Reply Brief — ExxonMobil Corporation, et al., Petitioners v. Environment Texas Citizen Lobby, Incorporated, et al.
Supreme Court briefJun 10, 2025
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No. 24-982
In the
Supreme Court of the United States
EXXONMOBIL CORPORATION; EXXONMOBIL
CHEMICAL COMPANY; EXXONMOBIL REFINING &
SUPPLY COMPANY,
Petitioners,
V.
ENVIRONMENT TEXAS CITIZEN LOBBY, INCORPORATED;
SIERRA CLUB,
Respondents.
ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
REPLY BRIEF FOR PETITIONERS
RUSSELL S. POST
BECK REDDEN LLP
1221 McKinney
Suite 4500
Houston, TX 77010
GREGORY G. GARRE
Counsel of Record
ROMAN MARTINEZ
CHRISTINA R. GAY
SOREN J. SCHMIDT
LATHAM & WATKINS LLP
555 Eleventh Street, NW
Suite 1000
Washington, DC 20004
(202) 637-2207
gregory.garre@lw.com
Counsel for Petitioners
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ...................................... ii
INTRODUCTION .......................................................1
ARGUMENT ...............................................................2
I.
The Traceability Question Warrants Review ....2
A. The Fifth Circuit’s Rule Sharply
Departs From This Court’s Precedents
And Has Generated Significant Discord.....3
B. There Are No Barriers To Review...............6
II.
The Laidlaw Question Warrants Review ..........8
III. At A Minimum, The Court Should CVSG ........11
CONCLUSION ..........................................................12
ii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Page(s)
CASES
Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Gaston Copper
Recycling Corp.,
204 F.3d 149 (4th Cir. 2000)............................... 5
Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw
Environmental Services (TOC), Inc,
528 U.S. 167 (2000) ............................1, 10, 11, 12
Groff v. DeJoy,
600 U.S. 447 (2023) ............................................. 7
Houston Community College System v.
Wilson,
595 U.S. 468 (2022) ............................................. 7
MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc.,
549 U.S. 118 (2007) ............................................. 9
Public Interest Research Group of New
Jersey, Inc. v. Powell Duffryn Terminals
Inc.,
913 F.2d 64 (3d Cir. 1990), cert. denied,
498 U.S. 1109 (1991) ....................................... 3, 5
Sierra Club, Lone Star Chapter v. Cedar
Point Oil Co.,
73 F.3d 546 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 519
U.S. 811 (1996)................................................ 3, 5
TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez,
594 U.S. 413 (2021) ............................................. 3
iii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued
Page
STATUTES
42 U.S.C. § 7413 ..................................................... 12
OTHER AUTHORITIES
5th Cir. R. 47.5.4 ...................................................... 6
Harold J. Krent, Laidlaw: Redressing the
Law of Redressability, 12 Duke Env’t &
Pol’y F. 85 (2001) ................................................ 9
INTRODUCTION
As petitioners have explained, the Fifth Circuit’s
splintered en banc decision in this case ultimately
perpetuates a “disastrous” Fifth Circuit standing
doctrine for citizen-suit cases that flouts Article III
principles and grants environmental plaintiffs
“standing in gross.” App.97a (Jones, J., dissenting);
id. at 282a (Oldham, J., dissenting). Under the Fifth
Circuit’s rule, a single harm resulting from a single
violation results in standing to sue—and secure civil
penalties—for all violations of a similar “kind,”
regardless of whether the violations actually or likely
affected the plaintiff at all. For associations like
respondents, this is a bonanza, allowing them to rack
up thousands of alleged violations and penalties
simply by showing that one or a small number of
members suffered discrete harms. Almost everyone
on the Fifth Circuit disagreed with this rule, but they
could not agree on a path forward and so left it in
place. This Court’s intervention is needed.
Respondents do not dispute the exceptional
importance of the questions presented—nor could
they. Twenty-seven States assert a “strong interest”
in certiorari because the Fifth Circuit’s “expanded
view” of citizen-suit standing “frustrates core
federalism principles.” States Amicus Br. 1, 17. A
cross-section of the U.S. business community warns
that the Fifth Circuit’s “diluted standing test”
disregards “bedrock standing principles” and fuels a
“uniquely burdensome” form of litigation. Chamber
Amicus Br. 8, 19, 20-22. And a separate set of groups
stresses the “grave Article II concerns” implicated by
this Court’s “egregiously wrong” decision in Friends of
the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Environmental Services
2
(TOC), Inc, 528 U.S. 167 (2000). American Free
Enterprise Chamber of Commerce (AmFree) Amicus
Br. 4, 20. Respondents ignore all this.
Instead, respondents cobble together a hodgepodge of vehicle arguments to scare away this Court
from these important issues. They make the almost
laughable claim that the Fifth Circuit’s radically
splintered decision in this case actually resolves the
“instability” in that court’s standing doctrine. BIO 15.
They claim that there is nothing for this Court to
review, even though they acknowledge that the Fifth
Circuit’s decision perpetuates the grossly flawed
“Cedar Point[] traceability framework.” Id. They
claim that the case presents “thorny antecedent
questions” that the Court would have to reach, id.,
even though they failed to cross-petition on those
issues. And they suggest that petitioners somehow
waived the second question presented by not asking
the Fifth Circuit to overrule Laidlaw’s flawed
redressability rule. Id. at 29-30.
All of this is a smokescreen.
There is no
impediment to reaching the important questions
presented, and the en banc Fifth Circuit’s inability to
realign its own standing precedent with this Court’s
decisions demands this Court’s intervention. At the
least, the Court should CVSG to give the Executive
Branch—whose primary enforcement role under the
Clean Air Act (CAA) is diminished by unduly lax
citizen-suit standing—an opportunity to weigh in.
ARGUMENT
I. The Traceability Question Warrants Review
The Fifth Circuit’s lax traceability standard for
environmental citizen suits “flatly violates Article
III,” flouts this Court’s precedents, and sanctions
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“standing in gross” for environmental plaintiffs.
Chamber Amicus Br. 7-16; Pet. 20. This Court’s
review is needed. And respondents’ efforts to evade
such review on vehicle grounds fails.
A. The Fifth Circuit’s Rule Sharply Departs
From This Court’s Precedents And Has
Generated Significant Discord
Amidst all of respondents’ hand-waving about the
Fifth Circuit’s traceability rule for citizen suits (at 2527), one thing is especially striking: respondents do
not even try to reconcile the Fifth Circuit’s rule that a
plaintiff need only show that a violation “contributes
to the kinds of injuries alleged” and “could have
affected the plaintiff,” Sierra Club, Lone Star Chapter
v. Cedar Point Oil Co. (Cedar Point), 73 F.3d 546, 557
(5th Cir.) (emphases added) (citation omitted), cert.
denied, 519 U.S. 811 (1996); App.208a, with Article
III’s requirement that a plaintiff show his “injury was
likely caused by the defendant,” TransUnion LLC v.
Ramirez, 594 U.S. 413, 423 (2021) (emphasis added).
In fact, respondents ignore Cedar Point’s language in
the merits section of their opposition. Probably
because they know the Cedar Point rule flouts this
Court’s “likely caused” standard, as Judge Aldisert
flagged when the Third Circuit first introduced this
problematic framework. See Public Int. Rsch. Grp. of
N.J., Inc. v. Powell Duffryn Terminals Inc., 913 F.2d
64, 89 (3d Cir. 1990) (concurring) (“Were this not an
environment case, [the plaintiff’s showing] certainly
would not be [enough to demonstrate standing].”),
cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1109 (1991).
Unable to defend that Cedar Point rule on its own
terms, respondents simply complain (at 27) that
petitioners “preview no alternative” to Cedar Point.
4
Nonsense.
Petitioners’ alternative is the rule
required by Article III and this Court’s precedents in
every other context:
environmental citizen-suit
plaintiffs, like other plaintiffs, must show that a
violation of an emissions limit likely injured them to
have standing to sue over it. Pet. 24. This alternative
would bring citizen-suit standing doctrine in line with
the Article III requirements that apply “to any other
case in federal court,” Chamber Amicus Br. 8, and
eradicate the Fifth Circuit’s flagrant departure from
the rule that standing is not dispensed “in gross.”
Here, the Fifth Circuit’s rule allowed respondents
to sue—and secure civil penalties—for thousands of
CAA violation days, despite only being able to trace
the injuries of their members to five emissions events,
representing 44 violation days.
Pet. 16-17.
Respondents detail (at 7-9) the exposures and injuries
claimed by two of their members from those 44
violation days. But respondents’ standing to sue for
those claimed injuries and violations is not at issue
here. It’s respondents’ ability to sue for thousands of
other violation days—with no allegations even trying
to tie any alleged injuries to those violations—that is
at issue in the first question presented. The Cedar
Point rule grants respondents standing to pursue—
and, as here, secure millions of dollars of penalties
with respect to—those other violations in gross. And
to make matters worse, respondents do not dispute
that many of the “nuisance-type” injuries they
claimed “could have been caused by … other
companies’ emissions” or even by entirely legal
emissions. Pet. 25-26 (quoting App.537a).
Respondents argue (at 21) that there is no direct
circuit conflict. But that is part of the problem—the
Cedar Point rule has spread. Nevertheless, the sharp
5
legal disagreement over that rule evidenced by the
battling en banc opinions below and by opinions in
other decisions is striking. Two of the leading circuitcourt decisions on the first question presented are
deeply fractured, with separate opinions raising red
flags about made-for-citizen-suits standing rules. See
Powell Duffryn, 913 F.2d at 83 (Aldisert, J.,
concurring); Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Gaston
Copper Recycling Corp., 204 F.3d 149, 164-65 (4th Cir.
2000) (three separate concurrences). And even Cedar
Point itself candidly admitted that a “literal reading
of [the traceability framework the Fifth Circuit
adopted] may produce results incongruous with our
usual understanding of the Article III standing
requirements.” 73 F.3d at 558 n.24. Indeed.
This case has only worsened the discord. Judge
Oldham issued two separate panel-stage dissents
articulating his disagreement with the Fifth Circuit’s
traceability rule. App.318a-26a, 278a-89a. And eight
Fifth Circuit judges issued three comprehensive
opinions at the en-banc stage further criticizing that
standard. Id. at 97a-159a, 160a-73a, 174a-200a. The
fact that this case alone has generated five opinions
challenging the majority rule not only offers an
uncommonly thorough examination of the precise
question in this case, but also highlights the radical
judicial disagreement on this issue.
Respondents’ suggestion (at 15) that the en banc
court’s per curiam decision “resolved” the “instability
in the law” is not serious. And their fallback position
(at 28) that there is “every reason to believe” the full
Fifth Circuit will soon “resolve the divisions among its
judges” and revisit Cedar Point once and for all is
equally absurd. The Fifth Circuit tried, and failed, to
6
end the Cedar Point experiment. This Court’s
intervention is now needed to rectify this abuse.
B. There Are No Barriers To Review
Tellingly, respondents devote most of their efforts
to manufacturing a vehicle defect. That project fails.
1. Respondents first assert (at 16-17) that “[t]here
is no precedential Fifth Circuit ruling for this Court
to review” and “no legal rule on traceability for this
Court to evaluate.” Wrong, and wrong.
The en banc court’s decision was published,
making the decision—which permitted citizen-suitplaintiffs to establish standing under circumstances
Supreme Court precedent squarely forecloses—
precedential under the Fifth Circuit’s rules. 5th Cir.
R. 47.5.4. Moreover, while perfunctory, that decision
affirmed a district-court decision holding that
plaintiffs had standing to pursue thousands of alleged
violations under the Cedar Point rule. Pet. 13, 16-17,
19, 26. Everyone agrees the district court applied the
Cedar Point rule, and that rule has governed in the
Fifth Circuit for decades. Id. at 19; see BIO 16. The
Cedar Point standard “drove the outcome in this
case,” Pet. 19, and indisputably remains the law in
the Fifth Circuit, BIO 15. There is no question that
this rule is before the Court here.
This case presents a clean opportunity to eradicate
that rule. No one is asking this Court to “‘review
evidence,’” “‘discuss specific facts,’” or “wade into ‘the
stipulated spreadsheet of violations.’”
BIO 17
(citations omitted). Instead, petitioners are asking
the Court to determine the correct legal standard for
evaluating traceability for citizen suits. Pet. 24. If
Cedar Point is wrong, then this Court would simply
remand for the lower courts to apply the correct
7
standard, consistent with its customary practice. See,
e.g., Groff v. DeJoy, 600 U.S. 447, 473 (2023).
2. Respondents claim (at 18-20) that this Court
would be “forc[ed]” to decide “novel antecedent
disputes” if it grants the petition. That is incorrect.
Respondents’ “antecedent” issues really boil down
to one: To what must citizen-plaintiffs trace their
injuries in order to sue for a past violation of an
emission limit? ETCL II held that citizen-plaintiffs
must trace their injuries to the past violation, albeit
using the lax Cedar Point standard. App.297a-98a.
But respondents—echoing Judge Davis’s separate
opinion below—make (at 18-20) the extravagant
claim that citizen-plaintiffs need merely trace their
injuries to a future violation of a limit to pursue every
past violation of that limit. App.12a-34a.
Under that theory, respondents would be entitled
to civil penalties for all 16,386 violation days alleged
by respondents, not the 3,651 violation days that
ETCL II, ETCL III, the district court’s judgment, and
ETCL IV’s affirmance of that judgment allowed. See
App.3a-4a (Davis, J., concurring); App.133a (Jones,
J., dissenting). Because adopting this position would
significantly expand the lower court’s judgment,
respondents were required to file a cross petition to
advance the theory before this Court. See Houston
Cmty. Coll. Sys. v. Wilson, 595 U.S. 468, 474 (2022).
They didn’t.
Accordingly, respondents’ so-called
“antecedent” issues are off the table.
In any event, this alternative theory is baseless.
As Judge Jones explained, respondents’ “prospective”
theory of standing lacks any “case law support[]”;
“ignores the statutory authorization for CAA citizen
suits,” which mandates that plaintiffs “prove past
8
violations and penalties based on past violations”; and
contradicts precedent from the Fifth Circuit and its
“sister circuits.” App.133a-40a. It also has startling
implications.
Respondents themselves “candidly
acknowledge[d]” that, under their theory, “any
individual who moves near a polluter [would have]
immediate standing to sue that polluter for civil
penalties premised on every violation that occurred
anytime within the limitations period so long as the
plaintiff can demonstrate that he faces certainly
impending harm from an imminent future violation.”
App.138a (Jones, J., dissenting). That extreme theory
of standing is way outside the bounds of Article III.
3. Last, respondents oddly claim that the petition
“does not actually implicate the first question
presented” because it did not fully quote Cedar Point
and its “‘causative nexus requirement’” verbatim.
BIO 15-16 (citation omitted). But they ignore the
question’s “‘could have’ caused” language, which
obviously subsumes this element. Pet i (citation
omitted). And the petition itself makes clear that
petitioners challenge the Cedar Point rule. Pet. 19
(explaining that Cedar Point “drove the outcome in
this case”). So this objection fails, too.
II. The Laidlaw Question Warrants Review
On the second question presented, respondents
simply double down on Laidlaw’s redressability rule,
while ignoring the serious criticisms that have been
leveled against that rule—beginning with Justices
Scalia and Thomas in Laidlaw itself. Pet. 27.
1. Respondents’ lead argument (at 29) is that
petitioners “conceded that Laidlaw’s redressability
holding is correct.” That is false. Petitioners simply
tried to align their arguments with Laidlaw; they
9
never conceded it was correct. And failing to ask a
lower court to overrule this Court’s precedent does
“not suggest a waiver”; it reflects a “sound assessment
that the argument would be futile.” MedImmune, Inc.
v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118, 125 (2007).
2. Respondents’ assertion (at 29-30) that Laidlaw
has not drawn “really any[] criticism” ignores the
chorus of amici arguing that Laidlaw is “egregiously
wrong as a matter of law” and “should be laid to rest.”
AmFree Amicus Br. 4, 10 (citation omitted); see
Chamber Amicus Br. 20. Numerous others have
criticized its redressability holding. See, e.g., Harold
J. Krent, Laidlaw: Redressing the Law of
Redressability, 12 Duke Env’t & Pol’y F. 85, 98 (2001).
So have members of this Court, despite respondents’
remarkable claim (at 30) to the contrary. Justice
Thomas joined Justice Scalia’s dissent in Laidlaw
doing just that. And respondents’ claim that “Judge
Ho was the only judge below to suggest that [Laidlaw]
be revisited,” BIO 29, disregards Judge Oldham’s
conclusion that “redressability” is a “problem lurking
in [this case]” because “[p]laintiffs do not receive any
of the civil penalties; they all go to the U.S. Treasury,”
App.288a-89a n.3; see id. at 185a-86a n.3.
3. On the merits, respondents cannot dispute that
“Laidlaw’s theory of redressability through the
incidental effects of a fine upon deterrence is
egregiously wrong.” AmFree Amicus Br. 4. So they
fall back on the other stare decisis factors. Starting
with workability, they claim (at 31) that the decision
provided adequate guidance to determine when the
deterrent effect of a claim for civil penalties becomes
so insubstantial that it cannot support redressability.
Yet, as best petitioners can tell, no lower court has
ever found Laidlaw’s redressability standard
10
unsatisfied when a citizen-plaintiff seeks civil
penalties for purportedly ongoing violations. See
AmFree Amicus Br. 17. Instead, the analysis goes
like this: Is the citizen-suit plaintiff seeking civil
penalties? If yes, redressability is met. Pet. 31; see
App.67a-68a. Laidlaw thus “abolishes redressability
for citizen plaintiffs.” AmFree Amicus Br. 17.
Respondents assert that the district court actually
“thrice issued findings that the ‘[c]ivil penalties ...
deter future violations.’” BIO 31 (alteration in
original) (citation omitted). Not true. The districtcourt passage respondents cherry-pick simply states
that “[c]ivil penalties in a CAA citizen suit satisfy the
redressability requirement of standing because they
deter future violations,” citing Laidlaw. App.501a.
All this shows is that the district court understood
Laidlaw to be a categorical rule—which is part of the
problem necessitating this Court’s intervention.
Respondents also argue (at 31, 33) that the
question of whether civil penalties can establish
standing is a “policy argument” for Congress. That is
circular, as the whole ballgame is whether Congress
can confer Article III standing using unusual citizensuit schemes in the first place—a question that falls
squarely within this Court’s purview, not Congress’s.
As Justice Scalia explained, it cannot. “In seeking to
… giv[e] an individual plaintiff the power to invoke a
public remedy, Congress [does] precisely what [this
Court has] said it cannot do: convert an
‘undifferentiated public interest’ into an ‘individual
right’ vindicable in the courts.” Friends of the Earth,
Inc. v. Laidlaw Env’t Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167,
204-05 (2000) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citation
omitted); see AmFree Amicus Br. 11-20.
11
Finally, respondents suggest (at 32) that Laidlaw
is consistent with this Court’s later decisions. Yet, as
amicus AmFree explains (at 14-16), “Laidlaw has
only become more of an outlier since it was decided.”
The Court should correct that mistake.
4. Taking a “nothing-to-see-here” approach,
respondents relegate (at 33 n.14) the “grave Article II
concerns” raised by Laidlaw, AmFree Amicus Br. 20,
to a footnote—arguing that petitioners forfeited these
arguments by not spelling them out in the question
presented. That is incorrect. As both Justice Scalia’s
dissent in Laidlaw and the petition make clear, these
Article II problems are inherent in Laidlaw’s flawed
redressability rule. Pet. 30. In Laidlaw, this Court
sidestepped Article II concerns because they “ha[d]
not been argued” at the merits stage. 528 U.S. at 209
(Scalia, J., dissenting). They are squarely in play
here. This case thus offers a prime opportunity to
fully consider those concerns.
III. At A Minimum, The Court Should CVSG
If the Court does not grant the petition outright, it
should call for the views of the Solicitor General.
Respondents argue (on 32) that a brief submitted
by the Biden administration at the en banc stage
reflects “the consistent view of the Executive Branch”
that “Laidlaw’s redressability holding” is correct.
That brief merely referred to “the reasoning of
Laidlaw,” CA5 U.S. Amicus En Banc Br. 25; it did not
say it was correct. And far from uniformly accepting
Laidlaw’s intrusion on Article II (as respondents
suggest), the Executive has objected to several
citizen-suit settlements, flagging the “‘[d]ifficult and
fundamental questions’ that arise when private
citizen groups exercise a power that the Constitution
12
commits to the Executive alone.” U.S. Resp. to Enter
Agreement 22, United States v. DTE Energy, No. 2:10cv-13101 (E.D. Mich. July 8, 2020) (quoting Laidlaw,
528 U.S. at 197 (Kennedy, J., concurring)).
The Executive plays the primary role in enforcing
the CAA, see 42 U.S.C. § 7413, and it has a vested
interest in ensuring citizen-suit standing does not
intrude on the Executive’s power to enforce the laws.
AmFree Amicus Br. 20. At the very least, the Court
should call for the Solicitor General’s views on the
important questions presented.
CONCLUSION
The petition should be granted.
Respectfully submitted,
RUSSELL S. POST
BECK REDDEN LLP
1221 McKinney
Suite 4500
Houston, TX 77010
June 10, 2025
GREGORY G. GARRE
Counsel of Record
ROMAN MARTINEZ
CHRISTINA R. GAY
SOREN J. SCHMIDT
LATHAM & WATKINS LLP
555 Eleventh Street, NW
Suite 1000
Washington, DC 20004
(202) 637-2207
gregory.garre@lw.com
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