Reply Brief — National Mining Association and America's Power, Applicant v. Environmental Protection Agency, et al.

Supreme Court briefAug 23, 2024

Ask Donna

What actually matters in this document.

Text

No. 24A97

In the Supreme Court of the United States

NATIONAL MINING ASSOCIATION and AMERICA’S POWER,

APPLICANTS,

v.

UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY and

MICHAEL S. REGAN, in his official capacity as Administrator of the United States

Environmental Protection Agency, ET AL.,

RESPONDENTS.

REPLY IN SUPPORT OF EMERGENCY APPLICATION FOR STAY

On Application For Stay To The

U.S. Court Of Appeals For The District of Columbia

To the Honorable John G. Roberts, Jr.,

Chief Justice of the United States and Circuit Justice for the United States

Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit

CARROLL WADE MCGUFFEY III

TROUTMAN PEPPER

HAMILTON SANDERS LLP

600 Peachtree St. N.E.

Suite 3000

Atlanta, GA 30308

MISHA TSEYTLIN

Counsel of Record

KAITLIN L. O’DONNELL

CARLY ROTHMAN SIDITSKY

KEVIN M. LEROY

TROUTMAN PEPPER

HAMILTON SANDERS LLP

227 W. Monroe, Suite 3900

Chicago, Illinois 60606

(608) 999-1240

(312) 759-1939 (fax)

misha.tseytlin@troutman.com

Attorneys for Applicants

TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................................... 1

ARGUMENT .................................................................................................................. 3

I.

This Court Would Likely Grant Review And Reverse If The D.C. Circuit

Upholds The Final Rule .................................................................................... 3

II. Applicants And Their Members Will Suffer Irreparable Harm If This

Court Does Not Grant A Stay ......................................................................... 10

III. The Final Rule’s Devastating Consequences Are Contrary To The Public

Interest ............................................................................................................ 16

CONCLUSION............................................................................................................. 17

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases

Barnes v. E-Sys., Inc. Grp. Hosp. Med. & Surgical Ins. Plan,

501 U.S. 1301 (1991) ......................................................................................... 12

Clinton v. City of New York,

524 U.S. 417 (1998) ............................................................................................. 1

Essex Chem. Corp. v. Ruckelshaus,

486 F.2d 427 (D.C. Cir. 1973) ............................................................................. 5

FCC v. Radiofone, Inc.,

516 U.S. 1301 (1995) ......................................................................................... 12

Labrador v. Poe by & through Poe,

144 S. Ct. 921 (2024) (mem.) ............................................................................ 12

Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo,

144 S. Ct. 2244 (2024) ......................................................................................... 1

Ohio v. EPA,

144 S. Ct. 2040 (2024) ................................................................. 2, 11, 12, 13, 14

Philip Morris USA Inc. v. Scott,

561 U.S. 1301 (2010) ......................................................................................... 14

Scripps-Howard Radio v. FCC,

316 U.S. 4 (1942) ............................................................................................... 12

Starbucks Corp. v. McKinney,

144 S. Ct. 1570 (2024) ....................................................................................... 12

West Virginia v. EPA,

577 U.S. 1126 (2016) (mem.)............................................................................. 13

West Virginia v. EPA,

597 U.S. 697 (2022) ................................................... 1, 3, 4, 5, 6, 8, 9, 10, 15, 17

Statutes

42 U.S.C. § 7411 ........................................................................................... 1, 4, 5, 6, 15

Regulations

80 Fed. Reg. 64,510 (Oct. 23, 2015) ........................................................................... 6, 9

84 Fed. Reg. 32,520 (July 8, 2019) ................................................................................ 9

- ii -

89 Fed. Reg. 39,798 (May 9, 2024) ................................................................ 4, 5, 6, 8, 9

Other Authorities

Comm’r Mark C. Christie, FERC, Letter Responding to House Comm. on Energy &

Com.’s Questions Regarding Clean Power Plan 2.0 (Aug. 13, 2024) .............. 16

Comment from Jeff Jickling, SaskPower (Aug. 4, 2023), Doc. ID No. EPA-HQ-OAR2023-0072-0687 ................................................................................................... 7

Comment from Shannon R. Mikula, Minnkota Power Cooperative (Aug. 8, 2023),

Doc. ID No. EPA-HQ-OAR-2023-0072-0632 ...................................................... 8

Comment from Tawny Bridgeford, National Mining Association (Aug. 8, 2023), Doc.

ID No. EPA-HQ-OAR-2023-0072-0695 .............................................................. 9

EPA, Memorandum, Review of the Current Status of the Carbon Capture and

Sequestration Projects (Mar. 2018), Doc. ID No. EPA-HQ-OAR-2013-049511947 ................................................................................................................... 7

EPA, Regulatory Impact Analysis (Apr. 2024), Doc. ID No. EPA-HQ-OAR-20230072-8913 ............................................................................................................ 9

Webster’s Third New International Dictionary of the English Language .................. 6

- iii -

INTRODUCTION

EPA’s Opposition makes a mockery out of this Court’s holding in West Virginia

v. EPA, 597 U.S. 697 (2022), while seeking to render judicial review of EPA’s actions

under Section 111(d) effectively meaningless. If EPA’s arguments prevail, the agency

will have found a way to bypass this Court’s holding that EPA may not mandate

generation shifting by setting “standards” that are impossible to achieve and then

insulating those “standards” from both meaningful judicial review and any possibility

of a stay. EPA’s position cannot be reconciled with basic principles of equity, the text

of Section 111(d), Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo, 144 S. Ct. 2244 (2024), or

this Court’s order staying the Clean Power Plan (which order EPA does not even

mention in its 67-page response).

On the merits, EPA urges this Court to defer to EPA’s technical expertise as to

whether the Final Rule’s lead “best system of emission reduction” (“BSER”)—fullunit, continuous 90% carbon capture and sequestration (“CCS”)—is “adequately

demonstrated” under Section 111. But that is merely an effort to “fak[e] out” this

Court. Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 469 (1998) (Scalia, J., concurring

in part). EPA appears to now concede that a BSER is not “adequately demonstrated”

unless EPA can show that the BSER itself has been successfully implemented by a

source in the real world. That concession should be the end of the Final Rule because,

as EPA knows, continuous 90% CCS has never been successfully applied to the

exhaust of an entire generating unit for a year. Not once. The closest any unit has

come to achieving what the Rule would require is a small unit in Canada that did so

for only a few days before the system broke. To meet what EPA now (correctly) admits

“adequately demonstrated” means, EPA would need to point to a unit that actually

implemented 90% CCS to all of its emissions for a full year. EPA cannot point to any

such unit because none has ever existed, contrary to EPA’s claim that its BSER is in

“existence.” Resp.30 (citation omitted).

On the equities, EPA does not meaningfully contest the numerous irreparable

harms that Applicants National Mining Association’s and America’s Power’s

members will suffer from the Final Rule—such as significant and unrecoverable work

for the few plants that try to remain operational under the Rule, the irrevocable

decision to retire for all other plants, and the devastating effects the Rule will have

for the coal mining industry as coal mines close and demand for coal is

gutted. Further, and remarkably, EPA does not even try to dispute Applicants’ point

that the irreparable harms that the Final Rule will cause are indistinguishable from

the harms that the Clean Power Plan would have caused absent a stay, which harms

justified this Court’s stay decision in 2016. Instead, as with its merits arguments,

EPA’s core irreparable-harm argument is that this Court should abdicate its

independent judgment in favor of EPA’s allegedly technical findings in the very Rule

being challenged here. That is a radical departure from this Court’s precedent—

including the Court’s Clean Power Plan stay decision and Ohio v. EPA, 144 S. Ct.

2040 (2024)—and would make stay relief practically unavailable in administrativelaw cases, as no agency would ever admit in the administrative record that its rule

causes more harm than benefit.

-2-

This Court should stay the Final Rule pending review on the merits of

Applicants’ petition for review.

ARGUMENT

I.

This Court Would Likely Grant Review And Reverse If The D.C.

Circuit Upholds The Final Rule

A. This Court is likely to grant review and reverse any D.C. Circuit decision

upholding the Final Rule. The Rule requires coal-fired plants to (1) implement CCS

technology at a continuous capture rate of 90% CO2 from an entire unit throughout

the entire year before 2032; (2) shift 40% of the plant’s energy production to natural

gas by 2030 and then shut down before 2039; or (3) shut down before 2032. NMA &

AP Appl.12.

Continuous, full-unit 90% CCS by 2032 is not “adequately

demonstrated” because no power plant has ever been able to apply CCS at that level

for more than a few days, and even if 90% CCS were to be feasible in the future, its

costs would be exorbitant. NMA & AP Appl.12–15 (citation omitted). Forcing coalfired units to convert to at least 40% natural gas is unlawful “generation shifting,”

see West Virginia, 597 U.S. at 728–29, requiring plants to swap one fuel resource for

another before shutting down in favor of other energy types, see id. at 730–31; NMA

& AP Appl.15–16. And requiring sources to shut down by 2032 to avoid these two

infeasible control options violates this Court’s prohibition on forced generation

shifting, see West Virginia, 597 U.S. at 732, as EPA has no authority to decide

whether coal plants should “cease making power,” id. at 728; NMA & AP Appl.16–17.

B. As an initial matter, EPA has no response to Applicants’ point that forcing

coal-fired power plants to shut down is generation shifting on its face, in violation of

-3-

this Court’s core holding in West Virginia. EPA obliquely acknowledges, see Resp.17–

18—and EPA’s own modeling expressly projects, see App.448a–50a (Schwartz Decl.

¶¶ 10–13); App.456a (Schwartz Decl. ¶ 22); App.297a–99a (Bloodworth Decl. ¶¶ 14–

18)—that the Final Rule will shut down many coal-fired power plants, eliminating a

critical portion of the Nation’s electricity supply. Yet the agency avoids discussing

which alternative electricity sources will shoulder the demand of consumers who

currently rely on the coal-fired facilities that the Rule will force into early retirement.

See Resp.11, 17–18, 28–29. The answer will not be more coal units, as the present

regulatory and economic landscape makes adding new coal capacity impossible. See

App.5a; 89 Fed. Reg. 39,798, 39,802 (May 9, 2024). Accordingly, the only possibility

is an unlawful generation shift to another energy source that EPA would prefer over

coal. EPA cannot use Section 111(d) to “direct existing sources to effectively cease to

exist,” West Virginia, 597 U.S. at 728 n.3, even indirectly by allowing no other viable

option, and so the Final Rule’s retirement option is unlawful.*

EPA’s claim that the Final Rule “does not direct any plant to close,” Resp.53

(emphasis added); see id. at 20, is based upon a claimed distinction without a

difference. The Final Rule gives coal plants an existential ultimatum: implement

That EPA has labeled the Final Rule’s shut-down-before-2032 option an

“exemption,” rather than a “subcategory,” is legally irrelevant. See Resp.20. Any

regulated entity can avoid a regulation by declining to comply and facing the

consequences associated with such noncompliance, regardless of whether EPA writes

any “exemption” for these entities. The shut-down-before-2032 option is, in reality, a

subcategory that exceeds EPA’s statutory authority to set “standards of

performance.” See App.272a; 42 U.S.C. § 7411(b)(1)(B). A plant’s retirement date is

not a “system of emission reduction,” App.271a; 42 U.S.C. § 7411(a)(1), but rather is

an economic decision made by the plant’s owner.

*

-4-

full-unit, continuous 90% CCS before 2032 (an incredibly costly technology that no

plant has ever successfully implemented, and which few will even try), or else shut

down before 2032 or 2039. In offering coal-fired plants the untenable “option” of 90%

CCS as the only way to stay open beyond 2038, EPA designed the Final Rule to force

plants into retiring prematurely. EPA’s own modeling shows that few coal-fired

power plants will even attempt the Final Rule’s 90% CCS.

See App.448a–50a

(Schwartz Decl. ¶¶ 10–13); App.456a (Schwartz Decl. ¶ 22); App.297a–99a

(Bloodworth Decl. ¶¶ 14–18). Although couched in the language of performance

standards, the Final Rule is just another unlawful effort to “transform the Nation’s

electrical power supply.” See West Virginia, 597 U.S. at 749 (Gorsuch, J., concurring).

Nor can EPA rescue the Final Rule’s fatally flawed first “option,” where fullunit, continuous 90% CCS does not yet exist and so has not been “adequately

demonstrated” by EPA’s own definition.

EPA does not defend the Final Rule’s

untenable assertion that a BSER that is merely “anticipated” or “reasonably

project[ed]” is nevertheless “adequately demonstrated” under Section 111.

See

App.4a; 89 Fed. Reg. at 39,801. Instead, the agency now admits that CCS must be

“shown to be reasonably reliable” and “reasonably efficient.” Resp.24 (emphasis

added) (quoting Essex Chem. Corp. v. Ruckelshaus, 486 F.2d 427, 433 (D.C. Cir.

1973)). EPA then engages in misdirection, arguing that “carbon capture writ large

has been adequately demonstrated.” Resp.26 (citing 89 Fed. Reg. at 39,846). But the

question of whether CCS “writ large”—whatever that means—has been “adequately

-5-

demonstrated” is not the legally relevant inquiry.† The Final Rule does not mandate

partial or slipstream CCS as the BSER for existing power plants; the BSER it selected

is full-unit, continuous 90% CCS. See App.41a; 89 Fed. Reg. at 39,838 (“CCS with 90

percent capture of CO2”). That is the system that coal-fired power plants will need to

implement before 2032 if they wish to avoid mandatory retirement.

Full-unit,

continuous 90% CCS is the system that EPA must show to have been “adequately

demonstrated,” not CCS “writ large,” and EPA has not provided a single example to

support its existence in the real world.

EPA’s assertion that “the basic [CCS]

technology already exists,” App.54a; 89 Fed. Reg. at 39,851, is beside the point under

what EPA now admits Section 111(d) requires. EPA must show that the best system

of emission reduction is adequately demonstrated, not any component technology.

See West Virginia, 597 U.S. at 726–27, 733 (discussing meaning of “system”). Here,

that system is full-unit, continuous 90% CCS, and EPA has made no such showing.

None of the existing facilities that EPA relies upon “show or prove,” Resp.24

(quoting Demonstrate, Webster’s Third New International Dictionary of the English

Language 600 (1971)), that 90% CCS has been adequately demonstrated:

† EPA’s reliance on the New Source Rule, 80 Fed. Reg. 64,510 (Oct. 23, 2015),

is misplaced. The agency contends that it “first found carbon capture to be adequately

demonstrated” in that rule, “which remains in effect.” Resp.27. In other words, EPA

suggests CCS is adequately demonstrated because the agency made that

determination a decade ago via a new-unit rule that remains in place. But EPA’s

2014 determination pertained only to 40% CCS, not 90% CCS. 80 Fed. Reg. at 64,510,

64,545. Further, courts have not yet resolved the legality of the New Source Rule:

while the New Source Rule was challenged in court, that case was held in abeyance

during the prior administration and has never been reinstated. Per Curiam Order,

North Dakota v. EPA, No.15-1381, Dkt.1688176 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 10, 2017).

-6-

•

Petra Nova: The Petra Nova project—the only large U.S. commercial

electric generating plant ever equipped with CCS—involved only a

“slipstream” CCS application (meaning only about a third of the unit’s

exhaust is directed to the capture system), and so has never achieved the

continuous 90% CCS that the Final Rule contemplates.

See EPA,

Memorandum, Review of the Current Status of the Carbon Capture and

Sequestration Projects, at 21–24 (Mar. 2018), Doc. ID No. EPA-HQ-OAR2013-0495-11947.

•

Project Barry: Project Barry in Alabama had only a small pilot CCS project

capable of 25 MW slipstream capture, not full-unit 90% CCS. App.408a

(McLennan Decl. ¶ 25).

•

Boundary Dam: The Boundary Dam Power Station in Canada achieved 90%

CO2 capture for a few days after it was commissioned in 2014, but after

those few days the system broke and never again hit that 90% mark.

Comment from Jeff Jickling, SaskPower (Aug. 4, 2023), Doc. ID No. EPAHQ-OAR-2023-0072-0687.

•

Project Tundra: EPA says that Project Tundra in North Dakota is “designed

to achieve ‘95 percent’ capture rates,” Resp.27 (quoting 89 Fed. Reg. at

39,850), but as Minnkota Power Cooperative, the developer of Project

Tundra, explained to EPA, “Project Tundra would not fully comply with

EPA’s mandate” of 90% CCS.

Comment from Shannon R. Mikula,

Minnkota Power Cooperative, at 2 (Aug. 8, 2023), Doc. ID No. EPA-HQ-

-7-

OAR-2023-0072-0632. Project Tundra is designed to achieve 95% capture

rates “from approximately 530 MW of the 734 MW produced at full load

from a combination of Unit 2 and Unit 1 flue gas.” Id. at 13 (emphasis

added). “Minnkota has no technical data or testing assurance that EPA’s

value of 90% capture can be achieved across varying unit loads,” making

“EPA’s aspirational 90% value . . . clearly speculative and unsupported.”

Id.

•

Project Diamond Vault: As for Project Diamond Vault in Louisiana, EPA

acknowledges that this is still years away from even being operational, let

alone demonstrated. App.54a; 89 Fed. Red. at 39,851.

EPA’s reliance on “attest[ations]” of technology vendors—rather than any

evidence of existing coal-fired plants actually implementing continuous, full-unit 90%

CCS, see Resp.27–28 (quoting 89 Fed. Reg. at 39,852)—is inconsistent with its now

admitted understanding of “adequately demonstrated.”

A third-party vendor

bragging that it can meet an aspirational future goal does not “show[ ]” that a BSER

has been adequately demonstrated. Resp.24 (emphasis added; citation omitted).

With respect to the Final Rule’s option to implement 40% gas co-firing and then

retire, EPA incorrectly argues that this is permissible “fuel-switching,” a “traditional

air pollution control.” Resp.19 (quoting West Virginia, 597 U.S. at 727). Requiring

40% co-firing unlawfully directs plants to shift almost half of their energy production

from coal to natural gas—precisely the sort of change in energy-type that this Court

held to be unlawful generation shifting. West Virginia, 597 U.S. at 731–32; see id. at

-8-

729 (“[t]here is little reason to think Congress assigned” to EPA “such decisions” as

to “how much of a switch from coal to natural gas is practically feasible”). And, of

course, requiring plants to shut down by 2039 is illegally mandated generationshifting on its face, a point that EPA does not address. See NMA & AP Appl.16–17.

This option is arbitrary and capricious, in any event. EPA claims that most

coal plants already have access to and use natural gas to some extent, see Resp.19

(quoting 89 Fed. Reg. at 39,902), but only 4% of coal plants now burn gas for

generation. See Comment from Tawny Bridgeford, National Mining Association at

48 (Aug. 8, 2023), Doc. ID No. EPA-HQ-OAR-2023-0072-0695. The rest use gas for

startup only, and obtaining access to sufficient gas pipeline capacity to reach 40%

would require extensive, costly changes.

Id.; accord EPA, Regulatory Impact

Analysis, at 3-31–32 tbl.3-14 (Apr. 2024), Doc. ID No. EPA-HQ-OAR-2023-0072-8913.

Indeed, EPA itself has twice previously concluded that natural gas co-firing is not the

BSER for reducing CO2 from coal-fired power plants.

See 80 Fed. Reg. 64,510,

64,727–28 (Oct. 23, 2015); 84 Fed. Reg. 32,520, 32,544–46 (July 8, 2019). EPA has

presented no basis to justify its change of mind here.

EPA falsely suggests that this Court in West Virginia endorsed the use of “fuelswitching” as a BSER. Resp.19 (quoting West Virginia, 597 U.S. at 727). Here, EPA

relies solely on a bit of background dicta describing EPA’s own prior discussion of

potential options for “traditional” control systems—essentially, EPA’s own say-so.

597 U.S. at 727 (quoting 80 Fed. Reg. at 64,784). In fact, West Virginia made clear

that it does not support EPA’s position, doubting whether EPA could “simply requir[e]

-9-

coal plants to become natural gas plants,” 597 U.S. at 728 n.3, and rejecting any

notion that EPA should be able to decide “how much of a switch from coal to natural

gas is practically feasible,” id at 728. The dissent understood this issue when it

recognized that “fuel-switching” has the potential to “restructure the Nation’s overall

mix of electricity generation” in a way that would contravene the majority’s holding.

Id. at 775 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (citations omitted). Plainly, EPA’s out-of-context

citation does not demonstrate that West Virginia authorizes EPA to force coal plants

to burn 40% gas—the argument is as backward as it sounds.

II.

Applicants And Their Members Will Suffer Irreparable Harm If This

Court Does Not Grant A Stay

A. As Applicants explained—with extensive supporting declarations—that

their members are likely to suffer multiple irreparable harms from the Final Rule’s

generation-shifting effects if this Court does not grant a stay, which harms are

indistinguishable from the harms faced by the applicants who sought a stay of the

Clean Power Plan from this Court. NMA & AP Appl.17–26. Unless this Court grants

a stay, generating facilities hoping to remain operational under the Final Rule must

immediately begin work—including planning, engineering, and other efforts—to even

attempt to install 90% CCS before 2032. NMA & AP Appl.18–19. Deciding to attempt

such a momentous installation is irreversible, and will impose immediate, exorbitant,

and nonrecoverable costs on these facilities. NMA & AP Appl.19–20. The majority

of generating facilities will decide not to engage in that herculean effort and will

instead make irrevocable decisions to retire, unless this Court grants a stay. NMA &

AP Appl.20–22. Those forced plant closures will devastate the Nation’s coal mining

- 10 -

industry—including by forcing a scaling back of capital investment, production, and

jobs—in a manner that cannot be unwound at the end of this litigation. NMA & AP

Appl.22–24. These harms are materially identical to those applicants presented to

this Court when it stayed the Clean Power Plan in 2016, a rule that similarly required

power plants to commence large-scale projects, make near-term commitments to

ensure replacement generation facilities would be operational, and cancel coal

contracts and close coal mines during the pendency of their challenge. NMA & AP

Appl.24–25.

B. EPA does not engage with Applicants’ well-supported harms or refute their

numerous supporting declarations.

See generally Resp.50–56.

Further, and

remarkably, the agency does not even try to dispute that the harms caused by the

Final Rule here are identical in all material respects to the harms that the Clean

Power Plan would have caused absent a stay. Compare NMA & AP Appl.3–4, 18, 24–

25, with Resp.50–56. Instead, EPA takes the unprecedented position that this Court

should defer to EPA’s own technical judgment as to whether a stay is warranted,

Resp.51–52, 54–55, which would make a stay of any rule impossible, as no agency

will ever admit in its rulemaking that its rule will cause more harm than benefit.

EPA’s theory of irreparable harm radically departs from basic principles of

equity, including in the stay context. “Stay applications are nothing new,” and this

Court applies the “same sound principles as other federal courts” when considering

whether to “grant or deny” a stay, even when the stay applicant “seek[s] to stay the

enforcement of a federal regulation against them.” Ohio, 144 S. Ct. at 2052 (citations

- 11 -

omitted; alterations omitted); accord Scripps-Howard Radio v. FCC, 316 U.S. 4, 17

(1942) (“[T]he power to stay [is] a power as old as the judicial system of the nation.”);

Starbucks Corp. v. McKinney, 144 S. Ct. 1570, 1576 (2024). With respect to the

irreparable-harm factor, in particular, those “sound principles” call for the judiciary’s

independent review of a stay-applicant’s claims of harm—including by considering

and weighing the movant’s supporting declarations and in light of the non-movant’s

competing declarations. See Ohio, 144 S. Ct. at 2052; see also, e.g., Barnes v. E-Sys.,

Inc. Grp. Hosp. Med. & Surgical Ins. Plan, 501 U.S. 1301, 1305 (1991) (“It is

ultimately necessary, in other words, to ‘balance the equities’—to explore the relative

harms to applicant and respondent, as well as the interests of the public at large.’”

(citation omitted)); Labrador v. Poe by & through Poe, 144 S. Ct. 921, 923 (2024)

(mem.) (Gorsuch, J., concurring) (“A court’s discretion to enter a stay is [ ] not left up

to its mere inclination, but to its judgment[.]” (citations omitted)); FCC v. Radiofone,

Inc., 516 U.S. 1301, 1301–02 (1995) (Stevens, J., in chambers) (“I am [ ] persuaded

that the harm . . . would outweigh the possible harm to respondent.”). And this

Court’s application of these principles in the context of a “stay [of] the enforcement of

a federal regulation” will “often” result in the conclusion that the stay-applicant has

established irreparable harm from the challenged regulation. Ohio, 144 S. Ct. at

2052.

EPA’s novel understanding of the irreparable-harm inquiry also conflicts with

this Court’s grant of a stay of the Clean Power Plan in 2016. There, the stayapplicants supported their arguments that the Plan would cause them irreparable

- 12 -

harm absent a stay—the same kinds of harms that the National Mining Association

and America’s Power have shown here, supra Part II.A—with multiple declarations,

see, e.g., Stay App. at 38–48, West Virginia v. EPA, No.15A773 (U.S. filed Jan. 26,

2016); Stay App. at 12–21, Basin Elec. Power Coop. v. EPA, No.15A776 (U.S. filed

Jan. 27, 2016). EPA, for its part, disputed the substance of those declarations, see,

e.g., Stay App. Opp’n at 54–69, West Virginia v. EPA, Nos.15A773, 15A776, 15A787,

15A793 (U.S. filed Feb. 2016), and offered declarations of its own, see id. (appendix),

with no argument that this Court should simply accept its say-so in the rule, see

generally id. at 54–69. After considering these competing declarations from the stayapplicants and EPA, this Court granted a stay of the Clean Power Plan, necessarily

concluding that the stay-applicants had established the irreparable-harm factor. See

West Virginia v. EPA, 577 U.S. 1126 (2016) (mem.).

This Court’s grant of a stay in Ohio followed the same course. The stayapplicants supported their claims of irreparable harm from EPA’s “Good Neighbor”

provision and Federal Implementation Plan with numerous declarations. See Stay

App. at 23–26, Ohio v. EPA, No.23A349 (U.S. filed Oct. 2023). Then, EPA attempted

to refute those declarations and submitted its own, Stay App. Opp’n at 43–51, Ohio

v. EPA, Nos.23A349, 23A350, 23A351 (U.S. filed Oct. 2023), without telling this Court

it should not make its own independent judgment, as it does here, see generally id.

This Court granted the stay, concluding that “each side has strong arguments about

the harms they face and equities involved,” including because of the arguments

presented in their supporting declarations.

- 13 -

See Ohio, 144 S. Ct. at 2052–53

(ultimately granting stay due to the stay-applicants’ showing on the likelihood-ofsuccess-on-the-merits factor).

Aside from its nonstarter claim that this Court should defer to the agency’s

technical judgment regarding the Final Rule’s harms, EPA does not meaningfully

dispute Applicants’ robust showing of irreparable harms absent a stay.

EPA claims that power plants and the coal mines that supply them will not

suffer significant harm while their challenge to the Final Rule is pending because

EPA concluded in the Final Rule that power plants will only need to conduct “initial”

or “preliminary” “feasibility work’” before “the June 2026 deadline for submitting

state plans.” Resp.51–53 (citations omitted). But Applicants submitted multiple

declarations refuting EPA’s assessment in the Final Rule and showing that, in fact,

the Final Rule imposes significant and immediate burdens upon their members.

NMA & AP Appl.17–26. EPA does not even attempt to respond to those declarations,

relying only on the erroneous assertions in the very Rule in dispute. See generally

Resp.50–56.

EPA’s effort to belittle the harms that power plants will face under the Final

Rule absent a stay as “initial” or “preliminary,” Resp.51–53, is legally unsound and

factually wrong. A party that suffers significant monetary losses that “cannot be

recouped,” Philip Morris USA Inc. v. Scott, 561 U.S. 1301, 1304 (2010) (Scalia, J., in

chambers), or “nonrecoverable” compliance “costs” from a regulation, Ohio, 144 S. Ct.

at 2053 (citation omitted), suffers irreparable harm, no matter whether those costs

are “initial” or “preliminary,” Resp.52; see, e.g., App.459a–63a (Short Decl. ¶ 3)

- 14 -

(estimating a minimum of $300 million in upfront expenditures over the next 24

months). That is why, again, the stay-applicants challenging the Clean Power Plan

could show that that rule inflicted irreparable harm upon them, although its

compliance deadline was at that point some years away. See Stay App. at 12–21,

Basin Elec. Power Coop. v. EPA, No.15A776 (U.S. filed Jan. 27, 2016). Moreover, the

work that needs to be done is not merely “preliminary,” but rather final, as the

majority of generating facilities will be forced to make irrevocable decisions to retire.

NMA & AP Appl.20–22.

Finally, EPA argues that the compliance costs that power plants will incur

from the Final Rule “will not necessarily be wasted if [they] eventually prevail”

because EPA could impose a different capture-rule in the future. Resp.52–53. But

EPA offers no reason to believe that after it loses this case, the agency will impose a

different CCS requirement in the future. EPA could decide not to impose any CCS

requirement at all, opting instead to create a different kind of rule, based upon a

different type of technology. Consider the recent regulatory history of Section 111(d)

with respect to coal-fired power plants.

After this Court issued the stay that

“prevented [the Clean Power Plan’s generation-shifting mandate] from taking effect,”

the

rule

was

administrations.”

“repealed

[by

EPA]

after

a

West Virginia, 597 U.S. at 699.

change

in

Presidential

Then, under that new

administration, EPA subsequently promulgated “the Affordable Clean Energy (ACE)

rule,” which rule required “a combination of equipment upgrades and [certain]

operating practices,” and no generation shifting or anything like it. Id. After the

- 15 -

most recent change in Presidential administration, EPA then repealed the ACE rule

itself and replaced it with the Final Rule here. App.1a. What the next EPA would

do after it loses this case is thus entirely uncertain.

III.

The Final Rule’s Devastating Consequences Are Contrary To The

Public Interest

A. The public interest weighs strongly for a stay, as it did in 2016 when this

Court stayed the Clean Power Plan. NMA & AP Appl.26–30. The Rule’s mandated,

irreversible mine closures and operational reductions will eliminate well-paying jobs

in communities where such jobs are rare. NMA & AP Appl.26–27. Mine closures will

cost federal, state, and local governments millions of dollars attributable to mining

jobs, in addition to the substantial royalties now paid to state and local governments

and the Navajo Nation. NMA & AP Appl.27–28. Absent a stay, the Final Rule will

jeopardize the Nation’s vulnerable electricity grid, risking many electricity

consumers’ access to reliable and affordable electricity and raising costs while power

demand soars. See NMA & AP Appl.28–29. Other federal agencies have recognized

that the Final Rule forces the hand of existing power plants. As a Commissioner of

the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (“FERC”) recently explained, the Final

Rule “will force the retirements of nearly all remaining coal generation plants and

will prevent the construction of vitally needed new combined-cycle baseload gas

generation.” Comm’r Mark C. Christie, FERC, Letter Responding to House Comm.

on Energy & Com.’s Questions Regarding Clean Power Plan 2.0 at 2 (Aug. 13, 2024).

Further, these concerns are analogous to those set forth by the States when seeking

a stay of the Clean Power Plan. See NMA & AP Appl.29–30. Neither EPA nor the

- 16 -

public will suffer any harm from a stay, as the public interest favors stopping illegal

agency rules, and the public is not harmed by ensuring the continued operations of

the coal-fired power plants that help sustain the country’s economy and electricity

grid. NMA & AP App.30.

B. EPA does not engage with these public-interest arguments, including the

point that the public’s interest here is the same as it was when this Court stayed the

Clean Power Plan in 2016. Compare NMA & AP Appl.26–30, with Resp.56–58.

Instead, the agency claims only that a stay of the Final Rule will delay the realization

of its purported benefits in combating climate change.

Resp.56–58.

In the

proceedings below, however, EPA repeatedly claimed that “market forces and other

factors” have already “been driving a transition of the electric power sector away from

coal generation,” and that this “market-driven decrease in coal generation is expected

to continue,” D.C. Cir. No.24-1120, Doc. 2059170 at 9; see also id. at 24–25, 28, 93–

94, echoing views rejected by a majority of this Court in West Virginia, 597 U.S. at

774–75 (Kagan, J., dissenting); see id. at 724–32. Thus, if EPA believes that this

trend away from coal-fired power plants will continue in the absence of its own heavyhanded regulations, then it cannot claim now that implementation of its Final Rule

is necessary to stem the “serious harm,” Resp.58, of climate change.

CONCLUSION

This Court should stay the Final Rule pending judicial review.

- 17 -

Respectfully submitted,

CARROLL WADE MCGUFFEY III

TROUTMAN PEPPER

HAMILTON SANDERS LLP

600 Peachtree St. N.E.

Suite 3000

Atlanta, GA 30308

August 2024

/s/ Misha Tseytlin

MISHA TSEYTLIN

Counsel of Record

KAITLIN L. O’DONNELL

CARLY ROTHMAN SIDITSKY

KEVIN M. LEROY

TROUTMAN PEPPER

HAMILTON SANDERS LLP

227 W. Monroe, Suite 3900

Chicago, Illinois 60606

(608) 999-1240

(312) 759-1939 (fax)

misha.tseytlin@troutman.com

- 18 -

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

A word about cookies

We need a few to keep you signed in and the library working. The rest help us see which pages people use and where they get stuck. They stay off unless you say yes.