Emergency Application — New York State Telecommunications Association, Inc., et al., Applicants v. Letitia A. James, Attorney General of New York
Supreme Court briefAug 2, 2024
Ask Donna
What actually matters in this document.
Text
No. 24A_____
___________
IN THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
___________
NEW YORK STATE TELECOMMUNICATIONS ASSOCIATION, INC., CTIA – THE WIRELESS
ASSOCIATION, ACA CONNECTS – AMERICA’S COMMUNICATIONS ASSOCIATION,
USTELECOM – THE BROADBAND ASSOCIATION, NTCA – THE RURAL BROADBAND
ASSOCIATION, AND SATELLITE BROADCASTING AND COMMUNICATIONS ASSOCIATION,
ON BEHALF OF THEIR RESPECTIVE MEMBERS,
Applicants,
v.
LETITIA A. JAMES, IN HER OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS ATTORNEY GENERAL OF NEW YORK,
Respondent.
___________
APPLICATION FOR AN EMERGENCY STAY OF THE JUDGMENT OF THE
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
PENDING DISPOSITION OF PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
___________
JEFFREY A. LAMKEN
MOLOLAMKEN LLP
The Watergate, Suite 500
600 New Hampshire Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20037
(202) 556-2000
Counsel for Applicant
ACA Connects – America’s
Communications Association
JARED P. MARX
HWG, LLP
1919 M Street, N.W., 8th Floor
Washington, D.C. 20036
(202) 730-1328
Counsel for Applicant
Satellite Broadcasting and
Communications Association
August 2, 2024
SCOTT H. ANGSTREICH
Counsel of Record
ALEX A. PARKINSON
ABIGAIL E. DEHART
DAREN G. ZHANG
KELLOGG, HANSEN, TODD,
FIGEL & FREDERICK, P.L.L.C.
1615 M Street, N.W., Suite 400
Washington, D.C. 20036
(202) 326-7900
(sangstreich@kellogghansen.com)
Counsel for Applicants
New York State Telecommunications
Association, Inc., CTIA – The Wireless
Association, NTCA – The Rural
Broadband Association, and USTelecom
– The Broadband Association
PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDINGS BELOW
Applicants New York State Telecommunications Association, Inc., CTIA –
The Wireless Association, ACA Connects – America’s Communications Association,
USTelecom – The Broadband Association, NTCA – The Rural Broadband Association,
and Satellite Broadcasting and Communications Association, on behalf of their
respective members, were the plaintiffs in the district court and the appellees in the
court of appeals.
Respondent Letitia A. James, in her official capacity as Attorney General of
New York, was the defendant in the district court and the appellant in the court of
appeals.
i
RULE 29.6 STATEMENTS
Pursuant to this Court’s Rule 29.6, applicants New York State
Telecommunications Association, Inc., CTIA – The Wireless Association, ACA
Connects – America’s Communications Association, USTelecom – The Broadband
Association, NTCA – The Rural Broadband Association, and Satellite Broadcasting
and Communications Association, on behalf of their respective members, state the
following:
ACA Connects – America’s Communications Association. ACA
Connects – America’s Communications Association (“ACA Connects”) states that
it has no parent corporation, and no persons, associations of persons, firms,
partnerships, limited liability companies, joint ventures, corporations, or any
similar entities have a 10 percent or greater ownership interest in ACA Connects.
CTIA – The Wireless Association. CTIA – The Wireless Association
(“CTIA”) states that it has no parent corporation, and no persons, associations
of persons, firms, partnerships, limited liability companies, joint ventures,
corporations, or any similar entities have a 10 percent or greater ownership
interest in CTIA.
New York State Telecommunications Association, Inc. New York
State Telecommunications Association, Inc. (“NYSTA”) states that it has no parent
corporation, and no persons, associations of persons, firms, partnerships, limited
liability companies, joint ventures, corporations, or any similar entities have a
10 percent or greater ownership interest in NYSTA.
ii
NTCA – The Rural Broadband Association. National Telecommunications
Cooperative Association d/b/a NTCA – The Rural Broadband Association (“NTCA”)
states that it has no parent corporation, and no persons, associations of persons,
firms, partnerships, limited liability companies, joint ventures, corporations, or
any similar entities have a 10 percent or greater ownership interest in NTCA.
Satellite Broadcasting and Communications Association. Satellite
Broadcasting and Communications Association discloses that no publicly held
corporation owns 10 percent or more of its stock.
USTelecom – The Broadband Association. USTelecom – The Broadband
Association (“USTelecom”) states that it has no parent corporation, and no persons,
associations of persons, firms, partnerships, limited liability companies, joint ventures,
corporations, or any similar entities have a 10 percent or greater ownership interest
in USTelecom.
iii
RELATED CASES
New York State Telecomms. Ass’n, Inc., et al. v. James, 544 F. Supp. 3d 269
(E.D.N.Y. June 11, 2021) (No. 2:21-cv-2389 (DRH) (AKT))
New York State Telecomms. Ass’n, Inc., et al. v. James, No. 2:21-cv-2389 (DRH)
(AKT), ECF No. 26 (E.D.N.Y. June 11, 2021) (preliminary injunction order)
New York State Telecomms. Ass’n, Inc., et al. v. James, No. 2:21-cv-2389 (DRH)
(AKT), ECF No. 34 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 10, 2021) (district court’s amended judgment)
New York State Telecomms. Ass’n, Inc., et al. v. James, 2021 WL 4472666
(2d Cir. Aug. 25, 2021) (No. 21-1603) (withdrawing initial appeal)
New York State Telecomms. Ass’n, Inc., et al. v. James, 101 F.4th 135
(2d Cir. Apr. 26, 2024) (No. 21-1975)
iv
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDINGS ............................................................................. i
RULE 29.6 STATEMENTS ........................................................................................... ii
RELATED CASES ........................................................................................................ iv
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ....................................................................................... viii
BACKGROUND ............................................................................................................. 4
I.
The Communications Act and FCC Decisions Regarding
Broadband Regulation ............................................................................. 4
II.
District Court Proceedings ....................................................................... 6
III.
Second Circuit Proceedings ...................................................................... 7
IV.
New York’s Temporary Agreement Not To Enforce the
ABA and the FCC’s Stayed 2024 Order .................................................. 9
ARGUMENT ................................................................................................................ 11
I.
THIS COURT IS LIKELY TO GRANT THE CERTIORARI
PETITION .............................................................................................. 11
A.
B.
II.
The Second Circuit’s Decision Conflicts with This
Court’s Precedents ....................................................................... 12
1.
The Second Circuit Erred in Holding That
the Communications Act’s Preempted Field
Excludes Interstate Information Services......................... 12
2.
The ABA Conflicts with the Communications
Act ...................................................................................... 16
This Case Presents Important Questions of Federal
Law with Profound Implications for the Future of
Broadband and Other Interstate Information
Services ........................................................................................ 18
APPLICANTS ARE LIKELY TO SUCCEED ON THE
MERITS .................................................................................................. 20
v
III.
IV.
APPLICANTS’ MEMBERS FACE IRREPARABLE
HARMS, AND THE BALANCE OF THE EQUITIES
FAVORS A STAY ................................................................................... 21
A.
The ABA Will Subject Applicants’ Members to
Immediate and Irreparable Harm .............................................. 21
B.
The Equities and the Public Interest Favor a Stay ................... 25
ALTERNATIVELY, THIS COURT SHOULD GRANT AN
INJUNCTION BARRING THE NEW YORK ATTORNEY
GENERAL FROM ENFORCING THE ABA PENDING
DISPOSITION OF APPLICANTS’ CERTIORARI
PETITION .............................................................................................. 28
CONCLUSION............................................................................................................. 29
APPENDIX:
Memorandum and Order of the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of New York, New York State Telecomms. Ass’n, Inc.,
et al. v. James, 544 F. Supp. 3d 269 (June 11, 2021) ............................................. Ex. 1
Preliminary Injunction Order of the United States District Court for
the Eastern District of New York, New York State Telecomms. Ass’n,
Inc., et al. v. James, No. 2:21-cv-2389 (DRH) (AKT), ECF No. 26
(June 11, 2021) ......................................................................................................... Ex. 2
Amended Judgment of the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of New York, New York State Telecomms. Ass’n, Inc., et al. v.
James, No. 2:21-cv-2389 (DRH) (AKT), ECF No. 34 (Aug. 10, 2021) .................... Ex. 3
Stipulated Final Judgment of the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of New York, New York State Telecomms. Ass’n, Inc.,
et al. v. James, No. 2:21-cv-2389 (DRH) (AKT), ECF No. 31 (July 28,
2021) ......................................................................................................................... Ex. 4
Stipulation Regarding Agreement Not To Enforce N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law
§ 399-zzzzz, New York State Telecomms. Ass’n, Inc., et al. v. James,
No. 2:21-cv-2389-GRB-AKT (June 11, 2024) .......................................................... Ex. 5
Order of the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit,
In re: MCP No. 185 Open Internet Rule (FCC 24-52), No. 24-7000,
Dkt. No. 71-2 (Aug. 1, 2024) (per curiam) .............................................................. Ex. 6
vi
Opinion of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit,
New York State Telecomms. Ass’n, Inc., et al. v. James, 101 F.4th 135
(Apr. 26, 2024).......................................................................................................... Ex. 7
Order of the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit,
In re: MCP No. 185 Open Internet Rule (FCC 24-52), No. 24-7000,
Dkt. No. 67-2 (July 12, 2024)................................................................................... Ex. 8
Declarations in Support of Plaintiffs’ Motion for Preliminary Injunction,
New York State Telecomms. Ass’n, Inc., et al. v. James, No. 2:21-cv2389 (DRH) (AKT), ECF Nos. 16-1–16-6 (E.D.N.Y. May 6, 2021) ......................... Ex. 9
Declaration of Wade Northrup in Support of Application for an
Emergency Stay of the Judgment of the United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit Pending Disposition of Petition
for a Writ of Certiorari (dated July 31, 2024) ....................................................... Ex. 10
Declaration of Glen Faulkner in Support of Application for an Emergency
Stay of the Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit Pending Disposition of Petition for a Writ of Certiorari
(dated Aug. 1, 2024) ............................................................................................... Ex. 11
Declaration of Jason Miller in Support of Application for an Emergency
Stay of the Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit Pending Disposition of Petition for a Writ of Certiorari
(dated July 18, 2024) ............................................................................................. Ex. 12
Declaration of Matthew Kramer Coakley in Support of Application for
an Emergency Stay of the Judgment of the United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit Pending Disposition of Petition for a
Writ of Certiorari (dated Aug. 2, 2024) ................................................................. Ex. 13
Declaration of Angela Wilkin in Support of Application for an Emergency
Stay of the Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit Pending Disposition of Petition for a Writ of Certiorari (dated July
29, 2024) ................................................................................................................. Ex. 14
vii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Page
CASES
AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utils. Bd., 525 U.S. 366 (1999).................................................. 18
Bank One v. Guttau, 190 F.3d 844 (8th Cir. 1999) ..................................................... 25
Barnes v. E-Sys., Inc. Grp. Hosp. Med. & Surgical Ins. Plan,
501 U.S. 1301 (1991) ........................................................................................... 3
Hollingsworth v. Perry, 558 U.S. 183 (2010) .............................................................. 21
Hughes v. Talen Energy Mktg., LLC, 578 U.S. 150 (2016)......................................... 14
Ivy Broad. Co. v. AT&T Co., 391 F.2d 486 (2d Cir. 1968) .......................................... 14
Jacobson & Co. v. Armstrong Cork Co., 548 F.2d 438 (2d Cir. 1977) ........................ 24
Labrador v. Poe ex rel. Poe, 144 S. Ct. 921 (2024) ...................................................... 28
Louisiana Pub. Serv. Comm’n v. FCC, 476 U.S. 355 (1986) ....................... 4, 12, 14-15
MCP No. 185 Open Internet Rule (FCC 24-52), In re, No. 24-7000
(6th Cir.):
Dkt. No. 67-2 (July 12, 2024) ............................................................................ 10
Dkt. No. 71-2 (Aug. 1, 2024) ................................................................. 3-4, 10-12
Merrill v. Milligan, 142 S. Ct. 879 (2022) ............................................................. 11, 20
Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 504 U.S. 374 (1992) ....................................... 21
Mozilla Corp. v. FCC, 940 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2019) ......................................... 5-6, 16-17
National Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs.,
545 U.S. 967 (2005) ....................................................................................... 4, 16
NCAA v. Board of Regents of Univ. of Oklahoma, 463 U.S. 1311 (1983) .................... 3
Nemer Jeep-Eagle, Inc. v. Jeep-Eagle Sales Corp., 992 F.2d 430
(2d Cir. 1993) ..................................................................................................... 22
New York Progress & Prot. PAC v. Walsh, 733 F.3d 483 (2d Cir. 2013) ................... 25
Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418 (2009) ........................................................................... 21
viii
Northwest Cent. Pipeline Corp. v. State Corp. Comm’n, 489 U.S. 493
(1989) ................................................................................................................. 17
Odebrecht Constr., Inc. v. Secretary, Florida Dep’t of Transp.,
715 F.3d 1268 (11th Cir. 2013) ......................................................................... 23
Postal Tel.-Cable Co. v. Warren-Godwin Lumber Co., 251 U.S. 27
(1919) ................................................................................................................. 14
Roche, In re, 448 U.S. 1312 (1980) .............................................................................. 20
Rogers Grp., Inc. v. City of Fayetteville, 629 F.3d 784 (8th Cir. 2010) ...................... 24
Roman Cath. Diocese of Brooklyn v. Cuomo, 592 U.S. 14 (2020)........................... 4, 28
Schneidewind v. ANR Pipeline Co., 485 U.S. 293 (1988) ...................................... 14-15
Smith v. City of Jackson, 544 U.S. 228 (2005)............................................................ 15
Spectrum Northeast, LLC v. Frey, 22 F.4th 287 (1st Cir. 2022),
cert. denied, 143 S. Ct. 562 (2023) .................................................................... 15
Tandon v. Newsom, 593 U.S. 61 (2021) ...................................................................... 28
Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Corp. v. State Oil & Gas Bd. of
Mississippi, 474 U.S. 409 (1986) ...................................................................... 17
United States v. Alabama, 691 F.3d 1269 (11th Cir. 2012) ....................................... 25
Verizon v. FCC, 740 F.3d 623 (D.C. Cir. 2014) ....................................................... 4, 16
Western Union Tel. Co. v. Boegli, 251 U.S. 315 (1920) ............................................... 14
ADMINISTRATIVE DECISIONS
Declaratory Ruling, Order, Report and Order, and Order on Reconsideration,
Safeguarding and Securing the Open Internet, WC Docket Nos. 23-230
& 17-108, FCC 24-52 (rel. May 7, 2024), https://bit.ly/4aexF00 ....... 9-11, 18-19
Declaratory Ruling, Report and Order, and Order, Restoring Internet
Freedom, 33 FCC Rcd 311 (2018) ........................................................ 5-6, 16, 18
Report and Order on Remand, Declaratory Ruling, and Order,
Protecting and Promoting the Open Internet, 30 FCC Rcd 5601
(2015) ................................................................................................................... 5
ix
CONSTITUTION, STATUTES, AND RULES
U.S. Const. amend. XI ............................................................................................ 22-23
All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651 ............................................................................... 1, 28
28 U.S.C. § 1651(a)........................................................................................ 1, 28
Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. § 151 et seq. .................... 1-4, 8, 11-16, 19-20
47 U.S.C. § 152 ............................................................................................. 13-14
47 U.S.C. § 152(a).............................................................................................. 13
47 U.S.C. § 152(b).............................................................................................. 13
47 U.S.C. § 153(24)............................................................................................ 19
47 U.S.C. § 153(51)............................................................................................ 16
47 U.S.C. § 160 .......................................................................................... 5, 9, 13
47 U.S.C. §§ 201-203 ....................................................................................... 5, 8
47 U.S.C. § 201(b).............................................................................................. 13
47 U.S.C. §§ 203-205 ......................................................................................... 13
47 U.S.C. § 1702 ................................................................................................ 25
47 U.S.C. § 1702(h)(4)(B) .................................................................................. 25
47 U.S.C. § 1702(h)(5)(D) .................................................................................. 25
Federal Power Act, 16 U.S.C. § 791a et seq. ......................................................... 14-15
Mann-Elkins Act, ch. 309, 36 Stat. 539 (1910) ..................................................... 14, 20
Natural Gas Act, 15 U.S.C. § 717 et seq. ......................................................... 14-15, 17
Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 ............ 13, 18, 21
28 U.S.C. § 2112 ........................................................................................................... 10
Affordable Broadband Act, N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 399-zzzzz ................ 6-10, 12, 15-16,
18, 20-25, 28-29
§ 399-zzzzz(1) ................................................................................................ 6, 12
x
§ 399-zzzzz(2)-(4) ................................................................................................. 6
§ 399-zzzzz(5) .................................................................................................... 23
§ 399-zzzzz(7) .................................................................................................... 24
§ 399-zzzzz(10) .............................................................................................. 6, 28
Sup. Ct. R. 23 ................................................................................................................. 1
OTHER MATERIALS
Governor Hochul Unveils $50 Million ConnectALL Digital Equity
Plan to Close New York’s Digital Divide (Apr. 5, 2024),
https://on.ny.gov/4aWF0By ............................................................................... 26
New York Initial Proposal, Volume II: Broadband Equity, Access,
and Deployment (BEAD) Program (Dec. 2023),
https://on.ny.gov/46sHw20 ................................................................................ 26
New York State Digital Equity Plan (June 2024), https://on.ny.gov/3RkZ7CG ........ 26
Press Release, FCC, FCC Brings Affordable Connectivity Program to a
Close (May 31, 2024), https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/
DOC-402930A1.pdf ........................................................................................... 26
State Level Data, appended to Public Notice, The Office of Economics
and Analytics and the Wireline Competition Bureau Announce
Publication of Affordable Connectivity Program Transparency
Data Collection Summary, WC Docket No. 21-450, DA 24-504
(rel. May 30, 2024), https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/DOC402907A1.pdf..................................................................................................... 27
USTelecom, 2023 Broadband Pricing Index (Oct. 2023),
https://bit.ly/3Kz36YC ................................................................................. 19, 27
White House Fact Sheet: President Biden Highlights Commitments
to Customers by Internet Service Providers to Offer Affordable
High-Speed Internet Plans, Calls on Congress to Restore
Funding for Affordable Connectivity Program (May 31, 2024),
https://bit.ly/4cbXi2W........................................................................................ 27
xi
APPLICATION FOR AN EMERGENCY STAY OF THE JUDGMENT OF THE
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
PENDING DISPOSITION OF PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
___________
To the Honorable Sonia Sotomayor, Associate Justice of the United States
Supreme Court and Circuit Justice for the Second Circuit:
Pursuant to Rule 23 of the Rules of this Court and the All Writs Act,
28 U.S.C. § 1651, applicants respectfully apply for a stay of the judgment of the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit pending resolution of applicants’
forthcoming petition for a writ of certiorari.1 That petition will seek review of a
divided panel decision that presents fundamental questions about whether the
Communications Act of 1934 preempts States from regulating rates for broadband
internet access service and other interstate information services. In the alternative,
applicants request an injunction preventing the New York Attorney General from
enforcing New York’s broadband rate regulation law, which the State has never
enforced, until this Court acts. Applicants request that the Court rule on this
application by August 15, 2024 — the day before New York may begin regulating
broadband rates — and that the Court issue an administrative stay, if necessary
to provide the Court sufficient time to rule on this application.
Applicants are trade associations with members that provide broadband
internet access service (“broadband” or “BIAS”) to customers in New York. They
seek review of the Second Circuit’s ruling dissolving a district court injunction and
1 While that petition is due on September 23, 2024, see Docket No. 24A40
(granting extension), applicants intend to file that petition no later than August 12,
2024.
allowing New York to set a maximum price for consumer broadband, an interstate
information service under federal law. The Second Circuit’s decision that the
Communications Act does not preempt state rate regulation of broadband because it
is an interstate information service would open the door to a wave of unprecedented
state rate regulation. Streaming video and music, cloud storage, email and
messaging, and video-conferencing services are all also interstate information
services under the Communications Act. If federal law does not preempt state
rate regulation of broadband, it also does not preempt state rate regulation of
those other services.
This Court should grant a limited-duration stay pending resolution of
applicants’ forthcoming certiorari petition, to preserve the status quo that has
prevailed since 2021 — first through a preliminary injunction, see New York State
Telecomms. Ass’n, Inc. v. James, 544 F. Supp. 3d 269 (E.D.N.Y. 2021) (“NYSTA I ”)
(attached hereto as Ex. 1); see also Exs. 2 (preliminary injunction order), 3 (amended
judgment), then through New York’s agreement to the entry of an appealable
permanent injunction, see Ex. 4, and then through the New York Attorney General’s
temporary agreement not to enforce the New York rate-regulation law despite the
Second Circuit’s ruling, see Ex. 5.
That temporary agreement expires on August 15, 2024. See id. Absent
this Court’s intervention, on August 16, 2024, New York would become the first
government — federal, state, or local — to regulate the retail rates that broadband
providers (including applicants’ members) may charge.
2
This Court is likely to grant certiorari to review the Second Circuit’s decision
and to reverse it. The Second Circuit held that Title I of the Communications Act —
which still governs broadband because the Sixth Circuit yesterday unanimously
stayed the Federal Communications Commission (“FCC”) order reclassifying
broadband as a Title II service2 — does not preempt New York from regulating
broadband rates. See New York State Telecomms. Ass’n, Inc. v. James, 101 F.4th
135 (2d Cir. 2024) (“NYSTA II ”) (attached hereto as Ex. 7). As the district court
found in 2021 and New York did not challenge on appeal, enforcing New York’s $15
broadband rate regulation would cause applicants’ members immediate, irreparable
harm. Applicants’ members’ additional declarations confirm that the irreparable
harms would occur today. In contrast, continuing to preserve the status quo would
not harm the public interest.
The Court should therefore stay the Second Circuit’s judgment, temporarily
reinstating the district court’s preliminary injunction while this Court reviews
applicants’ forthcoming certiorari petition. See, e.g., Barnes v. E-Sys., Inc. Grp.
Hosp. Med. & Surgical Ins. Plan, 501 U.S. 1301, 1302 (1991) (Scalia, J., in chambers)
(staying Fifth Circuit judgments regarding preemption pending review of petition
for certiorari); NCAA v. Board of Regents of Univ. of Oklahoma, 463 U.S. 1311,
1311 (1983) (White, J., in chambers) (granting stay of Tenth Circuit’s judgments
“pending the timely filing and disposition of a petition for writ of certiorari”). In
the alternative, this Court should issue an injunction pending disposition of the
2 See Order, In re: MCP No. 185 Open Internet Rule (FCC 24-52), No. 24-7000,
Dkt. No. 71-2 (6th Cir. Aug. 1, 2024) (per curiam) (attached hereto as Ex. 6).
3
certiorari petition that would have the same effect. See Roman Cath. Diocese of
Brooklyn v. Cuomo, 592 U.S. 14, 15 (2020) (per curiam) (granting injunction of
New York law pending review of petition for certiorari).
BACKGROUND
I.
The Communications Act and FCC Decisions Regarding Broadband
Regulation
In the Communications Act, Congress “divide[d] the world . . . into two
hemispheres — one comprised of interstate service, over which the FCC would have
plenary authority, and the other made up of intrastate service.” Louisiana Pub.
Serv. Comm’n v. FCC, 476 U.S. 355, 360 (1986) (emphasis added). While, “in
practice,” “actions taken by federal and state regulators within their respective
domains” can “affect” the “other ‘hemisphere,’ ” id. (emphasis added), federal law
preempts state laws regulating intrastate services where it is “not possible” for
separate intrastate and interstate regimes to co-exist, id. at 375-76 & n.4 (emphasis
omitted).
Historically, the FCC concluded that broadband is an interstate information
service subject to Title I of the Communications Act,3 making broadband
“statutorily exempt from common carrier treatment” under Title II of that Act
(including ex ante rate regulation). Verizon v. FCC, 740 F.3d 623, 654 (D.C.
Cir. 2014); see also Ex. 6, at 3-4 (recounting this history).
3 See National Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S.
967, 977-78 (2005) (upholding that classification).
4
In 2015, however, the FCC for the first time classified broadband as a
telecommunications service subject to common-carrier regulation under Title II.4
But even though Title II includes rate regulation and tariff filing among its
provisions, see 47 U.S.C. §§ 201-203, the FCC used its statutory forbearance
authority, see id. § 160, to prevent those “ex ante rate regulation” provisions from
applying, finding rate regulation not in the public interest. 2015 Order ¶¶ 441,
443, 449.
In 2018, the FCC returned to its pre-2015 approach, classifying broadband as
an interstate information service immune from all Title II regulation, including rate
regulation.5 The FCC noted that the threat of future rate regulation under the 2015
Order — notwithstanding forbearance — risked undermining “investments in
broadband infrastructure,” contrary to federal policy. 2018 Order ¶ 101. To protect
its decision from any possibility of state-level undermining, the FCC adopted a
“Preemption Directive,” which preempted all state regulation of broadband: even
purely intrastate regulations that did not conflict with the federal regime. See id.
¶¶ 194-204.
The D.C. Circuit upheld the FCC’s classification of broadband as a Title I
information service. See Mozilla Corp. v. FCC, 940 F.3d 1, 26, 72-73 (D.C. Cir.
2019) (per curiam). However, a 2-1 majority vacated the Preemption Directive,
4 See Report and Order on Remand, Declaratory Ruling, and Order, Protecting
and Promoting the Open Internet, 30 FCC Rcd 5601, ¶ 47 (2015) (“2015 Order”).
5 See Declaratory Ruling, Report and Order, and Order, Restoring Internet
Freedom, 33 FCC Rcd 311, ¶¶ 2, 18, 65 (2018) (“2018 Order”).
5
holding that, under Title I, the FCC lacked statutory authority “to wipe out a
broader array of state and local laws than traditional conflict preemption principles
would allow.” Id. at 74. But the majority denigrated as a “straw man” and
“confuse[d],” id. at 85, the dissenting judge’s contention that this meant that “each
of the 50 states is free to impose” the “heavy hand of Title II for the Internet,” id. at
95 (Williams, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Instead, the Mozilla
majority clarified that, where “a state practice actually undermines” the Title I
regime to which the 2018 Order returned broadband, “conflict preemption” would
apply. Id. at 85.
II.
District Court Proceedings
In 2021, New York enacted the so-called “Affordable Broadband Act” (“ABA”),
N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 399-zzzzz, a first-of-its-kind broadband rate regulation.
The ABA requires all broadband providers to sell broadband (other than mobile
broadband) to qualifying low-income households at a cost to consumers of no more
than $15 per month (for download speeds of at least 25 Mbps) or no more than
$20 per month (for download speeds of at least 200 Mbps). See id. § 399-zzzzz(2)(4). The law defines the “broadband service” it regulates as “a mass-market retail
service that provides the capability to transmit data to and receive data from all
or substantially all internet endpoints,” id. § 399-zzzzz(1) — mirroring the FCC’s
long-standing definition of broadband internet access service, see 2018 Order ¶ 21.
The ABA authorizes the Attorney General to enforce it, including by seeking a
$1,000-per-violation civil penalty. See N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 399-zzzzz(10).
6
Applicants filed a complaint and sought a preliminary and permanent
injunction barring the ABA’s enforcement. The district court issued an order
preliminarily enjoining the ABA before it took effect. The court found the rate
regulation would irreparably harm applicants’ members, see NYSTA I, 544 F. Supp.
3d at 276-79, and that applicants had established a likelihood of success on the
merits, under both field and conflict preemption, see id. at 279-88. The court also
found it “clear” that “the ABA is rate regulation” of an interstate service, id. at 282,
rejecting New York’s arguments that the ABA is an “intrastate affordable-pricing
scheme,” id. at 284.
New York soon thereafter stipulated to a permanent injunction — which the
district court entered — and then appealed the final judgment while dismissing its
earlier appeal of the preliminary injunction. See Ex. 4.
III.
Second Circuit Proceedings
On April 26, 2024, a divided panel of the Second Circuit reversed the district
court in a 2-1 decision that would vacate the permanent injunction.
The Second Circuit majority (Judges Nathan and Merriam) first found the
court had jurisdiction to consider New York’s appeal. See NYSTA II, 101 F.4th at
146-47.6 Turning to the merits, the majority agreed with the district court that,
“[a]s a threshold matter,” the ABA regulates the rates “of interstate
6 Applicants agreed to the Attorney General’s proposal to convert the
preliminary injunction into a stipulated final judgment imposing a permanent
injunction. Applicants understood that the Attorney General was not relinquishing
her right to appeal that permanent injunction.
7
communications services.” Id. at 148 n.10. The majority rejected New York’s
argument that the ABA was a “purely intrastate affordable-pricing scheme.” Id.
Yet the majority concluded that Congress had not occupied the field with
respect to interstate information services. See id. at 147-54. The Second Circuit
majority recognized that the Communications Act’s “comprehensive” regulation
of common carriers in Title II is field preemptive. Id. at 153 (citing 47 U.S.C.
§§ 201-203). However, the majority wrongly concluded that the absence of similar
provisions in Title I for interstate information services left the field open for States
to regulate the rates of such services. See id. at 152-53.7
The majority also found that conflict preemption did not bar enforcement of
the ABA. The majority noted that, when broadband is a Title I service, it is outside
the FCC’s authority over Title II services, including the authority to impose or
forbear from rate regulation. See id. at 155. It then concluded that, because Title I
does not give the FCC rate-setting authority over interstate information services,
any state rate setting for such services could not conflict with federal law. See id.
at 156-57.
Judge Sullivan dissented as to both appellate jurisdiction, see id. at 158-66,
and the merits, see id. at 166-68. As to the latter, Judge Sullivan would have found
the ABA field preempted by the Communications Act, which “grants the FCC
7 The majority was incorrect to state that applicants “abandoned” the breadth
of their field preemption argument on appeal. NYSTA I, 101 F.4th at 148. Rather,
applicants argued on appeal that, because rate regulation is at the core of the
preempted field, the Second Circuit did not need to define the outer limits of that
field, such as whether general state laws applicable to all contracts can apply to
contracts for interstate information services.
8
authority over ‘all interstate’ communication services — save for a limited set of
state-law prohibitions — while leaving to the states the power to regulate intrastate
communications.” Id. at 167. Judge Sullivan also would have found the ABA
conflict preempted, rejecting New York’s suggestion “that because the FCC
currently lacks power to regulate broadband rates, it cannot prevent states from
regulating those rates either.” Id. at 168.
IV.
New York’s Temporary Agreement Not To Enforce the ABA and the
FCC’s Stayed 2024 Order
Notwithstanding the Second Circuit’s decision, the New York Attorney
General entered into an agreement with applicants to preserve the status quo by
temporarily not enforcing the ABA. See Ex. 5.8 New York did so because, shortly
after the Second Circuit ruled, the FCC released its 2024 Order,9 in which the
FCC reverted to its 2015 claim to have authority to regulate broadband as a Title II
telecommunications service. See 2024 Order ¶¶ 2, 188-189. In the 2024 Order,
however, the FCC adhered to its long-standing conclusion that ex ante rate
regulation of broadband is not in the public interest. See id. ¶ 386. The FCC relied
on 47 U.S.C. § 160 to forbear from “all Title II provisions that could be used to
impose ex ante or ex post rate regulation on [broadband] providers.” Id. ¶ 389.
8 In exchange for that agreement, applicants did not seek further relief from
the Second Circuit. See Ex. 5, at 3. But applicants expressly reserved their right
to petition for certiorari and for “relief pending resolution of such a petition for
certiorari from the United States Supreme Court.” Id.
9 See Declaratory Ruling, Order, Report and Order, and Order on
Reconsideration, Safeguarding and Securing the Open Internet, WC Docket Nos.
23-230 & 17-108, FCC 24-52 (rel. May 7, 2024) (“2024 Order”), https://bit.ly/4aexF00.
9
Several trade associations with internet service provider members, including
some of the applicants here, filed petitions for review of the 2024 Order and also
moved for a stay pending resolution of those petitions.10 On August 1, 2024, the
Sixth Circuit granted a motion to stay the 2024 Order pending the resolution of
challenges to that order. See Ex. 6. In granting the stay, the Sixth Circuit found
that the petitioners were likely to succeed on the merits of their challenge to the
2024 Order — that is, that broadband is likely to remain a Title I information
service permanently. See id. at 5-7; see also id. at 9-13 (Sutton, C.J., concurring)
(identifying an “additional reason” why the petitioners are likely to succeed on the
merits). It also found that the members would suffer irreparable harm from being
subjected to a common-carrier regime while the litigation was pending. See id. at 7.
The Sixth Circuit set an accelerated briefing schedule and will hear oral argument
on review of the 2024 Order during the week of October 28, 2024 sitting. See id. at 9.
New York’s agreement not to enforce the ABA expires 14 days after entry
of the stay pending appeal. See Ex. 5, at 3. Accordingly, absent this Court’s
intervention, the New York Attorney General may begin enforcing the ABA against
applicants’ members on August 16, 2024.
10 Pursuant to the process in 28 U.S.C. § 2112, those petitions for review were
consolidated in the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit. In re: MCP
No. 185 Open Internet Rule (FCC 24-52), No. 24-7000 (6th Cir.). On July 12, 2024,
the Sixth Circuit administratively stayed the 2024 Order. See Order, In re: MCP No.
185 Open Internet Rule (FCC 24-52), No. 24-7000 (July 12, 2024) (attached hereto as
Ex. 8).
10
ARGUMENT
An applicant for a stay of judgment pending a petition for a writ of certiorari
must establish (1) “a reasonable probability that this Court would eventually grant
review,” (2) “a fair prospect that the Court would reverse,” and (3) “that the applicant
would likely suffer irreparable harm absent the stay” and “the equities” otherwise
support relief. Merrill v. Milligan, 142 S. Ct. 879, 880 (2022) (Kavanaugh, J.,
concurring). Applicants satisfy each of those requirements. The Court should grant
interim relief to preserve the status quo — just as the Sixth Circuit did in staying
the 2024 Order, see Ex. 6 — until this Court resolves applicants’ certiorari petition.
I.
THIS COURT IS LIKELY TO GRANT THE CERTIORARI PETITION
Certiorari is warranted because whether States can set prices for interstate
information services — including, but not limited to, broadband — is a question of
exceptional national importance. This Court will likely grant certiorari because the
Second Circuit’s 2-1 decision that New York has such rate-setting authority threatens
to spark a nationwide, state-by-state race to dictate the price of broadband. And
that race is unlikely to stop there. On the Second Circuit majority’s reasoning, the
Communications Act also poses no barrier to state rate setting for ad-supported and
paid internet services including video and music streaming and cloud storage, as
well as email and messaging — all interstate information services under federal
law. See 2024 Order ¶ 131.
In light of the vast legal and practical significance of this question, there is
more than a reasonable likelihood that this Court will grant certiorari to confirm
that the federal Communications Act — not a patchwork of state laws — governs
11
the regulation of broadband and other interstate information services. The Sixth
Circuit has already concluded that challenges to the FCC’s recent order subjecting
broadband to common-carrier regulation are likely to succeed on the merits. See
Ex. 6, at 5-7; see also id. at 9-13 (Sutton, C.J., concurring). If the Second Circuit’s
decision were allowed to stand, States in that circuit — and in the Ninth Circuit,
which reached a similar decision — would be free to engage in the very commoncarrier regulation that the Communications Act forbids.
A.
The Second Circuit’s Decision Conflicts with This Court’s
Precedents
1.
The Second Circuit Erred in Holding That the Communications
Act’s Preempted Field Excludes Interstate Information Services
The Second Circuit was correct to reject, unanimously, New York’s effort to
deem the ABA the type of intrastate regulation with limited spillover into the
interstate sphere that the Communications Act permits States to enact. See
Louisiana Pub. Serv. Comm’n v. FCC, 476 U.S. 355, 375-76 & n.4 (1986). All
three judges, like the district court, found that the ABA is a direct “regulation
of interstate communications services.” NYSTA II, 101 F.4th at 148 n.10; see
id. at 166 (Sullivan, J., dissenting); NYSTA I, 544 F. Supp. 3d at 282, 284.
This conclusion was inescapable because the ABA defines broadband as a service
that “provides the capability to transmit data to and receive data from all or
substantially all internet endpoints,” which are located around the country
(and around the world). N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 399-zzzzz(1).
However, the Second Circuit majority wrongly concluded that the
Communications Act is field preemptive only as to Title II services. See NYSTA II,
12
101 F.4th at 150-51. For Title II services, Congress dictated a public-utility rate
regime, with carriers filing rates in tariffs and the FCC authorized to assess whether
those rates are unjust and unreasonable and, if so, to dictate rates to be charged
going forward. See 47 U.S.C. §§ 201(b), 203-205. In the Telecommunications Act
of 1996, Congress also directed the FCC to exempt Title II services from those
statutory provisions when it is not in the public interest to enforce them. See
id. § 160.
Title I lacks the same public-utility rate regime. But that is not because
Congress wanted each State to be free to decide whether to regulate interstate
information services as public utilities. Instead, as Judge Sullivan explained, it is
because the Communications Act gives the FCC “exclusive authority over interstate
communications” and has left to the States only “the power to regulate intrastate
communications.” NYSTA II, 101 F.4th at 167 (Sullivan, J., dissenting). The fact
that Title I does not authorize rate regulation of interstate information services
means that such rate regulation is ruled out — not that States are free to regulate
in the Commission’s stead.
Congress divided the field of communications into separate interstate and
intrastate spheres in Section 152: granting the FCC exclusive jurisdiction over “all
interstate . . . communication by wire or radio,” 47 U.S.C. § 152(a), while denying
the FCC “jurisdiction with respect to . . . intrastate communication service,” id.
§ 152(b). As Judge Sullivan explained, Section 152 thus “prescribes that the FCC
has exclusive authority over interstate communications.” NYSTA II, 101 F.4th at
167 (Sullivan, J., dissenting). This Court reads Section 152 the same way, finding
13
that it “divide[s] the world . . . into two hemispheres — one comprised of interstate
service, over which the FCC would have plenary authority, and the other made up
of intrastate service, over which the States would retain exclusive jurisdiction.”
Louisiana Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 476 U.S. at 360 (emphasis added).
Congress copied Section 152 into the 1935 Federal Water Power Act (now
known as the Federal Power Act (“FPA”)) and the 1938 Natural Gas Act (“NGA”).
Consistent with Louisiana Public Service Commission, this Court has repeatedly
read that borrowed statutory language to be field preemptive. See, e.g., Hughes v.
Talen Energy Mktg., LLC, 578 U.S. 150, 154, 163 (2016) (finding that the FPA
“occup[ies] an entire field of regulation” and gives the relevant agency the “exclusive
authority to regulate ‘the sale of electric energy at wholesale in interstate commerce’ ”)
(citation omitted); Schneidewind v. ANR Pipeline Co., 485 U.S. 293, 300-01 (1988)
(holding that the NGA gives the relevant agency “exclusive jurisdiction over the
transportation and sale of natural gas in interstate commerce”). The language in
Section 152 — mirrored in the FPA and the NGA — is how the 1930s Congress
stated its intent to occupy the field and preclude state regulation of interstate
services.11
11 Further confirmation comes from the fact that the federal Communications
Act continues the 1910 Mann-Elkins Act, which this Court twice held to preempt
the field as to interstate telegraph service. See Postal Tel.-Cable Co. v. WarrenGodwin Lumber Co., 251 U.S. 27, 30 (1919); Western Union Tel. Co. v. Boegli, 251
U.S. 315, 316-17 (1920). Congress consolidated the Mann-Elkins Act, along with
other statutes, into the Communications Act, carrying forward the existing field
preemption. See Ivy Broad. Co. v. AT&T Co., 391 F.2d 486, 490-91 (2d Cir. 1968).
14
The Second Circuit majority erred when it concluded that field preemption
does not apply to Title I services. It correctly found that the ABA regulates directly
in the interstate sphere. See NYSTA II, 101 F.4th at 148 n.10. Therefore, the
majority erred in treating the ABA as though it were a non-preempted state action
regulating only within the intrastate sphere with limited effects that cross over
that boundary. See id. at 150 (citing Louisiana Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 476 U.S. at
375). The Second Circuit was also wrong to brush aside the similarities in the
Communications Act, the FPA, and the NGA. This Court already rejected the
majority’s view that the Communications Act language copied into the FPA and
the NGA is field preemptive only because this Court’s pre-FPA and NGA cases held
that the dormant Commerce Clause prevented state rate regulation of interstate
gas and electricity sales. See Schneidewind, 485 U.S. at 304-05; NYSTA II, 101
F.4th at 151. Instead, the proper conclusion from Congress’s decision to copy
the Communications Act language into the FPA and the NGA is “that Congress
intended that text to have the same meaning in [all three] statutes.” Smith v.
City of Jackson, 544 U.S. 228, 233 (2005) (plurality).12
12 The majority also incorrectly found that early instances of state regulation
of cable television rates, while cable was a Title I service, meant that Congress did
not preempt that field. As Judge Sullivan noted in dissent, this history is “scant”
and consists of one “article noting that eleven states oversaw rate regulation of
cable during the 1970s,” which is far from a “meaningful tradition.” NYSTA II,
101 F.4th at 167 n.5 (Sullivan, J., dissenting). In fact, the history of cable regulation
teaches the opposite lesson — States have lawfully regulated cable rates only where
federal law expressly authorized such regulation. See Spectrum Northeast, LLC v.
Frey, 22 F.4th 287, 294-96 (1st Cir. 2022), cert. denied, 143 S. Ct. 562 (2023).
15
2.
The ABA Conflicts with the Communications Act
Telecommunications carriers may be “treated as a common carrier under
[the Communications Act] only to the extent that [they are] engaged in providing
telecommunications services.” 47 U.S.C. § 153(51) (emphasis added); see National
Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 975 (2005)
(“The Act regulates telecommunications carriers, but not information-service
providers, as common carriers.”); Verizon v. FCC, 740 F.3d 623, 654 (D.C. Cir. 2014)
(same). The FCC correctly concluded in the 2018 Order that broadband is an
information service under the Communications Act, see 2018 Order ¶ 2, so it cannot
regulate broadband as a public-utility, common-carrier service. New York’s law
conflicts with Congress’s determination that interstate information services are
exempt from common-carrier regulation.
The Second Circuit majority erroneously concluded that the prohibition on
common-carrier regulation bars only the FCC from such regulation, while every
State may impose rate regulation and whatever other common-carrier rules it likes
onto broadband. See NYSTA II, 101 F.4th at 157-58. The majority thought it
necessary for broadband to be a Title II service and for the FCC to forbear from the
Communications Act’s rate regulation provisions for conflict preemption to prevent
broadband rate regulation at the state level. See id. at 154-55.13 Although Title II
13 In this way, the Second Circuit read the D.C. Circuit’s Mozilla decision
in the exact manner its authors warned against. The Mozilla majority said the
dissent was attacking a “straw man” in arguing that, if the FCC lacked authority
to expressly preempt all state broadband laws, including those that neither field
nor conflict preemption forbade, States were free to regulate broadband providers
as common carriers. Mozilla Corp. v. FCC, 940 F.3d 1, 85 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (per
16
classification and forbearance would be sufficient for broadband rates to remain free
from state regulation, it is not necessary.
Instead, for Congress’s decision to protect interstate information services
from common-carrier regulation to be given effect, the Act must prohibit States —
no different from the FCC — from imposing rate regulation. This Court reached
the same conclusion in analogous circumstances in Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line
Corp. v. State Oil & Gas Board of Mississippi, 474 U.S. 409 (1986). There, this
Court held that Congress’s decision to exempt certain gas sales from FERC’s publicutility regulation under the NGA preempted States from imposing public-utility
regulation on those same sales. This Court rejected the argument that Congress’s
decision “to give market forces a more significant role” for those gas sales reflected
Congress’s “inten[t] to give the States the power it had denied [the agency].” Id.
at 422. Instead, as the Court reiterated in a later case, “Congress’s intent . . . that
the supply, the demand, and the price of deregulated gas be determined by market
forces requires that the States still may not regulate purchasers so as to affect their
cost structures.” Northwest Cent. Pipeline Corp. v. State Corp. Comm’n, 489 U.S.
493, 507 n.8 (1989).
Here, too, Congress’s intent that the market — not legislators or bureaucrats
— determine the price of Title I services requires that States also not interfere with
those market forces through rate setting. This Court long ago recognized that, in
curiam). Yet the Second Circuit majority adopted that same “straw man” position
here, without acknowledging the Mozilla majority’s warning. See NYSTA II, 101
F.4th at 154-56.
17
the Telecommunications Act, Congress “unquestionably” took regulatory power
“away from the States.” AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utils. Bd., 525 U.S. 366, 379 n.6
(1999). The Congress that denied the FCC authority to regulate providers of Title I
services as common carriers was not indifferent to whether States regulated Title I
services as common-carrier services. It rejected all such regulation of those services.
B.
This Case Presents Important Questions of Federal Law with
Profound Implications for the Future of Broadband and Other
Interstate Information Services
Absent this Court’s intervention, the Second Circuit’s decision will lead to
more rate regulation. Other States are likely to copy New York once the Attorney
General begins enforcing the ABA and New York consumers can buy broadband
at well-below-market rates. As applicants’ members have shown and show here,
New York’s price cap will require them to sell broadband at a loss and deter them
from investing in and expanding their broadband networks. See Exs. 9-14. Rate
regulation will stifle critical investment in bringing broadband to unserved and
underserved areas.
In 2018, the FCC likewise found that the mere threat of “rate regulation”
risked chilling “investments in broadband infrastructure.” 2018 Order ¶ 101.
Smaller broadband providers in particular felt the effects of that threat, “given
their more limited resources, leading to depressed hiring in rural areas most in
need of additional resources.” Id. ¶ 104. Even the current FCC, a majority of which
supports common-carrier regulation of broadband providers, “cannot envision”
regulating broadband rates and has made a “commitment not to do so.” 2024 Order
¶ 386. Allowing New York and other States to begin regulating those rates would
18
be a radical departure from a long-standing status quo, under which broadband in
the United States has flourished. Broadband prices continue to decline, even as
broadband speeds and deployment increase.14
And broadband is not the only interstate information service the Second
Circuit’s decision opens to novel rate regulation. All online services and
applications — streaming video and music, cloud storage, email and messaging, and
online video conferencing — meet the statutory definition of a Title I information
service. See 47 U.S.C. § 153(24); see also 2024 Order ¶ 131. The Second Circuit’s
holding means that the Communications Act also does not preempt States from
requiring video- and music-streaming services — such as Netflix or Spotify — to
offer cheaper plans to low-income households. Nor would it preempt them from
mandating rates for cloud-storage services like Dropbox, the paid versions of online
video-conferencing tools like Zoom, online subscription dating services like Bumble,
or security or baby cameras that stream video online like Ring or Nanit. The
decision could also pave the way for States to mandate that free, ad-supported
online services offer a paid, ad-free tier at a state-mandated maximum price.
The implications of the Second Circuit’s decision for broadband are bad
enough, but the decision reaches far beyond broadband. It threatens to open the
door to widespread state rate regulation not only of broadband internet access
services, but also of the many online services that broadband’s Title I capabilities
enable consumers and businesses to access.
14 See USTelecom, 2023 Broadband Pricing Index (Oct. 2023),
https://bit.ly/3Kz36YC.
19
II.
APPLICANTS ARE LIKELY TO SUCCEED ON THE MERITS
There is more than “a fair prospect that the Court would reverse” upon
granting review. Merrill, 142 S. Ct. at 880 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring). For the
same reasons that this Court is likely to grant review, it is likely to reverse. See
In re Roche, 448 U.S. 1312, 1314 n.1 (1980) (Brennan, J., in chambers) (“Where
review is sought by the more discretionary avenue of writ of certiorari, . . . the
consideration of prospects for reversal dovetails, to a greater extent, with the
prediction that four Justices will vote to hear the case.”).
The Second Circuit’s decision is wrong on the law and at odds with a long line
of this Court’s precedent as to both field and conflict preemption. As the district
court explained, it is “hard to square” New York’s view — and, by extension, the
Second Circuit majority’s view — “with [this] Court’s decision in Louisiana Public
Service Commission v. FCC.” NYSTA I, 544 F. Supp. 3d at 287. And as Judge
Sullivan correctly concluded in dissent, Congress in the Communications Act
occupied the field of interstate communications services — a field that has rate
regulation at its core. See NYSTA II, 101 F.4th at 166-68 (Sullivan, J., dissenting)
(explaining that “both the Communications Act and its predecessor (the MannElkins Act) manifested ‘an intent on the part of Congress to occupy the field to the
exclusion of state law,’ including with respect to the ‘rates’ charged”). Congress did
so for all such services, not merely those that Congress concluded should be regulated
like public utilities and subject to Title II’s common-carrier regime. The ABA not
only regulates rates directly within that federal field, but also conflicts with
Congress’s express prohibition on the FCC subjecting interstate information
20
services to common-carrier regulation. Rate regulation is a quintessential form
of common-carrier regulation, so state rate regulation conflicts with Congress’s
prohibition. To conclude otherwise would attribute to Congress an attitude of
indifference toward state regulation that is at odds with the Telecommunications
Act, which divested States of authority they previously enjoyed.
III.
APPLICANTS’ MEMBERS FACE IRREPARABLE HARMS, AND THE
BALANCE OF THE EQUITIES FAVORS A STAY
To obtain a stay “pending the filing and disposition of a petition for a writ of
certiorari,” the applicant must also show “a likelihood that irreparable harm will
result from the denial of a stay.” Hollingsworth v. Perry, 558 U.S. 183, 190 (2010)
(per curiam). And the final stay factors call “for assessing the harm to the opposing
party and weighing the public interest.” Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 435 (2009).
When the government is the defendant, the analyses of these two “factors merge.”
Id. The district court found in 2021 that these “factors favor preliminary injunctive
relief.” NYSTA I, 544 F. Supp. 3d at 288. The same factors favor a stay here.
A.
The ABA Will Subject Applicants’ Members to Immediate and
Irreparable Harm
Applicants’ members face immediate and irreparable harm from the ABA
absent a stay from this Court. Once New York begins enforcing the ABA on August
16, 2024, broadband providers offering service in New York will face a “Hobson’s
choice” between “continually violat[ing]” the ABA and “expos[ing] themselves to
potentially huge liability; or . . . suffer[ing] the injury of obeying the law during
the pendency of the proceedings and any further review.” Morales v. Trans World
Airlines, Inc., 504 U.S. 374, 381 (1992). On the other side of that choice, broadband
21
providers that seek to comply with the ABA face immediate and irreparable harm to
their businesses.
The district court found that applicants “adequately demonstrated imminent
irreparable injury largely due to the monetary harm[s]” that their members would
suffer barring an injunction, which are unrecoverable due to the State’s Eleventh
Amendment immunity. NYSTA I, 544 F. Supp. 3d at 276-77. Those harms include
“lost income” from selling broadband at below-market rates, unrecoverable
“advertising costs” to comply with the ABA’s advertising mandate, and
unrecoverable costs to create and maintain systems to verify eligibility. Id. at 277;
see also Ex. 9 (declarations submitted in 2021).
As the attached, new declarations from applicants’ members attest, these
harms remain just as significant and imminent today:
First, the ABA will likely force some members to cancel preexisting plans to
expand broadband networks. See, e.g., Nemer Jeep-Eagle, Inc. v. Jeep-Eagle Sales
Corp., 992 F.2d 430, 435 (2d Cir. 1993) (explaining that “[m]ajor disruption of a
business can be as harmful as termination” and constitute irreparable injury). For
example, The Champlain Telephone Company’s current plans to overbuild its entire
network with fiber optic cable so that it can offer broadband over fiber to all of its
customers would become prohibitively costly given the high percentage of customers
eligible for discounted service under the ABA. See Ex. 10 ¶¶ 3-6 (Northrup Decl.).
The ABA’s mandated prices will similarly cause MTC Cable and DTC Cable to forgo
planned service expansions to bring broadband to currently unserved customers in
rural areas. See Ex. 11 ¶¶ 3, 6 (Faulkner Decl.); Ex. 12 ¶¶ 9-10 (Miller Decl.). The
22
elimination of these planned investments would cause irreparable harm to these
businesses and cost them goodwill from customers they otherwise could and would
have served.15
Second, the ABA will substantially reduce broadband providers’ revenues
from providing service and in many cases require them to provide service at below
cost. See Ex. 10 ¶ 9 (Northrup Decl.); Ex. 11 ¶¶ 14-17 (Faulkner Decl.); Ex. 12 ¶¶ 2,
7-8 (Miller Decl.); Ex. 13 ¶¶ 9-10 (Coakley Decl.); Ex. 14 ¶ 3 (Wilkin Decl.). These
monetary harms are irreparable because applicants’ members cannot recover or
redress them through legal remedies because of New York’s Eleventh Amendment
immunity. See NYSTA I, 544 F. Supp. 3d at 277; see also, e.g., Odebrecht Constr.,
Inc. v. Secretary, Florida Dep’t of Transp., 715 F.3d 1268, 1289 (11th Cir. 2013) (“In
the context of preliminary injunctions, numerous courts have held that the inability
to recover monetary damages because of sovereign immunity renders the harm
suffered irreparable.”).
15 In May 2021, New York’s Public Service Commission granted Champlain,
MTC, and many other providers that serve no more than 20,000 households a
temporary exemption from the ABA. See N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 399-zzzzz(5).
But after the district court preliminarily enjoined the ABA, the Public Service
Commission suspended its proceeding before reaching a final decision. It is unclear
when the proceeding will re-start, the criteria the Public Service Commission will
apply, and whether Champlain and MTC will receive permanent exemptions. As
the providers explain, they cannot make investments relying on the temporary
exemption from the ABA. See Ex. 10 ¶¶ 14-16 (Northrup Decl.); Ex. 11 ¶ 22
(Faulkner Decl.); Ex. 12 ¶ 12 (Miller Decl.); see also NYSTA I, 544 F. Supp. 3d at
278 (holding that the “temporary exemptions” do not eliminate irreparable harm
because they “merely give the PSC more time to decide (viz. potentially deny) the
requests, pursuant to ‘criteria and factors’ not yet identified”).
23
Third, the ABA will impose on applicants’ members significant and
unrecoverable administrative costs that are likewise unrecoverable from the State.
New York has not created a system providers can use to verify consumers’ eligibility
under the ABA, which instead leaves it to each provider to develop a system for
validating eligibility. See Ex. 10 ¶ 12 (Northrup Decl.); Ex. 11 ¶ 19 (Faulkner
Decl.); Ex. 13 ¶ 8 (Coakley Decl.); Ex. 14 ¶ 5 (Wilkin Decl.). The ABA also requires
providers to spend additional money to advertise to low-income consumers the
availability of the below-market prices. See N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 399-zzzzz(7).
This, too, would impose substantial (and unrecoverable) costs. See Ex. 10 ¶ 12
(Northrup Decl.); Ex. 11 ¶ 19 (Faulkner Decl.); Ex. 13 ¶ 12 (Coakley Decl.).
Fourth, if the Court allows the ABA to go into effect but later holds that
federal law preempts the ABA, then the withdrawal of the rate-regulated discounts
the ABA requires would undoubtedly prove unpopular with those customers
benefiting from them — harming the members’ reputations and customer goodwill.
See Ex. 10 ¶ 13 (Northrup Decl.); Ex. 11 ¶¶ 20-21 (Faulkner Decl.); Ex. 12 ¶ 11
(Miller Decl.); Ex. 13 ¶ 11 (Coakley Decl.); Ex. 14 ¶ 4 (Wilkin Decl.). That too
constitutes irreparable harm. See Jacobson & Co. v. Armstrong Cork Co., 548 F.2d
438, 445 (2d Cir. 1977) (affirming finding of irreparable harm because plaintiff
“presented ample evidence to show a threatened loss of good will and customers”);
Rogers Grp., Inc. v. City of Fayetteville, 629 F.3d 784, 789-90 (8th Cir. 2010)
(affirming finding that “a loss of goodwill among customers was sufficient to
establish a threat of irreparable harm”).
24
B.
The Equities and the Public Interest Favor a Stay
Permitting a State to enforce a preempted and therefore unconstitutional
statute harms the public interest. See, e.g., New York Progress & Prot. PAC v.
Walsh, 733 F.3d 483, 488 (2d Cir. 2013) (“[T]he Government does not have an
interest in the enforcement of an unconstitutional law.”); United States v. Alabama,
691 F.3d 1269, 1301 (11th Cir. 2012) (“Frustration of federal statutes and
prerogatives [is] not in the public interest.”); Bank One v. Guttau, 190 F.3d 844,
848 (8th Cir. 1999) (“[T]he public interest will perforce be served by enjoining the
enforcement of the invalid provisions of state law.”).
The ABA is also far from “the sole legislative effort” seeking “to expand access
to broadband internet.” NYSTA I, 544 F. Supp. 3d at 288. The federal government
has allocated “billions of dollars to achieve that same end.” Id. That includes the
federal BEAD program, which is a voluntary federal program that makes available
$42.5 billion in grants and funds for States to disburse — subject to federal
oversight — to expand broadband capacity in unserved and underserved areas.
See 47 U.S.C. § 1702. The broadband providers that voluntarily participate in
the BEAD program must offer at least one “low-cost broadband service option,”
id. § 1702(h)(4)(B), but Congress expressly prohibited construing that obligation
“to authorize . . . regulat[ing] the rates charged for broadband service,” id.
§ 1702(h)(5)(D). Notably, New York’s BEAD proposal deems “a price of no more
25
than $65 per month” for a service offering “100 Mbps” download speed to constitute
a sufficient low-cost option.16
In addition, Governor Hochul’s $1 billion ConnectALL initiative — “New
York’s largest-ever investment in broadband access” — is designed to “ensure that
all New Yorkers have access to reliable and affordable high-speed broadband
internet service.”17 Among other recent initiatives as part of that plan are $228
million “to connect tens of thousands of homes statewide to high-speed internet
through grants to public entities, local or Tribal governments, municipal utilities,
utility cooperatives, and their private sector partners” and $100 million “to bring
new broadband infrastructure to homes in affordable and public housing.”18 These
efforts and others are highlighted in New York’s recently adopted Digital Equity
Plan.19 None involves rate regulation.
Moreover, while the Affordable Connectivity Program (“ACP”), which
provided $30 per month broadband subsidies to qualifying households, recently
ended,20 the White House has highlighted voluntary commitments by a number of
providers — including those that offer broadband in New York — to offer broadband
16 New York Initial Proposal, Volume II:
Broadband Equity, Access, and
Deployment (BEAD) Program § 12.1, at 127 (Dec. 2023), https://on.ny.gov/46sHw20.
17 Governor Hochul Unveils $50 Million ConnectALL Digital Equity Plan to
Close New York’s Digital Divide (Apr. 5, 2024), https://on.ny.gov/4aWF0By.
18 Id.
19 See New York State Digital Equity Plan (June 2024),
https://on.ny.gov/3RkZ7CG.
20 See Press Release, FCC, FCC Brings Affordable Connectivity Program to a
Close (May 31, 2024), https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/DOC-402930A1.pdf.
26
plans at a price of $30 or less to low-income households through the end of 2024.21
Those plans should enable most New Yorkers who had been benefiting from the
ACP — and who were paying, on average, more than $40 per month for internet
access after applying the $30 subsidy22 — to continue receiving discounted
broadband service.
Finally, broadband prices continue to decline, even as broadband speeds
increase. From 2022 to 2023, the price of providers’ most popular broadband option
declined by 10% before adjusting for inflation and 18% after adjusting.23 That
decline is consistent with longer-term trends. The price for providers’ most popular
broadband plan declined by nearly 55% in real terms from 2015 to 2023, while
speeds increased by more than 280%.24 In short, even as other goods and services
have gotten more expensive, broadband is getting less expensive while consumers
are receiving better service.
Taking all these factors together, the “balance of the equities and the public
interest” supports a stay, for the same reasons the district court found in 2021.
21 See White House Fact Sheet:
President Biden Highlights Commitments to
Customers by Internet Service Providers to Offer Affordable High-Speed Internet
Plans, Calls on Congress to Restore Funding for Affordable Connectivity Program
(May 31, 2024), https://bit.ly/4cbXi2W.
22 See State Level Data, appended to Public Notice, The Office of Economics
and Analytics and the Wireline Competition Bureau Announce Publication of
Affordable Connectivity Program Transparency Data Collection Summary,
WC Docket No. 21-450, DA 24-504 (rel. May 30, 2024),
https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/DOC-402907A1.pdf.
23 See USTelecom, 2023 Broadband Pricing Index at 2 (Oct. 2023),
https://bit.ly/3Kz36YC.
24 See id. at 3.
27
NYSTA I, 544 F. Supp. 3d at 288-89. The federal and state programs described
above will ensure that, at most, minimal hardship will result from a stay that would
preserve the status quo and prevent irreparable harm until this Court can resolve
applicants’ forthcoming certiorari petition.
IV.
ALTERNATIVELY, THIS COURT SHOULD GRANT AN INJUNCTION
BARRING THE NEW YORK ATTORNEY GENERAL FROM
ENFORCING THE ABA PENDING DISPOSITION OF APPLICANTS’
CERTIORARI PETITION
For the same reasons that warrant a stay of the judgment, this Court may
alternatively grant an injunction pending disposition of applicants’ certiorari
petition. See Labrador v. Poe ex rel. Poe, 144 S. Ct. 921, 929 n.2 (2024) (Kavanaugh,
J., concurring) (noting that “[t]his Court has used different formulations of the
factors for granting emergency relief,” but “[a]ll formulations basically encompass”
the same factors). Under the All Writs Act, the Court “may issue all writs
necessary or appropriate” to exercise jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a). As relevant
here, this Court may grant an injunction pending further review when (1) the
applicant faces irreparable harm, (2) grant of certiorari and success on the merits
are likely, and (3) an injunction will not harm the public interest. See Tandon v.
Newsom, 593 U.S. 61, 64 (2021) (per curiam); Roman Cath. Diocese of Brooklyn v.
Cuomo, 592 U.S. 14, 16-19 (2020) (per curiam). Applicants satisfy all three factors,
for the reasons set out above, so the Court can preserve the status quo either
through a stay of the judgment or an injunction directed to the New York Attorney
General, who is the ABA’s enforcer. See N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 399-zzzzz(10).
28
CONCLUSION
This Court should stay the judgment entered by the Second Circuit, thereby
restoring the district court’s preliminary injunction, pending resolution of
applicants’ petition for a writ of certiorari. In the alternative, this Court should
issue an injunction temporarily enjoining New York from enforcing the ABA while
the Court decides whether to grant the petition. Applicants respectfully ask that
the Court rule on or before August 15, 2024, and that the Court issue an
administrative stay, if necessary to provide the Court with sufficient time to rule.
29
Respectfully submitted,
__________________________________
SCOTT H. ANGSTREICH
Counsel of Record
ALEX A. PARKINSON
ABIGAIL E. DEHART
DAREN G. ZHANG
KELLOGG, HANSEN, TODD,
FIGEL & FREDERICK, P.L.L.C.
1615 M Street, N.W., Suite 400
Washington, D.C. 20036
(202) 326-7900
(sangstreich@kellogghansen.com)
Counsel for Applicants
New York State Telecommunications
Association, Inc., CTIA – The Wireless
Association, NTCA – The Rural
Broadband Association, and USTelecom
– The Broadband Association
JEFFREY A. LAMKEN
MOLOLAMKEN LLP
The Watergate, Suite 500
600 New Hampshire Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20037
(202) 556-2000
Counsel for Applicant
ACA Connects – America’s
Communications Association
JARED P. MARX
HWG, LLP
1919 M Street, N.W., 8th Floor
Washington, D.C. 20036
(202) 730-1328
Counsel for Applicant
Satellite Broadcasting and
Communications Association
August 2, 2024
30
Respectfully submitted,
__________________________________
SCOTT H. ANGSTREICH
Counsel of Record
ALEX A. PARKINSON
ABIGAIL E. DEHART
DAREN G. ZHANG
KELLOGG, HANSEN, TODD,
FIGEL & FREDERICK, P.L.L.C.
1615 M Street, N.W., Suite 400
Washington, D.C. 20036
(202) 326-7900
(sangstreich@kellogghansen.com)
Counsel for Applicants
New York State Telecommunications
Association, Inc., CTIA – The Wireless
Association, NTCA – The Rural
Broadband Association, and USTelecom
– The Broadband Association
JEFFREY A. LAMKEN
MOLOLAMKEN LLP
The Watergate, Suite 500
600 New Hampshire Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20037
(202) 556-2000
Counsel for Applicant
ACA Connects – America’s
Communications Association
JARED P. MARX
HWG, LLP
1919 M Street, N.W., 8th Floor
Washington, D.C. 20036
(202) 730-1328
Counsel for Applicant
Satellite Broadcasting and
Communications Association
August 2, 2024
30
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.