Emergency Application — Joseph R. Biden, Jr., President of the United States, et al., Applicants v. Missouri, et al.
Supreme Court briefAug 13, 2024
Ask Donna
What actually matters in this document.
Text
No. 24A__
________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
_______________
JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR., PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, ET AL.,
APPLICANTS
v.
STATE OF MISSOURI, ET AL.
_______________
APPLICATION TO VACATE THE INJUNCTION PENDING APPEAL
ENTERED BY THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT
_______________
ELIZABETH B. PRELOGAR
Solicitor General
Counsel of Record
Department of Justice
Washington, D.C. 20530-0001
SupremeCtBriefs@usdoj.gov
(202) 514-2217
________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________
PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING
Applicants (defendants in the district court and appellants
and cross-appellees in the court of appeals) are Joseph Robinette
Biden, Jr., in his official capacity as President of the United
States; Miguel Cardona, in his official capacity as Secretary,
United States Department of Education; and the United States Department of Education.
Respondents (plaintiffs in the district court and appellees
and cross-appellants in the court of appeals) are the States of
Missouri, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, North Dakota, Ohio, and
Oklahoma.
RELATED PROCEEDINGS
United States District Court (E.D. Mo.):
Missouri v. Biden, No. 24-cv-520 (July 10, 2024)
United States Court of Appeals (8th Cir.):
Missouri v. Biden, No. 24-2332 (Aug. 9, 2024)
Missouri v. Biden, No. 24-2351 (Aug. 9, 2024)
(I)
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
_______________
No. 24A__
JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR., PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, ET AL.,
APPLICANTS
v.
STATE OF MISSOURI, ET AL.
_______________
APPLICATION TO VACATE THE INJUNCTION PENDING APPEAL
ENTERED BY THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT
_______________
Pursuant to Rule 23 of this Court and the All Writs Act, 28
U.S.C. 1651, the Solicitor General, on behalf of the President, the
Secretary of Education (Secretary), and the U.S. Department of Education (Department), respectfully applies to vacate the injunction
pending appeal entered on August 9, 2024, by the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit in this case (App., infra, 1a-10a).
This case involves the same rule the Court is considering in
Alaska v. Department of Education, No. 24A11 (filed July 5, 2024).
The rule makes changes to the Department’s income-contingent repayment plans, which have been mandated by statute since 1993 and
which allow millions of Americans to make student-loan payments
tailored to their income and then have their remaining balances
2
forgiven at the end of a fixed period of repayment.
Congress
authorized the Department to “determine[]” the “appropriate portion” of a borrower’s income for calculating payments, 20 U.S.C.
1087e(e)(4), and to “prescribe[]” an “extended” period of repayment, “not to exceed 25 years,” 20 U.S.C. 1087e(d)(1)(D).
The rule exercises those authorities by amending an existing
repayment plan to modify the calculation of a borrower’s discretionary income; to allow borrowers to pay 5% of their discretionary
income toward undergraduate loans rather than 10%; to provide that
borrowers will not be charged accrued interest in excess of their
payment in a given month; and to shorten the required repayment
period for certain borrowers with small loans.
The rule specifies
that those changes are independent and severable from each other.
More than nine months after the rule was announced -- and
after many of its provisions had already taken effect -- two groups
of States brought separate challenges to the rule.
In Alaska, the
Tenth Circuit stayed a district court’s preliminary injunction
barring the implementation of some provisions of the rule.
In
this case, the district court denied preliminary relief as to all
provisions of the rule except the shortened repayment period.
The
government has not sought to stay that injunction, which prevents
any loan forgiveness on the rule’s shorter timelines.
But the
Eighth Circuit has now issued a sweeping universal injunction
blocking the rule’s other challenged provisions -- as well as any
3
forgiveness under the preexisting plan, even under the longer prerule timelines adopted in 2015.
That extraordinary injunction has
scrambled the Department’s administration of loans for millions of
borrowers and nullified the Tenth Circuit’s order in Alaska.
The
Court should vacate the injunction for four reasons.
First, the injunction is premised on a demonstrably erroneous
theory of standing.
The Eighth Circuit held that Missouri has
standing based on allegations the court described as virtually
“identical” to the theory this Court accepted in Biden v. Nebraska,
600 U.S. 477 (2023).
App., infra, 6a.
There, the Court held that
Missouri could challenge a one-time loan-forgiveness program because MOHELA, a state instrumentality, would have lost loanservicing fees if loans were forgiven.
494.
Nebraska, 600 U.S. at 489-
That theory has no application here:
The district court
already enjoined the only provision of the rule authorizing earlier
loan forgiveness. The provisions of the rule at issue here address
the calculation of payments for loans that remain outstanding;
implementing those provisions would in no way diminish MOHELA’s
servicing fees (and, indeed, would likely save MOHELA money).
The
Eighth Circuit’s only theory of standing thus does not even arguably justify enjoining those provisions.
Second, the States are unlikely to succeed on the merits.
The rule is a straightforward exercise of the Department’s express
statutory authority to set the parameters of income-contingent
4
repayment plans -- just as it has done for three decades.
The
Eighth Circuit scarcely acknowledged the operative statutory text,
did not purport to engage in anything resembling a traditional
textual interpretation, and did not separately analyze the rule’s
distinct provisions.
Instead, the court relied almost entirely on
an (unofficial and inaccurate) estimate of the rule’s aggregate
cost.
That approach is a caricature of the major-questions doc-
trine, which is supposed to be a tool for discerning Congress’s
intent using text and context -- not a license for reflexive
judicial veto of any policy a court deems too expensive.
Third, the Eighth Circuit’s injunction is vastly overbroad.
Its universal scope flouts the fundamental principle that equitable relief “must not be ‘more burdensome to the defendant than
necessary to redress’ the plaintiff’s injuries.”
Labrador v. Poe,
144 S. Ct. 921, 927 (2024) (Gorsuch, J., concurring) (brackets and
citation omitted).
The injunction blocks implementation of the
rule for every borrower in the Nation -- including millions who
have no relationship to MOHELA.
And the Eighth Circuit also en-
joined the implementation of regulatory provisions that long predate the rule and that the States have not properly challenged.
Fourth,
injunction.
the
equities
overwhelmingly
favor
vacating
the
Even if Missouri could establish standing, any injury
it faces from the rule would be modest and highly attenuated.
And
this is not a case like Nebraska, where the absence of immediate
5
injunctive relief could have allowed full implementation of a onetime loan forgiveness program that could not have been reversed
following final judgment.
Instead, vacating the injunction would
simply affect the monthly payment amounts owed by some borrowers
while these cases continue to be litigated. That modest step would
impose no cognizable injury on the States. In contrast, the Eighth
Circuit’s injunction has severely harmed millions of borrowers and
the Department by blocking long-planned changes and creating widespread confusion and uncertainty.
Indeed, as the Eighth Circuit
acknowledged, the injunction has forced the Department to place
the affected borrowers into temporary forbearance -- a result that
is unambiguously worse for all involved.
If this Court vacates the injunction and denies the pending
application in Alaska, it will bring an end to that disruption and
allow these cases to be litigated in the ordinary course.
If,
however, the Court declines to grant that relief, it may wish to
construe this application as a petition for a writ of certiorari
before judgment, grant the petition, and set the case for expedited
briefing and argument this fall to avoid prolonging the harm the
Eighth Circuit’s injunction is inflicting on millions of Americans.
STATEMENT
A.
Legal Background
1.
Congress enacted the Higher Education Act of 1965 (Edu-
cation Act), Pub. L. No. 89-329, 79 Stat. 1219, to provide finan-
6
cial assistance for students in postsecondary and higher education.
In 1993, Congress amended the Education Act to authorize
the Secretary to lend money directly to student borrowers. Student
Loan Reform Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-66, Tit. IV, Subtit. A,
107 Stat. 341.
As amended, the statute requires the Department to
give borrowers the choice of various plans to repay those direct
loans. 20 U.S.C. 1087e(d)(1). One type of plan that the Department
must offer is “an income contingent repayment plan, with varying
annual repayment amounts based on the income of the borrower, paid
over an extended period of time prescribed by the Secretary, not
to exceed 25 years.”
20 U.S.C. 1087e(d)(1)(D).
As the name suggests, the amount that a borrower must repay
under an income-contingent repayment (ICR) plan depends on the
borrower’s income.
20 U.S.C. 1087e(e)(2).
The statute instructs
the Department to establish “[i]ncome contingent repayment schedules” and to “determine[]” the “appropriate portion” of the borrower’s income on which payments shall be based.
1087e(e)(4).
20 U.S.C.
It further instructs the Department to “prescribe[]”
the “extended period of time” during which payments must be made,
“not to exceed 25 years.”
20 U.S.C. 1087e(d)(1)(D).
And the
statute directs the Department to “establish procedures for determining the borrower’s repayment obligation,” as well as “such
other procedures as are necessary to implement effectively income
contingent repayment.”
20 U.S.C. 1087e(e)(1).
7
2.
Since 1993, the Department has offered several different
ICR plans.
The Department published regulations creating the orig-
inal ICR plan in 1994.
See 59 Fed. Reg. 61,664 (Dec. 1, 1994).
In
2012, the Department created a new ICR plan, known as the Pay As
You Earn (PAYE) plan.
See 77 Fed. Reg. 66,088 (Nov. 1, 2012).
And in 2015, the Department created the Revised Pay As You Earn
(REPAYE) plan.
See 80 Fed. Reg. 67,204 (Oct. 30, 2015).
The original ICR plan, the PAYE plan, and the REPAYE plan
differed in their details but shared the same basic structure.
First, each plan involved a determination by the Department about
the amount of a borrower’s income that should be “protected from
[loan] payments.”
88 Fed. Reg. 43,820, 43,827 (July 10, 2023).
Each plan calculated a borrower’s discretionary income by subtracting that protected amount from the borrower’s adjusted gross
income.
See 80 Fed. Reg. at 67,239; 77 Fed. Reg. at 66,137; 59
Fed. Reg. at 61,698.
Second, each plan involved a determination
by the Department about the percentage of a borrower’s discretionary income that should “go[] toward [monthly] loan payments.”
88
Fed. Reg. at 43,827; see 80 Fed. Reg. at 67,239; 77 Fed. Reg. at
66,137; 59 Fed. Reg. at 61,698.
Third, each plan involved a
determination by the Department about the period “of time borrowers
must pay before repayment ends.”
88 Fed. Reg. at 43,827.
Under
each plan, the Department forgave any outstanding loan balance
8
(principal plus interest) at the end of that period.
See 80 Fed.
Reg. at 67,209; 77 Fed. Reg. at 66,114; 59 Fed. Reg. at 61,666.
Under the 2015 version of the REPAYE plan, for instance, the
amount of income protected from loan payments was 150% of the
federal poverty line and a borrower’s discretionary income was
defined as the borrower’s adjusted gross income minus that protected amount.
80 Fed. Reg. at 67,239.
Monthly loan payments
were capped at 10% of a borrower’s discretionary income.
Ibid.
And borrowers could qualify for loan forgiveness after making payments for 20 or 25 years.
B.
Id. at 67,241.
The Rule
In June 2023, after both negotiated and notice-and-comment
rulemaking, see 20 U.S.C. 1098a(b), the Secretary signed a rule to
improve “income-driven repayment” (IDR) plans -- an umbrella term
that encompasses both ICR plans and “income-based repayment” (IBR)
plans, another type of plan that the Department must offer under
the Education Act.
88 Fed. Reg. at 43,820-43,821; see 20 U.S.C.
1087e(d)(1)(E); App., infra, 109a, 112a.
The rule was published
in the Federal Register on July 10, 2023.
88 Fed. Reg. at 43,820.
The rule makes various changes to the preexisting REPAYE plan.
88 Fed. Reg. at 43,822.
Four are particularly relevant here.
First, the protected-income provision increases the amount of income protected from loan payments to 225% of the federal poverty
line (i.e., $32,805 for a borrower with no dependents in 2023).
9
Id. at 43,881, 43,901.
Second, the payment-calculation provision
lowers monthly payments for undergraduate loans from 10% to 5% of
a borrower’s discretionary income.
Id. at 43,901.
Third, the
shortened-repayment-period provision “provid[es] for a shorter repayment period and earlier forgiveness for borrowers with smaller
original principal balances (starting at 10 years for borrowers
with original principal balances of $12,000 or less, and increasing
by 1 year for each additional $1,000 up to 20 or 25 years).”
at 43,880; see id. at 43,902-43,903.
Id.
Fourth, the accrued-interest
provision specifies that the borrower will not be charged accrued
interest that is not covered by the borrower’s calculated payment
for the relevant month.
Id. at 43,820, 43,827, 43,902.
The rule
also changes the name of the REPAYE plan to the Saving on a Valuable
Education (SAVE) plan.
Id. at 43,822.
The rule explains that its changes to the REPAYE plan are
“distinct and significant improvements” that had been “determined
independently.”
88 Fed. Reg. at 43,827-43,828.
The Department
thus emphasized that those changes are “independent and severable”
from each other and from the rest of the rule.
Id. at 43,828.
The rule also makes various changes that apply to other IDR
plans or to IDR plans generally.
For example, it credits certain
periods of deferment or forbearance, including for borrowers receiving cancer treatment or serving in the military, toward the
time needed to obtain loan forgiveness.
88 Fed. Reg. at 43,903.
10
It allows certain delinquent borrowers to be automatically enrolled in an IDR plan.
Id. at 43,904.
And it allows borrowers to
authorize the Department to use federal tax information to automatically recertify their income.
Id. at 43,865.
Although the rule was generally scheduled to take effect on
July 1, 2024, the Department exercised its statutory authority to
designate certain provisions for early implementation. See 20 U.S.C.
1089(c)(1) and (2). Those provisions included the protected-income
and accrued-interest provisions, which took effect on July 30,
2023, as well as the shortened-repayment-period provision, which
took effect on January 21, 2024.
See 88 Fed. Reg. at 43,820-
43,821; 89 Fed. Reg. 2489, 2489 (Jan. 16, 2024).
C.
Procedural History
1.
In April 2024, more than nine months after the rule was
adopted and long after several of its key provisions had already
taken effect, seven States brought this suit in the U.S. District
Court for the Eastern District of Missouri.
Compl. ¶¶ 15-28.
As
relevant here, the States alleged that the rule was contrary to the
Education Act and sought declaratory and injunctive relief against
“implementation and enforcement of the Final Rule.”
2.
Compl. 60.
On June 24, 2024, the district court granted in part and
denied in part the States’ motion for a preliminary injunction.
App., infra, 16a-76a.
While finding most of the States’ “theories
of standing” to be “tenuous at best,” id. at 53a-54a, the court
11
held that Missouri had standing to challenge the rule’s shortenedrepayment-period provision on the theory that “early forgiveness”
would likely reduce the administrative fees collected by Missouri’s instrumentality, MOHELA,
loans, id. at 51a.
for servicing
federally held
The court further held that Missouri had a
“fair chance” of succeeding on its claim that the shortenedrepayment-period provision exceeded the Secretary’s statutory authority.
Id. at 60a (citation omitted).
But the court determined
that the States were unlikely to succeed on the rest of their
claims.
Id. at 57a-58a, 62a-69a.
Turning to the remaining preliminary-injunction factors, the
district court concluded that although the States’ “delay in bringing this case [had] diminishe[d] [their] claims of imminent harm,”
Missouri had “adequately alleged a threat of irreparable harm”
from “early loan forgiveness.” App., infra, 72a. The court found,
however, that the States had “not stated a cognizable injury related to the other provisions of the SAVE program.”
Id. at 73a.
After determining that “each portion of the Final Rule is severable,” id. at 75a, the court entered a universal preliminary injunction limited to “any further loan forgiveness for borrowers
under the Final Rule’s SAVE plan,” id. at 76a.
3.
The government appealed and immediately complied with
the preliminary injunction, “ceas[ing]” to “process[] any additional loan forgiveness for borrowers enrolled in SAVE on the
12
shortened timelines provided for in the Final Rule.”
95a.
App., infra,
Although the government believes the district court’s in-
junction is erroneous and should be reversed, it has not sought a
stay pending appeal because that limited injunction addressing
forgiveness for a discrete set of borrowers does not impose the
same operational difficulties and widespread harms as an injunction that extends to the rule’s provisions governing the calculation of ongoing monthly payments for millions of borrowers.
The States cross-appealed and asked the district court to
enter an injunction pending appeal barring the government “from
implementing other provisions of the Final Rule -- specifically,
the two payment threshold provisions [i.e., the protected-income
and payment-calculation provisions] and the interest accrual provision.”
D. Ct. Doc. 41, at 7 (June 28, 2024).
The court denied
the motion, finding no “adequate basis” to enjoin “any additional
provisions of the Final Rule.”
App., infra, 13a.
The court
reiterated that the States’ “delay in bringing this case undermine[d] their request for immediate relief.”
Id. at 14a.
The States then filed a motion asking the district court to
“clarify” that the preliminary injunction blocked not only the
rule’s shortening of the REPAYE plan’s repayment periods for certain loans, but also the REPAYE plan’s preexisting provision of
forgiveness after a repayment period of 20 or 25 years.
Doc. 48, at 1 (June 29, 2024).
D. Ct.
The court denied the motion,
13
explaining that it had not enjoined anything “beyond the scope of
the Final Rule” because the States had “only sought injunctive
relief from implementation of the Final Rule.”
4.
App., infra, 12a.
On July 12, the States asked the Eighth Circuit for an
injunction pending appeal and an administrative stay pending consideration of its motion.
On July 18, the Eighth Circuit granted
“an administrative stay prohibiting the [government] from implementing or acting pursuant to the Final Rule.”
App., infra, 11a.
More than three weeks later, on August 9, the Eighth Circuit
granted a universal injunction pending appeal.
10a.
App., infra, 1a-
Believing that Missouri’s theory of standing was “substan-
tially similar to, if not identical to,” the theory this Court
accepted in Biden v. Nebraska, 600 U.S. 477 (2023), the court held
that Missouri had Article III standing.
App., infra, 6a.
Turning
to the merits, the court took the view that the “economic impact”
of the rule triggered the major-questions doctrine and that the
States were likely to prevail on their argument that the Department
cannot “forgive student loans through ICR plans.”
Id. at 7a-8a.
The court also concluded that MOHELA faced “irreparable harm” from
“loan forgiveness” and that the “balance of the equities” favored
“preserv[ing] the status quo” the court’s “administrative stay”
had established.
Id. at 8a-9a.
The Eighth Circuit’s universal injunction reads as follows:
The Government is, for any borrower whose loans are governed
in whole or in part by the terms of the [rule], enjoined from
14
any further forgiveness of principal or interest, from not
charging borrowers accrued interest, and from further implementing SAVE’s payment-threshold provisions.
Id. at 9a.
The government understands that injunction to prohibit
not only the rule’s shortening of the REPAYE plan’s repayment
periods for certain loans, but also the REPAYE plan’s preexisting
provision of forgiveness after a repayment period of 20 or 25
years.
The government also understands the injunction to block
the changes to the REPAYE plan made by the rule’s protected-income,
payment-calculation, and accrued-interest provisions.1
D.
The Alaska Litigation
In a separate suit brought by Alaska and other States, the
U.S. District Court for the District of Kansas dismissed most of
the plaintiffs for lack of standing and then issued a universal
preliminary injunction limited to the payment-calculation provision and other “parts of [the] Final Rule” that were “set to become
effective on July 1.”
24-cv-1057 D. Ct. Doc. 76, at 42 (D. Kan.
June 24, 2024); see 24-cv-1057 D. Ct. Doc. 68, at 46 (D. Kan. June
On August 12, the government filed a motion asking the
Eighth Circuit to clarify that the injunction does not prohibit
the government from forgiving loans under plans or authorities
that have never been at issue in this case but were subject to
various unchallenged modifications under the rule, such as the
original ICR plan, the PAYE plan, IBR plans, and any plan when the
forgiveness is based on the Public Service Loan Forgiveness program. If the Eighth Circuit grants that clarification, vacatur of
its injunction will still be warranted for the reasons set forth
in this application. And if the Eighth Circuit denies relief, the
injunction’s breadth will be even more unjustified -- making vacatur even more clearly warranted. The government has asked the
Eighth Circuit to rule on the motion by August 16.
1
15
7, 2024).
The Alaska court did not enjoin the rule’s shortened-
repayment-period,
protected-income,
or
accrued-interest
provi-
sions, each of which was the subject of early implementation; nor
did the court enjoin the Department from forgiving loans at the
end of the shortened repayment periods.
See Gov’t Resp. at 10-
13, 22, Alaska v. Department of Educ., No. 24A11 (July 17, 2024).
Both the government and the remaining Alaska plaintiffs have
appealed to the Tenth Circuit.
C.A. Nos. 24-3089, 24-3094.
On
June 30, the Tenth Circuit stayed the preliminary injunction pending appeal.
24-3089 C.A. Order 1 (June 30, 2024).
The remaining
plaintiffs have asked this Court to vacate that stay; their application remains pending.
See Alaska, supra (No. 24A11).
ARGUMENT
In deciding whether to vacate an injunction pending appeal,
this Court considers (1) the probability that the Court would
eventually grant review, (2) the applicant’s likelihood of success
on the merits, and (3) the applicant’s likelihood of irreparable
harm and the balance of equities.
See Merrill v. Milligan, 142
S. Ct. 879, 880 (2022) (Kavanaugh, J., concurring); Hollingsworth
v. Perry, 558 U.S. 183, 190 (2010) (per curiam).
Each of those
factors strongly supports vacating the Eighth Circuit’s injunction.2
Because vacatur of the Eighth Circuit’s injunction would
not disturb the district court’s injunction against the rule’s
shortened-repayment-period provision, App., infra, 76a, we do not
address the States’ challenge to that provision here.
2
16
I.
THIS COURT WOULD LIKELY GRANT REVIEW IF THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT
DIRECTED THE ENTRY OF A PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION
For nearly a decade, the REPAYE plan has made financing a
higher education more affordable for millions of Americans, allowing them to make student-loan payments based on their income,
with the promise of loan forgiveness after an extended period of
repayment.
80 Fed. Reg. at 67,209.
The Eighth Circuit’s injunc-
tion enjoins “any further forgiveness” under the REPAYE plan, nullifying the promise on which those borrowers have relied.
infra, 9a.
App.,
The injunction also enjoins several of the rule’s
changes to the REPAYE plan, each designed to “help[] more borrowers
avert delinquency and default and the significant negative consequences associated with those events.”
88 Fed. Reg. at 43,820.
If the Eighth Circuit were to direct the entry of a preliminary injunction like its injunction pending appeal, this Court’s
review would plainly be warranted.
The injunction pending appeal
conflicts with the Tenth Circuit’s order staying an injunction
against provisions of the same rule.
See pp. 14-15, supra.
And
even in the absence of a circuit conflict, this Court frequently
grants emergency relief or plenary review in response to lowercourt decisions blocking important federal regulations or policies.
See, e.g., Garland v. VanDerStok, 144 S. Ct. 44 (2023) (No.
23A82); Biden v. Nebraska, 143 S. Ct. 477 (2022) (No. 22A444);
Becerra v. Gresham, 142 S. Ct. 1665 (2022) (No. 20-37).
17
II.
THE GOVERNMENT IS LIKELY TO SUCCEED ON THE MERITS
There is more than a “fair prospect that the Court would
reverse” if it granted review.
vanaugh, J., concurring).
Merrill, 142 S. Ct. at 880 (Ka-
The States lack Article III standing;
their challenges to the REPAYE plan’s preexisting provision of
forgiveness and the rule’s changes to the REPAYE plan lack merit;
and the injunction is vastly overbroad.
A.
The States Lack Article III Standing
To obtain a preliminary injunction, “the plaintiff must make
a ‘clear showing’ that [it] is ‘likely’ to establish each element
of standing.”
Murthy v. Missouri, 144 S. Ct. 1972, 1986 (2024)
(citation omitted).
And because “standing is not dispensed in
gross,” plaintiffs “must demonstrate standing for each claim that
they press” and “each form of relief that they seek.”
(citation omitted).
Id. at 1988
The Eighth Circuit held that Missouri has
standing on the ground that its theory is “substantially similar
to, if not identical to,” the theory this Court accepted in Biden
v. Nebraska, 600 U.S. 477 (2023).
App., infra, 6a.
But the theory
accepted in Nebraska simply does not apply here, and the States
have failed to offer any valid alternative theory.
1.
As an initial matter, the theory this Court accepted in
Nebraska does not support the portion of the Eighth Circuit’s
injunction barring forgiveness on the REPAYE plan’s preexisting
timelines. In Nebraska, Missouri’s standing turned on the following
18
facts:
Its instrumentality, MOHELA, had a contract with the De-
partment to service federally held loans; MOHELA received administrative fees for the loans that it serviced; and the Department’s
new HEROES Act loan-forgiveness plan would have closed “roughly
half” of all outstanding student loans, costing MOHELA the “fees
that it otherwise would have earned” for servicing the forgiven
loans.
Nebraska, 600 U.S. at 489-490.
Unlike in Nebraska, Missouri cannot attribute the loss of any
“fees that it otherwise would have earned” to the REPAYE plan’s
preexisting provision of forgiveness.
Nebraska, 600 U.S. at 490.
That provision has been a part of the REPAYE plan since the plan’s
creation nearly a decade ago.
80 Fed. Reg. at 67,209.
Since then,
MOHELA has serviced federally held loans with the understanding
that, under the REPAYE plan’s preexisting timelines, loans would
be “forgiven” after “20 or 25 years of qualifying payments.” Ibid.
Thus, unlike implementation of the new loan-forgiveness plan in
Nebraska, continued application of the REPAYE plan’s preexisting
provision of forgiveness will not cost MOHELA any “fees that it
otherwise would have earned under its contract with the Department.”
Nebraska, 600 U.S. at 490.
The States have never attempted to show otherwise.
Their
complaint sought relief only against “implementation and enforcement of the Final Rule.”
Compl. 60.
And the district court
declined to “extend” its preliminary injunction “beyond the scope
19
of the Final Rule” precisely because the States “only sought injunctive relief from implementation of the Final Rule.”
infra, 12a.
App.,
The States thus did not seek a preliminary injunction
against the REPAYE plan’s preexisting provision of forgiveness -let alone show that they had standing to seek such relief.
And
because standing is their burden to establish, see Murthy, 144
S. Ct. at 1986, that failure should be dispositive.
2.
The theory of standing this Court accepted in Nebraska
also does not support Missouri’s standing to challenge the rule’s
protected-income, payment-calculation, and accrued-interest provisions.
Again, Missouri’s standing in Nebraska turned on a re-
duction in the number of loans that MOHELA would have serviced and
thus the per-loan fees that MOHELA would have earned.
But the
rule’s protected-income, payment-calculation, and accrued-interest
provisions will not reduce the number of loans MOHELA services.
Those provisions affect only how much a borrower owes each month.
And MOHELA receives the same administrative fee, regardless of how
much a borrower owes -- even if a borrower owes $0 in a given
month. App., infra, 100a-101a. Missouri thus cannot even arguably
attribute the loss of any “fees that it otherwise would have
earned,” Nebraska, 600 U.S. at 490, to those provisions.3
If anything, the relevant provisions of the rule will
save MOHELA money. Those provisions will result in more borrowers
paying $0, making their accounts “among the cheapest” to service
without diminishing MOHELA’s fees. App., infra, 101a-102a.
3
20
The Eighth Circuit did not identify any other theory of standing to support its injunction.
Indeed, the court devoted only a
single sentence to the issue.
App., infra, 6a.
And the court’s
grant of extraordinary universal relief based on a demonstrably
inapplicable theory is sufficient reason to vacate the injunction.
3.
The States, for their part, have advanced an alternative
theory based on the following chain of causation:
MOHELA holds
some Federal Family Education Loans (FFELs), a form of loan that
has not been issued since 2010, see 20 U.S.C. 1071(d); some borrowers may consolidate their FFELs into federal direct loans to
take advantage of the rule’s changes to the REPAYE plan; and such
consolidation will injure MOHELA’s pocketbook.
Reply Br. 3.
States C.A. Mot.
This Court did not address that alternative theory
in Nebraska, and it fails for two reasons.
First, Missouri has not shown that MOHELA is likely to suffer
any pocketbook “injury” at all.
Murthy, 144 S. Ct. at 1986.
When
a borrower consolidates a FFEL, the holder is paid the principal
and any accrued interest on the FFEL in full.
See 20 U.S.C. 1078-
3(b)(1)(D); 34 C.F.R. 685.220(f)(1) and (2).
Consolidation thus
results in full repayment of FFELs to MOHELA.
Full repayment “would ordinarily be cause for celebration,
not a lawsuit.” TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, 594 U.S. 413, 437 (2021).
Missouri nevertheless asserts that MOHELA would be harmed because
borrowers who consolidate their FFELs today will not owe any
21
interest on those loans in the future.
But the reason borrowers
will not owe any interest in the future is because their FFELs
will have already been repaid in full.
In addition to removing
any default risk, see 20 U.S.C. 1078(b)(1)(G), early repayment
lets the holder recoup the time value of money -- the economic
equivalent of the forgone interest payments, see Atlantic Mutual
Ins. Co. v. Commissioner, 523 U.S. 382, 384 (1998) (“[A] dollar
today is worth more than a dollar tomorrow.”) (citation omitted).
The effect of consolidation on MOHELA’s pocketbook therefore
cannot be assessed without accounting for the value of early repayment in full.
See Conkright v. Frommert, 559 U.S. 506, 519
(2010) (“In the actuarial world,” failing to “account for the time
value of money” is “heresy.”).
And because Missouri has not even
attempted to account for the value of early repayment, it has
failed to satisfy its burden of showing that MOHELA would suffer
any injury at all.
See Murthy, 144 S. Ct. at 1986.4
Second, even if Missouri could show that consolidation would
result in pocketbook injury, it has not shown that such injury
would be “fairly traceable” to the rule.
Murthy, 144 S. Ct. at
Missouri argued below that the value of early repayment
should not be considered because “no attempt [should be] made to
ask whether [an] injury is outweighed by benefits.” States C.A.
Mot. Reply Br. 4 (citation omitted). But early repayment is not
just some benefit, unrelated to the collection of future interest
payments; it is the very reason such payments will not be made.
The value of early repayment thus goes to the existence of any
pocketbook injury in the first place.
4
22
1986 (citation omitted).
This Court is “reluctant to endorse
standing theories that require guesswork as to how independent
decisionmakers will exercise their judgment.”
omitted).
Ibid. (citation
Missouri’s theory involves just such guesswork:
Its
chain of causation depends on borrowers consolidating their FFELs
because of the rule, but borrowers may choose to consolidate for
any number of other reasons.5
It is “purely speculative” whether
borrowers’ consolidation decisions are attributable to the rule or
are instead made “without regard to” the rule.
Simon v. Eastern
Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 42-43 (1976).
Missouri’s
chain of causation linking consolidation to the rule is thus “too
attenuated” to satisfy Article III.
FDA v. Alliance for Hippo-
cratic Med., 602 U.S. 367, 383 (2024).
B.
The States’ Statutory Challenges Lack Merit
Even if the States had standing, their challenges to the REPAYE
plan’s preexisting provision of forgiveness, as well as to the
rule’s changes to the REPAYE plan, lack merit.
1.
a.
The States’ challenge to the REPAYE plan’s
preexisting provision of forgiveness lacks merit
Since 1993, Congress has required the Department to offer
“an income contingent repayment plan, with varying annual repayment
amounts based on the income of the borrower, paid over an extended
See Fed. Student Aid, U.S. Dep’t of Educ., Consolidating
Student Loans, https://studentaid.gov/manage-loans/consolidation
(identifying possible benefits and disadvantages of consolidating).
5
23
period of time prescribed by the Secretary, not to exceed 25 years.”
20 U.S.C. 1087e(d)(1)(D).
questioned the
Until this litigation, no court had ever
Department’s “ability to forgive student loans
through ICR plans.”
App., infra, 8a.
That is for good reason.
The plain text of Section 1087e(d)(1)(D) establishes two
principles:
First, how much a borrower repays each year will be
“based on the income of the borrower.”
20 U.S.C. 1087e(d)(1)(D).
Second, no borrower will be required to make payments indefinitely;
rather, each borrower will be required to make payments for “an
extended period of time prescribed by the Secretary, not to exceed
25 years.”
Ibid.
The only type of plan that complies with both
of those principles is one that allows the borrower to make incomecontingent payments for the duration of the prescribed period and
then forgives any outstanding balance at the end of that period.
Any other type of plan would violate one or both of the principles
that Congress enacted into the text.
If, for instance, borrowers
who reached the end of the prescribed period were required to repay
any outstanding balance in full, the plan would violate the first
principle because the borrower’s final payment would be based not
on her income, but rather on her outstanding balance -- defeating
the whole point of “an income contingent repayment plan.”
Ibid.;
see App., infra, 92a.
It should come as no surprise, then, that every Secretary of
Education since the 1993 enactment of Section 1087e has understood
24
ICR plans to forgive any outstanding balance at the end of the
repayment period.
See, e.g., 80 Fed. Reg. at 67,209; 77 Fed. Reg.
at 66,114; 59 Fed. Reg. at 61,666.
And when Congress amended
Section 1087e in 2007, it reaffirmed that understanding.
See
College Cost Reduction and Access Act, Pub. L. No. 110-84, § 205,
121 Stat. 795-796.
The 2007 amendments instructed the Department
to count certain “time periods” (such as periods in which a borrower is “in deferment due to an economic hardship”) toward a
borrower’s repayment period.
20 U.S.C. 1087e(e)(7)(B)(i).
Those
amendments would be inexplicable unless covered loans are forgiven
at the end of the repayment period:
Otherwise, counting those
time periods would only accelerate a borrower’s obligation to repay
her loan in full, perversely making it more difficult for a borrower who has experienced economic hardship to afford her loan.
Courts must “make sense rather than nonsense out of the corpus
juris,” including “both previously and subsequently enacted law.”
West Va. Univ. Hosps., Inc. v. Casey, 499 U.S. 83, 100-101 (1991).
The only understanding that makes sense of the statutory provisions
governing ICR plans is that any outstanding balance is forgiven at
the end of the specified period.
b.
The Eighth Circuit nevertheless doubted the Department’s
authority “to forgive student loans through ICR plans.”
infra, 8a.
App.,
In doing so, the court invoked the major-questions
doctrine, which it believed to be triggered by the “economic im-
25
pact” of the rule.
Id. at 7a.
giveness for decades.
But ICR plans have granted for-
See, e.g., 59 Fed. Reg. at 61,666.
And the
Eighth Circuit itself described the preexisting REPAYE plan -which granted forgiveness after 20 or 25 years, see 80 Fed. Reg.
at 67,209 -- as a “relatively uncontroversial” plan that was “limited in scope.”
App., infra, 3a.
Thus, neither the economic
impact of the rule’s changes to the REPAYE plan nor the majorquestions doctrine provides any reason to question the statutory
authority
for
the
REPAYE
plan’s
preexisting
provision
of
forgiveness -- yet the Eighth Circuit enjoined it all the same.
The Eighth Circuit also attempted to draw a contrast between
Section 1087e, which it regarded as “silen[t]” on “forgiveness
under ICR plans,” and other provisions of the Education Act, which
it described as “‘explicitly permit[ting] loan forgiveness.’”
App., infra, 7a.
But the premise of that comparison is mistaken:
Section 1087e is not silent on forgiveness.
As explained above,
any plan that fails to forgive any outstanding balance at the end
of the repayment period cannot be squared with the text of either
Section 1087e(d)(1)(D) or the 2007 amendments to Section 1087e(e).
Here, as in other contexts, “Congress need not state its intent in
any particular way.”
Department of Agric. Rural Dev. Rural Hous.
Serv. v. Kirtz, 601 U.S. 42, 48 (2024) (citation omitted).
And
“the fact that Congress chose to use certain language” to provide
for forgiveness in one provision of the Education Act “hardly means
26
it was ‘foreclosed from using different language’” to provide for
forgiveness in a “different” provision of “the same law.”
Id. at
52 (brackets, citation, and ellipsis omitted).
Finally, the Eighth Circuit appeared to reason that if it did
not enjoin the REPAYE’s preexisting provision of forgiveness after
20 or 25 years of repayment, the result would be a “hybrid plan”
that rendered the district court’s preliminary injunction against
forgiveness on shorter timelines a “nullity.”
see id. at 8a.
App., infra, 4a;
Indeed, the Eighth Circuit appeared to suggest
that the Department acted improperly by continuing to forgive loans
on the REPAYE plan’s longer timelines.
Ibid.
But it was the
Eighth Circuit that misunderstood both the district court’s injunction and hornbook principles of severability.
The district court preliminarily enjoined a single change to
the REPAYE plan -- the rule’s shortening of the repayment period
for certain loans.
App., infra, 73a-74a, 76a.
The court then
concluded that the relevant provision of the rule was severable
and left everything else undisturbed.
Id. at 75a.
The result was
a REPAYE plan with all of the rule’s changes (including the change
in name to SAVE), except the rule’s shortening of the REPAYE plan’s
repayment periods.
When presented with the States’ request to
extend the preliminary injunction to the REPAYE plan’s preexisting
provision of forgiveness, see D. Ct. Doc. 48, at 1, the court did
not think it had to grant the request to avoid rendering its own
27
injunction a nullity; instead, it declined the request because the
States had “only sought injunctive relief from implementation of
the Final Rule.”
App., infra, 12a.
The Eighth Circuit made no
effort to grapple with the district court’s severability analysis
or rejection of the States’ request.
2.
a.
The States’ challenges to the rule’s protectedincome and payment-calculation provisions lack merit
The text of Section 1087e also clearly authorizes the
rule’s protected-income and payment-calculation provisions.
When
Congress amended the Education Act to direct the Department to
offer “income contingent repayment” plans, Congress established
the basic principles, requiring that they be plans “with varying
annual repayment amounts based on the income of the borrower, paid
over an extended period of time prescribed by the Secretary, not
to exceed 25 years.”
20 U.S.C. 1087e(d)(1)(D).
But Congress
expressly delegated to the Secretary the authority “to prescribe
rules to ‘fill up the details.’” Loper Bright Enters. v. Raimondo,
144 S. Ct. 2244, 2263 (2024) (citation omitted).
Congress instructed:
In particular,
“Income contingent repayment schedules shall
be established by regulations promulgated by the Secretary and
shall require payments that vary in relation to the appropriate
portion of the annual income of the borrower
by the Secretary.”
That provision
* * *
as determined
20 U.S.C. 1087e(e)(4) (emphases added).
unambiguously
authorizes the Secretary to
“determine[]” the “appropriate portion of the [borrower’s] annual
28
income” for calculating payments.
20 U.S.C. 1087e(e)(4).
And in
the original ICR plan and in every ICR plan since, the Secretary
has exercised that authority in the following way:
first, by de-
termining the amount of a borrower’s income that should be protected from loan payments and subtracting that protected amount
from the borrower’s adjusted gross income to arrive at the borrower’s discretionary income; and second, by determining the percentage of a borrower’s discretionary income that should go toward
monthly payments.
See p. 7, supra.
In the preexisting REPAYE plan, for example, the Secretary
determined a borrower’s protected income to be 150% of the federal
poverty line and the percentage of a borrower’s discretionary income
that should go toward monthly payments to be no more than 10%.
Fed. Reg. at 67,239.
80
The rule’s protected-income and payment-
calculation provisions simply adjust those figures -- raising a
borrower’s protected income to 225% of the federal poverty line and
reducing the monthly payments for undergraduate loans to 5% of a
borrower’s discretionary income.
88 Fed. Reg. at 43,881, 43,901.
Those changes fit squarely within the Secretary’s authority to
“determine[]” the “appropriate portion of the [borrower’s] annual
income” on which payments should be based.
20 U.S.C. 1087e(e)(4).
And the Eighth Circuit did not even purport to identify a textual
reason to conclude otherwise.
29
b.
Although
the
Eighth
Circuit
characterized
Sections
1087e(d)(1)(D) and (e)(4) as “wafer-thin reeds on which to rest”
the rule, App., infra, 8a (brackets and citation omitted), the court
did not engage with the text of those provisions.
Instead, the
court invoked the major-questions doctrine based on the rule’s
“economic impact.”
Id. at 7a-8a.6
But cost alone has never been
enough to trigger the major-questions doctrine.
After all, the
doctrine is a tool for discerning “the text’s most natural interpretation” by situating the text in “context.”
at 508 (Barrett, J., concurring).
Nebraska, 600 U.S.
So in deciding whether the
doctrine applies, this Court has considered not just the “economic
and political significance” of the asserted authority, but other
surrounding circumstances, such as the “history and the breadth of
th[at] authority.”
West Virginia v. EPA, 597 U.S. 697, 721 (2022)
(citation omitted); see, e.g., Nebraska, 600 U.S. at 501 (same).
The Eighth Circuit cited a Penn Wharton study estimating
the cost of the rule, after accounting for Nebraska’s invalidation
of the Department’s HEROES Act plan, to be $475 billion over ten
years. App., infra, 6a. But the Congressional Budget Office (CBO)
has provided an estimate of $276 billion over ten years. Letter
from Phillip L. Swagel, Dir., CBO, to Rep. Virginia Foxx and Sen.
William Cassidy, U.S. Congress, at 2 (Mar. 13, 2023), perma.cc/
899C-YM8M. In any event, because “each portion of the Final Rule
is severable,” App., infra, 75a, each provision must be analyzed
separately. The rule’s protected-income, payment-calculation, and
accrued-interest provisions accounted for approximately $72 billion, $59 billion, and $17 billion, respectively, of the rule’s
estimated cost of $156 billion before this Court’s decision in
Nebraska. 88 Fed. Reg. at 43,890 (Tbl. 5.4).
6
30
Here, neither the history nor the breadth of the authority
that the Department has exercised “provide[s] a ‘reason to hesitate
before concluding that Congress’ meant to confer such authority.”
West Virginia, 597 U.S. at 721 (citation omitted).
The authority
to “determine[]” the “appropriate portion of the [borrower’s] annual income” for calculating payments, 20 U.S.C. 1087e(e)(4), is
not some “‘unheralded’” or “newfound” power, App., infra, 7a (citation omitted).
Instead, it is the same power the Department has
exercised time and again in fashioning ICR plans since Section
1087e’s enactment.
See pp. 7-8, supra.
And far from providing a
reason to be skeptical of the Department’s authority, the text of
Section 1087e(e)(4) expressly instructs the Department to “determine[]” the portion of a borrower’s income that is “appropriate,”
20 U.S.C. 1087e(e)(4) -- a term that this Court recently reaffirmed
“leaves agencies with flexibility,” Loper Bright, 144 S. Ct. at
2263 (citation omitted).
In any event, even if the major-questions
doctrine applied, it would be satisfied here because the rule’s
protected-income and payment-calculation provisions clearly fall
within the Department’s Section 1087e(e)(4) authority.
This Court’s decision in Nebraska does not suggest otherwise.
In Nebraska, the Department invoked its authority under the HEROES
Act to “‘waive or modify’” existing statutory or regulatory provisions “to cancel $430 billion of student loan principal.”
U.S. at 494.
600
In holding that the HEROES Act did not authorize the
31
Department’s actions, the Court emphasized that the Department’s
“‘modifications’” had “created a novel and fundamentally different
loan forgiveness program,” id. at 496, and that its “invocation of
the waiver power” did “not remotely resemble how it ha[d] been
used on prior occasions,” id. at 497.
Here, in contrast, the De-
partment has merely revised a preexisting ICR plan by exercising
the same power to “determine[]” the “appropriate” basis for calculating loan payments as the Department exercised in creating the
plan in the first place.
20 U.S.C. 1087e(e)(4).
Because Nebraska
addressed a very different statute with a very different regulatory
history, it does not cast doubt on the Department’s exercise of
authority here.
See Department of Educ. v. Brown, 600 U.S. 551,
567 (2023) (“HEROES Act loan relief and [Education Act] loan relief
function independently of each other.”).
3.
The States’ challenge to the rule’s accrued-interest
provision lacks merit
The rule’s accrued-interest provision likewise falls comfortably
within
the
Department’s
1087e(e)(4) provides:
statutory
authority.
Section
“Income contingent repayment
schedules
shall be established by regulations promulgated by the Secretary.”
20 U.S.C. 1087e(e)(4).
That authority to establish “[i]ncome con-
tingent repayment schedules” encompasses the authority to determine the amount of accrued interest to be charged, and the Department exercised that authority in the preexisting REPAYE plan as
well.
Ibid.; see 20 U.S.C. 1087e(e)(5); see also 88 Fed. Reg. at
32
43,827.
Despite enjoining the accrued-interest provision, App.,
infra, 9a, the Eighth Circuit devoted no analysis to it.
C.
The Eighth Circuit’s Injunction Is Vastly Overbroad
Even setting aside the Eighth Circuit’s errors on standing
and the merits, its injunction is vastly overbroad in two ways.
First, the Eighth Circuit improperly issued a universal injunction. Article III and traditional principles of equity require
that injunctive relief be “limited to the inadequacy that produced
[the plaintiff’s] injury.” Gill v. Whitford, 585 U.S. 48, 66 (2018)
(citation omitted); see Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682, 702
(1979).
This Court recently “remind[ed] lower courts of th[at]
foundational rule” by staying a “universal injunction” that swept
more broadly than necessary to prevent harm to the plaintiffs.
Labrador v. Poe, 144 S. Ct. 921, 927 (2024) (Gorsuch, J., concurring); see id. at 921 (order of the Court).
Any injunctive relief
in this case thus should have been tailored to prevent harm to
Missouri -- the only State found to have standing by either the
Eighth Circuit or the district court.
App., infra, 6a, 54a.
Instead, the Eighth Circuit entered a universal injunction
barring the application of the REPAYE plan’s preexisting provision
of forgiveness, as well as the rule’s major changes to the REPAYE
plan, to millions of borrowers throughout the country -- most of
whom have no connection whatsoever to MOHELA.
81a, 84a, 99a.
See App., infra,
That injunction imposes all of the now-familiar
33
harms associated with universal relief.
(Gorsuch, J., concurring).
See Poe, 144 S. Ct. at 927
And here, those harms are particularly
acute because the Eighth Circuit’s injunction effectively nullifies the Tenth Circuit’s order in Alaska and grants the plaintiffs
in that case the very relief they were denied in their own suit.
The Eighth Circuit attempted to justify the scope of its
injunction by invoking its “discretion” to craft a remedy.
infra, 9a (citation omitted).
App.,
But the “foundational principles”
discussed above “constrain[]” a federal court’s remedial discretion.
Poe, 144 S. Ct. at 923 (Gorsuch, J., concurring).
The
Eighth Circuit also cited its decision to enter a universal injunction in Nebraska v. Biden, 52 F.4th 1044, 1048 (2022) (per
curiam).
App., infra, 9a.
But this Court did not approve that
injunction or address the proper scope of interim relief in that
case, and the Court has since stayed the universal aspect of a
district court’s injunction based on five Justices’ view that universal injunctions are likely impermissible.
See Poe, 144 S. Ct.
at 923 (Gorsuch, J., concurring in the grant of stay); id. at 933
n.4 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring in the grant of stay).
Second, the injunction is overbroad because it goes beyond the
rule to enjoin an aspect of the preexisting REPAYE plan that the
district court found the States had neither challenged nor sought
to enjoin:
the REPAYE plan’s provision of forgiveness after 20 or
25 years of payment. App., infra, 9a; see id. at 12a. That provision
34
has been part of the REPAYE plan since its inception.
Reg. at 67,209.
80 Fed.
And given that the States “only sought injunctive
relief from implementation of the Final Rule,” App., infra, 12a,
there was no basis for an injunction that sweeps beyond the rule
to reach the implementation of provisions that long predated it.
Indeed, neither the Eighth Circuit nor the States have even explained how the States could have challenged regulations issued in
2015.
See D. Ct. Doc. 52, at 8 (July 7, 8, 2024) (discussing
laches and statute-of-limitations obstacles to such a challenge).
At a minimum, therefore, this Court should vacate the Eighth
Circuit’s injunction to the extent that it extends (i) to loans
that are not serviced by MOHELA, and (ii) to the forgiveness of
loans under the REPAYE plan’s preexisting 20- and 25-year timelines.
Even accepting the Eighth Circuit’s theory of standing and
crediting its view that the States are likely to succeed in their
challenge to the rule, no broader relief was justified.
III. THE EQUITIES OVERWHELMINGLY FAVOR VACATING THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT’S
INJUNCTION
The States would not suffer any harm in the absence of the
Eighth Circuit’s injunction -- and even if they would, any harm to
them is far outweighed by the serious and irreparable harm that
the injunction is causing the government and the public.
1.
As explained above, the States would not suffer any
injury -- let alone irreparable harm -- absent an injunction.
pp. 17-22, supra.
See
The district court’s preliminary injunction
35
would remain in effect, preventing the implementation of the rule’s
shortened-repayment-period provision.
11-12, supra.
App., infra, 76a; see pp.
Thus, even without the Eighth Circuit’s injunction,
the States would still be protected from any purported “irreparable
harm” caused by “early loan forgiveness.”
App., infra, 72a.
The district court determined that the States had “not stated
a cognizable injury related to the other provisions of the SAVE
program.” App., infra, 73a. And the Eighth Circuit did not identify
any cognizable injury related to other provisions either.
6a, 8a.
Id. at
In fact, the Eighth Circuit acknowledged that the district
court had found that “the States had not shown irreparable harm with
respect to the payment-threshold provisions and the nonaccrual of
interest.”
Id. at 4a.
Yet the Eighth Circuit made no effort to
explain why enjoining those provisions was appropriate.
The only
source of “irreparable harm” that the Eighth Circuit identified -“loan forgiveness,” id. at 8a -- has nothing to do with the rule’s
protected-income, payment-calculation, and accrued-interest provisions, which play no role in causing accounts to close or in
reducing MOHELA’s administrative fees.
See p. 19, supra.
Moreover, as the district court found, the States’ “delay in
bringing this case diminishes [their] claims of imminent harm.”
App., infra, 72a; see id. at 14a.
The States waited nine months
after the rule’s adoption to file their complaint.
And they waited
nine years after the REPAYE plan’s creation to question the plan’s
36
provision of forgiveness.
That delay belies any need for an ex-
traordinary emergency injunction.
2.
At the same time, the Eighth Circuit’s injunction is
imposing serious harm on the Department and the public.
Any time
the government “is enjoined by a court from effectuating statutes
enacted by representatives of its people, it suffers a form of
irreparable injury.”
Poe, 144 S. Ct. at 929 (Gorsuch, J., con-
curring in the grant of stay) (citation omitted).
Here, that
injury is being felt not just by the government, but also by the
millions of borrowers on the REPAYE plan.
App., infra, 81a, 89a.
The Secretary signed the rule 14 months ago.
109a, 112a.
App., infra,
For more than a year, the Department has worked with
its servicers to implement the rule’s changes to the REPAYE plan.
Id. at 82a.
That work was necessary because administering a re-
payment plan for millions of borrowers involves linking “technically complex” database systems, which are used “to calculate payment amounts, send bills, and collect payments.”
Id. at 84a.
The Eighth Circuit’s injunction upends that work.
To revert
back to the pre-rule payment provisions, the Department and its
loan servicers would have to reprogram their systems, retrain their
staff, and recalculate monthly payments. App., infra, 87a-88a. That
process would take at least several months.
Id. at 88a-89a.
And
because the Department could not bill borrowers the correct amounts
until that process was complete, the injunction has forced it to
37
place the affected borrowers into “administrative forbearance” -that is, to suspend their payments altogether.
Id. at 89a; see
id. at 9a (acknowledging this effect).
At the same time, the injunction is causing significant and
irreparable harm to borrowers.
For the past year, millions have
received -- and paid -- bills that reflected the rule’s protectedincome and accrued-interest provisions, and many have also received bills that reflected the rule’s payment-calculation provision, which went into effect more recently.
App., infra, 85a-86a.
Because of the Eighth Circuit’s orders, however, many borrowers
are now experiencing intense confusion from being told that their
payments must be recalculated and from being placed in forbearance
-- which will delay any eventual loan forgiveness, including under
programs not challenged here, like the Public Service Loan Forgiveness program. Id. at 89a, 91a-93a. And borrowers would suffer
additional harm if they are eventually sent higher bills and told
that they can no longer count on the forgiveness that they were
promised at the end of their repayment periods.
3.
Id. at 90a-92a.
The Eighth Circuit nevertheless declared that “the bal-
ance of the equities in this case require[d] [the court] to intervene to preserve the status quo” pending appeal.
9a.
App., infra,
But the status quo for the past nine years under the REPAYE
plan -- and for the past 30 years under ICR plans generally -- has
been that any outstanding balance at the end of a borrower’s
38
repayment period is forgiven.
Far from preserving that status
quo, the Eighth Circuit’s injunction upends it.
By enjoining the
REPAYE plan’s preexisting provision of forgiveness after a repayment period of 20 or 25 years, the injunction denies borrowers the
forgiveness on which they have long relied.
App., infra, 90a.
As for the rule’s protected-income, payment-calculation, and
accrued-interest provisions, the “status quo” that the Eighth Circuit purported to “preserve” was entirely one of its own making.
App., infra, 9a. The court first blocked those provisions in July,
when it issued an “administrative stay” pending its consideration
of the States’ motion for an injunction pending appeal.
11a.
Id. at
But before that intervention, the status quo was quite dif-
ferent.
All three of the provisions were “already in effect.”
Id. at 82a. Two of them -- the protected-income and accrued-interest
provisions -- had been in effect for nearly a year.
Ibid.
So by
granting the “administrative stay” and then the injunction pending
appeal, the Eighth Circuit in fact disrupted the status quo.
The
resulting harm to the government and the public tips the balance
of equities decisively in favor of vacatur.
IV.
ALTERNATIVELY, THE COURT MAY WISH TO TREAT THIS APPLICATION
AS A PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI BEFORE JUDGMENT
For the foregoing reasons, this Court should vacate the Eighth
Circuit’s injunction pending appeal, or at a minimum narrow it to
the relief necessary to prevent any purported harm to MOHELA.
If,
however, the Court denies that relief, it may wish to construe
39
this application as a petition for a writ of certiorari before
judgment, grant the petition, and set this case for expedited
briefing and argument on the questions (1) whether the States have
Article III standing, (2) whether the Department has the authority
to forgive student loans under an ICR plan, and (3) whether the
rule’s
shortened-repayment-period,
protected-income,
payment-
calculation, and accrued-interest provisions exceed the Department’s statutory authority.
22A444).7
Cf. Nebraska, 143 S. Ct. at 477 (No.
The government would be prepared to brief this case on
an expedited schedule that would allow for oral argument in the
Court’s November sitting.
In opposing the application to vacate the Tenth Circuit’s
stay of the preliminary injunction in Alaska, the government argued
that certiorari before judgment was not warranted there.
Resp. at 40, Alaska, supra (No. 24A11).
Gov’t
In that case, there was
no justification for departing from “normal appellate practice,”
Sup. Ct. R. 11, because the Tenth Circuit had stayed the district
court’s disruptive preliminary relief.
But the Eighth Circuit has
now issued a conflicting injunction that upends the status quo and
is inflicting serious harms on millions of Americans. If the Court
Although the shortened-repayment-period provision is not
at issue in this stay application because it is separately blocked
by the district court’s preliminary injunction, a grant of certiorari before judgment would include the entire case before the
Eighth Circuit -- both the government’s appeal and the States’
cross-appeal -- and would thus allow the Court to consider all of
the relevant provisions of the rule on the merits.
7
40
does not vacate or narrow that extraordinary injunction pending
further appellate review, this case would be one “of such imperative public importance” as to justify an “immediate determination
in this Court.”
Ibid.
CONCLUSION
This Court should vacate, or at a minimum narrow, the injunction pending appeal entered by the Eighth Circuit.
If, however,
the Court declines to vacate the injunction, it may wish to construe this application as a petition for a writ of certiorari
before judgment, grant the petition, and set this case for expedited briefing and argument.
Respectfully submitted.
ELIZABETH B. PRELOGAR
Solicitor General
AUGUST 2024
APPENDIX
Court of appeals order granting in part and denying in part
respondents’ motion for an injunction pending appeal
(8th Cir. Aug. 9, 2024) .....................................1a
Court of appeals order granting an administrative stay
(8th Cir. July 18, 2024) ...................................11a
District order denying respondents’ motion for
clarification of the preliminary injunction,
D. Ct. Doc. 54 (E.D. Mo. July 10, 2024) ....................12a
District court order denying respondents’ motion
for an injunction pending appeal,
D. Ct. Doc. 45 (E.D. Mo. June 28, 2024) ....................13a
District court preliminary injunction,
D. Ct. Doc. 36 (E.D. Mo. June 24, 2024) ....................15a
District court memorandum and order granting in part and
denying in part respondents’ motion for a preliminary
injunction, D. Ct. Doc. 35 (E.D. Mo. June 24, 2024) ........16a
Government notice of compliance (8th Cir. July 19, 2024)......77a
Declaration of Denise L. Carter, addendum to the
government’s response in opposition to motion for
injunction pending appeal (8th Cir. July 19, 2024) .........81a
Government notice of compliance,
D. Ct. Doc. 44 (E.D. Mo. June 28, 2024) ....................95a
Declaration of James Richard Kvaal,
D. Ct. Doc. 22-2 (E.D. Mo. May 7, 2024) ....................97a
Declaration of Levon Schlichter,
D. Ct. Doc. 22-1 (E.D. Mo. May 7, 2024) ...................108a
Email of June 14, 2023, from the Office of the Federal
Register, D. Ct. Doc. 22-1 (E.D. Mo. May 7, 2024) .........111a
United States Court of Appeals
For the Eighth Circuit
___________________________
No. 24-2332
___________________________
State of Missouri; State of Arkansas; State of Florida; State of Georgia; State of
North Dakota; State of Ohio; State of Oklahoma
Plaintiffs - Appellees
v.
Joseph Robinette Biden, Jr., in his official capacity as President of the United
States; Miguel Cardona, in his official capacity as Secretary, United States
Department of Education; United States Department of Education
Defendants - Appellants
___________________________
No. 24-2351
___________________________
State of Missouri; State of Arkansas; State of Florida; State of Georgia; State of
North Dakota; State of Ohio; State of Oklahoma
Plaintiffs - Appellants
v.
Joseph Robinette Biden, Jr., in his official capacity as President of the United
States; Miguel Cardona, in his official capacity as Secretary, United States
Department of Education; United States Department of Education
Defendants - Appellees
____________
Appellate Case: 24-2332
Page: 1
(1a)
Date Filed: 08/09/2024 Entry ID: 5422990
2a
Appeal from United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Missouri - St. Louis
____________
Submitted: July 26, 2024
Filed: August 9, 2024
[Published]
____________
Before GRUENDER, ERICKSON, and GRASZ, Circuit Judges.
____________
PER CURIAM.
Before us is the motion of plaintiff States Missouri, Arkansas, Florida,
Georgia, North Dakota, Ohio, and Oklahoma (collectively, the “States”) seeking an
injunction pending appeal preventing the United States Secretary of Education from
implementing a plan to forgive approximately $475 billion in federal-student-loan
debt. See Improving Income Driven Repayment for the William D. Ford Federal
Direct Loan Program and the Federal Family Education Loan (FFEL) Program, 88
Fed. Reg. 43820 (July 10, 2023) (also known as the “Final Rule” or “SAVE”). We
grant in part and deny in part the States’ motion for the following reasons.
I.
SAVE is the Secretary of Education’s latest regulation creating a new version
of the income-contingent repayment (“ICR”) plan under the Higher Education Act
(“HEA”). See 20 U.S.C. § 1087e(d)(1) (directing the Secretary to “offer a borrower
of a loan made under this part a variety of plans for repayment of such loan, including
principal and interest on the loan”); § 1087e(d)(1)(D) (directing the Secretary to
establish an ICR plan). Before SAVE, the ICR plan was governed by the terms of a
regulation known as REPAYE, and before REPAYE, it was governed by PAYE.
Both REPAYE and PAYE forgave borrowers’ remaining principal at the end of
twenty or twenty-five years of repayment, see Student Assistance General
Appellate Case: 24-2332
Page: 2
Date Filed: 08/09/2024 Entry ID: 5422990
3a
Provisions, Federal Family Education Loan Program, and William D. Ford Federal
Direct Loan Program, 80 Fed. Reg. 67204, 67204-05 (October 30, 2015); Federal
Perkins Loan Program, Federal Family Education Loan Program, and William D.
Ford Federal Direct Loan Program, 77 Fed. Reg. 66088, 66088-89 (November 1,
2012), without clear authorization to do so from Congress. See 20 U.S.C.
§ 1087e(d)(1)(D); § 1098e(b)(7).
However, these plans were relatively
uncontroversial as they were limited in scope and less generous than income-based
repayment (“IBR”) plans, which Congress had specifically established to enable
more-favorable repayment terms and ultimately loan forgiveness for borrowers who
could demonstrate financial hardship. See § 1098e(b)(7) (requiring that “the
Secretary shall repay or cancel any outstanding balance of principal and interest due”
once an IBR borrower meets certain requirements). The new SAVE plan, by
contrast, is an order of magnitude broader than anything that has come before. Its
altered payment-threshold provisions significantly lower payment amounts, often to
$0 per month. See 88 Fed. Reg. 43828-29, 43833, 43901-02. SAVE additionally
does not charge borrowers accrued interest and forgives principal balances much
sooner, see id., and sets up a sliding-scale loan-forgiveness calculation under which
loans can be forgiven in as little as 10 years. Id. at 43891, 43902-03. The net result
is that millions of borrowers who opt-in to SAVE will pay nothing towards their
principal balance, nothing towards interest, and then will have their untouched
principal balance forgiven sooner. See Press Release, The White House, FACT
SHEET: President Biden Cancels Student Debt for more than 150,000 Student Loan
Borrowers
Ahead
of
Schedule
(Feb.
21,
2024),
https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2024/02/21/factsheet-president-biden-cancels-student-debt-for-more-than-150000-student-loanborrowers-ahead-of-schedule.
The plaintiff States sued President Joseph R. Biden, Secretary of Education
Miguel A. Cardona, and the United States Department of Education (collectively,
the “Government”) to enjoin prospectively the implementation of SAVE. The
district court granted in part the States’ motion for a preliminary injunction after
finding that at least one plaintiff, Missouri, had established standing through its state
Appellate Case: 24-2332
Page: 3
Date Filed: 08/09/2024 Entry ID: 5422990
4a
instrumentality—the Higher Education Loan Authority of the State of Missouri
(“MOHELA”)—and that MOHELA was facing “certain” irreparable harm. The
district court concluded that the States had shown a “fair chance” of success on the
merits of their claims both that loan forgiveness is not statutorily authorized for any
ICR plan and that SAVE violates separation of powers under the major-questions
doctrine. However, the district court only enjoined the ultimate forgiveness of loans,
finding that the States had not shown irreparable harm with respect to the paymentthreshold provisions and the nonaccrual of interest.
Despite the district court’s injunction, the Government continues to forgive
loans for borrowers enrolled in SAVE. It does so through a new so-called “hybrid
rule.” The Government’s hybrid rule combines the parts of SAVE that the district
court did not enjoin, such as the payment-threshold provisions and nonaccrual of
interest, with the forgiveness-of-principal provisions in REPAYE. Through this
hybrid plan, the Government has been able to make it such that borrowers who, prior
to the district court’s preliminary injunction, made reduced or $0 payments pursuant
to SAVE before ultimately being forgiven the remainder of their balance are now,
after the district court’s preliminary injunction, still making the same reduced or $0
payments pursuant to SAVE and are still ultimately being forgiven the remainder of
their loan balance pursuant to REPAYE. Indeed, the Government concedes as much.
See Resp. in Opp’n to Emergency Mot. for Inj. Pending Appeal at 19-20
(acknowledging that “[a]s a result [of the injunction], . . . the REPAYE plan was
partly amended and renamed [to SAVE], governed by the terms of the Final Rule
except for the criteria regarding time to forgiveness, which reverted to the terms of
the original REPAYE plan”). The Government’s hybrid plan was created after and
in response to the district court’s preliminary injunction and has effectively rendered
that injunction a nullity. As a result of the hybrid plan, the only practical effect of
the district court’s injunction is that borrowers formerly enrolled under SAVE and
now enrolled under the hybrid plan will not be eligible for loan forgiveness until
they have been making payments for at least 20 years, as opposed to as early as 10
years. But their payments are often $0 per month pursuant to the non-enjoined parts
Appellate Case: 24-2332
Page: 4
Date Filed: 08/09/2024 Entry ID: 5422990
5a
of SAVE, and after twenty years of $0 payments, the loans may still be entirely
forgiven.
The Government appealed the district court’s injunction. The States crossappealed, seeking an expanded injunction pending appeal in the district court. The
district court denied this motion before the Government could file a response. As
the Government’s hybrid plan took shape, the States moved to clarify the scope of
the preliminary injunction in the district court, asking the district court to clarify that
its preliminary injunction “prohibits [the Government] from using ICR authority to
forgive loans for any borrowers enrolled in the SAVE plan.” The district court
denied the motion. The States then sought an injunction pending appeal in this court.
In light of the Government’s post-injunction actions, we administratively stayed
implementation of the hybrid rule on July 18 until the parties could fully brief the
emergency motion for an injunction pending appeal.
II.
We now turn to the merits of the States’ emergency motion for an injunction
pending appeal. Like the Government’s last attempt to engage in mass student-loan
cancellation, “[w]hatever the eventual outcome of this case, it will affect the finances
of millions of Americans with student loan debt as well as those Americans who pay
taxes to finance the government and indeed everyone who is affected by such farreaching fiscal decisions.” Nebraska v. Biden (Nebraska I), 52 F.4th 1044, 1045
(8th Cir. 2022). “As such, we approach the motion before us with great care.” Id.
“In ruling on a request for an injunction pending appeal, the court must
engage in the same inquiry as when it reviews the grant or denial of a preliminary
injunction.” Id. at 1046; see Walker v. Lockhart, 678 F.2d 68, 70 (8th Cir. 1982).
“[A] district court may grant a preliminary injunction when a movant shows [1] that
he is likely to succeed on the merits, [2] that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm
in the absence of preliminary relief, [3] that the balance of equities tips in his favor,
and [4] that an injunction is in the public interest . . . .” Cigna Corp. v. Bricker, 103
Appellate Case: 24-2332
Page: 5
Date Filed: 08/09/2024 Entry ID: 5422990
6a
F.4th 1336, 1342 (8th Cir. 2024) (internal quotation marks omitted). “While no
single factor is determinative, the probability of success factor is the most
significant.” Id. “A movant shows a likelihood of success on the merits when [he]
demonstrates a fair chance, not necessarily greater than fifty percent, that [he] will
ultimately prevail under applicable law.” Id. at 1343 (internal quotation marks
omitted). “In circumstances where the movant has raised a substantial question and
the equities are otherwise strongly in his favor, the showing of success on the merits
can be less.” Nebraska I, 52 F.4th at 1046 (internal quotation marks omitted); see
also Fennell v. Butler, 570 F.2d 263, 264 (8th Cir. 1978) (“If the balance tips
decidedly towards the plaintiffs and the plaintiffs have raised questions serious
enough to require litigation, ordinarily the injunction should issue.”).
As a threshold matter, we agree with the district court that “[t]he allegations
in the Complaint are substantially similar to, if not identical to, those the Supreme
Court held were sufficient to establish Missouri’s standing just last year in Biden v.
Nebraska” (Nebraska II), 600 U.S. ----, 143 S. Ct. 2355 (2023), and thus that at least
one of the States, Missouri, has standing to sue. See Nebraska I, 52 F.4th at 104647.
Next, we turn to the “most significant” factor—the likelihood of success on
the merits. See Cigna Corp., 103 F.4th at 1342. The States have demonstrated at
least a “fair chance” that they will ultimately prevail under applicable law. Id. at
1343. The SAVE plan is even larger in scope than the loan-cancellation program at
issue in Nebraska II, 143 S. Ct. at 2369. According to the same budget model issued
by the Wharton School of the University of Pennsylvania cited in Nebraska II,
SAVE is anticipated to forgive an estimated $475 billion dollars in student loans.
See id. at 2373; Biden’s New Income-Driven Repayment (“SAVE”) Plan: Budgetary
Cost Estimate Update, Penn Wharton Budget Model (July 17, 2023). The
Government’s asserted authority to implement SAVE rests on the HEA’s directive
to the Secretary of Education to establish “an income contingent repayment plan,
with varying annual repayment amounts based on the income of the borrower, paid
over an extended period of time prescribed by the Secretary, not to exceed 25 years.”
Appellate Case: 24-2332
Page: 6
Date Filed: 08/09/2024 Entry ID: 5422990
7a
20 U.S.C. § 1087e(d)(1)(D). We agree with the district court that the Government’s
“interpretation” of this provision to authorize loan forgiveness of this magnitude “is
questionable,” especially in light of the fact that “other portions of the HEA . . .
explicitly permit loan forgiveness,” such as IBR plans. See 20 U.S.C. § 1098e(b)(7)
(requiring that “the Secretary shall repay or cancel any outstanding balance of
principal and interest due” once an IBR borrower meets certain requirements). The
clear statutory requirement that loans in certain programs, such as IBR plans, be
canceled, coupled with statutory silence regarding forgiveness under ICR plans,
suggests that—as the district court concluded—“Congress has made it clear under
what circumstances loan forgiveness is permitted, and the ICR plan is not one of
those circumstances.”
Moreover, the Government’s assertion that it has “discover[ed] in a longextant statute an unheralded power to regulate a significant portion of the American
economy” requires us to “greet [that] announcement with a measure of skepticism.”
Util. Air Regul. Grp. v. EPA, 573 U.S. 302, 324 (2014) (internal quotation marks
omitted). The economic impact of SAVE is roughly nine times larger than the $50
billion that triggered heightened scrutiny in Ala. Ass’n of Realtors v. Dep’t of Health
& Hum. Servs., 594 U.S. 758, 764 (2021). We agree with the United States District
Court for the District of Kansas, which also preliminarily enjoined SAVE in a case
that is now pending before the United States Supreme Court, that the expansion of
ICR plans from a program costing roughly $15 billion to $475 billion “expands
agency authority to such an extent that it alters it.” Alaska v. U.S. Dep’t of
Educ., --- F. Supp. 3d ---, 2024 WL 3104578, at *11 (D. Kan. June 24, 2024), stay
pending appeal granted, No. 24-3089 (10th Cir. June 30, 2024), application to
vacate stay filed, No. 24A11 (U.S. July 5, 2024); see Nebraska II, 143 S. Ct. at 2369
(“The Secretary’s plan has modified the cited provisions only in the same sense that
the French Revolution modified the status of the French nobility.” (internal quotation
marks omitted)). Here the Government asserts that it has discovered in a few
provisions of the HEA the authority to forgive hundreds of millions of dollars’ worth
of student loans, 3,000 percent more than has ever been forgiven under any previous
ICR program. In light of this vast assertion of newfound power, the major-questions
Appellate Case: 24-2332
Page: 7
Date Filed: 08/09/2024 Entry ID: 5422990
8a
doctrine requires that “something more than a merely plausible textual basis for the
agency action is necessary” in order to uphold the regulation. West Virginia v. EPA,
597 U.S. 697, 723 (2022). But the text of the HEA makes a showing of even mere
plausibility difficult, given that it demonstrates that “Congress opted to make debt
forgiveness available only in a few particular exigent circumstances,” Nebraska II,
143 S. Ct. at 2369, such as IBR plans, see 20 U.S.C. § 1098e(b)(7). Moreover, the
Government’s asserted ability to forgive student loans through ICR plans rests on
§ 1087e(d)(1)(D)’s requirement that the Secretary offer “an income contingent
repayment plan, with varying annual repayment amounts based on the income of the
borrower, paid over an extended period of time prescribed by the Secretary, not to
exceed 25 years” and § 1087e(e)(4)’s requirement that “[i]ncome contingent
repayment schedules shall be established by regulations promulgated by the
Secretary and shall require payments that vary in relation to the appropriate portion
of the annual income of the borrower . . . as determined by the Secretary.” These
are “wafer-thin reed[s] on which to rest such sweeping power.” Nebraska II, 143
S.Ct. at 2371. On initial review, the States have the better of the arguments on these
“substantial questions of law which remain to be resolved.” Nebraska I, 52 F.4th at
1047.
As to irreparable harm, the Government concedes that it continues to forgive
loans for borrowers enrolled in SAVE pursuant to the hybrid rule despite the district
court’s injunction. See Resp. in Opp’n to Emergency Mot. for Inj. Pending Appeal
at 19-20. As discussed above, the Government’s actions have resulted in there being
almost no practical difference in loan forgiveness for borrowers enrolled in SAVE
before and after the district court’s preliminary injunction, rendering the injunction
largely a nullity. In short, the Government continues to work the same irreparable
harm on MOHELA that the district court sought to enjoin.
Lastly, when balancing the equities, “the key question is whether the movant’s
likely harm without a preliminary injunction exceeds the nonmovant’s likely harm
with a preliminary injunction in place.” Cigna Corp., 103 F.4th at 1347; Morehouse
Enters., LLC v. ATF, 78 F.4th 1011, 1018 (8th Cir. 2023) (“The third and fourth
Appellate Case: 24-2332
Page: 8
Date Filed: 08/09/2024 Entry ID: 5422990
9a
factors for a preliminary injunction—harm to the opposing party and the public
interest—merge when the Government is the party opposing the preliminary
injunction.”). Among the considerations here are that all borrowers currently
impacted by our administrative stay are in administrative forbearance and thus not
required to pay principal or interest on their loans, borrowers who have remained in
PAYE and REPAYE plans are not impacted, and the States cannot turn back the
clock on any loans that have already been forgiven. See Nebraska I, 52 F.4th at
1047-48. We conclude that the balance of the equities in this case require us to
intervene to preserve the status quo pending the Government’s appeal of the district
court’s order. See id. at 1048.
In doing so, “we have carefully considered . . . the scope of any temporary
relief.” Id. “Crafting a preliminary injunction is an exercise of discretion and
judgment, often dependent as much on the equities of a given case as the substance
of the legal issues it presents.” Id. (quoting Trump v. Int’l Refugee Assistance
Project, 581 U.S. 571, 579 (2017)). We look to craft an injunction that is “no more
burdensome to the defendant than necessary to provide complete relief to the
plaintiffs.” Id. (quoting Madsen v. Women’s Health Ctr., Inc., 512 U.S. 753, 765
(1994)); see also id. (discussing the scope of an emergency injunction pending
appeal). We therefore grant in part and deny in part the States’ emergency motion
for an injunction pending appeal to prohibit the use of the hybrid rule to circumvent
the district court’s injunction.
III.
The Government is, for any borrower whose loans are governed in whole or
in part by the terms of the Improving Income Driven Repayment for the William D.
Ford Federal Direct Loan Program and the Federal Family Education Loan (FFEL)
Program, 88 Fed. Reg. 43820, enjoined from any further forgiveness of principal or
interest, from not charging borrowers accrued interest, and from further
implementing SAVE’s payment-threshold provisions. This injunction will remain
Appellate Case: 24-2332
Page: 9
Date Filed: 08/09/2024 Entry ID: 5422990
10a
in effect until further order of this court or the Supreme Court of the United States.
The administrative stay is hereby superseded.
______________________________
Appellate Case: 24-2332
Page: 10
Date Filed: 08/09/2024 Entry ID: 5422990
11a
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT
No: 24-2332
State of Missouri, et al.
Appellees
v.
Joseph Robinette Biden, Jr., in his official capacity as President of the United States, et al.
Appellants
No: 24-2351
State of Missouri, et al.
Appellants
v.
Joseph Robinette Biden, Jr., in his official capacity as President of the United States, et al.
Appellees
______________________________________________________________________________
Appeal from U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri - St. Louis
(4:24-cv-00520-JAR)
(4:24-cv-00520-JAR)
______________________________________________________________________________
ORDER
Appellants’ emergency motion for an administrative stay prohibiting the appellees from
implementing or acting pursuant to the Final Rule until this Court rules on the appellants’ motion
for an injunction pending appeal is granted.
July 18, 2024
Order Entered at the Direction of the Court:
Acting Clerk, U.S. Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.
____________________________________
/s/ Maureen W. Gornik
Appellate Case: 24-2332
Page: 1
Date Filed: 07/18/2024 Entry ID: 5414861
Case: 4:24-cv-00520-JAR
Doc. #: 54 Filed: 07/10/24
1179
12a
Page: 1 of 1 PageID #:
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
EASTERN DIVISION
STATE OF MISSOURI, et al.,
Plaintiffs,
v.
JOSEPH R. BIDEN, Jr., et al.,
Defendants.
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
No. 4:24-cv-00520-JAR
ORDER
This matter is before the Court on Plaintiffs’ Motion for Clarification of the Preliminary
Injunction. ECF No. 48. Plaintiffs filed their Motion on June 29, 2024. Defendants filed their
response on July 8, 2024. ECF No. 52. Plaintiffs filed their reply on July 9, 2024. ECF No. 53.
The Court has reviewed the parties’ arguments and has found that no additional
clarification is necessary. The Court’s preliminary injunction means what it says: that
“Defendants are preliminarily enjoined from any further loan forgiveness for borrowers under
the Final Rule’s SAVE plan . . . .” ECF No. 36. The Court need not extend this injunction
beyond the scope of the Final Rule as Plaintiffs only sought injunctive relief from
implementation of the Final Rule, which the Court has granted in part.
Accordingly,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiffs’ Motion for Clarification of the Preliminary
Injunction (ECF No. 48) is DENIED.
Dated this 10th day of July, 2024.
________________________________
JOHN A. ROSS
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Case: 4:24-cv-00520-JAR
Doc. #: 45 Filed: 06/28/24
1137
13a
Page: 1 of 2 PageID #:
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
EASTERN DIVISION
STATE OF MISSOURI, et al.,
Plaintiffs,
v.
JOSEPH R. BIDEN, Jr., et al.,
Defendants.
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
No. 4:24-cv-00520-JAR
ORDER
This matter is before the Court on Plaintiffs’ Motion for Injunction Pending Appeal or, in
the alternative, Temporary Administrative Stay of Agency Action. ECF No. 41. Plaintiffs ask
the Court to issue an injunction or administrative stay by Sunday, June 30, 2024, to prevent
Defendants from prospectively enforcing the entirety of the Final Rule. 1 Given the compressed
timeframe, Defendants have not yet filed a response.
The Court has already thoroughly considered the issues raised by Plaintiffs when
Plaintiffs presented their previous motions for preliminary injunction, a temporary restraining
order, or a stay. Indeed, after finding that Plaintiffs were only likely to succeed on the merits of
their claims as to the Final Rule’s loan forgiveness provisions, the Court issued a preliminary
injunction as to the loan forgiveness provisions of the Final Rule,. ECF Nos. 35 and 36.
Plaintiffs have not provided an adequate basis for the Court to issue an injunction further
enjoining any additional provisions of the Final Rule. For the reasons already explained in the
1
“Improving Income Driven Repayment for the William D. Ford Federal Direct Loan
Program and the Federal Family Education Loan (FFEL) Program.” 88 Fed. Reg. 43,820.
Case: 4:24-cv-00520-JAR
Doc. #: 45 Filed: 06/28/24
1138
14a
Page: 2 of 2 PageID #:
Court’s previous Order, the Court will deny Plaintiffs’ motion for an injunction or stay pending
appeal. See ECF No. 35.
Additionally, the Court has already found that Plaintiffs’ delay in bringing this case
undermines their request for immediate relief. Plaintiffs now ask this Court to take immediate
action to stay the Final Rule in its entirety on the eve of the rule’s full implementation and only
days after the Court issued its preliminary injunction in Plaintiffs’ favor. The Court finds no
reason to grant Plaintiffs relief that the Court has already determined is not appropriate on this
record. Again, for the reasons already expressed in the Court’s Order, the Court will deny
Plaintiffs’ motion.
Accordingly,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiffs’ Motion for Injunction Pending Appeal or, in
the alternative, Temporary Administrative Stay of Agency Action (ECF No. 41) is DENIED.
Dated this 28th day of June, 2024.
________________________________
JOHN A. ROSS
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Case: 4:24-cv-00520-JAR
Doc. #: 36 Filed: 06/24/24
1110
15a
Page: 1 of 1 PageID #:
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
EASTERN DIVISION
STATE OF MISSOURI, et al.,
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
Plaintiffs,
v.
JOSEPH R. BIDEN, Jr., et al.,
Defendants.
No. 4:24-cv-00520-JAR
PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendants are preliminarily enjoined from any further
loan forgiveness for borrowers under the Final Rule’s SAVE plan until such time as this Court
can decide the case on the merits.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Court will issue a separate Scheduling Order.
Dated this 24th day of June, 2024.
________________________________
JOHN A. ROSS
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Case: 4:24-cv-00520-JAR
Doc. #: 35
Filed: 06/24/24
1049
16a
Page: 1 of 61 PageID #:
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
EASTERN DIVISION
STATE OF MISSOURI, et al.,
Plaintiffs,
v.
JOSEPH R. BIDEN, Jr., et al.,
Defendants.
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
No. 4:24-cv-00520-JAR
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
The State of Missouri and six other states 1 bring this suit against President Joseph R.
Biden, Jr., Secretary of Education Miguel Cardona, 2 and the United States Department of
Education challenging the Secretary’s rule, “Improving Income Driven Repayment for the
William D. Ford Federal Direct Loan Program and the Federal Family Education Loan (FFEL)
Program,” (the “Final Rule”). The Final Rule creates a new income-driven repayment (“IDR”)
plan—referred to as the Savings on Valuable Education (“SAVE”) plan—to replace the Revised
Pay-As-You-Earn (“REPAYE”) plan. Compared to the REPAYE plan, the SAVE plan: (1)
increases the amount of a borrower’s income that is exempt from payment calculations from
150% to 225% of the federal poverty line (“FPL”); (2) decreases the maximum percentage of
discretionary income that can be used to calculate monthly payments on undergraduate loans
from 10% to 5%; (3) decreases the maximum time in repayment for borrowers with low initial
principal balances to qualify for loan forgiveness from 20 years for undergraduate loans to as
1
2
These are Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, North Dakota, Ohio, and Oklahoma.
Plaintiffs’ claims against the Secretary and the President are brought against them in their
respective official capacities.
Case: 4:24-cv-00520-JAR
Doc. #: 35
Filed: 06/24/24
1050
17a
Page: 2 of 61 PageID #:
little as 10 years 3; and (4) provides that any accrued interest not covered by a borrower’s
calculated monthly payment is not charged to the borrower. The Final Rule is to take full effect
on July 1, 2024, though the Secretary has designated some provisions for early implementation,
including the early loan forgiveness provisions. Thus, the Secretary has already forgiven
hundreds of thousands of loan balances for borrowers in the SAVE plan. 4 Plaintiffs argue that
Defendants lack congressional authority to implement these changes or otherwise have violated
the law in promulgating the Final Rule. Plaintiffs seek prospective injunctive and declaratory
relief to halt any further implementation of the Final Rule.
This matter is now before the Court on several motions. On April 16, 2024, Plaintiffs
filed their Motion to Stay or, in the alternative, for a Temporary Restraining Order. ECF No. 6.
On the same day, Plaintiffs filed a Motion to Stay or, in the alternative, for Preliminary
Injunction. ECF No. 7. On May 7, 2024, Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss and a Response
to Plaintiff’s Motions. ECF Nos. 21 and 22. On May 17, 2024, Plaintiffs filed their combined
Reply and Response to Defendants’ Motion. ECF No. 26. On May 27, 2024, Defendants filed
3
Under the SAVE plan, borrowers with original principal balances of $12,000 or less
become eligible for forgiveness of any remaining account balance after making at least 120
months (or 10 years) of eligible payments. For each additional $1,000 in a borrower’s initial
principal balance, the Final Rule permits full discharge of the unpaid balance after the borrower
makes an additional 12 months of eligible payments. For example, a borrower with an original
principal balance between $13,001 and $14,000 can have any remaining balance forgiven after
making 144 months (or 12 years) of eligible payments. The Final Rule sets a maximum
repayment period of 20 years for undergraduate loans or 25 years for graduate loans for
borrowers choosing the SAVE plan and permits the Secretary to fully cancel any remaining
balances after borrowers have been in repayment for the maximum repayment period.
4
Biden-Harris Administration Announces Additional $7.7 Billion in Approved Student
Debt Relief for 160,000 Borrowers, U.S. Dep’t of Educ. (May 21, 2024), https://perma.cc/94CJZU8B (“Today’s announcement brings total relief approved under the SAVE Plan to $5.5 billion
for 414,000 borrowers.”).
Case: 4:24-cv-00520-JAR
Doc. #: 35
Filed: 06/24/24
1051
18a
Page: 3 of 61 PageID #:
their Reply. ECF No. 29. On June 3, 2024, the Court heard oral argument on the parties’ various
motions. ECF No. 31. All Motions are now ripe for disposition.
The Court has thoroughly reviewed the parties’ briefing and exhibits and has carefully
considered the parties’ arguments. Because the Court finds that at least one Plaintiff has standing
and that venue is proper in this district, it will deny Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss. The Court
also finds that Plaintiffs are likely to succeed on the merits of their argument that the early loan
forgiveness provisions of the Final Rule were promulgated in a manner exceeding the Secretary’s
statutory authority. And because Plaintiffs have shown that Missouri faces impending harm from
any additional loan forgiveness under the Final Rule, the Court finds it necessary to enjoin
Defendants from any further implementation of the Final Rule’s loan forgiveness provisions until
this matter can be fully litigated. All other aspects of the Final Rule were promulgated properly.
For these reasons and others set forth below, the Court will grant in part and deny in part
Plaintiffs’ Motion for Stay or, in the alternative, for Preliminary Injunction.
Background
A.
The Higher Education Act and Accompanying Regulations
In 1965, Congress passed the Higher Education Act (“HEA”) “[t]o strengthen the
educational resources of our colleges and universities and to provide financial assistance for
students in postsecondary and higher education.” Higher Education Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89329, 79 Stat. 1219 (1965). The HEA authorized the Department to provide financial assistance
to students seeking a post-secondary education in the form of “Educational Opportunity Grants”
and by creating a federal loan insurance program administered by the Department to support
student loans issued by qualifying private lenders.
Case: 4:24-cv-00520-JAR
Doc. #: 35
Filed: 06/24/24
1052
19a
Page: 4 of 61 PageID #:
In 1993, Congress passed the Student Loan Reform Act, which created the Federal Direct
Student Loan Program, 5 which for the first time allowed the federal government to issue loans
for post-secondary education. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-66,
107 Stat. 312 (1993). As amended, the HEA provided borrowers with several options of
repayment plans, one of which was an income contingent repayment (“ICR”) plan “with varying
annual repayment amounts based on the income of the borrower, paid over an extended period of
time prescribed by the Secretary, not to exceed 25 years . . . .” 20 U.S.C. § 1087e(d)(1)(D)
(1993). The 1993 amendments also provided that “[i]ncome contingent repayment schedules
shall be established by regulations promulgated by the Secretary and shall require payments that
vary in relation to the appropriate portion of the annual income of the borrower (and the
borrower’s spouse, if applicable) as determined by the Secretary.” Id. 1087e(e)(4). The
language of section 1087e(e)(4) remains the same today as it was when first passed in 1993.
In 1994, the Secretary promulgated the first regulations regarding the standards, criteria,
and procedures governing ICR plans, and these regulations became effective on July 1, 1995. 59
Fed. Reg. 61664-01. Under the authority provided by 20 U.S.C. § 1087e(e)(4), these regulations
capped the repayment amount for ICR plans at 20% of discretionary income 6 (34 C.F.R.
§ 685.209(a)(2) (1994)) and provided that “[i]f a borrower has not repaid a loan in full at the end
of the 25-year repayment period under the [ICR] plan, the Secretary cancels the unpaid portion
of the loan.” Id. § 685.209(c)(2)(iv) (1994).
5
Now known as the William D. Ford Federal Direct Loan Program. 20 U.S.C.
§ 1087a(b)(1).
6
“Discretionary income” was defined as “a borrower’s [adjusted gross income] minus the
amount of the ‘HHS Poverty Guidelines for all States (except Alaska and Hawaii) and the
District of Columbia’ as published by the United States Department of Health and Human
Services on an annual basis.” 34 C.F.R. § 685.209(a)(3) (1994).
Case: 4:24-cv-00520-JAR
Doc. #: 35
Filed: 06/24/24
1053
20a
Page: 5 of 61 PageID #:
In 2007, Congress again amended the HEA. College Cost Reduction and Access Act,
Pub. L. 110-84, 121 Stat. 784. These amendments for the first time instructed the Secretary on
how the Department was to calculate the maximum repayment period under an ICR plan, but it
provided no specific definition of an “extended period of time” under 20 U.S.C.
§ 1087e(d)(1)(D). Nor did it prevent the Secretary from forgiving loans at the end of the
maximum repayment period. Instead, the amendments generally outline when payments under
various repayment plans qualify towards the maximum repayment period, including months in
which the borrowers are not in default or are in deferment due to an economic hardship. The
statutory limits in section 1087e(e)(7) regarding the calculation of the maximum repayment
period for an ICR plan remain the same today as they were when first passed in 2007.
The 2007 amendments also created a specific plan of loan forgiveness for public service
employees—the Public Service Loan Forgiveness (“PSLF”) program. Under 20 U.S.C.
§ 1087e(m), the Secretary “shall cancel the balance of interest and principal due . . . on any
eligible Federal Direct Loan not in default for a borrower” who has made 120 qualifying
monthly payments and has been employed in a public service job throughout the entirety of those
120 months. The statute further specifies that “the Secretary shall cancel the obligation to repay
the balance of principal and interest due as of the time of such cancellation . . . .” Id.
§ 1087e(m)(2). Outside of some amendments to the definition of a “public service job,” section
1087e(m) remains the same today as it was when first passed in 2007.
The 2007 amendments created yet another repayment plan—the income-based repayment
(“IBR”) plan. College Cost Reduction and Access Act, Pub. L. 110-84, 121 Stat. 784 (codified at
20 U.S.C. § 1098e). The IBR program permits borrowers experiencing “partial financial
hardship” to elect repayment under the IBR plan. A “partial financial hardship” is when a
Case: 4:24-cv-00520-JAR
Doc. #: 35
Filed: 06/24/24
1054
21a
Page: 6 of 61 PageID #:
borrower’s annual loan payments as calculated under the standard repayment plan 7 are greater
than 15% of the borrower’s (and the borrower’s spouse if filing jointly) adjusted gross income
(“AGI”) less 150% of the FPL. Id. It also directed the Secretary to repay or cancel a qualified
IBR plan borrower’s outstanding loan balance after a maximum repayment period of 25 years.
Id.
In 2010, Congress amended the terms of the IBR program. Congress lowered the
“financial hardship” threshold to qualify for IBR from 15% of AGI less 150% of the FPL to 10%
of AGI less 150% of the FPL. And “with respect to any loan made to a new borrower on or after
July 1, 2014[,]” Congress decreased the maximum repayment period under the IBR plan from 25
years to 20 years. Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-152,
124 Stat. 1029. Section 1098e(e) remains the same today as it was when first passed in 2010.
Congress has made no significant amendments to the HEA since 2010, but the Secretary
has promulgated regulations controlling ICR plans. In 2012, the Secretary implemented a new
ICR plan known as Pay As You Earn (“PAYE”) and incorporated some of the 2010 statutory
changes to the IBR plan into the Direct Loan and Federal Family Education Loan (“FFEL”)
program. 77 Fed. Reg. 66,088-01. Under the 2012 regulations, which became effective on July
1, 2013, borrowers of loans disbursed after October 1, 2011, 8 who could establish a partial
financial hardship could elect to repay their loan through the PAYE program. Id. at 66,137; 34
7
The standard repayment plan offers borrowers a “fixed annual repayment amount paid
over a fixed period of time, not to exceed 10 years[.]” 20 U.S.C. § 1078(b)(9)(A)(i).
8
An “eligible new borrower” under the PAYE plan was one who “[h]as no outstanding
balance on a Direct Loan Program loan or a FFEL Program loan as of October 1, 2007, or who
has no outstanding balance on such a loan on the date he or she received a new loan after
October 1, 2007; and . . . [r]eceives a disbursement of a [qualifying loan] after October 1,
2011 . . . .” making the PAYE plan available to borrowers who took out loans as far back as
2007. 34 C.F.R. § 685.209(a)(iii).
Case: 4:24-cv-00520-JAR
Doc. #: 35
Filed: 06/24/24
1055
22a
Page: 7 of 61 PageID #:
C.F.R. § 685.209(a)(2) (2013). A “partial financial hardship” under the PAYE program is when
a borrower’s annual amount due under the 10-year standard repayment plan is greater than 10%
of the borrower’s AGI less 150% of the FPL, the same as it is under the IBR plan. Id. at 66,137;
34 C.F.R. §§ 685.209(a)(1)(v)(A) and (B). Monthly payments under the PAYE plan “are limited
to no more than 10 percent of the amount by which the borrower’s AGI exceeds 150 percent of
the [FPL] applicable to the borrower’s family size, divided by 12,” which is the same as the limit
under the IBR plan. Id.; 34 C.F.R. § 685.209(a)(2). And, as with the IBR plan, qualifying
borrowers who opted into the PAYE plan were eligible for loan forgiveness after making 20
years of qualifying payments. Id. at 66,139–40; 34 C.F.R. § 685.209(a)(6).
In 2015, the Secretary issued additional regulations creating a new ICR plan called the
Revised Pay As You Earn (“REPAYE”) repayment plan. 80 Fed. Reg. 67,204. These regulations
became effective on July 1, 2016. 34 C.F.R. § 685.209(c) (2016). Some terms of the REPAYE
plan mirror those of the PAYE plan: borrowers’ monthly payments under the plan are again
limited to no more than 10% of the borrower’s AGI less 150% percent of the FPL and borrowers
under the plan qualify for loan forgiveness after 20 years of qualifying payment for
undergraduate loans and 25 years of qualifying payments for graduate loans. 80 Fed. Reg. at
67,239, 67,241; 34 C.F.R. §§ 685.209(c)(2)(i) and (c)(5) (2016). Importantly, unlike the PAYE
plan, which requires borrowers to show financial hardship and to have received loans after
October 1, 2011, the REPAYE plan is available to all borrowers. 9 80 Fed. Reg. at 67,239; 34
C.F.R. § 685.209(c)(ii) (2016). The REPAYE plan thus has many of the same repayment
provisions as the PAYE and IBR plans but is available to more borrowers. The terms of both the
9
Except those borrowers who are in default and “parent borrowers” who obtained loans to
help pay for their child’s education.
Case: 4:24-cv-00520-JAR
Doc. #: 35
Filed: 06/24/24
1056
23a
Page: 8 of 61 PageID #:
PAYE plan and the REPAYE plan remain in effect without significant alteration. 34 C.F.R.
§§ 685.209(a) and (c).
B.
The Final Rule
On May 26, 2021, the Secretary published in the Federal Register his intent to establish
negotiated rulemaking committees “to prepare proposed regulations for programs authorized
under title IV 10 of the [HEA].” 86 Fed. Reg. 28,299-01. It published the dates, times, and
locations of public hearings on the matter and permitted public comments on or before July 1,
2021. Among the issues the Department intended to address were “[l]oan repayment plans under
34 C.F.R. . . . [§§] 685.208, and 685.209” and “[t]he Public Service Loan Forgiveness program
under 34 C.F.R. [§] 685.219.” Id. at 28,300. Virtual public hearings were held on June 21, 23,
and 24, 2021. Id.; see also 88 Fed. Reg. 1,894-01. After these public hearings, the Secretary
published in the Federal Register notice of his intent to establish a committee to propose
modifications to the HEA loan repayment programs and requested “nominations for individual
negotiators who represent key stakeholder constituencies for the issues to be negotiated to serve
on the committee.” See 86 Fed. Reg. 43,609. Individual negotiators were nominated and
selected, and the committee met several times to negotiate the subsequent rulemaking.
After concluding the negotiated rulemaking process, on January 11, 2023, the Secretary
published a notice of proposed rulemaking (“NPRM”) outlining the proposed changes to the
HEA loan repayment programs. 88 Fed. Reg. 1,894-01. The NPRM explains that:
The Secretary proposes to amend the regulations governing [ICR] plans by
amending the [REPAYE] repayment plan, and to restructure and rename the
repayment plan regulations under the William D. Ford Federal Direct Loan (Direct
10
Title IV refers to the “Student Assistance” section of the HEA, which includes all
sections relating to the relevant student loans plans discussed herein. See 20 U.S.C. §§ 1070–
1099d.
Case: 4:24-cv-00520-JAR
Doc. #: 35
Filed: 06/24/24
1057
24a
Page: 9 of 61 PageID #:
Loan) Program, including combining the [ICR] and [IBR] plans under the umbrella
term of “Income-Driven Repayment (IDR) plans.”
Id. The NPRM further explained the Secretary’s intent to amend the regulations on IDR plans,
specifically to “expand the benefits of the REPAYE plan” by (1) increasing the amount of
protected income used to calculate borrowers’ monthly payments, (2) decreasing the share of
unprotected income used to calculate borrowers’ monthly payments, (3) reducing the time for
some low initial balance borrowers to receive loan forgiveness, and (4) no longer charging
borrowers accrued interest each month after borrowers make a qualifying payment. Borrowers
would also receive credit toward loan forgiveness for certain periods of deferment or forbearance
that were not previously credited. The NPRM set the date to receive public comments on the
proposed rule for February 10, 2023—30 days after the NPRM’s publication. Id.
After receiving public comments, on July 10, 2023, the Final Rule was published in the
Federal Register. 88 Fed. Reg. 43,820. In relevant part, the Final Rule’s outlines its major
provisions as follows:
The final regulations—
Expand access to affordable monthly Direct Loan payments through
changes to the [REPAYE] repayment plan, which may also be referred to as
the Saving on a Valuable Education (SAVE) plan; 11
...
11
Increase the amount of income exempted from the calculation of the
borrower’s payment amount from 150 percent of the [FPL] to 225 percent
of FPL for borrowers on the REPAYE plan;
Lower the share of discretionary income used to calculate the borrower’s
monthly payment for outstanding loans under REPAYE to 5 percent of
discretionary income for loans for the borrower’s undergraduate study and
10 percent of discretionary income for other outstanding loans; and an
amount between 5 and 10 percent of discretionary income based upon the
Throughout the Final Rule, REPAYE and SAVE are used interchangeably and both are
meant to refer to the changes to the REPAYE plan promulgated by the Final Rule.
Case: 4:24-cv-00520-JAR
Doc. #: 35
Filed: 06/24/24
1058
25a
Page: 10 of 61 PageID #:
weighted average of the original principal balances for those with
outstanding loans in both categories;
Provide a shorter maximum repayment period for borrowers with low
original loan principal balances;
...
Provide that the borrower will not be charged any remaining accrued
interest each month after the borrower’s payment is applied under the
REPAYE plan;
Credit certain periods of deferment or forbearance toward time needed to
receive loan forgiveness; [and]
Permit borrowers to receive credit toward forgiveness for payments made
prior to consolidating their [FFEL] loans[.]
Id.
The HEA provides procedural rules for when rules published by the Secretary may
become effective. Under 20 U.S.C. § 1089(c)(1), the Secretary must publish the final form of
any rule by “November 1 prior to the start of the award year” for the Secretary’s rules to become
effective during the next award year. 12 The Final Rule was published on July 10, 2023, and the
Secretary plans to fully implement the Final Rule by July 1, 2024. 88 Fed. Reg. at 43,821.
Despite the Final Rule’s July 1, 2024, onset date, the Secretary designated several
portions of the Final Rule for early implementation under the procedural requirements provided
by the HEA. Under § 1089(c)(2), “[t]he Secretary may designate any regulatory provision that
affects the programs under [Title IV of the HEA] and is published in final form after November 1
as one that an entity subject to the provision may, in the entity’s discretion, choose to implement
prior to the effective date described in [§ 1089(c)(1)].” This designation of provisions for early
12
The “award year” is defined as “the period beginning July 1 and ending June 30 of the
following year[,]” which generally aligns the rule’s implementation date with the beginning of a
school year. 20 U.S.C. § 1088.
Case: 4:24-cv-00520-JAR
Doc. #: 35
Filed: 06/24/24
1059
26a
Page: 11 of 61 PageID #:
implementation is accomplished by publication in the Federal Register and “shall be effective
with respect to that entity in accordance with the terms of the Secretary’s designation.” Id.
§ 1089(c)(2)(B). Under this authority, the Secretary designated several provisions of the Final
Rule for early implementation on July 30, 2023:
Adjusting the treatment of spousal income in the REPAYE plan for married
borrowers who file separately as described in § 685.209(e)(1)(i)(A) and (B);
Increasing the income exemption to 225 percent of the applicable poverty
guideline in the REPAYE plan as described in § 685.209(f);
Not charging accrued interest to the borrower after the borrower’s payment
on REPAYE is applied as described in § 685.209(h); . . .
Designating in § 685.209(a)(1) that REPAYE may also be referred to as the
Saving on Valuable Education (SAVE) plan[; and]
. . . the changes to the definition of family size for Direct Loan borrowers in
IBR, ICR, PAYE, and REPAYE in § 685.209(a) to exclude the spouse when a
borrower is married and files a separate tax return . . . .
88 Fed. Reg. at 43,820–21. The Final Rule also designated for early implementation the
provision for awarding credit toward loan forgiveness to certain periods of deferment and
provided that the Secretary “will publish a separate notice announcing the timing of the
implementation.” Id. at 43,821.
On October 23, 2023, the Department designated for early implementation a provision
that eliminated “the requirement for borrowers returning to SAVE after having previously been
on REPAYE to provide prior years’ income.” 88 Fed. Reg. 72,685-01. This effectively
eliminated the obligations of borrowers under the SAVE plan to recertify their previous year’s
income to remain on the plan.
On January 16, 2024, the Department designated for early implementation the provision
of the Final Rule permitting early forgiveness for certain borrowers with low initial principal
balances. 89 Fed. Reg. 2,489-01. Since early implementation of the forgiveness provision, the
Case: 4:24-cv-00520-JAR
Doc. #: 35
Filed: 06/24/24
1060
27a
Page: 12 of 61 PageID #:
Secretary has forgiven hundreds of thousands of loan balances for borrowers opting for the
SAVE plan.
C.
Biden v. Nebraska
The Supreme Court’s recent ruling regarding the Secretary’s previous student loan
forgiveness plan is instructive. Though the Secretary in that case claimed the authority to forgive
loans under a different statute not at issue here, there remains some overlap between the Supreme
Court’s analysis in that case and the issues presented here.
In 2001, following the September 11 terrorist attacks, Congress passed the Higher
Education Relief Opportunities to Students Act of 2001, which authorized the Secretary to
modify or waive provisions of the HEA student loan programs “in connection with the national
emergency.” Pub. L. 107-122, 115 Stat. 2386 (emphasis added). This statute specifically
authorized full tuition refunds “to students who are members of the Armed Forced serving on
active duty during the national emergency.” Id. In both instances, “the national emergency”
refers to the September 11 terrorist attacks.
Rather than let the Act terminate on September 20, 2003, Congress passed the Higher
Education Relief Opportunities for Students Act of 2003 (the “HEROES Act”), which again
granted the Secretary the authority to modify or waive “any statutory or regulatory provision
applicable to the student financial assistance programs under title IV of the Act as the Secretary
deems necessary in connection with a war or other military operation or national emergency
. . . .” Pub. L. 108-76, 117 Stat. 904.
The Secretary invoked this authority in the wake of the President’s declaration of a
national emergency for the COVID-19 pandemic 13 to promulgate modifications and waivers to
13
Presidential Proclamation No. 9994, 85 Fed. Reg. 15,337.
Case: 4:24-cv-00520-JAR
Doc. #: 35
Filed: 06/24/24
1061
28a
Page: 13 of 61 PageID #:
the student loan repayment program. One such set of modifications and waivers was published
in the Federal Register on October 12, 2022. 87 Fed. Reg. 61,512-01. There, the Secretary
announced his intention “to discharge up to a total of $20,000 in covered loans for affected
individuals who received Pell Grants and up to a total of $10,000 in covered loans for affected
individuals who did not receive a Pell Grant” for individual borrowers making less than
$125,000 per year or married couples filing jointly making less than $250,000. Id.
Several states, including Plaintiffs Missouri and Arkansas, subsequently sought to enjoin
the implementation of the Secretary’s forgiveness plan. Nebraska v. Biden, 636 F. Supp. 3d 991
(E.D. Mo. 2022). On October 20, 2022, the district court dismissed the case for lack of standing.
Id. But on November 14, 2022, the Eighth Circuit granted the plaintiff States’ Emergency
Motion for an injunction pending appeal to the Supreme Court. Nebraska v. Biden, 52 F.4th
1044, 1048 (8th Cir. 2022).
On June 30, 2023, the Supreme Court sided with the States and held the Secretary’s loan
forgiveness plan under the HEROES Act was unlawful. The Supreme Court in a six-to-three
majority opinion authored by the Chief Justice found that the plaintiff States had standing
because the Higher Education Loan Authority of the State of Missouri (“MOHELA”) is an
instrumentality of the State of Missouri, and therefore Missouri suffered direct harm when
MOHELA suffered harm from the loan forgiveness program. Biden v. Nebraska, 143 S. Ct.
2355, 2366–68 (2023) 14 (“The Secretary’s plan harms MOHELA in the performance of its public
function and so directly harms the State that created and controls MOHELA. Missouri thus has
suffered an injury in fact sufficient to give it standing to challenge the Secretary’s plan.”). The
14
Unless otherwise noted, additional references to Biden v. Nebraska refer to the Supreme
Court’s Opinion at 143 S. Ct. 2355.
Case: 4:24-cv-00520-JAR
Doc. #: 35
Filed: 06/24/24
1062
29a
Page: 14 of 61 PageID #:
Supreme Court further held that the Secretary’s forgiveness plan was unlawful under the major
questions doctrine, holding that the HEROES Act language that granted the Secretary authority
to “modify or waive” provisions of the student loan repayment plans was not “clear
congressional authorization” for the mass debt cancellation program. Id. at 2375. The decision
never directly spoke to the Secretary’s authority to implement repayment procedures under the
HEA that are at issue in this case.
D.
The Parties’ Motions
Plaintiffs filed two motions, though their requested relief for each is essentially the same.
Recognizing that their requested forms of relief significantly overlap, Plaintiffs filed a combined
Memorandum in Support of both Motions. ECF No. 10. Plaintiffs ask this Court to stay the
Final Rule under the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”). See 5 U.S.C. § 705. In the
alternative, Plaintiffs ask the Court to issue a temporary restraining order (“TRO”) or a
preliminary injunction to prevent Defendants from fully implementing the Final Rule.
Anticipating a challenge from Defendants regarding their standing to sue, Plaintiffs
present several arguments to support their standing. Plaintiffs then argue that they will likely be
successful on the merits. In particular, Plaintiffs contend that the Final Rule violates separation
of powers principles requiring invocation of the major questions doctrine and otherwise runs
afoul of the APA. Plaintiffs argue that these violations necessitate vacatur of the Final Rule in its
entirety. Finally, Plaintiffs argue that they face impending injury if the Final Rule is allowed to
continue and that the public interest favors a stay or other injunctive relief to prevent its further
implementation.
In their Motion to Dismiss, Defendants ask the Court to dismiss this case for two reasons.
First, Defendants argue that the Court should not reach the merits of this case because Plaintiffs
Case: 4:24-cv-00520-JAR
Doc. #: 35
Filed: 06/24/24
1063
30a
Page: 15 of 61 PageID #:
have not established standing, and therefore the case should be dismissed under Fed. R. Civ. P.
12(b)(1). Second, Defendants argue that even if Plaintiffs have standing, this Court is not the
appropriate venue for this case and therefore it should be dismissed under Fed. R. Civ. P.
12(b)(3). Defendants also argue that President Biden should be dismissed from the case.
Because the issues briefed by the parties overlap considerably, the Court will discuss the
parties’ arguments by topic rather than in the order they were presented for the sake of clarity.
1.
Standing
Plaintiffs allege several theories of standing, though they emphasize that if the Court
finds standing for any one of them on any theory, the case should proceed as to all Plaintiffs.
Defendants vigorously oppose all of Plaintiffs’ standing theories and insist that each Plaintiff
must separately establish standing under each alleged theory before the Court can consider
granting Plaintiffs’ requested relief.
a.
Missouri’s Standing Via Harm to Its State Instrumentality
Plaintiff Missouri asserts that it has standing based on alleged past and future harms to
MOHELA from the implementation of the Final Rule. Under this theory, Missouri is harmed
because its public instrumentality, MOHELA, will lose revenue in two ways. First, Missouri
argues that when the Direct Loans serviced by MOHELA are forgiven under the SAVE plan,
those loan accounts will be closed and MOHELA will no longer collect administrative servicing
fees for those accounts. Second, Missouri argues that the Final Rule encourages borrowers to
consolidate FFEL loans into Direct Loans and therefore will (1) deprive MOHELA of interest
revenue from consolidated FFEL loans, (2) decrease the value of FFEL loans on the tradable
market, and (3) harm MOHELA’s ability to issue bonds. Plaintiffs emphasize that Missouri’s
theory regarding the loss of income from loan servicing fees when loans are forgiven, was
accepted by the Supreme Court in Biden v. Nebraska and should have the same force here.
Case: 4:24-cv-00520-JAR
Doc. #: 35
Filed: 06/24/24
1064
31a
Page: 16 of 61 PageID #:
Defendants argue that the Supreme Court’s determination in Biden v. Nebraska that
Missouri had standing in that case does not mean that Missouri has standing here. Defendants
specifically attack the theory that Missouri has established that MOHELA is facing actual and
imminent financial harm from ongoing loan forgiveness under the Final Rule. Defendants point
to MOHELA’s recent request that the Department reallocate 1.5 million of its Direct Loan
accounts to other federal servicers. 15 See ECF No. 22-3. At the same time, Defendants admit
that, as of the date of its Motion to Dismiss, MOHELA had “discharged approximately 28,000
borrowers’ accounts under SAVE, and an estimated further 53,000 have been identified for
forgiveness and are being processed.” ECF No. 22 at 11; ECF No. 11-2 at ¶ 33. Defendants
argue that, because MOHELA has voluntarily requested that 1.5 million accounts be transferred
to other servicers, Missouri cannot simultaneously claim harm from the closing of fewer
accounts via loan forgiveness.
Defendants also argue that MOHELA will actually benefit from the SAVE plan. First,
Defendants argue that with fewer loans to service because of loan forgiveness, MOHELA will be
less likely to incur financial penalties, like a recent $7.2 million penalty imposed for servicing
errors. Second, the Department has already distributed to MOHELA $1.6 million in transition
costs as part of the switch to SAVE. Third, Defendants contend that the Final Rule will reduce
borrower delinquency, decreasing servicing costs and permitting MOHELA to collect additional
servicing fees on accounts that will otherwise fall into delinquency and default under previous
loan repayment programs.
15
The Department has indicated that it began transferring a portion of MOHELA’s accounts
to other servicers at MOHELA’s specific request. Update for MOHELA student loan borrowers,
U.S. Dep’t of Educ. (April 29, 2024), https://perma.cc/NTZ6-BVK6.
Case: 4:24-cv-00520-JAR
Doc. #: 35
Filed: 06/24/24
1065
32a
Page: 17 of 61 PageID #:
Defendants are also highly critical of Plaintiffs’ theory that the Final Rule encourages
borrowers of FFELs to seek consolidation. Defendants argue that any harm under such a theory
is contingent on the action of independent third parties and is far from certain. Defendants also
argue that, even if FFEL consolidation were to increase because of the Final Rule, Plaintiffs have
not established with sufficient certainty that such consolidation would actually harm MOHELA.
Plaintiffs in their Reply ask that the Court to reject Defendants’ preferred balancing
approach when assessing potential harms to MOHELA. According to Plaintiffs, if MOHELA
can show that it will lose a single dollar because of the Final Rule, that is enough.
b.
North Dakota’s Standing Via Harm to Its State Instrumentality
Plaintiff North Dakota argues it has a separate basis for standing through alleged harms to
the Bank of North Dakota (the “Bank”). The Bank provides loans to students enrolled in North
Dakota institutions of higher education. According to Plaintiffs, the Final Rule will “unlawfully
impose[] a direct competitive harm” on the Bank because the loan terms offered by the SAVE
plan are better than those offered by the Bank. Under this theory, the Bank will lose potential
revenue because fewer borrowers will choose to take out loans from the Bank and will instead
chose to take out Direct Loans to take advantage of the SAVE plan.
Defendants contest the bases of this theory. Defendants first note that North Dakota has
not clearly established that the Bank is an instrumentality of the state. Defendants further assert
that this kind of competitor standing has never been extended to situations where the government
itself was considered a competitor, but instead has been limited to cases in which government
action increased the competitive advantage of one non-governmental actor over another nongovernmental actor. Defendants also argue that North Dakota’s standing argument improperly
relies on the actions of independent third parties that are not certain to occur.
Case: 4:24-cv-00520-JAR
c.
Doc. #: 35
Filed: 06/24/24
1066
33a
Page: 18 of 61 PageID #:
Plaintiffs’ Recruitment Theory
Plaintiffs also contend that each of them has standing because the Final Rule harms their
ability to recruit and retain talent. According to Plaintiffs, they rely on the PSLF program’s 10year loan forgiveness timeline to recruit and retain talent for state and local government
employment. Plaintiffs allege that without the PSLF program’s comparatively strong benefits
over traditional student loan repayment plans, recruits will be lured away from government work
by the promise of higher pay in the private sector and a 10-year loan forgiveness timeline under
the SAVE plan. Plaintiffs support these contentions with sworn affidavits from State employees
who attest to the importance of the PSLF program in the recruitment and retention of
government employees. ECF Nos. 1-4, 1-5, and 1-6.
Defendants argue that Plaintiffs’ theory improperly relies on the actions of independent
third parties and is speculative. Defendants contend that the SAVE plan will continue to provide
significant benefits to borrowers seeking PSLF forgiveness in the form of lower payments and
limited interest accrual and may even increase participation in the PSLF program. Defendants
assert that any injunction preventing the additional benefits provided by SAVE plan will actually
exacerbate Plaintiffs’ concerns about recruitment.
d.
Georgia, Missouri, North Dakota, Oklahoma, and Ohio’s Lost Tax
Revenue Theory
Plaintiffs Georgia, Missouri, North Dakota, Oklahoma, and Ohio separately argue that
they have standing because the Final Rule will decrease their tax revenues. Generally, forgiven
student loan balances (besides those forgiven via PSLF) are considered taxable income under the
federal definition of AGI. 26 U.S.C. § 108(f). These Plaintiffs allege that, for the purposes of
assessing state income tax, their tax codes tie their definition of AGI to the federal government’s
definition. See, e.g., Mo. Rev. Stat. § 143.121 (“The Missouri [AGI] of a resident individual
Case: 4:24-cv-00520-JAR
Doc. #: 35
Filed: 06/24/24
1067
34a
Page: 19 of 61 PageID #:
shall be the taxpayer’s federal [AGI] subject to the modifications in this section.”). Thus, in
these States, forgiven loan balances are generally considered taxable income. But the American
Rescue Plan Act of 2021 at 26 U.S.C. § 108(f)(5)—passed by Congress in response to the
economic hardships caused by the COVID-19 pandemic—specifically excludes discharged
student loan debt from consideration of federal AGI through the end of 2025. Therefore, these
Plaintiffs argue that the SAVE plan, by permitting accelerated loan forgiveness, will decrease
their expected tax revenues in 2026 and beyond when loans are forgiven on the SAVE plan
before 2025.
Defendants argue that such a theory of standing is self-inflicted and precluded by binding
Supreme Court precedent. Defendants assert that the alleged loss of potential tax revenue is of
the Plaintiff States’ own making and is unduly speculative. Defendants contend that these
Plaintiffs have the ultimate power over their tax codes and can, if they so desire, change those tax
codes to avoid losing tax revenue.
2.
Venue
Defendants argue that the case should also be dismissed for the independent reason that
venue is improper in the Eastern District of Missouri. Defendants argue that under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1391(e)(1)(C), Missouri is an “entity” who “maintains its principal place of business” in
Missouri’s capital, Jefferson City, which is located in the Western District of Missouri. Under
this theory, Plaintiffs’ Complaint, which alleges that venue is proper in this Court because
“Plaintiff Missouri is a resident of this judicial district,” ECF No. 1 at ¶ 35, is insufficient to
establish venue. Defendants argue that, per the venue statute, the State of Missouri resides only
in the Western District of Missouri.
Case: 4:24-cv-00520-JAR
Doc. #: 35
Filed: 06/24/24
1068
35a
Page: 20 of 61 PageID #:
Defendants also state that the allegation in Plaintiffs’ Complaint that “a substantial part of
the events or omissions giving rise to the Complaint occurred within this district,” id., is not
supported by any other factual allegations. According to Defendants, the Complaint merely
describes actions taken by the federal government in the District of Columbia and lists no
specific actions taken by any party in the Eastern District of Missouri. For these reasons,
Defendants request dismissal of this case for improper venue or, in the alternative, transfer to the
Western District of Missouri or the District of D.C.
Plaintiffs disagree. They point to caselaw indicating that courts have unanimously found
that venue is proper when a State brings a case in any district court within that State. Plaintiffs
also contend that venue is proper in this Court because they are bringing this suit on behalf of
MOHELA, whose principal place of business is in the Eastern District.
Defendants assert in their Reply that the Ninth Circuit and other district courts were
mistaken in finding that a State can bring a suit in any judicial district within that State.
Defendants ask the Court to reject the rationale used in the cases cited by Plaintiffs. Defendants
similarly discount Plaintiffs’ argument that Missouri’s residence has any connection to the
location of MOHELA’s principal place of business.
3.
Dismissal of President Biden
Defendants briefly argue that Defendant Joseph R. Biden, Jr., should be dismissed
because President Biden is not subject to Plaintiffs’ requested relief. According to Defendants,
the Court lacks jurisdiction to enjoin the president.
Plaintiffs argue that the Court has the authority to issue declaratory relief and to issue
injunctive relief against the President when injunctive relief against the remaining Defendants
will not fully redress Plaintiffs’ alleged injuries. They argue that the Court can, and should, enter
Case: 4:24-cv-00520-JAR
Doc. #: 35
Filed: 06/24/24
1069
36a
Page: 21 of 61 PageID #:
injunctive relief against the President to prevent him from pursuing loan cancellation by
executive order.
4.
Statutory Authority and the Major Questions Doctrine
Plaintiffs assert that the Final Rule was promulgated in excess of statutory authority,
violates separation of powers principles, and implicates the major questions doctrine. Under the
major questions doctrine, when an agency takes an action touching on issues of important
economic and political significance, the agency must find clear congressional authority
delegating such action to the agency. Plaintiffs contend that the Final Rule is of such economic
and political significance that it requires clear congressional authorization and that Defendants
have no clear statutory authority to promulgate a rule with the provisions found in the Final Rule.
Plaintiffs further allege that the HEA does not permit the Secretary to forgive any loans
under any ICR program. Plaintiffs also argue that the general terms of the Final Rule unlawfully
change the ICR program from a loan repayment program into a grant program “for the typical
borrower.” Plaintiffs insist that the use of “repayment” in the statutory creation of the ICR
program requires full repayment of any student loan.
Plaintiffs also contend that the SAVE program under the Final Rule will make the IBR
program irrelevant, indicating that the Final Rule is not statutorily authorized. According to
Plaintiffs, the Secretary cannot make an ICR program more generous than the IBR program
because the IBR program was created by Congress. Plaintiffs argue that any specific conditions
set by Congress in the IBR program, like the percent of a borrower’s income considered when
calculating payments, cannot be more generous under an ICR program because Congress would
have set those conditions by statute as they did with the IBR plan. Plaintiffs use this same theory
to attack the provisions of the Final Rule providing for limits on the interest accrual as long as a
Case: 4:24-cv-00520-JAR
Doc. #: 35
Filed: 06/24/24
1070
37a
Page: 22 of 61 PageID #:
borrower participates in the SAVE plan because the IBR plan only permits the Secretary to
subsidize a borrower’s interest for a maximum of three years.
Additionally, Plaintiffs argue that the Secretary’s interpretation of his power under the
HEA is simply too broad. Plaintiffs assert that repayment “over an extended period of time
prescribed by the Secretary, not to exceed 25 years” does not mean, as Defendants suggest, that
there is no lower limit to the length of time a borrower must remain in repayment. Plaintiffs
contend that “an extended period of time” must be at least 20 years as that is the minimum
repayment timeline to qualify for forgiveness under the IBR plan as set by Congress.
Defendants argue that the Court need not rely on the major questions doctrine to decide
this case because the issues presented can be resolved using typical tools of statutory
interpretation. And even though Defendants dispute the applicability of the major questions
doctrine, they still assert that Congress has provided clear authority for the Final Rule’s
provisions via the HEA.
Additionally, Defendants reject the applicability of the Biden v. Nebraska decision to this
case. According to Defendants, the Biden v. Nebraska decision invoked the major questions
doctrine in relation to the Secretary’s reliance on the HEROES Act to create that loan forgiveness
program but said nothing about the Secretary’s authority under the HEA. Defendants emphasize
that this plan does not rely on emergency powers like those implicated by the HEROES Act, and
that any concerns the Supreme Court may have had about executive overreach in times of crisis
are not applicable to the Final Rule.
Defendants contend that Congress has granted them statutory authority to create ICR
plans in 20 U.S.C. § 1087e(d)(1)(D). According to Defendants, the Final Rule is just another
example of the Secretary exercising that authority. Defendants point out that, despite the
Case: 4:24-cv-00520-JAR
Doc. #: 35
Filed: 06/24/24
1071
38a
Page: 23 of 61 PageID #:
Secretary creating several ICR plans over the past three decades—including plans that allow for
forgiveness for borrowers who make 20 years of qualifying payments—Congress has never
specifically prevented the Secretary from offering loan forgiveness under ICR plans.
Defendants also question Plaintiffs’ position that the statutory provisions of the IBR plan
are implicit limitations on the Secretary’s authority to promulgate ICR plans. In Defendants’
view, if Congress wished to restrict the IBR plan’s provisions to borrowers experiencing a partial
financial hardship, Congress would have explicitly limited the ICR plan in the way Plaintiffs
suggest. And because Congress has not done so, the Court should not find the Secretary’s
authority contains this implicit limitation.
Plaintiffs argue in their Reply that Defendants’ alleged admission that the Secretary has
implied authority to forgive loans under the ICR plan is sufficient to show that there is no clear
statutory authority for the Secretary to do so. Plaintiffs further argue that, despite the Secretary
previously creating ICR plans that provided loan forgiveness, the Final Rule is of such economic
and political significance that it invokes the major questions doctrine and requires the Secretary
to established clear congressional authority for the Final Rule.
5.
The Administrative Procedure Act and Arbitrary and Capricious Agency
Action
Plaintiffs contend that, regardless of whether the Final Rule implicates the major
questions doctrine, it is also unlawful because it is arbitrary and capricious agency action or
otherwise violates the APA.
a.
The Final Rule’s Cost Estimate
Plaintiffs contend the Final Rule’s cost estimate is so inaccurate that its inclusion in the
Final Rule indicates that the Final Rule is arbitrary and capricious. According to Plaintiffs, the
cost estimate is flawed because it underestimates the cost of implementation and ignores that the
Case: 4:24-cv-00520-JAR
Doc. #: 35
Filed: 06/24/24
1072
39a
Page: 24 of 61 PageID #:
Department’s previous plan for loan forgiveness was struck down as unlawful by Biden v.
Nebraska. Much of Plaintiffs’ argument on this point is based on the timing of the publication of
the Final Rule, which was 10 days after the Supreme Court issued its decision in Biden v.
Nebraska. According to Plaintiffs, because the Secretary knew that the cost estimates as
published in the Final Rule were inaccurate at the time of publication, the Secretary’s
promulgation of the Final Rule was arbitrary and capricious agency action.
Defendants dispute that the Final Rule is arbitrary and capricious despite its seemingly
inaccurate cost estimate. Defendants argue the HEA does not require any cost-benefit analysis
with respect to ICR plans. Defendants assert that the only reason the Secretary conducted a costbenefit analysis was to conform to Executive Order 12,866 16 requiring an “Impact Analysis” by
the Office of Management and Budget to determine whether any regulatory action is
“significant.” 88 Fed. Reg. 43,867. Defendants contend that Executive Order 12,866 creates “no
rights enforceable by litigation plaintiffs outside the executive branch,” and is therefore not
appropriately enforceable by these Plaintiffs. Defendants further emphasize that the Secretary
had finalized the Final Rule prior to the Biden v. Nebraska decision, so the fact that the Final
Rule was published after that decision does not undermine the Secretary’s analysis. Defendants
also cite to the Secretary’s response to a comment in the Final Rule whereby the Secretary
considered and ultimately declined the commenter’s invitation to conduct an alternative costbenefit analysis to account for the possibility that the Supreme Court would ultimately find the
loan forgiveness plan under the HEROES Act unlawful.
Additionally, Defendants argue that, regardless of whether the Court agrees that the
Secretary should have conducted an alternative cost-benefit analysis, such an error by the
16
58 Fed. Reg. 51,735.
Case: 4:24-cv-00520-JAR
Doc. #: 35
Filed: 06/24/24
1073
40a
Page: 25 of 61 PageID #:
Secretary is not prejudicial. Defendants take the position that reducing the burdens of student
debt via the Final Rule was a priority of the President and the Secretary and—despite the
Supreme Court’s decision to strike down the previous loan forgiveness plan in Biden v. Nebraska
—the costs associated with that plan were known to the Secretary and were acceptable because
of its purported benefits. Defendants argue that whether the costs of the HEROES Act loan
forgiveness plan were incurred under that plan or will be incurred under the Final Rule, such
costs would not have discouraged the Secretary from promulgating the Final Rule given the
administration’s emphasis on providing borrowers with relief.
b.
Defendants’ Alleged Failure to Consider Important Aspects
of the Final Rule
Plaintiffs assert that the Final Rule is arbitrary and capricious agency action because
Defendants allegedly did not consider Plaintiffs’ reliance on state tax revenues and the PSLF
program as part of the Final Rule. Plaintiffs also argue that Defendants did not adequately
consider the inflationary effects of the Final Rule.
Defendants dispute Plaintiffs’ contention that the Secretary did not adequately consider
the reliance interests of the States or the inflationary effects of the Final Rule. Defendants point
to the Secretary’s responses to comments in the Final Rule showing that he indeed did consider
the effect the Final Rule may have on state tax revenues, the PSLF program, and inflation.
Defendants contend that these responses definitively show that the Secretary did not act
arbitrarily and capriciously by failing to consider these effects.
c.
Alleged Procedural Violations
Plaintiffs argue that the Final Rule violates the APA because it was promulgated in
violation of statutory procedures. Specifically, Plaintiffs take issue with the Secretary’s decision
to limit the notice and comment period to 30 days. Plaintiffs insist that a 30-day public comment
Case: 4:24-cv-00520-JAR
Doc. #: 35
Filed: 06/24/24
1074
41a
Page: 26 of 61 PageID #:
period was too short. Plaintiffs assert that a 60-day comment period is the minimum time for
comment for a rule of this importance.
Defendants argue that there is no specific requirement under the APA for a 60-day
comment period. In fact, Defendants argue that the APA does not include any requirement
beyond giving interested parties the opportunity to participate in the rulemaking process.
Defendants cite to Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. NRDC, 435 U.S. 519, 524 (1978) for
the contention that a reviewing court has no ability to impose additional requirements on agency
rulemaking not found in the APA. In the alternative, Defendants argue that if the Court does find
that the Secretary erred by providing only 30 days for public comments, such error was harmless
as the Secretary received over 13,600 written comments, some of which cover the issues
Plaintiffs now raise in this case and were addressed in the Final Rule.
d.
Plaintiffs’ Other Arguments
Plaintiffs make several other arguments as to why the Final Rule is arbitrary and
capricious, including that Defendants have: (1) allegedly “departed from 30 years of regulatory
practice”; (2) improperly stated the SAVE plan is a “loan” program when it is allegedly a grant
program; (3) implausibly assumed that borrowers at 100% of the FPL are statistically
indistinguishable from those at 225% of the FPL; and (4) provided for early implementation of
portions of the Final Rule without proper explanation. Plaintiffs assert that, for each of these
reasons, they are likely to succeed on the merits.
Defendants dispute Plaintiffs’ contentions on each of these issues. On each account,
Defendants refer to the Secretary’s explanations in the Final Rule itself or challenge the
adequacy of Plaintiffs’ explanations.
Case: 4:24-cv-00520-JAR
6.
Doc. #: 35
Filed: 06/24/24
1075
42a
Page: 27 of 61 PageID #:
Irreparable Harm
Plaintiffs argue that if they are not granted immediate relief, they will suffer irreparable
harm. They argue that MOHELA will suffer financial harm when (1) loans are forgiven under
the SAVE plan sooner than they would have been under previous ICR plans, or (2) borrowers
consolidate FFEL loans to take advantage of the SAVE program. North Dakota argues that,
without a TRO or preliminary injunction, the Bank—and thus North Dakota—will experience
competitive injury by having to compete with the federal government for student loan business.
Similarly, Plaintiffs assert that they will experience irreparable harm by the loss of competitive
advantage in the job market because of the alleged decreased appeal of the PSLF program and
the loss of tax revenue in those States that tie their State definition of AGI to the federal
definition.
Defendants’ arguments regarding Plaintiffs’ failure to establish irreparable harm mirror
those used to support their arguments against Plaintiffs’ standing. But Defendants additionally
argue that the timing of Plaintiffs’ Motions exhibits a lack of irreparable harm and weighs against
granting a TRO or preliminary injunction. Defendants assert that Plaintiffs’ nine-month’s delay
between the publication of the Final Rule and the filing of this lawsuit suggest that Plaintiffs
were not reasonably diligent in pursuing their case. Defendants believe this delay undermines
Plaintiffs’ claims of impending irreparable harm and alone is sufficient to deny Plaintiffs’
Motions.
Plaintiffs deny that they delayed bringing this suit and that such delay undermines their
assertion of impending irreparable harm. Plaintiffs argue that unreasonable delay can undermine
an argument for irreparable harm only when (1) the harms have already occurred, and (2) the
parties cannot be returned to the status quo. For Plaintiffs, neither is true in this case because a
Case: 4:24-cv-00520-JAR
Doc. #: 35
Filed: 06/24/24
1076
43a
Page: 28 of 61 PageID #:
vast majority of the harms they complain of will occur in the future and can therefore be rectified
by the injunctive relief they seek. 17 Plaintiffs also state that there was no unreasonable delay
here because the first time they were made aware of early implementation of the Final Rule was
in February 2024, and they filed suit 48 days later.
Plaintiffs further argue that unnecessary delay cannot be a valid argument here because
Plaintiffs, specifically the Missouri Attorney General’s Office, pursued non-litigation avenues
before bringing this case. Plaintiffs allege that in December 2023, the Missouri Attorney
General’s Office participated in the negotiated rule-making process for a different student loan
rule. According to Plaintiffs, that participation was Missouri’s attempt to pursue non-litigation
avenues to resolve this dispute. Plaintiffs admit that the Missouri Attorney General’s Office
failed to make any progress during the negotiations and eventually withdrew from the process.
7.
The Public Interest
Plaintiffs argue that the public interest heavily favors their position because they face
irreparable harm while Defendants merely face a delay in implementation. According to
Plaintiffs, “[a]n injunction will re-establish the status quo as it existed before the publication of
the Final Rule and the Department’s early implementation of various provisions.” ECF No. 10 at
49. However, Plaintiffs are asking only for a stay or injunctive relief to prevent any further loan
forgiveness and full implementation of the Final Rule. Plaintiffs also argue that borrowers
receiving loan forgiveness under the Final Rule will receive a huge windfall while the American
public will have to pay for it. Plaintiffs then state that the public interest cannot lie in keeping
17
Plaintiffs conceded at oral argument that they are seeking prospective relief and therefore
are not requesting that the Court turn back the clock to reverse any loan forgiveness that has
already occurred.
Case: 4:24-cv-00520-JAR
Doc. #: 35
Filed: 06/24/24
1077
44a
Page: 29 of 61 PageID #:
the allegedly unlawful Final Rule in place because the public has an interest in ensuring lawful
agency rulemaking.
Defendants argue that the public interest favors keeping the Final Rule in place.
Defendants assert that the public will experience several impending harms if the Final Rule were
to be put on hold, including loan defaults, delinquency, adverse effects on borrowers’ credit
scores, decreased borrower liquidity to make important purchases, decreased enrollment in
higher education, slowed national economic growth, and increased reliance on federal welfare
programs. In Defendants’ view, these harms are certain to occur if the Final Rule is put on hold,
while Plaintiffs have only presented speculative injuries. Defendants also contend that the status
quo is that portions of the Final Rule have already gone into effect and that injunctive relief at
this time would “result in chaos and uncertainty . . . .” ECF No. 22 at 55.
8.
Scope of Relief
Defendants assert that Plaintiffs’ requested relief is overbroad. Defendants suggest that,
if the Court finds that the Final Rule is unlawful, it should grant limited relief only to those
Plaintiffs that can establish standing and only as to provisions of the Final Rule that are found to
be harmful. Defendants also suggest that the provisions of the Final Rule are severable such that
the Court in its discretion can grant injunctive relief only as to the specific provisions of the rule
found to be unlawful.
Plaintiffs argue that their ultimate requested relief, i.e., vacatur of the entire rule, is
required under the APA. Plaintiffs argue that if the Court finds that Missouri has standing under
Biden v. Nebraska, then all Plaintiffs have standing and that vacatur of the final rule is the only
statutorily appropriate remedy. Plaintiffs further argue that, under the APA, if the Court finds
Case: 4:24-cv-00520-JAR
Doc. #: 35
Filed: 06/24/24
1078
45a
Page: 30 of 61 PageID #:
that the Final Rule is unlawful agency action, then it must vacate the rule in its entirety or
postpone the Final Rule’s effective date until the conclusion of this litigation.
Similarly, while Plaintiffs agree with Defendants that regulations can sometimes be
severed, Plaintiffs contend that severability is the exception and not the rule. According to
Plaintiffs, the limited severability exception is not applicable here because Defendants have
failed to show that the Secretary would have adopted the Final Rule if only the unchallenged
portions remained. Plaintiffs also contend that the remaining portions of the regulation would
not function sensibly without the provisions Plaintiffs seek to strike.
Legal Standard
A.
Motion to Dismiss
When a party challenges the Court’s subject matter jurisdiction, at issue is the Court’s
“very power to hear the case.” Osborn v. United States, 918 F.2d 724, 730 (8th Cir. 1990)
(citation omitted). The Court has substantial discretion and is “free to weigh the evidence and
satisfy itself as to the existence of its power to hear the case.” Little Otters of Love, LLC v.
Rosenberg, 724 F. App’x 498, 501 (8th Cir. 2018) (per curium) (citation omitted).
In deciding a motion under Rule 12(b)(1) regarding its jurisdiction to the hear the case,
the Court “must distinguish between a facial attack—where it looks only to the face of the
pleadings—and a factual attack—where it may consider matters outside the pleadings.” Croyle
ex rel. Croyle v. United States, 908 F.3d 377, 380 (8th Cir. 2018) (citing Osborn, 918 F.2d at 729
n.6). In either case, Plaintiffs bear the burden of proving that subject matter jurisdiction exists.
Buckler v. United States, 919 F.3d 1038, 1044 (8th Cir. 2019).
Defendants have not made clear whether they are lodging a facial or factual attack to
Plaintiffs’ standing. See ECF No. 21 and 22. But in reviewing Defendants’ arguments, and
Case: 4:24-cv-00520-JAR
Doc. #: 35
Filed: 06/24/24
1079
46a
Page: 31 of 61 PageID #:
despite the Defendants’ submission of additional exhibits for the Court’s consideration, the Court
interprets Defendants’ arguments as raising a facial challenge to Plaintiffs’ standing. Thus, the
Court must accept as true all facts alleged in Plaintiffs’ Complaint as it would on any motion to
dismiss raised under Rule 12(b)(6). Carlsen v. GameStop, Inc., 833 F.3d 903, 908 (8th Cir.
2016).
Defendants moving to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(3) generally must demonstrate that the
plaintiff’s choice of venue is improper through affidavits or other evidence. Gross & Janes Co.
v. Jeff Neill Timberland Mgmt., Inc., No. 4:15-cv-1058-JAR, 2016 WL 4665954, at *2 (E.D. Mo.
Sept. 7, 2016) (citations omitted). Plaintiffs allege that venue is proper in this Court under 28
U.S.C. §§ 1391(b)(2) and (e)(1). ECF No. 1 at ¶ 35. The general federal venue statute, in
relevant part, provides that:
(b) . . . A civil action may be brought in—
...
(2) a judicial district in which a substantial part of the events or omissions giving
rise to the claim occurred, or a substantial part of property that is the subject of the
action is situated;
...
(e)(1) . . . A civil action in which a defendant is an officer or employee of the United
States or an agency thereof acting in his official capacity or under color of legal
authority, or an agency of the United States, or the United States, may, except as
otherwise provided by law, be brought in any judicial district in which (A) a
defendant in the action resides, (B) a substantial part of the events or omissions
giving rise to the claim occurred, or a substantial part of property that is the subject
of the action is situated, or (C) the plaintiff resides if no real property is involved in
the action.
28 U.S.C. §§ 1391(b)(2) and (e)(1).
Plaintiffs allege that Defendants are agencies or officers of the United States sued in their
official capacities. Plaintiffs further allege that Plaintiff Missouri is a resident of the Eastern
Case: 4:24-cv-00520-JAR
Doc. #: 35
Filed: 06/24/24
1080
47a
Page: 32 of 61 PageID #:
District of Missouri and a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the Complaint
occurred within this district. ECF No. 1 at ¶ 35. In analyzing Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss,
the Court must determine whether Plaintiff Missouri resides within this district or whether a
substantial part of the events giving rise to this case occurred within this district. If venue is
improper, the Court may either dismiss the action or transfer it to the proper district. 28 U.S.C.
§ 1406(a).
B.
Motions for Stay or, in the alternative, for TRO or Preliminary Injunction
Plaintiffs seek a stay of the Final Rule, or, in the alternative, a TRO or a preliminary
injunction enjoining Defendants from any further implementation of the Final Rule. At this stage
in the litigation, the Court will determine whether a stay or a preliminary injunction is
appropriate.
As to the Court’s authority to issue a stay of the Final Rule, Section 705 of the APA
provides that when a plaintiff shows that a stay or preliminary injunction would be necessary to
prevent irreparable injury, the Court “may issue all necessary and appropriate process to
postpone the effective date of an agency action or to preserve status or rights pending conclusion
of the review proceedings.” 5 U.S.C. § 705. The Court’s power under section 705 to issue a stay
on agency action is limited “to the extent necessary to prevent irreparable injury . . . .” Id.; see
also Texas v. EPA, 829 F.3d 405, 435 (5th Cir. 2016).
The Court has the discretion to issue a stay and considers four factors: “(1) whether the
stay applicant has made a strong showing that he is likely to succeed on the merits; (2) whether
the applicant will be irreparably injured absent a stay; (3) whether issuance of the stay will
substantially injure the other parties interested in the proceeding; and (4) where the public
interest lies.” Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 434 (2009) (citation omitted). The mere possibility
Case: 4:24-cv-00520-JAR
Doc. #: 35
Filed: 06/24/24
1081
48a
Page: 33 of 61 PageID #:
of irreparable injury is not sufficient. Id. at 434–35 (citation omitted). When the government
opposes the stay, the final two factors merge into an assessment of the public interest. Id. at 435.
Besides its authority to issue a stay under the APA, the Court may alternatively issue a
preliminary injunction under traditional equitable principles. This Court has broad discretion
when ruling on preliminary injunctions. Lankford v. Sherman, 451 F.3d 496, 503 (8th Cir. 2006)
(citation omitted). “A preliminary injunction is an extraordinary remedy, and the burden of
establishing the propriety of an injunction is on the movant.” Ng. v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of
Minn., 64 F.4th 992, 997 (8th Cir. 2023) (quoting Turtle Island Foods, SPC v. Thompson, 992
F.3d 694, 699 (8th Cir. 2021)). Its “primary function . . . is to preserve the status quo until, upon
final hearing, a court may grant full, effective relief.” Ferry-Morse Seed Co. v. Food Corn, Inc.,
729 F.2d 589, 593 (8th Cir. 1984). “[W]hether a preliminary injunction should issue involves
consideration of (1) the threat of irreparable harm to the movant; (2) the state of balance between
this harm and the injury that granting the injunction will inflict on other parties litigant; (3) the
probability that movant will succeed on the merits; and (4) the public interest.” Dataphase Sys.,
Inc. v. C L Sys., Inc., 640 F.2d 109, 114 (8th Cir. 1981) (en banc); see also Winter v. NRDC, 555
U.S. 7, 24 (2008). These factors are essentially identical to those the Court must analyze when
considering issuing a stay. No single factor is dispositive, but the Court should afford substantial
weight to the movant’s likelihood of success on the merits. Home Instead, Inc. v. Florance, 721
F.3d 494, 497 (8th Cir. 2013).
“A movant shows a likelihood of success on the merits when it demonstrates a ‘fair
chance,’ not necessarily ‘greater than fifty percent,’ that it will ultimately prevail under
applicable law.” Cigna Corp. v. Bricker, ___ F.4th ___, 2024 WL 2839930, at *3 (8th Cir. June
5, 2024) (citing Heartland Acad. Cmty. Church v. Waddle, 335 F.3d 684, 690 (8th Cir. 2003)).
Case: 4:24-cv-00520-JAR
Doc. #: 35
Filed: 06/24/24
1082
49a
Page: 34 of 61 PageID #:
“Irreparable harm occurs when a party has no adequate remedy at law, typically because
its injuries cannot be fully compensated through an award of damages.” Gen. Motors Corp. v.
Harry Brown’s, LLC, 563 F.3d 312, 319 (8th Cir. 2009). Plaintiffs “must show more than the
mere possibility that irreparable harm will occur.” Ng, 64 F.4th at 997 (quoting Sessler v. City of
Davenport, 990 F.3d 1150, 1156 (8th Cir. 2021)). Rather, “[t]o demonstrate irreparable harm,
[the movant] must show harm that is certain and great and of such imminence that there is a clear
and present need for equitable relief.” H&R Block, Inc. v. Block, Inc., 58 F.4th 939, 951 (8th Cir.
2023) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Discussion
A.
Standing
“The law of Article III standing, which is built on separation-of-powers principles, serves
to prevent the judicial process from being used to usurp the powers of the political branches.”
Clapper v. Amnesty Int'l USA, 568 U.S. 398, 408 (2013) (citations omitted). Article III of the
Constitution limits the jurisdiction of federal court to “Cases” and “Controversies.” U.S. CONST.
art. III, § 2. “For there to be a case or controversy under Article III, the plaintiff must have a
‘personal stake’ in the case . . . .” TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, 594 U.S. 413, 423 (2021). To
establish this personal stake, plaintiffs must show: (1) they have suffered an “injury in fact” that
is concrete, particularized, and actual or imminent, (2) that there is a causal connection between
the alleged injury and the defendant’s conduct, and (3) that judicial relief will likely redress the
injury. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992). “The party invoking
federal jurisdiction bears the burden of establishing these elements.” Id. at 561. Plaintiffs,
therefore, “must support each element in the same way as any other matter on which they bear
the burden of proof.” Animal Legal Def. Fund v. Vaught, 8 F.4th 714, 718 (8th Cir. 2021) (citing
Case: 4:24-cv-00520-JAR
Doc. #: 35
Filed: 06/24/24
1083
50a
Page: 35 of 61 PageID #:
Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561) (internal quotation marks omitted). Therefore, on a motion to dismiss,
“plaintiffs must allege sufficient facts to support a reasonable inferen
This text is long and has been trimmed here. Open the source document for the complete record.
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.