Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Nicholas Robles, West Covina Police Officer, et al., Petitioners v. Ronnie Parham

No. 25In the

Supreme Court of the United States

NICHOLAS ROBLES, OFFICER NO. 451, et al.,

Petitioners,

v.

RONNIE PARHAM,

Respondent.

On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the

United States Court of A ppeals for the Ninth Circuit

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Scott Wm. Davenport*

Melissa M. Ballard

Ryan M. A llein

Jones Mayer

3777 North Harbor Boulevard

Fullerton, CA 92835

(714) 446-1400

swd@jones-mayer.com

Attorneys for Petitioners,

Nicholas Robles, et al.

*Counsel of Record

120907

A

(800) 274-3321 • (800) 359-6859

i

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

1. Does probable cause exist to stop, search, arrest,

and prosecute a criminal suspect for evading arrest

where unrefuted video evidence and the suspect’s own

admissions demonstrate that he refused to yield to the

traffic stop, subsequently briefly stopped, and then

accelerated away again?

2. Where an appellate panel is not in agreement

about whether an underlying constitutional violation has

occurred, how can the panel subsequently conclude that

the law is “clearly established” such that a law enforcement

officer is not entitled to qualified immunity for the claimed

constitutional violation?

ii

PARTIES

Petitioners Nicholas Robles, Carlos Gonzalez, Abel

Hernandez, and Matthew Munoz either are currently

or were at the time members of the West Covina Police

Department. Each petitioner was a defendant in the

district court and an appellant in the Ninth Circuit appeal

from which this petition is taken.

Respondent Ronnie Parham was the plaintiff in the

district court and the appellee in the Ninth Circuit.

iii

RELATED PROCEEDINGS

Parham v. City of West Covina, et al., United States

District Court, Central District of California, Case No.

2:21-cv-09114-FLA (GJSx), summary judgment denied

on July 29, 2024.

Parham v. Nicholas Robles, Officer No. 451, et al.,

United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, Case

No. 24-5205, judgment entered on December 18, 2025.

iv

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

QUESTIONS PRESENTED . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . i

PARTIES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ii

RELATED PROCEEDINGS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iii

TABLE OF CONTENTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iv

TABLE OF APPENDICES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vi

TABLE OF CITED AUTHORITIES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vii

OPINIONS AND ORDERS BELOW . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

JURISDICTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

CONST I T U T IONA L A N D STAT U T ORY

PROVISIONS INVOLVED . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

STATEMENT OF THE CASE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

ARGUMENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10

v

Table of Contents

Page

A. Probable Cause Exists to Stop, Search,

Arrest, and Prosecute a Criminal Suspect

for Evading Arrest Where Unrefuted

Video Evidence and the Suspect’s Own

Admissions Demonstrate That He Refused

to Yield to a Traffic Stop, Subsequently

Briefly Stopped, and Then Accelerated

Away Again . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10

B. W here an Appellate Panel is Not in

Agreement About Whether an Underlying

Constitutional Violation Has Occurred,

the Panel Cannot Conclude that the

Law is “Clearly Established” Such that

a Law Enforcement Off icer is NOT

Entitled to Qualified Immunity . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16

vi

TABLE OF APPENDICES

Page

APPENDIX A — MEMORANDUM OPINION

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF

APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

(DECEMBER 18, 2025) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1a

APPENDIX B — ORDER IN THE UNITED

STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DENYING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR

SUMMARY JUDGMENT (JULY 29, 2024) . . . . . 12a

vii

TABLE OF CITED AUTHORITIES

Page

Cases

Ashcroft v. al-Kidd,

563 U.S. 731 (2011) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12

Brinegar v. United States,

338 U.S. 160 (1949) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10

Carrol v. United States,

267 U.S. 132 (1925) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10

Davis v. Scherer,

468 U.S. 183 (1984) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14

District of Columbia v. Wesby,

583 U.S. ___ (2018) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11, 12

Freeman v. City of Santa Ana,

68 F.3d 1180 (9th Cir. 1995) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10

Gasho v. United States,

39 F.3d 1420 (9th Cir. 1994) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10

Harlow v. Fitzgerald,

457 U.S. 800 (1982) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

Hogan v. Carter,

85 F.3d 1113 (11th Cir. 1996) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15, 16

Illinois v. Wardlow,

528 U.S. 119 (2000) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12

viii

Cited Authorities

Page

Jackson v. County of Bremerton,

268 F.3d 646 (9th Cir. 2001) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13, 14

Lassiter v. City of Bremerton,

556 F.3d 1049 (9th Cir. 2009) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10

Malley v. Briggs,

475 U.S. 335 (1986) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14, 16

Maryland v. Pringle,

540 U.S. 366 (2003) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11

Pearson v. Callahan,

555 U.S. 223 (2009) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13, 16

Saucier v. Katz,

533 U.S. 194 (2001) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15

Scott v. Harris,

550 U.S. 372 (2007) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12

South Dakota v. Opperman,

428 U.S. 364 (1976) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11

Stanton v. Sims,

571 U.S. 3 (2013) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15

United States v. Mancera-Londono,

912 F.2d 373 (9th Cir. 1990) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11

ix

Cited Authorities

Page

White v. Pauly,

580 U.S. ___ (2017) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14

Wilson v. Layne,

526 U.S. 603 (1999) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16

Constitutional Provisions

U.S. Const. amend. IV . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1, 2

U.S. Const. amend. XIV . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1, 2

Statutes and Rules

28 U.S.C. § 1254(1) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

42 U.S.C. § 1983 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1, 2, 4

California Vehicle Code § 2800.1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4, 5

Sup. Ct. R. 13.3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

Other Authorities

MAV Dash Cam video

(Click here) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4, 7-11

1

OPINIONS AND ORDERS BELOW

The Ninth Circuit’s unpublished Memorandum

Opinion affirming the denial in part of petitioner’s motion

for summary judgment (App. 1a-11a) is at 2025 U.S. App.

LEXIS 33043.

The district court’s unpublished order denying

petitioner’s motion for summary judgment (App. 12a-34a)

is at 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 133786.

JURISDICTION

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals issued its

Memorandum affirming the district court’s order on

December 18, 2025.

This Court has jurisdiction to review the decision of

the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

by petition for writ of certiorari. 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1).

This petition is being timely filed within 90 days after

the Memorandum Opinion in the Ninth Circuit, pursuant

to United States Supreme Court Rule 13.3.

CONSTITUTIONAL AND

STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED

Respondent’s claims are under the Fourth and

Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United

States and 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

2

The Fourth Amendment states:

The right of the people to be secure in their

persons, houses, papers, and effects, against

unreasonable searches and seizures shall not

be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but

upon probable cause, supported by Oath or

affirmation, a particularly describing the place

to be searched, and the persons or things to be

seized.

Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment states:

All persons born or naturalized in the United

States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof,

are citizens of the United States and of the

state wherein they reside. No State shall

make or enforce any law which shall abridge

the privileges or immunities of citizens of the

United States; nor shall any State deprive any

persons of life, liberty, or property, without due

process of law; nor deny to any person within

its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.

Title 42 U.S. Section 1983 states:

Every person who, under color of any statute,

ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any

State or Territory of the District of Columbia,

subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen

of the United States or other person within the

jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any

rights, privileges, or immunities secured by

the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the

3

party injured in an action at law, suit in equity,

or other proper proceeding for redress, except

that in any action brought against a judicial

officer for an act or omission taken in such

officer’s judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall

not be granted unless a declaratory decree was

violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.

For the purposes of this section, any Act of

Congress applicable exclusively to the District

of Columbia shall be considered to be a statute

of the District of Columbia.

INTRODUCTION

When West Covina Police Officers Nicholas Robles

and Carlos Gonzalez observed Ronnie Parham driving

a vehicle which did not contain front license plates and

appeared to have illegally tinted windows just minutes

before midnight, they decided to perform a traffic stop for

the Vehicle Code violations. Unbeknownst to these officers,

Parham – who had suffered four felony convictions, had

been sentenced to state prison on two separate occasions,

and never completed high school – was apparently not

excited about the prospects of another contact with law

enforcement.

When Officers Robles and Gonzalez activated their

patrol light to initiate the traffic stop, Parham kept

driving and refused to pull over. Then, after pulling over

and stopping briefly, Parham accelerated away from the

officers. This evasive conduct resulted in the transmission

of a “failure to yield” call, the participation of additional

officers in the pursuit, and a “high risk” vehicle stop.

4

Once Parham eventually stopped for a second time, he

was initially compliant. For example, he rolled down his

window, placed his hands outside of the vehicle where they

could be seen, voluntarily exited the vehicle, approached

the officers walking backwards, kneeled on the ground,

and interlocked his fingers behind his head. However, once

a handcuff was applied to Parham’s right wrist, Parham

suddenly stood up and attempted to flee and, as a result,

Sergeant Hernandez and Officer Munoz used minimal

hands-on force to obtain compliance. These events are all

captured on the officers’ MAV Dash Cam system. MAV

Dash Cam video (Click here).1

The officers filed a motion for summary judgment

asserting, inter alia, that Parham had failed to state a

claim on any of his actions under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and the

officers were entitled to qualified immunity. The District

Court denied summary judgment on the use of force issue,

determining that a reasonable jury could conclude that the

post-detention force used was unreasonable. Then, despite

the uncontroverted evidence of Parham’s refusal to yield

that preceded the use of force, the District Court also

denied summary judgment on the false arrest, inventory

search, and malicious prosecution claims. App. 12a-34a.

This finding was made despite Parham’s own admission

that he failed to yield, a violation of California Vehicle

Code § 2800.1. See MAV Dash Cam video (Click here).

1. In connection with the motion for summary judgment,

the officers submitted a video taken from the MAV Dash Camera.

3-E.R.-554. On appeal, the parties submitted a joint motion to

transmit physical exhibits to the Ninth Circuit. App. Dkt. 15. For

the convenience of the Court, hypertext links to this evidence have

been included throughout this petition.

5

The District Court also denied summary judgment on

Parham’s deliberate indifference to a medical need claim.

On appeal, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the denial of

summary judgment on all grounds; however, Circuit Judge

Miller issued a pithy dissent on the wrongful arrest claim,

stating:

The officers arrested Parham for violating

California Vehicle Code section 2800.1(a), which

provides for the punishment of “[a]ny person

who, while operating a motor vehicle and with

the intent to evade, willfully flees or otherwise

attempts to elude a pursuing peace officer’s

motor vehicle.” Parham does not dispute that

after seeing the flashing lights on a marked

police car, he pulled over and came to a brief

stop, only to pull away again and drive off. At

that moment, the officers had probable cause

to believe that he violated the statute. App. 9a

(emphasis added).

Moreover, Judge Miller expressly noted that no case

authority existed which would put the officers on notice

that their conduct was unconstitutional and, therefore, the

officer should have been entitled to qualified immunity on

the wrongful arrest claim. App. 11a. And, although Judge

Miller limited his dissent to the issue of wrongful arrest,

his analysis should apply equally to the search, seizure,

and malicious prosecutions claims. This Court should so

clarify.

Finally, this divided panel opinion outlines another

problematic and unfortunate occurrence which continues

6

to rear its head in various circuit courts, in general,

and the Ninth Circuit, in particular. Namely, where an

appellate panel is not in agreement about whether an

underlying constitutional violation has occurred, how

can it subsequently conclude that the law is “clearly

established” such that a law enforcement officer is not

entitled to qualified immunity? Such a ruling holds officers

to a standard upon which circuit judges cannot even agree.

Surely, this is not the state of the law, nor should it be.

Simply stated, the uncontroverted facts demonstrate

that Parham’s arrest, the subsequent search of his vehicle,

and his ultimate prosecution were based on probable

cause. As such, Parham’s claims fail as a matter of law.

And, because a split of authority existed at the circuit

level as to whether a constitutional violation occurred, the

officers should have been entitled to qualified immunity.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

On August 18, 2018, at approximately 11:30 p.m., West

Covina Police Officer Nicholas Robles and his partner

Officer Carlos Gonzalez were on routine patrol when they

observed Parham driving a vehicle near the intersection of

Francisquito and Lark Ellen in West Covina, California.

Parham, who had suffered four felony convictions and

who had been sentenced to state prison on two separate

occasions, never completed high school and did most of

his schooling while incarcerated.

As Officers Robles and Gonzalez approached Parham’s

vehicle from the opposite direction, they observed that

Parham’s vehicle did not have a front license plate and

had what appeared to be illegal tinting. Officer Gonzalez

7

performed a U-turn and began to effectuate a traffic stop.

Officer Gonzalez activated the MAV Dash Cam system

while Officer Robles broadcast a traffic stop over the police

radio. MAV Dash Cam video (Click here) at 0:00-7:27.

After Officer Gonzalez activated his lights, Parham

did not stop and, instead, made a turn down Valinda Street

and continued to drive southbound. Parham admits that as

he turned onto Valinda he saw the officers’ lights but did

not pull over. As the officers continued to follow Parham

with their lights activated, Parham then made a right turn

on Doublegrove Street, stopped his vehicle momentarily,

and then accelerated away. MAV Dash Cam video (Click

here) at 0:50.

Once Parham accelerated away, Officer Gonzalez

activated his sirens. Officer Robles made a second police

broadcast that Parham had failed to yield to the traffic

stop, an action which resulted in the interaction being

treated as a “high risk” stop. After the “failure to yield”

call was made, Sergeant Abel Hernandez and Officer

Mathew Munoz joined the pursuit. Parham proceeded

down Doublegrove Street for approximately one minute

covering less than a mile at speeds of approximately 20

to 35 mph before pulling over a second time. MAV Dash

Cam video (Click here) at 1:35.

Once Parham stopped his vehicle for the second

time, Officer Gonzalez ordered him to roll down his

window and place his hands outside where they could be

seen, an order with which Parham complied. MAV Dash

Cam video (Click here) at 1:47-4:47. After backup units

arrived, Officer Gonzalez ordered Parham to step out of

his vehicle, an order with which Parham complied. MAV

8

Dash Cam video (Click here) at 4:48-5:13. Officer Robles

then ordered Parham to face away and walk toward the

officers backwards, an order with which Parham complied.

MAV Dash Cam video (Click here) at 5:14-5:32.

Sergeant Hernandez then took over and ordered

Parham to kneel on the ground and interlock his fingers

behind his head, an order with which Parham complied.

MAV Dash Cam video (Click here) at 5:30-5:41. Sergeant

Hernandez placed one handcuff on Parham’s wrist, an

action which Parham did not resist. Sergeant Hernandez

then attempted to bring Parham’s hands behind his back

while Parham was still in the kneeling position so that he

could apply the second handcuff.

As Sergeant Hernandez was attempting to apply

the second handcuff, Parham suddenly stood up and

attempted to pull away. MAV Dash Cam video (Click

here) at 5:42. When Parham stood up with handcuffs only

fastened to one wrist, Sergeant Hernandez grabbed him

and pulled him to the ground. MAV Dash Cam video (Click

here) at 5:44. After a brief struggle of approximately 30

to 45 seconds, Parham was handcuffed. MAV Dash Cam

video (Click here) at 5:44-6:17. As Parham was taken to

the ground, he continued to physically resist attempts to

be handcuffed.

During the struggle, neither Officer Gonzalez nor

Officer Robles used any force to attempt to subdue

Parham; however, Officer Munoz delivered four closed-fist

strikes on the shoulder in an attempt to obtain compliance

and Sergeant Hernandez placed a knee on Parham’s back

in an attempt to prevent him from standing up. MAV Dash

Cam video (Click here) at 5:44-6:17.

9

After Parham was handcuffed and arrested, officers

performed an inventory search of Parham’s vehicle and

impounded it. Parham was then transported to a local

hospital where he refused medical treatment.

As a result of these events, on October 11, 2018,

Parham was charged with two misdemeanor counts

of evading arrest and resisting arrest. However, on

November 22, 2019, Parham was found not guilty of these

charges.

On November 21, 2021, Parham filed a complaint

alleging various federal claims arising out of his arrest for

evading arrest. After discovery was complete, petitioners

filed a motion for summary judgment and, on July 29, 2024,

the District Court entered an order denying summary

judgment in its entirety. App. 12a-34a.

On appeal, a majority of the panel issued an eightpage, unpublished, Memorandum Opinion (App. 1a-8a)

which stated that viewing the evidence in the light most

favorable to Parham, the officers used excessive force

and did so in violation of clearly established law. Notably,

however, the opinion also included a dissent authored by

Judge Miller which concluded that the officers should

have been entitled to summary judgment on the wrongful

arrest claim based on the presence of probable cause

and, since the law was not clearly established, under the

doctrine of qualified immunity. App. 8a-11a.

10

ARGUMENT

A. Probable Cause Exists to Stop, Search, Arrest, and

Prosecute a Criminal Suspect for Evading Arrest

Where Unrefuted Video Evidence and the Suspect’s

Own Admissions Demonstrate That He Refused

to Yield to a Traffic Stop, Subsequently Briefly

Stopped, and Then Accelerated Away Again

P r obable c au se e x i st s wher e t he fa c t s a nd

circumstances within an officer’s knowledge of which they

had reasonably trustworthy information are sufficient

in themselves to warrant a man of reasonable caution in

the belief that an offense has been or is being committed.

Carrol v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 162 (1925). Probable

cause means less than evidence that would justify a

conviction. Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175

(1949). Even an acquittal would not be evidence of a lack of

probable cause. Id. Thus, the mere fact that a prosecution

was unsuccessful does not mean that it was not supported

by probable cause. Freeman v. City of Santa Ana, 68 F.3d

1180, 1189 (9thCir. 1995). Probable cause is an absolute

defense to malicious prosecution claims. Lassiter v. City

of Bremerton, 556 F.3d 1049, 1054-1055 (9th Cir. 2009).

Moreover, probable cause to justify an arrest may exist for

a closely related offense other than the one charged. Gasho

v. United States, 39 F.3d 1420, 1428, n. 6 (9th Cir. 1994).

In this case, the uncontroverted facts demonstrate

that Parham failed to yield when the officers initially

attempted to perform a traffic stop and then, after

stopping briefly, that Parham accelerated away again,

resulting in a “failure to yield” transmission and creating

11

a “high risk” stop. See MAV Dash Cam video (Click here)

at 0:50. Indeed, Parham himself admitted these actions.

As such, there was clearly probable cause to arrest and

prosecute him for his own admitted actions.

Similarly, given that Parham’s vehicle was properly

impounded incident to his arrest, there was also good

cause to perform an inventory search of the contents of

his vehicle. South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 367

(1976); United States v. Mancera-Londono, 912 F.2d 373,

375 (9th Cir. 1990).

Despite this black letter law and undisputed facts,

both the District Court and the Ninth Circuit denied

summary judgment under the theory that a reasonable

jury could believe that Parham did not attempt to evade

arrest prior to being removed from the car. Both courts

also concluded that because a jury could so conclude,

summary judgment must also be denied regarding the

constitutionality of Parham’s subsequent arrest and

prosecution. Not so.

There is no legal authority for the position that a suspect

can refuse to yield to an officer and/or drive away from an

initial stop if he is doing so to park in front of a relative’s

house. This argument strains credibility. Moreover, it

must be remembered that probable cause examines the

events leading up to an arrest from the standpoint of an

objectively reasonable police officer. Maryland v. Pringle,

540 U.S. 366, 371 (2003). As the Court noted in Wesby,

officers are entitled to make reasonable inferences based

on the totality of the circumstances. District of Columbia

v. Wesby, 583 U.S. ___, 57 (2018).

12

Moreover, this Court has repeatedly held that

unprovoked f lights are “certainly suggestive” of

wrongdoing and can be treated as “suspicious behavior”

that factors into the totality of the circumstances. Illinois

v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 124-125 (2000).

Given Parham’s erratic actions of repeated flight, his

behavior certainly qualified as “suspicious,” warranting

not only his arrest, but the search and seizure of his

automobile. A valid concern existed regarding the possible

contents of Parham’s vehicle which would cause him to

attempt to evade arrest. However, in this case, the Courts

bypassed the proper search and seizure of the car incident

to Parham’s arrest and, instead, relied on an impound

statute based on the “community caretaker” function.

This was clear error.

Where, as here, the uncontroverted facts demonstrate

that probable cause existed and where the lower court

erred on both the merits of the constitutional claim and the

question of qualified immunity, the Court has the ability

to correct errors at each step. District of Columbia v.

Wesby, 583 U.S. at 62; Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731,

735 (2011). This Court should do so.

Finally, one last issue warrants comment. The

Courts’ orders in this case seem to imply that some sort

of issue of fact exists despite Parham’s own admissions

on the uncontroverted video evidence. These rulings fly

in the face of Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380 (2007), in

which Justice Scalia, writing for a majority of this Court,

concluded that facts on summary judgment should be

viewed in the light depicted in the videotape. However,

both the District Court’s order and the Ninth Circuit’s

13

majority opinion are contrary to this doctrine. This

Court can and should mark a brighter line on the use of

undisputed video evidence and provide further instruction

to courts of inferior jurisdiction on this critical issue.

B. Where an Appellate Panel is Not in Agreement

About Whether an Underlying Constitutional

Violation Has Occurred, the Panel Cannot

Conclude that the Law is “Clearly Established”

Such that a Law Enforcement Officer is NOT

Entitled to Qualified Immunity

The law is clear that qualified immunity protects

government officials from suit under federal law claims

if “their conduct does not violate clearly established

statutory or constitutional rights or which a reasonable

person would have known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S.

800, 818 (1982). “The protection of qualified immunity

applies regardless of whether the government official’s

error is ‘a mistake of law, a mistake of fact, or a mistake

based on mixed questions of law and fact.’” Pearson

v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 230 (2009) (emphasis added).

To evaluate qualified immunity, a court must first

decide whether the facts show that the government

official’s conduct violated a constitutional right. Jackson v.

County of Bremerton, 268 F.3d 646 (9th Cir. 2001). Second,

a court decides whether the government official could

nevertheless have reasonably but mistakenly believed

that his or her conduct did not violate a clearly established

right. Id. However, the court may skip the first step and

proceed to the second. Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. at

227.

14

This Court has recently clarified that a government

official is entitled to qualified immunity from suit/

liability where, at the time of the conduct, there was no

prior precedent or case law with facts specifically and

substantially identical to the facts of the incident at issue

which would have put the defendant on notice that his or

her conduct was unconstitutional. White v. Pauly, 580

U.S. ___, 79 (2017) (“clearly established law” should

not be defined “at a high level of generality” but must be

“particularized” to the facts of the case). This Court has

emphasized this point again and again, because qualified

immunity is important to society as a whole and because

the immunity from suit is effectively lost if a case is

erroneously permitted to go to trial. Id. at 551-555.

Under the doctrine of qualified immunity, if a

government official’s mistake as to what the law requires is

reasonable, the government official is entitled to qualified

immunity. Davis v. Scherer, 468 U.S. 183, 205 (1984).

Moreover, this doctrine is sweeping in scope and designed

to protect “all but the plainly incompetent or those who

knowingly violate the law.” Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S.

335, 341 (1986).

Applying the two-pronged qualified immunity

analysis, this Court must first look to whether the officers’

conduct violated a constitutional right. Jackson, 268

F.3d at 646. However, there is no relevant case authority

which holds that the officers’ conduct in this matter was

constitutionally deficient.

In this case, the Ninth Circuit could not agree as

to whether an underlying constitutional violation had

occurred. Specifically, Judge Miller determined that no

15

underlying constitutional violation had occurred with

respect to the wrongful arrestee claim because the

uncontroverted facts demonstrated that probable cause

existed. App. 8a-11a. This analysis is also applicable to

Parham’s claims of an illegal stop, search, and malicious

prosecution. Notwithstanding – and despite Judge Miller’s

clear statement that no prior case authority existed which

would “clearly establish” that the officers were on notice

that their conduct was unconstitutional – the panel held

that the officers were not entitled to qualified immunity.

This ruling cannot withstand serious scrutiny.

As stated above, “[t]he relevant dispositive inquiry

in determining whether a right is clearly established is

whether it would be clear to a reasonable officer that his

conduct was unlawful in the situation he confronted.”

Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 202 (2001). Although this

Court “‘do[es] not require a case directly on point’ before

concluding that the law is clearly established . . . ‘existing

precedent must have placed the statutory or constitutional

question beyond debate.’” Stanton v. Sims, 571 U.S. 3, 6

(2013) (emphasis added).

Here, contrary to the majority’s conclusion, the law

is not “clearly established” and, indeed, the panel could

not agree amongst itself as to whether a constitutional

violation had occurred. “Although there might be instances

where a reasonable jurist, but not a reasonable official,

would consider particular conduct violative of clearly

established law, if a reasonable jurist would not have

viewed the defendant’s action as violative of clearly

established law, then it necessarily follows that the

reasonable officer likewise would not have viewed that

conduct as violative of clearly established law.” Hogan

16

v. Carter, 85 F.3d 1113, 1116 n. 3 (11th Cir. 1996) (emphasis

added). As this Court stated, “If judges thus disagree on

a constitutional question, it is unfair to subject police

to money damages for picking the losing side of the

controversy.” Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 618 (1999)

(emphasis added).

Given the lack of unanimity in the Memorandum

Opinion, it is not reasonable to hold a law enforcement

officer to a standard which circuit judges cannot even

achieve. Moreover, even if one could argue that the law

was clearly established (which it was not), to the extent

that the officers were wrong about either the nature of

the law or whether Parham constituted a threat, they are

nonetheless entitled to qualified immunity. The doctrine

is sweeping in scope and designed to protect “all but the

plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the

law.” Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. at 341.

In sum, because the Circuit Court did not agree

on whether an underlying constitutional violation had

occurred, the officers should have been entitled to qualified

immunity. Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. at 341; Pearson v.

Callahan, 555 U.S. at 320. Based on this fundamental

error, a writ of certiorari is warranted.

CONCLUSION

This Court should issue the requested writ of

certiorari in order to clarify to lower courts: (1) that

probable cause exists to stop, search, arrest and prosecute

a criminal suspect for evading arrest where he refused

to yield to the traffic stop, subsequently briefly stopped,

and then accelerated away again; and (2) that where an

17

appellate panel is not in agreement about whether an

underlying constitutional violation has occurred, the panel

may not conclude that the law is “clearly established” for

the purpose of denying qualified immunity.

Respectfully submitted,

Scott Wm. Davenport*

Melissa M. Ballard

Ryan M. A llein

Jones Mayer

3777 North Harbor Boulevard

Fullerton, CA 92835

(714) 446-1400

swd@jones-mayer.com

Attorneys for Petitioners,

Nicholas Robles, et al.

*Counsel of Record

APPENDIX

i

TABLE OF APPENDICES

Page

APPENDIX A — MEMORANDUM OPINION

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF

APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

(DECEMBER 18, 2025) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1a

APPENDIX B — ORDER IN THE UNITED

STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DENYING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR

SUMMARY JUDGMENT (JULY 29, 2024) . . . . . 12a

1a

A

APPENDIX A —Appendix

MEMORANDUM

OPINION

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT (DECEMBER 18, 2025)

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

No. 24-5205

D.C. No. 2:21-cv-09114-FLA-GJS

RONNIE PARHAM,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

NICHOLAS ROBLES, OFFICER NO. 451;

CARLOS GONZALEZ, OFFICER NO. 444;

ABEL HERNANDEZ, OFFICER NO. 395;

MATTHEW MUNOZ, OFFICER NO. 445,

Defendants-Appellants.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Central District of California

Fernando L. Aenlle-Rocha, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted November 21, 2025

Pasadena, California

Filed December 18, 2025

Before: BERZON, N.R. SMITH, and MILLER, Circuit

Judges.

2a

Appendix A

Partial Concurrence and Partial Dissent by Judge

MILLER.

MEMORANDUM1

West Covina Police Department officers, Nicholas

Robles, Carlos Gonzalez, Abel Hernandez, and Matthew

Munoz (collectively, “WCPD Officers”), appeal from the

district court’s denial of summary judgment based on

qualified immunity in this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action. We

review the district court’s order de novo, “assuming all

factual disputes are resolved, and all reasonable inferences

are drawn, in plaintiff’s favor.” Peck v. Montoya, 51 F.4th

877, 884–85 (9th Cir. 2022) (citation omitted). We affirm.

1. On an interlocutory appeal from the denial of

qualified immunity, we have jurisdiction “to resolv[e] a

defendant’s purely legal contention that his or her conduct

did not violate the Constitution and, in any event, did not

violate clearly established law.” Est. of Anderson v. Marsh,

985 F.3d 726, 731 (9th Cir. 2021) (citation modified). In

such a procedural stance, we generally “lack jurisdiction”

over arguments that “the evidence is insufficient to

raise a genuine issue of material fact.” Id. The court

may, however, “view[] the facts in the light depicted by”

video evidence for purposes of qualified immunity if the

plaintiff’s version of the event is “blatantly contradicted”

or “utterly discredited” by the video evidence. Scott v.

1. This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is

not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

3a

Appendix A

Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380–81, 127 S. Ct. 1769, 167 L. Ed.

2d 686 (2007).

Based on video evidence, the WCPD Officers ask this

court to overturn the district court’s determination that

there are genuine issues of fact as to whether Parham

evaded or resisted arrest and as to the level of force used

by the WCPD Officers. But having reviewed the video

evidence, we conclude that it is unclear as to the evasion

and force issues, and so not within Scott’s “blatantly

contradicted” exception. We therefore “view the facts in

the light most favorable” to Parham on each of his § 1983

claims. Rosenbaum v. City of San Jose, 107 F.4th 919, 922

(9th Cir. 2024).

2. We affirm the district court’s denial of qualified

immunity to the WCPD Officers on Parham’s excessive

force claim. Parham maintains that he was not evading

arrest by driving safely for less than a minute to his

grandfather’s house after having initially pulled over.

The WCPD Officers do not dispute that, after Parham

pulled over, he complied with all commands up until being

handcuffed and did not threaten the arresting officers.

Parham and his sister testified that while handcuffing

him, the officers forcefully pulled Parham upwards and

slammed him to the ground, where he was then kicked,

punched, kneed, and struck with a baton violently for a

minute and a half. The district court held that the evidence

raised a genuine issue of material fact as to whether

Parham had attempted to flee or resist arrest.

4a

Appendix A

Resolving all factual disputes in favor of Parham,

the constitutional question is whether the use of force on

Parham when he was not resisting arrest was excessive.

A reasonable jury could find that the use of force was

excessive based on the factors we outlined in Rice v.

Morehouse, 989 F.3d 1112, 1121 (9th Cir. 2021). We have

previously stated that similar conduct, when applied to an

individual who is “unarmed, posed no threat to anyone,

and w[as] not engaged in any criminal activity,” would

constitute sufficient force to permit a jury to reasonably

conclude it was excessive. Nicholson v. City of Los

Angeles, 935 F.3d 685, 691 (9th Cir. 2019); Blankenhorn

v. City of Orange, 485 F.3d 463, 479–80 (9th Cir. 2007).

This constitutional violation was clearly established at

the time. See Nicholson, 935 F.3d at 691; Rice, 989 F.3d

at 1125–1126. 2 We therefore affirm the denial of qualified

immunity on the excessive force claim.

3. We also affirm the district court’s denial of qualified

immunity to the WCPD Officers on Parham’s claim for

unlawful arrest. The WCPD Officers predicate their

probable cause on a violation of Cal. Vehicle Code Section

2800.1(a), which requires that, to be held criminally liable,

an individual must have an “intent to evade” a pursuing

police officer in a motor vehicle. Where a party claims

2. The WCPD Officers fail to present any argument as to

how the district court erred in denying summary judgment on

the failure to intervene claim. Therefore, the claim is waived.

Tri-Valley Cares v. United States Dept. of Energy, 671 F.3d 1113,

1130 (9th Cir. 2012).

5a

Appendix A

that they were subject to an unlawful arrest or detention,

the qualified immunity analysis asks “(1) whether there

was probable cause for the arrest; and (2) whether it is

reasonably arguable that there was probable cause for

arrest.” Rosenbaum v. Washoe Cnty., 663 F.3d 1071, 1076

(9th Cir. 2011) (emphasis in original).

Parham contends that he was not evading arrest by

continuing to drive safely to his grandfather’s house after

having initially pulled over and then fully complying with

all commands given to him. Whether there is probable

cause for an arrest “depends upon the reasonable

conclusion to be drawn from the facts known to the

arresting officer at the time of the arrest.” Devenpeck

v. Alford, 543 U.S. 146, 152, 125 S. Ct. 588, 160 L. Ed.

2d 537 (2004) (emphasis added). The district court held

that a reasonable jury could conclude at the time of the

arrest, “the Officer Defendants did not reasonably suspect

Plaintiff [had been] evading or resisting arrest.” Resolving

all factual disputes in favor of Parham, we agree that the

WCPD Officers lacked probable cause to arrest Parham,

thereby committing a constitutional violation sufficient for

the first step of the qualified immunity analysis.

As to second step, accepting Parham’s version of

events, it is not “reasonably arguable” that at the time of

the arrest, the officers could have reasonably concluded

that they had probable cause to believe that Parham had

intentionally evaded arrest. He pulled over briefly and then

drove in a controlled manner to his nearby grandfather’s

6a

Appendix A

house. Once there, over a period of four minutes, he fully

complied will all officer commands. Accepting these facts

as true, the WCPD Officers could not reasonably conclude

that they had probable cause to believe Parham acted at

any point with an “intent to evade” arrest, as required

by Cal. Vehicle Code Section 2800.1(a). Rosenbaum, 663

F.3d at 1076.

4. We affirm the district court’s denial of qualified

immunity to the WCPD Officers on Parham’s claim for

malicious prosecution. “A police officer who maliciously

or recklessly makes false reports to the prosecutor may

be held liable for damages incurred as a proximate result

of those reports.” Blankenhorn, 485 F.3d at 482. Parham

alleges that, after he was arrested without probable

cause, Officers Hernandez and Munoz filed false reports

indicating that Parham “attempted to flee when abruptly

standing up during handcuffing and thereafter resisted

arrest,” and that these false reports resulted in his

prosecution. Accepting Parham’s version of events, these

actions amount to a violation of Parham’s constitutional

rights. Further, the Ninth Circuit has clearly established

that it is a constitutional violation for an officer to cite a

suspect based on a knowingly false report while aware

that a prosecutor would rely on the report to file charges.

See Blankenhorn, 485 F.3d at 480–84 (reversing summary

judgment finding on malicious prosecution claim and

finding that qualified immunity did not apply).

5. We affirm the district court’s denial of qualified

immunity to the WCPD Officers on Parham’s illegal search

7a

Appendix A

claim. Parham asserts that the officers lacked authority to

undertake a warrantless search of his vehicle for evidence

because (1) there was no basis for believing there was

evidence of a crime in the vehicle, United States v. Rodgers,

656 F.3d 1023, 1028 (9th Cir. 2011) (citing United States v.

Brooks, 610 F.3d 1186, 1193 (9th Cir. 2010)); (2) there was

no basis for a search incident to arrest because Parham

was out of the car handcuffed at the time of the search and

so had no access to anything in the car, id. at 1024 (citing

Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 351, 129 S. Ct. 1710, 173

L. Ed. 2d 485 (2009)); and (3) the officers did not present

evidence in the district court that they complied with the

necessary protocols for conducting an inventory search,

United States v. Caseres, 533 F.3d 1064, 1074–75 (9th Cir.

2008). Resolving these disputes in Parham’s favor, the

district court held that a jury could conclude the officers

conducted an unconstitutional search of Parham’s vehicle.

For purposes of qualified immunity on appeal, the lack of

compliance with any standard permitting a warrantless

search is a constitutional violation clearly established by

Ninth Circuit and Supreme Court precedent. Rodgers,

656 F.3d at 1024 (citing Carroll, 267 U.S. 132, 160–62, 45

S. Ct. 280, 69 L. Ed. 543, T.D. 3686 (1925); and California

v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 390, 105 S. Ct. 2066, 85 L. Ed.

2d 406 (1985)).

6. We affirm the district court’s denial of qualified

immunity to the WCPD Officers on Parham’s claim for

deliberate indifference to Parham’s medical needs. It is

undisputed that Parham was injured during his arrest,

8a

Appendix A

and that Officer Robles, Officer Gonzalez, and Sergeant

Hernandez transported him to the hospital. Parham

testified that he did not refuse medical treatment.

The parties do not dispute that the three officers who

had taken him to the hospital transported him from the

hospital to the police station with the knowledge that he

had yet to receive medical treatment. The district court

held that a “reasonable jury could determine Officers

Hernandez, Robles, and Gonzalez prevented Plaintiff from

being treated at the hospital in violation of his Fourteenth

Amendment right.” Resolving all factual disputes in favor

of Parham, the WCPD Officers violated Parham’s right

to receive medical treatment by removing him from the

hospital and taking him to the police station. And we have

clearly established that a government official cannot deny,

delay, or intentionally interfere with medical treatment.

See Sandoval v. Cnty. of San Diego, 985 F.3d 657, 679 (9th

Cir. 2021); see also Clement v. Gomez, 298 F.3d 898, 906

(9th Cir. 2002).

AFFIRMED.

MILLER, Circuit Judge, concurring in part and

dissenting in part:

I join the court’s disposition except as to part 3.

I agree that the defendant officers are not entitled to

qualified immunity on the claims for excessive force,

unlawful search, malicious prosecution, and deliberate

9a

Appendix A

indifference. But I would reverse the district court’s denial

of qualified immunity on the claim for unlawful arrest.

“If an officer has probable cause to believe that an

individual has committed even a very minor criminal

offense in his presence, he may, without violating the

Fourth Amendment, arrest the offender.” Atwater v.

City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 354, 121 S. Ct. 1536,

149 L. Ed. 2d 549 (2001). Probable cause “requires only a

probability or substantial chance of criminal activity, not

an actual showing of such activity.” Illinois v. Gates, 462

U.S. 213, 243 n.13, 103 S. Ct. 2317, 76 L. Ed. 2d 527 (1983).

The standard “is not a high bar.” Kaley v. United States,

571 U.S. 320, 338, 134 S. Ct. 1090, 188 L. Ed. 2d 46 (2014).

The officers arrested Parham for violating California

Vehicle Code section 2800.1(a), which provides for the

punishment of “[a]ny person who, while operating a motor

vehicle and with the intent to evade, willfully flees or

otherwise attempts to elude a pursuing peace officer’s

motor vehicle.” Parham does not dispute that after seeing

the flashing lights on a marked police car, he pulled over

and came to a brief stop, only to pull away again and drive

off. At that moment, the officers had probable cause to

believe that he had violated the statute. Of course, they

lacked direct evidence that he had “the intent to evade.”

But intent can be inferred from circumstantial evidence,

and the officers could reasonably have inferred it from his

driving away after stopping. See People v. Johnson, 32 Cal.

App. 5th 26, 243 Cal. Rptr. 3d 586, 614 (Ct. App. 2019).

10a

Appendix A

Parham emphasizes that his flight soon came to an

end when he stopped near his grandfather’s house and

submitted to arrest. But that does not show that he lacked

an intent to evade when he first drove away. If he had such

an intent, the offense was completed at that moment, and

a later change of heart would not undo it, or else no one

could ever be guilty of violating section 2800.1(a) as long

as he eventually surrendered. Nor does it matter that

Parham drove in a controlled manner and under the speed

limit—that, too, is consistent with an intent to violate

section 2800.1(a). (Just ask O.J. Simpson.)

To be sure, the officers could have accepted Parham’s

explanation for his actions. But the Supreme Court has

emphatically rejected the suggestion that a court assessing

probable cause can “dismiss outright any circumstances

that [are] susceptible of innocent explanation.” District

of Columbia v. Wesby, 583 U.S. 48, 61, 138 S. Ct. 577, 199

L. Ed. 2d 453 (2018) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Instead, the question before us is “whether a reasonable

officer could conclude—considering all of the surrounding

circumstances, including the plausibility of the explanation

itself—that there was a ‘substantial chance of criminal

activity.’” Id. (quoting Gates, 462 U.S. at 244 n.13). A

reasonable officer could have concluded exactly that.

Even if we were to determine that the officers lacked

probable cause, that would not be sufficient to deny

qualified immunity. Officers are entitled to qualified

immunity unless they violated a constitutional right and

11a

Appendix A

the right was “clearly established at the time.” Reichle

v. Howards, 566 U.S. 658, 664, 132 S. Ct. 2088, 182 L.

Ed. 2d 985 (2012). “The ‘clearly established’ standard

. . . requires that the legal principle clearly prohibit the

officer’s conduct in the particular circumstances before

him.” Wesby, 583 U.S. at 63. That standard demands “a

high ‘degree of specificity,’” and the Supreme Court has

“stressed that the ‘specificity’ of the rule is ‘especially

important in the Fourth Amendment context.’” Id. at

63–64 (quoting Mullenix v. Luna, 577 U.S. 7, 12–13, 136

S. Ct. 305, 193 L. Ed. 2d 255 (2015) (per curiam)).

Neither Parham nor the court identifies any case

establishing that the officers lacked probable cause in

these circumstances. They cite no cases involving section

2800.1(a) or any similar statute; instead, they cite only

cases setting out the general standard of probable cause.

Those cases do not come close to placing “the lawfulness

of the particular arrest ‘beyond debate.’” Wesby, 583 U.S.

at 64 (quoting Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 741, 131

S. Ct. 2074, 179 L. Ed. 2d 1149 (2011)) (emphasis added).

12a

Appendix

B UNITED STATES

APPENDIX B — ORDER

IN THE

DISTRICT COURT FOR THE CENTRAL DISTRICT

OF CALIFORNIA DENYING DEFENDANTS’

MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (JULY 29, 2024)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

Case No. 2:21-cv-09114-FLA (GJSx)

RONNIE PARHAM,

Plaintiff,

v.

CITY OF WEST COVINA, et al.,

Defendants.

Filed July 29, 2024

ORDER DENYING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION

FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT [DKT. 45]

RULING

Before the court is City of West Covina (“City”) and

Officers N. Robles (“Officer Robles”), Carlos Gonzalez

(“Officer Gonzalez”), A. Hernandez (“Officer Hernandez”),

and Matthew Muñoz’s (“Officer Muñoz”) (together,

“Officer Defendants”)1 Motion for Summary Judgment

1. The court refers to the City and Officer Defendants

collectively as “Defendants.”

13a

Appendix B

(“Motion”). Dkt. 45 (“Mot.”). Plaintiff Ronnie Parham

(“Plaintiff” or “Parham”) opposes the Motion. Dkt. 48

(“Opp’n”). On January 31, 2024, the court found the Motion

appropriate for resolution without oral argument and

vacated the respective hearing. See Dkt. 55; Fed. R. Civ.

P. 78(b); Local Rule 7-15.

For the reasons stated below, the court DENIES the

Motion.

BACKGROUND

I.

Factual Background

The following facts are undisputed unless stated

otherwise. On August 18, 2018, officers of the West Covina

Police Department (“WCPD”) initiated a traffic stop of

Plaintiff for missing a front license plate and having tinted

windows. Dkt. 54-1 (“PSF”) ¶¶ 1, 7. Plaintiff pulled over

briefly, but never fully stopped, and then drove a few more

blocks over a period of approximately 60 seconds and

parked in front of his grandparents’ house. Id. ¶¶ 8–15; see

also Dkt. 45-9, available at https://tinyurl.com/ParhamDashcam-Vid (“Dashcam Vid.”)2 at 0:44–1:41.

Officers ordered Plaintiff to roll down his windows

and stick his hands out of the car, which Plaintiff did.

PSF ¶ 15; Dashcam Vid. at 1:42–4:48. Several minutes

later, an officer ordered Plaintiff to exit the car and walk

backwards toward the officers with his hands up, and

2. The video has no audio.

14a

Appendix B

Plaintiff complied. PSF ¶¶ 16–18; Dashcam Vid. at 4:48–

5:25. Officer Hernandez then ordered Plaintiff to get on

his knees and interlace his fingers behind his head. PSF

¶ 19; Dashcam Vid. at 5:25–5:33. Plaintiff was compliant

and did not resist Officer Hernandez. PSF ¶¶ 20–22;

Dashcam Vid. at 5:33–5:40.

The parties dispute what happened next, and it is

unclear from the dashcam video. See Dashcam Vid. at

5:40–5:45. Plaintiff contends Officer Hernandez grabbed

Plaintiff’s left arm, pulled his body upward by his

wrists, and slammed him to the ground. PSF ¶¶ 23–24.

Defendants contend that, while Officer Hernandez was

attempting to apply the second handcuff, Plaintiff stood

up and attempted to escape, causing Officer Hernandez

to grab and pull him to the ground. Dkt. 50 (“DSF”)

¶¶ 18–20.

Thereafter, a struggle ensued that lasted approximately

30 seconds and cannot be seen clearly on the dashcam

video. See Dashcam Vid. at 5:45–6:15. It is undisputed

Officer Muñoz punched Plaintiff multiple times, but

Plaintiff also contends other officers, including Officer

Hernandez, hit him with batons, kicked him, kneed him,

and caused his face to hit the concrete multiple times.

DSF ¶ 23; PSF ¶¶ 27–33. It is further undisputed Plaintiff

did not threaten or assault any officers, or reach toward

any officers’ weapons or waistbands, PSF ¶¶ 42, 46–47;

the officers had no information indicating Plaintiff was

armed, id. ¶¶ 48–49; none of the officers intervened during

the use of force against Plaintiff, id. ¶ 35; Plaintiff’s

sister observed the incident after she exited Plaintiff’s

15a

Appendix B

grandparents’ house, id. ¶ 36; and Plaintiff was injured

and in need of medical treatment, id. ¶ 51.

Plaintiff was arrested for resisting arrest in violation

of Cal. Penal Code § 148(a)(1) and evading a pursuing

officer’s vehicle in violation of Cal. Veh. Code § 2800.1(a).

PSF ¶ 39. The officers conducted an inventory search of

Plaintiff’s car and impounded it. Id. ¶¶ 40–41. Officers

Robles, Gonzalez, and Hernandez transported Plaintiff to

a hospital. Id. ¶ 52. It is disputed whether Plaintiff refused

treatment, but undisputed that the officers transported

Plaintiff to the police station before Plaintiff received

treatment. Id. ¶¶ 54§ 55.

On October 11, 2018, the Los Angeles County District

Attorney (“DA”) charged Plaintiff with two counts of

resisting arrest and one count of evading a pursuing

officer’s vehicle. Id. ¶ 61. The evasion charge was dismissed

by the DA, and a jury found Plaintiff not guilty on both

counts of resisting arrest on November 21, 2019. Id. ¶ 62.

II. Procedural Background

On November 21, 2021, Plaintiff filed a Complaint,

alleging six causes of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983

(“§ 1983”) for: (1) excessive force against the Officer

Defendants; (2) false arrest against the Officer Defendants;

(3) unlawful search against the Officer Defendants; (4)

municipal liability for unlawful custom and practice

against the City; (5) malicious prosecution against Officers

Hernandez and Muñoz; and (6) deliberate indifference to

a serious medical need against Officers Robles, Gonzalez,

and Hernandez. See Dkt. 1 (“Compl”).

16a

Appendix B

On November 10, 2022, the court denied Defendants’

Motion to Dismiss the Complaint (“MTD”) based on

Defendants’ statute of limitations argument, but granted

the MTD as to Plaintiff’s fourth cause of action (municipal

liability) with leave to amend. Dkt. 26 (“Order re MTD”).

Plaintiff did not file an amended complaint.

In the instant Motion, Defendants again raise their

statute of limitations argument, and argue Plaintiff

has failed to demonstrate he is entitled to relief on his

five remaining claims because his constitutional rights

were not violated, and even if they were, Defendants are

shielded from liability under the doctrine of qualified

immunity. See Mot.

LEGAL STANDARD

I.

Rule 56

Summary judgment is appropriate where “there is no

genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant

is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ.

P. 56(a). “The substantive law determines which facts

are material; only disputes over facts that might affect

the outcome of the suit under the governing law properly

preclude the entry of summary judgment.” Nat’l Ass’n of

Optometrists & Opticians v. Harris, 682 F.3d 1144, 1147

(9th Cir. 2012) (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477

U.S. 242, 248, 106 S. Ct. 2505, 91 L. Ed. 2d 202 (1986)). A

dispute about a material fact is “genuine” if the evidence

is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for

the nonmoving party. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248.

17a

Appendix B

“A moving party without the ultimate burden of

persuasion at trial ... has both the initial burden of

production and the ultimate burden of persuasion on a

motion for summary judgment.” Nissan Fire & Marine

Ins. Co. v. Fritz Cos., 210 F.3d 1099, 1102 (9th Cir. 2000).

“[T]o carry its burden of production, the moving party

must either produce evidence negating an essential

element of the nonmoving party’s claim or defense or

show that the nonmoving party does not have enough

evidence of an essential element to carry its ultimate

burden of persuasion at trial.” Id. “[T]o carry its ultimate

burden of persuasion on the motion, the moving party

must persuade the court that there is no genuine issue of

material fact.” Id.

“If ... a moving party carries its burden of production,

the nonmoving party must produce evidence to support

its claim or defense.” Id. at 1103. “Where the record

taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to

find for the nonmoving party, there is no ‘genuine issue

for trial.’” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio

Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S. Ct. 1348, 89 L. Ed. 2d 538

(1986). Summary judgment must be granted “against a

party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish

the existence of an element essential to that party’s case,

and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at

trial.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.

Ct. 2548, 91 L. Ed. 2d 265 (1986).

“If the nonmoving party produces direct evidence of

a material fact, the court may not assess the credibility of

this evidence nor weigh against it any conflicting evidence

18a

Appendix B

presented by the moving party.” T.W. Elec. Serv., Inc. v.

Pac. Elec. Contractors Ass’n, 809 F.2d 626, 631 (9th Cir.

1987). Inferences may be drawn from underlying facts

that are either not in dispute or that may be resolved at

trial in favor of the nonmoving party, but only if they are

“rational” or “reasonable” and otherwise permissible

under the governing substantive law. Id. The court must

view all evidence and justifiable inferences “in the light

most favorable to the nonmoving party.” Id. at 630–31.

However, a party cannot defeat summary judgment

based solely on the allegations or denials of the pleadings,

conclusory statements, or unsupported conjecture.

Hernandez v. Spacelabs Med., Inc., 343 F.3d 1107, 1112

(9th Cir. 2003); see also FTC v. Publ’g Clearing House,

Inc., 104 F.3d 1168, 1171 (9th Cir. 1997) (“A conclusory,

self-serving affidavit, lacking detailed facts and any

supporting evidence, is insufficient to create a genuine

issue of material fact.”).

DISCUSSION

I.

Evidentiary Objections

The court’s Initial Standing Order (Dkt. 9) sets forth

the requirements for objections to evidence regarding

Rule 56 motions:

If a party disputes a fact based in whole or in

part on an evidentiary objection, the ground

for the objection should be stated succinctly in

a separate statement of evidentiary objections

in a two-column format. The left column should

identify the items objected to (including page

and line number if applicable) and the right

19a

Appendix B

column should set forth a concise objection (e.g.,

hearsay, lack of foundation, etc.) with a citation

to the Federal Rules of Evidence or, where

applicable, a case citation. A proposed order

shall be filed and attached to the evidentiary

objections as a separate document consistent

with Local Rule 52-4.1 and either uploaded

through the CM/ECF System or emailed

directly to the court’s chambers email address

at fla_chambers@cacd.uscourts.gov.

Dkt. 9 at 12.

Neither party submitted a “separate statement of

evidentiary objections.” Id.; see PSF; DSF. Additionally,

the parties, for the most part, made evidentiary

objections to purported facts. See PSF; DSF. Purported

facts, however, are not evidence, and neither party made

evidentiary objections to the actual evidence. See id. For

these reasons, the parties’ objections are OVERRULED.

See j2 Glob. Communs., Inc. v. Blue Jay, Inc., Case No.

08-cv-04254-PJH, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1616, 2009 WL

29905, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 5, 2009) (overruling evidentiary

objections aimed at “characterizations and purported

misstatements of evidence, not at the actual evidence

supporting those statements”); Hanger Prosthetics &

Orthotics, Inc. v. Capstone Orthopedic, Inc., 556 F. Supp.

2d 1122, 1126 n. 1 (E.D. Cal. 2008) (same).

II. Statute of Limitations

Defendants acknowledge the court previously rejected

their argument regarding the statute of limitations when

20a

Appendix B

the court found the two-year limitations period was tolled

under Cal. Gov’t Code § 945.3 and California Rules of

Court, Emergency Rule 9 (“Emergency Rule 9”). 3 Mot. at

13; Order re MTD at 4–8. Defendants’ only new argument

is that Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate facts which

support equitable tolling under Emergency Rule 9. Mot.

at 14–17 (arguing equitable tolling requires a plaintiff to

establish diligence and extraordinary circumstances).

Tolling under Emergency Rule 9, however, is not

equitable tolling. Rather, Emergency Rule 9 is a California

Rule of Court promulgated by the Judicial Council of

California. Sholes v. Cates, Case No. 1:21-cv-01006DAD (HBK), 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 229107, 2021 WL

5567381, at *5 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 29, 2021). Additionally, the

rule plainly states that statutes of limitation are tolled

“notwithstanding any other law.” Emergency Rule 9.

The court, therefore, DENIES Defendants’ Motion

on this ground.

III. Excessive Force

Plaintiff alleges the Officer Defendants used excessive

force to restrain him in violation of his Fourth Amendment

rights. Compl. ¶ 31. Defendants seek summary judgment

on the bases that the Officer Defendants’ force was

objectively reasonable and, thus, did not violate Plaintiff’s

3. See Cal. Rules of Court, App. I: Emergency Rules Related

to COVID-19, Emergency Rule 9(a) (adopted April 6, 2020,

amended effective May 29, 2020), available at https://www.courts.

ca.gov/documents/appendix-i.pdf.

21a

Appendix B

Fourth Amendment rights, and, in any case, the Officer

Defendants are subject to qualified immunity. Mot. at

17–21.

Qualified immunity protects government officials

from civil liability where “their conduct does not violate

clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of

which a reasonable person would have known.” Pearson

v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231, 129 S. Ct. 808, 172 L. Ed.

2d 565 (2009) (cleaned up). “A public official is entitled

to qualified immunity if (1) the disputed facts taken

in the light most favorable to the party asserting the

injury do not show that the official’s conduct violated a

constitutional right, or (2) the constitutional right was not

clearly established at the time the official acted.” Atencio

v. Arpaio, 674 F. App’x 623, 625 (9th Cir. 2016); see also

Torres v. City of Madera, 648 F.3d 1119, 1127 (9th Cir.

2011). “While the constitutional violation prong concerns

the reasonableness of [an] officer’s mistake of fact, the

clearly established prong concerns the officer’s mistake

of law ....” Torres, 648 F.3d at 1127 (emphases in original).

Either prong may be used as the starting point pursuant

to the court’s “sound discretion.” Pearson, 555 U.S. at 236.

A constitutional violation is “clearly established only

if existing law placed the constitutionality of the officer’s

conduct beyond debate, such that every ‘reasonable official

would understand that what he is doing is unlawful.”

Hopson v. Alexander, 71 F.4th 692, 697 (9th Cir. 2023)

(cleaned up). “Although a case directly on point is not

necessarily required, a rule is only clearly established

if it has been settled by controlling authority or a

22a

Appendix B

robust consensus of cases of persuasive authority that

clearly prohibits the officer’s conduct in the particular

circumstances, with a high degree of specificity.” Id.

(cleaned up). “The plaintiff bears the burden of showing

that the right at issue was clearly established under this

second prong.” Sorrels v. McKee, 290 F.3d 965, 969 (9th

Cir. 2002).

A.

Objectively Reasonable Force / Violation of

Fourth Amendment

“An excessive force claim is a claim that a law

enforcement officer carried out an unreasonable seizure

through a use of force that was not justified under the

relevant circumstances.” Cnty. of Los Angeles, Calif. v.

Mendez, 581 U.S. 420, 428, 137 S. Ct. 1539, 198 L. Ed. 2d

52 (2017). “In evaluating a Fourth Amendment claim of

excessive force, [courts] ask whether the officers’ actions

are ‘objectively reasonable’ in light of the facts and

circumstances confronting them.” Rice v. Morehouse,

989 F.3d 1112, 1121 (9th Cir. 2021) (quoting Graham v.

Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 397, 109 S. Ct. 1865, 104 L. Ed. 2d

443 (1989)) (cleaned up).

“Within the Ninth Circuit, courts apply a three-step

analysis to evaluate excessive force claims.” Hermosillo v.

Cnty. of Orange, 562 F. Supp. 3d 802, 811 (C.D. Cal. 2021);

see also Rice, 989 F.3d at 1121 (describing analysis). “First,

the court considers the severity of the intrusion on the

plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment rights based on the type

and amount of force inflicted.” Hermosillo, 562 F. Supp. 3d

at 811. “Next, the court evaluates the government interest

23a

Appendix B

in light of the three Graham factors, which include ‘the

severity of the crime at issue, whether the suspect poses

an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others,

and whether he is actively resisting arrest or attempting

to evade arrest by flight.’” Id. (quoting Graham, 490 U.S.

at 396). “Finally, the court balances the intrusion on the

plaintiff against the government’s need for the use of

force.” Hermosillo, 562 F. Supp. 3d at 811.

“The most important factor is whether the suspect

posed an immediate threat to the safety of the officers

or others.” Id. (quoting S.B. v. County of San Diego, 864

F.3d 1010, 1013 (9th Cir. 2017) (cleaned up)). “Where the

objective reasonableness of an officer’s conduct turns on

disputed issues of material fact, it is ‘a question of fact

best resolved by a jury.’” Torres, 648 F.3d at 1123; see also

Santos v. Gates, 287 F.3d 846, 853 (9th Cir. 2002) (finding

summary judgment in excessive force cases should be

granted sparingly because balancing the factors “nearly

always requires a jury to sift through disputed factual

contentions, and to draw inferences therefrom”).

1.

Officers Who Used Force

Defendants arg ue the force used by Off icers

Hernandez and Muñoz was reasonable as a matter of

law based on the Graham factors. Mot. at 19–20 (citing

Graham, 490 U.S. at 394–95). Under the Graham factors,

Defendants argue Plaintiff’s crime was severe, he posed a

real and immediate danger, and he resisted and attempt

to evade arrest (or officers at least reasonably thought he

resisted and attempted to evade). Mot. at 19–20, 24.

24a

Appendix B

Under the Ninth Circuit’s test, however, the Graham

factors are used to determine the government’s interest,

which is then balanced against the individual’s Fourth

Amendment interest to determine whether the seizure

was reasonable. Hermosillo, 562 F. Supp. at 811; Rice, 989

F.3d at 1121. Defendants do not establish the severity of

the Fourth-Amendment intrusion (first step of excessive

force analysis), or balance the gravity of that intrusion

with the government’s need for the intrusion (third

step of analysis). Rice, 989 F.3d at 11214; Mot. at 19–20.

Defendants, therefore, have not met their burden to show

Officers Hernandez and Muñoz did not use excessive

force in violation of the Fourth Amendment as a matter

of law. 5 See Nissan Fire, 210 F.3d at 1102 (moving party

has burden of persuasion).

4. See also Graham, 480 U.S. at 396 (“Determining whether

force used to effect a particular seizure is ‘reasonable’ ... requires

a careful balancing of the nature and quality of the intrusion

on the individual’s Fourth Amendment interests against the

countervailing governmental interests at stake.”); Hopson v.

Alexander, 71 F.4th 692, 698 (9th Cir. 2023) (“To determine

whether an officer used excessive force in violation of the Fourth

Amendment, we balance the nature and quality of the intrusion

on the individual’s Fourth Amendment interests against the

countervailing governmental interests at stake. This requires us

to [consider] the totality of the circumstances, including the type

and amount of force inflicted, the severity of injuries, the severity

of the crime at issue, whether the suspect poses an immediate

threat to the safety of the officers or others, and whether he is

actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight.”)

(cleaned up).

5. Defendants did not engage with the balancing test even

after Plaintiff raised it in his opposition. Opp’n at 9–13; Reply at

6–9.

25a

Appendix B

2.

Officers Who Did Not Intervene

Defendants argue Officers Gonzalez and Robles

cannot be liable because they did not use force on Plaintiff

and the “incredibly brief encounter d[id] not provide any

opportunity for either [officer] to have intervened even if

such action would have been deemed necessary (which it

wasn’t).” Mot. at 19.

“Pursuant to a long line of civil cases, police officers

have a duty to intercede when their fellow officers violate

the constitutional rights of a suspect or other citizen.”

United States v. Koon, 34 F.3d 1416, 1447 n. 25 (9th Cir.

1994), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 518 U.S. 81, 116 S. Ct.

2035, 135 L. Ed. 2d 392 (1996) (collecting cases). “In these

cases, the constitutional right violated by the passive

defendant is analytically the same as the right violated

by the person who strikes the blows.” Id. “Thus[,] an

officer who failed to intercede when his colleagues were

depriving a victim of his Fourth Amendment right to be

free from unreasonable force in the course of an arrest

would, like his colleagues, be responsible for subjecting

the victim to a deprivation of his Fourth Amendment

rights.” Id. “Whether an officer had sufficient time to

intervene or was capable of preventing the harm caused

by the other officer is generally an issue for the trier of

fact unless, considering all the evidence, a reasonable jury

could not possibly conclude otherwise.” Abdullahi v. City

of Madison, 423 F.3d 763, 774 (7th Cir. 2005) (citation

omitted) (emphasis in original).

Here, Defendants concede the struggle lasted “30 to

45 seconds.” Mot. at 19. A reasonable jury could conclude

26a

Appendix B

Officers Gonzalez and Robles could have intervened in

that window of time. See Abdullahi, 423 F.3d at 774.

Defendants, therefore, have not established that Officers

Gonzalez and Robles cannot be liable for excessive force

as a matter of law.

B. Clearly Established Right

It has long been established that, when an individual

“d[oes] not make any threats or resist the officer ... the use

of non-trivial force of any kind [is] unreasonable.” Rice,

989 F.3d at 1126 (quoting Gravelet-Blondin v. Shelton,

728 F.3d 1086, 1094 (9th Cir. 2013) (emphasis in original).

The parties agree Plaintiff did not make any threats, PSF

¶ 42, and Plaintiff creates a genuine dispute of fact as to

whether he attempted to flee or resist arrest, Dashcam

Vid. at 5:40–6:15; Dkt. 51-1 (“R. Parham Dep. Tr.”) at

73:24–80:25; Dkt. 51-2 (“K. Parham Dep. Tr.”) at 33:1–10,

35:2–10.

“[F]or purposes of determining whether [an officer]

is entitled to qualified immunity under [the] second

prong, we assume [the officer] correctly perceived all of

the relevant facts and ask whether an officer could have

reasonably believed at the time that the force actually used

was lawful under the circumstances.” Torres, 648 F.3d at

1127. The court draws reasonable inferences in favor of

Plaintiff and assumes he did not resist arrest, and as such,

every reasonable officer would understand the Officer

Defendants’ use of non-trivial force was unlawful, because

non-trivial force cannot be used on a person who is not

resisting. See Hopson, 71 F.4th at 697; Rice, 989 F.3d at

27a

Appendix B

1126. The Officer Defendants, therefore, are not entitled

to qualified immunity under the second prong.

C.

Conclusion Regarding Excessive Force

In sum, the court DENIES the Motion as to Plaintiff’s

excessive force claim.

IV. False Arrest

Plaintiff alleges the Officer Defendants arrested

him without probable cause in violation of his Fourth

A mendment rights. Compl. ¶¶ 42 – 43. Defendants

seek summary judgment on the basis that the Officer

Defendants had probable cause because Plaintiff refused

to pull over and resisted arrest. Mot. at 20–24.

“A police officer may make a warrantless arrest when

the officer has probable cause to believe that the person

to be arrested has committed a felony, whether or not a

felony, in fact, has been committed.” Blankenhorn v. City

of Orange, 485 F.3d 463, 471 (9th Cir. 2007) (cleaned up).

“The test for whether probable cause exists is whether at

the moment of arrest the facts and circumstances within

the knowledge of the arresting officers and of which they

had reasonably trustworthy information were sufficient to

warrant a prudent person in believing that the petitioner

had committed or was committing an offense.” Id. (cleaned

up). “Probable cause exists when, under the totality of the

circumstances known to the arresting officers (or within

the knowledge of the other officers at the scene), a prudent

person would believe the suspect had committed a crime.”

28a

Appendix B

Id. (cleaned up). “[I]n a § 1983 action[,] the factual matters

underlying the judgment of reasonableness generally

mean that probable cause is a question for the jury, and

summary judgment is appropriate only if no reasonable

jury could find that the officers did or did not have probable

cause to arrest.” McKenzie v. Lamb, 738 F.2d 1005, 1008

(9th Cir. 1984) (cleaned up).

Here, a reasonable jury could find the Officer

Defendants did not reasonably suspect Plaintiff was

evading or resisting arrest where he merely decelerated

and then drove in a controlled manner a few blocks to

his grandparents’ house, calmly and fully complied with

all instructions for several minutes before the disputed

scuffle, and, if the jury so found, did not flee or resist

arrest during the scuffle. See also McKenzie, 738 F.2d

at 1008 (“Conclusive evidence of guilt is not necessary to

establish probable cause. Mere suspicion, common rumor,

or even strong reason to suspect are not enough, however.

There must have been some objective evidence which

would allow a reasonable officer to deduce that a particular

individual has committed or is in the process of committing

a criminal offense.”). Alternatively, a reasonable jury

could find the Officer Defendants reasonably believed

Plaintiff was evading or resisting arrest when he did

not immediately pull over, or that Plaintiff attempted to

escape when Officer Hernandez handcuffed him.

The court, therefore, DENIES Defendants’ Motion

as to Plaintiff’s claim for false arrest.

29a

Appendix B

V. Unlawful Search

Plaintiff alleges the Officer Defendants unlawfully

searched his car in violation of his Fourth Amendment

rights because they did not have reasonable suspicion or

probable cause to believe he was involved in any criminal

activity or that evidence of a crime was contained in his

car. Compl. ¶¶ 49–50. Defendants seek summary judgment

on the basis that the Officer Defendants had “good

cause” to perform an inventory search of the contents of

Plaintiff’s car. Mot. at 20–24.

“Under California Vehicle Code § 22651(h)(1), the

police may impound a vehicle ‘when an officer arrests

any person driving or in control of a vehicle for an alleged

offense’ and takes that person into custody.” United States

v. Caseres, 533 F.3d 1064, 1074 (9th Cir. 2008). “A lawfully

impounded vehicle may be searched for the purpose of

determining its condition and contents at the time of

impounding.” Id. “Such warrantless inventory searches of

vehicles are lawful only if conducted pursuant to standard

police procedures that are aimed at protecting the owner’s

property and at protecting the police from the owner

charging them with having stolen, lost, or damaged his

property.” Id. (citation omitted).

“Additionally, a vehicle can be impounded under

§ 22651(h)(1) only if impoundment serves some ‘community

caretaking function.’” Id. “Whether an impoundment is

warranted under the community caretaking doctrine

depends on the location of the vehicle and the police

officers’ duty to prevent it from creating a hazard to other

30a

Appendix B

drivers or from being a target for vandalism or theft.” Id.

at 1075 (citations omitted).

“[N]o lawful basis” exists to impound a person’s

car, and “therefore the subsequent inventory search [is]

unconstitutional,” where the car is legally parked at the

curb of a residential street two houses away from the

person’s home; the possibility that the car would be stolen,

broken into, or vandalized is no greater than if the police

had not arrested the person; and the government does not

present any evidence that the car was blocking a driveway

or crosswalk, or that it poses a hazard or impediment to

other traffic. Id.

Here, a reasonable jury could conclude no community

caretaking function existed because Plaintiff’s car was

parked legally at the curb of a residential street near

his grandparents’ home, was not blocking a driveway

or crosswalk, and did not pose a hazard or impediment

to other traffic. See PSF ¶¶ 15, 37–38; Dashcam Vid. at

1:42–4:48. Defendants offer no evidence Plaintiff’s car

was at a greater risk of vandalism than if police had not

arrested him. DSF ¶¶ 12, 25.

The court, therefore, DENIES Defendants’ Motion

as to Plaintiff’s claim for unlawful search.

VI. Malicious Prosecution

Plaintiff alleges Officers Hernandez and Muñoz

wrongfully caused his prosecution in violation of his

Fourteenth Amendment rights because they lied about

31a

Appendix B

Plaintiff’s conduct in their police reports to cover up

their use of excessive force. Compl. ¶¶ 68–69; Opp’n at 21.

Defendants move for summary judgment on the basis the

Officer Defendants had probable cause to arrest Plaintiff.

Mot. at 20–24.

“A criminal defendant may maintain a malicious

prosecution claim ... against ... police officers and

investigators ... who wrongfully caused his prosecution.”

Smith v. Almada, 640 F.3d 931, 938 (9th Cir. 2011). “To

maintain a § 1983 action for malicious prosecution, a

plaintiff must show that the defendants prosecuted [him]

with malice and without probable cause, and that they did

so for the purpose of denying [him] a specific constitutional

right.” Id. (cleaned up). “Probable cause is an absolute

defense to malicious prosecution.” Id. (cleaned up).

Defendants’ sole argument is that Officers Hernandez

and Muñoz had probable cause to arrest Plaintiff, and

thus did not maliciously cause his prosecution. Mot. at 21.

Because the court has already determined a reasonable

jury could conclude no probable cause existed to arrest

Plaintiff, see supra § IV, the court DENIES Defendants’

Motion as to Plaintiff’s claim for malicious prosecution.

VII. Deliberate Indifference to a Medical Need

Plaintiff alleges Officers Hernandez, Robles, and

Gonzalez violated his right to adequate medical care under

the Fourteenth Amendment when they transported him

from the hospital to the police station despite knowing he

had yet to receive any medical attention. Compl. ¶¶ 74–75.

32a

Appendix B

Defendants seek summary judgment on the bases that the

officers’ conduct was reasonable under the circumstances,

and that they are entitled to qualified immunity. Mot. at

21–24. The legal standard for qualified immunity was set

forth previously. See supra § III.

A.

Violation of Constitutional Right

Defendants contend “[a]llegations of denial of medical

care immediately following arrest are [] analyzed under

the Fourth Amendment’s reasonableness standard.” Mot.

at 21 (citing Tatum v. City and Cnty. of S.F., 441 F.3d

1090, 1098 (9th Cir. 2006)). Plaintiff, however, brings his

claim under the Fourteenth Amendment. Compl. ¶ 74.

Additionally, “[a]lthough the Fourth Amendment provides

the proper framework for [a plaintiff’s] excessive force

claim, it does not govern his medical needs claim.” Lolli v.

Cnty. of Orange, 351 F.3d 410, 418 (9th Cir. 2003) (cleaned

up). “Claims of failure to provide care for serious medical

needs, when brought by a detainee [] who has been neither

charged nor convicted of a crime, are analyzed under

the substantive due process clause of the Fourteenth

Amendment.” Id. (citation omitted). Indeed, the section of

Tatum upon which Defendants rely addresses excessive

force under the Fourth Amendment. See Tatum, 441 F.3d

at 1095–1100.

“ The Due Process Clause [of the Fourteenth

Amendment] . . . require[s] the responsible government or

governmental agency to provide medical care to persons

... who have been injured while being apprehended by the

police.” City of Revere v. Massachusetts Gen. Hosp., 463

33a

Appendix B

U.S. 239, 244, 103 S. Ct. 2979, 77 L. Ed. 2d 605 (1983).

“The Due Process Clause requires, at least, that persons

in custody have the established right to not have officials

remain deliberately indifferent to their serious medical

needs.” Cabral v. Cnty. of Glenn, 624 F. Supp. 2d 1184, 1190

(E.D. Cal. 2009) (citation and quotation marks omitted).

Officials are “deliberately indifferent” to “serious medical

needs” when they “deny, delay, or intentionally interfere

with medical treatment.” Lolli, 351 F.3d at 419.

Here, the parties agree Plaintiff was “obviously

injured and in need of medical treatment” and “Officers

could see that [Plaintiff’s] face was wounded and bleeding.”

PSF ¶ 51. There is a dispute of fact, however, as to whether

Officers Hernandez, Robles, and Gonzalez interfered with

Plaintiff’s medical treatment. Plaintiff testified he never

refused treatment, R. Parham Dep. Tr. at 93:7–94:6,

but hospital documents state otherwise, Dkt. 54-3. A

reasonable jury could determine Officers Hernandez,

Robles, and Gonzalez prevented Plaintiff from being

treated at the hospital in violation of his Fourteenth

Amendment right.

B. Clearly Established Right

It is clearly established that a government official

cannot deny, delay, or intentionally interfere with medical

treatment. See Lolli, 351 F.3d at 419; Lopez v. Smith,

203 F.3d 1122, 1132 (9th Cir. 2000). Here, drawing all

inferences in favor of Plaintiff, and assuming he did

not refuse treatment and, instead, Officers Hernandez,

Robles, and Gonzalez interfered with his treatment by

34a

Appendix B

removing him from the hospital, every reasonable officer

would understand that Officers Hernandez, Robles, and

Gonzalez’s actions were unconstitutional. See Hopson, 71

F.4th at 697.

C.

Conclusion Regarding Deliberate Indifference

Accordingly, the court DENIES Defendants’ motion

as to Plaintiff’s claim for deliberate indifference.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Motion is DENIED

in its entirety. The court SETS a Pretrial Conference for

October 4, 2024, at 1:30 p.m., and Trial for October 14,

2024, at 8:15 a.m.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: July 29, 2024 /s/ Fernando L. Aenlle-Rocha

FERNANDO L. AENLLE-ROCHA

United States District Judge