. Garriga that he wanted to appeal his

termination. (Appx. 558, at 25 min.) Ms. Garriga was

clear, however, that despite the continuation of his

benefits during his appeals, he was terminated and he

would not receive pay. (Appx. 392: 14-23) Indeed, in

addition to the unambiguous language in the

termination letter, Mr. Berger told Mr. Hanna he was

terminated once and Ms. Garriga told him three

separate times that he was terminated. (Appx. 558, at

11:48 min.; 19:35 min.; 20:19 min.; and 21:35 min.)

Consistent with Mr. Hanna’s decision to appeal

his termination, he submitted a first-level appeal to

his immediate supervisor, John Mathews, on June 9,

2017. (Appx. 54) Mr. Mathews met with Mr. Hanna,

listened to his assertions and arguments, but declined

to overturn the termination. (Appx. 439: 11-25; 440: 17) Contrary to Mr. Hanna’s assertion in his Initial

Brief, Mr. Berger did not direct Mr. Mathews to deny

App.80a

the appeal. (See Complainant’s Initial Brief at 10.) To

the contrary, Mr. Mathews tested Mr. Hanna’s

contention that he did not leave the site, but he

concluded that Mr. Hanna’s explanation “was not

remotely close” to the facts, and, as a result, he denied

Mr. Hanna’s appeal. (Appx. 439: 11-25; 440: 1-7)

One month later, on July 10, 2017, Mr. Hanna

filed his second appeal, this time with his second-level

manager, Mr. Berger. (Appx. 56) Mr. Berger also

considered Mr. Hanna’s submittal. On July 17, 2017,

however, he met with Mr. Hanna and provided him

with a letter denying his second appeal. (Appx. 461)

That letter summarized the result of Mr. Berger’s

review. “After a full review of the situation, and the

points you have presented in your appeal, I conclude

that the Positive Management Policy and corresponding

practice were followed properly and consistently. The

actions taken were justified due to the severity of the

violations. For these reasons, the decision to terminate

your employment stands.” (Appx. 461)

Mr. Hanna notified Ms. Garriga later that day,

that he wanted to pursue a final, third-level appeal.

(Appx. 729-30) Two days later, on July 19, 2017,

before he submitted any information in that final

appeal, however, Mr. Hanna changed his mind and

opted, instead, to file a concern with the GE Ombuds

Program. (Appx. 61) Section 4.5 of Employee Appeals

Procedure, HEP-51, which Ms. Garriga gave to Mr.

Hanna, and discussed with him, at his termination

meeting, specifically provides: “Employees should decide

which review process to use ‘up front’. For example, it

is not appropriate to use the GE Ombuds process and

the appeals process concurrently.” (Appx. 476; section

4.5) (Emphasis added.)

App.81a

Mr. Hanna’s Ombuds concern included various

technical safety concerns, as well as an assertion that

his termination was retaliatory. Mr. Hanna also

explicitly questioned the objectivity of the Company’s

prior investigations: “[B]ased on my experience at the

[GNFA] Wilmington facility, I had reservations about

the objectivity of any investigation.” (Appx. 62) He

also asserted that the “final step in the appeal process

is scheduled for Tuesday July 25 and I am convinced

that the review will change nothing because John

Berger wants me out.” (Appx. 63) Given Mr. Hanna’s

allegations and his expressed concern for objectivity,

the Company retained Timothy P. Matthews, a

partner at Morgan, Lewis & Bockius, LLP, to conduct an

independent, non-privileged investigation into Mr.

Hanna’s technical and employment-related concerns.

(Appx. 335: 8-24) (Timothy Matthews is not related to

Mr. Hanna’s former supervisor, John Mathews, who

conducted the first-level appeal.) On July 28, 2017,

the GE Ombuds person, Mariana Monteiro, thanked

Mr. Hanna for raising his concern and informed him

that the investigation would begin. (Appx. 247)

Mr. Matthews received his assignment on July

31, 2017 (Appx. 335: 1-6). Consistent with Ms.

Monteiro’s message to Mr. Hanna, he started working

on the investigation “immediately.” (Appx. 341: 3)

Given Mr. Hanna’s detailed written submittal to the

Ombuds Program and the existing records from Mr.

Hanna’s prior appeals, Mr. Matthews reviewed the

existing documentation and then, “very quickly in

August,” traveled to Wilmington to conduct interviews.

(Appx. 341: 3-21) After this initial field work and his

subsequent review of the materials retrieved during

his site visit, Mr. Matthews prepared to interview Mr.

App.82a

Hanna. (Appx. 342: 10-14) He contacted Mr. Hanna by

e-mail on September 26, 2017, introduced himself,

indicated that he had been engaged to conduct the

investigation, and requested an interview of Mr.

Hanna on October 2, 2017, in Wilmington, NC. (Appx.

467) Mr. Hanna declined to be interviewed because he

said he was leaving Wilmington to “lend [his]

assistance and experience to victims of the

hurricanes down in Florida and the keys [sic].” (Appx.

466-67) He concluded, “the best I can do is email you

one week before I return, to try to set up and

appointment/meeting.” (Appx. 467) Mr. Hanna’s

declination of this interview request caused a

“significant delay” in the completion of the investigation. (Appx. 342) After two weeks passed without

hearing from Mr. Hanna, Mr. Matthews reached out

again, on October 11, 2017, asking Mr. Hanna to reply

at his “earliest convenience” about his availability for an

interview later in October. (Appx. 466) (Appx. 342: 2325; 343: 1) Ultimately, Mr. Hanna made himself

available for an interview in Wilmington on October

27, 2017. (Appx. 343: 7-10)

When Mr. Hanna met with Mr. Matthews on

October 27, 2017, he gave Mr. Matthews a recently

prepared three-page, written statement. (Appx 65)

(Appx. 343: 13-24) Some of the assertions contained in

that document, as well as Mr. Hanna’s responses to

Mr. Matthews’ questions, were inconsistent with Mr.

Hanna’s prior submittals and the evidence that Mr.

Matthews had already collected. (Appx. 344: 2-17)

According to Mr. Matthews, Mr. Hanna’s interview and

his new written statement created “[e]ssentially. a

new set of facts that required [Mr. Matthews] to re-do

some of [his] interviews [and] some of his field work.

App.83a

[He] needed to go back and follow-up with managers

and co-workers that [Mr. Hanna] claimed to have

interacted with on the additional or different details.”

(Appx. 344: 13-17) Mr. Matthews explained to Mr.

Hanna that, given this new information, he would

have to conduct additional field work and that this

could impact the timing of the completion of the

investigation. (Appx. 344: 18-22) Mr. Hanna did not

object to the additional time and, according to Mr.

Matthews, he actually “expected it.” (Appx. 344: 2325; 345: 1)

Consistent with Mr. Matthews’ discussion with

Mr. Hanna, he followed up on the new information

and made an additional trip to Wilmington to conduct

more field work. In all, Mr. Matthews made four trips

to Wilmington and spent over eleven days on site – in

addition to the work he performed remotely. (Appx.

348: 1-3) After completing his field work, Mr.

Matthews spent two weeks analyzing the information

and writing his report. (Appx. 348: 9-10)

Before Mr. Matthews completed his report, Mr.

Hanna sent an e-mail to Mr. Matthews with a demand

for money on December 7, 2017, as well as an

expression of an intent to initiate legal action if his

demands were not met. Specifically, Mr. Hanna

demanded: (a) reinstatement, a $100,000 salaried

position, guaranteed employment for six years, the

removal of his second-level manager (Mr. Berger), and

receipt of all back pay; or (b) $600,000 after taxes. Mr.

Hanna wrote that the “offer” would expire in about

two hours, and, if GNF-A did not accept it, he would

file a complaint with “several government agencies

including OSHA and NRC” and that he would contact

“local and national media.” (Appx. 241-42) Mr.

App.84a

Matthews forwarded Mr. Hanna’s demand to GNF-A

and also replied to Mr. Hanna, reminding him that he

is not counsel to GNF-A, but only the independent

investigator assigned to investigate Mr. Hanna’s

concerns. (Appx. 346: 14-21) (Appx. 241) Consistent

with Mr. Matthews’ sole responsibility as the

independent investigator, he played no role in

responding substantively to Mr. Hanna’s demand.

(Appx. 346: 22-14)

On December 8, 2017, Mr. Hanna filed his ERA

complaint with OSHA, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 5851,

ten days after the expiration of the statute of

limitations. (Appx. 1-7)

After Mr. Matthews completed his report of

investigation, he conducted a telephonic debriefing

with Mr. Hanna on December 22, 2017, in which he

discussed the results of the investigation. (Appx. 347:

15-25; 348: 11-13) Mr. Matthews separately addressed

each of Mr. Hanna’s allegations, summarized what

Mr. Matthews did to investigate the allegation, and

then provided the conclusion for each allegation.

(Appx. 350: 11-17) Mr. Matthews informed Mr. Hanna

that the evidence did not substantiate any of Mr.

Hanna’s allegations. (Appx. 350: 14-17) The debriefing

occurred “as early as [Mr. Matthews] possibly could,

after completing the follow-up field work based on

[Mr. Hanna’s] interview” (Appx. 347: 25; 348: 1) and

“as quickly as [Mr. Matthews] could button up [his]

report. . . . ” (Appx. 348: 11) The timing of the debrief

“had absolutely nothing to do with any DOL or any

other statute of limitations.” (Appx. 348: 12-13)

App.85a

Overview of the Relevant Law

The United States Supreme Court and the ARB

have recognized that “equitable relief from limitations

periods is ‘typically extended . . . only sparingly’.” (Wood

v. Boeing – South Carolina, ARB Case No. 11-067,

ALJ Case No. 2011-AIR-009 (Dec. 10, 2012), at 8

(emphasis added), quoting, Irwin v. Dep’t of Veterans

Affairs, 498 U.S. 89, 96 (1990)). Similarly, the United

States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit (the

circuit in which this matter arises) has noted that

equitable tolling is available “only in those rare

instances where – due to circumstances external to a

party’s own conduct – it would be unconscionable to

enforce the limitations period against the party and

gross injustice would result.” (Harris v. Hutchinson,

209 F.3d 325, 330 (4th Cir. 2000) (emphasis added)).

Consistent with these standards and principles,

the Fourth Circuit has established a high bar for a

plaintiff seeking to extend a limitations period on the

basis of equitable estoppel. In English v. Whitfield, 858

F.2d 957 (4th Cir. 1988), the court considered whether

to apply that principle to an untimely complaint filed

by a terminated employee under the ERA. The court

held that an employee seeking to invoke equitable

estoppel must show that “‘an employee’s failure to file

in timely fashion is the consequence either of a

deliberate design by the employer or of actions that

the employer should unmistakably have understood

would cause the employee to delay filing his charge’.”

(English v. Whitfield, 858 F.2d 957, 963 (4th Cir.

1988), quoting, Price v. Litton Business Systems, Inc.,

694 F.2d 963, 965 (4th Cir. 1982)) Significantly, the

court noted that ‘“[a]n employee’s hope for . . . a

continuing employment relationship cannot toll the

App.86a

statute absent some employer conduct likely to mislead

an employee to sleeping on his rights’.” (Id., quoting,

Price v. Litton Business Systems, Inc., 694 F.2d 963,

965-66 (citations omitted) (4th Cir. 1982)) Moreover,

“even an employer’s confirmation of that hope could

not estop the employer absent some indication that the

promise was a quid-pro-quo for the employee’s

forbearance in filing a claim.” (Id., at 963) Given these

principles, the court declined to extend the statute of

limitations on the basis of equitable estoppel, even

though the employer allegedly made “repeated

assurances that permanent placement was being

sought for [the plaintiff] elsewhere in the company” and

an assertion that a company “executive” told the

plaintiff that “[the company] did not intend to fire

her.” (Id.) The court held, “this is not the type of

conduct that equitably estops under our rule.” (Id. See

also English v. Pabst Brewing Co., 828 F.2d 1047,

1049 (4th Cir. 1987), Coe v. Baltimore City Fire

Department, Civ. No. WDQ-11-1282 (D. Md.) (Feb. 21,

2013), slip op. at 9.)

Applying these principles, courts have declined to

apply equitable estoppel under facts far more

compelling than those present here. For example, in

Radbod v. Washington Suburban Sanitary Commission,

Civ. No. JFM-03-309 (D. Md. Jul. 14, 2003), slip op. at

3, the court rejected the plaintiff’s argument that

equitable estoppel applied because the employer

“misled [the plaintiff] into believing that it was

investigating his claims of discrimination and would

act as his advocate.” Likewise, in Talbot v. Mobil

Corporation, 46 F.Supp.2d 468 (E.D. Va. 1999), the

court rejected a former employee’s claim that equitable

estoppel applied even though the employer allegedly

App.87a

“gave him [a] temporary job, and at the same time,

gave him expectations in an email from his supervisor

that he would be considered for work beyond that

job. . . . ” (Id. at 473) The court determined that

equitable estoppel did not apply because there was no

indication of the required “quid-pro-quo.” (Id.)

The ARB and the Secretary of Labor have

reached similar results. For example, in Woods v.

Boeing – South Carolina, ARB Case No. 11-067, ALJ

Case No. 2100-AIR-009 (Dec. 10, 2012), the Board

noted that the courts “generally have held that unless

the employer has acted deliberately to deceive,

mislead, or coerce the employee into not filing a claim

in a timely manner, equitable estoppel will not apply.”

(Woods v. Boeing – South Carolina, ARB Case No. 11067, ALJ Case No. 2100-AIR-009 (Dec. 10, 2012) at 9,

quoting Tracy v. Consolidated Edison Co., No 1989CAA-001, slip op. at 5 (Sec’y July 8, 1992)) In Woods,

the Board noted that the use of the employer’s EEO

and Ethics procedure for addressing complaints of

harassment “falls short of the kind of evidence needed

to establish that [the employer] improperly misled or

‘induced’ [the employee] to make use of this procedure

to his detriment.” (Id. at 9) Additionally, the fact that

the internal processes did not rule in the Plaintiff’s

favor was “not sufficient for tolling purposes.” (Id.) The

Board found no evidence that the employer “attempted

to improperly induce, much less coerce, [the employee]

into forgoing the filing of an AIR 21 complaint.” (Id.)

Likewise, in Tracy v. Consolidated Edison Co.,

Case No. 89-CAA-1 (Sec’y Jul. 8, 1992), a suspended

employee alleged that, after his suspension, the

employee’s supervisor told the employee’s union representative that the company was attempting to

App.88a

resolve the issue and that the union should take no

further action. (Id. at 2) Ultimately, however, the

company did not rescind the employee’s suspension.

In rejecting the complainant’s assertion that equitable

estoppel applied, the Secretary found the evidence,

even when considered in the most favorable light for

the complainant, was “insufficient under the case law

and the prior decisions of the Secretary. . . . ” (Id. at 3)

The Secretary cited English v. Whitfield, and

concluded that the union representative’s discussions

with management and the company’s alleged statement

that “the matter was being resolved” were not sufficient

to show that the company misled the employee about

his claim. (Id. at 3) The Secretary wrote, “Courts

generally have held that unless the employer has

acted deliberately to deceive, mislead, or coerce the

employee into not filing a claim in a timely manner,

equitable estoppel will not apply.” (Id. at 3)

As discussed later in this brief, there are no

assertions in this case – and certainly no evidence –

that GNF-A ever deceived, misled, or coerced Mr.

Hanna into not filing an ERA claim in a timely

manner. Nor is there any evidence that GNF-A

created in Mr. Hanna a false sense of security that he

would be reinstated. And there is no evidence that

GNF-A ever made a promise of any sort to Mr. Hanna

as a quid-pro-quo for his forbearance in filing a claim.

App.89a

Argument

I.

Mr. Hanna’s Current Assertion Is Inconsistent

with His Prior Submittals and Testimony

In this appeal, Mr. Hanna asserted that GNF-A

lulled him into not filing a claim before the expiration

of the statutory filing deadline by creating in Mr.

Hanna a “false sense of security.” (Complainant’s

Initial Brief, at 15) Allegedly, Mr. Hanna “believed

that GNF intended to resolve his employment issues

and reinstall him at the nuclear site.” (Id.) Because he

claims that he “trusted GNF’s actions,” he “did not

seek to file a complaint with OSHA.” (Id. at 16)

Mr. Hanna’s assertions are not only inconsistent

with the facts, they are also inconsistent with his prior

submittals and testimony. Until the recent submittal

of his appeal to the Board, Mr. Hanna maintained

that: (a) he filed a timely verbal complaint with OSHA;

and (b) that he also filed a timely complaint in the

wrong forum. He told the Chief Judge in his Response

to the Show Cause Order that he verbally filed a

complaint with OSHA in November 2017, before the

expiration of the statute of limitations. (Appx. 160-61)

Mr. Hanna wrote that he “believed that he raised his

complaint of both retaliation and whistleblowing in

the proper forum – to the proper agency and well

within the appropriate timeframe.” (Appx. 167) In the

hearing, he repeated this assertion, testifying that he

called OSHA on November 24 or 25, 2017. (Appx. 318:

15-16) He cannot tell the Chief Judge that he pursued

his claim within the statute of limitations, while

simultaneously telling the Board that he missed the

filing deadline because GNF-A lulled him into

App.90a

inactivity. The

inconsistent.

two

positions

are

factually

Mr. Hanna also repeatedly told the Chief Judge

how actively he pursued his rights before the expiration

of the limitations period. For example, Mr. Hanna

wrote in his January 6, 2020, Response to the Show

Cause Order, that he spoke with various state and

federal agencies alleging retaliation only seven days

after his termination. Mr. Hanna asserted that he

“made many phone calls over a period of several

months to several agencies.” (Appx. 156) (Emphasis

added.) In his Initial Post-Hearing Brief (after the

conclusion of the limited hearing), Mr. Hanna said

that he made eleven phone calls to “various government

agencies.” (Appx. 599) More specifically, he claimed in

his Response to the Show Cause Order that he called

“the US Office of Civil Rights,” the NRC, the EEOC,

the North Carlina DOL, the Federal Bureau of

Investigation, and the New Hanover County Sherriff’s

office. (Appx. 158) Mr. Hanna said that he took “every

measure he knew to try and find the appropriate

agency to report to but none showed much

interest. . . . ” (Appx. 167) During Mr. Hanna’s 38minute call on June 7, 2017, with the EEOC, he said

that he and his friend, Ms. MacDonald, had an

“extremely detailed” discussion with the EEOC during

which Ms. MacDonald discussed the situation “from

beginning to end,” including his whistleblower concerns

and the alleged retaliation. (Appx. 158)

He testified at the limited hearing, that he

“informed [the EEOC] of everything.” (Appx. 277: 1314) In his Response to the Show Cause Order, he

asserted that he “believed this was the appropriate

forum to raise his retaliation, protected activity, dis-

App.91a

crimination, whistleblower complaint, along with his

other employment concerns.” (Appx. 158) Mr. Hanna

also claimed that this 38-minute call was “a valid

filing of his concerns. . . . ” (Appx. 179) Similarly, Mr.

Hanna told the Chief Judge in his Initial Post Hearing

Brief, that “he believed after a 38-minute phone call

with that agency that he had raised a valid

complaint.” (Appx. 593) See also Appx. 261-62; 293:78) He also testified that Ms. MacDonald followed-up with

the EEOC on Mr. Hanna’s behalf on September 23,

2017. (Appx. 307: 1-7) In describing his level of

activity, Mr. Hanna testified at the hearing that he

made “a good two dozen phone calls” and that they

were “not 30-second phone calls,” but “five, seven or

eight minute phone calls.” (Appx. 276: 16-21)

Mr. Hanna’s claimed actions – which allegedly

occurred during the time that Mr. Hanna pursued his

internal appeals and his Ombuds concern, and during

the period that he continued to receive benefits from

GNF-A – are not the actions of a person who has been

misled into believing that he should not file a timely

complaint or one who has been lulled into inactivity.

And these alleged contacts with government agencies

seeking relief are not the actions of a person who has

a “false sense of security” that the Company will

ultimately reinstate him.

Given his prior testimony and submittals claiming

that he actively challenged his termination and sought

the assistance of various government agencies, Mr.

Hanna cannot now claim that GNF-A created a false

sense of security about his reinstatement or that

GNF-A somehow lulled him into a protracted period

of inactivity, which caused him to miss the filing

deadline. Indeed, he previously claimed that he met

App.92a

the filing deadline. His current claim that he passively

waited to file a complaint because he trusted GNF-A

and that he was lulled into a false sense of security

cannot be reconciled with his earlier claims and

testimony.

II. The Evidence Does Not Support Mr. Hanna’s

Assertion that GNF-A Created a False Sense

of Security in Him or Lulled Him into

Sleeping on His Rights

Mr. Hanna claims that four GNF-A actions “led

Mr. Hanna to believe his complaints were being

resolved internally.” (Complainant’s Initial Brief, at

23) More specifically, he identified “the internal

appeals, ombudsman process, external investigation,

[and] company administrative actions” as the GNF-A

actions in question. (Id.) The facts refute Mr. Hanna’s

claim.

A. Mr. Hanna’s Use of the GNF-A Internal

Appeal Process Did Not Create in Him a

False Sense of Security or Lull Him into

Sleeping on His Rights

Mr. Hanna claims that, through his participation

in the internal appeals process, GNF-A “lulled Hanna

into believing he did not need to actively seek out an

alternative forum.” (Complainant’s Initial Brief, at

24-25) He asserts that GNF-A “slowly shuffle[ed]

Hanna through this internal appeal process” and

“fail[ed] to communicate whether there was a real

possibility Hanna could get his job back.” (Id. at 24)

These claims are false.

At the termination meeting on May 31, 2017, the

Human Resources Manager, Ms. Garriga, specifically

reminded Mr. Hanna of his right to seek relief

App.93a

outside the Company. She told him, “You may decide

at some point to go to the authorities and, you know,

put in a formal claim if you are feeling that that’s, you

know, impending.” (Appx. 558, at 19:00 min.) She also

told Mr. Hanna that “this termination is appealable”

and she provided Mr. Hanna with the procedure that

afforded him the opportunity to appeal his termination

within the Company. (Id., at 19:35 min.) (Appx. 53)

There is nothing in the record to suggest – and Mr.

Hanna has not claimed – that she addressed his

likelihood of success if he chose to appeal his

termination. Nor is there any evidence that she misled

him or that she promised him anything if he were to

use the appeals process and forego taking legal action.

She simply advised him of its availability, as she would

for any other terminated employee, and provided him

with the appeals procedure for his review and

consideration. At the end of their discussion on May

31, 2017, Mr. Hanna elected to appeal. (Appx. 558, at

25:00 min.)

Consistent with Mr. Hanna’s decision to appeal

his termination, he submitted a first-level appeal to

his immediate supervisor, John Mathews, on June 9,

2017. (Appx 54) Mr. Mathews expeditiously met with

Mr. Hanna, listened to his assertions and arguments,

but he did not overturn the termination. (Appx. 439:

11-25; 440: 1-7) Contrary to Mr. Hanna’s assertion in

his Initial Brief, Mr. Berger did not direct Mr.

Mathews to deny the appeal. (See Complainant’s

Initial Brief at 10.) In fact, Mr. Mathews tested Mr.

Hanna’s contention that he did not leave site, but he

concluded that Mr. Hanna’s explanation “was not

remotely close” to the facts, and, as a result, he denied

Mr. Hanna’s appeal. (Appx. 439: 11-25; 440: 1-7) That

App.94a

expeditious denial of Mr. Hanna’s appeal could not

possibly have created a false sense of security in Mr.

Hanna, or a reasonable belief, that he would be

reinstated.

Likewise, one month later, on July 10, 2017, Mr.

Hanna filed his second appeal with his second-level

manager, Mr. Berger. (Appx 56) Mr. Berger also

considered Mr. Hanna’s contentions and submittal.

Seven days after receiving Mr. Hanna’s appeal, Mr.

Berger met with Mr. Hanna and provided him with a

letter denying his second appeal. (Appx. 461) Again,

no reasonable employee would conclude that this

unfavorable outcome was somehow an assurance that

he would be reinstated. Indeed, there is nothing in the

record that suggests that either Mr. Mathews or Mr.

Berger said or did anything that would have led Mr.

Hanna to think that he would be reinstated or that he

should forego the submittal of a complaint to OSHA.

After Mr. Berger denied Mr. Hanna’s second-level

appeal, Mr. Hanna notified Ms. Garriga that he

wanted to pursue a third-level appeal. (Appx. 729730) That final appeal was scheduled for July 25,

2017. (Appx. 63) But, on July 19, 2017, before the final

appeal could be conducted, Mr. Hanna changed his

mind and opted, instead, to file a concern with the GE

Ombuds Program. (Appx. 61-63) As previously

discussed, Section 4.5 of Employee Appeals Procedure,

HEP-51, which Ms. Garriga gave to Mr. Hanna, and

discussed with him at his termination meeting,

specifically provides: “Employees should decide which

review process to use ‘up front’. For example, it is not

appropriate to use the GE Ombuds process and the

appeals process concurrently.” (Appx. 476, section 4.5)

(Emphasis added.)

App.95a

These facts conclusively establish that GNF-A

did not create a false sense of security in Mr. Hanna

or mislead him into believing that the appeal process

would ultimately lead to his reinstatement. Indeed,

after he received two unfavorable decisions, he abandoned the appeals process and filed an Ombuds

concern. His actions prove that he had no false sense

of security that his appeals would prevail and that he

would be reinstated.

These facts also establish that GNF-A did not

“shuffle” Mr. Hanna slowly through the appeal process.

To the contrary, it acted expeditiously and deliberately

to resolve Mr. Hanna’s appeals. In fact, if Mr. Hanna

had pursued the third-level appeal, the three-step

appeals process would have concluded soon after the

scheduled meeting on July 25, 2017, less than two

months after his termination and about four months

before the expiration of the statute of limitations on

November 28, 2017. The only reason that Mr. Hanna’s

concerns were not resolved in July 2017 was Mr.

Hanna’s decision to change course and file a new

Ombuds case. He – not GNF-A – determined the

timing.

Mr. Hanna’s assertion that GNF-A “fail[ed] to

communicate whether there was a real possibility

Hanna could get his job back” does not support a claim

of equitable estoppel. (See Complainant’s Initial Brief,

at 24) Ms. Garriga, who helped administer the appeal

process, and the two managers who considered Mr.

Hanna’s appeal, properly did not pre-judge or

comment on Mr. Hanna’s likelihood of success before

they received his contentions and heard his arguments.

Nor should they. If the Complainant’s position were

adopted by the Board, companies with internal appeals

App.96a

processes would be compelled to handicap an employee’s

appeal chances and communicate those chances to the

employee or face the possibility that their silence

provided the employee with some false sense of

security that his appeal will be successful. Obviously,

such an outcome would be counterproductive to a fair

appeal.

Finally, Mr. Hanna’s contention is contrary to

established law. Controlling case law establishes that

internal appeals or grievance processes have no

bearing on statutes of limitation. The United States

Supreme Court has held that the “grievance procedure,

by its nature, is a remedy for a prior decision, not an

opportunity to influence that decision before it is

made . . . [W]e already have held that the pendency of

a grievance, or some other method of collateral review

of an employment decision, does not toll the running

of the limitations periods.” (Delaware State College v.

Ricks, 449 U.S. 250, 261 (1980) (citing Int’l Union of

Elec., Radio & Machine Workers v. Robbins & Meyers,

Inc., 429 U.S. 229 (1976) (emphasis in original))

The ARB has followed this well-settled principle.

In Woods v. Boeing – South Carolina, ARB Case No.

11-067, ALJ Case No. 2011-AIR-009, the complainant

alleged that he was “induced into taking advantage of

several internal processes, none of which found in his

favor, but all of which culminated in the dismissal of

his harassment complaint exactly one day after the 90

day AIR filing period had run.” (Id. at 9) The Board

rejected his argument, noting “The Secretary of Labor

has ruled in an ERA case that the deadline for filing

claims is not tolled when an employee engages in the

employer’s internal review proceedings.” (Id., citing

Ackison v. Detroit Edison Co., No. 1990-ERA-038, slip

App.97a

op. at 2 (Sec’y Aug. 2, 1990)) The Board noted that the

availability and use of a company’s internal appeals

procedure “falls short of the kind of evidence needed

to establish that [the company] improperly misled or

‘induced’ [the complainant] to make use of this

procedure to his detriment. The fact that [the appeals]

did not find in [the complainant’s] favor, in and of

itself, is also not sufficient for tolling purposes.” (Id.,

at 9) The Board determined that the complainant “has

alleged no facts establishing that [the company] is in

any way responsible for the fact that [the complainant] convinced himself that he was certain to

prevail and so chose, of his own free will, not to file an

AIR 21 complaint.” (Id.) See also Leiva v. Union Pac.

R.R. Co., ALJ No. 2017-FRS-36, slip op. at 47 (May 25,

2018) (“[D]uring the pendency of a grievance or some

form of collateral review of an employment decision,

the statute of limitations is not tolled.”) (internal

citation omitted); Jenkins v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency,

ARB No. 98-146, ALJ No. 1988-SWD-2, slip op. at 14

(ARB Feb. 28, 2003)) (“It is well established that the

filing of a grievance does not operate to toll the

limitations period for filing a complaint under the

whistleblower statutes.”) (Internal citations omitted).

If Mr. Hanna’s contention were to prevail – that

his receipt of the appeals procedure and voluntary use

of the process were sufficient to “lull” him into

delaying or foregoing legal action – it would not only

be contrary to established law, it would also provide a

strong disincentive for companies to provide processes

and procedures for employees to internally appeal

discipline. The unavailability (or reduction in the

number) of internal appeal processes would serve

neither employees nor employers. Left only with

App.98a

litigation as a potential resource for the resolution of

employment disputes, employees would be compelled

to seek redress in the courts and administrative

agencies, thereby increasing demands on an already

burdened system.

In short, Mr. Hanna has provided no evidence to

suggest that anyone at GNF-A, or that the appeals

process itself, induced him into pursuing an internal

appeal and foregoing the right to file a timely complaint

with OSHA. He alone made that decision. His voluntary

use of the GNF-A appeal process does not support a

determination that equitable estoppel somehow tolled

the running of the limitations period.

B. Mr. Hanna’s Communications with the

Ombuds Program Did Not Create in Him

a False Sense of Security or Lull Him into

Sleeping on His Rights

Mr. Hanna alleges that through his voluntary

participation in the Ombuds Program, GNF-A somehow

misled him to believe that he would be reinstated,

thereby causing him to miss the ERA filing deadline.

(Complainant’s Initial Brief, at 25-27) To support this

assertion, Mr. Hanna notes that the Corporate

Ombuds person, Ms. Monteiro, referred him to his

local Human Resources manager when Mr. Hanna

requested reinstatement of his pay. (Id., at 25) The

facts establish that Ms. Garriga, the Human Resources

manager, made it clear to Mr. Hanna that he was

terminated and that neither his pay nor his employment were going to be reinstated during the Ombuds

investigation.

On July 28, 2017, Ms. Monteiro sent an e-mail to

Mr. Hanna advising him that she “requested that the

App.99a

appeal you have filed with the plant manager [the

third-level appeal] be held in abeyance while the

investigation is conducted.” (Appx. 248) As previously

discussed, Ms. Monteiro’s message to Mr. Hanna was

consistent with the governing procedure, which provides

that an employee should decide “up front” whether to

pursue an internal appeal or an Ombuds concern.

(Appx. 476) That was not new information to Mr.

Hanna. Ms. Garriga provided him with the procedure

at his May 31, 2017, termination meeting and explained

that point to him.

In that same July 28, 2017, e-mail exchange with

Mr. Hanna, Ms. Montiero wrote, “Similarly, I have

asked that your status remain unchanged during the

pendency of the investigation.” (Appx. 248) Of course,

he was terminated effective June 1, 2017, and he

remained terminated in July 2017. Indeed, he had

just lost both appeals. Interestingly, during his

appeals, Mr. Hanna was clear on his terminated status.

In his first appeal, he submitted a written statement

acknowledging that Mr. Berger told him he “was being

terminated for a Class I Offense,” and he argued that

his “termination is without merit and should be

reversed.” (Appx. 54-55) Similarly, in his second

appeal, Mr. Hanna acknowledged receiving a

“termination letter,” and he asked that it be “rescinded.” (Appx. 60) (And, as previously noted, Mr. Berger

and Ms. Garriga told Mr. Hanna four times during the

termination meeting that he was terminated.)

Notwithstanding the clarity of the outcome of the

appeals, on July 28, 2017, Mr. Hanna asked Ms.

Monteiro to contact Human Resources and “reinstate

his pay.” (Appx. 247) Because Mr. Hanna had not been

reinstated and because Ms. Monteiro lacked any

App.100a

authority to reinstate either his employment or his

pay, she replied that he needed to contact his Human

Resources organization to address his request. (Id.) Ms.

Garriga confirmed in her testimony that Ms. Monteiro

did not change Mr. Hanna’s status; nor did Ms.

Monteiro have the authority to do so. (Appx. 403: 2225; 404: 1-25) On August 8, 2017, Mr. Hanna sent a

text message to Ms. Garriga saying (incorrectly), “It is

my understanding that Ge [sic] corporate is now

taking a fresh look at everything, and that I should be

re-instated to pre-June 1 status during the new

investigation.” (Appx. 669) Ms. Garriga corrected him

almost immediately in a text message replying, “your

status remains at termination pending the results of

the [Ombuds] investigation.” (Appx. 668) (Emphasis

added.)) Even in the unlikely event that Mr. Hanna

were somehow confused by Ms. Monteiro’s July 28,

2017, e-mail about his status remaining “unchanged”

during the Ombuds investigation, Ms. Garriga’s

follow-up message removed any doubt. He was

terminated effective June 1, 2017. He remained

terminated during his two unsuccessful appeals and

the subsequent Ombuds investigation. Consequently,

he would not receive pay. Nothing in this exchange

supports a claim that GNF-A misled Mr. Hanna or

created in him a false sense of security that he had

been, or would be, reinstated. Indeed, GNF-A clearly

told him, verbally and in writing, on May 31, 2017,

that he was terminated effective June 1, 2017, and

Ms. Garriga reinforced that same message on August

8, 2017, when she denied Mr. Hanna’s baseless request

that he be reinstated to his “pre-June 1 status.”

Mr. Hanna clearly understood his terminated

status. Indeed, nothing had changed since he received

App.101a

his June 1, 2017, termination letter, which told him

unambiguously that his “employment with the General

Electric Company was being terminated effective

immediately.” (Appx. 53)

Clearly, he was not “lulled” into thinking that he

was, or would be, reinstated. On September 18, 2017,

after Mr. Hanna’s July 28, 2017, e-mail exchange with

Ms. Monteiro and after Ms. Garriga’s confirmation of his

termination, Mr. Hanna wrote again to Ms. Monteiro

arguing that he had been “terminated under false

pretenses” and he noted that he had heard that his job

position had been posted. (Appx. 573) Without

question, he understood he was terminated. He again

asked “for G.E. corporate to have G.E. Nuclear reinstate

me to pre-June 1 status.” (Appx. 573) Ms. Monteiro

replied, “I am not aware of any of the developments

you described[.] The best way to manage those are

directly with your HR representative[.]” (Appx. 573)

This exchange confirms that Mr. Hanna understood

precisely that he had been terminated. Nothing in

these exchanges supports a conclusion that GNF-A

misled Mr. Hanna about his terminated status or

created in him a false sense of security that he would

be reinstated such that he should not file a complaint

under the ERA.

C. The Independent Ombuds Investigation

Did Not Create a False Sense of Security

in Mr. Hanna or Lull Him into Sleeping

on His Rights

Mr. Hanna claims that the independent Ombuds

investigation conducted by Mr. Matthews caused

Mr. Hanna to “waste[] months of his statutory deadline believing in good faith that an independent

App.102a

investigator was performing a neutral investigation.”

(Complainant’s Initial Brief, at 27) He alleges that

“GNF misled Hanna by omitting the fact that Matthews

worked for GNF.” (Id.) He also complains about the

length of Mr. Matthews’ investigation and the timing

of his debriefing. (Id.)

Mr. Hanna’s allegations are baseless and do not

support the application of equitable estoppel.

(1) Mr. Matthews’ Independence

In Mr. Matthews’ first communication with Mr.

Hanna, he included his firm’s name, address, phone

number, and web site, in addition to Mr. Matthews’ email address and contact information. (Appx. 467) Mr.

Matthews was open and transparent about his

position and his organization. Additionally, Mr.

Matthews made it clear in that same e-mail that he

had been “engaged by GE’s Ombuds program” to

conduct the investigation into Mr. Hanna’s concern.

(Id.) There was simply nothing inaccurate or misleading

about Mr. Matthews’ communication.

Indeed, Mr. Matthews testified at the hearing

that he conducted a non-privileged investigation into

Mr. Hanna’s Ombuds concerns (Appx. 335: 22-24) and

at no time did anyone from the Company impose any

restrictions or conditions on his investigation. (Appx.

335: 25. 336: 1-3) Nor did anyone attempt to influence

the outcome of the investigation. (Appx. 336: 4-6) To

the contrary, the Company hired Mr. Matthews

because he was independent of the Company, as Mr.

Hanna had specifically requested when he submitted

his concern to the Company’s Ombuds Program.

(Appx. 63) Mr. Matthews “worked for” GNF-A, as Mr.

Hanna alleges, only in the sense that he was hired by

App.103a

the Company to conduct the independent Ombuds

investigation that Mr. Hanna specifically requested.

Contrary to Mr. Hanna’s insinuation, Mr. Matthews

was not serving as counsel to GNF-A or its parent

company, GE, when he conducted the investigation.

As he accurately told Mr. Hanna in his initial e-mail,

his sole responsibility was to perform an independent

investigation.

(2) The Timing of the Investigation

Mr. Hanna also complains about the duration of

Mr. Matthews’ investigation, noting that his debriefing

occurred after the passage of the limitations period.

(Complainant’s Initial Brief, at 27) As the earlier

factual discussion demonstrates, there is no credible

evidence that Mr. Matthews purposefully delayed his

investigation or that the running of the statute of

limitations played any role in his investigation. In

fact, Mr. Matthews confirmed in his testimony that it

played no role whatsoever. (Appx. 348: 12-13)

The timeline of Mr. Matthews’ investigation

establishes that he diligently investigated Mr. Hanna’s

concerns. The GE Ombuds Program hired Mr.

Matthews on July 31, 2017. (Appx. 335: 4-6) He

“immediately” began work. (Appx. 341: 3) Mr. Matthews

reviewed a host of prior documents related to the prior

investigations, including statements by Mr. Hanna,

and he conducted a number of on-site interviews in

Wilmington, starting in early August. (Appx. 341: 2021) After reviewing the relevant files and documents

and after conducting the initial field work, Mr.

Matthews reached out to Mr. Hanna on September 26,

2017, (more than two months prior to the expiration

of the statute of limitations period), to schedule an

App.104a

interview with him. (Appx. 341: 3-25; 342: 1-14) Mr.

Hanna told Mr. Matthews that he could not meet with

him because he was going to Florida to perform repair

work after a hurricane. (Appx. 342: 15-20) Hearing

nothing from Mr. Hanna for two weeks, Mr. Matthews

reached out again and asked for an interview. (Appx.

342: 23-25; 343: 1-6) Mr. Hanna ultimately made

himself available for an interview on October 27,

2017. (Appx. 343: 7-10) During the interview, Mr.

Hanna provided yet another written statement and

discussed new facts, which caused Mr. Matthews to

conduct additional field work and interviews. (Appx.

344: 2-17) As Mr. Matthews testified at the hearing,

Mr. Hanna’s statements that day “differed from

multiple statements he had given the Company in

prior investigations,” which provided a “new set of

facts,” and caused Mr. Matthews to conduct additional

field work and interviews. (Appx. 344: 6-7, 13-15) On

October 31, 2017, Mr. Matthews’ father passed away,

which caused him to be unavailable for some time.

(Appx. 366: 5-6) To follow-up on the new information

provided by Mr. Hanna in his interview, Mr.

Matthews travelled again to Wilmington in the end

of November to complete his field work. (Appx. 348:

3-6) Over the course of his investigation, he made four

separate trips to Wilmington to conduct interviews

and investigate Mr. Hanna’s concerns. (Appx. 348: 23) He then spent two weeks analyzing all the data and

information collected and writing his report. (Appx.

348: 9-10) Mr. Matthews debriefed Mr. Hanna on the

results, “as early as possible after completing the

follow-up field work based on [Mr. Hanna’s] interview.”

(Appx. 347: 24-25; 348: 1) As Mr. Matthews explained

to Mr. Hanna on cross-examination: “The investigation

took the time it took because the field work had to

App.105a

happen again because in our interview, you provided

yet another version of those same facts about the

incinerator and the like, and about where you were.”

(Appx. 367: 7-11)

There is simply no credible evidence that Mr.

Matthews delayed his investigation in any way or for

any reason, much less that he delayed it to lull Mr.

Hanna into sleeping on his rights.

(3) Mr. Hanna’s Alleged “False Sense of

Security”

In any case, Mr. Hanna’s al

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Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Gregory Hanna, Petitioner v. Department of Labor, Administrative Review Board, et al. | Frix