Reply Brief — ExxonMobil Corporation, et al., Petitioners v. Environment Texas Citizen Lobby, Incorporated, et al.

Supreme Court briefJun 10, 2025

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No. 24-982

In the

Supreme Court of the United States

EXXONMOBIL CORPORATION; EXXONMOBIL

CHEMICAL COMPANY; EXXONMOBIL REFINING &

SUPPLY COMPANY,

Petitioners,

V.

ENVIRONMENT TEXAS CITIZEN LOBBY, INCORPORATED;

SIERRA CLUB,

Respondents.

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

REPLY BRIEF FOR PETITIONERS

RUSSELL S. POST

BECK REDDEN LLP

1221 McKinney

Suite 4500

Houston, TX 77010

GREGORY G. GARRE

Counsel of Record

ROMAN MARTINEZ

CHRISTINA R. GAY

SOREN J. SCHMIDT

LATHAM & WATKINS LLP

555 Eleventh Street, NW

Suite 1000

Washington, DC 20004

(202) 637-2207

gregory.garre@lw.com

Counsel for Petitioners

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ...................................... ii

INTRODUCTION .......................................................1

ARGUMENT ...............................................................2

I.

The Traceability Question Warrants Review ....2

A. The Fifth Circuit’s Rule Sharply

Departs From This Court’s Precedents

And Has Generated Significant Discord.....3

B. There Are No Barriers To Review...............6

II.

The Laidlaw Question Warrants Review ..........8

III. At A Minimum, The Court Should CVSG ........11

CONCLUSION ..........................................................12

ii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Page(s)

CASES

Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Gaston Copper

Recycling Corp.,

204 F.3d 149 (4th Cir. 2000)............................... 5

Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw

Environmental Services (TOC), Inc,

528 U.S. 167 (2000) ............................1, 10, 11, 12

Groff v. DeJoy,

600 U.S. 447 (2023) ............................................. 7

Houston Community College System v.

Wilson,

595 U.S. 468 (2022) ............................................. 7

MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc.,

549 U.S. 118 (2007) ............................................. 9

Public Interest Research Group of New

Jersey, Inc. v. Powell Duffryn Terminals

Inc.,

913 F.2d 64 (3d Cir. 1990), cert. denied,

498 U.S. 1109 (1991) ....................................... 3, 5

Sierra Club, Lone Star Chapter v. Cedar

Point Oil Co.,

73 F.3d 546 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 519

U.S. 811 (1996)................................................ 3, 5

TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez,

594 U.S. 413 (2021) ............................................. 3

iii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued

Page

STATUTES

42 U.S.C. § 7413 ..................................................... 12

OTHER AUTHORITIES

5th Cir. R. 47.5.4 ...................................................... 6

Harold J. Krent, Laidlaw: Redressing the

Law of Redressability, 12 Duke Env’t &

Pol’y F. 85 (2001) ................................................ 9

INTRODUCTION

As petitioners have explained, the Fifth Circuit’s

splintered en banc decision in this case ultimately

perpetuates a “disastrous” Fifth Circuit standing

doctrine for citizen-suit cases that flouts Article III

principles and grants environmental plaintiffs

“standing in gross.” App.97a (Jones, J., dissenting);

id. at 282a (Oldham, J., dissenting). Under the Fifth

Circuit’s rule, a single harm resulting from a single

violation results in standing to sue—and secure civil

penalties—for all violations of a similar “kind,”

regardless of whether the violations actually or likely

affected the plaintiff at all. For associations like

respondents, this is a bonanza, allowing them to rack

up thousands of alleged violations and penalties

simply by showing that one or a small number of

members suffered discrete harms. Almost everyone

on the Fifth Circuit disagreed with this rule, but they

could not agree on a path forward and so left it in

place. This Court’s intervention is needed.

Respondents do not dispute the exceptional

importance of the questions presented—nor could

they. Twenty-seven States assert a “strong interest”

in certiorari because the Fifth Circuit’s “expanded

view” of citizen-suit standing “frustrates core

federalism principles.” States Amicus Br. 1, 17. A

cross-section of the U.S. business community warns

that the Fifth Circuit’s “diluted standing test”

disregards “bedrock standing principles” and fuels a

“uniquely burdensome” form of litigation. Chamber

Amicus Br. 8, 19, 20-22. And a separate set of groups

stresses the “grave Article II concerns” implicated by

this Court’s “egregiously wrong” decision in Friends of

the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Environmental Services

2

(TOC), Inc, 528 U.S. 167 (2000). American Free

Enterprise Chamber of Commerce (AmFree) Amicus

Br. 4, 20. Respondents ignore all this.

Instead, respondents cobble together a hodgepodge of vehicle arguments to scare away this Court

from these important issues. They make the almost

laughable claim that the Fifth Circuit’s radically

splintered decision in this case actually resolves the

“instability” in that court’s standing doctrine. BIO 15.

They claim that there is nothing for this Court to

review, even though they acknowledge that the Fifth

Circuit’s decision perpetuates the grossly flawed

“Cedar Point[] traceability framework.” Id. They

claim that the case presents “thorny antecedent

questions” that the Court would have to reach, id.,

even though they failed to cross-petition on those

issues. And they suggest that petitioners somehow

waived the second question presented by not asking

the Fifth Circuit to overrule Laidlaw’s flawed

redressability rule. Id. at 29-30.

All of this is a smokescreen.

There is no

impediment to reaching the important questions

presented, and the en banc Fifth Circuit’s inability to

realign its own standing precedent with this Court’s

decisions demands this Court’s intervention. At the

least, the Court should CVSG to give the Executive

Branch—whose primary enforcement role under the

Clean Air Act (CAA) is diminished by unduly lax

citizen-suit standing—an opportunity to weigh in.

ARGUMENT

I. The Traceability Question Warrants Review

The Fifth Circuit’s lax traceability standard for

environmental citizen suits “flatly violates Article

III,” flouts this Court’s precedents, and sanctions

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“standing in gross” for environmental plaintiffs.

Chamber Amicus Br. 7-16; Pet. 20. This Court’s

review is needed. And respondents’ efforts to evade

such review on vehicle grounds fails.

A. The Fifth Circuit’s Rule Sharply Departs

From This Court’s Precedents And Has

Generated Significant Discord

Amidst all of respondents’ hand-waving about the

Fifth Circuit’s traceability rule for citizen suits (at 2527), one thing is especially striking: respondents do

not even try to reconcile the Fifth Circuit’s rule that a

plaintiff need only show that a violation “contributes

to the kinds of injuries alleged” and “could have

affected the plaintiff,” Sierra Club, Lone Star Chapter

v. Cedar Point Oil Co. (Cedar Point), 73 F.3d 546, 557

(5th Cir.) (emphases added) (citation omitted), cert.

denied, 519 U.S. 811 (1996); App.208a, with Article

III’s requirement that a plaintiff show his “injury was

likely caused by the defendant,” TransUnion LLC v.

Ramirez, 594 U.S. 413, 423 (2021) (emphasis added).

In fact, respondents ignore Cedar Point’s language in

the merits section of their opposition. Probably

because they know the Cedar Point rule flouts this

Court’s “likely caused” standard, as Judge Aldisert

flagged when the Third Circuit first introduced this

problematic framework. See Public Int. Rsch. Grp. of

N.J., Inc. v. Powell Duffryn Terminals Inc., 913 F.2d

64, 89 (3d Cir. 1990) (concurring) (“Were this not an

environment case, [the plaintiff’s showing] certainly

would not be [enough to demonstrate standing].”),

cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1109 (1991).

Unable to defend that Cedar Point rule on its own

terms, respondents simply complain (at 27) that

petitioners “preview no alternative” to Cedar Point.

4

Nonsense.

Petitioners’ alternative is the rule

required by Article III and this Court’s precedents in

every other context:

environmental citizen-suit

plaintiffs, like other plaintiffs, must show that a

violation of an emissions limit likely injured them to

have standing to sue over it. Pet. 24. This alternative

would bring citizen-suit standing doctrine in line with

the Article III requirements that apply “to any other

case in federal court,” Chamber Amicus Br. 8, and

eradicate the Fifth Circuit’s flagrant departure from

the rule that standing is not dispensed “in gross.”

Here, the Fifth Circuit’s rule allowed respondents

to sue—and secure civil penalties—for thousands of

CAA violation days, despite only being able to trace

the injuries of their members to five emissions events,

representing 44 violation days.

Pet. 16-17.

Respondents detail (at 7-9) the exposures and injuries

claimed by two of their members from those 44

violation days. But respondents’ standing to sue for

those claimed injuries and violations is not at issue

here. It’s respondents’ ability to sue for thousands of

other violation days—with no allegations even trying

to tie any alleged injuries to those violations—that is

at issue in the first question presented. The Cedar

Point rule grants respondents standing to pursue—

and, as here, secure millions of dollars of penalties

with respect to—those other violations in gross. And

to make matters worse, respondents do not dispute

that many of the “nuisance-type” injuries they

claimed “could have been caused by … other

companies’ emissions” or even by entirely legal

emissions. Pet. 25-26 (quoting App.537a).

Respondents argue (at 21) that there is no direct

circuit conflict. But that is part of the problem—the

Cedar Point rule has spread. Nevertheless, the sharp

5

legal disagreement over that rule evidenced by the

battling en banc opinions below and by opinions in

other decisions is striking. Two of the leading circuitcourt decisions on the first question presented are

deeply fractured, with separate opinions raising red

flags about made-for-citizen-suits standing rules. See

Powell Duffryn, 913 F.2d at 83 (Aldisert, J.,

concurring); Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Gaston

Copper Recycling Corp., 204 F.3d 149, 164-65 (4th Cir.

2000) (three separate concurrences). And even Cedar

Point itself candidly admitted that a “literal reading

of [the traceability framework the Fifth Circuit

adopted] may produce results incongruous with our

usual understanding of the Article III standing

requirements.” 73 F.3d at 558 n.24. Indeed.

This case has only worsened the discord. Judge

Oldham issued two separate panel-stage dissents

articulating his disagreement with the Fifth Circuit’s

traceability rule. App.318a-26a, 278a-89a. And eight

Fifth Circuit judges issued three comprehensive

opinions at the en-banc stage further criticizing that

standard. Id. at 97a-159a, 160a-73a, 174a-200a. The

fact that this case alone has generated five opinions

challenging the majority rule not only offers an

uncommonly thorough examination of the precise

question in this case, but also highlights the radical

judicial disagreement on this issue.

Respondents’ suggestion (at 15) that the en banc

court’s per curiam decision “resolved” the “instability

in the law” is not serious. And their fallback position

(at 28) that there is “every reason to believe” the full

Fifth Circuit will soon “resolve the divisions among its

judges” and revisit Cedar Point once and for all is

equally absurd. The Fifth Circuit tried, and failed, to

6

end the Cedar Point experiment. This Court’s

intervention is now needed to rectify this abuse.

B. There Are No Barriers To Review

Tellingly, respondents devote most of their efforts

to manufacturing a vehicle defect. That project fails.

1. Respondents first assert (at 16-17) that “[t]here

is no precedential Fifth Circuit ruling for this Court

to review” and “no legal rule on traceability for this

Court to evaluate.” Wrong, and wrong.

The en banc court’s decision was published,

making the decision—which permitted citizen-suitplaintiffs to establish standing under circumstances

Supreme Court precedent squarely forecloses—

precedential under the Fifth Circuit’s rules. 5th Cir.

R. 47.5.4. Moreover, while perfunctory, that decision

affirmed a district-court decision holding that

plaintiffs had standing to pursue thousands of alleged

violations under the Cedar Point rule. Pet. 13, 16-17,

19, 26. Everyone agrees the district court applied the

Cedar Point rule, and that rule has governed in the

Fifth Circuit for decades. Id. at 19; see BIO 16. The

Cedar Point standard “drove the outcome in this

case,” Pet. 19, and indisputably remains the law in

the Fifth Circuit, BIO 15. There is no question that

this rule is before the Court here.

This case presents a clean opportunity to eradicate

that rule. No one is asking this Court to “‘review

evidence,’” “‘discuss specific facts,’” or “wade into ‘the

stipulated spreadsheet of violations.’”

BIO 17

(citations omitted). Instead, petitioners are asking

the Court to determine the correct legal standard for

evaluating traceability for citizen suits. Pet. 24. If

Cedar Point is wrong, then this Court would simply

remand for the lower courts to apply the correct

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standard, consistent with its customary practice. See,

e.g., Groff v. DeJoy, 600 U.S. 447, 473 (2023).

2. Respondents claim (at 18-20) that this Court

would be “forc[ed]” to decide “novel antecedent

disputes” if it grants the petition. That is incorrect.

Respondents’ “antecedent” issues really boil down

to one: To what must citizen-plaintiffs trace their

injuries in order to sue for a past violation of an

emission limit? ETCL II held that citizen-plaintiffs

must trace their injuries to the past violation, albeit

using the lax Cedar Point standard. App.297a-98a.

But respondents—echoing Judge Davis’s separate

opinion below—make (at 18-20) the extravagant

claim that citizen-plaintiffs need merely trace their

injuries to a future violation of a limit to pursue every

past violation of that limit. App.12a-34a.

Under that theory, respondents would be entitled

to civil penalties for all 16,386 violation days alleged

by respondents, not the 3,651 violation days that

ETCL II, ETCL III, the district court’s judgment, and

ETCL IV’s affirmance of that judgment allowed. See

App.3a-4a (Davis, J., concurring); App.133a (Jones,

J., dissenting). Because adopting this position would

significantly expand the lower court’s judgment,

respondents were required to file a cross petition to

advance the theory before this Court. See Houston

Cmty. Coll. Sys. v. Wilson, 595 U.S. 468, 474 (2022).

They didn’t.

Accordingly, respondents’ so-called

“antecedent” issues are off the table.

In any event, this alternative theory is baseless.

As Judge Jones explained, respondents’ “prospective”

theory of standing lacks any “case law support[]”;

“ignores the statutory authorization for CAA citizen

suits,” which mandates that plaintiffs “prove past

8

violations and penalties based on past violations”; and

contradicts precedent from the Fifth Circuit and its

“sister circuits.” App.133a-40a. It also has startling

implications.

Respondents themselves “candidly

acknowledge[d]” that, under their theory, “any

individual who moves near a polluter [would have]

immediate standing to sue that polluter for civil

penalties premised on every violation that occurred

anytime within the limitations period so long as the

plaintiff can demonstrate that he faces certainly

impending harm from an imminent future violation.”

App.138a (Jones, J., dissenting). That extreme theory

of standing is way outside the bounds of Article III.

3. Last, respondents oddly claim that the petition

“does not actually implicate the first question

presented” because it did not fully quote Cedar Point

and its “‘causative nexus requirement’” verbatim.

BIO 15-16 (citation omitted). But they ignore the

question’s “‘could have’ caused” language, which

obviously subsumes this element. Pet i (citation

omitted). And the petition itself makes clear that

petitioners challenge the Cedar Point rule. Pet. 19

(explaining that Cedar Point “drove the outcome in

this case”). So this objection fails, too.

II. The Laidlaw Question Warrants Review

On the second question presented, respondents

simply double down on Laidlaw’s redressability rule,

while ignoring the serious criticisms that have been

leveled against that rule—beginning with Justices

Scalia and Thomas in Laidlaw itself. Pet. 27.

1. Respondents’ lead argument (at 29) is that

petitioners “conceded that Laidlaw’s redressability

holding is correct.” That is false. Petitioners simply

tried to align their arguments with Laidlaw; they

9

never conceded it was correct. And failing to ask a

lower court to overrule this Court’s precedent does

“not suggest a waiver”; it reflects a “sound assessment

that the argument would be futile.” MedImmune, Inc.

v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118, 125 (2007).

2. Respondents’ assertion (at 29-30) that Laidlaw

has not drawn “really any[] criticism” ignores the

chorus of amici arguing that Laidlaw is “egregiously

wrong as a matter of law” and “should be laid to rest.”

AmFree Amicus Br. 4, 10 (citation omitted); see

Chamber Amicus Br. 20. Numerous others have

criticized its redressability holding. See, e.g., Harold

J. Krent, Laidlaw: Redressing the Law of

Redressability, 12 Duke Env’t & Pol’y F. 85, 98 (2001).

So have members of this Court, despite respondents’

remarkable claim (at 30) to the contrary. Justice

Thomas joined Justice Scalia’s dissent in Laidlaw

doing just that. And respondents’ claim that “Judge

Ho was the only judge below to suggest that [Laidlaw]

be revisited,” BIO 29, disregards Judge Oldham’s

conclusion that “redressability” is a “problem lurking

in [this case]” because “[p]laintiffs do not receive any

of the civil penalties; they all go to the U.S. Treasury,”

App.288a-89a n.3; see id. at 185a-86a n.3.

3. On the merits, respondents cannot dispute that

“Laidlaw’s theory of redressability through the

incidental effects of a fine upon deterrence is

egregiously wrong.” AmFree Amicus Br. 4. So they

fall back on the other stare decisis factors. Starting

with workability, they claim (at 31) that the decision

provided adequate guidance to determine when the

deterrent effect of a claim for civil penalties becomes

so insubstantial that it cannot support redressability.

Yet, as best petitioners can tell, no lower court has

ever found Laidlaw’s redressability standard

10

unsatisfied when a citizen-plaintiff seeks civil

penalties for purportedly ongoing violations. See

AmFree Amicus Br. 17. Instead, the analysis goes

like this: Is the citizen-suit plaintiff seeking civil

penalties? If yes, redressability is met. Pet. 31; see

App.67a-68a. Laidlaw thus “abolishes redressability

for citizen plaintiffs.” AmFree Amicus Br. 17.

Respondents assert that the district court actually

“thrice issued findings that the ‘[c]ivil penalties ...

deter future violations.’” BIO 31 (alteration in

original) (citation omitted). Not true. The districtcourt passage respondents cherry-pick simply states

that “[c]ivil penalties in a CAA citizen suit satisfy the

redressability requirement of standing because they

deter future violations,” citing Laidlaw. App.501a.

All this shows is that the district court understood

Laidlaw to be a categorical rule—which is part of the

problem necessitating this Court’s intervention.

Respondents also argue (at 31, 33) that the

question of whether civil penalties can establish

standing is a “policy argument” for Congress. That is

circular, as the whole ballgame is whether Congress

can confer Article III standing using unusual citizensuit schemes in the first place—a question that falls

squarely within this Court’s purview, not Congress’s.

As Justice Scalia explained, it cannot. “In seeking to

… giv[e] an individual plaintiff the power to invoke a

public remedy, Congress [does] precisely what [this

Court has] said it cannot do: convert an

‘undifferentiated public interest’ into an ‘individual

right’ vindicable in the courts.” Friends of the Earth,

Inc. v. Laidlaw Env’t Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167,

204-05 (2000) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citation

omitted); see AmFree Amicus Br. 11-20.

11

Finally, respondents suggest (at 32) that Laidlaw

is consistent with this Court’s later decisions. Yet, as

amicus AmFree explains (at 14-16), “Laidlaw has

only become more of an outlier since it was decided.”

The Court should correct that mistake.

4. Taking a “nothing-to-see-here” approach,

respondents relegate (at 33 n.14) the “grave Article II

concerns” raised by Laidlaw, AmFree Amicus Br. 20,

to a footnote—arguing that petitioners forfeited these

arguments by not spelling them out in the question

presented. That is incorrect. As both Justice Scalia’s

dissent in Laidlaw and the petition make clear, these

Article II problems are inherent in Laidlaw’s flawed

redressability rule. Pet. 30. In Laidlaw, this Court

sidestepped Article II concerns because they “ha[d]

not been argued” at the merits stage. 528 U.S. at 209

(Scalia, J., dissenting). They are squarely in play

here. This case thus offers a prime opportunity to

fully consider those concerns.

III. At A Minimum, The Court Should CVSG

If the Court does not grant the petition outright, it

should call for the views of the Solicitor General.

Respondents argue (on 32) that a brief submitted

by the Biden administration at the en banc stage

reflects “the consistent view of the Executive Branch”

that “Laidlaw’s redressability holding” is correct.

That brief merely referred to “the reasoning of

Laidlaw,” CA5 U.S. Amicus En Banc Br. 25; it did not

say it was correct. And far from uniformly accepting

Laidlaw’s intrusion on Article II (as respondents

suggest), the Executive has objected to several

citizen-suit settlements, flagging the “‘[d]ifficult and

fundamental questions’ that arise when private

citizen groups exercise a power that the Constitution

12

commits to the Executive alone.” U.S. Resp. to Enter

Agreement 22, United States v. DTE Energy, No. 2:10cv-13101 (E.D. Mich. July 8, 2020) (quoting Laidlaw,

528 U.S. at 197 (Kennedy, J., concurring)).

The Executive plays the primary role in enforcing

the CAA, see 42 U.S.C. § 7413, and it has a vested

interest in ensuring citizen-suit standing does not

intrude on the Executive’s power to enforce the laws.

AmFree Amicus Br. 20. At the very least, the Court

should call for the Solicitor General’s views on the

important questions presented.

CONCLUSION

The petition should be granted.

Respectfully submitted,

RUSSELL S. POST

BECK REDDEN LLP

1221 McKinney

Suite 4500

Houston, TX 77010

June 10, 2025

GREGORY G. GARRE

Counsel of Record

ROMAN MARTINEZ

CHRISTINA R. GAY

SOREN J. SCHMIDT

LATHAM & WATKINS LLP

555 Eleventh Street, NW

Suite 1000

Washington, DC 20004

(202) 637-2207

gregory.garre@lw.com

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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