Amicus Curiae Brief — Gabriel Olivier, Petitioner v. City of Brandon, Mississippi

Supreme Court briefApr 16, 2025

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No. 24-993

In the Supreme Court of the United States

GABRIEL OLIVIER,

Petitioner,

CITY OF BRANDON, ET AL.,

Respondents.

On Petition for Writ of Certiorari

to the United States Court of Appeals

for the Fifth Circuit.

BRIEF OF YOUNG AMERICA’S

FOUNDATION AS AMICUS CURIAE

IN SUPPORT OF PETITIONER

Rachel A. Rickel

McMahon Surovik Suttle, P.C.

P.O. Box 3679

Abilene, TX 79604

Madison Leigh Hahn

Counsel of Record

Young America’s

Foundation

11480 Commerce Park

Dr., Ste 600

Reston, VA 20191

mhahn@yaf.org

(800) 872-1776

Counsel for Amicus Curiae

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Table of Authorities .................................................... ii

Interest of Amici Curiae .............................................. 1

Summary of the Argument ......................................... 3

Argument ..................................................................... 4

I. This Court should grant certiorari to address

inconsistencies between the Fifth Circuit’s

holding and other judicial doctrines that

control claimants’ access to federal courts. .... 4

A. The Fifth Circuit’s holding violates City

of Houston’s proscription against

abstention in First Amendment facial

challenges. ................................................... 5

B. The Fifth Circuit’s application of Heck

ignores safeguards present in Rooker–

Feldman, claim preclusion, and

abstention doctrines. .................................. 8

II. This Court should grant certiorari to ensure

the Heck bar respects statutory text. ........... 19

III.This Court should grant certiorari to correct

an interpretation that is inconsistent with

the context of Heck’s rule. ............................ 23

Conclusion .................................................................. 27

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases

Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90 (1980) ...................8, 12

Arizonans for Off. Eng. v. Arizona,

520 U.S. 43 (1997) ............................................15–16

City of Houston v. Hill,

482 U.S. 451 (1987), .......................................5–6, 16

Colo. River Water Conserv. Dist. v. United States,

424 U.S. 800 (1976) ............................4, 7, 12, 15, 17

Expressions Hair Design v. Schneiderman,

581 U.S. 37 (2017) ..............................................7, 16

Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp.,

544 U.S. 280 (2005) ..................................................9

Growe v. Emison, 507 U.S. 25 (1993) .............8, 12, 15

Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff,

467 U.S. 229 (1984) ..........................................14–15

Health & Hosp. Corp. v. Talevski,

599 U.S. 166 (2023) ................................................20

Heck v. Humphrey,

512 U.S. 477 (1994) ..............3–5, 7–8, 13, 19, 21–27

iii

Lance v. Dennis, 546 U.S. 459 (2006) .....................8–9

Maleng v. Cook, 490 U.S. 488 (1989) ........................21

McDonough v. Smith, 588 U.S. 109 (2019) ..............26

Middlesex Cnty. Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar

Ass’n, 457 U.S. 423 (1982) .....................................13

Migra v. Warren City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ.,

465 U.S. 75 (1984) ..................................................10

Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225 (1972) .............13, 20

New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc. v. Council of New

Orleans, 491 U.S. 350 (1989) ...........................13–14

Patsy v. Bd. of Regents, 457 U.S. 496 (1982) ............20

Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475 (1973) ......3, 21–22

Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co.,

517 U.S. 706 (1996) .........................................16–17

Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509 (1982) ..........................21

San Remo Hotel, L.P. v. City & Cnty. of San

Francisco, 545 U.S. 323 (2005) ..............................10

Sprint Commc’ns, Inc. v. Jacobs,

571 U.S. 69 (2013) ..................................7, 13–14, 19

Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452 (1974) .................14

Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914 (2000) ...................6

Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus,

573 U.S. 149 (2014) ................................................26

Whole Woman's Health v. Hellerstedt,

579 U.S. 582 (2016) ..........................................10–12

Statutes

28 U.S.C. § 2254.........................................................21

42 U.S.C. § 1983...........................10, 12–13, 17, 19–27

Other Authorities

CONG GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. (1871).................20

INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE1

Young America’s Foundation (“YAF”) is a

national nonprofit organization committed to

ensuring that increasing numbers of young

Americans understand and are inspired by the ideas

of individual freedom, a strong national defense, free

enterprise, and traditional values. YAF leads the

Conservative Movement on campuses throughout the

country by sponsoring campus lectures and other

activities, which often results in conflict with

university leaders who disagree with YAF’s messages

and ideas.

YAF’s National Journalism Center trains

budding journalists to be truth-seekers who are

ethical and bold in exercising their First Amendment

rights. Over the last 45 years, the Center has trained

over 2,250 journalists to combat bias in the

mainstream media. YAF also has a significant

1 No counsel for a party authored this brief in whole or in part,

and no person other than amici and their counsel made any

monetary contribution intended to fun the preparation or

submission of this brief. Counsel were timely notified of this brief

as required by Supreme Court Rule 37.2.

interest in protecting

Amendment rights.

those

journalists’

First

YAF is alarmed at the far-reaching effect and

lack of protection for claimants under the Fifth

Circuit’s expansion of the Heck bar. YAF’s

membership base consists of college students who

regularly seek to exercise their free speech rights, and

who because of limited finances, experience, and time

are more likely to feel they have no choice but to plead

guilty to a violation and pay a small fine than to fight

a conviction. Under the holding below, this course of

action would render the students unable to seek

prospective injunctive relief against further

encroachments on their First Amendment rights.

YAF files this brief out of concern for its

members’ ability to seek needed relief for First

Amendment violations.

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

The Fifth Circuit’s holding below presents a de

facto broad new abstention doctrine that is

inconsistent with other judicial doctrines that control

the doors of the federal courthouse. Neither the

Rooker–Feldman doctrine, nor claim preclusion, nor

abstention doctrines block claimants’ access to federal

courts to raise issues distinct from those that a state

court considered in a completed prior proceeding—

especially when the federal claim contains a First

Amendment constitutional challenge. In contrast, the

Fifth Circuit’s holding in Olivier closes the courthouse

doors in exactly this situation. The Fifth Circuit’s

erroneous application of the bar that this Court stated

in Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), abdicates

federal courts’ “virtually unflagging obligation” to

adjudicate “cases and controversies” over which they

hold jurisdiction.

Additionally, the original bar in Preiser v.

Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475 (1973) and in Heck v.

Humphrey recognized principles of statutory

construction and thus attempted to harmonize

Congress’s expressed intent in two apparently

conflicting statutes: the Civil Rights Act and the

federal habeas statute. And the context of the original

Heck bar counsels a restrained interpretation of what

“necessarily impl[ies] the invalidity” of a conviction.

The Fifth Circuit’s interpretation of Heck fails to

respect principles of statutory interpretation and runs

far beyond Heck’s context.

Because the basis for the Fifth Circuit’s

decision, and the decision itself, violate important

constitutional principles and contradict case law, with

far-reaching implications, the Supreme Court’s

intervention is necessary.

ARGUMENT

I. This Court should grant certiorari to

address inconsistencies between the

Fifth Circuit’s holding and other judicial

doctrines that control claimants’ access

to federal courts.

Federal courts have a “virtually unflagging

obligation . . . to exercise the jurisdiction given them,”

including when state courts hold concurrent

jurisdiction over the same matter. Colo. River Water

Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 817,

(1976) (citing England v. La. State Bd. of Med.

Exam’rs, 375 U.S. 411, 415 (1964); McClellan v.

Carland, 217 U.S. 268, 281–82 (1910); Cohens v.

Virginia, 19 U.S. 264 (1821)). Thus, generally, “the

pendency of an action in the state court is no bar to

proceedings concerning the same matter in the

Federal court having jurisdiction.” Id. (quoting

McClellan, 217 U.S. at 282) (citing Donovan v. City of

Dallas, 377 U.S. 408 (1964)). Although several

doctrines require or permit federal courts to avoid

adjudicating a claim related to a state action, the

application of these doctrines is exceptionally narrow.

Id.

In the decision below, the Fifth Circuit

significantly expanded the rule of Heck v. Humphrey,

512 U.S. 477 (1994) to create in essence a new

abstention doctrine. This extension of the Heck bar

violates the principles of City of Houston v. Hill, 482

U.S. 451 (1987), which disapproves of abstention in

First Amendment facial challenges to city ordinances

such as the ordinance that Petitioner Gabriel Olivier

seeks to address. The holding also ignores safeguards

and limitations present in other doctrines that control

claimants’ ability to bring constitutional challenges in

federal courts. Thus, this case presents important

issues for this Court’s review.

A. The Fifth Circuit’s holding violates City

of Houston’s proscription against

abstention in First Amendment facial

challenges.

Olivier initiated this federal case asserting that

the City of Brandon’s ordinance violates the First

Amendment. Appx. 16a. Olivier petitioned the district

court for “prospective injunctive relief . . . on grounds

of facial unconstitutionality.” Appx. 9a. This is exactly

the type of adjudication from which this Court has

said federal courts should not abstain. City of

Houston, 482 U.S. at 453, 467–68 (first quoting

Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 489–90 (1965);

and then quoting Zwickler v. Koota, 389 U.S. 421

(1967)).

In City of Houston, 482 U.S. at 453, 455, the

plaintiff brought a facial First Amendment challenge

to a municipal ordinance. The City of Houston, as

defendant, urged abstention on the grounds that the

matter was better suited for state courts. Id. at 467.

This Court rejected the abstention argument, noting

that the municipal court that “regularly applied” the

ordinance had a fair opportunity to limit the scope of

the ordinance and failed to do so. Id. at 469–70. This

Court held that “there is certainly no need for a

federal court to abstain until state appellate courts

have an opportunity to construe” a regularly-applied

or unambiguous statute. Id. at 467, 469–70; see also

Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 945 (2000)

(confirming the City of Houston rule).

This Court further held that “forc[ing] the

plaintiff who has commenced a federal action to suffer

the delay of state-court proceedings might itself effect

the impermissible chilling of the very constitutional

right he seeks to protect.” City of Houston, 482 U.S. at

467–68 (quoting Zwickler, 389 U.S. at 252). In so

holding, this Court reconfirmed that “[a]bstention

is . . . the exception and not the rule” and that

“abstention . . . is inappropriate” for “facial challenges

based on the First Amendment.” Id. In a more recent

concurring opinion, Justice Sotomayor acknowledged

the continuing validity of this rule, stating that “this

Court has described abstention as particularly

problematic where, as here, a challenge to a state

statute rests on the First Amendment.” Expressions

Hair Design v. Schneiderman, 581 U.S. 37, 58 (2017)

(Sotomayer, J., concurring) (citing Virginia v. Am.

Booksellers Assn., Inc., 484 U.S. 383, 396 (1988); City

of Houston, 482 U.S. at 467–68).

The Fifth Circuit’s decision to expand Heck is

inconsistent with its obligation to decide cases and

controversies over which it holds jurisdiction. See

Colo. River, 424 U.S. at 817. It is also inconsistent

with this Court’s admonitions that abstention is an

“exceptional” step. See Sprint Commc’ns, Inc. v.

Jacobs, 571 U.S. 69, 73 (2013) (quoting Colo. River,

424 U.S. at 817). Allowing the Fifth Circuit to turn the

Heck bar into a de facto broad new abstention

doctrine—as it has in this case—will chill the First

Amendment rights of many throughout that Circuit,

including amicus’s members. This important matter

thus warrants this Court’s review.

B. The Fifth Circuit’s application of Heck

ignores guardrails present in Rooker–

Feldman,

claim

preclusion,

and

abstention doctrines.

The

Rooker–Feldman

doctrine,

claim

preclusion, and various abstention doctrines govern

interplay between federal and state courts. Lance v.

Dennis, 546 U.S. 459, 463 (2006) (Rooker–Feldman);

Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 101 (1980) (preclusion);

Growe v. Emison, 507 U.S. 25, 32 (1993) (abstention).

As amicus discusses below, this Court has provided

guidance as to when one or more of these doctrines

might bar a plaintiff’s federal court claim on the basis

of a related state court proceeding. However, each of

these limiting doctrines addresses concerns relating

to jurisdiction, Congressional direction, or federalism.

And each imposes at least a modicum of protection

that supports claimants’ access to relief in federal

courts. These concerns and guardrails are not present

in the Fifth Circuit’s reading of Heck.

The Rooker–Feldman doctrine delineates one

aspect of the boundaries of federal courts’ subject

matter jurisdiction: it prevents lower federal courts

from adjudicating collateral attacks on state court

judgments because Congress has reserved such

federal review to this Court. Lance, 546 U.S. at 463

(citing 28 U.S.C. § 1257). Rooker–Feldman applies

only after a state court has rendered a final judgment,

and only bars review of the state court judgment itself.

Id. at 464. The doctrine does not prevent a federal

district court from exercising jurisdiction over “a

matter [that the same party] previously litigated in

state court” or “some independent claim, albeit one

that denies a legal conclusion that a state court has

reached in a case to which he was a party.” Exxon

Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280,

293 (2005) (quoting GASH Assocs. v. Rosemont, 995 F.

2d 726, 728 (7th Cir. 1993) (citing Noel v. Hall, 341

F.3d 1148, 1163–64 (9th Cir. 2003). Accordingly, this

Court has been sparse in its application of the Rooker–

Feldman doctrine and has warned of its narrowness—

confining its reach strictly to constitutional and

legislative mandates. Lance, 546 U.S. at 464; Exxon

Mobil 544 U.S. at 293.

Olivier’s claim is well within federal courts’

jurisdictional bounds as stated in Exxon Mobil,

because he does not appeal his prior conviction.

However, the Fifth Circuit does not base its new Heck

bar on an interpretation of either jurisdictional or

Congressional grounds; instead, it focuses on

reinterpreting—and expanding—a judge-made rule.

Appx. 7a–9a, 11a, 14a.

Claim preclusion is another doctrine that

addresses federalism and comity concerns. Allen, 449

U.S. at 95–96 (first citing Montana v. United States,

440 U.S. 147 (1979); then citing Angel v. Bullington,

330 U.S. 183 (1947); and then citing Younger v.

Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 43–45 (1971)). Pursuant to the

constitution’s Full Faith and Credit Clause, Congress

legislated that state acts and judicial proceedings

“shall have the same full faith and credit in [federal

courts] as they have by law or usage” in their

respective state courts. Migra v. Warren City Sch.

Dist. Bd. of Educ., 465 U.S. 75, 83–84 (1984) (quoting

28 U.S.C. § 1738) (citing U.S. CONST., Art. IV, § 1).

Claim preclusion arises from this legislative mandate

and prohibits federal courts from relitigating the

“very same claim” that a state court already

considered and adjudged between the same parties.

Id.; Whole Woman's Health v. Hellerstedt, 579 U.S.

582, 599, (2016), as revised (June 27, 2016), abrogated

on other grounds by Dobbs v. Jackson Women's Health

Org., 597 U.S. 215 (2022).

Claim preclusion rules apply to suits brought

under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Allen, 449 U.S. at 95–96.

Claim preclusion prevents a federal plaintiff from

litigating the “same federal issues” that a state court

previously considered and resolved. San Remo Hotel,

L.P. v. City & Cnty. of San Francisco, 545 U.S. 323,

327 (2005) (applying preclusion to a Takings Claim

when the state court analyzed and ruled on a state law

claim using on this Court’s Takings Claim rules).

However, claim preclusion does not prevent a plaintiff

who received a state court judgment from bringing a

slightly new claim in federal court. Whole Woman’s

Health, 579 U.S. at 604–05. Whole Woman’s Health

emphasized the extreme narrowness of the preclusion

doctrine as prohibiting only “successive litigation of

the very same claim” and held that tiny changes in a

claimant’s posture can result in a subsequent claim on

the same subject matter being a different claim for

preclusion purposes. Id. at 599–600 (emphasis added).

For example, two constitutional attacks on the very

same statutory provision were not the “very same

claim” when the first was a pre-enforcement facial

challenge and the second a post-enforcement asapplied challenge. Id. at 600. New factual

development showing additional harm can make a

second identical claim not the “very same claim.” Id.

at 600–01. A state court ruling on a constitutional

challenge to one statutory provision did not preclude

a constitutional challenge on another provision within

the same statute. Id. at 604–05.

Using this framework by analogy, the two

claims at play in this matter are clearly dissimilar to

the point that this Court’s statedconcerns of

federalism and comity would not apply. In the state

court proceeding, Olivier pleaded guilty to violating a

municipal ordinance. Appx. 2a. In the subsequent

federal court proceeding, Olivier did not attack his

state conviction or challenge the facts of whether his

actions fell within the ordinance’s scope; instead, he

brought a wholly different claim under § 1983,

requesting prospective relief based on the

unconstitutionality of the ordinance. Appx. 1a–2a. If

two constitutional challenges to the same statute do

not constitute the “very same claim” such that comity

and federalism preclude a federal court from

considering the challenge, see Whole Woman’s Health,

579 U.S. at 600, 604–05, comity and federalism

concerns certainly would not preclude Olivier’s § 1983

claim. Even when preclusion applies, it does not bar a

federal answer, but merely requires a federal court to

give the state court judgment preclusive effect only to

the extent the courts of that state would do so—a far

less severe result than the Fifth Circuit’s refusal to

provide any answer. Allen, 449 U.S at 96; Appx. 13a.

Thus, preclusion is far more restrained than the Fifth

Circuit’s Heck bar, which oversteps the principles this

Court has laid out on appropriate interplay between

state and federal courts.

Additionally, federal courts in “extraordinary”

circumstances may may apply various abstention

doctrines to refrain from deciding cases and

controversies in which they have subject matter

jurisdiction. See, e.g., Colo. River, 424 U.S. at 813–14

(collecting cases). In comparison to the Fifth Circuit’s

Heck bar, these doctrines are narrower and more

specifically targeted to the underlying concerns of

comity and federalism. Growe, 507 U.S. at 32.

First, the Younger abstention doctrine prevents

federal courts from enjoining state prosecutions or

particular state civil proceedings that are akin to

criminal prosecutions. Sprint Commc’ns, 571 U.S at

72–73 (citing Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592

(1975)) (applying doctrine of Younger v. Harris, 401

U.S. 37 (1971)). Similar to Heck, early case law on the

Younger doctrine addressed the juxtaposition of

§ 1983 suits and state criminal prosecutions. See, e.g.,

Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 231 (1972).

However, Younger merely “precluded federal

intrusion into ongoing state criminal prosecutions,”

Sprint Commc’ns, 571 U.S. at 73 (citing New Orleans

Pub. Serv., Inc. v. Council of New Orleans, 491 U.S.

350, 358 (1989)) (emphasis added). And Younger does

not apply if the state court proceeding does not

provide “an adequate opportunity . . . to raise

constitutional challenges.” Middlesex Cnty. Ethics

Comm. v. Garden State Bar Ass’n, 457 U.S. 423, 432

(1982) (affirmed as factor in the Younger analysis by

Sprint Commnc’ns, 571 U.S. at 81).

Since establishing the Younger doctrine, this

Court has curtailed broad applications. For example,

it warned that expanding Younger’s scope into a

“broad abstention requirement would make a mockery

of the rule that only exceptional circumstances justify

a federal court’s refusal to decide a case in deference

to the States.” New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc., 491 U.S.

at 368 (citing Colo. River, 424 U.S. at 817; Moses H.

Cone Memorial Hospital v. Mercury Construction

Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 25 (1983); Moore v. Sims, 442 U.S.

415 423, n.8 (1979)). In Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff,

467 U.S. 229, 237–38 (1984), this Court held

“considerations of economy, equity, and federalism”

counseled against Younger abstention even in certain

cases in which a parallel state court proceeding

existed. And most recently, this Court reversed the

Eighth Circuit’s extension of Younger, stating that its

“result is irreconcilable with our dominant instruction

that, even in the presence of parallel state

proceedings, abstention from the exercise of federal

jurisdiction is the ‘exception, not the rule.’” Sprint

Commnc’ns, 571 U.S. at 81–82 (quoting Haw. Hous.

Auth., 467 U.S. at 236).

Younger’s narrow bounds contrast with the

Fifth Circuit’s Heck bar. Here, no state court

proceeding is pending. Appx. 3a. The holding below

applies a broad rule without examining whether

comity, equity, and federalism warrant the rule’s

application in that specific context, and without

considering whether the specific question implicates

an exceptional state interest. “[T]he relevant

principles of equity, comity, and federalism ‘have little

force in the absence of a pending state proceeding.’”

Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 462 (1974) (quoting

Lake Carriers’ Assn. v. MacMullan, 406 U.S. 498, 509

(1972)). Thus, the Fifth Circuit’s holding is at odds

with this Court’s abstention analysis under Younger.

Second, the historical Pullman “abstention” is

more appropriately called a “deferral,” as it allowed

federal courts to stay the federal proceeding pending

resolution of a concurrent state court proceeding.

Growe, 507 U.S. 32 n.1. Under this doctrine, federal

courts on occasion would give state courts the

opportunity to resolve complex issues of state law, if

such resolution would render the remaining federal

issues moot. Id.; Colo. River, 424 U.S. at 814 (quoting

County of Allegheny v. Frank Masuda Co., 360 U.S.

185, 189 (1166)). This doctrine necessarily required

(a) a concurrent state court proceeding and (b) an

ambiguous state statute that the state courts had not

yet interpreted. Haw. Hous. Auth., 467 U.S. at 237.

Neither element existed in the proceeding below—yet

the Fifth Circuit still abstained.

“Certification today covers territory once

dominated by . . . Pullman abstention.” Arizonans for

Off. Eng. v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 76 (1997) (citing

Railroad Comm’n of Tex. v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496

(1941). This Court has approved use of certification in

cases involving constitutional challenges to a state

statute—but only for the purpose of requesting the

state court’s interpretation of an ambiguous statute,

after which the federal court must then consider

whether the statute, as construed by the state court,

violates the federal constitution. See, e.g., id. at 76

(approving of certification for a “novel state-law

question”); Expressions Hair Design v. Schneiderman,

581 U.S. 37, 58 (2017) (Sotomayor, J., concurring)

(approving of certification to “resolve antecedent

state-law question” prior to federal court “resolution

of the constitutional question”). Thus, claimants

ultimately receive a federal court analysis and answer

on their constitutional challenges. Moreover,

although certification is less “problematic” than

abstention, see Arizonans for Off. Eng., 520 U.S. at 58

(Sotomayor, J., concurring), it is still “manifestly

inappropriate to certify a question” when “there is no

uncertain question of state law whose resolution

might affect the pending federal claim.” City of

Houston, 482 U.S. at 471. As a result, federal courts’

use of the Pullman abstention and certification

contrasts with the Fifth Circuit’s outright refusal to

consider Olivier’s federal constitutional challenge of

an unambiguous local ordinance.

Third, the Burford abstention requires a

complex analysis related to whether the matter

contains “difficult questions of state law bearing on

policy problems of substantial public import.”

Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 517 U.S. 706, 726–

27 (1996) (quoting New Orleans Pub. Serv., 491 U.S.

at 361). Burford does not apply at all when the case

does not “involve a state-law claim, nor even an

assertion that the federal claims [were] ‘in any way

entangled in a skein of state law . . . .” Id. at 727

(quoting New Orleans Pub. Serv., 491 U.S. at 361).

Thus, it is far narrower than the holding below, in

which the Fifth Circuit, without undergoing any

complex Burford-like analysis or citing ambiguity,

abstained from deciding a claim that Olivier brought

under § 1983 (federal law) in which he requested a

First Amendment analysis of an unambiguous,

commonly-applied municipal ordinance.

Finally, the Colorado River abstention involves

another complex, factor-based analysis and applies

only in cases involving “the contemporaneous exercise

of concurrent jurisdictions”; it does not apply to the

exercise of federal jurisdiction after completion of

state court proceedings. Colo. River, 424 U.S. at 818–

19. Indeed, this Court expressed particular wariness

in abstaining in parallel proceedings between a

federal court and a state court, because abstention in

such cases abdicates a court’s duty to exercise the

jurisdiction given it. Id. at 817 (citing England v. La.

State Bd., 375 U.S. 411; McClellan, 217 U.S. at 281;

Cohens, 19 U.S. at 404). And this Court noted that

“the presence of a federal basis for jurisdiction”—such

as a § 1983 claim—“may raise the level of justification

needed for abstention” generally. Id. at 815 n.21

(citing Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315, 319 n.5

(1943); Hawks v. Hamill, 288 U.S. 52, 61 (1933)).

Yet the Fifth Circuit would now abstain from

deciding a wide subset of cases that present a federal

question merely because a state court previously (noncontemporaneously) adjudged that a person’s actions

failed to comply with an ordinance—providing clarity

as to state court construal of the ordinance. This

subset of cases is inapposite to those cases in which

Colorado River would counsel an abstention. The fifth

Circuit thus leaps over the guardrails that this Court

established in Colorado River, effectively lowering the

level of justification it provides for its abstention.

In sum, each of these abstention doctrines

stems from comity and federalism concerns. However,

in none of these doctrines has this Court found that

such concerns require a federal court to abstain from

considering federal constitutional questions that a

claimant did not raise in a final state court

proceeding. Yet that is exactly what the Fifth Circuit

purports to do: without analyzing comity or

federalism, it bars Olivier from having a federal court

adjudicate the constitutionality of a statute—an issue

that his state court proceeding did not touch.

Regardless of various scholars’ views of

abstention doctrines generally, or the proper extent of

their application, the Fifth Circuit’s Heck bar

embraces substantially greater abstention—for

substantially broader reasons—than any of the

abstention doctrines. The Fifth Circuit invokes

neither subject matter jurisdiction (as in Rooker–

Feldman), nor Congressional mandate (as in

preclusion), nor principles of comity and federalism

(as in abstention doctriens) when wielding Heck as a

tool to refuse to adjudicate a cases and controversy

otherwise properly before it. Thus, the Fifth Circuit

uses Heck to close the courthouse doors where no

other limiting doctrine would do so. In this manner, it

fails its “virtually unflagging” “obligation” to hear and

decide a case over which it has subject matter

jurisdiction. See Sprint Commnc’ns, 571 U.S. at 591

(quoting Colo. River, 424 U.S. at 817).

All these limiting doctrines impose guardrails

and require justifications that provide claimants with

a level of access to relief in federal court. The Fifth

Circuit’s reading of Heck lacks similar protection and

analysis. This case thus presents important federal

questions—ones that the Fifth Circuit has decided in

a manner that conflicts with relevant decisions of this

Court. This Court should grant certiorari to resolve

these conflicts.

II.This Court should grant certiorari to

ensure the Heck bar respects statutory

text.

Congress established the Civil Rights Act of

1871, now codified in 42 U.S.C. § 1983, to give

plaintiffs broad access to federal courts to obtain relief

from constitutional injuries. Mitchum v. Foster, 407

U.S. 225, 242 (1972). Congressional members believed

state courts did not provide an adequate means for

such relief. CONG GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess., app. 78,

252, 394 (1871) (remarks of Rep. Perry, Sen. Morton,

and Rep. Rainey) (“the apparatus and machinery of

[state] government . . . skulk away”; “large classes of

people . . . are without legal remedy in the courts of

the States”; “[state] courts are in many instances

under the control of those who are wholly inimical to

the impartial administration of law and equity”).

Thus, § 1983 suits are Congress’s answer to that

issue, and the statute’s plain language “reflect[s] the

regrettable reality that state instrumentalities could

not, or would not, fully protect federal rights.” Health

& Hosp. Corp. v. Talevski, 599 U.S. 166, 177 (2023)

(quoting Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1, 4 (1980))

(citing Mitchum, 407 U.S. at 240 (1972)) (cleaned up)

(holding that this Court “ha[s] adhered to this

understanding of § 1983’s operation”). Consistent with

the purpose of providing “dual or concurrent forums

in the state and federal system,” § 1983 suits do not

require plaintiffs to first exhaust state administrative

remedies. Patsy v. Bd. of Regents, 457 U.S. 496, 502,

506 (1982).

The federal habeas statute provides another

avenue for a narrow group of petitioners to obtain a

narrow type of relief from constitutional injuries

through federal courts. 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (providing

review of application “in behalf of a person in custody

. . . only on the ground that he is in custody in violation

of the Constitution . . .”). The limitations are clear

from the statutory text: habeas is available only to

custodial prisoners who seek to attack the fact or

duration of the sentence that they are then serving.

Maleng v. Cook, 490 U.S. 488, 490 (1989) (citing

Carafasi v. LaVellee, 391 U.S. 234, 238 (1968)).

Additionally, federal habeas relief is available only

after a petitioner exhausts all avenues of relief in

state courts. Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 518 (1982)

(holding exhaustion rule is based on principles of

federalism and comity).

Section 1983’s availability regardless of a

plaintiff’s attempts to gain relief through state courts

makes it attractive to prisoners, who would logically

prefer to use § 1983 as a workaround to obtain the

same relief that federal habeas statutes would provide

only after exhaustion of state remedies. See, e.g.,

Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 479 (1973)

(addressing prisoner’s § 1983 suit that was “in fact an

application for habeas corpus”). In Preiser, the

precursor to Heck, this Court addressed this conflict

by applying the principle of statutory interpretation

that the specific controls over the general. Id. at 489–

90. Although the plain language of § 1983 would

ostensibly allow custodial prisoners to attack the fact

or duration of their confinement, Preiser carved this

type of claim—the realm of the more specific habeas

statute—out of the claims available under the more

generalized § 1983 statute. Id. This Court’s analysis

focused on harmonizing both statutory provisions and

giving meaning to each. Id. (“It would wholly frustrate

explicit congressional intent to hold that the

respondents in the present case could evade this

requirement by the simple expedient of putting a

different label on their pleadings.”

The “enterprise” of the Heck Court was to

continue address the “collision course” between § 1983

and federal habeas statutes and to harmonize them.

Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 491 (1994) (Thomas,

J., concurring). Heck to some degree continued to

apply the rule of statutory interpretation that the

specific (habeas) controls the general (§ 1983). Id.

Under this principle, Heck held that a claim by a

prisoner

“attacking . . . the

fact

length

of . . . confinement”—even when not seeking release

from that confinement—required as a prerequisite the

same threshold showing as does the habeas statute:

favorable termination. Id. at 481–82, 487.

The Fifth Circuit has run far afield of this

interpretation and the original statutory basis for the

Heck bar and its precursor, Preiser. Instead of merely

carving out the piece of § 1983 to which the specific

provisions of the federal habeas statutes apply, either

to establish the claim or its prerequisite, the Fifth

Circuit now applies the Heck bar to restrict claimants’

access to federal courts through § 1983 suits even

when the claimants cannot—and never could—use

federal habeas statutes to claim relief. App. 3a, 10a

(barring Olivier’s claim even though he never suffered

confinement and thus never had access to habeas

relief).

Accordingly, amicus is concerned not only

about the Fifth Circuit’s ultimate decision, but the

analysis by which the Fifth Circuit reached its

decision—an analysis that neither respects

Congress’s intent as expressed in § 1983 nor concerns

itself with harmonizing the text of § 1983 and the

habeas statutes. Amicus is also concerned of farreaching negative impact on the constitutional roles

of the judiciary and legislative branches if courts are

permitted to apply judge-made doctrines so broadly

that they controvert legislative direction. For this

additional reason, this case presents important

questions meriting this Court’s resolution.

III.This Court should grant certiorari to

correct an interpretation that is

inconsistent with the context of Heck’s

rule.

The opinion below—and much of the Heck

progeny—focus on determining whether the plaintiff’s

claim, if successful, “necessarily impl[ies] the

invalidity” of a conviction. App. 7a–91, 11a, 14a

(quoting Heck, 512 U.S at 487). However, because the

Fifth Circuit failed to consider the context of this

phrase, its holding is inconsistent with Heck. Thus, if

this Court continues to uphold the rule that Heck bars

§ 1983 suits whose success would “necessarily imply”

the invalidity of a prior conviction or sentence, it

should provide clarity as to the extent of the bar and

the analysis lower courts must undertake.

In Heck, the plaintiff was a state prisoner still

in confinement who claimed damages under § 1983 on

the basis of what this Court identified as a malicious

prosecution suit. 512 U.S. at 478–79, 484. As an

element of the cause of action, the plaintiff needed to

prove that the “prior criminal proceeding”—his

conviction—ended in his favor through reversal,

expungement, or other declaration of invalidity

through an authorized state tribunal or federal writ of

habeas corpus. Id. at 484, 486–87. On this basis, this

Court held that “establishing the basis for the

damages claim necessarily demonstrates the

invalidity of the conviction.” Id. at 481–82. This Court

further established what we now call the Heck bar on

“[a] claim for damages bearing that relationship to a

conviction or sentence.” Id. at 487 (emphasis added).

It was in this immediate context that the Court

stated:

“Thus, when a state prisoner seeks damages in

a § 1983 suit, the district court must consider

whether a judgment in favor of the plaintiff

would necessarily imply the invalidity of his

conviction or sentence; if it would, the

complaint must be dismissed unless the

plaintiff can demonstrate that the conviction or

sentence has already been invalidated.”

Id. (emphasis added).

This context supports that “necessarily

imply[ing] the invalidity of a[a]sentence” is tied to the

elements of a claim, and that the claim and sentence

must bear the same type of relationship as in Heck. In

other words, if the cause of action requires, as an

essential element, that the plaintiff prove the facts of

his prior conviction and its invalidity, success on the

claim necessarily implies the invalidity of the

sentence. For this reason, the Heck bar analysis

“depends on what facts a § 1983 plaintiff would need

to prove to prevail on his claim.” McDonough v. Smith,

588 U.S. 109 (2019) (Thomas, J., dissenting). Thus,

courts cannot determine whether the Heck bar—or

any other rules—apply to a § 1983 claim until it

“determine[s] the elements of” the claim. Id.

In the opinion below, the Fifth Circuit applied

Heck to bar Olivier’s challenge to the constitutionality

of the ordinance under which he was convicted. App.

14a. This type of claim does not, as an essential

element or as a threshold showing, require the

claimant to prove any facts relating to any prior

conviction—because it does not require that a plaintiff

hold a prior conviction at all. Susan B. Anthony List v.

Driehaus, 573 U.S. 149, 158–59 (2014). Indeed, a

plaintiff can succeed in bringing a facial constitutional

challenge to a statute without mentioning that he

committed acts prohibited by the statute, or whether

he was charged, prosecuted, convicted, or sentenced

under the statute. Id. at 158 (citing Steffel v.

Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 459 (1974) (“an actual

arrest, prosecution, or other enforcement action is not

a prerequisite to challenging the law.”). Although a

plaintiff could use the facts of his conviction to

establish standing, for example to show imminent

harm or the presence of an actual controversy, a prior

conviction is still not necessary even for this threshold

determination. Id.

Thus, the Fifth Circuit’s reading does not limit

itself to the context in which Heck laid out its

“necessarily imply” rule. Instead, the Fifth Circuit

would use Heck to bar any claim that, as an essential

element, requires the plaintiff to prove that a statute

is invalid when the plaintiff asserts any § 1983 claim

challenging a statute under which he happens to have

a prior conviction.

Because of this apparent discrepancy between

Heck and its progeny, on the one hand, and the Fifth

Circuit’s holding, on the other, this Court should

clarify whether it intends for courts to analyze, as part

of a Heck bar, whether a claim “necessarily imply[ing]

the invalidity” of a conviction merely indicates a claim

that, as an essential element, requires the plaintiff to

prove the facts of the invalidity of his own conviction.

CONCLUSION

The holding below is inconsistent with

abstention doctrines, principles of statutory

construction, and the contextual basis of the rule it

seeks to apply. For all the above reasons and those

presented by Petitioner, the Court should grant the

petition.

Respectfully submitted,