Emergency Application — Westmoreland Mining Holdings LLC, et al., Applicants v. Environmental Protection Agency, et al.
Supreme Court briefAug 16, 2024
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
APPENDIX A
Order Denying Stay, State of North Dakota v. EPA,
No. 24-1119 (D.C. Circuit, August 6, 2024) ………………………………… App.1
APPENDIX B
42 U.S.C. § 7412 ………………………………………………………………… App.3
APPENDIX C
National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants:
Coal- and Oil-Fired Electric Utility Steam Generating Units
Review of the Residual Risk and Technology Review,
89 Fed. Reg. 38508 (May 7, 2024) ……………………………………….…..App.34
APPENDIX D
Comments of Westmoreland Mining Holdings LLC,
EPA-HQ-OAR-2018-0794-5935………………………………………..…… App.120
APPENDIX E
Comments of Northwestern Energy,
EPA-HQ-OAR-2018-0794-5980……………………………………………...App.226
APPENDIX F
Comments of National Mining Association,
EPA-HQ-OAR-2009-0234-20531…………………………………………….App.251
APPENDIX G
Comments of Talen Montana,
EPA-HQ-OAR-2018-0794-5987……………………………………………...App.443
APPENDIX H
Declarations:
Exhibit 1 – Declaration of Patrick Barkey ………………………. App.484
Exhibit 2 – Declaration of Jeremy Cottrell …………………...…. App.518
APPENDIX D
APPENDIX
eee ese
@ WESTMORELAND
ne Tree, CO 80124
303.922.6463
www.wesimoreland.com
July 22, 2023
Docket ID No. EPA-HQ-OAR-2018-0794
ATTN:
Administrator Michael Regan
C/O EPA Docket Center (EPA/DC)
Docket ID No. EPA-HQ-OAR-2018-0794
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
Submitted via Federal eRulemaking Portal (Regulations.gov)
RE:
Comments of Westmoreland Mining Holdings LLC (“Westmoreland”) on
the “National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants: Coal- and
Oil-Fired Electric Utility Steam Generating Units Review of the Residual
Risk and Technology Review” 88 Fed. Reg. 24854 (April 24, 2023)
(“Proposed Rule”).
Dear Administrator Regan:
Westmoreland Mining Holdings LLC (“Westmoreland”) presents the following comments
regarding EPA’s proposed rulemaking titled “National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air
Pollutants: Coal- and Oil-Fired Electric Utility Steam Generating Units Review of the Residual
Risk and Technology Review,” published in the Federal Register at 88 Fed. Reg. 24854, on April
24, 2023 (hereafter, the “Proposed Rule”). Westmoreland supplies all coal required by the mine-
mouth powerplant in Colstrip Montana.
This proposed rulemaking has significant implications for coal fired power plants in
general and disproportionately impacts one facility in particular, the Colstrip Power Plant in
Colstrip, Montana. Under EPA’s proposal, the rule at issue would impose tens of millions of
dollars on Colstrip per year and require temporary shutdown to design and retrofit additional
emission controls, despite the fact that EPA has now determined multiple times that the existing
standards provide an ample margin of safety to protect public health and that more stringent
standards are not necessary to prevent an adverse environmental effect.
For these reasons and those discussed below, the Proposed Rule does not demonstrate that
its proposed technology-review-based emission standards are in fact “necessary” in terms of cost,
feasibility, utility, cost-effectiveness, and adverse collateral environmental impacts. Accordingly,
Westmoreland offers the following comments herein regarding specific issues with the Proposed
Rule and its supporting analysis.
App.120
In the event that EPA instead finalizes different limits than those in the Proposed Rule,
EPA must at that time provide a rationale for such inclusion and provide opportunity for public
comment on any such newly proposed limits.
Any Limits Proposed by EPA Must Appropriately Account for Cost, Feasibility, Utility, Cost
Effectiveness, and Adverse Environmental Impacts Associated With Proposed Technology
Major source emission standards under section 112 of the CAA are initially be based on
“the maximum degree of reduction in emissions of the hazardous air pollutants . . . that the
Administrator, taking into consideration the cost of achieving such emission reduction, and any
non-air quality health and environmental impacts and energy requirements, determines is
achievable for new or existing sources.” See 42 U.S. Code § 7412(d)(2)(a). EPA then must conduct
a “technology review” of these established limits every 8 years, in which EPA “shall review, and
revise as necessary (taking into account developments in practices, processes, and control
technologies), emission standards promulgated under this section.” See 42 U.S. Code § 7412(d)(6).
Importantly, during a technology review, EPA is not required to recalculate the maximum
achievable control technology floor. Ass'n of Battery Recyclers, Inc. v. E.P.A., 716 F.3d 667, 673
(D.C. Cir. 2013). Nor does EPA claim to do so in the Proposed Rule. When determining whether
changes are “necessary” as part of a technology review EPA is statutorily required to account for
the cost of any proposed changes. Jd. And courts have upheld EPA’s past practice of further taking
into account “feasibility, utility, cost-effectiveness, and adverse collateral environmental impacts
associated with this technology” when assessing whether to require additional limits as part ofa
technology review. Jd. at 674. And because EPA has relied on such factors in the past, it would be
unlawfully arbitrary for EPA to fail to consider such factors in this or other technology reviews
without providing a rationale for the reversal in policy. FCC v. Fox Te elevision Stations, Inc., 556
U.S. 502 (2009) (“An agency may not . . . depart from a prior policy sub silentio”). The Proposed
Rule purports to be solely based on EPA’s technology review authority, and thus must account for
these factors including cost, feasibility, utility, cost-effectiveness, and adverse collateral
environmental impacts.!
The Proposed
Rule is Not Cost Effective, and EPA’s
Determination
to the Contrary
is
Arbitrary and Unreasonable
The proposed tule seeks to impose an eight-figure cost-per-ton of emission reduction. Not
only is there no reasonable basis to find cost effectiveness of this magnitude to be cost effective,
but it is also so far afield from prior EPA cost effectiveness determinations as to be arbitrary and.
is in direct conflict with prior EPA determinations that such costs are in fact not cost effective.
The Proposed Rule itself estimates that lowering the {PM standard to 0.010 Ib/MMBtu
million
would only reduce industrywide metal HAP by about 6 tons per year but would cost $77.3
on a
1 Although EPA also has authority to make changes to an existing emission standard under Section 112 based
safety to protect public
“residual risk” analysis of whether an emission standard provides an “ample margin of
determination that the
2020
EPA’s
reaffirms
health.” See 42 U.S. Code § 7412(f), the Proposed Rule expressly
and that more
current MATS requirements already provided an ample margin of safety to protect public health
not rely on that
does
thus
and
effect,
al
environment
adverse
an
stringent standards were not necessary to prevent
24865-66.
at
Rule
Proposed
See
limits.
emission
basis for any of the proposed additional
3
App.121
to $93.2 million per year. See Proposed Rule at 24870, Table 3. Thus, the total cost effectiveness
of the proposed reduction is 12.2 million to 14.7 million dollars per ton of non-hg metal HAP
controlled. EPA has never endorsed such extraordinary costs for such meager rewards and doing
so here would be arbitrary and capricious.
Indeed, even the low end of EPA’s estimate—$12.2 million per ton of emission reduction
— dwarfs other cost-per-ton calculations previously rejected by EPA as not cost effective. See, e.g.,
85 Fed. Reg. 42074, 42090 (July 13, 2020) (rejecting an “estimated cost effectiveness ... [of]
approximately $14,000/ton,” because it “is above the range that the EPA has typically considered
cost effective for volatile HAP”); see also 78 Fed. Reg. 10006, 10020-21 (Feb. 12, 2013) (rejecting
more stringent limit of 0.04 Ib/ton, versus the then-current limit of 0.07 Ib/ton, reasoning that
achieving that additional increment of particulate reduction would not be cost effective on a costper-ton basis because “$268,000
per ton of PM
removed
... is [a] significantly higher cost
effectiveness for PM than the EPA has accepted in other NESHAP standards”) (citing 76 Fed.
Reg. 15704 (March 21, 2011) (rejecting $48,501 per ton of PM as not cost effective for PM emitted
by solid waste energy recovery units)). Likewise, in a report titled The Benefits and Costs of the
Clean Air Act from 1990 to 2020 (released in April 2011), EPA noted in the specific context of
PM, that “controls more costly than $15,000 per ton may not be cost-effective,” and acknowledged
that “[c]ontinued effort is needed to ensure that air pollution policies are pursued in the most cost-
effective manner possible.”?? And just earlier this year, EPA rejected, on cost-effectiveness
grounds,
imposition of lead controls that would,
effectiveness of $4.7M/ton,”
which
EPA
for at least one facility, result in “a cost
acknowledged
“is considerably higher than cost
effectiveness values we have historically accepted for lead.” See, e.g., 88 Fed. Reg. 11556, 11565
(February 23, 2023). The proposed rule’s cost effectiveness of $12-14 million per ton of regulated
pollutant emissions is not aligned with EPA’s policy, precedent, or obligation to pursue air
pollution policies “in the most cost-effective manner possible,” and would arbitrarily conflict with
every single prior cost-effectiveness determination EPA has made in analogous contexts.
The few instances in which EPA has found imposition costs per ton in the same order of
magnitude as the Proposed Rule to be cost effective is exclusively in the context of highly toxic
chemicals e.g. hexavalent chromium, or ethylene oxide. And even then, EPA only proposed such
high cost-per-ton of emissions reduced to be cost effective when such reductions were necessary
to provide an ample margin of safety under residual risk reviews. Those examples thus could not
be used to justify the Proposed Rule (and notably, EPA properly does not do so). In fact, EPA
expressly determined in 2020 that the current NESHAP
limit for coal fired power plants was
sufficiently protective of human health and the environment, and that no further reductions were
required. The Proposed Rule expressly agrees with its 2020 finding and makes clear that EPA is
“not proposing any revisions to the 2020 determination” “that the current MATS requirements
2 Report is available at https://www.epa.gov/sites/default/files/20 1 5-07/documents/fullreport_rev_a.pdf
to a
3 EPA assumes total {PM reductions of 2,074 tons/year (Proposed Rule at 24870, Table 3), which would equate
cost
not
found
specifically
cost effectiveness of $37,270 to $44,937 per ton of {PM, well over the costs that EPA has
additional
whether
on
focused
is
112
effective for {PM as well. But regardless, because an RtR review under Section
control of regulated HAP is “necessary” the cost effectiveness analysis should focus on the regulated HAP rather
than justification in terms of non-HAP reductions.
4
App.122
provided an ample margin of safety to protect public health in accordance with CAA section 112
... [and] that more stringent standards were not necessary to prevent an adverse environmental
effect.” (Proposed Rule at 24865-66.) It is therefore arbitrary and capricious for EPA to impose
such unprecedented costs on facilities, particularly when the reduction will only result in a
marginal reduction of emissions that even EPA agrees are not posing unreasonable risk to the
environment or public health.
Furthermore, EPA’s rationale for imposing such exorbitant compliance costs is a non-
sequitur. EPA justifies the costs “[bJecause much of the fleet is already” in compliance with the
proposed limit, and therefore the costs “are modest in the context of total control costs and
emissions of the coal fleet.” But the control costs of the coal fleet at large is not the relevant metric
because, as EPA points out, much of the fleet will not incur such high substantial additional costs.
Instead, the tens of millions of dollars of annual compliance costs will fall disproportionately on a
few facilities.
For Colstrip in particular, EPA estimates an annualized cost of $38,051,172.4 EPA
does not adequately justify its proposal of forcing a few facilities to incur massive compliance
costs, only to incrementally reduce emissions that have already been reduced to a level which EPA
agrees poses no danger to the environment or public health. The fact that the cost will be
disproportionately allocated to a few facilities, and most facilities will not incur any additional
costs, serves only to highlight the arbitrary and capricious nature of the Proposed Rule. After all,
it is arbitrary to justify imposition of cost-ineffective proposals by averaging the cost across all
power plants not in fact impacted by the massive costs, just as it would be arbitrary to conclude
that imposing cost-ineffective controls was cost justified in comparison to profits across all other
sectors of the US economy not impacted by the Proposed Rule.
Not only is EPA’s rationale arbitrary on its face, but it is also arbitrary because it reverses,
without explanation, EPA’s
prior acknowledgements that cost-effectiveness should account for the
cost effectiveness of imposing controls at each affected facility, and not simply on an aggregate
nationwide basis. See, e.g., 88 Fed. Reg. 11556, 11565 (February 23, 2023) (rejecting on cost
effectiveness grounds a lead emission requirement because it would have imposed costs on a single
facility “a cost effectiveness of $4.7M/ton,” which EPA acknowledged “is considerably higher
than cost effectiveness values we have historically accepted for lead.”).
EPA’s Cost Analysis is Unreasonable and Arbitrary
The other elements of EPA’s cost analysis underlying the Proposed Rule are likewise
arbitrary or otherwise unsupported in several key respects:
First, the monetized benefits that EPA weighs against the above discussed costs are based
entirely on non-HAP (i.e., PM2.s, Ozone, and COz).° This is not reasonable or appropriate, because
the statutory requirement that revised technology standards under section 1 12(d)(6) be “necessary”
4 $18,992,866 for one unit, and $19,058,306 for the other. See 2023 Technology Review for the Coal- and Oil-Fired
EGU Source Category, at 80, Appendix D, Docket ID. EPA-HQ-OAR-2018-0794-5789 (“Technology Review
TSD”)
5 See Proposed Rule at 24891 (projecting monetized benefits of $3.3 billion in present value, or expected annual
value of $390 million, based solely on anticipated reductions of PM2s, Ozone, and CO, that are expected to occur as
an indirect effect of this Proposed Rule).
5
App.123
must be understood in the context of section 112, which applies solely to HAPs (and in fact bars
the regulation of criteria pollutants as HAPs), and thus a finding that a specific control on a specific
regulated HAP is “necessary” must be justified by the benefits derived from additional regulation
of that specific HAP, and not based on benefits that might be associated with non-HAP.
Furthermore, EPA’s reliance on non-HAP reduction benefits to justify the cost of proposed
controls is arbitrary because it departs from EPA’s prior related rulemakings without adequate
explanation. Specifically, when assessing the appropriateness of taking into account benefits of
non-HAP reductions in the context of the Clean Air Act’s HAP regulations of fossil fuel fired
power plants under section 112 of the Clean Air Act, EPA found in 2020 that “equal reliance on
the particulate matter (PM) air quality co-benefits projected to occur as a result of the reductions
in HAP was flawed as the focus of CAA section 112(n)(1)(A) is HAP emissions reductions.”®
More specifically, “it would be highly illogical for the Agency to make a determination that
regulation under CAA section 112, which is expressly designed to deal with HAP, is justified
principally on the basis of the criteria pollutant impacts of these regulations. That is, if the HAP
related benefits are not at least moderately commensurate with the cost of HAP controls, then no
amount of co-benefits can offset this imbalance for purposes of a determination that it is
appropriate to regulate under CAA section 112(n)(1)(A).” Although EPA later rescinded the
particular rulemaking containing this analysis, EPA did not abandon this specific determination
regarding the appropriateness of using non-HAP co-benefits to justify section 112 HAP
regulations, instead making a specific finding that “under its preferred approach, the EPA finds
regulating EGU HAP emissions is appropriate without consideration of non-HAP emissions
reductions”.’ Although CAA Sections 112(n)(1)(A) and 112(d)(6) are separate statutory
provisions, both turn on whether regulation is “necessary” in the specific context of section 112,
and thus the cost/benefit analysis must be treated consistently. Accordingly, it is unlawful and
arbitrarily inconsistent with prior EPA actions to justify the costs and burdens of the Proposed
Rule by resort to non-HAP co-reductions.
Second, the Proposed Rule states that its calculation of estimated benefits related to
decreased CO2 emissions are based on an interim Social Cost of Carbon estimate developed by an
Interagency Working Group in February 2021 ® Those estimates, relied on in the Proposed Rule,
are in turn “identical to those reported in the 2016 SC-GHG TSD (WG 2016a) adjusted for
inflation to 2019 doliars.”” It is not reasonable for EPA to rely on these social cost of carbon
6 See “Proposed Rule: National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants: Coal- and Oil-Fired Electric
Utility Steam Generating Units—Reconsideration of Supplemental Finding and Residual Risk and Technology
Review,” 84 Fed. Reg. 2670, 2676; see also “Final Rule: National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants:
Coal- and Oil-Fired Electric Utility Steam Generating Units—Reconsideration of Supplemental Finding and
Residual Risk and Technology Review,” 85 Fed. Reg. 31,286, 31,299 (May 22, 2020) (“finalizing the determination
outlined in the 2019 Proposal”).
7 See “National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants: Coal- and Oil-Fired Electric Utility Steam
Generating Units—Revocation of the 2020 Reconsideration and Affirmation of the Appropriate and Necessary
Supplemental Finding,” 88 Fed. Reg. 13956, 13967 (March 6, 2023).
8 Proposed Rule at 24890 (citing “Technical Support Document: Social Cost of Carbon, Methane, and Nitrous Oxide
interim Estimates under Executive Order 13990,” (Feb. 2021), available at https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-
content/uploads/202 1/02/TechnicalSupportDocument_SocialCostofCarbonMethaneNitrousOxide.pdf).
9 See “Final version of the RIA for the Proposed EGU MATS RTR,” At 4-49, Table 4-11, Docket ID. EPA-HQ-
OAR-2018-0794-5837,
6
App.124
estimates, given the many issues identified with the arbitrariness and unlawfulness of these very
same social cost of carbon estimates by stakeholders and states in other litigation to which EPA
has been a party, without addressing the flaws that have been identified to EPA in such lawsuits.!°
Specifically, it is arbitrary for EPA to fail to address relevant considerations, and these many
challenges to the validity and reliability of the 2021 social cost of carbon estimates are relevant
as
considerations which EPA must address before deciding to rely on those estimates.'' And
further detailed in the complaints and motions for preliminary injunction specifically referenced
in footnote 10 above, which are hereby incorporated by reference into these comments, EPA
reliance on the IWG2021 cost of carbon estimates is unlawful and arbitrary, because the IWG2021
expressly violates statutory prohibitions, is based on a fundamentally flawed methodology that
does not take into account statutory considerations, ignores decades of best regulatory practices,
and sub silentio departs from regulatory documents that remain in force. For example:
a. The underlying 2021 Interim Working Group assessment (IWG 2021) reflects a policy and
value judgment to consider the anticipated global effects of greenhouse gases, not just their
anticipated effects within the United States. [WG2021 at 14-16. But reliance on global
impacts directly conflict with the text and structure of the Clean Air Act, both by
considering factors not permitted by Congress (Le., global impacts) and neglecting to
consider relevant statutory factors and their unmistakably domestic focus. In adopting the
CAA, Congress made several specific findings, all of which are explicitly domestic. See
42 U.S.C. §7401(a)(1)-(4) (referring to “the Nation’s population,” the “responsibility of
States and local governments,” and “cooperative Federal, State, regional, and local
programs to prevent and control air pollution”). Congress also made clear that CAA
so
programs are designed to protect and enhance the quality of the Nation’s air resources
as to promote the public health and welfare and the productive capacity of its population.”
the
Id. §7401(b)(1) (emphasis added). To implement this design, the CAA authorizes
Administrator of EPA to set air pollution standards for new motor vehicles and stationary
sources, “which may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health or welfare.” Id.
§§ 7411(b)(1)(A), 7521{a)(1). Nowhere is the Administrator authorized to consider global
effects in setting these vitally important standards. The structure of the CAA likewise
confirms that agencies may not consider global effects. When Congress addresses global
the
effects through the CAA, it does so through a specific process in Section 115. There
reason
Administrator is instructed to instate a formal State SIP plan process when he “has
or
cause
to believe that any air pollutant or pollutants emitted in the United States
contribute to air pollution which may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health
or welfare in a foreign country.” 42 U.S.C. §7415(a). When EPA wishes to consider foreign
the other
effects of air pollution, it can only through this specific process—not through
10 See Missouri v. Biden, No. 4:21-cv-00287 (E.D. Mo., complaint filed, and motion for preliminary
injunction filed
April 22, 2021, and motion for
May 3, 2021); Louisiana v. Biden, No. 2:21-cv-01074 (W.D. La., complaint filed
preliminary injunction filed July 29, 2021).
11 See FCC vy, Prometheus Radio Project, 141 S. Ct.
1150, 1158 (2021) (When an agency acts, it must “reasonably
see also Michigan v. EPA,
consider[] the relevant issues and reasonably explain[]” its actions) (citations omitted);
of the relevant factors”
ion
considerat
a
on
rests
it
if
only
576 U.S. 743, 751-52 (2015) (“[Algency action is lawful
omitted).
citations
and
quotations
and “important aspects] of the problem.”) (internal
7
App.125
provisions of CAA, which are explicitly focused on domestic effects. This conclusion is
further buttressed by the fact that when Congress wishes for agencies to consider
international effects, it does so explicitly. For example, in the Energy Independence and
Security Act of 2007’s amendment to EPCA, Congress created an International Clean
Energy Foundation entirely separate from the CAFE and energy efficiency programs to
study international implications of greenhouse gases. See 42 U.S.C. §17352(a)(3). By
creating such a separate authority Congress demonstrates that it knows how to clearly
instruct agencies to consider international effects. Cf Morrison v. Nat’l Australia Bank
Lid.,
561
U.S.
247,
255
(2010)
statute
(“When a
gives
no
clear indication
of an
extraterritorial application, it has none. ”); ¢f Corrosion Proof Fittings v. E.P.A., 947 F.2d
1201, 1209 (5th Cir. 1991) (international considerations cannot be implied when statue
“provides a laundry list of factors to consider when promulgating a rule under section 6,
including ‘the effect [of the rule] on the national economy” and “[i|nternational concerns
are conspicuously absent from the statute”). Accordingly, reliance on the [WG2021
explicitly and unlawfully conflicts with the text and structure of the Clean Air Act. Agency
action is unlawful if it is “not in accordance with law” or “in excess of statutory jurisdiction,
authority, or limitations.” 5 U.S.C. §706(2)(A) & (C).
. EPA’s reliance on IWG2021 ignores specific factual findings and decisions made by the
previous EPA Administration and other federal agencies. In the first place, WG2021’s
reliance on global impacts, in addition to being unlawful, as described above, also
arbitrarily departs from decades of prior EPA practice and the directives of OMB Circular
A-4. See Arden Rowell, Foreign Impacts and Climate Change, 39 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev.
371, 389 (2015) (observing that “agencies have used [the domestic scope] in their cost-
benefit analyses for decades”). Indeed, IWG2021 concedes that “[b]enefit-cost analysis of
U.S. Federal regulations have traditionally focused on the benefits and costs that accrue to
individuals that reside within the country’s national boundaries.” [WG2021 at 14. Cf
California v. Bernhardt, 472 F. Supp.
3d 573, 600-01
(N.D.
Cal. 2020)
(“While the
Executive branch holds the power to issue executive orders, an agency cannot flip-flop
regulations on the whims of each new administration. The APA requires reasoning,
deliberation, and process. These requirements exist, in part, because markets and industries
rely on stable regulations.”). But [WG2021
does not actually acknowledge that it broke
with OMB Circular A-4’s clear and reasoned directive to “focus on benefits and costs that
accrue to citizens and residents of the United States.” Circular A-4, at 15. Instead,
IWG2021, like its predecessor, attempts to argue that its global focus is somehow
consistent with Circular A-4’s domestic effects framework. See Rowell, supra, at 397 0.138
(“The IWG’s choice of a standardized global SCC thus deviates from [Circular A-4’s]
guidance in two important ways: in focusing on foreign impacts, and in encouraging
agencies to value, calculate, and make decisions based upon a global SCC that does not
require any separate identification, much less consideration, of domestic impacts.”). By
misrepresenting Circular A-4’s clear guidance, the IWG2021 arbitrarily failed to “display
awareness that it is changing position.” See Fox Television Stations, 556 U.S. at 515 (“An
agency may not, for example, depart from a prior policy sub silentio or simply disregard
rules that are still on the books.”). Moreover, the IWG2021 completely ignores the
8
App.126
extensive discussion and findings regarding discount rates and uncertainty in Chapter 7 of
the EPA’s RIA supporting the repeal of the Clean Power Plan. See EPA, Regulatory Impact
Analysis for the Review of the Clean Power Plan, at 7-2 through 7-8 (June 2019), Docket
ID EPA-HQ-OAR-2017-0355-26743; EPA, Regulatory Impact Analysis for the Review of
the Clean Power Plan: Proposal, at 42-46 (Oct. 2017), Docket ID EPA-HQ-OAR-20170355-0110.
Moreover,
[WG2021
arbitrarily departed
from decades
of prior Executive
Branch cost/benefit practice regarding discount rates. As embodied in OMB Circular A-4,
Executive Branch agencies have long utilized standard discount rates of 3 percent and 7
percent. See Arden Rowell, Foreign Impacts and Climate Change, 39 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev.
371, 385 n.88 (2015) (“Agencies typically discount at 3% and 7%, the rates set forth in
OMB Circular A-4, which provides well-established executive guidance to agencies
performing cost-benefit analysis.”). The TWG fundamentally alters this longstanding
practice without a reasoned justification. Circular A-4 explains that the 7 percent discount
rate is essential to reasoned cost/benefit analysis because “it is a broad measure that reflects
the returns to real estate and small business capital as well as corporate capital” and
“approximates the opportunity cost of capital.” Circular A-4, at 33. Therefore, the 7 percent
discount rate “is the appropriate discount rate whenever the main effect of a regulation is
to displace or alter the use of capital in the private sector.” /d. Neither the Proposed Rule
nor IWG2021
assert that the fundamentals
of economics
have changed
in a manner
justifying abandoning the longstanding 7 percent discount rate. Instead, to reach a higher
SC-GHG valuation, the Proposed Rule simply ignores the effects that regulations have on
“the use of capital in the private sector” by instead stating that the use of 3% or lower
discount rate is appropriate due to “intergenerational impacts” (Proposed Rule at 24894).
But this capital measure, as long recognized by Circular A-4, and Executive Branch
agencies, is an indispensable variable when calculating regulatory costs. By directing
agencies to ignore it, the [WG2021 estimates direct agencies to systematically ignore an
important aspect of any regulatory cost/benefit analysis. EPA’s failure to address these
prior fact findings by itself renders EPA’s reliance on [WG 2021 Estimates arbitrary and
capricious. See F.C.C. v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502, 515 (2009) (agency
required to “provide a more detailed justification than what would suffice for a new policy
created on a blank slate” when “its new policy rests upon factual findings that contradict
those which underlay its prior policy”); see also Dep ’t of Homeland Sec. y. Regents of the
Univ. of Cal., 140 S. Ct. 1891, 1912 (2020) (agency’s “prior judgment” or factual finding
cannot be ignored
alternative).
“without
any
consideration
whatsoever”
of the prior
finding
or
Similarly, EPA’s reliance on IWG2021 ignores the relevant fact that other agencies have
rejected [WG2021 and its approaches. For example, 1WG2021 does not even acknowledge
the existence
of the Council
on Environmental
Quality’s
final rule regarding
the
appropriate calculation of uncertainty under NEPA, which finalized revisions to its binding
NEPA regulations to “simplify the definition of effects by striking the specific references
to direct, indirect, and cumulative effects and providing clarity on the bounds of effects
App.127
consistent with the Supreme Court’s holding in Public Citizen.”'? As agencies have
observed, CEQ’s NEPA regulation “explains that agencies should not consider effects that
are ‘remote in time, geographically remote, or the result of a lengthy causal chain.’””?
Instead, “[u]nder this standard, the mere fact that an effect might not occur ‘but for’ the
project is not sufficient to trigger a NEPA analysis; rather, there must be a ‘reasonably
close causal relationship’ between the proposed action and the effect, ‘analogous to
proximate cause in tort law.’” Jd. This proximate cause standard is fundamentally at odds
with the expansive approach to causation embedded in the [WG2021, which are much
closer to the but-for standard that CEQ explicitly considered and rejected. The [WG does
not even acknowledge the existence of CEQ’s standard—or that it is compelling agencies
to use a fundamentally different causation standard when calculating environmental effects
for cost/benefit purposes than the standard they must use when calculating the same effects
under NEPA. Furthermore the Bureau of Land Management found that the IWG2016 on
which the IWG2021 is based “is not appropriate” because “‘it is intended to model effects
on the welfare of future generations on a global scale by additional carbon emissions
occurring in the present,” “[m]onetizing only certain effects on social welfare can lead to
an unbalanced assessment,” and “[r]eporting the SCC in isolation would be misleading.”
BLM, Record of Decision, WY-060-EA13-147 (Nov. 30, 2017) (regarding West Antelope
Il South Lease Modification WY W-177903; see also WildEarth Guardians vy. Bernhardt,
2020 WL 6799068, at *11 (D.N.M. Nov. 19, 2020) (affirming BLM’s refusal to use SCC).
d.
The IWG2021 fails to justify the use of a global rather than domestic scope in calculating
costs. Focusing on global effects is particularly unreasoned in the context of greenhouse
gas emissions. As one court has noted, “Greenhouse gases, once emitted from a specific
source, quickly mix and disperse in the global atmosphere and have a long atmospheric
lifetime. Current research on how greenhouse gases influence global climate change has
focused on the cumulative environmental effects from aggregate regional or global sources.
But there is limited scientific capability in assessing, detecting, or measuring the
relationship between a certain GHG emission source and localized climate impacts in a
given region.” Washington Env’t Council v. Bellon, 732. F.3d 1131, 1143-44 (9th Cir.
2013). Thus, calculating the global effect of any discrete regulated activity is inherently
arbitrary. Jd. (noting that “the effect of collective emissions from the Oil Refineries on
global climate change is ‘scientifically indiscernible”).
e.
IWG2021
fails to consider all important aspects of the problem by failing to consider the
positive externalities of energy production. [WG2021 arbitrarily focused only upon energy
production’s negative aspects without discounting costs based on the concomitant benefits
affordable energy has on economic development, social welfare, economic and energy
independence, and international peace. Instead, it continued to rely upon flawed integrated
assessment models (IAMs) that arbitrarily refuse to consider potential benefits from a
12 CEQ, “Update to the Regulations Implementing the Procedural Provisions of the National Environmental Policy
Act,” 85 Fed. Reg. 43304, 43375 (July 16, 2020).
'3 Qualifying Facility Rates & Requirements Implementation Issues Under the Pub. Util. Regul. Pol’y Act of 1978,
173 FERC § 61158 n.790 (2020) (quoting id.).
10
App.128
the input of [WG2021 (id.
warming climate. The DICE Model, which accounts for 1/3 of
g-related diseases but
at 10), focuses exclusively upon increased mortality from warmin
Dudley et al., The
ignores decreased mortality from wintertime mortality. See Susan E.
on the Benefits and
Office of Management and Budget’s Draft 2010 Report to Congress
Center, see also Arden
Costs of Federal Regulations, at 12, GW Regulatory Studies
L. Rev. 371, 383 (2015)
Rowell, Foreign Impacts and Climate Change, 39 Harv. Envtl.
models, the IWG
(“[L]acking any principled mechanism for distinguishing between the
each model as one third
decided to simply average them. This had the effect of weighting
refuse to consider
of the SCC.”). Both [1WG2021 and its underlying models systematically
science to a particular
economic and health benefits, indicating a determination to bend
policy outcome.
There is a “significant mismatch”
between the conclusions of the IWG2021
and the
Ct. 2551, 2575 (2019).
administrative record. See Dep’t of Commerce v. New York, 139 S.
ted models, needs
IWG2021 itself recognized that its SC-GHG Estimate is based on antiqua
ork. But instead of
updating to reflect changed circumstance, and based largely on guessw
out the SC-GHG
addressing these serious shortcomings, the Working Group rushed
able reason for this
Estimates in a hurried process with no outside input. The only discern
up with the most
rush was to comply with EO 13990’s demand that the IWG come
Texas v. United States,
important number in American regulatory policy in a month. Cf
that a similar time frame “did
2021 WL 723856, at *41 (S.D. Tex. Feb. 23, 2021) (noting
l reasons can be a
not leave much time for reflection and analysis”). Although politica
accountability by refusing to
legitimate basis for agency action, agencies cannot avoid
decisionmaking, Dep't of
frankly acknowledge the influence of such reasons on their
nect between the decision
Commerce, 139 S. Ct. at 2575 (“[W]e cannot ignore the discon
d to exhibit a naiveté from
made and the Case explanation given [and] are ‘not require
ther, the evidence’—that
which ordinary citizens are free.’”) (cleaned up). “Altoge
-- “tells a story that does not
1WG2016 was at a minimum, insufficient and out of date
decision.” /d. Because IWG2021
match the explanation the [Working Group] gave for [its]
ledging the political
dresses up a political decision in the cloak of science without acknow
drivers of the decision, it is arbitrary and capricious.
21 uses to produce social
_ Both the underlying models themselves and the process 1WG20
acknowledged that the task of
cost values from them are inherently unreliable. [WG2021
ting to predict global “changes
assigning “social costs” to greenhouse gases involves attemp
ty damage from increased
in net agricultural productivity, human health effects, proper
s, risk of conflict, environmental
flood risk natural disasters, disruption of energy system
at 2. This includes “spillover
migration, and the value of ecosystem services.” IWG2021
and global migration.” Jd. at 3. In
pathways such as economic and political destabilization
unknowable contingencies as the
other words, this task involves attempting to predict such
ational conflicts and human
likelihood, frequency, scope, and severity of future intern
Group also admitted that its
migrations for 300 years into the future. Id. The Working
opments in human technology and
calculations involve attempting to predict future devel
195
gies performed by the world’s
innovation for centuries to come, future mitigation strate
11
App.129
nations, and global atmospheric concentrations due to greenhouse gas emissions. /d. at 1516. The underlying models estimates of climate impacts out to the year 2300 represent “a
significantly longer time scale than is generally included in such analyses, which do not
typically extend further than fifty years.” Rowell, supra at 386. This time horizon is
inherently arbitrary and cannot serve as a reasoned basis for regulatory prediction given
the impossibility of forecasting that far into the future. For example, estimating costs
incurred almost 300 years in the future would require considering how well someone living
in 1720 could have projected the societal values and vulnerabilities of 2020, including
markets, levels of economic output, technologies, and lifestyle preferences. Market seers
of 1720 would have overemphasized the importance of protecting against a future threat to
the supply of horses, given that horses and other animals provided the sole source of
locomotion on land other than walking. As noted above, the models are also flawed because
they
systematically
undervalue
or entirely
ignore positive
externalities
from
energy
production. And the [WG added another layer of arbitrariness in its method of using these
arbitrary models to come to the SC-GHG Estimates. Each model produces different SCGHG values. Instead of accounting for the relative flaws and strengths of each model, the
IWG 2021 simply averages the SC-GHG values produced by these models to reach the
definitive SC-GHG Estimates that agencies must follow. See Rowell, supra at 383
(“[G]iven that the different IAMs predicted different monetized impacts, how should the
IWG calculate a single, standardized SCC? One option, of course, would have been to
create multiple SCCs representing the predicted outcomes of each model. ... Instead,
lacking any principled mechanism for distinguishing between the models, the [WG decided
to simply average them. This had the effect of weighting each model as one third of the
SCC.”). In other words, the SC-GHG Estimates are just a simple average of three flawed
models— nothing more. See id. at 383 n.75 (noting that “[tJhis approach has not been met
with universal approval” in the expert community); Cf Settling Devotional Claimants v.
Copyright Royalty Bd., 797 F.3d 1106, 1109 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (an “arbitrary splitting of the
baby” is not reasoned decision making).
. Unreliability is further introduced in the [WG2021 approach to calculating the present
dollar value for the “social cost” of a greenhouse gas (i.e., the “discount rate”). Jd. at 16—
22. IWG2021 calculated the social cost of each gas at four different values using three
different discount rates — 5%, 3%, and 2.5%, and a 95% probability distribution for the 3%
rate. Using these different discount rates, the “social cost” of carbon dioxide ranges from
$14 per metric ton to $152 per metric ton, depending on the discount rate selected. Jd. at 5.
The Working Group admits that “the range of discount rates reflects both uncertainty and,
at least in part, different policy or value judgments.” /d. at 27. According to the Working
Group, “the choice of a discount rate ... raises highly contested and exceedingly difficult
questions of science, economics, ethics, and law.” Jd. at 17 (emphasis added). But rather
than explain the proper discount rate to use in this action, EPA arbitrarily averages the
discount rates together without attempting to explain which is more appropriate or why an
average would appropriately address the “highly contested and exceedingly difficult
questions of science, economics, ethics, and law” identified by [WG2021.
12
App.130
Third, regardless of the validity of using the interim social cost of carbon estimates, it is
arbitrary for EPA to take credit for CO2 decreases associated with the Proposed Rule when EPA
is simultaneously rendering any such emission emissions irrelevant in its contemporanecously
proposed GHG NSPS rulemaking requiring carbon capture on these very same sources.!* EPA is
required to account for other rulemaking actions it has proposed when evaluating a given proposed
rulemaking.!° Accordingly, EPA cannot double count anticipated CO emission reductions from
this rulemaking when this rulemaking would not in fact cause such reductions, or at least not to
the same magnitude, when EPA’s other related rulemakings for this same source category are
accounted for.
Fourth, EPA’s estimated benefits related to decreased Ozone emissions is flawed because
it accounts for decreases in Ozone exposures generally, without accounting for the fact that EPA
has in another contemporaneous rulemaking determined that Montana emission sources do not
significantly contribute to any out of state Ozone concentrations above EPA’s national ambient air
quality standards for ozone, and thus any benefits related to reduced ozone related to Colstrip
emissions cannot be assumed to occur outside Montana.!®
Fifth, although EPA estimates that a vastly disproportionate majority of costs and emission
reductions (e.g., of PM) will be localized at Montana power plants,!” EPA does not appear to limit
its modeling of benefits from reduced PM emission exposures to populations actually within a
scope that could be affected by such plants, or otherwise account for the localized nature of benefits
from reduced emission exposures to populations near relevant facilities EPA anticipates PM
emission reductions to actually occur. And it would be arbitrary to account for health benefits
nationwide from reduced exposures without first demonstrating that such populations are actually
geographically capable of benefitting from any reduction in emissions from Colstrip and the other
facilities from which EPA anticipates the Proposed Rule to force PM reductions.
"4 See e.g., “New Source Performance Standards for Greenhouse Gas Emissions From New, Modified, and
Reconstructed Fossil Fuel-Fired Electric Generating Units; Emission Guidelines for Greenhouse Gas Emissions
From Existing Fossil Fuel-Fired Electric Generating Units; and Repeal of the Affordable Clean Energy Rule,” 88
Fed. Reg. 33240 (May 23, 2023).
5 See e.g., Portland Cement Association v. EPA, 665 F.3d 177 (D.C. Cir 2011) (holding in the context of EPA
publishing related but separate NSPS and NESHAP rulemakings that “Basing its decision on a premise the agency
itself has already planned to disrupt is arbitrary and capricious” and “Reasoned decision-making requires an agency
to examine the relevant data and articulate a satisfactory explanation for its action[s]. The impending [regulatory
change regarding an] undeniably related source category is clearly a relevant factor or an important aspect of the
problem that must be considered.” And “Since agencies have an obligation to deal with newly acquired evidence in
some reasonable fashion, or to reexamine their approaches if a significant factual predicate changes, an agency must
have a similar obligation to acknowledge and account for a changed regulatory posture the agency creates—
especially when the change impacts a contemporaneous and closely related rulemaking.” And “The refrain that EPA
must promulgate rules based on the information it currently possesses simply cannot excuse its reliance on that
information when its own process is about to render it irrelevant.”) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)
16 See “Federal ‘*Good Neighbor Plan’ for the 2015 Ozone National Ambient Air Quality Standards,” 88 Fed. Reg.
36654 (June 5, 2023) (e.g., at 36710, estimating the highest contribution from all Montana combined to still be
almost an order of magnitude below EPA’s de-minimis screening threshold or 0.7 ppb).
17 Eg. 2023 Technology Review for the Coal- and Oil-Fired EGU Source Category, at 80, Appendix D, Docket ID.
EPA-HQ-OAR-2018-0794-5789 (“Technology Review TSD”).
13
App.131
Sixth, EPA’s
cost analysis does not appear to account for lost revenues during the downtime
required to engineer and retrofit additional control technologies to comply with the Proposed
Rule.
skews EPA’s
Such downtime would be significant, and ignoring this relevant factor arbitrarily
EPA’s cost
cost assumptions extremely low and as a result makes them significantly flawed.
y retrofit
analysis likewise does not appear to account for other indirect impacts of such temporar
associated
induced shutdowns, including unavailability of power during the retrofit, security risks
coal
with even temporarily reduced electric generation capacity, and increased costs to the utilities,
suppliers, and ratepayers purchasing needed makeup power on the open market.
ing the
Seventh, EPA fails to provide any consideration for the life of sources in determin
related
feasibility or cost effectiveness of the Proposed Rule. This conflicts with EPA policy in
ing whether a
rulemakings, where EPA has expressly accounted for the life of sources in determin
recently
particularly costly control technology can be cost justified. For example, in EPA’s
same coal
proposed greenhouse gas NSPS emission standards under section 111(d) for the very
life of
fired power plants subject to the Proposed Rule, EPA proposed to account for existing
compliance
sources by exempting or otherwise requiring alternative more cost effective
alternatives for sources that were scheduled to retire before January 1, 2040." It is arbitrary for
arbitrary
EPA to fail to account for the life of the plant in one rule and not the other. It is further
Rule
Proposed
to fail to account for the life of a facility where EPA’s own proposed rules (both the
costs of such
and EPA’s contemporaneous NSPS rules targeting coal fired power plants) impose
a magnitude as to affects the feasibility and cost justification of coal fired power plants
continuing
that
operations beyond 2040.'%° This is especially true here, where EPA’s cost analysis assumes
the equipment,
large capital expenditures (¢.g. a baghouse) can be annualized based on the life of
have a much
without even attempting to account for the fact that such large expenditures would
the fabric filter
higher annualized cost if the facility were forced to close sooner than the life of
GHG NSPS.
control system, due to costs imposed by EPA’s contemporaneously proposed
forcing the choice
Accordingly, EPA must at minimum provide compliance flexibilities to avoid
be able to recoup the
between unjustified cost and premature retirement for sources that would not
additional control device capital expenditure investments over a longer cost period.
eam
Eighth, EPA entirely fails to consider, quantitatively or qualitatively, the downstr
s, the Proposed
economic costs of the Proposed Rule. As discussed elsewhere in these comment
Rule threatens the viability of Colstrip, especially
when
considered in concert with EPA’s
on Colstrip, its
contemporaneously proposed GHG NSPS. In addition to the direct costs imposed
Colstrip would also impact
owner/operators, its workers, and the Colstrip community, impacts on
Westmoreland Mining Holdings, which operates the Rosebud mine that supplies
coal to Colstrip.
s From New, Modified, and
18 See e.g., “New Source Performance Standards for Greenhouse Gas Emission
es for Greenhouse Gas Emissions
Reconstructed Fossil Fuel-Fired Electric Generating Units; Emission Guidelin
the Affordable Clean Energy Rule,” 88
From Existing Fossil Fuel-Fired Electric Generating Units; and Repeal of
Fed, Reg, 33240 (May 23, 2023).
ed costs are likely to force a shift away
19 EPA has already recognized that its proposed NSPS standards and associat
-OAR-
Adequacy” at 5, table 1, Docket ID. EPA-HQ
from at least some coal power plants. See e.g. “TSD-Resource
shutdown of over 39 GW of coal fired power plant
the
to
GHG NSPS will lead
4023-0072-0034 (predicting that the
capacity by 2040).
177 (D.C. Cir 2011).
20 See fn.11 above, citing Portland Cement Association v. EPA, 665 F.3d
14
App.132
App.1382
As discussed in detail in the Barkey Report (attached hereto), a closure of the Rosebud mine would
be devastating for the State of Montana.”! Among other things, closure would lead to a Montana
economy that:
a.
Loses over 1,800 jobs, with an average earnings per year exceeding $62,000;
b.
c.
Experiences a shortfall of more than $40 million in state government revenue; and
Faces a loss of revenue to business in excess of $330 million per year.
Impacts Summary?
CATEGORY
UNITS
Total employment
Personal income
IMPACTS
BY YEAR
2020
2022
2022
2023
2024
2025
Jobs
-1,716
-1,852
-1,893
-1,872
-1,819
-1,754
Millions
-$115.4
-$95.6
-$101.4
-$109.2
-$113.0
-$114.8
Disposable personal income
“$81.1
-$86.1
-$92.9
-$96.4
-$98.0
-S98.6
State Tax and Nontax Revenue
-$39.0
-$410
-$42.7
-$43.8
-$44.4
-$44.7
Output
-$325.9
-$347.8
-$355.2
-$353.4
-$346.8
-$338.5
$64,921
-1,909
Earnings per Lost Job
Dollars
$61,998
$60,722
$61,828
$62,896
$63,940
Population
People
-568
-998
1,337
-1,592
1,777
These economic costs to the state of Montana and its citizens are critical considerations
that EPA failed to consider and that, once considered, would not allow EPA to reasonably
or rationally finalize the Proposed Rule as being “necessary” under section 112(d)(6),
particularly when much of the putative benefits are limited to Montana, where much of the
impact of the regulation will be felt.
Ninth, EPA’s focus on contextualizing costs associated with the Proposed Rule (including
retrofits and costs associated with temporary shutdowns, among others) in terms of the electric
utility industry as a whole arbitrarily ignores the disparate impacts of the rule’s costs, which will
not in fact be spread out industrywide. At Colstrip in particular, multiple of the utilities with an
ownership share in Colstrip are forced to exit before 2030 or in some cases 2025, due to their state
PUC mandates to shift away from coal. This places a disproportional funding obligation on the
remaining owners (post 2025). Likewise, the sole merchant utility owner is most impacted. And
cost impacts are particularly significant for merchant utility owners who are unable to pass through
costs to ratepayers.
The Proposed Rule Does Not Adequately Demonstrate the Achievability and Feasibility of
the Proposed Limits.
21 The Barkey Report was prepared in 2019 in the context of administrative litigation concerning a Montana Major
Facility Siting Act certificate revision that purported to permit Colstrip to use coal from non-Rosebud mines.
Accordingly, the impacts on the Colstrip community would, in fact, be far greater if Colstrip were to close because
the Barkey Report only accounts for the closure of the mining operations in support of Colstrip, whereas both the
powerplant and its dedicated Rosebud mine may not continue to operate if the Proposed Rule is finalized.
Moreover, although the terms of the report itself were focused on a specific time horizon, Westmoreland attests to
the accuracy and relevance of this recent econometric study under 2023 conditions; if anything, the impact would be
greater today on a monetized basis due to inflation.
15
App.133
Under 42 U.S.C. § 7412(d)(2), EPA’s promulgation of new emissions standards can only
be the “maximum degree of reduction in emissions” that EPA determines are “achievable” for new
or existing sources after balancing factors such as cost, non-air-quality health and environmental
concerns, and energy implications. EPA claims the Proposed Rule is “achievable” here for new
and existing sources under this standard but, in reality, EPA reached this (incorrect) determination
using an arbitrary and self-serving set of criteria and data. EPA also acknowledges that the
Proposed Rule will require modifications to the Colstrip facility but does nothing to analyze how
such modifications affect its “achievability” analysis.
First, EPA supports its achievability analysis based on a document titled “2023 Technology
Review for the Coal- and Oil-Fired EGU Source Category.”’? Therein, EPA states that when
assessing the emission rates actually achieved in practice by existing coal fired power plants, it
“removed units from [its] analysis that ... will shut down or no longer burn coal/oil by December
31, 2028.” But, at the same time, EPA included “EGUs [already] planning to convert to natural
gas by the proposed compliance date” that are not subject to the rule, and thus concluded that since
those EGUs “already meet a 6.0E-03 lb/MMBtu potential standard” they will have “no associated
upgrade costs or emission reductions assumed in this analysis.” As such, EPA has cherry picked
the available data to support its belief that lower emissions standards are “achievable.” EPA on the
one hand arbitrarily excludes from consideration facilities that likely do not meet the agency’s
preferred emissions rate based on something these facilities might do in the future, while on the
other hand including facilities that support EPA’s desired outcome despite acknowledging such
facilities will not even be subject to the Proposed Rule. Such analysis does not evidence objective
and reasoned agency decision making.
Second, and similarly, § 7412(d)(3)(A) requires EPA to exclude from its minimum
“achievability” analysis for existing sources those that “within 18 months before the emission
standard is proposed or within 30 months before such standard is promulgated, whichever is later,
first achieved a level of emission rate or emission reduction which complies, or would comply if
the source is not subject to such standard, with the lowest achievable emission rate [] applicable to
the source category and prevailing at the time[.]” But EPA has not excluded any sources from its
technical analysis of achievable rates on this basis. This again results in a skewed analysis towards
a lower “achievable” emissions standard using a method explicitly prohibited by the CAA. See 5
U.S.C. § 706(2) (reviewing court shall hold unlawful and set aside agency actions that are “not in
accordance with law” and “in excess of statutory [] limitations”); see also Bethesda Health, Inc. v.
Azar, 389 F. Supp. 3d 32, 41 (D.D.C. 2019) (setting aside as arbitrary and capricious agency action
that contradicts its own regulations). And although this requirement is only expressly listed with
respect to setting the initial MACT
floor, it would be unreasonable and arbitrary to interpret
requirements imposed under technology review not to be subject to the same requirement since
EPA could otherwise easily circumvent the statutory limit at will simply by adding such sources
back to its achievability analysis under each successive technology review period. In any case EPA
has not identified any rationale for exempting Section 112(d)(6) technology review determinations
from this same constraint. In accordance with the CAA, EPA must determine what the LAER rate
2 Docket ID. EPA-HQ-OAR-2018-0794-5789
16
App.134
is for this category, and then exclude from its achievability analysis any sources that already meet
the lower emissions limit contemplated in the Proposed Rule.
Third, in EPA’s “Technical Memo,” EPA acknowledges (at 9) that the Proposed Rule
would require installation of fabric filter controls (such as a baghouse) at Colstrip. But—contrary
to EPA’s obligations under the CAA—EPA fails to consider the economic or technical feasibility
of doing so. See § 7412(d)(2) (EPA must “tak[e] into consideration the cost of achieving such
emission reduction, and any non-air quality health and environmental
impacts and energy
requirements”). Installation of a baghouse at Colstrip’s two generating units would likely costs
tens of millions of dollars to design, install, and maintain—assuming, that is, retrofitting the units
with a baghouse is even technically possible in the first place given spatial constraints, changes in
fluegas rates, temperatures, constituents of the locally permitted coal, and compatibility with the
existing venturi-type wet-scrubbers. EPA considers none of these limitations here, despite being
obligated to do so by statute. What’s more, EPA has in the past accounted for feasibility of
standards imposed under a technology review, and thus cannot depart from that practice without
providing any rationale. See, e.g., Nat’l Ass'n of Battery Recyclers, Inc. v. E.P.A., 716 F.3d 667,
674 (D.C. Cir. 2013); FCC y. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502 (2009).
The Alternative Potential Standard is Not Justified.
In addition to all the reasons EPA has not adequately justified a 0.01 lb PM/MMBtu
standard, there are additional reasons EPA cannot and should not consider any stricter limit such
as the alternative 6.0E-03 Ib. PM/MMBtu potential standard EPA requests comment on.
First, EPA acknowledges that any limit below 0.01 lb PM/MMBtu would be more stringent
than the PM limit applicable to new sources. See Proposed Rule at 24857 & n.5. But EPA has
identified no rationale—and thus it would be arbitrary and capricious— to impose a stricter limit
on existing sources than on new sources, especially where it costs more, and requires greater
resources and downtime, to retrofit existing units so that it can achieve the same standards as a
new source. See Watson Lab'ys, Inc. v. Sebelius, 2012 WL 6968224, at *19 (D.D.C. Oct. 22, 2012)
(agency decision arbitrary and capricious where “it produces absurd results that are contrary to the
purpose of the [statute].”), vacated as moot, 2013 WL 11250319 (D.C. Cir. June 10, 2013).
Second, EPA’s
titled “Particulate Control
technical memorandum
Cost Development
Methodology” notes (at 2) that suppliers of control technology that will be needed to comply with
a stricter than 0.010 Ib/MMBtu standard will not provide any performance guarantees below a
0.010 Ib/MMBtu threshold. And even at the 0.010 lb/MMBtu level, suppliers only guarantee such
performance “depending on the application.” It would be arbitrary and contrary to the evidence
before the agency to finalize an industrywide requirement below 0.010 Ib/MMBtu level in the face
of such acknowledged unavailability of vendor guarantees.”’ It is critical to obtain vendor
guarantees from suppliers when constructing or retrofitting facilities and associated control
23 Indeed, the fact that even at the 0.010 lb/MMBtu level, suppliers only guarantee such performance “depending on
the application” likewise means that it would be arbitrary and contrary to the evidence before the agency to finalize
an industrywide requirement even at that level, because a level below what control technology vendors can
consistently guarantee on an industrywide basis cannot be said to be “necessary” from a strict technological
feasibility perspective, absent some other justification such as residual risk.
17
App.135
systems, to ensure that the purchased equipment can comply with applicable standards. It would
be arbitrary and capricious for EPA to ignore this relevant factor by mandating emissions standards
that hold source operators to standards that industry suppliers needed to achieve those standards
will not even guarantee. See FCC v. Prometheus Radio Project, 141 S. Ct. 1150, 1158 (2021)
(When an agency acts, it must “reasonably consider[] the relevant issues and reasonably explain[]”
its actions) (citations omitted); see also Michigan v. EPA, 576 U.S. 743, 751-52 (2015) ([A]gency
action is lawful only if it rests on a consideration of the relevant factors” and “important aspects]
of the problem.”) (internal quotations and citations omitted). Furthermore, EPA has previously
acknowledged the importance of being able to obtain vendor guarantees when setting the emission
standards, and thus it would be arbitrary for EPA
to ignore that consideration here without
providing adequate rationale for the reversal in course.”
Third, EPA’s own technical supporting documents concede that emission limits below
0.010 Ib/MMBtu are not likely attainable using an electrostatic precipitator (ESP) unless (1) a
separate fabric filter is installed or (2) the ESP is itself converted to a fabric filter.*” And yet these
same documents also note that such conversions are not universally possible because ESPs vary
in size. Id. EPA makes no effort to analyze the extent of this reality at facilities implicated by the
Proposed Rule. Nor does EPA consider the significant increases in energy disruption if a greater
percentage of facilities must be idled during necessary retrofits, if such retrofits are even possible.
There are a variety of costs involved in this disruption that are each meaningful, cumulatively very
substantial, and none considered by EPA’s existing analysis in the Proposed Rule. And EPA
conducts no feasibility analysis to conclude that a limit below 0.010 Ib/MMBtu is physically
attainable by any substantial number of sources that currently rely on an ESP. And EPA
acknowledges that the substantially higher compliance costs on the industry compared to the
proposed 0.010 Ib/MMBtu standard, but nowhere provides rationale for how such higher costs
could qualify as cost effective.”° It would be arbitrary and capricious to impose this alternative
lower standard without having accomplished any of this necessary prerequisite analysis.
Fourth, Given EPA’s acknowledgement that emission limits below 0.010 lb/MMBtu are
generally unattainable by a significant portion of existing facilities absent retrofit, and EPA’s
selection of only certain time periods of data to review, the proposed alternative standard appears
to be an attempt to set a standard that seeks to improve upon the best-performing period of
reporting from various plants. But that is not a lawful use of a technology-based review under
section
112(d)(6), which
does not provide
for EPA
to update
standards
in order to drive
technology, but instead only allows EPA to update standards as “necessary” to account for already
24 Fg. “Standards of Performance for New Stationary Sources: Electric Arc Furnaces and Argon-Oxygen
Decarburization Vessels in Steel Plants” 49 Fed. Reg. 43838, 43,840 (Oct. 31, 1984) (in the context of setting PM
not
limits for electric arc furnaces, concluding “However, the Agency has determined that the mass standard should
be lowered. This is because it was determined that, to guarantee fabric filter compliance with [a more stringent grain
loading standard], vendors might increase capital costs of fabric filters as much as 25 percent [docket references
omitted]. This increase in costs would result from the increased air-to-cloth ratio and other designed factors needed
to ensure continuous compliance with a more stringent emission limit.”),
25 @.g., “Particulate Control Cost Development Methodology,” at 2, Docket ID. EPA-HQ-OAR-2018-0794-5834
26 See 2023 Technology Review for the Coal- and Oil-Fired EGU Source Category, Appendix D, Docket ID. EPAHQ-OAR-2018-0794-5789 (estimating annual costs would increase by an order of magnitude)
18
App.136
existing historic “developments in practices, processes, and control technologies,” not to improve
on such developments.
EPA Should Not Eliminate the Alternative Option to Demonstrate Compliance Via Tests of
Individual or Total Regulated Metal HAPs Rather than fPM.
EPA proposes to eliminate the existing alternative option to test for the specific metal
HAPs subject to the NESHAP for this source category (i.e., 40 C.F.R. Part 63, Subpart VDUUUU),
and proposes to only rely on the surrogate of {PM going forward. Proposed Rule at 24886. But this
proposal is arbitrary because EPA’s own data demonstrates that ratios of metal HAP to {PM can
significantly vary2’, and thus that it is possible for a source to be in compliance with the limits on
individual metal HAP regulatable under Subpart UUUUU, even if emitting amounts of total {PM
above the proposed 0.010 !b/MMBtu standard.”* It is particularly arbitrary to remove individual
metal HAP measurements as a compliance option for Colstrip, given that EPA’s own data appears
to indicate that Colstrip’s coal sources and unique control system have a lower ratio of metal HAP
to PM than most other sources analyzed by EPA.”?
Finally, EPA’s stated rationale for eliminating individual and total metal HAP standards is
arbitrary. Specifically, EPA claim that companies currently demonstrate compliance almost solely
through fPM testing is irrelevant because EPA has not proposed to retain the standard which
companies currently demonstrate compliance with through {PM testing. It would be arbitrary to
eliminate compliance demonstration options on this basis without first demonstrating that
companies will also not use (or need to use) any option other than {PM to demonstrate compliance
with the Proposed Rule’s lower standards. EPA has wholly failed to attempt such rationale here,
ignoring a highly relevant factor in determining whether individual and total metal HAP standards
should continue to be included in the rulemaking.
The Proposed Rule Does Not Appropriately Account for Environmental Impacts Of the
Controls Required to Achieve the Proposed Emission Standards, Including Increased Air
Pollution and New Non-Air Waste Streams.
Section 112(d) of the CAA explicitly states that in making its achievability determinations,
EPA must “tak[e] into account the cost of achieving such emission reduction, and any non-air
quality health and environmental impacts and energy requirements.” (emphasis added). And
although this requirement is only expressly listed with respect to setting the MACT floor, it would
be unreasonable and arbitrary to interpret requirements imposed under technology review not to
be subject to the same requirement, and in any case EPA has not identified any rationale for
exempting RtR determinations from this same constraint. EPA has failed to reasonably account
for such environmental impacts from the Proposed Rules for multiple reasons.
27 See “Quarterly MATS Metals and PM2.5 data” Docket ID EPA-HQ-OAR-2018-0794-5789_attachment_1
(showing Metal to PM ratios ranging all the way from 0.000808448 to 0.025126035).
28 Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Assn. of United States, Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Automobile Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983)
State Farm, 463 U.S. at 43, 103 S.Ct. 2856 (finding agency action arbitrary and capricious if the agency explained
its decision in a way that “runs counter to the evidence before the agency”).
29 See “Quarterly MATS Metals and PM2.5 data” Docket ID EPA-HQ-OAR-2018-0794-5789_attachment_l
(showing Metal to PM ratio of ratio of 0.00225 for Colstrip, as compared to an industry average of 0.00413).
19
App.137
Specifically, EPA does not appropriately account for the potential to actually increase
some emissions of fossil fuels at the Colstrip facility based on the apparent need, under the
Proposed Rule, to install a baghouse in line with the wet scrubbers at Colstrip. Specifically, EPA’s
“Particulate Control Cost Development Methodology” documents notes that installation of a
baghouse downstream of a wet scrubber would require additional power generation due to
“increased fan power to account for the added fabric filter pressure drop and, as applicable, air
blowers
and transport
air drying
equipment
for the
SO3
mitigation
system.”
Despite
this
prediction, EPA currently accounts for the extra power needed only as an additional economic
cost. EPA fails to account for the environmental impact that additional non-PM emissions would
be associated with the need to supply the additional power for a baghouse. Nor would any generic
acknowledgement of indirectly increased non-PM emissions be adequate to demonstrate reasoned
decision making, because EPA cannot conclude that such increases in non-PM criteria pollutants
and HAPs are justified by PM decreases without substantive analysis. See Sierra Club v. Mainella,
459 F. Supp. 2d 76, 100 (D.D.C. 2006) (“Merely describing an impact and stating a conclusion of
non-impairment is insufficient[.]”
The Proposed Rule Fails to Account For Related Rulemakings.
When determining whether, and to what extent, changes to the existing MATS NESHAP
standards may be necessary, EPA fails to account for the effects of its concurrent proposal to
impose carbon capture and sequestration (CCS) on these very same existing coal fired power
plants? As the D.C. Circuit has held in the context of another occasion on which EPA
contemporaneously proposed changes to section 111 NSPS standards and section 112 NESHAP
standards for related source categories, “Reasoned decision-making requires an agency to examine
explanation
the relevant data and articulate a satisfactory
for its action[s].
The
impending
[regulatory change regarding an] undeniably related source category is clearly a relevant factor or
an important aspect of the problem that must be considered.”?! EPA’s
failure to consider the related
impacts of this contemporaneous proposed rule affects the reasonableness of many aspects of the
proposed rulemaking.
First, Source owners will need to determine how to make investments to comply with both
the GHG NSPS and a potential CCS mandate in an integrated manner, taking into account the
specific regulatory requirements that EPA imposes, market conditions, ete. But EPA’s seriatim
consideration of two tremendously impactful rulemakings that mutually ignore one another makes
doing so infeasible. As a matter of rationality and simple fairness, EPA should exercise its
30 See “New Source Performance Standards for Greenhouse Gas Emissions From New, Modified, and Reconstructed
Fossil Fuel-Fired Electric Generating Units; Emission Guidelines for Greenhouse Gas Emissions From Existing
33240
Fossil Fuel-Fired Electric Generating Units; and Repeal of the Affordable Clean Energy Rule,” 88 Fed. Reg.
(May 23, 2023) (GHG NSPS)
31 Portland Cement Association v. EPA, 665 F.3d 177 (D.C. Cir 2011). See also id. (“Basing its decision on a
premise the agency itself has already planned to disrupt is arbitrary and capricious” and “Since agencies have an
if a
obligation to deal with newly acquired evidence in some reasonable fashion, or to reexamine their approaches
a
for
account
and
acknowledge
to
obligation
similar
a
have
must
agency
an
significant factual predicate changes,
closely
and
ous
contemporane
a
impacts
change
the
when
ially
creates—espec
agency
the
posture
changed regulatory
related rulemaking.” And “The refrain that EPA must promulgate rules based on the information it currently
possesses simply cannot excuse its reliance on that information when its own process is about to render it
irrelevant.”) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
20
App.138
discretion to determine that any revisions to the MATS must be done in conjunction with the GHG
NSPS and with compliance deadlines that are coordinated with the GHG NSPS.
Second, EPA states in this concurrent proposed GHG NSPS rulemaking that CCS, and the
additional control technologies required for CCS to work, may both cause co-reductions in {PM
as well. Accordingly, it is arbitrary for EPA not to account for the impact of these planned [PM
reductions on whether any additional controls on {PM were “necessary” for purposes of section
112(d)(6) at all.
Third, EPA fails to account for the proposed GHG NSPS rule in terms of compliance
deadlines and availability for compliance extensions. Any sources that are required to install
additional control technology as a result of both rules (such as Colstrip, which may be required to
install both a fabric filter baghouse by the Proposed Rule, and CCS by the proposed GHG NSPS,
as well as a series of upstream controls required to make both work, assuming it is technically
possible to retrofit) will require additional time to engineer and design such systems to work in
concert than a source would need simply to engineer and install systems required only for a single
applicable rulemaking.
Fourth, it was arbitrary for EPA to deny the request for comment extension for the
Proposed Rule to account for the interplay and effect of these two related rulemakings on each
other. As raised in a prior extension request for this Proposed Rule, EPA published the proposed
GHG NSPS halfway through the comment period for this Proposed Rule. And this newly proposed
GHG NSPS fundamentally changed the technical and cost analysis with respect to the Proposed
Rule, because if both rulemakings are finalized, sources will have to assess how this different
control requirements required by each rulemaking interact with and affect each other rather than
simply analyzing the Proposed Rule requirements by themselves as was required during the first
portion of the public comment period for the Proposed Rule. This is particularly important for
Colstrip which may be required to install both a fabric filter system under the Proposed Rule and
CCS by the proposed GHG NSPS, as well as a series of upstream controls required to make both
work, assuming it is technically possible to retrofit, all of which require additional analysis to
determine feasibility and cost of designing each new system to work with the other newly required
control system. EPA’s unexplained denial arbitrarily prevented facilities, including Colstrip, from
fully analyzing the technical interplay of these rules during the public comment period. In any
case, EPA’s failure to itself assess the technical effect of the GHG NSPS on the feasibility and
cost of the Proposed Rule was itself arbitrary and inconsistent with reasoned decision-making.
EPA Cannot Publish Alternative Emission Limits Without First Issuing for Public Comment
Additional Proposed Standards and their Basis.
The rulemaking procedures at section 307(d) of the CAA specifically require that a
proposed rulemaking must “include a summary of —{A) the factual data on which the proposed
rule is based; (B) the methodology used in obtaining the data and in analyzing the data; and (C)
the major legal interpretations and policy considerations underlying the proposed rule” and “Ail
data, information, and documents referred to in this paragraph on which the proposed rule relies
21
App.139
shall be included in the docket on the date of publication of the proposed rule.”>? Furthermore, any
final “promulgated rule may not be based (in part or whole) on any information or data which has
not been placed in the docket as of the date of such promulgation.” Relatedly, EPA has “an initial
burden of promulgating
and explaining a non-arbitrary,
non-capricious rule” including
an
obligation to “explain how the standard proposed is achievable under the range of relevant
conditions which may affect the emissions to be regulated.” Accordingly, EPA cannot finalize
any emission standard other than those analyzed in the Proposed Rule absent a new proposed rule
providing the opportunity for public comment on the necessity, appropriateness, feasibility, and
cost effectiveness of any such newly proposed limits. To do otherwise would be unlawful and
arbitrary.
Sincerely,
Ga
ee
ae
Jeremy Cottrell
General Counsel & Secretary
Westmoreland Mining LLC
32 42 U.S.C. § 7607(d)G3)
33 42 U.S.C. § 7607(d)(6)(C)
of anew source performance
34 National Lime Ass'n y. E. P. A., 627 F.2d 416, 433 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (in the context
burden of promulgating and
initial
“an
that
holding
7607(d),
§
U.S.C.
42
to
subject
standard rulemaking procedure
by failing to explain how the
explaining a non-arbitrary, non-capricious rule rests with the Agency and we think that
emissions to be
standard proposed is achievable under the range of relevant conditions which may affect the
EPA, 755 F.3d 1010,
v.
Council
Def.
regulated, the Agency has not satisfied this initial purden.”); see also Nat. Res.
burden of
affirmative
its
of
part
as
1023 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (“EPA retains a duty to examine key assumptions
assumption
that
justify
must
EPA
therefore
and
promulgating and explaining a nonarbitrary, non-capricious rule
omitted)
ellipses
and
marks,
question
internal
(citation,
even if no one objects to it during the comment period.”)
22
App.140
Attachment: Barkey Report
23
App.141
The Economic Impacts of a Rosebud Mine Closure
By Patrick M. Barkey, Ph.D.
October 4, 2019
October 4, 2019
__________________
(date)
______________________________________
________________________________
Patrick
M. Barke
Barkey, Ph
Ph.D.
atri k M
D
1
App.142
Table of Contents
Executive Summary
Introduction and Overview
Rosebud County Profile
The Rosebud Mine Closure Scenario
Research Approach
The Economic Impacts of a Rosebud Mine Closure
Summary and Conclusions
References
Appendix 1: REMI Tables
Appendix 2: Barkey Vita
2
App.143
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Since the 1970s, the economy of Colstrip, Montana has been dominated by the operations of the
Rosebud coal mine and the mine-mouth coal-fired electric generating plant that have operated
continuously in this small community in eastern Montana since that time. Located on the northern
portion of the Powder River Basin just south of the generating station, the Westmoreland’s Rosebud
mine has delivered coal to the generating units via conveyor to fuel their production. The mine and the
generating units have thus been closely linked for decades, with production in each facility tied to the
other.
Recent events have called into question the future of that relationship. In a future scenario where the
Colstrip Steam Electric Station (SES) takes deliveries of its coal via rail or truck from a separate, possibly
non-Montana, source, the continued operation of the Rosebud mine would no longer be viable. In the
event that coal production at the facility were to end, the community, the region and the state as a
whole would lose an important driver of its economic vitality.
This study is intended to assess the economic implications of the closure of the Rosebud mine, in a
scenario where the Colstrip SES continues to operate with coal from another source. If the mine were
to close, its wages paid to workers, purchases from vendors, and tax payments to governments would
largely cease. The spending of those who receive those payments as income or revenues can be
expected to be significantly curtailed, with further knock-on effects on economic activity. As the process
continues, a new, lower level of economic activity emerges that shrinks the overall economic pie by
more than that of the mine itself.
We assess the ultimate impact of the Rosebud mine closure with the use of an economic model that
traces the interactions between the mine and the rest of the economy. Specifically developed for this
purpose and calibrated with Montana-specific data, the REMI model was leased from Regional Economic
Models, Inc. (www.remi.com) for use in this study. Since its development in the early 1980s, the REMI
model has been the subject of dozens of peer-reviewed economic articles and has been employed in
hundreds of applications.
A mine-closure scenario for the Montana economy was constructed for this study that consisted of
three broad components. The first was the removal of the mine itself from the economy. Using
information obtained from the mine owners on production, employment, payroll, taxes and vendor
spending (Westmoreland, 2019), the direct contribution of its operations was removed from the
economy. A second component was the remediation activities that would commence and continue
after mine closure.
The third component were the operating changes, if any, at the Colstrip SES that might be expected to
occur with coal deliveries by rail to that facility from a non-Montana source. While little information
was available to detail actual plans and potential investments, a simplified scenario can at least
represent the basics of how fuel source changes would affect economic flows.
3
App.144
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS
Our basic finding is that the shutdown of the Rosebud mine would be a significant economic event, both
for the Colstrip community and to the remainder of the state. The loss of 337 jobs at the facility 1,
producing 6.5 million tons of coal annually, would ultimately lead to a state economy that:
x
x
x
x
x
x
Suffers a loss in excess of 1,800 jobs, across a broad mix of industries, with average earnings per
job lost in excess of $62,000 per year;
Has annual income received by households fall more than $100 million short of the amount that
would have occurred had the mine remained in operation;
Experiences a shortfall of more than $40 million per year in state government revenue;
Sees local governments collect $8 million less per year in property tax revenue, most of which
occurs in Rosebud County;
Faces a loss of revenue to businesses in excess of $330 million per year compared to levels that
would be maintained under continued operation;
Has a population that is smaller by more than 1,900 people;
Impacts Summary 2
IMPACTS BY YEAR
CATEGORY
UNITS
2020
2021
2022
2023
2024
2025
Total employment
Jobs
-1,716
-1,852
-1,893
-1,872
-1,819
-1,754
Personal income
Disposable personal income
State Tax and Nontax Revenue
Output
Millions
-$95.6
-$81.1
-$39.0
-$325.9
-$101.4
-$86.1
-$41.0
-$347.8
-$109.2
-$92.9
-$42.7
-$355.2
-$113.0
-$96.4
-$43.8
-$353.4
-$114.8
-$98.0
-$44.4
-$346.8
-$115.4
-$98.6
-$44.7
-$338.5
Earnings per Lost Job
Population
Dollars
People
$61,998 $60,722 $61,828 $62,896 $63,940 $64,921
-568
-998
-1,337
-1,592
-1,777
-1,909
These findings take into account the positive impacts that come from the $165 million that is expected
to be spent in the decade following the closure on environmental remediation, as well as the modest
increase in rail and material handling jobs that could be expected to occur as the Colstrip SES moves to
use of non-Montana coal.
1
Since a permanent mine closure would occur after the announced date of closure for the smaller, older
generating units of the Colstrip SES, the loss of employment and production directly linked to mine closure is
slightly smaller than current levels, reflecting mine activity serving the remaining Colstrip SES units.
2
Impacts in the table correspond to mine closure in year 2020. Impacts extend beyond the years shown. The
nature and magnitude of the findings would not be materially affected by a different choice of start year for events
associated with mine closure.
4
App.145
1. INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW
This is an analysis of the economic implications of the closure of the Rosebud mine located just south of
the city of Colstrip in Rosebud County in eastern Montana. The mine has continuously served the coal
needs of the four units of the 2,100 megawatt Colstrip Steam Electric Station (SES) since the 1970s,
delivering coal to that facility via a 4.5 mile conveyor belt. The possibility that the SES would satisfy its
coal needs from a different source in the future is the motivation for conducting this study, since the
nature of coal markets and the limited transportation access of the mine to those markets would render
its continued operation impossible.
The author of this report is Patrick M. Barkey, Ph.D. He was retained by BakerHostetler to conduct this
analysis and to write this report. He is being compensated for this work. The amount of his
compensation is not dependent on the outcome of the project. He has not testified in deposition or as
an expert witness in any litigated matter in the past.
In addition to publicly available data (see References) the study has made use of operating and other
information (Westmoreland, 2019) provided by Westmoreland Mining, LLC, the owner and operator of
the Rosebud mine.
Ample evidence exists to support the conclusion that coal mining in Montana makes sizable
contributions to the state economy (Barkey and Polzin, 2010; Barkey (2012); Bureau of Business and
Economic Research (2015); Barkey (2018)). The high rates of employee compensation, the large
component of inputs sourced from within the state, and the higher than average tax contribution of the
coal mining industry all play a role in making coal production an important driver of activity in the
economy as a whole.
The prosperity and relative affluence of the small community of Colstrip is testimony to that fact.
Incorporated in 1998, the city of just over 9,000 people is home to one of the largest industrial facilities
in the state, and has an assessed property tax base as large as urban areas many times its size. It has
been largely immune to recessions, and has median household income almost 75 percent higher than
the state as a whole. Located in the eastern portion of the state where economic growth has lagged
that of the more populous urban areas to the west, these accomplishments stand out.
Yet the base on which that prosperity is built upon is narrow. Events which impact the coal-fired electric
generation industry have an outsized importance for Colstrip, certainly. But they also have implications
for the entire state, as this report demonstrates.
5
App.146
2. ROSEBUD COUNTY PROFILE
Rosebud County, the home of the
Westmoreland Rosebud mine and the
community of Colstrip, is the 25th
largest county by population, and the
fourth largest by area in Montana. It is
traversed by Interstate 94, which
passes through Forsyth, the county
seat, as the major transportation
artery between Billings and Bismarck,
North Dakota. A large portion of the
Northern Cheyenne Indian Reservation
lies within Rosebud County.
Like many other counties in eastern
Montana, agriculture plays an
important role in the economy. More uniquely, the southern and central portions of the county sit over
the Powder River Basin, a rich coal-producing seam that produces 43 percent of all U.S. coal (Energy
Information Administration, 2019). The two largest coal mines in Montana are either completely
contained within the County (Rosebud
Rosebud County Profile
mine) or straddle its border (Spring
Value
State
Creek mine). The county is also home
INDICATOR
Rank
to the 2,100 megawatt Costrip Steam
Total Population
9,063
25
Electric Station (SES) coal-fired power
generator, one of the largest industrial
Percent Change Since 2010
-1.8%
45
facilities in the entire state.
Median Age
36.5
49
Percent Aged 65 or Older
14.4%
27
As a whole, the county shares some of
Percent with Bachelors Degree or
the same characteristics of other less
Higher (Age 25+)
18.8%
50
populated counties in the eastern
Percent Without Health Insurance
portion of the state. It has seen slight
Coverage
13.8%
42
population decline since the Census of
2010. Its adult population is ranked low – 50th out of 56 counties – in the percent with at least a 4-year
college degree. The outmigration of younger people has skewed its population slightly older than the
state average, and much older than many of the more populous urban areas.
Rosebud County covers more than 5,000 square miles of territory, and the county-level data can mask
some of the unique characteristics of the community. It is useful to examine the city of Colstrip and the
remainder of the County separately. This can be accomplished with data from the American Community
Survey, produced by the U.S. Census Bureau.
Population by Age, Race and Educational Status
Examining the population by race and Hispanic origin, we can clearly see the prominence of the
American Indian population in the southeast portion of the state. While the city of Colstrip’s share of
American Indians is high in comparison to the state average, the balance of the County is almost 44
6
App.147
percent American Indian. Colstrip
also has a higher fraction of its
population who consider
themselves to be Hispanic or Latino,
which potentially straddles multiple
racial classifications.
The age profile of Colstrip reveals
some of the importance of the
Rosebud mine and the Colstrip SES
as employers in the community.
The city of Colstrip is dominated by
prime-aged workers, more than
either the rest of the County or the
entire state. The population cohort
aged 45-64 years makes up more
than 40 percent of the population,
almost double the share of the rest
of the County.
The city has a markedly lower
fraction of those 65 and older in its
population, and a higher fraction of
children. The latter could be
influenced by the Colstrip school
system which, thanks to the strong
tax base, has outstanding resources
that few other schools in the eastern
portion of the state can match.
7
App.148
There are also significant differences between
Colstrip and the balance of Rosebud County in
educational attainment. The city has an
extremely low fraction – just 1.2 percent -- of its
adult population that lacks a high school
diploma or GED. In contract, the rest of the
county has more than double this fraction than
the state as a whole. Differences in other levels
of educational attainment for the city and the
balance of the County are not as marked,
although the city of Colstrip does score slightly
higher in terms of participation in College.
8
App.149
Employment and Income
The importance of the strong mining
and industrial employers in both the
city and the County can be seen from
the occupation and industry
classifications of the working
population. Compared to the state
average, Rosebud County workers –
both in Colstrip and without – are
much more prominent in those
classifications. More than a third of
Colstrip workers are employed in
agriculture, mining or construction.
The state average is less than 20
percent.
The other side of the coin finds Colstrip
with a much smaller presence of
workers for professional business
services employers, which include
finance, real estate, administrative and
professional and technical services
companies. Colstrip also has a smaller
number of workers working for
government, perhaps due to the fact
that neither tribal government or the
county seat are located there.
In terms of occupations, Colstrip
workers are more prominent in
construction trades, production and
transportation activities, and much less
likely to be in service and sales
occupations.
9
App.150
Perhaps the starkest contrast between
Colstrip and the surrounding County is in
measures of income. Household income
includes income of all household members,
with households encompassing both
individual and family households. As can be
seen from the figure, Colstrip has a very high
fraction of its households with income
towards the upper end of the distribution. To
state it another way, just under 14 percent of
Colstrip households make less than $50,000
per year. By contrast, nearly half the
households in the state make less than that
amount.
The fact that the jobs at both the Colstrip SES
and the Rosebud mine pay salaries that
extended into six figures in many cases is
apparent from the fraction of Colstrip
households with income higher than $100,000
per year. The balance of the county is
dramatically different than the city, with
nearly a third of households having annual
income of $25,000 or less.
Summary measures of income underscore
these differences. Median household income
in Colstrip, at $88,452, is more than 75 percent
higher than the state average. Rosebud
County (balance of county data are not
available for these measures) is much closer to
the state average for both median household
income and median family income. The latter
excludes single person households. The
comparatively larger presence of children in
Colstrip brings the differences in per capita
income closer than the other two measures
between different geographies.
10
App.151
The differences in income and other
characteristics between Colstrip and the
balance of Rosebud County produce
significant differences in poverty
outcomes as well. As shown in the
figure, less than 5 percent of all families
in Colstrip were below the poverty line
in 2017, compared to nearly 15 percent
in the rest of the County. It is
particularly unfortunate that poverty
rates are so alarmingly high for two
categories most at risk – American
Indian families and female headed
families. For these groups, as much as a
third or more fall under the poverty
line, and the differences in these
fractions is not appreciably different for
different areas.
It is apparent from the Census data that the energy and natural resource jobs connected – literally, by
conveyor – to the electric generation activities in Colstrip have made an enormous impact on the
economic status of many who live there. There is another aspect to the presence of the Colstrip SES and
the Rosebud mine in the economy that is not captured by this data. That is the economic stability the
relatively steady operation of these facilities has produced.
11
App.152
Employment in Rosebud county has fluctuated in a very narrow range at roughly 4,000 since the early
1990s, as shown in the figure above. During this interval of time the national economy experienced 3
recessions, the last of which produced a pronounced decline in the state economy. During the early
1980s Rosebud County employment showed strong gains as the construction of the two newer, larger
generating units at the Colstrip SES was completed, again during a period of considerable economic
turbulence in the national economy.
The capital intensive nature of wealth generation in Colstrip, in a county with less than 10,000 people,
stands out in a state that is not home to many industrial facilities of the same size. County Gross
Domestic Product, or GDP, is a measure of economic output. In year 2015, the most recent year for
which data are available, Rosebud County GDP was almost $90,000 per capita, easily the highest of any
county in the state.
Conclusion
The presence of the Colstrip SES and the Rosebud mine within and immediately adjacent to the city of
Colstrip has fostered the growth and development of a community like few others in the state. As a
result of the high wages jobs, significant vendor spending and tax contributions of these facilities, the
Colstrip community:
x
x
x
x
has median household income of $88,452, more than 75 percent higher than the state;
has poverty rates of just 4.9 percent for families, much lower than either the state (9.1 percent)
or the remainder of Rosebud County (14.9 percent);
has just 1.2 percent of its adult population lacking a high school diploma or equivalent,
compared to 7.0 percent for the state and 16.2 percent for the balance of the County;
was not visibly impacted by any of the three most recent national economic recessions,
including the Great Recession of 2008-09;
12
App.153
Its economic success stands in even greater contrast to its eastern Montana peers, who have seen much
more evident economic booms and busts, and generally have incomes less that the state as a whole. In
this portion of the state that has enjoyed less prosperity than average, its achievements stand out as a
remarkable exception.
13
App.154
3. RESEARCH APPROACH
Regional economic impacts occur because of events or activities that create new expenditures within
that region. New spending – that is, spending which is over and above existing expenditures, and which
does not displace other spending elsewhere in the region – not only adds to economic activity in its own
right, but it also induces further spending as the recipients of wages, sales, and tax revenues spend a
portion of their income in the local economy. Changes in the path of investment, migration, prices, and
wages are also possible.
This study uses an economic model, calibrated to represent the interactions specific to the Montana
economy, to estimate the economic impacts resulting from events that comprise the Rosebud mine
closure scenario. Leased from Regional Economic Models, Inc., the REMI model is one of the best known
and most respected analytical tools in the policy analysis arena. It is constructed using national, state
and sub-state area data on income, employment, spending, prices, trade flows and population from
public data sources, including the Bureau of Economic Analysis, the Bureau of Labor Statistics, the
Census Bureau. A full description of the data sources and estimation methodology used to construct
and calibrate the model can be found at https://www.remi.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/08/DataSources-and-Estimation-Procedures.pdf .
The REMI model forecasts employment, income, expenditures, and populations for regions based on a
model containing over 100 stochastic and dynamic relationships, as well as a number of identities. A full
explanation of the design and operation of the model can be found in Treyz (1993).
The REMI Modeling Methodology
The REMI model is a state-of-the-art policy analysis model that brings together three powerful tools to
address a wide range of applied research questions: an input-output model that captures the
connectivity between industries in the economy, an econometric model that accounts for the
adjustment in markets to changes in economic opportunity and rates of return, and a demographic
model that can relate changes in migration to age-structure of the population and labor supply. The
model is based on extensive and detailed data on income, employment, prices, population, and
spending in the national, state and sub-state economies (REMI, 2019).
The basic philosophy of the REMI model is that regions of the country compete for investment, jobs and
people. When events – such as a new business opening or an existing business closing -- cause changes
in a regional economy that impact economic opportunity or rates of return, spending and population
flows occur between regions to bring the economy to a new resting point. The REMI model used in this
analysis pertained to the state of Montana as a whole, with the U.S. economy as a backdrop.
The model itself has been extensively documented and evaluated in a number of peer-reviewed
economic journals (see, e.g., Treyz, et. al., 1992; Crihfield, 1992; Rickman and Schwer, 1993). It has been
used in hundreds of published studies on topics including energy, tourism, taxes, transportation, and
economic development. An extensive bibliography of REMI studies can be found at the REMI web site,
www.remi.com .
14
App.155
The basic approach of using the REMI model to produce the results for this study is illustrated in Figure
1, below. The analysis started with a baseline projection for the Montana economy, using the status quo
assumption that the Rosebud mine continues to operate. Next, the analysis employed the REMI model
a second time, simulating an alternative scenario where the events described in the Rosebud mine
closure scenario occur and the mine’s contributions are removed from the economy.
Figure 1. Policy analysis using the REMI model
The difference between economic activity in baseline scenario and the alternative scenario is the
ultimate economic impact of the events precipitating closure of the Rosebud mine.
The REMI model utilizes historical data on production, prices, trade flows, migration, and technological
advances to calibrate the relationship between five basic blocks of the state economy, as shown in
Figure 2, below.
15
App.156
Figure
Schematic model
Figure 2
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16
App.157
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These blocks are:
(1) Output and Demand;
(2) Labor and Capital Demand;
(3) Population and Labor Supply;
(4) Compensation, Prices and Costs; and
(5) Market Shares.
The differences in production, labor demand, and intermediate demand associated with the closure of
the Rosebud mine perturbs this system, causing changes and adjustment that feedback on each other
and eventually come to a new equilibrium. This new equilibrium, or resting point for the economy, is the
alternative projection depicted in Figure 1.
The underlying philosophy of the REMI model is that regions throughout the country compete for
investment, jobs, and people. When events occur in one region that change economic opportunity,
demand, or productivity, they set off a chain reaction of events that cause resources to flow toward
better investment and production opportunities, followed over time by workers and households toward
better employment opportunities and higher wages.
At its heart of the REMI model is an 82-sector input/output matrix that models the technological
interdependence of production sectors of the economy, as well as extensive trade and capital flow data.
Together, these components enable the estimates of the shares of each sector’s demand that can be
met by local production. Simplified illustrations of the schematic model in Figure 2 are provided on the
following pages, in figures 3 through 7.
Figure 3 OUTPUT LINKAGES
17
App.158
Figure
AND CAPITAL
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18
App.159
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Population
Figure 6 WAGES, PRICES AND PRODUCTION COSTS LINKAGES
Figure 7 MARKET SHARE LINKAGES
The use of the model involves (a) carefully constructing an input scenario that faithfully represents the
changes in the economy that are the subject of analysis, and (b) using the model to produce an alternate
projection of the economy that incorporates those changes. The model’s purpose is to trace and
quantify how events in specific sectors or industries ultimately move the overall economy to a new level
of activity.
Conclusion
The REMI model is a powerful, flexible, well-documented and well-respected tool for conducting policy
analysis in general, and the analysis of the Rosebud mine closure in particular. We now turn to the use
of the model for this study.
19
App.160
4. THE ROSEBUD MINE CLOSURE SCENARIO
In the event that the Colstrip SES switched sources for its coal away from the Rosebud mine, the mine
would lose its only significant customer. Because of this, it would lose its ability to operate in an
economic manner. This study constructs, analyzes, and describes a scenario that includes the closure
and reclamation of the Rosebud mine.
While any number of events can occur to affect the future, the objective of this study is to explore and
quantify the economic implications of a specific event, namely, the closure of the mine. The outcome of
this analysis is not a forecast – it is the difference between two different forecasts of the state economy:
a forecast that continues its operation, and a forecast that includes the closure of the Rosebud mine.
Because the closure of the two smaller, older generating units (Units 1 and 2) of the Colstrip SES is
scheduled to take place in the very near future, the baseline projection of the economy entails slightly
reduced levels of activity at the Rosebud mine than currently exist today. The changes in the economy
that would occur in the event that the mine ceased operation are measured against this lower baseline.
The first step in this analysis is to carefully construct the Rosebud mine closure scenario. This is meant
to describe how an economy with no Rosebud mine would differ from the baseline. In the language of
economic impact analysis, these are the direct impacts.
Additionally, there are other economic activities that occur that are not part of the production of coal
but are nonetheless linked to the cessation of activities at the mine. These include (a) the
environmental remediation activities that would commence after production ends, and (b) the new
transport and material handling activities that can be expected to occur at the Colstrip SES due to the
shift to rail delivery of its fuel source. These are often referred to as indirect impacts.
These changes to the economy are presented to an economic model (REMI) that translates them into
changes in the broader economy as spending, production, income and employment changes propagate.
These total impacts include the direct and indirect impacts, and also include the other changes in
economic activity that are induced by the mine closure.
In this analysis, no changes in the (post Unit 1 and 2 closure) operation of the Colstrip SES are assumed –
its production levels and thus electricity markets are assumed to be unaffected by the change in fuel
source. It is implicitly assumed that Montana coal is not used for the Colstrip SES in the Rosebud closure
scenario. In the event of a fuel switch at the Colstrip SES, the Rosebud mine is almost certain to close.
We can attach no such certainty to the ultimate source of whatever new fuel is acquired, but the
proximity and capacity of the Wyoming mines in the Powder River Basin make it quite plausible that
non-Montana coal would be used.
Direct Impacts: Rosebud Mine Operations
The Rosebud mine has produced output in the neighborhood of 8.5 million tons of low-sulphur,
subbituminous coal for use almost exclusively to the Colstrip SES since 2012 (see graph). The coal is
delivered by conveyor to the electric generating units 4.5 miles away. After the closure of Units 1 and 2
of the Colstrip SES, this output will fall to approximately 6.5 million annual tons.
20
App.161
Rosebud Mine Annual Production, Tons
16,000,000
14,000,000
12,000,000
10,000,000
8,000,000
6,000,000
4,000,000
2,000,000
0
In the scenario where the fuel for the Colstrip SES comes from another source and the Rosebud mine
closes, this production is lost to the economy.
The post Unit 1 and 2 closure operations of the
Rosebud Mine Operational Information
Rosebud mine will employ 337 Westmoreland
employees, in addition to a small number of non- CATEGORY
UNITS
2020
company contractors, on an annual basis. As can
be seen from the table, those jobs pay total
Headcount employment Jobs
337
compensation of approximately $40.6 million per Employee compensation $ Millions
$40.6
year, an average compensation level of
Mine production
Million tons
6.5
approximately $120,000 per employee.
Additionally, the company pays vendors and suppliers for everything from diesel fuel to scientific
services. Spending for inputs, some of which the company itself supplies, will be on the order of $31
million annually.
Operations of the mine also entail tax and royalty payments to all levels of government. Of special
importance are the taxes and royalties that are paid by all coal producers to state and local government.
Taxes Applied to Montana Coal Production
Tax Description
Coal Severance Tax
Gross Proceeds Tax
Resource Indemnity and Ground Water Assessment Tax
State Royalty Assessment
Federal Royalty Assessment
Federal Black Lung Tax
Federal Reclamation Tax
State Funds
State & Federal Funds
Federal Funds
Recipient
Tax Rates
15% of Contract Sales Price
State Government
5% of Contract Sales Price
Local Government
.4% of Contract Sales Price
State Government
Statutorily Set by DNRC
State Government
State & Federal Government 12.5% of Contract Sales Price
$0.55 per ton
Federal Government
$0.28 per ton
Federal Government
21
App.162
These taxes comprise an important
component of the Rosebud mine’s
direct impact. Based on recent
history, we have used the estimates
for mine-related tax and royalty
payments shown in the table, adjusted
to incorporate the closure of Units 1
and 2 of the Colstrip SES.
Rosebud Mine Coal Tax Payments ($ Millions)
CATEGORY
REMITTED TO
AMOUNT
Coal Severance Tax
State
$18.2
Gross Proceeds Tax
Local
$6.0
Resource Indemnity
and Ground Water
State
$0.5
Closure of the mine ceases production Assessment Tax
State Royalty Assessment
State
$0.5
ends these payments. The
Federal Royalty Assessment
State and Federal
$12.0
government spending and services
supported by these payments is assumed to be reduced accordingly. The alternative, raising taxes on
other taxpayers, was considered a less reasonable scenario.
Rosebud Mine Closure: Indirect Impacts
The closure of the Rosebud mine would be closely associated with two other events with economic
implications. One is the environmental remediation activities to return the land to a natural state.
Planning and bonding such activity are pre-requisites for permitting.
Westmoreland currently has a $165 million bond set aside for remediation. We assume that the
remediation activity funded by this bond will take place over a 10-year period commencing immediately
after mine closure. Since the source of funds for this activity comes from the company owners, this
activity adds jobs, income, and other spending flows to the local economy.
22
App.163
BNSF Southeast Montana – Northeast Wyoming Network Map
A second category of indirect impacts has to do with investments and operations at the Colstrip SES to
accommodate the delivery of coal by rail instead of conveyor. No information was made available as to
the size and scope of the capital investments needed at the Colstrip SES site. We did, however, make a
projection of the new rail activity that could occur. While not definitive, it does serve to illuminate the
order of magnitude of impacts that are associated with rail transport.
We begin with the assumption that Colstrip SES coal is sourced from Campbell County, Wyoming, where
the largest coal mines in the world are located immediately adjacent to rail transport. The BNSF rail
network map suggests an approximate rail distance of just under 300 miles along these corridors,
travelling through Sheridan, Lockwood, Forsyth, and finally south to Colstrip. Approximately 200 miles
of that route lies within the state of Montana, and at a cost of $0.03 per ton-mile for rail transport, it
represents a demand for $58 million for rail transport services for the 6.5 million tons of annual coal
consumption for the Colstrip SES.
This demand for rail transport services does increase rail employment and investment in the state, and it
is incorporated into the analysis.
23
App.164
Conclusion
The Rosebud mine has served the coal needs of the adjacent Colstrip Steam Electric Station (SES)
generating facility for more than 40 years. If this relationship were severed and those needs were
satisfied elsewhere, the mine’s operation would cease. This section has described the changes in
economic activity that could reasonably be expected in a mine closure scenario, including the cessation
of mining operations, the environmental remediation of the mine site, and changes in coal delivery at
the Colstrip SES. All of the changes are measured against a baseline that incorporates the closure of the
two smaller, older units of the Colstrip SES.
As described previously, these changes comprise the Rosebud mine closure scenario that is used to
produce an alternative projection of the state economy that reflects those events. We now turn to an
examination of those outcomes.
24
App.165
5. THE ECONOMIC IMPACTS OF A ROSEBUD MINE CLOSURE
An assessment of the economic implications of the closure of Westmoreland’s Rosebud Mine adjacent
to Colstrip, Montana involves (a) assessing the economic changes directly and indirectly associated with
the event, and (b) using an economic model to track how those changes propagate across the broader
economy to estimate the ultimate impact of the closure.
The economic impacts reported here include all changes in the economy that can be expected to occur
in a Rosebud mine closure scenario described in the previous section. As will be seen, the impacts
extend beyond the industry and workers directly affected, and are several orders of magnitude larger
than the activity of the mine itself. The impacts induced in the economy beyond the mine and beyond
Colstrip occur because of the spending flows from coal production that are received as income and
revenue by individuals, businesses and governments.
The impacts summarized in this report are not a forecast. They are the difference between two
forecasts of the future for the state economy – a status quo forecast, and a forecast that incorporates
the changes that would occur in a mine closure scenario. Since many measurements of economic
activity are in dollar terms, all such measures have been corrected for inflation and can be understood
as measures of dollar in terms of their purchasing power in the year 2019.
The closure scenario assumes that the fuel switching at the Colstrip SES and the mine closure take place
in the year 2020. This is clearly not realistic – an actual sequence of events that would produce a mine
closure would doubtless take years to occur. But the specificity of the assumption is useful in
understanding the results. The findings would be fundamentally unchanged for a different choice of
specific timing.
Impact Summary
Our basic finding is that the closure of the Rosebud mine would be a significant economic event, both
for the community of Colstrip and the rest of the state. The loss of 337 mining jobs and the production
of 6.5 million tons of coal in Colstrip ultimately contribute to a total job loss statewide of more than
1,800 jobs, as shown in the Table. The magnitude of the induced impacts on the rest of the economy
occur in part because of the high-paying nature of the mining jobs, and the outsized impact that mining
activity has on state and local tax revenues.
Impacts Summary
IMPACTS BY YEAR
CATEGORY
UNITS
2020
2021
2022
2023
2024
2025
Total employment
Jobs
-1,716
-1,852
-1,893
-1,872
-1,819
-1,754
Personal income
Disposable personal income
State Tax and Nontax Revenue
Output
Millions
-$95.6
-$81.1
-$39.0
-$325.9
-$101.4
-$86.1
-$41.0
-$347.8
-$109.2
-$92.9
-$42.7
-$355.2
-$113.0
-$96.4
-$43.8
-$353.4
-$114.8
-$98.0
-$44.4
-$346.8
-$115.4
-$98.6
-$44.7
-$338.5
Earnings per Lost Job
Population
Dollars
People
$61,998 $60,722 $61,828 $62,896 $63,940 $64,921
-568
-998
-1,337
-1,592
-1,777
-1,909
25
App.166
Other measures of economic activity reflect on different aspects of the mine closure’s impact.
x
Personal income received by Montana households would be reduced by more than $110 million
per year, compared to levels that would occur if the mine remained in operation. In terms of
after-tax, or disposable income, this is a decline of almost $100 million in purchasing power of
Montana households.
x
The revenue received by state government would be more than $40 million less each year due
to the closure of the mine, reflecting revenue from both tax and non-tax sources. Revenue
changes occur directly from the payments of the mine in natural resource taxes, and indirectly
from closure-induced changes in income and population.
x
Output, defined as gross receipts of business and non-business organizations would be more
than $340 million lower due to mine closure across the state;
x
The state of Montana would have fewer people, amounting ultimately to more than 1,900, in
the wake of events that led to closure of the Rosebud mine as described in this report. Those
shortfalls widen with time as individuals and families move in response to changes in economic
opportunities.
Not all of the changes in the economy that would take place in the aftermath of a Rosebud mine closure
are coincident with the actual closure events. We report on changes for a six year period – projected
economic impacts beyond six years can be found in the Appendix.
The changes summarized in the table refer to the economy of the state as a whole. While it can be
expected that the largest portion of these impacts are experienced in Colstrip and the surrounding
region itself, there are also impacts felt in other parts of the state. These occur primarily due to the
cutbacks in state government that are caused by the revenue impacts of the closure.
These impacts reflect all of the direct and indirect impacts associated with mine closure described in the
previous section – the negative as well as the positive. They include, for example, the positive impacts
that occur due to mine remediation activities as well as the additional rail activity that would occur in a
mine closure scenario. The fact that the net impacts are negative is because of the dominant effect of
the mine closure itself.
Employment Impacts
The dynamic nature of the economic changes that can be expected to occur in a mine closure scenario
can be seen by examining impacts over a longer period of time, as we present for total employment
impacts shown in the Figure below. There are several factors at work in the behavior of total
employment in response to mine closure-related events.
26
App.167
Employment Impacts by Year
0
-200
-400
-600
-800
-1,000
-1,200
-1,400
-1,600
-1,800
-2,000
The first observation is simply to note that the job impacts which commence in year 2020 when closure
takes place change over time. While many factors are at work in contributing to this outcome, three
stand out as being particularly important.
x
Short-term construction overshoot. In the years immediately following the closure, the
economy will have excess capital – both in structures and equipment. Construction will be
initially depressed as that excess supply is gradually absorbed. Thus impacts build for an interval
beyond the year that closure takes place, recovering slightly thereafter.
x
Productivity impacts. Over medium and long intervals of time, the productivity changes that can
be expected to occur that reduce labor requirements in capital intensive industries such as
mining result in smaller employment impacts for any physical output loss. Thus employment
impacts moderate slightly over longer time horizons.
x
Migration and demographic impacts. The migration of individuals and families not only happens
more slowly that other changes, the demographic changes that migration induces show up in
more complex ways. This is the main reason why population impacts continue to exhibit
variation decades after the closure event.
Another important aspect of the economic implications of Rosebud mine closure events can be seen
from a more detailed examination of job impacts, as shown in the table below.
27
App.168
State Employment Impacts
NUMBER OF JOBS
INDUSTRY
2020
2021
2022
2023
2024
2025
State and local government
-540
-602
-633
-646
-650
-646
Mining
-384
-382
-369
-358
-347
-337
Construction
-256
-310
-318
-301
-271
-237
Retail trade
-151
-159
-165
-164
-161
-156
Accommodation and food services
-75
-83
-90
-95
-98
-99
Health care and social assistance
-68
-69
-70
-69
-67
-66
Other services, except public administration
-59
-57
-56
-55
-53
-50
Professional and technical services
-33
-37
-38
-38
-37
-36
Wholesale trade
-26
-26
-26
-24
-23
-22
Arts, entertainments and recreation
-20
-20
-20
-19
-18
-18
Transportation and warehousing
-14
-14
-13
-11
-9
-8
Administrative and waste services
-9
-11
-11
-11
-10
-9
Manufacturing
-11
-11
-11
-10
-10
-9
Other private
-70
-72
-73
-70
-66
-62
-1,716
-1,852
-1,893
-1,872
-1,819
-1,754
TOTAL
Employment Impacts by Industry, 2022
State and local government
-633
Mining
-369
Construction
-318
Retail trade
-165
Accommodation and food services
-90
Health care and social assistance
-70
Other services, except public administration
-56
Professional and technical services
-38
Wholesale trade
-26
Arts, entertainments and recreation
-20
Transportation and warehousing
-13
Administrative and waste services
-11
Manufacturing
-11
Other private
-73
28
App.169
Perhaps the most striking aspect of the industry profile of employment impacts is the fact that the
sector of the state economy that makes the largest contribution to the total is state and local
government, not mining. There are several reasons for this outcome.
The first is that mining is a capital-intensive industry, and the loss of output affects relatively fewer
workers as a result. By contrast, government is primarily services with a relatively larger labor
requirements for each dollar of output. A second reason for the large state and local government
employment impact has to do with the disproportionate tax burden borne by natural resource
industries in general, and coal mining in particular. As we detail below, the Rosebud mine directly pays
more than $25 million to state and local government in taxes and royalties.
A third reason for the impact on government has to do with changes in population that occur due to
mine closure-related events. This clearly affects tax revenues, but it also impacts important nontax
revenue sources such as transfers from the Federal government. Those transfer flows change because
their apportionment formulas are linked to population.
More generally, the employment impacts demonstrate how closure related events propagate through
the rest of the economy. Removing almost $100 million in spending power from the state economy
lowers demand and thus labor needs for a wide range of industries, including retail trade, health care
and construction.
Personal Income Impacts
While reductions in employment associated with mine closure events clearly produce a loss in wage
income for Montana households, the reduction in economic activity that occurs due to closure also
produces other outcomes affecting income. This can be seen for a more detailed look at personal
income impacts shown in the Table below.
The Table presents an income accounting that is in standard use by Federal statistics agencies, applied
to the changes in income that can be expected to occur in a mine closure scenario. As can be seen,
while the bulk of changes due to closure events do occur in earnings – more specifically, in wages and
salaries – property income is affected as well. The latter exceed $9 million per year in year 2025. These
reductions occur due to population declines, as well as the lower demand for housing and commercial
real estate that result from lower levels of economic activity.
The definition of personal income, as can be seen from the Table below, is net of pension and social
security contributions and thus is closer to income available for spending than raw compensation.
Disposable income, which nets out personal income taxes, is even closer to that concept.
29
App.170
Personal Income Impacts
INCOME PER YEAR ($ Millions)
CATEGORY
TOTAL EARNINGS
Total wages and salary disbursements
SUPPLEMENTS TO WAGES AND SALARIES
Employer contributions for employee pension and insurance
funds
Employer contributions for government social insurance
Proprietors’ income w/inventory valuation and capital
consumption adjustments
LESS:
Contributions for government social insurance
Employee and self-employed contributions for government
social insurance
Employer contributions for government social insurance
PLUS:
2020
2021
2022
2023
2024
2025
-106.4
-112.5
-117.0
-117.7
-116.3
-113.9
-77.6
-81.2
-84.2
-85.0
-84.5
-83.3
-18.9
-20.4
-21.7
-22.4
-22.7
-22.7
-12.5
-13.5
-14.3
-14.8
-15.0
-15.0
-6.4
-6.9
-7.4
-7.6
-7.7
-7.7
-10.0
-10.9
-11.1
-10.4
-9.2
-7.9
-13.9
-14.7
-15.4
-15.8
-15.8
-15.7
-7.5
-7.8
-8.1
-8.2
-8.1
-8.0
-7.7
-6.4
-6.9
-7.4
-7.6
-7.7
Adjustment for residence
0.4
1.2
1.2
1.0
0.8
0.5
Gross in
-1.5
-0.9
-1.0
-1.1
-1.3
-1.5
Gross out
-1.9
-2.1
-2.2
-2.2
-2.1
-2.1
EQUALS:
Net earnings
-92.1
-96.5
-100.4
-100.9
-99.7
-97.6
PLUS:
Property income
-3.1
-3.8
-5.6
-7.1
-8.3
-9.2
Dividends
-1.1
-1.3
-1.9
-2.4
-2.7
-2.9
Interest
-1.4
-1.7
-2.7
-3.5
-4.1
-4.7
Rent
-0.6
-0.7
-1.1
-1.3
-1.5
-1.6
Transfer payments
EQUALS: Personal Income
LESS:
Personal current taxes
DISPOSABLE PERSONAL INCOME
-0.5
-1.1
-3.1
-5.0
-6.8
-8.5
-95.6
-14.5
-81.1
-101.4
-15.3
-86.1
-109.2
-16.2
-92.9
-113.0
-16.6
-96.4
-114.8
-16.8
-98.0
-115.4
-16.7
-98.6
Output Impacts
Income to business and non-business organizations is significantly impacted by the events described in
the Rosebud mine closure scenario. We show how economic output, or gross receipts for goods and
services, if affected for major industry categories by Rosebud mine closure events. The definition of
output in this table differs slightly from the more generally used definition – in the REMI model, output
is equal to gross receipts with the exception of retail and wholesale trade industries, where markup is
used instead.
The figure below gives a slightly different portrayal of impacts by industry than the pattern of impacts
for employment. In terms of output, mining itself is the industry that experiences the largest decline.
The sizable impacts felt by other businesses, most notably construction, retail trade and health care,
also are of note. These impacts give more information on the kinds of business and non-business
activity that would ultimately feel the effect of a closure of the Rosebud mine.
30
App.171
State Output Impacts
OUTPUT PER YEAR ($ Millions)
INDUSTRY
Mining
2020
2021
2022
2023
2024
2025
-167.6
-170.0
-169.6
-169.2
-168.8
-168.5
State and local government
-53.7
-60.2
-63.9
-65.8
-66.6
-66.8
Construction
-43.2
-53.6
-56.1
-53.9
-49.3
-43.9
Retail trade
-11.6
-12.5
-13.3
-13.5
-13.5
-13.4
Health care and social assistance
-7.5
-7.8
-8.1
-8.2
-8.1
-8.1
Wholesale trade
-5.7
-6.0
-6.0
-5.9
-5.7
-5.5
Accommodation and food services
-4.5
-5.0
-5.5
-5.8
-5.9
-6.0
Other services, except public administration
-4.0
-3.9
-3.9
-3.9
-3.8
-3.6
Manufacturing
-3.9
-3.9
-3.8
-3.5
-3.2
-2.9
Professional and technical services
-3.4
-3.8
-4.0
-4.0
-4.0
-3.9
Transportation and warehousing
1.8
2.1
2.6
3.1
3.6
4.0
Arts, entertainments and recreation
-1.3
-1.3
-1.3
-1.3
-1.3
-1.2
Administrative and waste services
1.1
1.0
0.9
1.0
1.0
1.1
Other private
-22.3
-22.8
-23.3
-22.5
-21.2
-19.8
TOTAL
-325.9
-347.8
-355.2
-353.4
-346.8
-338.5
Output Impacts by Industry, $ Millions, 2022
Mining
-169.6
State and local government
-63.9
Construction
-56.1
Retail trade
-13.3
Health care and social assistance
-8.1
Wholesale trade
-6.0
Accommodation and food services
-5.5
Other services, except public administration
-3.9
Manufacturing
-3.8
Professional and technical services
-4.0
Transportation and warehousing
2.6
Arts, entertainments and recreation
-1.3
Administrative and waste services
0.9
Other private
-23.3
31
App.172
State and Local Revenue Impacts
The outsized role of coal mining and other natural resource industries in the state revenue base makes
events which affect production and sales of especial importance to Montana. A closure of the second
largest coal mine in the state can be expected to have a noticeable impact on revenues. Since Federal
tax revenues flow outside the state and have only a limited impact on Federal spending, we focus on the
impacts at the state and local level.
The revenue impacts that are estimated by the REMI model are classified by the same categories
defined by the Census of Governments conducted by the U.S. Census Bureau. As can be seen from the
tax and nontax revenue impacts of the events associated with the Rosebud mine closure shown in the
Table and Figure below, some of these categories directly correspond to specific taxes, such as the
individual income tax. The general sales tax category, of course, registers no impact because the state
of Montana has no general sales tax.
The second largest revenue impact to state government is not a tax source. It is the broad category of
intergovernmental revenue that is almost totally comprised of transfers from the Federal government.
This reflects everything from highway funding to health care programs, and is affected by changes in
income and population that go into the apportionment formulas. The largest impact is in the selected
sales tax category, where mining royalties (both from state land and the remittance of a portion of
royalties from federal land) and severance taxes are included.
Aside from a small levy to support the University system, there is no statewide property tax in Montana.
Those impacts are not included in the Table.
32
App.173
State Revenue Impacts
REVENUE PER YEAR ($ Millions)
CATEGORY
Intergovernmental Revenue
2020
2021
2022
2023
2024
2025
-7.9
-8.9
-9.8
-10.4
-10.8
-11.2
General Sales Tax
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
Selective Sales Tax
-20.6
-20.9
-21.1
-21.1
-21.2
-21.2
License Taxes
-0.5
-0.6
-0.6
-0.6
-0.6
-0.6
Individual Income Tax
-2.8
-3.0
-3.2
-3.2
-3.2
-3.2
Corporate Income Tax
-0.8
-0.8
-0.9
-0.9
-0.8
-0.8
Other Taxes
-1.3
-1.3
-1.4
-1.5
-1.5
-1.5
Current Charges
-1.4
-1.4
-1.6
-1.6
-1.6
-1.6
Miscellaneous General Revenue
-1.2
-1.3
-1.4
-1.4
-1.5
-1.5
Utility Revenue
-0.1
-0.1
-0.1
-0.2
-0.2
-0.2
Liquor Store Revenue
-0.2
-0.2
-0.2
-0.2
-0.2
-0.2
Insurance Trust Revenue
-2.2
-2.3
-2.5
-2.6
-2.6
-2.7
TOTAL
-39.0
-41.0
-42.7
-43.8
-44.4
-44.7
State Revenue Impacts, $ Millions, 2022
Intergovernmental Revenue
-11.2
General Sales Tax
Selective Sales Tax
0.0
-21.2
License Taxes
-0.6
Individual Income Tax
-3.2
Corporate Income Tax
-0.8
Other Taxes
-1.5
Current Charges
-1.6
Miscellaneous General Revenue
-1.5
Utility Revenue
-0.2
Liquor Store Revenue
-0.2
Insurance Trust Revenue
-2.7
Property tax impacts are almost totally felt by local governments, and can be expected to be significant.
Aside from the six largest cities, the city of Colstrip has the highest assessed value for property tax in the
state. Actual tax impacts depend on a number of factors that are difficult to project, including the
33
App.174
setting of mill rates of remaining property. But it is possible to describe the kinds of revenue declines
that could be expected to occur in the mine closure scenario addressed by this report.
The results reported here were produced by combining the impacts on residential and nonresidential
capital stock produced by REMI model with effective tax rates by property class and county across the
state. Because changes in capital occur slowly in response to economic events, the property tax impacts
display a lagged response to mine closure events.
$ Millions
Property Tax Impact by Region 2020-2040
0
Other
Regions
-1
-2
-3
-4
-5
-6
Eastern Region
-7
-8
2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 2026 2027 2028 2029 2030 2031 2032 2033 2034 2035 2036 2037 2038 2039 2040
The results are shown for five regions of the state in the Figure above. As can be seen, the property tax
impact for the eastern region of the state, which includes Rosebud County where the mine is located,
dominate the overall impacts. The impacts in the east exceed $7 million in lost annual revenue per year.
Population Impacts
The movement of people and families to places of greater economic opportunity is an important part of
this analysis. Those movements are coincident with, and often caused by, changes in business
investment towards and away from regions in response to profitability and return. It can be expected
that declines in opportunity in the small community of Colstrip would produce considerable migration
from the community. Even at the state level, population impacts would be noticeable.
34
App.175
Population Impacts by Age
POPULATION IMPACT
AGE COHORT
2020
2021
2022
2023
2024
2025
Ages 0-14
-140
-251
-343
-418
-477
-523
Ages 15-24
-126
-206
-254
-274
-276
-267
Ages 25-64
-302
-539
-734
-889
-1,007
-1,094
Ages 65+
0
-2
-6
-11
-18
-26
TOTAL
-568
-998
-1,337
-1,592
-1,777
-1,909
Population Impacts by Age, 2025
Ages 0-14
-523
Ages 15-24
Ages 25-64
-267
-1,094
-26
Ages 65+
The impacts on population caused by mine closure events are dominated by working age people and
their children, as can be seen from the figure above. This has implications for demand for local
government services, especially K-12 schools. Population impacts continue to evolve in subsequent
years.
35
App.176
Conclusion
The closure of the Rosebud mine would be a significant economic event. Even after taking into account
the new economic activity associated with remediation of the mine site, as well as additional rail jobs
created from rail delivery of coal to the Colstrip SES, the net result of a fuel switch would be:
x
x
x
x
x
x
a loss in excess of 1,800 jobs in the state economy, across a broad mix of industries;
a reduction in annual income received by households of more than $100 million per year,
compared to levels that would have occurred had the mine remained in operation;
a shortfall of more than $40 million per year in state government revenue;
a decline in local property tax revenue in excess of $7 million per year, most of which occurs in
Rosebud County;
a loss of revenue to businesses in excess of $300 million per year compared to levels that would
be maintained under continued operation;
a state population that is smaller by more than 1,900 people;
36
App.177
6. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
This study is intended to assess the economic implications of the closure of the Rosebud mine, in a
scenario where the Colstrip SES continues to operate with coal from another source. If the mine were
to close, its wages, vendor purchases, and tax payments to workers, businesses and governments would
largely cease. The spending of those who receive those payments as income or revenues can be
expected to be significantly curtailed, with further knock-on effects on economic activity. As the process
continues, an equilibrium level of activity emerges that shrinks the overall economic pie by more than
that of the mine itself.
We assess the ultimate impact of the Rosebud mine closure with the use of an economic model that
traces the interactions between the mine and the rest of the economy. Specifically developed for this
purpose and calibrated with Montana-specific data, the REMI model was leased from Regional Economic
Models, Inc. (www.remi.com) for use in this study. Since its development in the early 1980s, the REMI
model has been the subject of dozens of peer-reviewed economic articles and has been employed in
hundreds of applications.
A mine-closure scenario for the Montana economy was constructed for this study that consisted of
three broad components. The first was the removal of the mine itself from the economy. Using
information obtained from the mine owners on production, employment, payroll, taxes and vendor
spending, the direct contribution of its operations was removed from the economy. A second
component was the remediation activities that would commence and continue subsequent to mine
closure.
The third component were the operating changes, if any, at the Colstrip SES that might be expected to
occur with coal deliveries by rail to that facility from a non-Montana source. While little information
was available to detail actual plans and potential investments, a simplified scenario can at least
represent the basics of how fuel source changes would affect economic flows.
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS
Our basic finding is that the shutdown of the Rosebud mine would be a significant economic event, both
for the Colstrip community and to the remainder of the state. The loss of the facility’s 337 jobs,
currently mining 6.5 million tons of coal annually, would ultimately lead to a state economy that:
x
x
x
x
x
x
Suffers a loss in excess of almost 1,900 jobs, across a broad mix of industries;
Has annual income received by households fall more than $100 million short of the amount that
would have occurred had the mine remained in operation;
Experiences a shortfall of more than $40 million per year in state government revenue;
Sees local governments collect $7 million less per year in property tax revenue, most of which
occurs in Rosebud County;
Faces a loss of revenue to businesses in excess of $300 million per year compared to levels that
would be maintained under continued operation;
Has a population that is smaller by more than 1,900 people;
37
App.178
Impacts Summary
IMPACTS BY YEAR
CATEGORY
UNITS
2020
2021
2022
2023
2024
2025
Total employment
Jobs
-1,716
-1,852
-1,893
-1,872
-1,819
-1,754
Personal income
Disposable personal income
State Tax and Nontax Revenue
Output
Millions
-$95.6
-$81.1
-$39.0
-$325.9
-$101.4
-$86.1
-$41.0
-$347.8
-$109.2
-$92.9
-$42.7
-$355.2
-$113.0
-$96.4
-$43.8
-$353.4
-$114.8
-$98.0
-$44.4
-$346.8
-$115.4
-$98.6
-$44.7
-$338.5
Earnings per Lost Job
Population
Dollars
People
$61,998 $60,722 $61,828 $62,896 $63,940 $64,921
-568
-998
-1,337
-1,592
-1,777
-1,909
These findings take into account the positive impacts that come from the $165 million that is expected
to be spent in the decade following the closure on environmental remediation, as well as the modest
increase in rail and material handling jobs that could be expected to occur as the Colstrip SES moves to
use of non-Montana coal.
38
App.179
REFERENCES
Barkey, PM and PE Polzin (2010) The economic contribution of Colstrip Steam Electric Station units 1-4,
Missoula.
Barkey, PM (2012). The economic impact of increased production at the Spring Creek mine, Missoula:
Bureau of Business and Economic Research, University of Montana.
Bureau of Business and Economic Research, University of Montana (2015). The economic implications
of implementing the EPA Clean Power Plan in Montana: Final Report. Missoula: Bureau of Business and
Economic Research.
Barkey, PM (2018). The economic impact of the early retirement of Colstrip Units 3 and 4: Final Report.
Missoula, Bureau of Business and Economic Research, University of Montana.
Brucker SM, Hastings SE, Latham WR III (1990) The variation of estimated impacts from five regional
input-output models. Int Reg Sci Rev 13:119–139.
Crihfield JB, Campbell HS Jr (1991) Evaluating alternative regional planning models. Growth and Change
22:1–16.
Crihfield JB, Campbell HS Jr (1992) Evaluating alternative regional planning models: reply. Growth and
Change 23:521–530.
Grimes DR, Fulton GA, Bonardelli MA (1992) Evaluating alternative regional planning models: a
comment. Growth and Change 23:516–520.
Radtke H, Detering S, Brokken R (1985) A comparison of economic impact estimates for changes in the
federal grazing fee: secondary vs primary data I/O models. Western J Agricultural Econ 10:382–390.
REMI (2019) Data sources and estimation procedures, https://www.remi.com/wpcontent/uploads/2019/08/Data-Sources-and-Estimation-Procedures.pdf .
Richman DS, Schwer RK (1993) A systematic comparison of the REMI and IMPLAN models: the case of
southern Nevada. Rev Reg Stud 23:143–161.
Rickman DS, Schwer RK (1994) Multiplier comparisons of the IMPLAN and REMI models across versions:
illuminating black boxes. Environ Plan A26.
Stevens BH, Treyz GI, Ehrlich DJ, Bower JR (1983) A new technique for the construction of non-survey
regional input-output models. Int Reg Sci Rev 8:271–286.
Stevens BH, Treyz GI, Lahr ML (1989) On the comparative accuracy of RPC estimating techniques. In:
Miller RE, Polenske KR, Rose AZ (eds) Frontier of input-output analysis. Oxford University Press, New
York Oxford.
Treyz GI, Richman DS, Shao G (1992) The REMI economic-demographic forecasting and simulation
model. Int Reg Sci Rev 14:221–253.
Treyz, GI (1993). Regional Economic Modeling: A Systematic Approach to Economic Forecasting and
Policy Analysis. New York, NY: Springer Netherlands.
39
App.180
Westmoreland Mining, LLC (2019). Personal communication, July 23, 2019, summarized as follows:
Current headcount employment – 365
Total compensation to employees - $44M annually
Total annual mine production – 8.5 million tons
Employment and compensation of outside contractors – 4 employees, $15M/year
Selected vendor and supplier purchases -- $8M/year electricity, $10M/year diesel
Taxes paid:
Montana Severance Tax – 23M /year
Rosebud County Gross Proceeds Tax - $8M/year
Federal Royalties - $13M/year
Bond amount for remediation - $165M
Note: Employment and other measures used in the analysis incorporate reductions from these
amounts to account for the impact of the closure of Colstrip SES Units 1 and 2 in the baseline
scenario.
40
App.181
A
PPENDIX 1:
TABLES
APPENDIX
1: REMI
REMI TABLES
41
41
App.182
Forecast
&ŽƌĞĐĂƐƚ
0.000
Ϭ͘ϬϬϬ
0.000
Ϭ͘ϬϬϬ
Individuals
/ŶĚŝǀŝĚƵĂůƐ
Individuals
/ŶĚŝǀŝĚƵĂůƐ
Individuals
/ŶĚŝǀŝĚƵĂůƐ
Millions
of Fixed (2019) Dollars
DŝůůŝŽŶƐŽĨ&ŝdžĞĚ;ϮϬϭϵͿŽůůĂƌƐ
Millions
of Fixed (2019) Dollars
DŝůůŝŽŶƐŽĨ&ŝdžĞĚ;ϮϬϭϵͿŽůůĂƌƐ
Millions
of Fixed (2019) Dollars
DŝůůŝŽŶƐŽĨ&ŝdžĞĚ;ϮϬϭϵͿŽůůĂƌƐ
Millions
of Fixed (2019) Dollars
DŝůůŝŽŶƐŽĨ&ŝdžĞĚ;ϮϬϭϵͿŽůůĂƌƐ
Millions
of Fixed (2019) Dollars
DŝůůŝŽŶƐŽĨ&ŝdžĞĚ;ϮϬϭϵͿŽůůĂƌƐ
Millions
of Fixed (2012) Dollars
DŝůůŝŽŶƐŽĨ&ŝdžĞĚ;ϮϬϭϮͿŽůůĂƌƐ
Thousands
of Fixed (2012) Dollars
dŚŽƵƐĂŶĚƐŽĨ&ŝdžĞĚ;ϮϬϭϮͿŽůůĂƌƐ
2012=100
(Nation)
ϮϬϭϮсϭϬϬ;EĂƚŝŽŶͿ
Population
WŽƉƵůĂƚŝŽŶ
Labor
Force
>ĂďŽƌ&ŽƌĐĞ
Gross
Domestic Product
'ƌŽƐƐŽŵĞƐƚŝĐWƌŽĚƵĐƚ
Output
KƵƚƉƵƚ
Value-Added
sĂůƵĞͲĚĚĞĚ
Personal
Income
WĞƌƐŽŶĂů/ŶĐŽŵĞ
Disposable
Personal Income
ŝƐƉŽƐĂďůĞWĞƌƐŽŶĂů/ŶĐŽŵĞ
Real
Disposable Personal Income
ZĞĂůŝƐƉŽƐĂďůĞWĞƌƐŽŶĂů/ŶĐŽŵĞ
Real
Disposable Personal Income per Capita
ZĞĂůŝƐƉŽƐĂďůĞWĞƌƐŽŶĂů/ŶĐŽŵĞƉĞƌĂƉŝƚĂ
PCE-Price
Index
WͲWƌŝĐĞ/ŶĚĞdž
0.000
Ϭ͘ϬϬϬ
0.000
Ϭ͘ϬϬϬ
0.000!
Ϭ͘ϬϬϬ
0.000:
Ϭ͘ϬϬϬ
0.000!
Ϭ͘ϬϬϬ
0.000:
Ϭ͘ϬϬϬ
0.000!
Ϭ͘ϬϬϬ
0.000:
Ϭ͘ϬϬϬ
0.000!
Ϭ͘ϬϬϬ
0.000:
Ϭ͘ϬϬϬ
Individuals
(Jobs)
/ŶĚŝǀŝĚƵĂůƐ;:ŽďƐͿ
0.000!
Ϭ͘ϬϬϬ
id
Adjusted
ZĞƐŝĚĞŶĐĞĚũƵƐƚĞĚŵƉůŽLJŵĞŶƚ
ploy
2018
ϮϬϭϴ
Westmoreland
Shutdown Postland2
tĞƐƚŵŽƌĞůĂŶĚ^ŚƵƚĚŽǁŶWŽƐƚϭĂŶĚϮ
Private
Non-Farm Employment
WƌŝǀĂƚĞEŽŶͲ&ĂƌŵŵƉůŽLJŵĞŶƚ
Units
hŶŝƚƐ
Comparison
Type
ŽŵƉĂƌŝƐŽŶdLJƉĞ
Differences
ŝĨĨĞƌĞŶĐĞƐ
Individuals
(Jobs)
/ŶĚŝǀŝĚƵĂůƐ;:ŽďƐͿ
Category
ĂƚĞŐŽƌLJ
Region
ZĞŐŝŽŶ
Total
Employment
dŽƚĂůŵƉůŽLJŵĞŶƚ
Montana
DŽŶƚĂŶĂ
Summary
^ƵŵŵĂƌLJ
Comparison
Forecast
ŽŵƉĂƌŝƐŽŶ&ŽƌĞĐĂƐƚ
0.000
Ϭ͘ϬϬϬ
0.000
Ϭ͘ϬϬϬ
0.000!
Ϭ͘ϬϬϬ
0.000:
Ϭ͘ϬϬϬ
0.000!
Ϭ͘ϬϬϬ
0.000:
Ϭ͘ϬϬϬ
0.000!
Ϭ͘ϬϬϬ
0.000:
Ϭ͘ϬϬϬ
0.000!
Ϭ͘ϬϬϬ
0.000:
Ϭ͘ϬϬϬ
0.000!
Ϭ͘ϬϬϬ
0.000:
Ϭ͘ϬϬϬ
0.000!
Ϭ͘ϬϬϬ
-0.003
ͲϬ͘ϬϬϯ
-0.049
ͲϬ͘Ϭϰϵ
-73.795
Ͳϳϯ͘ϳϵϱ
-81.125
Ͳϴϭ͘ϭϮϱ
-95.626
Ͳϵϱ͘ϲϮϲ
-199.704
Ͳϭϵϵ͘ϳϬϰ
325.891
ͲϯϮϱ͘ϴϵϭ
-199.704
Ͳϭϵϵ͘ϳϬϰ
-427.680
ͲϰϮϳ͘ϲϴϬ
-568.216
Ͳϱϲϴ͘Ϯϭϲ
-1702.460
ͲϭϳϬϮ͘ϰϲϬ
-1176.778
Ͳϭϭϳϲ͘ϳϳϴ
-1716.455
Ͳϭϳϭϲ͘ϰϱϱ
2020
ϮϬϮϬ
App.1838
App.183
2019
ϮϬϭϵ
Standard
Regional Control
^ƚĂŶĚĂƌĚZĞŐŝŽŶĂůŽŶƚƌŽů
-0.024|
ͲϬ͘ϬϮϰ
-0.038
ͲϬ͘Ϭϯϴ
-78.340
Ͳϳϴ͘ϯϰϬ
-86.121
Ͳϴϲ͘ϭϮϭ
-101.421
ͲϭϬϭ͘ϰϮϭ
-213.063
ͲϮϭϯ͘Ϭϲϯ
347.753
Ͳϯϰϳ͘ϳϱϯ
-213.063
ͲϮϭϯ͘Ϭϲϯ
-706,292
ͲϳϬϲ͘ϮϵϮ
-997.782
Ͳϵϵϳ͘ϳϴϮ
-1824,223
ͲϭϴϮϰ͘ϮϮϯ
-1249.764
ͲϭϮϰϵ͘ϳϲϰ
-1851.973
Ͳϭϴϱϭ͘ϵϳϯ
2021
ϮϬϮϭ
Year
zĞĂƌ
2022
ϮϬϮϮ
-0.027
ͲϬ͘ϬϮϳ
-0.031
ͲϬ͘Ϭϯϭ
-84.545
Ͳϴϰ͘ϱϰϱ
-92.942
ͲϵϮ͘ϵϰϮ
-109.150
ͲϭϬϵ͘ϭϱϬ
-217.918
ͲϮϭϳ͘ϵϭϴ
-355.220
Ͳϯϱϱ͘ϮϮϬ
-217.918
ͲϮϭϳ͘ϵϭϴ
-908.732
ͲϵϬϴ͘ϳϯϮ
-1337.341
Ͳϭϯϯϳ͘ϯϰϭ
-1867.377
Ͳϭϴϲϳ͘ϯϳϳ
-1259.691
ͲϭϮϱϵ͘ϲϵϭ
-1892.618
ͲϭϴϵϮ͘ϲϭϴ
2023
ϮϬϮϯ
-0.029
ͲϬ͘ϬϮϵ
-0.024
ͲϬ͘ϬϮϰ
-87.697
Ͳϴϳ͘ϲϵϳ
-96.407
Ͳϵϲ͘ϰϬϳ
-113.036
Ͳϭϭϯ͘Ϭϯϲ
-217.036
ͲϮϭϳ͘Ϭϯϲ
-353.373
Ͳϯϱϯ͘ϯϳϯ
-217.036
ͲϮϭϳ͘Ϭϯϲ
-1050.001
ͲϭϬϱϬ͘ϬϬϭ
-1591.959
Ͳϭϱϵϭ͘ϵϱϵ
-1851.420
Ͳϭϴϱϭ͘ϰϮϬ
-1225.317
ͲϭϮϮϱ͘ϯϭϳ
-1871.783
Ͳϭϴϳϭ͘ϳϴϯ
2024
ϮϬϮϰ
-0.029
ͲϬ͘ϬϮϵ
-0.018
ͲϬ͘Ϭϭϴ
-89.188
Ͳϴϵ͘ϭϴϴ
-98.046
Ͳϵϴ͘Ϭϰϲ
-114.801
Ͳϭϭϰ͘ϴϬϭ
-213.282
ͲϮϭϯ͘ϮϴϮ
-346.844
Ͳϯϰϲ͘ϴϰϰ
-213.282
ͲϮϭϯ͘ϮϴϮ
-1136.611
Ͳϭϭϯϲ͘ϲϭϭ
-1777.074
Ͳϭϳϳϳ͘Ϭϳϰ
-1805.309
ͲϭϴϬϱ͘ϯϬϵ
-1169.818
Ͳϭϭϲϵ͘ϴϭϴ
-1819.331
Ͳϭϴϭϵ͘ϯϯϭ
2025
ϮϬϮϱ
-0.029
ͲϬ͘ϬϮϵ
-0.013
ͲϬ͘Ϭϭϯ
-89.711
Ͳϴϵ͘ϳϭϭ
-98.622
Ͳϵϴ͘ϲϮϮ
-115.356
Ͳϭϭϱ͘ϯϱϲ
-208.439
ͲϮϬϴ͘ϰϯϵ
-338.521
Ͳϯϯϴ͘ϱϮϭ
-208.439
ͲϮϬϴ͘ϰϯϵ
-1184.804'
Ͳϭϭϴϰ͘ϴϬϰ
-1909.481
ͲϭϵϬϵ͘ϰϴϭ
-1746.773
Ͳϭϳϰϲ͘ϳϳϯ
-1107.546
ͲϭϭϬϳ͘ϱϰϲ
-1754.040
Ͳϭϳϱϰ͘ϬϰϬ
2026
ϮϬϮϲ
-0.029
ͲϬ͘ϬϮϵ
-0.009
ͲϬ͘ϬϬϵ
-88.954
Ͳϴϴ͘ϵϱϰ
-97.789
Ͳϵϳ͘ϳϴϵ
-115.261
Ͳϭϭϱ͘Ϯϲϭ
-203.468
ͲϮϬϯ͘ϰϲϴ
-329.970
ͲϯϮϵ͘ϵϳϬ
-203.468
ͲϮϬϯ͘ϰϲϴ
-1207.785
ͲϭϮϬϳ͘ϳϴϱ
-2001.623
ͲϮϬϬϭ͘ϲϮϯ
-1686.573
Ͳϭϲϴϲ͘ϱϳϯ
-1046.949
ͲϭϬϰϲ͘ϵϰϵ
-1687.595
Ͳϭϲϴϳ͘ϱϵϱ
2027
ϮϬϮϳ
-0.028
ͲϬ͘ϬϮϴ
-0.005
ͲϬ͘ϬϬϱ
-88.087
Ͳϴϴ͘Ϭϴϳ
-96.836
Ͳϵϲ͘ϴϯϲ
-114.896
Ͳϭϭϰ͘ϴϵϲ
-198.946
Ͳϭϵϴ͘ϵϰϲ
-322.350
ͲϯϮϮ͘ϯϱϬ
-198.946
Ͳϭϵϴ͘ϵϰϲ
-1213.279
ͲϭϮϭϯ͘Ϯϳϵ
-2062.205
ͲϮϬϲϮ͘ϮϬϱ
-1630.498
ͲϭϲϯϬ͘ϰϵϴ
-992.925
ͲϵϵϮ͘ϵϮϱ
-1625.836
ͲϭϲϮϱ͘ϴϯϲ
2028
ϮϬϮϴ
-0.028
ͲϬ͘ϬϮϴ
-0.003
ͲϬ͘ϬϬϯ
-88.156
Ͳϴϴ͘ϭϱϲ
-96.912
Ͳϵϲ͘ϵϭϮ
-114.721
Ͳϭϭϰ͘ϳϮϭ
-195.221
Ͳϭϵϱ͘ϮϮϭ
-316.116
Ͳϯϭϲ͘ϭϭϲ
-195.221
Ͳϭϵϱ͘ϮϮϭ
-1208.059
ͲϭϮϬϴ͘Ϭϱϵ
-2101.659
ͲϮϭϬϭ͘ϲϱϵ
-1583.703
Ͳϭϱϴϯ͘ϳϬϯ
-948.781
Ͳϵϰϴ͘ϳϴϭ
-1573.938
Ͳϭϱϳϯ͘ϵϯϴ
2029
ϮϬϮϵ
-0.027
ͲϬ͘ϬϮϳ
-0.001
ͲϬ͘ϬϬϭ
-88.234'
Ͳϴϴ͘Ϯϯϰ
-96.998
Ͳϵϲ͘ϵϵϴ
-114.681
Ͳϭϭϰ͘ϲϴϭ
-192.308
ͲϭϵϮ͘ϯϬϴ
-311.303
Ͳϯϭϭ͘ϯϬϯ
-192.308
ͲϭϵϮ͘ϯϬϴ
-1197.573
Ͳϭϭϵϳ͘ϱϳϯ
-2125.971
ͲϮϭϮϱ͘ϵϳϭ
-1544.985
Ͳϭϱϰϰ͘ϵϴϱ
-913.432
Ͳϵϭϯ͘ϰϯϮ
-1531.020
Ͳϭϱϯϭ͘ϬϮϬ
2030
ϮϬϯϬ
-0.027
ͲϬ͘ϬϮϳ
0.000:
Ϭ͘ϬϬϬ
-88.355
Ͳϴϴ͘ϯϱϱ
-97.131
Ͳϵϳ͘ϭϯϭ
-114.702
Ͳϭϭϰ͘ϳϬϮ
-190.283
ͲϭϵϬ͘Ϯϴϯ
-308.026
ͲϯϬϴ͘ϬϮϲ
-190.283
ͲϭϵϬ͘Ϯϴϯ
-1183.176
Ͳϭϭϴϯ͘ϭϳϲ
-2139.229
ͲϮϭϯϵ͘ϮϮϵ
-1513.331
Ͳϭϱϭϯ͘ϯϯϭ
-886.312
Ͳϴϴϲ͘ϯϭϮ
-1496.067
Ͳϭϰϵϲ͘Ϭϲϳ
Category
ĂƚĞŐŽƌLJ
0.000
Ϭ͘ϬϬϬ
0.000
Ϭ͘ϬϬϬ
0.000
Ϭ͘ϬϬϬ
0.000
Ϭ͘ϬϬϬ
Individuals
(Jobs)
/ŶĚŝǀŝĚƵĂůƐ;:ŽďƐͿ
Individuals
(Jobs)
/ŶĚŝǀŝĚƵĂůƐ;:ŽďƐͿ
Individuals
(Jobs)
/ŶĚŝǀŝĚƵĂůƐ;:ŽďƐͿ
Individuals
(Jobs)
/ŶĚŝǀŝĚƵĂůƐ;:ŽďƐͿ
Individuals
(Jobs)
/ŶĚŝǀŝĚƵĂůƐ;:ŽďƐͿ
Individuals
(Jobs)
/ŶĚŝǀŝĚƵĂůƐ;:ŽďƐͿ
Individuals
(Jobs)
/ŶĚŝǀŝĚƵĂůƐ;:ŽďƐͿ
Individuals
(Jobs)
/ŶĚŝǀŝĚƵĂůƐ;:ŽďƐͿ
Individuals
(Jobs)
/ŶĚŝǀŝĚƵĂůƐ;:ŽďƐͿ
Individuals
(Jobs)
/ŶĚŝǀŝĚƵĂůƐ;:ŽďƐͿ
Individuals
(Jobs)
/ŶĚŝǀŝĚƵĂůƐ;:ŽďƐͿ
Individuals
(Jobs)
/ŶĚŝǀŝĚƵĂůƐ;:ŽďƐͿ
Individuals
(Jobs)
/ŶĚŝǀŝĚƵĂůƐ;:ŽďƐͿ
Individuals
(Jobs)
/ŶĚŝǀŝĚƵĂůƐ;:ŽďƐͿ
Individuals
(Jobs)
/ŶĚŝǀŝĚƵĂůƐ;:ŽďƐͿ
Individuals
(Jobs)
/ŶĚŝǀŝĚƵĂůƐ;:ŽďƐͿ
Individuals
(Jobs)
/ŶĚŝǀŝĚƵĂůƐ;:ŽďƐͿ
Individuals
(Jobs)
/ŶĚŝǀŝĚƵĂůƐ;:ŽďƐͿ
Individuals
(Jobs)
/ŶĚŝǀŝĚƵĂůƐ;:ŽďƐͿ
Individuals
(Jobs)
/ŶĚŝǀŝĚƵĂůƐ;:ŽďƐͿ
Individuals
(Jobs)
/ŶĚŝǀŝĚƵĂůƐ;:ŽďƐͿ
Individuals
(Jobs)
/ŶĚŝǀŝĚƵĂůƐ;:ŽďƐͿ
Individuals
(Jobs)
/ŶĚŝǀŝĚƵĂůƐ;:ŽďƐͿ
Individuals
(Jobs)
/ŶĚŝǀŝĚƵĂůƐ;:ŽďƐͿ
Individuals
(Jobs)
/ŶĚŝǀŝĚƵĂůƐ;:ŽďƐͿ
Individuals
(Jobs)
/ŶĚŝǀŝĚƵĂůƐ;:ŽďƐͿ
Individuals
(Jobs)
/ŶĚŝǀŝĚƵĂůƐ;:ŽďƐͿ
Individuals
(Jobs)
/ŶĚŝǀŝĚƵĂůƐ;:ŽďƐͿ
Individuals
(Jobs)
/ŶĚŝǀŝĚƵĂůƐ;:ŽďƐͿ
Individuals
(Jobs)
/ŶĚŝǀŝĚƵĂůƐ;:ŽďƐͿ
Individuals
(Jobs)
/ŶĚŝǀŝĚƵĂůƐ;:ŽďƐͿ
Individuals
(Jobs)
/ŶĚŝǀŝĚƵĂůƐ;:ŽďƐͿ
Individuals
(Jobs)
/ŶĚŝǀŝĚƵĂůƐ;:ŽďƐͿ
Individuals
(Jobs)
/ŶĚŝǀŝĚƵĂůƐ;:ŽďƐͿ
Individuals
(Jobs)
/ŶĚŝǀŝĚƵĂůƐ;:ŽďƐͿ
Individuals
(Jobs)
/ŶĚŝǀŝĚƵĂůƐ;:ŽďƐͿ
Individuals
(Jobs)
/ŶĚŝǀŝĚƵĂůƐ;:ŽďƐͿ
Individuals
(Jobs)
/ŶĚŝǀŝĚƵĂůƐ;:ŽďƐͿ
Individuals
(Jobs)
/ŶĚŝǀŝĚƵĂůƐ;:ŽďƐͿ
Individuals
(Jobs)
/ŶĚŝǀŝĚƵĂůƐ;:ŽďƐͿ
Individuals
(Jobs)
/ŶĚŝǀŝĚƵĂůƐ;:ŽďƐͿ
Individuals
(Jobs)
/ŶĚŝǀŝĚƵĂůƐ;:ŽďƐͿ
Individuals
(Jobs)
/ŶĚŝǀŝĚƵĂůƐ;:ŽďƐͿ
Individuals
(Jobs)
/ŶĚŝǀŝĚƵĂůƐ;:ŽďƐͿ
Individuals
(Jobs)
/ŶĚŝǀŝĚƵĂůƐ;:ŽďƐͿ
Individuals
(Jobs)
/ŶĚŝǀŝĚƵĂůƐ;:ŽďƐͿ
Individuals
(Jobs)
/ŶĚŝǀŝĚƵĂůƐ;:ŽďƐͿ
Support
activities for mining
^ƵƉƉŽƌƚĂĐƚŝǀŝƚŝĞƐĨŽƌŵŝŶŝŶŐ
Utilities
hƚŝůŝƚŝĞƐ
Construction
ŽŶƐƚƌƵĐƚŝŽŶ
Wood
product manufacturing
tŽŽĚƉƌŽĚƵĐƚŵĂŶƵĨĂĐƚƵƌŝŶŐ
Nonmetallic
mineral product manufacturing
EŽŶŵĞƚĂůůŝĐŵŝŶĞƌĂůƉƌŽĚƵĐƚŵĂŶƵĨĂĐƚƵƌŝŶŐ
Primary
metal manufacturing
WƌŝŵĂƌLJŵĞƚĂůŵĂŶƵĨĂĐƚƵƌŝŶŐ
metal product
&ĂďƌŝĐĂƚĞĚŵĞƚĂůƉƌŽĚƵĐƚŵĂŶƵĨĂĐƚƵƌŝŶŐ
Machinery
manufacturing
DĂĐŚŝŶĞƌLJŵĂŶƵĨĂĐƚƵƌŝŶŐ
Computer
and electronic product manufacturing
ŽŵƉƵƚĞƌĂŶĚĞůĞĐƚƌŽŶŝĐƉƌŽĚƵĐƚŵĂŶƵĨĂĐƚƵƌŝŶŐ
and
ng
ůĞĐƚƌŝĐĂůĞƋƵŝƉŵĞŶƚ͕ĂƉƉůŝĂŶĐĞ͕ĂŶĚĐŽŵƉŽŶĞŶƚŵĂŶƵĨĂĐƚƵƌŝŶŐ
Motor
vehicles, bodies and trailers, and parts manufacturing
DŽƚŽƌǀĞŚŝĐůĞƐ͕ďŽĚŝĞƐĂŶĚƚƌĂŝůĞƌƐ͕ĂŶĚƉĂƌƚƐŵĂŶƵĨĂĐƚƵƌŝŶŐ
Other
i
i
i
KƚŚĞƌƚƌĂŶƐƉŽƌƚĂƚŝŽŶĞƋƵŝƉŵĞŶƚŵĂŶƵĨĂĐƚƵƌŝŶŐ
Furniture
and related product manufacturing
&ƵƌŶŝƚƵƌĞĂŶĚƌĞůĂƚĞĚƉƌŽĚƵĐƚŵĂŶƵĨĂĐƚƵƌŝŶŐ
Miscellaneous
manufacturing
DŝƐĐĞůůĂŶĞŽƵƐŵĂŶƵĨĂĐƚƵƌŝŶŐ
Food
manufacturing
&ŽŽĚŵĂŶƵĨĂĐƚƵƌŝŶŐ
Beverage
and tobacco product manufacturing
ĞǀĞƌĂŐĞĂŶĚƚŽďĂĐĐŽƉƌŽĚƵĐƚŵĂŶƵĨĂĐƚƵƌŝŶŐ
Textile
mills; Textile product mills
dĞdžƚŝůĞŵŝůůƐ͖dĞdžƚŝůĞƉƌŽĚƵĐƚŵŝůůƐ
Apparel
manufacturing; Leather and allied product manufacturing
ƉƉĂƌĞůŵĂŶƵĨĂĐƚƵƌŝŶŐ͖>ĞĂƚŚĞƌĂŶĚĂůůŝĞĚƉƌŽĚƵĐƚŵĂŶƵĨĂĐƚƵƌŝŶŐ
Paper
manufacturing
WĂƉĞƌŵĂŶƵĨĂĐƚƵƌŝŶŐ
Printing
and related support acti’
S
WƌŝŶƚŝŶŐĂŶĚƌĞůĂƚĞĚƐƵƉƉŽƌƚĂĐƚŝǀŝƚŝĞƐ
Petroleum
and coal products manufacturing
WĞƚƌŽůĞƵŵĂŶĚĐŽĂůƉƌŽĚƵĐƚƐŵĂŶƵĨĂĐƚƵƌŝŶŐ
Chemical
manufacturing
ŚĞŵŝĐĂůŵĂŶƵĨĂĐƚƵƌŝŶŐ
Plastics
and rubber products manufacturing
WůĂƐƚŝĐƐĂŶĚƌƵďďĞƌƉƌŽĚƵĐƚƐŵĂŶƵĨĂĐƚƵƌŝŶŐ
Wholesale
trade
tŚŽůĞƐĂůĞƚƌĂĚĞ
Retail
trade
ZĞƚĂŝůƚƌĂĚĞ
Air
transportation
ŝƌƚƌĂŶƐƉŽƌƚĂƚŝŽŶ
Rail
transportation
ZĂŝůƚƌĂŶƐƉŽƌƚĂƚŝŽŶ
Water
transportation
tĂƚĞƌƚƌĂŶƐƉŽƌƚĂƚŝŽŶ
Truck
transportation
dƌƵĐŬƚƌĂŶƐƉŽƌƚĂƚŝŽŶ
Couriers
and messengers
ŽƵƌŝĞƌƐĂŶĚŵĞƐƐĞŶŐĞƌƐ
Transit
and ground passenger transportation
dƌĂŶƐŝƚĂŶĚŐƌŽƵŶĚƉĂƐƐĞŶŐĞƌƚƌĂŶƐƉŽƌƚĂƚŝŽŶ
Pipeline
transportation
WŝƉĞůŝŶĞƚƌĂŶƐƉŽƌƚĂƚŝŽŶ
Scenic
and sightseeing transportation; Support activities for transportation
^ĐĞŶŝĐĂŶĚƐŝŐŚƚƐĞĞŝŶŐƚƌĂŶƐƉŽƌƚĂƚŝŽŶ͖^ƵƉƉŽƌƚĂĐƚŝǀŝƚŝĞƐĨŽƌƚƌĂŶƐƉŽƌƚĂƚŝŽŶ
Warehousing
and storage
tĂƌĞŚŽƵƐŝŶŐĂŶĚƐƚŽƌĂŐĞ
Publishing
industries, except Internet
WƵďůŝƐŚŝŶŐŝŶĚƵƐƚƌŝĞƐ͕ĞdžĐĞƉƚ/ŶƚĞƌŶĞƚ
Motion
picture and sound recording industries
DŽƚŝŽŶƉŝĐƚƵƌĞĂŶĚƐŽƵŶĚƌĞĐŽƌĚŝŶŐŝŶĚƵƐƚƌŝĞƐ
Data
processing, hosting, and related services; Other information services
ĂƚĂƉƌŽĐĞƐƐŝŶŐ͕ŚŽƐƚŝŶŐ͕ĂŶĚƌĞůĂƚĞĚƐĞƌǀŝĐĞƐ͖KƚŚĞƌŝŶĨŽƌŵĂƚŝŽŶƐĞƌǀŝĐĞƐ
Broadcasting,
except Internet
ƌŽĂĚĐĂƐƚŝŶŐ͕ĞdžĐĞƉƚ/ŶƚĞƌŶĞƚ
Telecommunicat
ns
dĞůĞĐŽŵŵƵŶŝĐĂƚŝŽŶƐ
Monetary
authorities - central bank; Credit intermediation and related acti
ies
DŽŶĞƚĂƌLJĂƵƚŚŽƌŝƚŝĞƐͲĐĞŶƚƌĂůďĂŶŬ͖ƌĞĚŝƚŝŶƚĞƌŵĞĚŝĂƚŝŽŶĂŶĚƌĞůĂƚĞĚĂĐƚŝǀŝƚŝĞƐ
other i
Funds, trusts, other financial vehicles
^ĞĐƵƌŝƚŝĞƐ͕ĐŽŵŵŽĚŝƚLJĐŽŶƚƌĂĐƚƐ͕ŽƚŚĞƌŝŶǀĞƐƚŵĞŶƚƐ͖&ƵŶĚƐ͕ƚƌƵƐƚƐ͕ŽƚŚĞƌĨŝŶĂŶĐŝĂůǀĞŚŝĐůĞƐ
Insurance
carriers and related acti
/ŶƐƵƌĂŶĐĞĐĂƌƌŝĞƌƐĂŶĚƌĞůĂƚĞĚĂĐƚŝǀŝƚŝĞƐ
Real
estate
ZĞĂůĞƐƚĂƚĞ
Rental
and lea: g services; Lessors of nonfinancial intangible assets
ZĞŶƚĂůĂŶĚůĞĂƐŝŶŐƐĞƌǀŝĐĞƐ͖>ĞƐƐŽƌƐŽĨŶŽŶĨŝŶĂŶĐŝĂůŝŶƚĂŶŐŝďůĞĂƐƐĞƚƐ
Professional,
scientific, and technical services
WƌŽĨĞƐƐŝŽŶĂů͕ƐĐŝĞŶƚŝĨŝĐ͕ĂŶĚƚĞĐŚŶŝĐĂůƐĞƌǀŝĐĞƐ
Management
of companies and enterprises
DĂŶĂŐĞŵĞŶƚŽĨĐŽŵƉĂŶŝĞƐĂŶĚĞŶƚĞƌƉƌŝƐĞƐ
Administrative
and support services
ĚŵŝŶŝƐƚƌĂƚŝǀĞĂŶĚƐƵƉƉŽƌƚƐĞƌǀŝĐĞƐ
App.184
App.184
0.000
Ϭ͘ϬϬϬ
0.000
Ϭ͘ϬϬϬ
0.000
Ϭ͘ϬϬϬ
0.000
Ϭ͘ϬϬϬ
0.000
Ϭ͘ϬϬϬ
0.000
Ϭ͘ϬϬϬ
0.000
Ϭ͘ϬϬϬ
0.000
Ϭ͘ϬϬϬ
0.000
Ϭ͘ϬϬϬ
0.000
Ϭ͘ϬϬϬ
0.000
Ϭ͘ϬϬϬ
0.000
Ϭ͘ϬϬϬ
0.000
Ϭ͘ϬϬϬ
0.000
Ϭ͘ϬϬϬ
0.000
Ϭ͘ϬϬϬ
0.000
Ϭ͘ϬϬϬ
0.000
Ϭ͘ϬϬϬ
0.000
Ϭ͘ϬϬϬ
0.000
Ϭ͘ϬϬϬ
0.000
Ϭ͘ϬϬϬ
0.000
Ϭ͘ϬϬϬ
0.000
Ϭ͘ϬϬϬ
0.000
Ϭ͘ϬϬϬ
0.000
Ϭ͘ϬϬϬ
0.000
Ϭ͘ϬϬϬ
0.000
Ϭ͘ϬϬϬ
0.000
Ϭ͘ϬϬϬ
0.000
Ϭ͘ϬϬϬ
0.000
Ϭ͘ϬϬϬ
0.000
Ϭ͘ϬϬϬ
0.000
Ϭ͘ϬϬϬ
0.000
Ϭ͘ϬϬϬ
0.000
Ϭ͘ϬϬϬ
0.000
Ϭ͘ϬϬϬ
0.000
Ϭ͘ϬϬϬ
0.000
Ϭ͘ϬϬϬ
0.000
Ϭ͘ϬϬϬ
0.000
Ϭ͘ϬϬϬ
0.000
Ϭ͘ϬϬϬ
0.000
Ϭ͘ϬϬϬ
0.000
Ϭ͘ϬϬϬ
0.000
Ϭ͘ϬϬϬ
0.000
Ϭ͘ϬϬϬ
0.000
Ϭ͘ϬϬϬ
0.000
Ϭ͘ϬϬϬ
0.000
Ϭ͘ϬϬϬ
0.000
Ϭ͘ϬϬϬ
0.000
Ϭ͘ϬϬϬ
0.000
Ϭ͘ϬϬϬ
0.000
Ϭ͘ϬϬϬ
0.000
Ϭ͘ϬϬϬ
0.000
Ϭ͘ϬϬϬ
0.000
Ϭ͘ϬϬϬ
0.000
Ϭ͘ϬϬϬ
0.000
Ϭ͘ϬϬϬ
0.000
Ϭ͘ϬϬϬ
0.000
Ϭ͘ϬϬϬ
0.000
Ϭ͘ϬϬϬ
0.000
Ϭ͘ϬϬϬ
0.000
Ϭ͘ϬϬϬ
0.000
Ϭ͘ϬϬϬ
0.000
Ϭ͘ϬϬϬ
0.000
Ϭ͘ϬϬϬ
0.000
Ϭ͘ϬϬϬ
0.000
Ϭ͘ϬϬϬ
0.000
Ϭ͘ϬϬϬ
0.000
Ϭ͘ϬϬϬ
0.000
Ϭ͘ϬϬϬ
0.000
Ϭ͘ϬϬϬ
0.000
Ϭ͘ϬϬϬ
0.000
Ϭ͘ϬϬϬ
0.000
Ϭ͘ϬϬϬ
0.000
Ϭ͘ϬϬϬ
0.000
Ϭ͘ϬϬϬ
0.000
Ϭ͘ϬϬϬ
0.000
Ϭ͘ϬϬϬ
0.000
Ϭ͘ϬϬϬ
0.000
Ϭ͘ϬϬϬ
0.000
Ϭ͘ϬϬϬ
0.000
Ϭ͘ϬϬϬ
0.000
Ϭ͘ϬϬϬ
0.000
Ϭ͘ϬϬϬ
0.000
Ϭ͘ϬϬϬ
0.000
Ϭ͘ϬϬϬ
0.000
Ϭ͘ϬϬϬ
0.000
Ϭ͘ϬϬϬ
0.000
Ϭ͘ϬϬϬ
0.000
Ϭ͘ϬϬϬ
0.000
Ϭ͘ϬϬϬ
0.000
Ϭ͘ϬϬϬ
0.000
Ϭ͘ϬϬϬ
0.000
Ϭ͘ϬϬϬ
Individuals
(Jobs)
/ŶĚŝǀŝĚƵĂůƐ;:ŽďƐͿ
Mining
(except oil and gas)
DŝŶŝŶŐ;ĞdžĐĞƉƚŽŝůĂŶĚŐĂƐͿ
0.000
Ϭ͘ϬϬϬ
0.000
Ϭ͘ϬϬϬ
Individuals
(Jobs)
/ŶĚŝǀŝĚƵĂůƐ;:ŽďƐͿ
0.000
Ϭ͘ϬϬϬ
0.000
Ϭ͘ϬϬϬ
Oil
and gas extraction
KŝůĂŶĚŐĂƐĞdžƚƌĂĐƚŝŽŶ
0.000
Ϭ͘ϬϬϬ
2019
ϮϬϭϵ
Individuals
(Jobs)
/ŶĚŝǀŝĚƵĂůƐ;:ŽďƐͿ
2018
ϮϬϭϴ
Forecast
&ŽƌĞĐĂƐƚ
Westmoreland
Shutdown Postland2
tĞƐƚŵŽƌĞůĂŶĚ^ŚƵƚĚŽǁŶWŽƐƚϭĂŶĚϮ
0.000
Ϭ͘ϬϬϬ
Comparison
Type
ŽŵƉĂƌŝƐŽŶdLJƉĞ
Differences
ŝĨĨĞƌĞŶĐĞƐ
Support
activities for agriculture and forestry
^ƵƉƉŽƌƚĂĐƚŝǀŝƚŝĞƐĨŽƌĂŐƌŝĐƵůƚƵƌĞĂŶĚĨŽƌĞƐƚƌLJ
Units
hŶŝƚƐ
Employment
ŵƉůŽLJŵĞŶƚ
Individuals
(Jobs)
/ŶĚŝǀŝĚƵĂůƐ;:ŽďƐͿ
Industries
/ŶĚƵƐƚƌŝĞƐ
Region
ZĞŐŝŽŶ
Forestry
and Logging; Fishing, hunting and trapping
&ŽƌĞƐƚƌLJĂŶĚ>ŽŐŐŝŶŐ͖&ŝƐŚŝŶŐ͕ŚƵŶƚŝŶŐĂŶĚƚƌĂƉƉŝŶŐ
Montana
DŽŶƚĂŶĂ
Employment
by Industry
ŵƉůŽLJŵĞŶƚďLJ/ŶĚƵƐƚƌLJ
Comparison
Forecast
ŽŵƉĂƌŝƐŽŶ&ŽƌĞĐĂƐƚ
2020
ϮϬϮϬ
-25.980
ͲϮϱ͘ϵϴϬ
-0.032
ͲϬ͘ϬϯϮ
-33.489
Ͳϯϯ͘ϰϴϵ
-8.202
Ͳϴ͘ϮϬϮ
-46.357
Ͳϰϲ͘ϯϱϳ
-1,159
Ͳϭ͘ϭϱϵ
-4.124
Ͳϰ͘ϭϮϰ
-0.659
ͲϬ͘ϲϱϵ
-0.645
ͲϬ͘ϲϰϱ
-0,.228
ͲϬ͘ϮϮϴ
-0.335
ͲϬ͘ϯϯϱ
-0.487
ͲϬ͘ϰϴϳ
-0.020
ͲϬ͘ϬϮϬ
-0.838
ͲϬ͘ϴϯϴ
-1.333
Ͳϭ͘ϯϯϯ
-0.418
ͲϬ͘ϰϭϴ
-6.468
Ͳϲ͘ϰϲϴ
-0.657
ͲϬ͘ϲϱϳ
-9.375
Ͳϵ͘ϯϳϱ
-0.011
ͲϬ͘Ϭϭϭ
5.505
ϱ͘ϱϬϱ
-0.707
ͲϬ͘ϳϬϳ
-150.633}
ͲϭϱϬ͘ϲϯϯ
-25.743]
ͲϮϱ͘ϳϰϯ
-0.461
ͲϬ͘ϰϲϭ
-0.109
ͲϬ͘ϭϬϵ
-0.579
ͲϬ͘ϱϳϵ
-0.234
ͲϬ͘Ϯϯϰ
-0.008
ͲϬ͘ϬϬϴ
-0.432
ͲϬ͘ϰϯϮ
-0.286
ͲϬ͘Ϯϴϲ
-1.756
Ͳϭ͘ϳϱϲ
-2.041
ͲϮ͘Ϭϰϭ
-0.318
ͲϬ͘ϯϭϴ
-1.003
Ͳϭ͘ϬϬϯ
-0.019
ͲϬ͘Ϭϭϵ
-0.172
ͲϬ͘ϭϳϮ
-0.001
ͲϬ͘ϬϬϭ
-0.201
ͲϬ͘ϮϬϭ
0.224
ͲϬ͘ϮϮϰ
-0.839
ͲϬ͘ϴϯϵ
-0.047
ͲϬ͘Ϭϰϳ
-0.556
ͲϬ͘ϱϱϲ
-1.491
Ͳϭ͘ϰϵϭ
-256.458}
ͲϮϱϲ͘ϰϱϴ
5,104
Ͳϱ͘ϭϬϰ
-4.164
Ͳϰ͘ϭϲϰ
-378.541|
Ͳϯϳϴ͘ϱϰϭ
-1.039
Ͳϭ͘Ϭϯϵ
-0.240
ͲϬ͘ϮϰϬ
-26.893
ͲϮϲ͘ϴϵϯ
0.028
Ϭ͘ϬϮϴ
-36.880
Ͳϯϲ͘ϴϴϬ
-8.337
Ͳϴ͘ϯϯϳ
-50.033
ͲϱϬ͘Ϭϯϯ
-1.047
Ͳϭ͘Ϭϰϳ
-3.792
Ͳϯ͘ϳϵϮ
0.142
Ϭ͘ϭϰϮ
-0.506
ͲϬ͘ϱϬϲ
-0.237
ͲϬ͘Ϯϯϳ
-0.353
ͲϬ͘ϯϱϯ
-0.478
ͲϬ͘ϰϳϴ
0.040
Ϭ͘ϬϰϬ
-0.832
ͲϬ͘ϴϯϮ
-1.148
Ͳϭ͘ϭϰϴ
-0.164
ͲϬ͘ϭϲϰ
-6.566
Ͳϲ͘ϱϲϲ
-0.467
ͲϬ͘ϰϲϳ
-9.663
Ͳϵ͘ϲϲϯ
-0.010
ͲϬ͘ϬϭϬ
5.686
ϱ͘ϲϴϲ
-0.696
ͲϬ͘ϲϵϲ
-159.442
Ͳϭϱϵ͘ϰϰϮ
-26.137
ͲϮϲ͘ϭϯϳ
-0.478
ͲϬ͘ϰϳϴ
-0.094
ͲϬ͘Ϭϵϰ
-0.515
ͲϬ͘ϱϭϱ
-0.207
ͲϬ͘ϮϬϳ
-0.008
ͲϬ͘ϬϬϴ
-0.362
ͲϬ͘ϯϲϮ
-0.271
ͲϬ͘Ϯϳϭ
-2.026
ͲϮ͘ϬϮϲ
-2.118
ͲϮ͘ϭϭϴ
-0.257
ͲϬ͘Ϯϱϳ
-1.060
Ͳϭ͘ϬϲϬ
-0.019
ͲϬ͘Ϭϭϵ
-0.181
ͲϬ͘ϭϴϭ
0.002
Ϭ͘ϬϬϮ
-0.157
ͲϬ͘ϭϱϳ
-0.226
ͲϬ͘ϮϮϲ
-0.880
ͲϬ͘ϴϴϬ
-0.047
ͲϬ͘Ϭϰϳ
-0.577
ͲϬ͘ϱϳϳ
-1.646
Ͳϭ͘ϲϰϲ
-310.170
ͲϯϭϬ͘ϭϳϬ
-4.468
Ͳϰ͘ϰϲϴ
-4.301
Ͳϰ͘ϯϬϭ
-377.334
Ͳϯϳϳ͘ϯϯϰ
-0.265
ͲϬ͘Ϯϲϱ
-0.024
ͲϬ͘ϬϮϰ
-0.210
ͲϬ͘ϮϭϬ
2021
ϮϬϮϭ
Year
zĞĂƌ
-0.270
ͲϬ͘ϮϳϬ
Standard
Re
nal Control
^ƚĂŶĚĂƌĚZĞŐŝŽŶĂůŽŶƚƌŽů
1.174
ϭ͘ϭϳϰ
0.418
Ϭ͘ϰϭϴ
-0.072
ͲϬ͘ϬϳϮ
2023
ϮϬϮϯ
1.730
ϭ͘ϳϯϬ
0.601
Ϭ͘ϲϬϭ
-0.009
ͲϬ͘ϬϬϵ
2024
ϮϬϮϰ
-27.249
ͲϮϳ͘Ϯϰϵ
0.086
Ϭ͘Ϭϴϲ
-38.132
Ͳϯϴ͘ϭϯϮ
-8.152
Ͳϴ͘ϭϱϮ
-53.676
Ͳϱϯ͘ϲϳϲ
-0.906
ͲϬ͘ϵϬϲ
-3.384
Ͳϯ͘ϯϴϰ
0.888
Ϭ͘ϴϴϴ
-0.370
ͲϬ͘ϯϳϬ
-0.240
ͲϬ͘ϮϰϬ
-0.364
ͲϬ͘ϯϲϰ
-0.465
ͲϬ͘ϰϲϱ
0.095
Ϭ͘Ϭϵϱ
-0.808
ͲϬ͘ϴϬϴ
-26.726
ͲϮϲ͘ϳϮϲ
0.136
Ϭ͘ϭϯϲ
-37.945
Ͳϯϳ͘ϵϰϱ
-7.820
Ͳϳ͘ϴϮϬ
-53.851
Ͳϱϯ͘ϴϱϭ
-0.749
ͲϬ͘ϳϰϵ
-2.943
ͲϮ͘ϵϰϯ
1.536
ϭ͘ϱϯϲ
-0.247
ͲϬ͘Ϯϰϳ
-0.236
ͲϬ͘Ϯϯϲ
-0.367
ͲϬ͘ϯϲϳ
-0.438
ͲϬ͘ϰϯϴ
0.142
Ϭ͘ϭϰϮ
-0.769
ͲϬ͘ϳϲϵ
0.288
Ϭ͘Ϯϴϴ
-0.733
ͲϬ͘ϳϯϯ
0.077
Ϭ͘Ϭϳϳ
-6.307
Ͳϲ͘ϯϬϳ
-0.059
ͲϬ͘Ϭϱϵ
-8.820
Ͳϴ͘ϴϮϬ
-0.009
ͲϬ͘ϬϬϵ
5.970
ϱ͘ϵϳϬ
-0.624
ͲϬ͘ϲϮϰ
-164.088
Ͳϭϲϰ͘Ϭϴϴ
-24.482
ͲϮϰ͘ϰϴϮ
-0.455
ͲϬ͘ϰϱϱ
-0.060
ͲϬ͘ϬϲϬ
-0.351
ͲϬ͘ϯϱϭ
-0.148
ͲϬ͘ϭϰϴ
-0.008
ͲϬ͘ϬϬϴ
-0.239
ͲϬ͘Ϯϯϵ
-0.238
ͲϬ͘Ϯϯϴ
-2.383
ͲϮ͘ϯϴϯ
-2.105
ͲϮ͘ϭϬϱ
-0.119
ͲϬ͘ϭϭϵ
-1.066
Ͳϭ͘Ϭϲϲ
-0.016
ͲϬ͘Ϭϭϲ
-0.175
ͲϬ͘ϭϳϱ
0.007
Ϭ͘ϬϬϳ
-0.031
ͲϬ͘Ϭϯϭ
-0,194
ͲϬ͘ϭϵϰ
-0.782
ͲϬ͘ϳϴϮ
-0.040
ͲϬ͘ϬϰϬ
-0.472
ͲϬ͘ϰϳϮ
-1.467
Ͳϭ͘ϰϲϳ
-300.673
ͲϯϬϬ͘ϲϳϯ
-3.602
Ͳϯ͘ϲϬϮ
-3.428
Ͳϯ͘ϰϮϴ
-0.944
ͲϬ͘ϵϰϰ
-6.516
Ͳϲ͘ϱϭϲ
-0.263
ͲϬ͘Ϯϲϯ
-9.394
Ͳϵ͘ϯϵϰ
-0.010
ͲϬ͘ϬϭϬ
5.846
ϱ͘ϴϰϲ
-0.669
ͲϬ͘ϲϲϵ
-164.580
Ͳϭϲϰ͘ϱϴϬ
-25.653
ͲϮϱ͘ϲϱϯ
-0.474
ͲϬ͘ϰϳϰ
-0.078
ͲϬ͘Ϭϳϴ
-0.435
ͲϬ͘ϰϯϱ
-0.179
ͲϬ͘ϭϳϵ
-0.008
ͲϬ͘ϬϬϴ
-0.301
ͲϬ͘ϯϬϭ
-0.257
ͲϬ͘Ϯϱϳ
-2.245
ͲϮ͘Ϯϰϱ
-2.143
ͲϮ͘ϭϰϯ
-0.191
ͲϬ͘ϭϵϭ
-1.087
Ͳϭ͘Ϭϴϳ
-0.018
ͲϬ͘Ϭϭϴ
-0.181
ͲϬ͘ϭϴϭ
0.005
Ϭ͘ϬϬϱ
-0.097
ͲϬ͘Ϭϵϳ
-0.214
ͲϬ͘Ϯϭϰ
-0.853
ͲϬ͘ϴϱϯ
-0.045
ͲϬ͘Ϭϰϱ
-0.541
ͲϬ͘ϱϰϭ
-1.616
Ͳϭ͘ϲϭϲ
-318.215
Ͳϯϭϴ͘Ϯϭϱ
-4.031
Ͳϰ͘Ϭϯϭ
-3.971
Ͳϯ͘ϵϳϭ
-25.791
ͲϮϱ͘ϳϵϭ
0.176
Ϭ͘ϭϳϲ
-37.025
Ͳϯϳ͘ϬϮϱ
-7.430
Ͳϳ͘ϰϯϬ
-52.199
ͲϱϮ͘ϭϵϵ
-0.602
ͲϬ͘ϲϬϮ
-2.535
ͲϮ͘ϱϯϱ
2.057
Ϯ͘Ϭϱϳ
-0.148
ͲϬ͘ϭϰϴ
-0.230
ͲϬ͘ϮϯϬ
-0.366
ͲϬ͘ϯϲϲ
-0.407
ͲϬ͘ϰϬϳ
0.179
Ϭ͘ϭϳϵ
-0.726
ͲϬ͘ϳϮϲ
-0.539
ͲϬ͘ϱϯϵ
0.465
Ϭ͘ϰϲϱ
-6.040
Ͳϲ͘ϬϰϬ
0.122
Ϭ͘ϭϮϮ
-8.133
Ͳϴ͘ϭϯϯ
-0,009
ͲϬ͘ϬϬϵ
6.042
ϲ͘ϬϰϮ
-0.576
ͲϬ͘ϱϳϲ
-160.762
ͲϭϲϬ͘ϳϲϮ
-23.056
ͲϮϯ͘Ϭϱϲ
-0.430
ͲϬ͘ϰϯϬ
-0.044
ͲϬ͘Ϭϰϰ
-0.274
ͲϬ͘Ϯϳϰ
-0.121
ͲϬ͘ϭϮϭ
-0.007
ͲϬ͘ϬϬϳ
-0.187
ͲϬ͘ϭϴϳ
-0.219
ͲϬ͘Ϯϭϵ
-2.470
ͲϮ͘ϰϳϬ
-2.041
ͲϮ͘Ϭϰϭ
-0.053
ͲϬ͘Ϭϱϯ
-1.028
Ͳϭ͘ϬϮϴ
-0.014
ͲϬ͘Ϭϭϰ
-0.167
ͲϬ͘ϭϲϳ
0.010
Ϭ͘ϬϭϬ
0.028
Ϭ͘ϬϮϴ
-0.174
ͲϬ͘ϭϳϰ
-0.695
ͲϬ͘ϲϵϱ
-0.035
ͲϬ͘Ϭϯϱ
-0.392
ͲϬ͘ϯϵϮ
-1,268
Ͳϭ͘Ϯϲϴ
-270.693
ͲϮϳϬ͘ϲϵϯ
3,225
Ͳϯ͘ϮϮϱ
-2.814
ͲϮ͘ϴϭϰ
-365.958
Ͳϯϲϱ͘ϵϱϴ -355,.856
Ͳϯϱϱ͘ϴϱϲ -346.316
Ͳϯϰϲ͘ϯϭϲ
0.497
Ϭ͘ϰϵϳ
0.204
Ϭ͘ϮϬϰ
-0.142
ͲϬ͘ϭϰϮ
2022
ϮϬϮϮ
-24.735
ͲϮϰ͘ϳϯϱ
0.205
Ϭ͘ϮϬϱ
-35.823
Ͳϯϱ͘ϴϮϯ
-7.036
Ͳϳ͘Ϭϯϲ
-49.785
Ͳϰϵ͘ϳϴϱ
-0.482
ͲϬ͘ϰϴϮ
-2.189
ͲϮ͘ϭϴϵ
2.444
Ϯ͘ϰϰϰ
-0.078
ͲϬ͘Ϭϳϴ
0.224
ͲϬ͘ϮϮϰ
-0.363
ͲϬ͘ϯϲϯ
-0.376
ͲϬ͘ϯϳϲ
0.206
Ϭ͘ϮϬϲ
-0.685
ͲϬ͘ϲϴϱ
-0.375
ͲϬ͘ϯϳϱ
0.600
Ϭ͘ϲϬϬ
-5.765
Ͳϱ͘ϳϲϱ
0.270
Ϭ͘ϮϳϬ
-7.445
Ͳϳ͘ϰϰϱ
-0.008
ͲϬ͘ϬϬϴ
6.055
ϲ͘Ϭϱϱ
-0.528
ͲϬ͘ϱϮϴ
-156.172
Ͳϭϱϲ͘ϭϳϮ
-21.619
ͲϮϭ͘ϲϭϵ
-0.403
ͲϬ͘ϰϬϯ
-0.029
ͲϬ͘ϬϮϵ
-0.207
ͲϬ͘ϮϬϳ
-0,098
ͲϬ͘Ϭϵϴ
-0.007
ͲϬ͘ϬϬϳ
-0.145
ͲϬ͘ϭϰϱ
-0.202
ͲϬ͘ϮϬϮ
-2,519
ͲϮ͘ϱϭϵ
-1.973
Ͳϭ͘ϵϳϯ
0.002
Ϭ͘ϬϬϮ
-0.982
ͲϬ͘ϵϴϮ
-0.012
ͲϬ͘ϬϭϮ
-0.157
ͲϬ͘ϭϱϳ
0.011
Ϭ͘Ϭϭϭ
0.077
Ϭ͘Ϭϳϳ
-0.155
ͲϬ͘ϭϱϱ
-0.607
ͲϬ͘ϲϬϳ
-0.030
ͲϬ͘ϬϯϬ
-0.314
ͲϬ͘ϯϭϰ
-1,061
Ͳϭ͘Ϭϲϭ
-236.844
ͲϮϯϲ͘ϴϰϰ
-2.924
ͲϮ͘ϵϮϰ
-2.205
ͲϮ͘ϮϬϱ
-337.089
Ͳϯϯϳ͘Ϭϴϵ
2.146
Ϯ͘ϭϰϲ
0.744
Ϭ͘ϳϰϰ
0.042
Ϭ͘ϬϰϮ
2025
ϮϬϮϱ
-23.724
ͲϮϯ͘ϳϮϰ
0.223
Ϭ͘ϮϮϯ
-34.630
Ͳϯϰ͘ϲϯϬ
-6.675
Ͳϲ͘ϲϳϱ
-47.231
Ͳϰϳ͘Ϯϯϭ
-0.392
ͲϬ͘ϯϵϮ
-1.911
Ͳϭ͘ϵϭϭ
2.708
Ϯ͘ϳϬϴ
-0.034
ͲϬ͘Ϭϯϰ
-0,.219
ͲϬ͘Ϯϭϵ
-0.361
ͲϬ͘ϯϲϭ
-0.348
ͲϬ͘ϯϰϴ
0.224|
Ϭ͘ϮϮϰ
-0.649
ͲϬ͘ϲϰϵ
-0.245
ͲϬ͘Ϯϰϱ
0.690
Ϭ͘ϲϵϬ
-5.509
Ͳϱ͘ϱϬϵ
0.383
Ϭ͘ϯϴϯ
-6.817
Ͳϲ͘ϴϭϳ
-0.007
ͲϬ͘ϬϬϳ
6.018
ϲ͘Ϭϭϴ
-0.485
ͲϬ͘ϰϴϱ
-150.980
ͲϭϱϬ͘ϵϴϬ
-20.295
ͲϮϬ͘Ϯϵϱ
-0.378
ͲϬ͘ϯϳϴ
-0.017
ͲϬ͘Ϭϭϳ
-0.153
ͲϬ͘ϭϱϯ
-0.081
ͲϬ͘Ϭϴϭ
-0.007
ͲϬ͘ϬϬϳ
-0.112
ͲϬ͘ϭϭϮ
-0.186
ͲϬ͘ϭϴϲ
-2,538
ͲϮ͘ϱϯϴ
-1.909
Ͳϭ͘ϵϬϵ
0.045
Ϭ͘Ϭϰϱ
-
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