Amicus Curiae Brief — Gabriel Olivier, Petitioner v. City of Brandon, Mississippi

No. 24-993

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

___________

GABRIEL OLIVIER,

v.

Petitioner,

CITY OF BRANDON, MISSISSIPPI, et al.,

Respondents.

___________

On Writ of Certiorari to the

United States Court of Appeals

for the Fifth Circuit

___________

BRIEF OF AMICI CURIAE

HUMAN RIGHTS DEFENSE CENTER AND

AMERICAN ASSOCIATION FOR JUSTICE

IN SUPPORT OF PETITIONER

___________

BRUCE PLAXEN

President

JEFFREY R. WHITE

Sr. Associate General

Counsel

AMERICAN ASSOCIATION

FOR JUSTICE

777 6th Street, N.W.

#300

Washington, DC 20001

Counsel for American

Association for Justice

TOBIAS S. LOSS-EATON

Counsel of Record

SIDLEY AUSTIN LLP

1501 K Street, N.W.

Washington, DC 20005

(202) 736-8000

tlosseaton@sidley.com

PHILLIP M. AURENTZ

CHELSEA A. PRIEST

SIDLEY AUSTIN LLP

2021 McKinney Avenue

Suite 2000

Dallas, TX 75201

Counsel for Amici Curiae

September 9, 2025

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

Table of authorities...................................................... ii

Interests of amici curiae .............................................. 1

Introduction and summary of argument .................... 2

Argument ..................................................................... 4

I. Access to courts to protect fundamental rights

is itself a fundamental constitutional right. ......... 4

II. The Fifth Circuit’s extension of Heck to purely

prospective claims wrongly deprives litigants

of access to courts. .................................................. 5

A. The Fifth Circuit’s rule leaves people

without the ability to vindicate their rights. ... 6

B. Prisoners in particular have an acute need

to

access

courts

to

challenge

unconstitutional prison policies. ...................... 7

III.Prospective relief targets future enforcement

and policy, not past convictions. .......................... 10

IV. Extending Heck to plaintiffs with no habeas

path is particularly harmful to current and

former prisoners’ civil rights. ............................... 13

V. Access to courts is especially critical for

incarcerated people. ............................................. 14

A. Prisoners uniquely rely on judicial oversight

and have limited alternative remedies. ......... 15

B. Habeas is not an adequate remedy in all

cases. ................................................................ 15

C. Allowing § 1983 claims promotes judicial

economy. .......................................................... 16

Conclusion .................................................................. 18

(i)

ii

CASES

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Page

Boddie v. Connecticut,

401 U.S. 371 (1971) ....................................... 4, 5

Bounds v. Smith,

430 U.S. 817 (1977) ................................. 3, 4, 15

Clarke v. Stalder,

154 F.3d 186 (5th Cir. 1998) ......................... 8, 9

Edwards v. Balisok,

520 U.S. 641 (1997) ......................................... 11

Heck v. Humphrey,

512 U.S. 477 (1994) ................................. 2, 6, 13

Ex parte Hull,

312 U.S. 546 (1941) ................................... 14, 15

Lewis v. Casey,

518 U.S. 343 (1996) ..................................... 4, 15

Olivier v. City of Brandon,

121 F.4th 511 (5th Cir. 2024) ........................... 7

Patsy v. Bd. of Regents,

457 U.S. 496 (1982) ........................................... 5

Skinner v. Switzer,

562 U.S. 521 (2011) ................................... 10, 11

Smith v. Robinson,

468 U.S. 992 (1984) ........................................... 5

Spencer v. Kemna,

523 U.S. 1 (1998) ....................................... 14, 16

Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus,

573 U.S. 149 (2014) ........................................... 7

Teague v. Lane,

489 U.S. 288 (1989) ......................................... 12

Wilkinson v. Dotson,

544 U.S. 74 (2005) ........................... 3, 10, 11, 16

Wolff v. McDonnell,

418 U.S. 539 (1974) ........................................... 4

Wooley v. Maynard,

430 U.S. 705 (1977) ..................................... 3, 11

iii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES – continued

Page

STATUTES

28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) ......................................... 6, 10

42 U.S.C. § 1983 ................................................... 3

OTHER AUTHORITIES

Note, Defining the Reach of Heck v.

Humphrey: Should the Favorable

Termination Rule Apply to Individuals

who Lack Access to Habeas Corpus?,

121 Harv. L. Rev. 868 (2008) .................... 13, 14

Jan Ransom, In N.Y.C. Jail System,

Guards Often Lie About Excessive Force,

N.Y. Times (Apr. 24, 2021),

https://tinyurl.com/mvez8cw5 ......................... 10

Devi M. Rao, The Heck Bar Gone Too Far:

Heck’s Application to Prisoners’ Excessive

Force Suits, 17 Harv. L. & Pol’y Rev.

365 (2023) .................................................... 9, 10

INTERESTS OF AMICI CURIAE1

The Human Rights Defense Center is a 501(c)(3)

non-profit organization that advocates on behalf of the

human rights of people held in U.S. detention facilities. This includes people in state and federal prisons,

local jails, immigration detention centers, civil commitment facilities, Bureau of Indian Affairs jails, juvenile facilities and military prisons. HRDC is one of the

few national opponents to the private prison industry

and is the foremost advocate on behalf of the free

speech rights of publishers to communicate with prisoners and the right of prisoners to receive publications

and communications from outside sources. HRDC also

does significant work around government transparency and accountability issues. HRDC publishes and

distributes self-help reference books for prisoners, and

engages in litigation, media campaigns and outreach,

public speaking and education, and testimony before

legislative and regulatory bodies.

The American Association for Justice (“AAJ”) is a national, voluntary bar association established in 1946 to

strengthen the civil justice system, preserve the right

to trial by jury, and protect access to the courts for

those who have been wrongfully injured. With members in the United States, Canada, and abroad, AAJ is

the world’s largest plaintiff trial bar. AAJ members

primarily represent plaintiffs in personal injury actions, employment rights cases, consumer cases, and

other civil actions, including civil rights cases.

1 Pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 37, amici state that no counsel for any party authored this brief in whole or in part, and that

no entity or person other than amici and their counsel made any

monetary contribution intended to fund the preparation or submission of this brief.

2

Throughout its 79-year history, AAJ has served as a

leading advocate for the right of all Americans to seek

legal recourse for wrongful conduct. AAJ members are

concerned that affirmance of the decision below will

deprive a wide swath of victims of the remedy Congress intended for those deprived of their constitutional rights.

This case directly implicates amici’s work because

the Fifth Circuit’s rule restricts the ability to access

courts to seek redress for or prospective relief against

rights violations, including for incarcerated people.

INTRODUCTION AND

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

The Court should reverse the Fifth Circuit’s unwarranted extension of Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477

(1994), which improperly bars § 1983 suits seeking

only prospective relief. Heck was meant to serve a narrow purpose: to channel challenges to the validity of a

conviction or confinement into habeas, where the statutory exhaustion requirements apply. See Heck, 512

U.S. at 481–83. That limitation ensures that habeas

remains the exclusive remedy for attacks on existing

convictions and sentences, while preserving § 1983’s

essential role in vindicating constitutional rights.

The concerns underlying Heck have no application

where a plaintiff does not—and cannot—seek habeas

relief. When an individual seeks only to prevent the

future enforcement of an unconstitutional law, or

when habeas is unavailable because the person is not,

or is no longer, “in custody,” there is no conflict between § 1983 and the habeas statute. In those circumstances, § 1983 provides the only meaningful avenue

for relief. To bar such claims deprives people of the

“fundamental constitutional right of access to the

3

courts” recognized in this Court’s precedents. See

Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 821–25 (1977).

The Fifth Circuit’s approach wrongly closes the

courthouse doors in just this way. By reading Heck to

foreclose all § 1983 claims that might “possibly” imply

the invalidity of a conviction or punishment—whether

past or prospective—the Fifth Circuit leaves people

with no remedy at all. That perverse outcome is at

odds with the text of § 1983, which authorizes “[a]ny

citizen” to seek redress for violations of constitutional

rights, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and with this Court’s decisions distinguishing between retrospective and prospective relief. See, e.g., Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S.

74, 81–82 (2005); Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705,

711–12 (1977).

The Fifth Circuit’s rule has severe consequences. For

people previously convicted under unconstitutional

laws, it denies the opportunity to secure forward-looking relief against future enforcement. For prisoners or

other people never eligible for habeas in the first place

(like Mr. Olivier), it extinguishes their only avenue to

vindicate their rights.

This Court’s precedents make clear that prospective

relief under § 1983 neither undermines habeas nor

threatens the finality of prior convictions. Injunctions

operate prospectively, not retroactively; they regulate

future conduct without annulling past judgments. Applying Heck to bar such claims needlessly sacrifices access to the courts, a fundamental constitutional right.

The Court should restore the proper scope of Heck,

confirm that § 1983 remains available for prospective

challenges, and reaffirm the principle that access to

courts to vindicate constitutional rights is itself a fundamental constitutional guarantee.

4

ARGUMENT

I. Access to courts to protect fundamental

rights is itself a fundamental constitutional

right.

“The right of access to the courts . . . is founded in

the Due Process Clause[,] and assures that no person

will be denied the opportunity to present to the judiciary allegations concerning violations of fundamental

constitutional rights.” Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S.

539, 579 (1974). “[H]abeas corpus and civil rights actions,” in particular, “are of ‘fundamental importance . . . in our constitutional scheme’ because

they directly protect our most valued rights.” Bounds,

430 U.S. at 827 (quoting Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S.

483 (1969)). As a result, this Court’s precedents are replete with decisions protecting “the fundamental constitutional right of access to the courts,” especially for

prisoners seeking to vindicate their rights. Bounds,

430 U.S. at 821–25 (collecting cases); see also Lewis v.

Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 351 (1996) (describing the “35year line of access-to-courts cases on which Bounds relied”).

Access to courts to protect these rights is critical.

“[T]he right to due process reflects a fundamental

value in our American constitutional system.” Boddie

v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 374 (1971). “American society . . . bottoms its systematic definition of individual

rights and duties, as well as its machinery for dispute

settlement, not on custom or the will of strategically

placed individuals, but on the common-law model. It is

to courts, or other quasi-judicial official bodies, that we

ultimately look for the implementation of a regularized, orderly process of dispute settlement.” Id. at 375.

But for that system to be effective, individuals must be

able to access it to advocate for the protection of their

5

rights. “[D]enial of a [party’s] full access to that process

raises grave problems for its legitimacy.” Id. at 376.

Section 1983 plays a vital role in facilitating that allimportant access to courts. “Since 1871, when it was

passed by Congress, § 1983 has stood as an independent safeguard against deprivations of federal constitutional and statutory rights.” Smith v. Robinson, 468

U.S. 992, 1012 (1984). Section 1983 “‘throw[s] open the

doors of the United States courts’ to individuals who

were threatened with, or who had suffered, the deprivation of constitutional rights, and . . . provide[s] these

individuals immediate access to the federal courts.”

Patsy v. Bd. of Regents, 457 U.S. 496, 504 (1982).

Against that background, this Court “do[es] not lightly

conclude that Congress intended to preclude reliance

on § 1983 as a remedy” for federal rights violations.

Smith, 468 U.S. at 1012.

II. The Fifth Circuit’s extension of Heck to

purely prospective claims wrongly deprives

litigants of access to courts.

By extending Heck to bar purely prospective § 1983

claims, the Fifth Circuit slammed the courthouse

doors shut on innumerable would-be litigants seeking

to vindicate their constitutional rights. Under the

Fifth Circuit’s view, people suffering ongoing or future

violations of their constitutional rights are left without

any remedies. This interpretation stretches Heck beyond its reasoning and unnecessarily insulates ongoing constitutional violations from challenge.

The Fifth Circuit’s rule wrongly prevents people, including those who are or have been imprisoned, from

securing relief against ongoing or future violations of

their rights.

6

A. The Fifth Circuit’s rule leaves people

without the ability to vindicate their

rights.

The Fifth Circuit’s rule closes the courthouse doors

on those most in need of access to courts to vindicate

their rights, with no basis in statutory text. Both

§ 1983 and habeas “provide access to a federal forum

for claims of unconstitutional treatment at the hands

of state officials.” Heck, 512 U.S. at 480. Section 1983

allows “any citizen” (emphasis added) who has been

deprived of “any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws” by someone acting

under color of state law to bring a claim to vindicate

those rights. Habeas corpus, meanwhile, permits prisoners to seek release when they are being held “in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the

United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a).

Heck involved “the intersection” of § 1983 and habeas, where a § 1983 claim would “call into question

the lawfulness of” a state prisoner’s “conviction or confinement,” which is typically a habeas issue. Heck, 512

U.S. at 481–83. Under those circumstances, this Court

read an implied—but narrow—exception into § 1983,

to channel claims challenging a conviction through habeas, where they belong. Id. In other words, where a

litigant might otherwise have been able to pursue either a § 1983 claim or a habeas claim, this Court held

that § 1983 claims are not cognizable because the litigant must seek any relief through habeas instead. Id.

at 482–83.

The Fifth Circuit’s expansion of Heck, however, creates circumstances in which a person has neither a cognizable § 1983 claim nor a habeas claim. For example,

if someone was never in custody, or if she was not in

custody long enough to exhaust the habeas process,

she cannot prevail on a habeas claim and therefore has

7

no remedy. See Pet’r Br. 41–45. But under the Fifth

Circuit’s view, that person also cannot bring a § 1983

claim, even for prospective relief. In other words, the

perverse result of the decision below is that a litigant

who otherwise might have had two different avenues

to a federal forum to vindicate constitutional rights

now has none.

Furthermore, those people left without any remedy

are those most likely to need one. According to the

Fifth Circuit, any person who has previously been convicted of violating a law cannot seek prospective relief

against that law’s future enforcement. But those who

have been convicted of violating a (perhaps unconstitutional) law in the past are more likely to be able to

establish a “risk of future injury under the ordinance”

if they intend to continue violating the law. See Olivier

v. City of Brandon, 121 F.4th 511, 512 (5th Cir. 2024)

(Ho, J., dissenting) (mem.), citing Susan B. Anthony

List v. Driehaus, 573 U.S. 149, 164 (2014) (“[P]ast enforcement . . . is good evidence that the threat of enforcement is not ‘chimerical.’”). If that individual believes the ordinance violates his or her constitutional

rights, § 1983 provides a federal forum for that individual to make those arguments. Yet the Fifth Circuit’s interpretation of Heck has the perverse result of

closing the courthouse doors to that individual entirely.

B. Prisoners in particular have an acute

need to access courts to challenge unconstitutional prison policies.

Closing the courthouse doors is particularly harmful

to prisoners seeking prospective relief against unconstitutional policies applied to them in prisons. The

court’s ruling in Clarke, on which the decision below

relied, App. 8a–10a, is a prime example. The plaintiff

in Clarke was disciplined for violating a prison rule

8

that prohibited “threatening a prison employee with

legal redress during a confrontational situation.”

Clarke v. Stalder, 154 F.3d 186, 188 (5th Cir. 1998)

(cleaned up). He was punished with “the loss of ten

days good-time credit” and a transfer “to a higher-security prison.” Id. He then brought a § 1983 suit seeking damages, the restoration of his good-time credits,

and “prospective injunctive relief” under the First

Amendment against the rule’s future enforcement

against him. See id. The Fifth Circuit panel rejected

the retrospective-relief claims as Heck-barred, but

reached the merits of the prospective-relief claim,

holding the prison rule facially unconstitutional. Id. at

187.

The en banc Fifth Circuit, however, held that Heck

barred all these claims—including the claim for injunctive relief. In the court’s view, “a facial declaration

of the unconstitutionality of” the prison’s rule “would

‘necessarily imply’ the invalidity of his loss of goodtime credits”—meaning it “would ‘necessarily imply’

the invalidity of his punishment.” Id. at 189–90. In the

Fifth Circuit, even such prospective, “broad-based attacks” on prison policies “must be pursued initially

through habeas corpus.” Id. at 190 (cleaned up) (quoting Serio v. Members of La. State Bd. of Pardons, 821

F.2d 1112, 1119 (5th Cir. 1987)).

As the Clarke dissenters explained, by requiring resort to habeas even for purely prospective challenges

to prison policies, the Fifth Circuit’s rule requires “a

waste of judicial time and resources.” Id. at 194

(Garza, J., dissenting). “It is not necessary for [a plaintiff] to have a lower court conduct Habeas Corpus proceedings” to adjudicate such prospective claims. Id. “At

best,” a successful prospective claim “could ‘possibly

imply’ the invalidity of” the underlying disciplinary action, which is not enough to trigger Heck. Id. at 191.

9

That follows both from the distinction between retrospective and prospective relief and from the fact that

(as Heck itself noted) various doctrines could prevent

even a successful prospective-relief claim from implying that the plaintiff was unlawfully punished. See id.

at 195–96 (Dennis, J., dissenting); App. 50a (Oldham,

J., dissenting).

By requiring such wasteful and protracted habeas

proceedings, the Fifth Circuit’s rule insulates unconstitutional prison policies from judicial review—either

temporarily or permanently. A habeas challenge can

take years to adjudicate, during which the plaintiff remains subject to the unconstitutional policy. At worst,

a merits resolution will never come. If, for example, a

habeas court determines that the application of the

challenged policy was irrelevant to the ultimate discipline imposed—possibly because there were other

grounds for discipline—it need not resolve the issue at

all. Cf. Clarke, 154 F.3d at 195–96 (Dennis, J., dissenting).

The Fifth Circuit’s approach also exacerbates a related issue. Because prison disciplinary proceedings

are treated as “convictions” under Heck to the extent

they result in the loss of good-time credits, courts often

apply Heck to reject § 1983 claims alleging excessive

force by prison guards if the prisoner’s allegations contradict the version of events accepted in the disciplinary proceedings. See Devi M. Rao, The Heck Bar

Gone Too Far: Heck’s Application to Prisoners’ Excessive Force Suits, 17 Harv. L. & Pol’y Rev. 365, 373–76

(2023) (discussing Santos v. White, 18 F.4th 472 (5th

Cir. 2021)). By itself, that approach creates perverse

incentives by providing “a unique opportunity for

prison officials to forever insulate themselves from liability—and federal-court review—by simply falsify-

10

ing a disciplinary report.” Id. at 377; see also Jan Ransom, In N.Y.C. Jail System, Guards Often Lie About

Excessive Force, N.Y. Times (Apr. 24, 2021), https://tinyurl.com/mvez8cw5 (describing recurring instances

of prison guards lying to investigators or filing incomplete or inaccurate reports). Extending Heck to bar

purely prospective claims just worsens the problem: A

prisoner who faces an ongoing pattern of excessive

force and physical abuse cannot point to past incidents

of abuse to secure injunctive relief under § 1983 if

prison officials have punished him with lost good-time

credits based on guards’ falsified accounts of their actions. And to make matters worse, the Fifth Circuit’s

application of these rules in the prison-discipline context is “byzantine and inadministrable.” Rao, supra, at

378–79.

For these reasons, the Fifth Circuit’s approach “subverts the federal courts’ role as arbiters of federal

rights.” Id. at 377.

III. Prospective relief targets future enforcement and policy, not past convictions.

Applying the Heck bar to § 1983 claims seeking

solely prospective relief is not necessary to (1) avoid

interfering with habeas or (2) protect the integrity of

past convictions.

Habeas is about seeking relief from existing convictions—it allows “a person in custody” to seek earlier or

immediate release from confinement. 28 U.S.C.

§ 2254(a). “Habeas is the exclusive remedy . . . for the

prisoner who seeks ‘immediate or speedier release’

from confinement.” Skinner v. Switzer, 562 U.S. 521,

525 (2011) (quoting Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74,

82 (2005)). “Where the prisoner’s claim would not ‘necessarily spell speedier release,’ however, suit may be

11

brought under § 1983.” Id. (quoting Wilkinson, 544

U.S. at 82).

Purely prospective relief seeking to bar future enforcement of a law “does not result in immediate or

speedier release into the community or necessarily imply the invalidity of a prior conviction or sentence.”

App. 47a (Ho, J., dissenting) (cleaned up); id. at 50a

(Oldham, J., dissenting). In Wilkinson, for example,

this Court held that prisoners could bring § 1983

claims challenging allegedly unconstitutional procedures used at their parole hearings. The prisoners

sought prospective relief in the form of new parole

hearings conducted using constitutionally proper procedures. This Court reasoned that those “claims for future relief (which, if successful, will not necessarily imply the invalidity of confinement or shorten its duration)” were “distant from” the “core of habeas corpus.”

544 U.S. at 75, 82. Thus, allowing § 1983 claims where

the relief sought challenges purely prospective application of a law does not interfere with habeas.

Nor does an injunction seeking purely prospective

relief call into question the validity of a past conviction. A suit seeking “wholly prospective [relief], to preclude further prosecution under a statute alleged to violate [the plaintiff’s] constitutional rights,” “is in no

way ‘designed to annul the results of a state trial’” that

produced a prior conviction under the challenged law.

Wooley, 430 U.S. at 711–12. “Ordinarily,” then, “a

prayer for such prospective relief will not ‘necessarily

imply’ the invalidity of a previous [conviction or] loss

of good-time credits, and so may properly be brought

under § 1983.” Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U.S. 641, 648

(1997); see Skinner, 562 U.S. at 525 (while the petitioner’s aim was to establish his innocence and achieve

release from custody, success in his § 1983 suit would

not necessarily result in release).

12

“Injunctions do not work backwards to invalidate official actions taken in the past.” App. 50a (Oldham, J.,

dissenting). Accordingly, a forward-looking injunction

to “prevent future official enforcement actions” does

not necessarily invalidate a past conviction entered before the injunction took effect. Id.; see also Pet’r Br. 20.

That is consistent with how courts treat changes in the

law, which generally (with few exceptions) do not apply retroactively to call into question past convictions

that have become final. Cf. Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S.

288, 310 (1989) (plurality op.) (holding that “new constitutional rules of criminal procedure will not be applicable to those cases which have become final before

the new rules are announced”).

The Fifth Circuit’s approach otherwise leads to illogical results. The Heck bar, according to the Fifth Circuit, precludes a person who has been convicted of violating a law—call him John Doe—from bringing a

§ 1983 claim challenging that law as unconstitutional.

But Heck does not preclude a different person who was

not previously convicted of violating that same law—

Jane Smith—from bringing such a claim. And if Jane

Smith succeeds in obtaining an injunction barring future enforcement of the law, that prospective relief

would not invalidate John Doe’s past conviction. The

result is no different, however, if John Doe, instead of

Jane Smith, brings the claim for prospective relief. In

both situations, the impact of the § 1983 claim is only

prospective. Its outcome says nothing about past convictions. So the Fifth Circuit’s overbroad reading of

Heck is unnecessary to protect the integrity of those

convictions.

13

IV. Extending Heck to plaintiffs with no habeas

path is particularly harmful to current and

former prisoners’ civil rights.

By applying Heck even where habeas is not available, the Fifth Circuit further extends the doctrine beyond its reasoning and prevents people from vindicating their rights altogether.

Since the passage of the Anti-terrorism and Effective

Death Penalty Act of 1996, “[t]he combination of

AEDPA’s habeas restrictions and Heck’s bar on certain

§ 1983 claims may leave many prisoners with valid but

unremedied constitutional claims.” See Note, Defining

the Reach of Heck v. Humphrey: Should the Favorable

Termination Rule Apply to Individuals who Lack Access to Habeas Corpus?, 121 Harv. L. Rev. 868, 869

(2008). Heck’s rule reflects Congress’s determination

“that habeas corpus is the appropriate remedy for

state prisoners attacking the validity of the fact or

length of their confinement.” 512 U.S. at 482 (quoting

Preiser, 411 U.S. at 490). But that rationale has no

force where a prisoner has been released, or where a

person (like Mr. Olivier) was never imprisoned to

begin with. Nor can a § 1983 suit have preclusive effect

in habeas proceedings where habeas is unavailable.

Cf. id. at 488 n.9.

Thus, “the interests that the Court felt were at stake

in Heck and Preiser”—“preventing an end-run around

the [habeas] exhaustion requirement and ensuring

that § 1983 does not serve as even an indirect basis for

undoing state criminal convictions”—are “not compromised in cases in which habeas relief is unavailable.”

Defining the Reach, supra, at 882. And “the state interests in denying remedies under § 1983 are simply

not so substantial as to deny access to the federal forum for inmates”—or other litigants seeking to vindicate their constitutional rights—“who are ineligible for

14

habeas and who seek relief for constitutional deprivations.” Id. at 888. Unlike habeas claims, § 1983 claims

“do not reduce the certitude that the convicted criminal will serve the sentence that the state has imposed

upon him.” Id. at 886. Likewise, even a successful

§ 1983 claim “does not result in the undoing of a criminal conviction.” Id. at 887 (emphasis added). On the

other hand, “when Heck is invoked to bar claims by individuals who no longer have access to habeas corpus,”

either because they are no longer in custody or were

never incarcerated to begin with, “a curious remedial

oddity results: less serious constitutional claims remain cognizable in § 1983, while more serious constitutional claims—those that would necessarily imply

the invalidity of petitioner’s conviction—go unremedied entirely.” Id. at 889.

“The better view” of Heck¸ then, “is that a former

prisoner, no longer ‘in custody,’ may bring a § 1983 action establishing the unconstitutionality of a conviction or confinement without being bound to satisfy a

favorable termination requirement that it would be

impossible as a matter of law for himself to satisfy.”

Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 20–21 (1998) (Souter, J.,

concurring).

V. Access to courts is especially critical for incarcerated people.

The “better view” of Heck—that § 1983 claims may

proceed where success would not necessarily call into

question the validity of a conviction or the length of

confinement—does more than safeguard constitutional rights in the abstract. It accords with the Constitution’s longstanding protection of access to the

courts, particularly for prisoners, who are uniquely under the government’s control. See, e.g., Ex parte Hull,

312 U.S. 546, 549 (1941) (stating that “the state and

its officers may not abridge or impair petitioner’s right

15

to apply to a federal court for a writ of habeas corpus”);

Bounds, 430 U.S. at 821–23 (recognizing prisoners’

right of meaningful access to courts); Lewis, 518 U.S.

at 343 (clarifying that Bounds “acknowledged [ ] the

right of access to the courts”).

A. Prisoners uniquely rely on judicial oversight and have limited alternative remedies.

People in custody live under total institutional control. Day‑to‑day decisions affecting their liberty,

safety, speech, and bodily integrity are made by officials operating behind walls, often shielded from public view. In that environment, external judicial review

is frequently the only effective check on constitutional

violations that otherwise may never surface. This

Court has therefore guarded prisoners’ ability to reach

the judiciary, forbidding administrative gatekeeping

of legal filings and requiring that the government provide meaningful access to courts. See, e.g., Ex parte

Hull, 312 U.S. at 549; Bounds, 430 U.S. at 821–23.

That context matters here. While conditions of confinement are not at issue in Mr. Olivier’s case, an interpretation of Heck that uniquely impedes incarcerated litigants’ ability to seek prospective injunctive relief under § 1983 would erode the very access this

Court has insisted must remain open. Restraints on

prisoners’ ability to access the courts—by their mere

status as a current or former prisoner—risks impairing prisoners’ access to the only remedial avenue that

may be available to them.

B. Habeas is not an adequate remedy in all

cases.

Habeas does not provide an adequate remedy for ongoing constitutional violations. Prisoners subject to

unconstitutional prison policies may have their rights

16

violated daily. The habeas process, however, is slow

and narrowly targeted at release. Many prisoners complete short sentences before habeas litigation can even

begin, much less conclude; others are never “in custody” in a way that permits habeas at all (for example,

those convicted of fine‑only ordinance violations or

those released from confinement). See Spencer, 523

U.S. at 19 (Souter, J., concurring) (stating that for a

released prisoner, where habeas is unavailable, it

would be “unsound” to bar § 1983). If Heck were read

to foreclose § 1983 actions unless and until a favorable

termination occurs—even when habeas is unavailable

or ill‑suited—serious constitutional injuries would go

unremedied and ongoing harms would continue unchecked during and after confinement. This Court’s

precedent avoids that mismatch by permitting § 1983

claims for prospective and other relief that do not necessarily call a conviction’s validity into question. See,

e.g., Wilkinson, 544 U.S. at 82.

C. Allowing § 1983 claims promotes judicial

economy.

Allowing incarcerated (or recently incarcerated)

people to litigate constitutional challenges under

§ 1983 promotes judicial economy and accelerates resolution of important questions. These people are

uniquely motivated to challenge the violation, as the

person actually subjected to the challenged policy or

ordinance has the strongest incentive to bring a focused claim, assemble the relevant record, and obtain

prompt forward‑looking relief. Early adjudication by

those best positioned to litigate prevents ongoing violations and reduces repetitive litigation by later, similarly situated plaintiffs.

The contrary rule, adopted by the Fifth Circuit, illogically silences the litigant most motivated and best positioned to challenge an unconstitutional policy, while

17

inviting only strangers or future victims to sue. Nothing in Heck or Preiser requires that inefficiency. The

better reading—fully consistent with this Court’s access‑to‑courts jurisprudence and with the limited role

of habeas—permits § 1983 actions that do not necessarily imply invalidity of a prior conviction, particularly when the plaintiff seeks only forward‑looking relief. That approach protects constitutional rights,

channels disputes into the proper procedural vehicle,

and avoids uniquely excluding prisoners from the

courthouse.

18

CONCLUSION

For these reasons, the Court should reverse the decision below.

Respectfully submitted,

BRUCE PLAXEN

President

JEFFREY R. WHITE

Sr. Associate General

Counsel

AMERICAN ASSOCIATION

FOR JUSTICE

777 6th Street, N.W.

#300

Washington, DC 20001

Counsel for American

Association for Justice

TOBIAS S. LOSS-EATON

Counsel of Record

SIDLEY AUSTIN LLP

1501 K Street, N.W.

Washington, DC 20005

(202) 736-8000

tlosseaton@sidley.com

PHILLIP M. AURENTZ

CHELSEA A. PRIEST

SIDLEY AUSTIN LLP

2021 McKinney Avenue

Suite 2000

Dallas, TX 75201

Counsel for Amici Curiae

September 9, 2025