Amicus Curiae Brief — Triumph Foods, LLC, et al., Petitioners v. Andrea J. Campbell, Attorney General of Massachusetts, et al.

No. 25-1047

In the Supreme Court of the United States

_______________

TRIUMPH FOODS, LLC, ET AL,

Petitioners,

v.

ANDREA J. CAMBPELL, IN HER OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS

ATTORNEY GENERAL OF MASSACHUSETTS, ET AL.,

Respondents.

_______________

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT

_________________________________

BRIEF OF IOWA AND 23 OTHER STATES

AS AMICI CURIAE IN SUPPORT OF

GRANTING THE PETITION

______________________________________________

BRENNA BIRD

Attorney General of Iowa

ERIC WESSAN

Solicitor General

Counsel of Record

BREANNE STOLTZE

Assistant Solicitor General

1305 E Walnut Street

Des Moines, IA 50319

(515) 823- 9117

eric.wessan@ag.iowa.gov

Counsel for Amici Curiae

(additional counsel listed in addendum)

i

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

1. Whether the Federal Meat Inspection Act

imposes more or different—even if non-conflicting—

requirements on pork producers, and is thus

preempted by the FMIA under principles of express or

implied preemption?

2. Whether the Act violates the dormant

Commerce Clause or the other constitutional doctrines

sufficiently pleaded in the Complaint?

ii

TABLE OF CONTENTS

QUESTIONS PRESENTED ........................................ i

TABLE OF CONTENTS .............................................ii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ...................................... iii

INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE ............................. 1

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT ..................................... 3

ARGUMENT ................................................................ 4

I. QUESTION 3 HARMS AGRICUTURAL

STATES AND CONSUMERS .................................. 4

II. QUESTION 3 HAS STARTED AN

INTERSTATE RACE-TO-THE-BOTTOM .............. 9

III. QUESTION 3 VIOLATES THE

CONSTITTUTION ................................................. 13

CONCLUSION .......................................................... 16

APPENDIX

ADDITIONAL COUNSEL ........................................ 1a

iii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases

Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc.,

294 U.S. 511 (1935) .......................................... 11, 13

Baldwin,

267 U.S. .................................................................. 14

Brown v. Maryland,

25 U.S. 419 ............................................................. 19

Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of

Harrison,

520 U.S. 564 (1997) ................................................ 18

Carroll v. Lanza,

349 U.S. 408 (1955) ................................................ 21

Comptroller of Treasury of Md. v. Wynne,

575 U.S. 542 (2015) .......................................... 18, 19

CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am.,

481 U.S. 69 (1987) ............................................ 11, 12

Franchise Tax Bd. of California v. Hyatt,

587 U.S. 230 (2019) .......................................... 24, 25

H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. Du Mond,

336 U.S. 525 (1949) ................................................ 15

Healy v. Beer Inst., Inc.,

491 U.S. 324 (1989) .................................... 11, 13, 28

Hoyt v. Sprague,

103 U.S. 613 (1881) ................................................ 23

Hughes v. Fetter,

341 U.S. 609 (1951) ................................................ 26

Hughes v. Oklahoma,

441 U.S. 322 (1979) ................................................ 10

Learning Resources, Inc. v. Trump,

146 S.Ct. 628 (2026) ............................................... 20

Michelin Tire Corp. v. Wages,

423 U.S. 276 (1976) ................................................ 10

iv

Nat’l Pork Producers Council v. Ross,

598 U.S. 356 (2023) 5, 6, 9, 14, 17, 18, 20, 21, 23, 24

Northwest Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Holder,

557 U.S. 193 (2009) ................................................ 25

Oregon Waste Sys., Inc. v. Department of Envtl.

Quality,

511 U.S. 93 (1994) .................................................. 28

Paul v. Virginia,

75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168 (1868) ................................... 27

Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc.,

397 U.S. 137 (1970) ................................................ 28

Powell v. Khodari-Intergreen Co.,

334 N.W.2d 127 (Iowa 1983).................................. 28

Rositzky v. Rositzky,

46 S.W.2d 591 (Mo. 1931) ...................................... 29

Shelby County v. Holder,

570 U.S. 529 (2013) ................................................ 25

Styczinski v. Arnold,

46 F.4th 907 (2022) ................................................ 24

Toomer v. Witsell,

334 U.S. 385 (1948) ................................................ 26

Woodruff v. Parham,

75 U.S. 123 (1869) .................................................. 19

World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson,

444 U.S. 286 (1980) ................................................ 25

Statutes

Colo. Rev. Stat. § 40-2-124 ........................................ 15

Mass. Gen. Laws Ch. 129 App., § 1–3................... 2, 22

U.S. Const. amend. VI ............................................... 27

U.S. Const. art. I, § 10 ............................................... 17

U.S. Const. art. IV, § 1 ........................................ 21, 26

U.S. Const. art. IV, § 2 .............................................. 27

v

Regulations

Cal. Code. Regs. Tit. 17, § 95481 .............................. 15

Or. Admin. R. 340-253-0040...................................... 15

Other Authorities

Boris I. Bittker & Brannon P. Denning, The ImportExport Clause, 68 Miss. L.J. 521 (1998).......... 17, 18

Douglas Laycock, Equal Citizens of Equal and

Territorial States: The Constitutional Foundations

of Choice of Law, 92 Colum. L. Rev. 249 (1992) ... 21

James W. Coleman, Importing Energy, Exporting

Regulation, 83 Fordham L. Rev. 1357 (2014) ....... 15

Mark D. Rosen, State Extraterritorial Powers

Reconsidered, 85 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1133 (2010)

................................................................................ 21

1

INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE 1

Suppose Iowa voters worried about overfishing

and the inhumane harvesting of Atlantic shellfish. So

the Iowa Legislature passes a law about how lobsters,

clams, and steamers must be harvested to be lawfully

sold in the State. For example, lobsters must be able

to turn around in the lobster cages that capture them.

Perhaps the Atlantic fishermen think that the rules

are unworkable and would dramatically raise the cost

of otherwise ethical fishing. Iowa neither employs nor

consults experts within the field—the Iowa-based

Atlantic fishing community is not that large. And so,

without fishermen to raise their concerns with local

legislators or voters, this new hypothetical law is

enacted.

While that law equally affects Atlantic

fishermen across the country, it likely would impose

greater compliance costs on States that have a more

meaningfully sized fishing industry than Iowa. Even

more so if other Midwestern states joined the ethical

crusade. That is no different from the current

approach of some States that do not raise hogs trying

to impose unworkable restrictions in States that do.

And while consumers in the regulating States will pay

higher prices as a result, the economic implications

are far greater—and more troubling. The structural

constitution precludes that result.

The States of Iowa, Alabama, Alaska,

Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Kansas, Kentucky,

Louisiana, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska,

New Hampshire, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma,

Pursuant to Rule 37.2, amici provided timely

notice of their intent to file this brief to all parties.

1

2

South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas,

Utah, West Virginia, and Wyoming submit this brief

in support of Plaintiffs because Massachusetts’s

Question 3 imposes a detrimental and overly

burdensome regulatory scheme on the almost entirely

out-of-Massachusetts pig farmers and pork processors

in their respective States. This Court should remedy

what has become a muddy jurisprudential sty.

One part of Question 3, the Prevention of Farm

Animal Cruelty Act, governs “farm owner[s and]

operators

within

the

Commonwealth

of

Massachusetts.” Mass. Gen. Laws Ch. 129 App., § 1–

2. But Question 3 also makes it unlawful for a

business to sell within Massachusetts “any . . . [w]hole

pork meat that the business owner or operator knows

or should know is the meat of a covered animal [or]of

the immediate offspring of a covered animal” if the

covered animal was “confined in a cruel manner,” as

defined by the Question. Id. § 1–3. “Whole pork meat”

includes uncooked pork, like bacon, ham, roast, and

brisket. Id. § 1–5.

On its face, Question 3 appears only to regulate

sales of pork that occur in Massachusetts. But its

reach is much broader. Question 3 denies market

access to out-of-state pork farmers and processors

unless their practices comply with Massachusetts’s

mandates.

Question 3’s broad sweep will harm

agricultural states. Iowa, for example, is the top porkproducing and exporting State. 2020 Iowa Pork

Industry Report 7 (May 2020), available at

https://perma.cc/3DFZ-SV5N. The pork industry

employs more than 147,000 Iowans and contributes

billions of dollars annually to Iowa’s economy. Id.

3

Beyond Iowa, hog farmers are critical to many

States’ economies. Massachusetts Question 3 will

disrupt the pork industry by imposing stringent

requirements inconsistent with industry practices on

hog farmers and pork processors across the country.

The First Circuit’s approach declines to address

the arrogation of authority and abrogation of other

States’ sovereign authority imposed by Question 3.

This Court should grant certiorari and allow the

Petitioners’ case to proceed.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

Massachusetts has fired shots in what could be

an interstate trade war. Rather than respect her sister

States’ regulatory approach to raising pork in their

own States, Massachusetts seeks to substitute its own

inexpert judgment for what regulations are best.

Question 3 requires pork producing States to oversee

massive disruption in vital businesses to establish two

supply chains: one to sell pork in Massachusetts and

one to sell everywhere else.

Even if Massachusetts’s trade war on best

practices was limited only to Massachusetts it would

be a major problem. Prices in Massachusetts have

spiked over the past two years, making feeding

Massachusetts nutritious and healthy pork even more

expensive. But other States are imposing their own

nationwide regulations that pork produced outside of

their States must follow or risk being prohibited from

sale. Not yet are there conflicting regulations between

those States, but establishing a patchwork of

mandatory regulations across the fifty States risks

undermining one of the core pieces of our federalist

system.

4

Mutual respect rather than imperious

regulation should be the norm. And unlike this Court’s

earlier case in National Pork Producers Council v.

Ross, Petitioners here have raised and preserved the

discrimination and interest-balancing claims at issue.

This Court should find that the balances weigh

against allowing Massachusetts to tell States across

the country how to raise hogs.

Beyond those precedents, there are many

potential constitutional infirmities with Question 3.

On remand, with this Court’s instruction, the district

court can fully address those constitutional issues in

the first instance. To reach some of those issues, this

Court must address precedents that violate the

original understanding of the clauses that they

interpret.

The amici States respectfully request that the

Court reverse the First Circuit to enjoin enforcement

of Question 3.

ARGUMENT

I.

QUESTION 3 HARMS AGRICULTURAL STATES

AND CONSUMERS

Question 3 has already forced out-of-state

farmers to endure enormous compliance costs.

Economic studies conducted on California’s less

burdensome law estimate that compliance will cost

hog producers in the United States between $294

million and $348 million. Brief of Iowa Pork Producers

Ass’n, et al. as Amici Curiae, p. 17, Nat’l Pork

Producers Council v. Ross, 598 U.S. 356 (2023)

(“NPPC”).

5

To contextualize those numbers, an “average

barn might cost $1,600 to USD 2,500 per sow, or $3

million to $4.5m million in total.” Erica Shaffer,

Rabobank: California’s Prop 12 a Call to Lead on

Animal

Welfare,

MEAT+POULTRY

(2021),

https://perma.cc/TUZ5-SX5V.

But

laws

like

Massachusetts’s Question 3 will raise those costs to

“averag[e] as much as $3,400 per sow.” Id. Farmers’

costs will double—causing some farmers to go out of

business and dramatically raising consumer costs.

That stems from legal changes like elevated building

costs of these luxury accommodations. See id.

Small, independent hog farmers will be

devastated. Most pig farmers continue to operate

independent farms, with 52,984 independent pig

farms holding 25.6 million pigs in inventory, according

to the 2022 Agricultural Census. Nat’l Agric. Stat.

Serv., 2022 Census of Agriculture: U.S. Nat’l Level

Data, Table 23, https://perma.cc/M3FE-KJA9. Of

those farms, about 90 percent had fewer than 100 pigs

in inventory. Id.

Question 3 will disproportionately affect those

farms because small farmers generally have “a lower

return to investments and therefore will likely realize

less favorable terms of credit.” Barry K. Goodwin,

California’s Proposition 12 and its Impacts on the Pork

Industry (May 13, 2021), at 8–9. Thus, they “will be

the least able to undertake the changes that would

make facilities comfortable.” Id. Question 3 thus

places an added burden on a substantial and already

contracting segment of the industry. From 2017 to

2022, the number of independent farms with herds of

fewer than 100 pigs dropped by about 9 percent.

Compare Nat’l Agric. Stat. Serv., 2022 Census of

6

Agriculture: U.S. Nat’l Level Data, Table 23 with Nat’l

Agric. Stat. Serv., 2017 Census of Agriculture: U.S.

Nat’l Level Data, Table 23, https://perma.cc/D3TY62EJ.

Expensive regulations will “hasten the

concentration of the hog Industry, with smaller

farmers exiting the sector, leaving a US hog industry

that has fewer but larger farms.” Goodwin, supra, at

10.

Indeed, the problem is not isolated to

Massachusetts. In the wake of National Pork

Producers, other States have imposed their own,

different, pork-related mandates. The potential

financial effect on farmers will continue to increase if

other States impose similar unworkable regulations

with their own idiosyncrasies inconsistent with those

in Massachusetts. For example, farmers in Iowa could

invest millions of dollars to remodel their hog farms to

comply with Massachusetts’s requirements only to

find California enacting a law imposing larger housing

requirements per pig. See Brief of Iowa Pork

Producers Ass’n, et al. as Amici Curiae, p. 17.

How many States with different and perhaps

conflicting regulations must hog farmers comply with?

There is a real risk of forcing those farmers to

continuously “invest millions of dollars in capital

expenditures” to “comply with everchanging

standards that other states choose.” Id. at 18.

While Question 3 is expensive, non-compliance

may cost pork producers even more. If farmers and

pork processors do not adjust to the new rules, they

may be shut out of Massachusetts entirely. Because

Massachusetts “is [the] distribution hub for Vermont,

7

New Hampshire, Rhode Island and Maine,” Question

3 “could affect the production and sale of pork across a

broad swath of the country.” The Editorial Board,

Massachusetts Wants Your Bacon, WALL STREET

JOURNAL, (Aug. 10, 2022), https://perma.cc/9HR89KDQ.

And hog farmers probably will not be the

hardest hit. The increased costs on raising and

processing pork will make American consumers

squeal. Pork prices are already high enough. In 2021,

pork prices rose 12.1 percent from the year before.

Brian Deese, et al., Addressing Concentration in the

Meat-Processing Industry to Lower Food Prices for

American Families, THE WHITE HOUSE (Sept. 8, 2021),

https://perma.cc/AJ7F-XFAA. And in October 2022,

pork prices hit a record level of $5.05 per pound.

Jennifer Shike, Here’s a Look at Pork Price Spreads,

PORK

BUSINESS

(May

15,

2023),

https://perma.cc/N23H-CA5H.

Costly regulations mean expensive pork.

Indeed, early data on California’s less-burdensome

Proposition 12 already shows that consumers are

seeing higher pork prices at the grocery store. Three

USDA economists analyzed preliminary retail scanner

data and found that pork prices in California rose 20

percent on average since July 1, 2023, when the State

began implementing the new regulations. See Hannah

Hawkins, Shawn Arita, & Seth Meyer, Proposition 12

Pork Retail Price Impacts on California Consumers,

U.C. Giannini Found. of Agric. Econ., ARE Update

27(3), 5–8 (2024), available at https://perma.cc/Z8ETD4Q4.

The price of some pork products increased even

more. For example, after Proposition 12 went into

8

effect, the price of pork loins rose by more than 40

percent. Id. at 5. That means California consumers are

paying an extra $1.04 per pound for bacon, $0.54 per

pound more for ribs, and an additional $1.42 per

pound for pork loin—the three most-purchased pork

products by California consumers. Id. at 7. Those price

increases continued after the regulations were fully

implemented on January 1, 2024. More regulations

will continue to inflate prices.

High pork prices disproportionately affect

lower-income households. Laws like Question 3 may

“lead to a decline in the number of options” and “make

certain pork products too expensive for lower-income

people.” Alicia Wallace, Pork Is Already Super

Expensive. This New Animal-Welfare Law Could Push

Prices Higher, CNN BUSINESS (Oct. 17, 2021),

https://perma.cc/42YJ-CF7J. That shift will hurt the

pocketbooks of folks who have long relied on pork as a

low-cost, high protein option for feeding their families.

Question 3 also jeopardizes Americans’ health

and safety. Scientific literature suggests that animalconfinement regulations, like those Question 3

mandates, could worsen animal health and welfare

and introduce extra risk to standardized sanitary

practices.

Counter-intuitively

for

nonfarmers,

sometimes larger pens increases the risk of injury and

illness for hogs. For example, housing hogs in larger

individual stalls increases the risk of disease

transmission. Those spaces mean that pigs are more

likely to come into nose-to-nose contact and share

water and feeding systems. See Brief for American

Association of Swine Veterinarians as Amicus Curiae,

p. 4–19, NPPC, 598 U.S. 356. Therefore, Question 3

has real risks for human health.

9

II.

QUESTION 3 HAS STARTED AN INTERSTATE

RACE-TO-THE-BOTTOM.

The Framers’ “central concern . . . for calling the

Constitutional Convention” was “the conviction that,

in order to succeed, the new Union would have to avoid

the tendencies toward economic Balkanization that

had plagued relations among the colonies and later

among the States under the Articles of

Confederation.” Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322,

325 (1979). “One of the major defects of the Articles of

Confederation . . . was the fact that the Articles

essentially left the individual States free to burden

commerce both among themselves and with foreign

countries very much as they pleased.” Michelin Tire

Corp. v. Wages, 423 U.S. 276, 283 (1976).

Yet, Question 3—and ballot initiatives like it—

reinvigorate those isolationist tendencies and

undermine the economic union the Framers created.

“The entire Constitution was ‘framed upon the theory

that the peoples of the several states must sink or

swim together, and that in the long run prosperity and

salvation are in union and not division.’” Healy v. Beer

Inst., Inc., 491 U.S. 324, 336 n.12 (1989) (quoting

Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511, 523

(1935)). Question 3 sows this division in multiple

ways:

First, Question 3, creates a “risk of inconsistent

regulation by different States.” CTS Corp. v.

Dynamics Corp. of Am., 481 U.S. 69, 89 (1987). Here,

Massachusetts’ requirements for pig farms and pork

processors deviate from lawful industry practices

across the country. Massachusetts itself has few hog

farmers or pork producers—most live elsewhere. That

10

means, in effect, that the State is trying to regulate a

market in which it lacks expertise and economic stake.

Iowa, for example, produces a lot of pork. In

2020, the pork industry contributed $40.8 billion in

output, and more than 147,000 jobs to Iowa’s economy.

2020 Iowa Pork Industry Report, at 7 (May 2020),

available at https://perma.cc/8PB8-QYLY. Hogs

generated $893 million in state and local taxes and

$1.3 billion in federal taxes. Id. That same year, Iowa

had more than 5,400 pig farms and housed nearly one

third (almost 25 million) of the nation’s hogs. Id. at 6.

Contrast Iowa with Massachusetts, which

purchases nearly all pork sold within its borders from

other states. Chris Lisinski, New Mass. Law on Pork

Sales Takes Effect This Month (Aug. 8, 2023), NBC

BOSTON, https://perma.cc/24J7-NE2M. Its residents

annually consume 396 million pounds of pork but

produce only 1.9 million in state. Thus, Massachusetts

produces less than one-half of one percent of the pork

it eats. Id. Yet Question 3 directs pork-producing

States to reorganize their industries based on the

“moral” sensibilities of its voters—the equivalent of

Iowa, a land-locked state, passing a law on the

“humane” harvesting of shellfish.

Massachusetts’ unlawful mandate comes at a

cost and affects every link on the supply chain. As

occurred in California after Proposition 12, to continue

selling pork products in New England, “U.S. grocery

retailers, meat wholesalers, and pork processors will

need to split the pork supply chain into two separate

classes of product; 1) pork products that are compliant

with [Massachusetts’s Question 3] and destined only

for that market, and 2) traditional pork products that

make no claims about compliance.” Goodwin, supra,

11

at 3. Those tiers will create artificial scarcity and

skyrocketing prices in New England, while creating an

artificial glut and price collapse in other markets. Id.

at 3–40. The market segmentation directly

undermines the “maintenance of a national economic

union unfettered by state-imposed limitations on

interstate commerce” that the Framers sought to

create. See Healy, 491 U.S. at 335–36 n.12.

Second, upholding Question 3 could drag other

States into a regulatory “race to the bottom” that

extends beyond just pork. As Justice Cardozo once

warned, allowing one state to project its regulation

into another would mean “the door had been opened to

rivalries and reprisals that were meant to be averted

by subjecting commerce between the states to the

power of the nation.” Baldwin, 294 U.S. at 522. For

example, imagine Washington—the State with the

highest minimum wage—refusing to allow sale of

products from States with a lower minimum wage. Or

imagine a State prohibiting “the retail sale of goods

from producers that do not pay for employees’ birth

control or abortions.” Brief of Indiana and 25 Other

States as Amici Curiae, p. 33, NPPC, 598 U.S. 356.

Upholding Question 3 invites States to upend

national markets based on “flavor of the day” policy

preferences and so “effectively force other States to

regulate in accordance with those idiosyncratic state

demands.” NPPC, 598 U.S. at 407 (Kavanaugh, J.,

concurring in part and dissenting in part). State

appeals to health and economic welfare should not

suffice. “To give entrance to that excuse would be to

invite a speedy end to our national solidarity.”

Baldwin, 267 U.S. at 523.

12

Indeed, State efforts to exert unilateral control

over large sectors of the national economy already are

increasingly common. For example, in the field of

energy regulation, Oregon and California regulate

greenhouse gas emissions along the electricity supply

chain leading to those states. Cal. Code. Regs. Tit. 17,

§ 95481; Or. Admin. R. 340-253-0040; see also James

W. Coleman, Importing Energy, Exporting Regulation,

83 Fordham L. Rev. 1357 (2014). And Colorado

regulates the renewable energy portfolios of power

companies selling electricity for the State’s use. Colo.

Rev. Stat. § 40-2-124. Laws and ballot initiatives like

Question 3 thus invite States to revert to a time when

“each state would legislate according to its estimate of

its own interests, the importance of its own products,

and the local advantages or disadvantages of its

position in a political or commercial view.” H.P. Hood

& Sons, Inc. v. Du Mond, 336 U.S. 525, 533 (1949)

(internal quotation omitted).

Third, Massachusetts’ attempt to become the

nation’s pork police reflect similar efforts by other

States that have led to bad results. For example,

California’s energy efficiency efforts show “how even

well-intentioned regulation presents a temptation

toward protectionism.” Coleman, supra, at 1386.

During its implementation, California altered the

standard to break ethanol into two geographic

categories, “California” and “Midwest,” assigning a

higher carbon intensity score to Midwest ethanol

compared to ethanol produced the same way in

California. Id. at 1386–87.

That out-of-State discrimination failed. No

more should this Court affirm Massachusetts’s desire

to be the nation’s pork regulator than it should

13

California’s. That single-State supremacy is not what

the States intended when they joined the

Constitution. Even then, because California could not

stomach such strict regulations on an industry present

in the state “it exempted unconventional oil despite its

similar emissions profile.” Id. at 1387. That served as

the policy’s legal downfall. The pork producers are not

so lucky.

State policy “experiments” like Question 3 are

“fertile ground for protectionist measures that would

at best forfeit the efficiency and reliability benefits of

integrated . . . markets, and at worst, could ignite

state-to-state and even international trade wars.” Id.

at 1399.

III.

QUESTION 3 VIOLATES THE CONSTITUTION.

A. NPPC

Recognized

Alternative

Constitutional Infirmities to State Laws

Like Question 3.

Beyond the Commerce Clause, Question 3, and

other laws like it, may also conflict with other

constitutional provisions such as the Import-Export

Clause and the Full Faith and Credit Clause. See

NPPC, 598 U.S. at 408 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring in

part and dissenting in part).

Under the Import-Export Clause, “No State

shall, without the Consent of the Congress, lay any

Imposts or Duties on Imports or Exports, except what

may be absolutely necessary for executing it’s

inspection laws.” U.S. Const. art. I, § 10, cl. 2. “The

Import-Export Clause was the principal remedy

proposed by the Philadelphia Convention to remedy

the commercial strife that characterized the relations

14

among the states under the Articles of Confederation.”

Boris I. Bittker & Brannon P. Denning, The ImportExport Clause, 68 Miss. L.J. 521, 521 (1998). In

particular, the Clause was designed to stop the

“exploitation of the inland states by the seaboard

states,” which were imposing taxes on arriving goods

destined for other states. Id. at 522.

This Court should return to the Clause’s

original meaning. See Nat’l Pork Producers Council,

598 U.S. at 408 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring in part and

dissenting in part); Comptroller of Treasury of Md. v.

Wynne, 575 U.S. 542, 573 (2015) (Scalia, J.,

dissenting); Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v.

Town of Harrison, 520 U.S. 564, 621–637 (1997)

(Thomas, J., dissenting); Brown v. Maryland, 25 U.S.

419, 438−439, 449 (1827); but see Woodruff v. Parham,

75 U.S. 123 (1869) (limiting the Import-Export Clause

to foreign trade). That type of return means that

discriminatory actions taken by one State to require

regulations in another State could require clearing a

higher hurdle. Indeed, “not all duties were taxes:

Some were imposed not for revenue but merely to

regulate (or effectively prohibit) trade in particular

articles.” Robert G. Natelson, What the Constitution

Means by “Duties, Imposts, and Excises”—and “Taxes”

(Direct or Otherwise), 66 Case W. Rev. 297, 320 (2015).

Justices Scalia and Thomas have explained

that the Import-Export Clause prevents States “from

imposing certain especially burdensome taxes” and

duties on imports from other States and not just from

foreign countries. Wynne, 575 U.S. at 573.

Here, Question 3 conditions the sale of pork on

“the use of preferred farming, manufacturing, or

production practices in another State” where the pork

15

originated. NPPC, 598 U.S. at 408 (Kavanaugh, J.,

concurring in part and dissenting in part); see also

Learning Resources, Inc. v. Trump, 146 S.Ct. 628, 639

(2026). That could be construed as a tax or duty under

the original understanding of the Import-Export

Clause. Because that may conflict with the ImportExport Clause’s original meaning, the issue warrants

reconsideration. See NPPC, 598 U.S. at 408

(Kavanaugh, J., concurring in part and dissenting in

part).

Question 3 may also violate the Full Faith and

Credit Clause, which requires each State to afford

“Full Faith and Credit” to the “public Acts” of “every

other State.” U.S. Const. art. IV, § 1. It prevents States

from “adopting any policy of hostility to the public

Acts” of another State. Carroll v. Lanza, 349 U.S. 408,

413 (1955). According to Justice Kavanaugh, “[a]

State’s effort to regulate farming, manufacturing, and

production practices in another State (in a manner

different from how that other State’s laws regulate

those practices) could in some circumstances raise

questions under that Clause.” NPPC, 598 U.S. at 408

(Kavanaugh, J., concurring in part and dissenting in

part); see also Mark D. Rosen, State Extraterritorial

Powers Reconsidered, 85 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1133,

1151-53 (2010); Douglas Laycock, Equal Citizens of

Equal and Territorial States: The Constitutional

Foundations of Choice of Law, 92 Colum. L. Rev. 249,

290, 296–301 (1992).

While the Full Faith and Credit Clause does not

have so broad a scope as to encompass any law that

has extraterritorial effect, the lower courts can assess

whether the Full Faith and Credit Clause is

implicated when an agricultural regulation conflicts

16

with another State’s laws about how pork may be

produced in that State in the first instance.

Massachusetts created the precise scenario

about which Justice Kavanaugh warns. Question 3

regulates pork production in States, like Iowa, in a

manner different from how those States regulate pork

production. See Elizabeth R. Rumley, States’ Farm

Animal Confinement Statutes, Nat’l Agric. Law Ctr.,

https://perma.cc/C9GZ-PZ3U. Indeed, Question 3

explicitly prohibits certain States from engaging in

otherwise legal practices encouraged by those States’

laws if they want to sell pork in Massachusetts. Mass.

Gen. Laws Ch. 129 App., § 1–3. Thus, the Full Faith

and Credit Clause should preclude Massachusetts

from enacting its agricultural regulations that conflict

with Iowa’s laws and that of other top pork-producing

states.

B. The

Structural

Constitution’s

Extraterritoriality Principle Counsels

Against Applying Question 3 to Out-ofState Pork Producers.

Massachusetts’s law may also violate the

structural constitution’s horizontal separation of

powers principle. See NPPC, 598 U.S. at 376 n.1.

Indeed, this Court regularly invalidates state actions

that exceed “the usual ‘legislative power of a State to

act upon persons and property within the limits of its

own territory,’” see id. at 375 (quoting Hoyt v. Sprague,

103 U.S. 613, 630 (1881)).

While some circuit courts have applied those

principles through the Dormant Commerce Clause,

this Court has also explained that the Full Faith and

Credit Clause and Due Process Clause include those

17

“principles of sovereignty and comity” reflecting the

Constitution’s extraterritoriality principle. See id. at

376; Styczinski v. Arnold, 46 F.4th 907, 913 (2022).

The extraterritoriality principle is one of “many

constitutional doctrines that are not spelled out in the

Constitution but are nevertheless implicit in its

structure and supported by historical practice.”

Franchise Tax Bd. of California v. Hyatt, 587 U.S. 230,

248 (2019) (regarding State sovereign immunity). For

example, the President’s removal power, executive

privilege, and executive immunity are all “historically

rooted principle[s] embedded in the text and structure

of the Constitution.” Id. at 248 (citing cases).

The Constitution’s structure gives each State

sovereignty equal to every other state. That

“‘fundamental principle of equal sovereignty among

the states,’” id. at 246 (quoting Shelby County v.

Holder, 570 U.S. 529, 544 (2013)), is at the core of our

constitutional design. See also Northwest Austin Mun.

Util. Dist. No. One v. Holder, 557 U.S. 193, 203 (2009)

(describing “our historic tradition that States enjoy

equal sovereignty”) (citation modified).

Accordingly, a State’s equal sovereignty under

the Constitution “implie[s] a limitation on the

sovereignty of all of its sister States.” World-Wide

Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 293

(1980).

Still further constitutional sections reinforce

the Constitution’s horizontal federalism and reflect

the inherent territorial limitations on state authority.

The requirement that States respect the sovereignty

of sister states finds expression throughout the

constitution.

18

The Full Faith and Credit Clause, for example,

imposes a “constitutional obligation to enforce the

rights and duties validly created under the laws of

other states.” Hughes v. Fetter, 341 U.S. 609, 611

(1951); U.S. Const. art. IV, § 1 (“Full Faith and Credit

shall be given in each State to the public Acts, Records,

and judicial Proceedings of every other State.”).

The Privileges and Immunities Clause also bars

“discrimination against citizens of other States where

there is no substantial reason for the discrimination

beyond the mere fact that they are citizens of other

States,” Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385, 396 (1948),

thereby “plac[ing] the citizens of each State upon the

same footing with citizens of other States,” Paul v.

Virginia, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168, 180 (1868); U.S. Const.

art. IV, § 2, cl. 1.

The Extradition Clause implies territorial

limits to state power by invoking the concept of a

“State having Jurisdiction of the Crime,” U.S. Const.,

art. IV § 2, cl. 2.

The

Sixth

Amendment

requires

that

defendants receive a trial “by an impartial jury of the

State and district wherein the crime shall have been

committed,” U.S. Const. amend. VI, which limits state

territorial jurisdiction.

And the Dormant Commerce Clause also

policies the proper limits of the Constitution’s

horizontal federalism by prohibiting State laws that

(i) discriminate against out of state economic

interests, in purpose or effect, by benefitting in-state

economic interests while burdening out-of-state

economic interests, Oregon Waste Sys., Inc. v.

Department of Envtl. Quality, 511 U.S. 93, 99 (1994),

19

(ii) impose burdens on interstate commerce that are

“clearly excessive in relation to the putative local

benefits,” Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142

(1970), or (iii) have the effect of regulating commerce

in other States, Healy, 491 U.S. at 336.

The extraterritoriality principle is so

fundamental and firmly rooted in our constitutional

design that it is also found in the jurisprudence of

state supreme courts. Powell v. Khodari-Intergreen

Co., 334 N.W.2d 127, 131 (Iowa 1983) (“It is a

generally recognized principle that a statute of one

state has no extraterritorial effect beyond its

borders.”); Rositzky v. Rositzky, 46 S.W.2d 591, 594

(Mo. 1931) (“[I]t is well to remember that it is the

settled law and almost axiomatic that the statutes of

a state or country prescribe the law within its

boundaries only, and have no extraterritorial force or

effect.”).

Here,

this

Court

should

find

that

Massachusetts’ attempt at extraterritorial regulation

impermissibly burdens her sister States and hold

Question 3 unenforceable as to pork production in

those States.

CONCLUSION

This Court should grant certiorari to reverse

the First Circuit’s judgment.

Respectfully submitted,

BRENNA BIRD

Attorney General

State of Iowa

ERIC WESSAN*

Solicitor General

20

BREANNE STOLTZE

Assistant Solicitor General

(515) 823- 9177

eric.wessan@ag.iowa.gov

March 20, 2025

*Counsel of Record

APPENDIX

APPENDIX TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

Additional Counsel .............................................. 1a

1a

ADDITIONAL COUNSEL

Steve Marshall

Attorney General of

Alabama

Lynn Fitch

Attorney General of

Mississippi

Stephen J. Cox

Attorney General of

Alaska

Catherine Hanaway

Attorney General of

Missouri

Tim Griffin

Attorney General of

Arkansas

Austin Knudsen

Attorney General of

Montana

James Uthmeier

Attorney General of

Florida

Michael T. Hilgers

Attorney General of

Nebraska

Chris Carr

Attorney General of

Georgia

John Formella

Attorney General

New Hampshire

Kris Kobach

Attorney General of

Kansas

Drew Wrigley

Attorney General of

North Dakota

Rusell M. Coleman

Attorney General

Kentucky

Dave Yost

Attorney General of

Ohio

Liz Murrill

Attorney General of

Louisiana

of

Gentner Drummond

Attorney General of

Oklahoma

of

2a

Alan Wilson

Attorney General of

South Carolina

Marty Jackley

Attorney General of

South Dakota

Jonathan Skrmetti

Attorney General of

Tennessee

Ken Paxton

Attorney General

Texas

Derek E. Brown

Attorney General of

Utah

John B. McCuskey

Attorney General of

West Virginia

Keith G. Kautz

Attorney General of

Wyoming

of