Amicus Curiae Brief — Gabriel Olivier, Petitioner v. City of Brandon, Mississippi

No. 24-993

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

_______________________________________________________________________________________________

GABRIEL OLIVIER

Petitioner,

v.

CITY OF BRANDON, ET AL.,

Respondents.

_______________________________________________________________________________________________

On Writ of Certiorari to the United States

Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

_______________________________________________________________________________________________

BRIEF OF AMICI CURIAE CHRISTIAN LEGAL

SOCIETY, COALITION OF VIRTUE, JEWISH

COALITION FOR RELIGIOUS LIBERTY, AND

AMERICAN HINDU JEWISH CONGRESS IN

SUPPORT OF PETITIONER

_______________________________________________________________________________________________

RICHARD G. PARKER

COLLEEN E. ROH SINZDAK

Counsel of Record

ANASTASIA PASTAN

CHASE J. HANSON

MILBANK LLP

1101 New York Ave. NW

Washington, DC 20005

Telephone: (202) 835-7500

crohsinzdak@milbank.com

Counsel for Amici Curiae

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

TABLE OF CONTENTS .............................................. i

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ........................................ii

INTERESTS OF AMICI CURIAE .............................. v

INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF

ARGUMENT ................................................................ 1

ARGUMENT ................................................................ 3

I.

Public Expression Of Religion Is A Core Tenet

Of Many Faiths ................................................. 3

A.

Sharing Religious Convictions Is

Imperative For Adherents Of Many Faiths

.................................................................... 4

B.

There Is A Rich Tradition Of Public

Preaching In America, Both Before And

After The Founding ................................... 7

II.

The First Amendment Prevents Government

Interference With Public Expressions Of

Religion .......................................................... 8

III.

The Decision Below Threatens Federal

Courts’ Ability To Vindicate The First

Amendment’s Protections For Public

Religious Expression ................................... 12

CONCLUSION .......................................................... 14

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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Page(s)

Cases

Bailey v. Patterson,

369 U.S. 31 (1962) (per curiam) ............................ 13

Board of Airport Comm’rs of City of Los Angeles v.

Jews for Jesus, Inc.,

482 U.S. 569 (1987) ................................................ 11

Cantwell v. Connecticut,

310 U.S. 296 (1940) .................................................. 9

Fowler v. Rhode Island,

345 U.S. 67 (1953) .................................................. 10

Heck v. Humphrey,

512 U.S. 477 (1994) .................................................. 1

Henagan v. City of Lafayette,

No. 6:21-CV-03946, 2022 WL 4553055 (W.D. La.

Aug. 16, 2022) ........................................................ 12

Int’l Soc. for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee,

505 U.S. 672 (1992) ................................................ 11

Lee v. Int’l Soc. for Krishna Consciousness, Inc.,

505 U.S. 830 (1992) (per curiam) .......................... 11

Martin v. City of Struthers,

319 U.S. 141 (1943) ................................................ 10

Murdock v. Pennsylvania,

319 U.S. 105 (1943) ................................ 1, 6, 8, 9, 10

Niemotko v. Maryland,

340 U.S. 268 (1951) ................................................ 10

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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued

Page(s)

Patsy v. Board of Regents of State of Fla.,

457 U.S. 496 (1982) ................................................ 14

Poor Bear v. Nesbitt,

399 F. Supp. 2d 904 (D. Neb. 2004)....................... 12

Reed v. Goertz,

598 U.S. 230 (2023) ................................................ 14

Schneider v. New Jersey,

308 U.S. 147 (1939) .................................................. 9

Van Orden v. Perry,

545 U.S. 677 (2005) .................................................. 8

West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette,

319 U.S. 624 (1943) ................................................ 13

Wooley v. Maynard,

430 U.S. 705 (1977) ................................................ 13

Yeazizw v. City of Edina,

No. 02–524, 2003 WL 1966285 (D. Minn. Apr. 28,

2003) ....................................................................... 12

Other Authorities

Acts Of The Apostles .................................................... 5

Brief of Amicus Curiae Hindu American Foundation

in No. 24-20485 (CA5).............................................. 6

General Conference of Seventh-day Adventist

Church, Religious Liberty, Evangelism, and

Proselytism (June 29, 2000),

https://gc.adventist.org/officialstatements/religious-liberty-evangelism-andproselytism/ .............................................................. 7

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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued

Page(s)

Hosea, Book of .............................................................. 4

Isaiah, Book of ............................................................. 4

Jeremiah, Book of ........................................................ 4

Mahāthera, The Buddha and His Teachings (3d ed.

2010) ......................................................................... 6

Matthew, Gospel According To.................................... 5

McConnell, Religion and Republicanism in the

American Revolution, in Religion and the American

Revolution 18 (Y. Levin et al., eds. 2025) ............... 8

Quran ........................................................................... 5

The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints,

Gospel Principles ch. 33 (2011),

https://www.churchofjesuschrist.org ....................... 7

Timothy, Paul’s Letter to ............................................. 5

Yoga Vasishtha ............................................................ 6

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INTERESTS OF AMICI CURIAE 1

Christian Legal Society (CLS) is a nonprofit,

interdenominational

association

of

Christian

attorneys, law students, judges, and law professors

with members in every state and chapters on over 115

law school campuses. CLS’s legal advocacy division,

the Center for Law & Religious Freedom, works to

protect the free-exercise rights of all citizens.

Coalition of Virtue (COV) is a nonprofit association

of Muslim individuals whose mission is to promote

virtue in society, grounded in divine guidance as

embodied in the Islamic tradition, in cooperation with

those who share its moral vision. COV strives to

encourage citizens to become civically engaged,

pushing for legislative changes that represent the

highest values of faith and reason.

The Jewish Coalition for Religious Liberty (JCRL)

is a non-denominational organization of Jewish

communal and lay leaders seeking to protect the

ability of Americans freely to practice their faith.

Since its founding, JCRL has recruited a volunteer

network of accomplished attorneys, submitted legal

briefs, and written op-eds in Jewish and generalmedia outlets in defense of religious liberty. While

Judaism does not encourage evangelizing, JCRL

understands the importance of such practices to its

neighbors and friends. It also understands the

importance of this case to protecting religious

expression generally.

Pursuant to this Court’s Rule 37.6, counsel for amici

curiae certifies that this brief was not authored in whole or in

part by counsel for any party and that no person or entity other

that amici curiae or its counsel has made a monetary

contribution to the preparation or submission of this brief.

1

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The American Hindu Jewish Congress (AHJC) is a

national, non-partisan coalition representing the

shared interests and concerns of Hindu Americans

and Jewish Americans. Founded in 2025, AHJC unites

two vibrant, millennia-old faith communities to

advocate for religious liberty, mutual respect, and

interfaith solidarity. The AHJC membership

encompasses community leaders, houses of worship,

cultural associations, student fellowships, and civilrights advocates across all fifty States.

Amici and their members hold sincere religious

convictions regarding the expression of their faiths

publicly. The decision below jeopardizes their ability—

and that of others similarly compelled—to challenge

laws and ordinances that unconstitutionally limit

their ability to profess their faith publicly.

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INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF

ARGUMENT

In many religions, the faithful are called to

evangelize—that is, to publicly profess the tenets of

their faith. The United States Constitution protects

their right to do so. As this Court has long recognized,

evangelizing “occupies the same high estate under the

First Amendment as do worship in the churches and

preaching from the pulpits.” Murdock v. Pennsylvania,

319 U.S. 105, 109 (1943). It therefore “has the same

claim to protection as th[ose] more orthodox and

conventional exercises of religion,” and the “same

claim” to “the guarantees of freedom of speech and

freedom of the press.” Ibid.

In the decision below, however, the Fifth Circuit

held that it could not even consider whether a local

ordinance infringes on petitioner’s constitutional right

to publicly proclaim his faith because petitioner had

previously pleaded nolo contendre to a charge of

violating the ordinance. In the Fifth Circuit’s view,

Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), requires that

result because it prohibits a prisoner from using a

Section 1983 suit to challenge the validity of his

conviction. But petitioner was not and is not a

prisoner, never had access to habeas relief, and does

not seek to invalidate his prior conviction. He seeks an

injunction preventing respondent from interfering

with his First Amendment right to evangelize by

applying its ordinance against him in the future. For

the reasons explained in petitioner’s brief, Heck does

not apply in these circumstances, and there is no basis

for denying petitioner the opportunity to press his

fundamental constitutional challenge before the

federal courts.

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If the decision below is allowed to stand, it will

imperil the First Amendment rights of people like

petitioner who are criminally prosecuted for

professing their faith and reasonably elect to resolve

the charges through a plea rather than facing jail

time. Such individuals will be unable to use Section

1983 to obtain an injunction against future

prosecutions under the same law, leaving them with a

Hobson’s choice: Forgo further evangelizing or risk

additional charges under the same potentially

unconstitutional law. Amici abhor that result—and so

does the First Amendment.

Public

expressions

of

religion—such

as

evangelizing and preaching—have deep historical

roots. Both the Bible and the Quran model and

command public proclamation of their messages as the

very word of God; for millennia, public expressions of

faith have been an important part of the Christian,

Muslim, and Hindu faiths that amici practice. And

while Judaism does not encourage evangelizing, it

does encourage other public acts of faith, such as

publicizing the miracle of Chanukah by lighting

Menorahs in a public-facing manner.

Evangelizing is also important to the followers of

many other religions that are practiced in the United

States, including Buddhists and to the adherents of

many minority religions like Jehovah’s Witnesses,

Latter-day Saints, and Seventh-day Adventists.

Moreover, because the Constitution protects religious

freedom, public expressions of faith have played a

central role in our Nation’s history, as epitomized by

events like the major evangelistic efforts that occurred

throughout the country during the Great Awakening.

And when government actors have overstepped by

impermissibly impeding the right to religious

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expression that the First Amendment protects, this

Court has repeatedly stepped in. This case calls for

another such intervention.

The Fifth Circuit’s decision threatens this

unbroken commitment to the public exchange of faith.

Extending Heck to bar claims for injunctive relief

against future prosecution—even by those who never

could seek habeas relief—will make it harder for

courts to intervene when public religious expression is

impermissibly criminalized. Without Section 1983

available

prospectively

to

challenge

the

constitutionality of restrictions on public speech,

people like petitioner who have been prosecuted before

for their religious expression have no meaningful way

to enlist the judiciary’s assistance in avoiding future,

unconstitutional prosecutions. Yet those are the very

people who need the courts most. And without an

avenue for relief, many may simply fall silent. Nothing

in Heck requires that untenable result, and nothing in

the First Amendment countenances it.

For these reasons and those raised by petitioner,

the Court should reverse the decision below and

reopen the federal courts to those most threatened in

their religious exercise.

ARGUMENT

I.

Public Expression Of Religion Is A Core

Tenet Of Many Faiths

Religious people have shared their faith publicly

from time immemorial. The foundational texts of

many religions feature prophets and other similar

figures who disseminate religious teachings to the

public, and many religions encourage believers to

share their faith publicly. The United States has a rich

tradition of such public religious expression, which is

at the core of the First Amendment’s protections.

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A. Sharing

Religious

Convictions

Is

Imperative For Adherents Of Many Faiths

Publicly sharing religious beliefs is an important

aspect of each of the four faith traditions that amici

represent—Judaism,

Christianity,

Islam,

and

Hinduism. Evangelizing features prominently in the

New and Old Testaments of the Bible and the Quran,

and many Hindus believe it is essential to disseminate

religious teachings, such as non-violence. Other faiths,

too, emphasize public religious expression, including

Buddhism, Jehovah’s Witnesses, and Mormonism.

1.

In the Judeo-Christian tradition, it is a

divine command to go forth and share God’s word (as

petitioner sought to do). The Old Testament of the

Bible contains numerous accounts of prophets who

were commanded to preach in the public square. See,

e.g., Isaiah 6:8–13. In many instances, these public

callings to repentance are met with unwelcoming, or

even hostile, audiences. The Bible describes how

Jeremiah was arrested for sharing his faith because

political leaders did not want his message to

proliferate among the public. Jeremiah 43. The

prophetic message throughout the Old Testament—

that Israel and Judah would be invaded and their

people exiled, but that a loving God would enable a

remnant to return, Hosea chs. 6–9, 14—was an

unpopular one at the time and constitutes a

foundational example of both religious exercise and

dissent. And while Jewish adherents do not

understand these passages to require evangelizing,

other public expressions of faith—such as lighting a

Menorah for all to see—remain important to many

Jews.

The New Testament, too, contains many

passages that command or encourage evangelizing.

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Jesus commissioned his followers with an

unambiguous directive to proclaim their faith: “Go

therefore and make disciples of all nations * * *

teaching them to observe all that I have commanded

you.” Matthew 28:19–20. Luke quotes Jesus’ very last

words to His disciples: “[Y]ou will be my witnesses in

Jerusalem and in all Judea and Samaria, and to the

end of the earth.” Acts 1:8. The Apostle Paul enjoins a

disciple to “preach the word; be ready in season and

out of season; reprove, rebuke, and exhort, with

complete patience and teaching” and “always be soberminded, endure suffering, do the work of an

evangelist, fulfill your ministry.” 2 Timothy 4:2, 5.

Christians understand these passages as a call to

publicly share their faith.

2.

Sharing and spreading one’s faith is also a

fundamental tenet for followers of Islam. This

command, likewise, comes from sacred texts: The

concept of da‘wah—rooted in passages of the Quran—

directs Muslims to share their beliefs outwardly and

to spread the word of Allah. The Quran emphasizes

the importance of da‘wah to Islam, entreating

adherents to “[c]all to the way of your Lord with

wisdom and good preaching.” Quran 16:125. And it

admonishes, “Who is better in speech than one who

calls to Allah, does righteous deeds and says indeed I

am among the Muslims.” Quran 41:33. Accordingly,

many Muslims hold the sincere religious belief that

sharing their faith publicly is a vital component of

Islam.

3.

Many Hindus recognize the importance of

sharing one’s faith with others. Foundational texts

emphasize the importance of sharing tenets of

Hinduism publicly, as the sage Vasistha preached

“whoever recites or causes it to be recited either with

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or without any desire of reward, shall have his ample

reward.” VI Yoga Vasishtha 215:12. While “Hinduism

is [] known for its spectrum of religious practices,”

some Hindus believe that key teachings, such as

nonviolence, must be spread to others and that failing

to share this belief can itself constitute violence. Brief

of Amicus Curiae Hindu American Foundation in No.

24-20485 (CA5), pp. 4, 7.

4.

Public preaching is also central to the

Buddhist faith. The Buddha sent his disciples to

preach the dharmadāna—the gift of the Dharma—

charging his followers to “[p]reach * * * the Dhamma,

excellent in the beginning, excellent in the middle,

excellent in the end, both in the spirit and in the letter.

Proclaim the holy life, altogether perfect and pure.”

Mahāthera, The Buddha and His Teachings 108 (3d

ed. 2010) (footnote omitted). Thus, Buddhists believe

that publicly preaching and spreading the Buddhist

faith is a divine command in keeping with the

Buddha’s directive: “Preach the Sublime Dhamma.

Work for the good of others, you who have done your

duties.” Ibid.

5.

Evangelizing is also a central feature of

many other faiths. For Jehovah’s Witnesses, for

example, evangelizing is a fundamental religious

obligation. Murdock, 319 U.S. at 108 (“Petitioners

spread their interpretations of the Bible and their

religious beliefs largely through the hand distribution

of literature by full or part time workers. * * * In doing

so they believe that they are obeying a commandment

of God.”). Latter-day Saints, too, are obligated to share

their message and believe everyone is “responsible to

teach the gospel by word and deed to all of our

Heavenly Father’s children.” The Church of Jesus

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Christ of Latter-day Saints, Gospel Principles ch. 33

(2011), https://www.churchofjesuschrist.org

/study/manual/gospel-principles/chapter-33missionary-work?lang=eng.

And

Seventh-day

Adventists likewise consider evangelizing a religious

obligation, believing that “the dissemination of

religion is not only a right, but a joyful responsibility

based on a divine mandate to witness.” General

Conference of Seventh-day Adventist Church,

Religious Liberty, Evangelism, and Proselytism (June

29,

2000),

https://gc.adventist.org/officialstatements/religious-liberty-evangelism-andproselytism/.

B. There Is A Rich Tradition Of Public

Preaching In America, Both Before And

After The Founding

Given the array of religions in the United States, it

is no surprise that adherents of many faiths have

chosen to express their messages publicly. Indeed,

public preaching and evangelizing historically served

as one of the primary means of church growth, as well

as of voicing dissent and criticizing religious

orthodoxy. And such religious expression has a deep

historical pedigree in America.

Even before the American Revolution and the

ratification of the Bill of Rights, public preaching and

evangelizing was a meaningful part of American

colonial life. Much public discourse was attributable to

vigorous religious dissent, itself a deeply rooted

characteristic of faith in America and a key reason

that many Colonists fled Europe. Prominent religious

figures like Jonathan Edwards, John Wesley, and

George Whitfield challenged religious orthodoxy in the

colonies through public sermons and “revivalist

preaching” during the First Great Awakening.

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McConnell, Religion and Republicanism in the

American Revolution, in Religion and the American

Revolution 18 (Y. Levin et al., eds. 2025). When the

Framers ratified the Constitution, they enshrined

protections for exactly this kind of public religious

speech in the First Amendment of the Bill of Rights.

Murdock, 319 U.S. at 109 (“This form of religious

activity occupies the same high estate under the First

Amendment as do worship in the churches and

preaching from the pulpits. * * * It also has the same

claim as the others to the guarantees of freedom of

speech and freedom of the press.”). The public

expression of religious convictions is therefore a

common feature of life in the United States, “where

the spirit of religion and the spirit of freedom are

productively united, reigning together but in separate

spheres on the same soil.” Van Orden v. Perry, 545

U.S. 677, 698 (2005) (Breyer, J., concurring in the

judgment) (cleaned up).

II.

The

First

Amendment

Prevents

Government Interference With Public

Expressions Of Religion

Despite the rich tradition of public religious

speech, from time to time, government actors have

sought impermissibly to impede the ability of citizens

to share their faith in public. When that has occurred,

this Court has stepped in to vindicate the First

Amendment’s protections. Time and again, this Court

has made clear that the First Amendment safeguards

an individual’s freedom to exercise her faith through

public forms of evangelism such as canvassing and

preaching in community spaces.

1.

A series of cases regarding Jehovah’s

Witnesses well illustrate the Court’s fundamental role

in protecting the right to evangelize publicly. In

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Schneider v. New Jersey, 308 U.S. 147 (1939), and

Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940), this

Court invalidated laws requiring Jehovah’s Witnesses

to obtain permits to canvass and solicit donations from

officials who could withhold permits with unfettered

discretion. Schneider, 308 U.S. at 164 (canvassing);

Cantwell, 310 U.S. at 305 (soliciting). These cases held

that the First Amendment does not permit the

government to condition the dissemination of ideas on

the “consideration and approval” of “police

authorities.” Schneider, 308 U.S. at 164. The

discretion to withhold approval would permit

government “censorship of religion.” Cantwell, 310

U.S. at 305. In separately invalidating the petitioner’s

conviction for breaching the peace, Cantwell explained

that though petitioner’s message “aroused animosity,”

id. at 311, he could not be held liable for merely

exhorting others “to buy a book or to contribute money

in the interest of what Cantwell, however misguided

others may think him, conceived to be true religion,”

id. at 310.

These principles were articulated more fully in

Murdock v. Pennsylvania. There, several Jehovah’s

Witnesses challenged their criminal convictions for

violating an ordinance prohibiting the unlicensed sale

of goods. 319 U.S. at 106–07. Murdock explained that

for the petitioners, door-to-door evangelizing was

“obeying a commandment of God,” id. at 108, and that

“[t]his form of religious activity occupies the same high

estate under the First Amendment as do worship in

the churches and preaching from the pulpits,” id. at

109. Because this “age-old type of evangelism” had “as

high a claim to constitutional protection as the more

orthodox types,” id. at 110, the municipality could not

require the petitioners to pay a fee for a license to

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solicit donations and sell religious pamphlets, id. at

112. This was particularly so because some considered

the Jehovah’s Witnesses’ message offensive. Imposing

a “tax” on “the dissemination of views because they are

unpopular, annoying or distasteful” would be “a

complete repudiation of the philosophy of the Bill of

Rights.” Id. at 116. As the Court explained in another

decision the same year, “[t]he authors of the First

Amendment knew that novel and unconventional

ideas might disturb the complacent, but they chose to

encourage a freedom which they believed essential if

vigorous enlightenment was ever to triumph over

slothful ignorance.” Martin v. City of Struthers, 319

U.S. 141, 143 (1943) (invalidating complete

prohibition on door-to-door canvassing).

Several years later, the Court again vindicated the

right of Jehovah’s Witnesses publicly to profess their

faith. In Niemotko v. Maryland, a pair of Jehovah’s

Witnesses were convicted for failing to obtain a permit

to hold Bible talks in a park. 340 U.S. 268, 270 (1951).

Concluding from the trial record that “the use of the

park was denied because of the City Council’s dislike

for or disagreement with the Witnesses or their views”

the Court reiterated that “the right to equal protection

of the laws, in the exercise of those freedoms of speech

and religion protected by the First and Fourteenth

Amendments, has a firmer foundation than the whims

or personal opinions of a local governing body.” Id. at

272; see also, e.g., Fowler v. Rhode Island, 345 U.S. 67,

69–70 (1953) (“Appellant’s sect has conventions that

are different from the practices of other religious

groups. * * * But apart from narrow exceptions not

relevant here, it is no business of courts to say that

what is a religious practice or activity for one group is

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not religion under the protection of the First

Amendment.” (citations omitted)).

2.

In the years since, the Court has applied the

same principles to vindicate the rights of other groups

whose beliefs compel them to spread their faith

through canvassing, door-to-door solicitation, and

other public expressions of religion. In Lee v.

International Society for Krishna Consciousness, Inc.,

the Court invalidated a ban on the distribution of

literature in airport terminals. 505 U.S. 830, 831

(1992) (per curiam). Justice Kennedy, writing for a

plurality in the consolidated cases, explained that the

First Amendment stands to protect the rights of

unpopular groups to speak and preach freely in public

forums. The alternative would “allow[] the

government to tilt the dialog heard by the public, to

exclude many, more marginal, voices.” Int’l Soc. for

Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 702

(1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment).

Likewise, in Board of Airport Commissioners of City of

Los Angeles v. Jews for Jesus, Inc., the Court struck

down a resolution that prohibited all “First

Amendment activities” in the Los Angeles

International Airport. 482 U.S. 569, 571 (1987). In

doing so, the Court noted the intolerable “chilling

effect of the resolution on protected speech” stood in

stark contrast to the First Amendment’s protection for

public expression and discourse, and “no conceivable

governmental interest would justify such an absolute

prohibition of speech.” Id. at 575–76. The robust First

Amendment protections manifested by these cases

enable people of all religions to share their faiths

without fear of government reprisal.

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III.

The Decision Below Threatens Federal

Courts’ Ability To Vindicate The First

Amendment’s Protections For Public

Religious Expression

The Fifth Circuit’s extension of Heck to bar Section

1983 claims for prospective relief will weaken the

federal judiciary’s ability to protect important First

Amendment rights by preventing individuals from

challenging the constitutionality of laws under which

they have been prosecuted before. The invidious

effects of applying Heck to adherents like petitioner

are apparent. In the Fifth Circuit, an individual could

be convicted for the public expression of his religious

faith under a patently unconstitutional law—like

those the Court struck down in Schneider, Cantwell,

and Murdock—but have no means to challenge the

law’s constitutionality or prevent future prosecutions

under it. Such a regime risks stifling religious

expression, especially by those expressing unpopular

religious views. This is not a hypothetical threat.

Courts have already applied Heck to bar First

Amendment claims in a number of cases. See, e.g.,

Henagan v. City of Lafayette, No. 6:21-CV-03946, 2022

WL 4553055, at *3 (W.D. La. Aug. 16, 2022)

(dismissing First Amendment claim for injunctive

relief against local ordinance as barred by Heck),

report and recommendation adopted, 2022 WL

4546721 (W.D. La. Sep. 27, 2022); Poor Bear v. Nesbitt,

300 F. Supp. 2d 904, 911–12 (D. Neb. 2004)

(dismissing free exercise claim for injunctive relief

under Heck); Yeazizw v. City of Edina, No. 02–524,

2003 WL 1966285, at * 11 (D. Minn. Apr. 28, 2003)

(similar).

This result is particularly unpalatable because of

the procedural hurdles litigants must surmount to

bring a successful Section 1983 action. Among those

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requirements, a plaintiff seeking to enjoin the future

enforcement of a state law must have standing,

meaning he must face the imminent application of the

law to him. Bailey v. Patterson, 369 U.S. 31, 32 (1962)

(per curiam). The Fifth Circuit’s application of Heck

leads to the ironic result that those, like petitioner,

who have already been prosecuted and thus have

suffered the most concrete injury are prohibited from

seeking relief from ongoing or future constitutional

violations because it might threaten the earlier

conviction.

This very case illustrates the point. Petitioner was

arrested for publicly professing his faith under the

City’s ordinance, pleaded nolo contendre and was

given a suspended sentence. Because of this past

prosecution, petitioner has every reason to believe

that he will again be prosecuted if he engages in the

same religious expression. Yet the past prosecution

that virtually ensures future charges also bars him

from testing the constitutionality of the ordinance. His

only choices are therefore to stay silent or risk further

prosecution.

That rule promises to chill religious expression and

instill political orthodoxy—a prospect that “invades

the sphere of intellect and spirit which it is the

purpose of the First Amendment to our Constitution

to reserve from all official control.” West Virginia State

Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943). The

Court has rejected similar procedural impediments to

vindicating constitutional rights through Section 1983

actions seeking prospective relief. See, e.g., Wooley v.

Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 711 (1977) (rejecting

application of Younger abstention to Section 1983

action against “prosecutions for future violations”);

Patsy v. Board of Regents of State of Fla., 457 U.S. 496,

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501 (1982) (“[E]xhaustion is not a prerequisite to an

action under § 1983.”). Cf. Reed v. Goertz, 598 U.S.

230, 235 (2023) (rejecting application of the RookerFeldman doctrine to Section 1983 action seeking

prospective relief). It should do the same here and

reject the Fifth Circuit’s novel extension of Heck.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, as well as those provided

by petitioner, the Court should reverse the Fifth

Circuit’s decision.

Respectfully submitted,

RICHARD G. PARKER

COLLEEN E. ROH SINZDAK

ANASTASIA PASTAN

CHASE J. HANSON

MILBANK LLP

1101 New York Ave. NW

Washington, DC 20005

Telephone: (202) 835-7500

crohsinzdak@milbank.com

September 9, 2025

Counsel for Amici Curiae

02013.27600