Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Seafreeze Shoreside, Inc., et al., Petitioners v. Department of the Interior, et al.
Supreme Court briefMar 4, 2025
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No. 24In the
Supreme Court of the United States
SEAFREEZE SHORESIDE, INC.; LONG
ISLAND COMMERCIAL FISHING ASSOC., INC.;
XIII NORTHEAST FISHERY SECTOR, INC.;
HERITAGE FISHERIES, INC.; NAT. W., INC.;
OLD SQUAW FISHERIES, INC.,
Petitioners,
v.
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT
OF THE INTERIOR; et al.,
Respondents.
On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the United
States Court of A ppeals for the First Circuit
PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
Robert Henneke
Chance Weldon
Theodore Hadzi-A ntich*
*Counsel of Record
Connor Mighell
Texas Public Policy Foundation
901 Congress Avenue
Austin, TX 78701
(512) 472-2700
tha@texaspolicy.com
Counsel for Petitioners
120240
A
(800) 274-3321 • (800) 359-6859
i
QUESTIONS PRESENTED
In 2021, the federal government launched an ambitious
initiative to diminish demand for fossil fuels by approving
dozens of wind energy generation projects in federal waters
on the outer Continental Shelf (“OCS”) off the Atlantic,
Pacific and Gulf Coasts. Pursuant to that initiative, the
Departments of the Interior, Commerce, and Defense,
acting through their sub-agencies and officers (“Federal
Respondents”), jointly prepared an environmental impact
statement under the National Environmental Policy Act
(“NEPA”) leading to the approval of the construction and
operations plan of the Vineyard Wind 1 project, the first
of many such large-scale, industrial offshore wind energy
projects slated for the OCS. Prior to this case, no court
had ever reviewed such an approval.
Petitioners challenged the Vineyard Wind 1 project
approval as contrary to the texts of the Outer Continental
Shelf Lands Act (“OCSLA”) and NEPA. The record showed
the project would result in momentous adverse impacts
on marine navigation, public safety, the environment, and
national security. The First Circuit rejected the challenge
by adopting the lower court’s uncritical reliance on the
Federal Respondents’ presumed discretion to interpret
the statutory texts.
The questions presented are:
1. Whether the First Circuit’s decision conflicts
with Loper Bright Enters v. Raimondo, 603
U.S. 369 (2024), which requires courts to
independently determine the meaning of
federal statutes rather than deferring to
agency interpretations.
ii
2. W hether the First Circuit’s decision
conflicts with La. Pub. Serv. Comm’n v.
FCC, 476 U.S. 355, 374 (1986), which held
that “an agency literally has no power to
act . . . unless and until Congress confers
power upon it.”
iii
PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING
Petitioners are Seafreeze Shoreside, Inc., Long Island
Commercial Fishing Association, Inc., XIII Northeast
Fishery Sector, Inc., Heritage Fisheries, Inc., Nat. W.,
Inc., and Old Squaw Fisheries, Inc.
Respondents are the United States Department of
the Interior, Doug Burgum, in his official capacity as
Secretary of the Department of the Interior, the Bureau of
Ocean Energy Management, Walter Cruickshank, Ph.D.,
in his official capacity as the Director of the Bureau of
Ocean Energy Management, United States Department
of Commerce, Honorable Howard Lutnick, in his official
capacity as the Secretary of the Department of Commerce,
Steve Feldgus, in his official capacity as Principal Deputy
Assistant Secretary, Land and Minerals Management, the
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, the
National Marine Fisheries Service, Vice Admiral Nancy
Hann, in her official capacity as Administrator of the
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, the
United States Department of Defense, Pete Hegseth, in
his official capacity as the Secretary of the Department
of Defense, the United States Army Corps of Engineers,
Lt. Gen. William H. “Butch” Graham, Jr., in his official
capacity as the Commander and Chief of Engineers of the
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Colonel Justin R. Pabis,
P.E., in his official capacity as the District Engineer of
the New England District of the U.S. Army Corps of
Engineers, and Vineyard Wind 1, LLC.
iv
RULE 29.6 DISCLOSURE STATEMENT
Petitioner Seafreeze Shoreside, Inc. (“Seafreeze”)
is a commercial seafood processing company. It has one
parent company, namely Yoplant LLC, which holds 100
percent ownership interest in Seafreeze. There are no
other publicly held companies that have a 10 percent or
greater ownership interest in Seafreeze.
Petitioner Long Isla nd Commercia l Fishi ng
Association, Inc. (“LICFA”) is an organization of
commercial fishermen and fishing companies supporting
and advocating for sustainable fishery management,
including clean, fishable waters free from pollution and
navigational obstruction. It has no parent companies and
there are no publicly held companies that have a 10 percent
or greater ownership interest in LICFA.
Petitioner XIII Northeast Fishery Sector, Inc. (“XIII
Northeast”) is a non-profit membership organization of
commercial fishermen and fishing companies. It has no
parent companies and there are no publicly held companies
that have a 10 percent or greater ownership interest in
XIII Northeast.
Petitioner Heritage Fisheries, Inc. (“Heritage”) is a
commercial fishing company. It has no parent companies
and there are no publicly held companies that have a 10
percent or greater ownership interest in Heritage.
Petitioner Nat W., Inc. (“Nat W.”) is a commercial
fishing company. It has no parent companies and there
are no publicly held companies that have a 10 percent or
greater ownership interest in Nat W.
v
Petitioner Old Squaw Fisheries, Inc. (“Old Squaw”) is
a commercial fishing company. It has no parent companies
and there are no publicly held companies that have a 10
percent or greater ownership interest in Old Squaw.
vi
RELATED PROCEEDINGS
United States Court of Appeals (1st Cir.):
Responsible Offshore Development Alliance v.
United States Department of the Interior
et al., No. 23-2051 (Dec. 5, 2024)
vii
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
QUESTIONS PRESENTED . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . i
PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iii
RULE 29.6 DISCLOSURE STATEMENT . . . . . . . . . . iv
RELATED PROCEEDINGS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vi
TABLE OF CONTENTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vii
TABLE OF APPENDICES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . x
TABLE OF CITED AUTHORITIES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xi
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI . . . . . . . . . 1
INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
OPINIONS BELOW . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
JURISDICTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED . . . . . . . . . . 3
STATEMENT OF THE CASE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
A. Legal and Regulatory Background . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.
Legal Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
viii
Table of Contents
Page
2.
Regulatory Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
B. Proceedings Below . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
1.
Administrative Proceedings . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
2.
Legal Proceedings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION . . . . 10
I.
The First Circuit’s OCSLA decision
warrants this Court’s review . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
A. The question presented is of national
importance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
B. The decision below is inconsistent with
prior decisions of this Court . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
C. The decision below is wrong . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
II. The First Circuit’s NEPA decision warrants
this Court’s review . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
A. The question presented is of national
importance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
B. The decision below conflicts with prior
decisions of this Court . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
ix
Table of Contents
Page
i.
T h e Fe d e r a l R e s p o n d e n t s
impermissibly pre-determined
“reasonable alternatives” . . . . . . . . . . . 32
ii. T h e Fe d e r a l R e s p o n d e n t s
impermissibly revived the EIS
without public comment . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
C. The decision below creates a conflict
among the courts of appeal . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
D. The decision below is wrong . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
x
TABLE OF APPENDICES
Page
A P P E N DI X A — O P I N ION O F T H E
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR T H E F I R S T CI RCU I T, F I L ED
DECEMBER 5, 2024 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1a
A PPENDI X B — J U DGMENT OF THE
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT, ENTERED
DECEMBER 5, 2024 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .48a
APPENDIX C — MEMORANDUM & ORDER
OF THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT
COURT, DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS,
FILED OCTOBER 12, 2023 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51a
A PPENDI X D — J U DGMENT OF THE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT,
DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS, FILED
OCTOBER 12, 2023 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112a
APPENDIX E — RELEVANT STATUTES AND
REGULATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114a
xi
TABLE OF CITED AUTHORITIES
Cases:
Page
Adkins v. VIM Recycling, Inc.,
644 F.3d 483 (7th Cir. 2011) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
Alabama v. North Carolina,
560 U.S. 330 (2010) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
Batterton v. Francis,
432 U.S. 416 (1977) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
Bennett v. Spear,
520 U.S. 154 (1997) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31, 35
Beyond Nuclear v. U.S. Nuclear Regul. Comm’n,
704 F.3d 12 (1st Cir. 2013) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
Bruner v. United States,
343 U.S. 112 (1952) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC, Inc.,
467 U.S. 837 (1984) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
Chicago & N. W. Transp. Co. v.
Kalo Brick & Tile Co.,
450 U.S. 311 (1981) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
Chickasaw Nation v. United States,
534 U.S. 84 (2001) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
xii
Cited Authorities
Page
City of Arlington v. FCC,
569 U.S. 290 (2013) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
Del. Riverkeeper Network v. FERC,
753 F.3d 1304 (D.C. Cir. 2014) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
Duncan v. Walker,
533 U.S. 167 (2001) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp.,
529 U.S. 120 (2000) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
Gonzales v. Oregon,
546 U.S. 243 (2006) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
Gozlon-Peretz v. United States,
498 U.S. 395 (1991) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
La. Pub. Serv. Comm’n v. FCC,
476 U.S. 355 (1986) . . . . . . . . . . . . 2, 9, 11, 17, 21, 31-34
Lambert v. Wicklund,
520 U.S. 292 (1997) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11, 25
Loper Bright Enters. v. Raimondo,
603 U.S. 369 (2024) . . . . . . . . . 2, 9, 10, 12, 16-19, 22-25
Marin Audubon Soc’y v. FAA,
121 F.4th 902 (D.C. Cir. 2024) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5, 34
xiii
Cited Authorities
Page
Marsh v. Or. Nat. Res. Council,
490 U.S. 360 (1989) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
Michigan v. EPA,
576 U.S. 743 (2015) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
Mock v. Garland,
75 F.4th 563 (5th Cir. 2023) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
Moctezuma-Reyes v. Garland,
124 F.4th 416 (6th Cir. 2024) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v.
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.,
463 U.S. 29 (1983) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders v.
Defenders of Wildlife,
551 U.S. 644 (2007) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. DOL, OSHA,
595 U.S. 109, 142 S. Ct. 661 (2022) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
National Org. for Women, Inc. v. Scheidler,
510 U.S. 249 (1994) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
Relentless, Inc. v. United States DOC,
62 F.4th 621 (1st Cir. 2023) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
xiv
Cited Authorities
Page
Rothensies v. Electric Storage Battery Co.,
329 U.S. 296 (1946) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16, 30
Thompson v. Keohane,
516 U.S. 99 (1995) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
United States v. Coleman,
390 U.S. 599 (1968) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
United States v. Doe,
465 U.S. 605 (1984) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11, 32, 34
Utah Power & Light Co. v. United States,
243 U.S. 389 (1917) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. NRDC,
435 U.S. 519 (1978) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
Wayman v. Southard,
10 Wheat. 1 (1825) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
West Virginia v. EPA,
597 U.S. 697 (2022) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2, 31
WildWest Inst. v. Bull,
547 F.3d 1162 (9th Cir. 2008) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
Wood v. GMC,
865 F.2d 395 (1st Cir. 1988) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
xv
Cited Authorities
Page
Statutes & Regulations:
5 U.S.C.
§ 706(2) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
28 U.S.C.
§ 1254(1) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
42 U.S.C.
§ 4332(B) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .4
§ 4332(C)(i)-(iii) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
43 U.S.C.
§§ 1331-1356 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
§ 1332(1) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
§ 1332(2) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4, 27
§ 1332(3) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
§ 1337(p)(4) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1, 9, 10, 17, 19-21, 24
§ 1337(p)(4)(A) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
§ 1337(p)(4)(B) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
§ 1337(p)(4)(F) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
xvi
Cited Authorities
Page
40 C.F.R.
§ 1500.1(a) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
§ 1502.14(a) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
§ 1508.7 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
79 Fed. Reg. 70545 (Nov. 26, 2014) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
85 Fed. Reg. 81486 (Dec. 16, 2020) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
86 Fed. Reg. 12495 (Mar. 3, 2021) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
86 Fed. Reg. 14153 (Mar. 12, 2021) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
86 Fed. Reg. 26541 (May 14, 2021) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Fed. R. App. P. 28(j) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Other Authorities:
Fact Sheet: Biden Administration Jumpstarts
Offshore Wind Energy Projects to Create
Jobs, T he White House (Mar. 29, 2021),
https://tinyurl.com/str7ymwf . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
First Circuit Oral Argument: 23-1853, Seafreeze
Shoreside, Inc. v. US Dep’t of the Interior, U.S.
First Cir. Court of A pp. (July 25, 2024), at
https://tinyurl.com/mry68r3p . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
xvii
Cited Authorities
Page
GCube Scr utinizes Bla de Breaka ges,
N. A m . C l e a n E n er g y (Sept . 8 , 2 014),
https://tinyurl.com/358e6fsy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Justice Harlan, Some Aspects of the Judicial
Process in the Supreme Court of the United
States, 33 Austl. L. J. 108 (1959) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Letter to Ms. Rachel Pachter, U.S. Dep’t of Interior
(Jan. 17, 2025), https://tinyurl.com/mwnf4x73 . . . . . 27
Temporary Withdrawal of All Areas on the
Outer Continental Shelf From Offshore
Wind Leasing and Review of the Federal
Gover nment’s Leasing and Per mitting
Practices for Wind Projects, The White House
(Jan. 20, 2025), https://tinyurl.com/bde3dkez . . . . . 13
Vineyard Wind Construction and Operations
Pl a n A d d e n d u m , B u r e a u o f O c e a n
Energy M anagement (Dec. 5, 2024) at § 1.0,
https://tinyurl.com/5eb8wmr4 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15, 26
1
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
Petitioners Seafreeze Shoreside, Inc., Long Island
Commercial Fishing Association, Inc., XIII Northeast
Fishery Sector, Inc., Heritage Fisheries, Inc., Nat.
W., Inc., and Old Squaw Fisheries, Inc. (“Petitioners’)
respectfully petition for a writ of certiorari to review the
judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the
First Circuit.
INTRODUCTION
In a rush to replace fossil fuels as this nation’s
primary source of electricity, the federal government
launched an aggressive, nationwide program to approve
30 gigawatts (“GW”) of offshore wind energy projects
across all three American coasts by 2030. To accomplish
this enormous task, the Department of the Interior’s
Bureau of Ocean Energy Management (“BOEM”) led a
whole-of-government effort to approve as many offshore
wind projects as possible, as quickly as possible. The first
approval under this massive program was the Vineyard
Wind 1 project (“Project”), located in the North Atlantic
off the coast of Massachusetts.
During the approval process, the Departments of
the Interior, Commerce, and Defense, acting through
their sub-agencies and officers (“Federal Respondents”),
acknowledged that the Project would harm safety, the
environment, and national security but permitted it
anyway—skirting their mandatory duties under the
Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act (“OCSLA”), 43 U.S.C.
§ 1337(p)(4), to “ensure” offshore wind projects are carried
out “in a manner that provides for safety, protection of the
environment, [and] . . . national security.” In the process,
2
the Federal Respondents sidestepped their procedural
duties under the National Environmental Policy Act
(“NEPA”).
This Court’s recent decision in Loper Bright Enters.
v. Raimondo, 603 U.S. 369 (2024), held that courts must
“exercise their independent judgment in deciding whether
an agency has acted within its statutory authority. . . .”
Id. at 412. And this Court previously held that “an agency
literally has no power to act . . . unless and until Congress
confers power upon it.” La. Pub. Serv. Comm’n v. FCC, 476
U.S. 355, 374 (1986); see also West Virginia v. EPA, 597
U.S. 697, 723 (2022) (opining that administrative agencies
“have only those powers given to them by Congress”).
The First Circuit failed to adhere to those precedents
and impermissibly deferred to Federal Respondents’
interpretations of OCSLA and NEPA, thereby creating
conflicts between its ruling in the instant case and prior
decisions of this Court. In so doing, the First Circuit
unlawfully sanctioned the federal government’s approval
of the first of many such planned, enormous wind energy
projects scheduled to industrialize the pristine waters
of America’s outer Continental Shelf (“OCS”), a decision
that has grave adverse consequences for marine safety,
the environment, and national security.
In addition, the First Circuit’s decision created a
conflict with the D.C. Circuit regarding the validity of
regulations issued by the Council on Environmental
Quality (“CEQ”) under NEPA. Specifically, the D.C.
Circuit held that CEQ’s NEPA regulations were ultra
vires and void, while the First Circuit subsequently
applied those very regulations to uphold the Federal
Respondents’ approval of the Project.
3
OPINIONS BELOW
The opinion of the court of appeals (Appx. at 1a–47a)
is reported at 123 F.4th 1.
JURISDICTION
The court of appeals entered judgment on December
5, 2024. This Court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1254(1).
STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED
Relevant statutory provisions are reproduced in the
appendix to this petition. Appx. at 114a–140a.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. Legal and Regulatory Background
1.
Legal Background
Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act (“OCSLA”)
Congress enacted OCSLA, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1331–1356,
in August 1953, recognizing “the subsoil and seabed of
the outer Continental Shelf” (“OCS”) are “subject to
[the] jurisdiction, control, and power of disposition” of
the United States. 43 U.S.C. § 1332(1)1; Appx. at 120a.
1. Unless otherwise specified, all statutes and regulations
cited in this petition are from the United States Code or the
United States Code of Federal Regulations, as the case may be,
as codified in 2020.
4
Congress directed that the OCS “should be made available
for expeditious and orderly development, subject to
environmental safeguards,” and instructed that “this Act
shall be construed in such a manner that the character of
the waters above the [OCS] as high seas and the right to
navigation and fishing therein shall not be affected.” Id.
at §§ 1332(2), (3). Appx. at 120a.
Until 2005, OCSLA governed the development of oil
and gas resources on the OCS but not renewable energy
resources. In 2005, Congress amended OCSLA to add
mandatory legal obligations for permitting offshore
renewable energy leases. It required the Secretary of
the Interior to “ensure that any [OCS renewable energy
leasing] activity . . . is carried out in a manner that provides
for” a list of twelve items, including “safety, protection of
the environment, [and] protection of national security
interests of the United States. . . .” 43 U.S.C. § 1337(p)(4)
(A), (B), (F). Appx. at 121a.
NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ACT
(“NEPA”)
NEPA is our “basic national charter for the protection
of the environment.” 40 C.F.R. § 1500.1(a), Appx. at 135a.
It requires agencies to “identify and develop methods
and procedures” to ensure “environmental amenities and
values may be given appropriate consideration in decisionmaking. . . .” 42 U.S.C. § 4332(B). Appx. at 118a. Agencies
do so by preparing a “detailed statement” for major agency
actions “significantly affecting the quality of the human
environment” that specifies, among other things, the
“environmental impact” of the action and “any adverse
environmental effects which cannot be avoided should
5
the proposal be implemented,” along with “alternatives
to the proposed action[.]” Id. at § 4332(C)(i)–(iii). Appx.
at 118a–119a. Such a statement is generally referred to
as an environmental impact statement (“EIS”).
2.
Regulatory Background
The alternatives section is the “heart” of an EIS
required by NEPA. 40 C.F.R. § 1502.14; Appx. at 138a. An
EIS must (1) “rigorously explore and objectively evaluate
all reasonable alternatives” to proposed federal agency
actions and (2) “for alternatives which were eliminated
from detailed study, briefly discuss the reasons for their
having been eliminated.” Id. at § 1502.14(a). Appx. at 138a.
The D.C. Circuit recently held in Marin Audubon
Soc’y v. FAA, 121 F.4th 902, 908 (D.C. Cir. 2024), that these
NEPA regulations “are ultra vires” because they were
promulgated by the Council on Environmental Quality
(“CEQ”), which had no rulemaking authority. After that
decision, the First Circuit relied on those very regulations
to hold in this case that the Federal Respondents complied
with NEPA when approving the Project. Appx. at 36a. The
D.C. Circuit denied rehearing of Marin Audubon Soc’y on
January 31, 2025. See 2025 U.S. App. LEXIS 2280 (denial
of panel rehearing); 2025 U.S. App. LEXIS 2237 (denial of
rehearing en banc). Accordingly, there is a conflict among
the First and D.C. Circuits regarding whether the CEQ
regulations applied by the First Circuit in this case have
any validity. See infra. at II.C.
6
B. Proceedings Below
1.
Administrative Proceedings
BOEM awarded a lease in the OCS to the company
that would become Vineyard Wind 1, LLC (“Project
Developer”). 79 Fed. Reg. 70545 (Nov. 26, 2014). Project
Developer submitted a construction and operations plan
(“COP”) for NEPA review. Well before the completion
of the COP’s environmental impact statement (“EIS”),
Project Developer entered into binding power purchase
agreements (“PPAs”) to sell electricity generated by the
Project to Massachusetts-based electric utility companies.
These contracts were intended to meet Massachusetts’s
efforts to switch from fossil fuels to renewable energy
sources for electricity generation.
Federal Respondents issued a Draft Environmental
Impact Statement (“DEIS”) on Dec. 7, 2018, and a
supplemental DEIS on June 12, 2020. Those documents
showed that the Project would erect multiple turbine
structures that interfere with navigational and defense
radar and would pollute the ocean environment. Six
months after the issuance of the supplemental DEIS,
on December 1, 2020, Project Developer withdrew the
COP from federal review. Within two weeks, BOEM
published notice that “[s]ince the COP has been withdrawn
from review and decision-making, there is no longer
. . . a decision pending before BOEM[,]” and because
“the preparation and completion of an EIS is no longer
necessary, . . . the process is hereby terminated.” 85 Fed.
Reg. 81486 (Dec. 16, 2020).
The very next month, on January 22, 2021, immediately
after a new presidential administration took office in
7
Washington, D.C., Project Developer asked BOEM to
resume the terminated NEPA review and revive the
Project. See 86 Fed. Reg. 12495 (Mar. 3, 2021). Acting
under the new administration, BOEM acquiesced without
providing opportunity for public comment. Id. Nine days
after resuming NEPA review, BOEM published the final
EIS. See 86 Fed. Reg. 14153 (Mar. 12, 2021).
Two weeks later, on March 29, 2021, that same new
administration announced “a set of bold actions that will
catalyze offshore wind energy” as part of its environmental
agenda. Fact Sheet: Biden Administration Jumpstarts
Offshore Wind Energy Projects to Create Jobs, The White
House (Mar. 29, 2021), https://tinyurl.com/str7ymwf
(“the Offshore Wind Policy”). The Offshore Wind Policy
launched “a shared goal to deploy 30 gigawatts (GW) of
offshore wind in the United States by 2030 . . . [and] 110
GW by 2050.” Id. BOEM pledged as part of this effort “to
advance new lease sales and complete review of at least
16 Construction and Operations Plans (COPs) by 2025,
representing more than 19 GW” of offshore wind. Id.
Approximately six weeks after publication of the
Offshore Wind Policy, Federal Respondents issued a
Record of Decision (“ROD”) approving the Project on
May 10, 2021. 86 Fed. Reg. 26541 (May 14, 2021). The
Project was the first of many slated for the OCS under
the Offshore Wind Policy. The ROD stated that the
purpose of the Project was to meet Project Developer’s
contractual commitments made to Massachusetts’ electric
generating companies to achieve that state’s renewable
energy goals and that several alternatives were rejected
during NEPA review because they would not meet that
8
purpose. BOEM_0076823. 2 The ROD also stated that
the Project would likely cause commercial fishermen to
abandon the entire Project lease area “due to difficulties
with navigation.” BOEM_0076837. Shortly thereafter,
BOEM deferred its requirements that Project Developer
provide financial assurance for decommissioning and
removal of the Project “until 15 years after construction.”
BOEM_0077110. To date, no decommissioning plan exists
for the Project, and due to BOEM’s deferral, no financial
assurance exists to implement removal of the Project from
the OCS at the end of the Project’s useful life. See Pet.
First Cir. Op. Br. Appx. at 01409.
2.
Legal Proceedings
Because the Project is located in prime fishing
grounds and represents a threat to their livelihoods,
several commercial fishing companies and a shoreside
seafood processing business (“Petitioners”) sued the
Federal Respondents on December 15, 2021. Project
Developer joined the lawsuit as a defendant-intervenor.
The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment
in the U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts
(“the district court”) on April 3, 2023, and filed a motion
for stay of the construction of the project on May 10, 2023.
The district court denied the motion for stay on May 25,
2023, and Petitioners filed an interlocutory appeal with the
First Circuit. On October 12, 2023, while the interlocutory
appeal was pending, the district court granted summary
2. Citations formatted in this manner reference the
administrative record, which was before the district court and
the First Circuit.
9
judgment to the Federal Respondents and Project
Developer, holding that the Federal Respondents had
discretion to determine whether the statutory criteria
found in OCSLA Section 1337(p)(4) were satisfied, and that
Petitioners lacked standing to bring their NEPA claims.
Appx. at 88a–90a, 103a–109a.
Petitioners voluntarily dismissed their interlocutory
appeal and immediately appealed the district court’s
summary judgment ruling, arguing that the district court
impermissibly deferred to the Federal Respondents’
reading of OCSLA Section 1337(p)(4), that Petitioners
had standing to bring their NEPA claims, and that the
Federal Respondents failed to comply with numerous
requirements of both OCSLA and NEPA. Pet. First Cir.
Op. Br. at 49–64. 3 Petitioners stated the district court’s
judgment “flies in the face of Supreme Court precedent[,]”
id. at 54, namely, the holding that “an agency literally
has no power to act . . . unless and until Congress confers
power upon it.” La. Pub. Serv. Comm’n v. FCC, 476 U.S.
355, 374 (1986).
After briefing but before oral argument, Petitioners
notified the First Circuit on July 9, 2024, pursuant to
Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 28(j), of this Court’s
decision in Loper Bright Enters. v. Raimondo, 603 U.S.
369 (2024). Specifically, Petitioners advised the First
Circuit that Loper Bright required courts to “decide all
relevant questions of law arising on review of agency
action[,]” Loper Bright, 603 U.S. at 392 (quotations
omitted), rather than relying on agency discretion, as had
been done by the district court.
3. When citing to filings on the First Circuit appellate docket,
this petition uses the Bates page numbering.
10
The case was argued before the First Circuit on July
25, 2024. On December 5, 2024, the First Circuit issued
its opinion affirming in part the judgment of the district
court. Regarding OCSLA, the First Circuit approvingly
cited the district court’s statement “that the BOEM must
have ‘discretion’ in considering whether each statutory
criterion is satisfied, and that the BOEM must ‘balance’
the statutory mandate to develop energy projects on the
Outer Continental Shelf with the twelve statutory criteria
[in Section 1337(p)(4)] for which it must provide.” Appx. at
44a–45a. Regarding NEPA, the First Circuit found that
Petitioners did have standing to bring their NEPA claims
but also that Federal Respondents did not violate NEPA.
Id. at 32a–38a. At no point in its opinion did the First
Circuit address this Court’s decisions in Loper Bright or
La. Pub. Serv. Comm’n.
REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION
The First Circuit’s rulings deal with important and
recurring issues of federal law and conflict with rulings
of this Court and those of the D.C. Circuit. The issues
include protection of public safety, the environment, and
national security.
By deferring to Federal Respondents’ interpretations
of OCSLA and NEPA without conducting independent
statutory analyses of the best readings of those statutes,
the First Circuit impermissibly failed to adhere to this
Court’s instructions to “exercise their independent
judgment in deciding whether an agency has acted within
its statutory authority.” Loper Bright, 603 U.S. at 412. The
First Circuit also failed to follow this Court’s instruction
that courts must conduct their reviews “independent of
11
the political branches when interpreting the laws those
branches enact” and that “the APA . . . bars judges from
disregarding that responsibility just because an Executive
Branch agency views a statute differently.” Id. (emphasis
in original). Because the First Circuit did not provide
independent analysis of the OCSLA and NEPA language
central to the issues in this case involving the first of
dozens of massive wind energy projects slated for the
OCS, certiorari is appropriate. See United States v. Doe,
465 U.S. 605, 610 (1984) (granting certiorari to “resolve the
apparent conflict between the Court of Appeals’ holding
and the reasoning underlying this Court’s holding” in a
prior case).
Moreover, the First Circuit failed to apply this Court’s
ruling that “an agency literally has no power to act . . .
unless and until Congress confers power upon it.” La.
Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 476 U.S. at 374. Instead, the First
Circuit assumed that the Federal Respondents had the
powers they claimed. But a careful reading of the relevant
statutory provisions of OCSLA and NEPA would have
shown that the Federal Respondents were not delegated
such claimed powers by Congress. Id.; see also Lambert
v. Wicklund, 520 U.S. 292, 293 (1997) (granting petition
where lower court’s decision is “in direct conflict with [this
Court’s] precedents”).
Beyond the facts of this case, there are dozens of
pending, similar offshore wind projects scheduled to be
built on the OCS awaiting approval from the Federal
Respondents. Accordingly, the First Circuit’s legal errors
that conflict with this Court’s rulings would have longlasting, nationwide impact that can only be remedied by
this Court’s prompt action.
12
Finally, as indicated in the Regulatory Background
section, supra, there is a conflict among the courts of
appeal regarding whether the CEQ’s NEPA regulations
are null and void. Because that question is central to the
NEPA issues in this case, and would be central to all
future COP approval challenges under NEPA, certiorari
is appropriate. See Justice Harlan, Some Aspects of the
Judicial Process in the Supreme Court of the United
States, 33 Austl . L. J. 108 (1959) (observing that “a
conflict of decisions may safely be relied on as a ground for
certiorari . . . [if] the conflict is one that can be effectively
resolved only by the prompt action of the Supreme Court”).
I.
The First Circuit’s OCSLA decision warrants this
Court’s review
The First Circuit impermissibly disregarded Loper
Bright while deciding issues of national importance.
Accordingly, this Court should grant certiorari to ensure
that other lower courts adhere to Loper Bright in the
future.
A.
The question presented is of national
importance
This case concerns the first step in a massive federal
program to industrialize the OCS on all three American
coasts. Record evidence establishes that the Project
and the planned follow-on projects under the Offshore
Wind Policy will degrade marine navigation and military
readiness by interfering with marine and defense radar.
See D. Mass. MSJ at 28, 44; D. Mass. MSJ Reply at 56–57;
Pet. First Cir. Op. Br. at 24, 65, 68–69, 71. These projects
will also displace vast marine resources by altering the
13
ocean floor, upending established fisheries, and upsetting
the benthic environment across all three American coasts.
See D. Mass. MSJ at 44–45; Pet. First Cir. Op. Br. at
65–68. They will affect endangered species, especially
species that use sound to communicate like the critically
endangered North Atlantic right whale (“NARW”), which
inhabits the Vineyard Wind 1 project area. See D. Mass.
MSJ at 22 (referencing Project’s effects on NARW).
These impacts are acknowledged in a recently issued
executive order. See Temporary Withdrawal of All
Areas on the Outer Continental Shelf From Offshore
Wind Leasing and Review of the Federal Government’s
Leasing and Permitting Practices for Wind Projects,
The White House (Jan. 20, 2025), https://tinyurl.com/
bde3dkcz. The executive order recognizes the issues
Petitioners raise in this case as significant problems
worthy of re-examination. It states that there are “various
alleged legal deficiencies” in permitting processes for
offshore wind, “the consequences of which may lead to
grave harm—including negative impacts on navigational
safety interests, transportation interests, national
security interests, commercial interests, and marine
mammals. . . .” Id. And it admits “potential inadequacies
in various environmental review required by [NEPA]” in
permitting offshore wind projects. Id. Accordingly, the
executive order calls for a “comprehensive assessment and
review of Federal wind leasing and permitting practices”
to be carried out by no fewer than seven agencies or subagencies. Id.
But this presidential decree does not lessen this case’s
urgency or importance. It provides no deadline for the
agencies’ reassessment of federal wind leasing. To date,
14
39 commercial wind leases have been granted on all three
coasts, and the executive order does not halt construction
at any approved offshore wind projects, including the
Project at issue.4 The threats these projects present to the
nation’s commercial fishing industry, ocean environment,
public safety, and national security capabilities remain.
Even if the current administration were to permanently
halt all ongoing offshore wind construction, which has not
happened, the Offshore Wind Program may continue in a
future administration without change unless this Court
acts now to clarify the meaning of Section 1337(p)(4) and
the limitations that section sets on development of the
OCS for renewable energy projects.
Additionally, BOEM impermissibly waived all required
decommissioning payments from Project Developer
during the first 15 years of the Project’s operation. Pet.
First Cir. Op. Br. at 76 (quoting administrative record
at BOEM_0077110). Furthermore, Project Developer
has no approved decommissioning plan, and has never
demonstrated that one exists, even in draft form. See
Pet. First Cir. Op. Br. Appx. at 01409 (cross-examination
of Project Developer CEO). Certiorari should be granted
so that future wind energy projects are not approved
without robust decommissioning plans backed by palpable
financial security guarantees.
4. Offshore wind projects currently in various phases of
construction include South Fork Wind (approved 2022), Coastal
Virginia Offshore Wind (approved 2023), Revolution Wind
(approved 2023), and the instant Project. In 2011, a decade
before the Offshore Wind Policy was initiated in 2021, BOEM’s
predecessor agency approved the Cape Wind offshore wind
project, a small project involving only five wind turbines, but Cape
Wind was abandoned by its developer in 2017.
15
This matters because recent events show that the
Project already has caused substantial environmental
damage and is likely to cause more. One of the Project’s
blades (the size of a football field) broke apart and fell
into the ocean in pieces soon after installation in July
2024, scattering fiberglass debris across Massachusetts
beaches and depositing microplastics into the ocean,
potentially polluting it forever. Upon reviewing the Project
after the blade incident, BOEM’s Bureau of Safety and
Environmental Enforcement (“BSEE”) found that up to
66 already-installed blades of equal size located on 22 of
the already-constructed turbines had the same danger
of failure and ordered their removal—providing further
proof of the Project’s unsafe and environmentally perilous
nature. See Vineyard Wind Construction and Operations
Plan Addendum, Bureau of Ocean Energy Management
(Dec. 5, 2024) at § 1.0, https://tinyurl.com/5eb8wmr4. The
risks of blade failure are well known, yet the Federal
Respondents failed to account for such risks in the
EIS. 5 Without this Court’s intervention, every one of the
Project’s anticipated 186 turbine blades located on a total
of 62 approved wind turbines, each of which is 298 feet
taller than the Washington Monument, will hang over
America’s pristine OCS waters for the foreseeable future,
with the potential of dropping into the ocean and causing
further environmental harm. And other pending offshore
wind projects may well create the same dangers if other
lower courts defer to government agency “discretion”
regarding the meaning of Section 1337(p)(4), just as
the First Circuit did in the instant case. That section is
reproduced in full at Appx. 121a-122a and is analyzed
infra in Section I.B.
5. See GCube Scrutinizes Blade Breakages, N. A m. Clean
Energy (Sept. 8, 2014), https://tinyurl.com/358e6fsy.
16
Thus, this case concerns issues of national importance
involving the use of public lands on the OCS that only
this Court can definitively resolve. The First Circuit’s
failure to provide independent judicial guidance as to how
Section 1337(p)(4) applies in such instances should not be
permitted to stand. See United States v. Coleman, 390
U.S. 599, 601 (1968) (granting certiorari “because of the
importance of the decision to the utilization of the public
lands”). Here, due to the First Circuit’s deference to the
Federal Respondents “discretion” in interpreting Section
1337(p)(4), the Federal Defendants have been given a
virtual green light to determine how the public lands of
the OCS will be used for renewable energy development.
Significantly, all the other approved offshore wind
projects undergoing construction have been challenged.6
See Rothensies v. Electric Storage Battery Co., 329 U.S.
296 (1946) (granting certiorari due to serious hinderance
to effective legal administration caused by lower court
decision). To ensure uniformity among courts in dealing
with the risks posed by these enormous offshore wind
energy projects, this Court must provide guidance that
will satisfy OCSLA’s requirements for all OCS offshore
wind development.
B. The decision below is inconsistent with prior
decisions of this Court
Contrary to this Court’s recent decision in Loper
Br ight , the First Circuit failed to independently
determine the best reading of Section 1337(p)(4) but
instead uncritically adopted the district court’s judgment
6. See supra at n.4 for identification of approved offshore wind
projects in various stages of construction.
17
that the Federal Respondents “retain” discretion as to
how to apply Section 1337(p)(4). See Appx. at 107a. As set
forth in detail infra, that position matches precisely the
view taken in a legal memorandum of the Department of
the Interior addressing Section 1337(p)(4)’s meaning. Such
uncritical deference to agency interpretation of a statutory
provision directly conflicts with Loper Bright. The First
Circuit’s approach is also contrary to this Court’s ruling
in La. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 476 U.S. at 374 (1986) (opining
that “an agency literally has no power to act . . . unless
and until Congress confers power upon it”).
In Loper Bright, this Court rejected the doctrine
of assumptive judicial deference to agency readings of
ambiguous statutory language prescribed in Chevron,
U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). See
Loper Bright, 603 U.S. at 398 (describing Chevron
and its progeny as “heedless of the original design of
the APA” (quotations omitted)). Not only that, but the
Loper Bright Court erased Chevron’s presumption that
ambiguous language always reflects “implicit delegations
to agencies.” Id. at 399. Now, courts must “use every tool
at their disposal to determine the best reading of the
statute and resolve the ambiguity.” Id. at 400.
Importantly, this Court did not rule in Loper Bright
that the duty to independently interpret statutory law only
applied in a narrow set of cases. “Courts interpret statutes,
no matter the context, based on the traditional tools of
statutory construction, not individual policy preferences”
and “exercise judgment free from the influence of the
political branches.” Id. at 403 (emphasis added). Neither
may courts reflexively defer to agency readings of statutes
when that agency’s technical expertise may be relevant
18
to a term’s meaning. “Congress expects courts to handle
technical statutory questions.” Id. at 402. In any such
instance, “the court will go about its task with the agency’s
body of experience and informed judgment, among other
information, at its disposal.” Id. (quotations omitted).
Independent interpretation of laws matters especially
in cases involving the extent of agency authority. Loper
Bright, id. at 394–95, recognizes that some statutes allow
agencies “a degree of discretion” in three primary ways:
• Express delegation to determine what a
statute’s terms mean. See Batterton v.
Francis, 432 U.S. 416, 425 (1977).
• Rulemaking to fill in a statute’s details.
See Wayman v. Southard, 10 Wheat. 1, 43
(1825).
• Regulation subject to “a term or phrase
that ‘leaves agencies with flexibility,’ such as
‘appropriate’ or ‘reasonable.’” Loper Bright,
603 U.S. at 395 (quoting Michigan v. EPA,
576 U.S. 743, 752 (2015)).
Other appellate courts recognize that the statutes
cited as examples of deference in Loper Bright “pair that
language with words that expressly empower the agency
to exercise judgment.” Moctezuma-Reyes v. Garland,
124 F.4th 416, 420 (6th Cir. 2024) (citing Loper Bright
for the proposition that courts must use independent
judgment to determine the scope of agency discretion and
authority). “When the best reading of a statute is that it
delegates discretionary authority to an agency, the role
19
of the reviewing court under the APA is, as always, to
independently interpret the statute and effectuate the
will of Congress subject to constitutional limits,” Loper
Bright, 603 U.S. at 395, and to “police the outer statutory
boundaries” of delegations of authority from Congress to
agencies. Id. at 374.
Despite this Court’s vacatur of the First Circuit’s
judgment in Loper Bright’s sister case, Relentless, Inc.
v. United States DOC, 62 F.4th 621 (1st Cir. 2023), the
First Circuit refused to apply Loper Bright here but
instead adopted the district court’s pre-Loper Bright
opinion, which was profoundly deferential to the Federal
Defendant’s statutory interpretation of Section 1337(p)(4),
on the ground that “the APA affords great deference to
agency decision-making and agency actions are presumed
valid. . . .” Appx. at 62a. But OCSLA does not afford the
Federal Respondents “great deference” in reviewing
proposed wind energy projects on the OCS.
In relevant part, Section 1337(p)(4) of OCSLA reads
as follows:
Requirements. The Secretary [of the Interior]
shall ensure that any activity under this
subsection is carried out in a manner that
provides for—
(A) safety;
(B) protection of the environment;
(C) prevention of waste;
20
(D) conservation of the natural resources
of the outer Continental Shelf;
(E) coordination with relevant Federal
agencies; [and]
(F) prot ect ion of nat iona l secu r ity
interests of the United States. . . .
Appx. at 121a (emphasis added). As Petitioners explained
in their First Circuit briefing, Section 1337(p)(4) sets forth
mandatory criteria that must be met before any renewable
energy development project is approved on the OCS. The
statutory language does not provide the Secretary of
the Interior with authority to “balance” or “reasonably”
ensure that the requirements of Section 1337(p)(4)
are met. On the contrary, it requires the Secretary to
ensure, e.g., safety, protection of the environment, and
national security for “any activity” on the OCS involving
renewable energy development. If any of the enumerated
“requirements” are not met, the Secretary does not have
the authority to approve the project. And nothing in the
statute provides that the Secretary “retains” discretion
regarding the extent to which the criteria of Section
1337(p)(4) must be met. See Appx. at 121a–122a (text of
Section 1337(p)(4)); but see Appx. at 107a (district court
opinion); 44a–45a (First Circuit affirming district court).
The mistaken view that Federal Respondents
retain discretion under Section 1337(p)(4) stems from
the Federal Respondents’ misreading of the statute.
As indicated supra, the Department of the Interior’s
Principal Deputy Solicitor General issued a memorandum
interpreting OCSLA Section 1337(p)(4). See U.S. Dept. of
21
Interior, M-37067, Secretary’s Duties under Subsection
8(p)(4) of the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act When
Authorizing Activities on the Outer Continental Shelf
(Apr. 9, 2021) (“the M-Opinion”). The M-Opinion rescinded
an earlier administration’s interpretation of Section
1337(p)(4) and found the section “require[s] only that the
Secretary strike a rational balance between Congress’s
enumerated goals. . . . In making this determination, the
Secretary retains wide discretion to weigh those goals
as an application of her technical expertise and policy
judgment.” Id. at 2 (emphasis added). The M-Opinion
weakens the mandatory requirements of the statute into
aspirational goals, and alters the statute’s plain language.
In the district court, the Federal Respondents
advocated for the M-Opinion’s interpretation of Section
1337(p)(4). See, e.g., Pet. First Cir. Op. Br. Appx. at 01296
(Federal Respondents’ counsel referencing M-Opinion);
Federal Respondents’ MSJ at 44–45. Without independent
analysis of Section 1337(p)(4), the district court deferred
to the M-Opinion’s interpretation (albeit without specific
citation) by assuming that “[t]he Secretary still retains
some discretion in considering whether the enumerated
statutory criteria have been satisfied, even when the
statute does not state so expressly.” Appx. at 107a
(emphasis added).
But Congress must speak clearly if it wishes to
delegate authority to agencies. See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep.
Bus. v. DOL, OSHA, 595 U.S. 109, 142 S. Ct. 661, 665
(2022) (per curiam) (because “[a]dministrative agencies
are creatures of statute, [t]hey accordingly possess only
the authority that Congress has provided”); La. Pub. Serv.
Comm’n, 476 U.S. at 374 (1986) (“an agency literally has no
22
power to act . . . unless and until Congress confers power
upon it”). Accordingly, the only discretion permitted is
that which the statutory text of OCSLA allows. There
is no discretion “retained” by the Federal Respondents
under OCSLA that is not found in the statutory language.
The First Circuit skirted this bedrock principle of
separation of powers by refusing to reverse the ruling of
the district court. Moreover, it profoundly misunderstood
the scope of Loper Bright.
During oral argument7, the First Circuit asked the
parties to address Loper Bright. First Circuit Oral
Argument: 23-1853, Seafreeze Shoreside, Inc. v. US Dep’t
of the Interior, U.S. First Cir. Court of A pp. (July 25,
2024), at https://tinyurl.com/mry68r3p. The court stated
the following:
JUDGE GELPI: And I will say, at least I’m
speaking for myself, but it would appear to
me . . . that this is not a case where we’re
not deferring to agency interpretation of a
regulation, this is an agency that’s granting
permits and it’s involved in the permit-making
process, so it would appear that it’s a different
scenario. . . .
Id. at 01:05–01:28. But Loper Bright is not limited to
statutory interpretation in the context of challenges to
agency regulations. It applies with equal force to other
7. The First Circuit does not make transcripts of oral
argument available to parties but publishes them as audio files
on its website.
23
agency actions, including the issuance of permits. In
all such cases, courts must independently interpret the
meaning of the relevant statutes that are at issue.
The First Circuit continued during oral argument:
JUDGE GELPI: Isn’t this permit granting
that’s not like—we’re not deferring to agency
interpretation. We’re reviewing whether, you
know, the permit administratively . . . complies
with our standard of review.
MR. HADZI-ANTICH [Counsel for Petitioners]:
The question is whether the district court
deferred to the agency judgment, and the
answer is yes, and again—
JUDGE GELPI: Won’t that happen in probably
every case we affirm an agency, because it’s an
agency judgment and we’re affirming it?
MR. HADZI-ANTICH: But they deferred to
the agency’s judgment regarding the meaning
of 1337(p)(4). That’s a statutory interpretation
issue that the Supreme Court in Loper Bright
reserved strictly for courts, for the judicial
branch.
Id. at 48:48–49:30.
The First Circuit’s opinion does not discuss, cite, or
even acknowledge Loper Bright. Rather, it simply adopts
the district court’s ruling that the Federal Respondents
retain discretion to decide when their actions meet
24
statutory requirements. See Appx. at 44a–45a. The opinion
states:
The district court held only that the BOEM
must have “discretion” in considering whether
each statutory criterion is satisfied, and that the
BOEM must “balance” the statutory mandate
to develop energy projects on the Outer
Continental Shelf with the twelve statutory
criteria for which it must provide. . . .
Id. But, as set forth in more detail in I.C. infra, nothing
in OCSLA authorizes BOEM to “balance” the statutory
criteria. Nor does OCSLA provide BOEM with any
“discretion” regarding whether the statutory criteria
must be met. Furthermore, OCSLA does not “mandate”
the development of OCS renewable energy projects but
merely authorizes such projects if BOEM ensures that
the statutory criteria are met. Accordingly, the statutory
criteria serve as limitations on BOEM’s authority to
approve offshore wind projects.
Moreover, the First Circuit’s questioning at oral
argument demonstrates that it mistakenly believed Loper
Bright did not apply to this case because the Petitioners
did not challenge a regulation per se but only challenged
a permit, i.e., the COP approval. Thus, the First Circuit
“presum[ed]” that Section 1337(p)(4) contained “implicit
delegations to agencies,” a presumption that “does not
approximate reality.” Loper Bright, 603 U.S. at 373.
Uncritically adopting an agency construal of a statute
that is contraindicated by the statute’s text elevates the
agencies’ interpretive power over that of the judiciary.
Id. at 400–401.
25
This Court must clarify that Loper Bright applies
to all cases involving agency action, and that it requires
courts to provide the best reading of statutes using the
traditional tools of statutory construction—“the reading
the court would have reached if no agency were involved.”
Id. at 400 (quotation omitted). The First Circuit’s opinion
directly conflicts with Loper Bright’s instructions to lower
courts, which provides ample reason for this Court to
grant certiorari. See Lambert, 520 U.S. at 293.
C.
The decision below is wrong
For at least two additional reasons, the First Circuit’s
decision regarding OCSLA is wrong.
First, the First Circuit ignored the massive amount
of data in the record showing that the Project will cause
substantial negative impacts on safety and the environment,
thereby failing to meet OCSLA’s requirement to “ensure”
safety and environmental protection. In their First Circuit
brief, Petitioners cited to record evidence from the final
EIS and other agency documents demonstrating that:
• Pile driving, other construction activity, and
the operations of the constructed Project
will harm the ocean environment, displace
marine species, and adversely impact public
safety;
• The Project’s turbines are untested in
w ind speeds exceeding 112 mph and
turbine failure will cause environmental
devastation;
26
• The Project will increase vessel collision
risk and interfere with marine navigation,
with major overall cumulative impacts
expected; and
• The Project’s turbines will interfere with
military radar.
See Pet. First Cir. Op. Br. at 65–66. Declarations from
commercial fishermen affirmed these risks. Id. at 69–71.
As indicated supra, events unfortunately proved
Petitioners right. Shortly before oral argument, a turbine
blade at the Project broke off and fell into the ocean,
scattering fiberglass in all directions at the surface and
subsurface. Project Developer failed to contain this debris,
which washed up on the shores of nearby communities
including Nantucket Island, requiring beach closures and
a massive cleanup effort. The impact of the microplastics
and harmful industrial materials that polluted the ocean
because of a single blade’s failure at the Project is still
not yet fully understood. BSEE later discovered that
up to 66 blades had the same flaw as the one that fell.
See Vineyard Wind Construction and Operations Plan
Addendum at § 1.0.
After this disaster, Petitioners notified the First
Circuit of the blade failure and argued that the Federal
Respondents’ post facto investigation and mitigation were
too little, too late to halt the environmental harm that
even a single blade failure wrought. 8 Unfortunately, the
8. The Federal Respondents did not revoke Project
Developer’s COP and require them to remove their harmful
27
First Circuit turned a blind eye to the risks reported by
the Petitioners and convinced itself that “the mitigation
requirements that the BOEM imposed in response to the
safety and environmental concerns raised” were enough
to satisfy OCSLA. Appx. at 47a. But as the blade failure
incident and the record and declaratory evidence set forth
in the Petitioners’ First Circuit briefing demonstrate, Pet.
First Cir. Op. Br. at 65–66, those mitigation measures are
far too few in number and scope to “ensure” safety and
environmental protection, as required by Section 1337(p)
(4). Accordingly, this Court should grant certiorari to
correct this serious error. See Chicago & N. W. Transp.
Co. v. Kalo Brick & Tile Co., 450 U.S. 311 (1981) (granting
certiorari to correct obviously incorrect legal decision).
Second, as brief ly mentioned in I.B. supra, by
enacting Section 1337(p)(4) Congress specifically limited
BOEM’s general authority to permit renewable energy
development, see 43 U.S.C. § 1332(2), by imposing a set
of nondiscretionary requirements. See Gozlon-Peretz
v. United States, 498 U.S. 395, 407 (1991) (“A specific
provision controls one of more general application.”).
Section 1337(p)(4) cannot be read as a list of aspirational
goals to be balanced against each other. The statute
employs the mandatory term “shall” to make clear that
the requirements of Section 1337(p)(4) must be met
to satisfy the statute. Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders v.
Project when the blade failure occurred. On January 17, 2025,
three days before a new administration entered office, BOEM
approved Project Developer’s COP Addendum without opportunity
for comment and allowed construction to continue, provided that
up to 66 offending blades were removed. See Letter to Ms. Rachel
Pachter, U.S. Dep’t of Interior (Jan. 17, 2025), https://tinyurl.
com/mwnf4x73.
28
Defenders of Wildlife, 551 U.S. 644, 661–62 (2007) (the
term “shall” imposes a mandatory duty). This means that
if the criteria are not met, the activity in question may not
move forward. Far from an “absolutist argument,” Appx.
at 46a, Petitioners’ interpretation gives effect to every jot
and tittle of the statute. Allowing Federal Respondents
an implied, amorphous “retained” discretion to balance
among Section 1337(p)(4)’s criteria renders its mandatory
language meaningless. Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167,
174 (2001) (interpretation that renders a term meaningless
should be avoided); see also Chickasaw Nation v. United
States, 534 U.S. 84, 93 (2001) (holding that “every clause
and word of a statute should, if possible, be given effect”).
And courts “cannot . . . add provisions to a federal statute.”
Alabama v. North Carolina, 560 U.S. 330, 352 (2010); see
also Pet. First Cir. Op. Br. at 60 (citing Alabama). Given
the national importance of this first-of-its-kind case,
the First Circuit’s erroneous interpretation should be
corrected.
II. The First Circuit’s NEPA decision warrants this
Court’s review.
Joining the district court’s unquestioning deference to
the Federal Respondents’ EIS process, the First Circuit
permitted the Federal Respondents to cut corners by
tightly tethering the purpose of the action to Project
Developer’s compliance with private contracts. Pursuing
that purpose, the Federal Respondents impermissibly (1)
ignored reasonable alternatives, (2) segmented the EIS’s
analysis by neglecting environmental impacts from related
projects, and (3) revived a terminated EIS without public
comment. The First Circuit’s approval of such actions
impacts future EISs performed by federal agencies, and
29
constitutes a novel, indefensible interpretation of NEPA.
See National Org. for Women, Inc. v. Scheidler, 510 U.S.
249, 252 (1994) (granting certiorari due to importance of
novel interpretation of statute).
A.
The question presented is of national
importance
The First Circuit’s decision allows third-party
offshore wind developers like Project Developer to
exercise undue control over the wind energy approval
process on the OCS. Though this Court has never directly
spoken on this issue, “agency capture” is “the undesirable
scenario where the regulated industry gains influence
over the regulators, and the regulators end up serving
the interests of the industry, rather than the general
public.” Wood v. GMC, 865 F.2d 395, 418 (1st Cir. 1988).
Congress allowed Americans to sue federal agencies
partially because “regulatory agencies are subject to the
phenomenon known as ‘agency capture.’” Adkins v. VIM
Recycling, Inc., 644 F.3d 483, 499 (7th Cir. 2011).
The Federal Respondents refused to consider certain
alternatives because they would require further surveying
work from Project Developer, “which . . . could impact the
[Project Developer’s] ability to meet the requirements of
its power purchase agreements” and therefore “would not
meet the [Project’s] purpose and need.” Pet. First Cir. Op.
Br. at 50 (quoting DEIS and ROD). Such subservience
to Project Developer’s priorities goes well beyond the
“substantial weight” that the First Circuit found agencies
may give to a project sponsor’s preferences. See Appx. at
37a (relying on Beyond Nuclear v. U.S. Nuclear Regul.
Comm’n, 704 F.3d 12, 19 (1st Cir. 2013)); see also infra at
30
II.D. (explaining why the First Circuit’s ruling is wrong).
The type of agency capture at play here will have farreaching effects over project permitting if allowed to
stand because the First Circuit’s decision sets a precedent
allowing agencies to defer to project sponsors rather
than conducting the robust environmental reviews NEPA
requires.
The Federal Respondents also unilaterally determined
they could restart a previously-terminated NEPA review
process for the Project solely because Project Developer
falsely claimed the process was still a “decision pending
before BOEM.” Pet. First Cir. Op. Br. at 52–55. The
district court found nothing wrong with this decision,
and the First Circuit affirmed and faulted Petitioners for
failing to point to a comment they “were precluded from
submitting to the BOEM.” First Cir. Op. at 42.
Allowing the First Circuit’s NEPA procedural
decisions to stand would sanction a practice by which
agencies may ignore the plain text of NEPA and make
decisions that benefit commercial project sponsors without
considering full environmental impacts. In its supervisory
role over federal courts, this Court should put a halt to this
type of agency behavior before it infects other offshore
wind project approvals. Indeed, if allowed to stand, the
First Circuit’s decision could be viewed as a green light for
any agency to circumvent NEPA’s mandated procedures
in order to further the goals of a project sponsor. Such a
practice would only serve to invite more NEPA challenges.
Rothensies, 329 U.S. 296 (granting certiorari due to
lower court’s decision hindering effective administration
of the laws). “It is rudimentary administrative law that
discretion as to the substance of the ultimate decision does
31
not confer discretion to ignore the required procedures
of decisionmaking.” Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 172
(1997).
B. The decision below conf licts with prior
decisions of this Court
“An agency literally has no power to act . . . unless
and until Congress confers power upon it.” La. Pub.
Serv. Comm’n, 476 U.S. at 374. Administrative agencies’
“power to act and how they are to act are authoritatively
prescribed by Congress, so that when they act improperly,
no less when they act beyond their jurisdiction, what they
do is ultra vires.” City of Arlington v. FCC, 569 U.S. 290,
297 (2013). And an agency’s authority to regulate in the
public interest is limited to that authority which is spelled
out in the grant of power. Congress does not broadly confer
authority “through an implicit delegation.” West Virginia
v. EPA, 597 U.S. 697, 722 (2022) (quoting Gonzales v.
Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 267 (2006)); see also FDA v. Brown
& Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 161 (2000)
(holding such regulatory power “must always be grounded
in a valid grant of authority from Congress”).
NEPA “require[s] that agencies take a hard look at the
environmental effects of their planned action. . . .” Marsh v.
Or. Nat. Res. Council, 490 U.S. 360, 374 (1989). This “hard
look” is accomplished through an EIS. At “the heart”
of the EIS is the determination of alternatives to the
project, which an agency must “[r]igorously explore and
objectively evaluate.” 40 C.F.R. § 1502.14(a); Appx. at 138a.
The First Circuit found that the following two procedures
conducted by BOEM satisfied this requirement. Neither of
these procedures were rigorous or objective, as required
32
by NEPA. As such, the First Circuit’s decision that the
Federal Respondents had authority not found within
NEPA’s plain text runs afoul of La. Pub. Serv. Comm’n
and warrants certiorari. See Doe, 465 U.S. at 610.
i.
The Federal Respondents impermissibly
pre-determined “reasonable alternatives”
The First Circuit authorized the Federal Respondents’
decision to eliminate several alternatives from full
consideration in the EIS because those alternatives could
lead Project Developer to violate its prematurely-signed
PPAs. See infra at II.C.; Appx. at 36a–37a. The First
Circuit found the Federal Respondents’ consideration of
alternatives under NEPA should be “bounded by some
notion of [technical and economic] feasibility.” Id. at 37a
(quoting Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. NRDC,
435 U.S. 519, 551 (1978)). But alternatives that do not
satisfy a project sponsor’s contractual commitments are
not necessarily technically or economically infeasible.
Pointing to those contractual commitments to limit
decisionmaking constitutes reliance “on factors which
Congress has not intended [the agency] to consider,” and is
therefore arbitrary and capricious under the APA. Motor
Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463
U.S. 29, 43 (1983).
Congress has not conferred power on agencies to
ignore otherwise reasonable alternatives during EIS
review solely because those alternatives may not fully
permit a project developer to meet its pre-EIS contractual
obligations. By holding that Federal Respondents
could ignore reasonable alternatives that would not
assist Project Developer in meeting its contracts, the
33
First Circuit allowed ultra vires action. Appx. at 37a.
Accordingly, the First Circuit’s decision runs counter to
this Court’s holding in La. Pub. Serv. Comm’n.
ii.
The Federal Respondents impermissibly
revived the EIS without public comment.
The Federal Respondents decided they could restart
a previously-terminated NEPA review process for the
Project without providing opportunity for public comment,
and the First Circuit assumed the Federal Respondents
had such authority under NEPA.
But NEPA does not authorize federal agencies to
revive a terminated EIS without any opportunity for
public comment. See, e.g., WildWest Inst. v. Bull, 547 F.3d
1162, 1169 (9th Cir. 2008) (stating that “NEPA dictates
that federal agencies shall to the fullest extent possible
encourage and facilitate public involvement in decisions
which affect the quality of the human environment”)
(cleaned up) (emphasis added). At the very least, the
Federal Respondents should have provided an opportunity
for comment before resuscitating the terminated COP.
Accordingly, the Federal Respondents “literally ha[d]
no power to act” in the manner they did. La. Pub. Serv.
Comm’n, 476 U.S. at 374.
By foregoing public comment, the Federal Respondents
unilaterally and impermissibly revived the terminated
Project. That decision resulted in the Project’s approval.
This is the “taint from the . . . procedural error [that]
had a causal effect on the BOEM’s ultimate approval of
the COP.” Appx. at 38a (First Circuit contrafactually
ruling that no such taint exists). Petitioners do not need
34
to demonstrate they would have submitted a comment
to BOEM had the comment period been reopened. See
Mock v. Garland, 75 F.4th 563, 586 (5th Cir. 2023) (finding
prejudicial error where “plaintiffs were not on notice, nor
could they comment on the expanded rule”). Courts must
“hold unlawful and set aside agency action . . . found to be
. . . without observance of procedure required by law[,]”
including the procedural requirement of public comment.
5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(D); Appx. at 115a; cf. Bennett, 520 U.S.
at 172. Because it approved ultra vires agency action, the
First Circuit’s decision conflicts with this Court’s holding
in La. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, meriting certiorari. See Doe,
465 U.S. at 610.
C.
The decision below creates a conflict among
the courts of appeal
The First Circuit’s decision held that Project
Sponsor’s compliance with regulations promulgated by
the CEQ was enough to satisfy NEPA. It did so despite
a prior ruling by the D.C. Circuit that those regulations
were ultra vires because CEQ has no rulemaking
authority granted by Congress. See Marin Audubon
Soc’y, 121 F.4th at 908. “If any [agency] regulations go
beyond what Congress can authorize or beyond what it
has authorized, those regulations are void and may be
disregarded. . . .” Utah Power & Light Co. v. United
States, 243 U.S. 389, 410 (1917); see also 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)
(instructing courts to “hold unlawful and set aside” such
regulations). This serious NEPA conflict between circuit
courts itself warrants certiorari. See, e.g., Thompson v.
Keohane, 516 U.S. 99, 106 (1995) (granting certiorari to
resolve disagreement between circuit courts “[b]ecause
uniformity among federal courts is important on questions
of this order”).
35
D.
The decision below is wrong
The First Circuit’s merits ruling on the NEPA claims
was wrong for two additional reasons.
First, because the First Circuit found that the district
court erred when it ruled Petitioners lacked standing to
bring their NEPA claims, Appx. at 35a, it should have
remanded the case to the district court to determine the
extent to which Petitioners’ NEPA procedural arguments
were meritorious. See Bennett, 520 U.S. at 172. Because
the district court held Petitioners lacked standing, it
devoted no appreciable effort to determining whether
Petitioners’ NEPA arguments had merit. Therefore, the
district court’s record on those arguments was insufficient
for the First Circuit to properly rule on the NEPA issues
raised by the Petitioners. Nevertheless, the First Circuit
ruled on the NEPA merits. Appx. at 35a–40a. This Court
should exercise its supervisory role to correct that serious
error made in the context of a challenge to the first of likely
many challenges to COP approvals for renewable energy
projects on the OCS. See Bruner v. United States, 343 U.S.
112 (1952) (granting certiorari because of supervisory role
over lower courts).
Second, after confirming the adverse effects the
Project would have on the environment in the supplement to
the DEIS, the Federal Respondents conveniently excluded
that analysis from the final EIS and undercounted planned
offshore wind development. See Pet. First Cir. Op. Br. at
55–56. In so doing, they failed to account for the Project’s
“incremental impact . . . when added to . . . reasonably
foreseeable future actions.” 40 C.F.R. § 1508.7; Appx. at
139a. And in failing to consider the impact of the federal
36
government’s offshore wind program as a whole, the
Federal Respondents improperly segmented their NEPA
analysis. See Del. Riverkeeper Network v. FERC, 753
F.3d 1304, 1313 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (faulting federal agency
for “divid[ing] connected, cumulative, or similar federal
actions into separate projects” and thus violating NEPA).
The First Circuit held Petitioners did not develop this
argument and “therefore have not put the correctness
of the district court’s ruling into issue.” First Cir. Op.
at 43. But the district court ruled Petitioners could not
bring this argument due to a perceived lack of standing.
Again, given that the First Circuit found the Petitioners
had standing to bring their NEPA claims, it should have
remanded the cumulative impacts issue to the district
court for a merits ruling.
37
CONCLUSION
The petition for a writ of certiorari should be granted.
Respectfully submitted,
Robert Henneke
Chance Weldon
Theodore Hadzi-A ntich*
*Counsel of Record
Connor Mighell
Texas Public Policy Foundation
901 Congress Avenue
Austin, TX 78701
(512) 472-2700
tha@texaspolicy.com
Counsel for Petitioners
Date: March 4, 2025
APPENDIX
i
TABLE OF APPENDICES
Page
A P P E N DI X A — O P I N ION O F T H E
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR T H E F I R S T CI RCU I T, F I L ED
DECEMBER 5, 2024 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1a
A PPENDI X B — J U DGMENT OF THE
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT, ENTERED
DECEMBER 5, 2024 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .48a
APPENDIX C — MEMORANDUM & ORDER
OF THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT
COURT, DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS,
FILED OCTOBER 12, 2023 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51a
A PPENDI X D — J U DGMENT OF THE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT,
DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS, FILED
OCTOBER 12, 2023 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112a
APPENDIX E — RELEVANT STATUTES AND
REGULATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114a
1a
Appendix
A
APPENDIX A — OPINION
OF THE
UNITED STATES
COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT,
FILED DECEMBER 5, 2024
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
No. 23-1853
No. 23-2051
SEAFREEZE SHORESIDE, INC.; LONG
ISLAND COMMERCIAL FISHING ASSOC., INC.;
XIII NORTHEAST FISHERY SECTOR, INC.;
HERITAGE FISHERIES, INC.; NAT. W., INC.;
OLD SQUAW FISHERIES, INC.,
Plaintiffs, Appellants,
v.
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE
INTERIOR; HONORABLE DEBRA HAALAND,
IN HER OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS SECRETARY
OF THE DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR;
BUREAU OF OCEAN ENERGY MANAGEMENT;
LIZ KLEIN, IN HER OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS
THE DIRECTOR OF THE BUREAU OF OCEAN
ENERGY MANAGEMENT; LAURA DANIELDAVID, IN HER OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS
PRINCIPAL DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY,
LAND AND MINERALS MANAGEMENT;
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE;
HONORABLE GINA M. RAIMONDO, IN HER
OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS THE SECRETARY
OF THE DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE;
NATIONAL OCEANIC AND ATMOSPHERIC
ADMINISTRATION, NATIONAL MARINE
2a
Appendix A
FISHERIES SERVICE; CATHERINE MARZIN,
IN HER OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS THE DEPUTY
DIRECTOR OF THE NATIONAL OCEANIC
AND ATMOSPHERIC ADMINISTRATION;
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE;
HONORABLE LLOYD J. AUSTIN, III, IN HIS
OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS THE SECRETARY OF
THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE; UNITED
STATES ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS; LT.
GEN. SCOTT A. SPELLMON, IN HIS OFFICIAL
CAPACITY AS THE COMMANDER AND CHIEF
OF ENGINEERS OF THE U.S. ARMY CORPS OF
ENGINEERS; COLONEL JOHN A. ATILANO, II,
IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS THE DISTRICT
ENGINEER OF THE NEW ENGLAND DISTRICT
OF THE U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS;
VINEYARD WIND 1, LLC,
Defendants, Appellees,
RESPONSIBLE OFFSHORE DEVELOPMENT
ALLIANCE, A D.C. NONPROFIT CORPORATION,
Plaintiff, Appellant,
v.
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE
INTERIOR; DEBRA HAALAND, IN HER
OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS THE SECRETARY OF
THE INTERIOR; BUREAU OF OCEAN ENERGY
MANAGEMENT; LIZ KLEIN, IN HER OFFICIAL
CAPACITY AS THE DIRECTOR OF THE BUREAU
OF OCEAN ENERGY MANAGEMENT; NATIONAL
3a
Appendix A
MARINE FISHERIES SERVICE; RICHARD W.
SPINRAD, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS THE
ADMINISTRATOR OF THE NATIONAL OCEANIC
AND ATMOSPHERIC ADMINISTRATION;
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY;
CHRISTINE WORMUTH, IN HER OFFICIAL
CAPACITY AS SECRETARY OF THE ARMY;
UNITED STATES ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS;
JAMIE A. PINKHAM, IN HIS OFFICIAL
CAPACITY AS THE ACTING ASSISTANT
SECRETARY OF THE ARMY FOR CIVIL WORKS;
VINEYARD WIND 1, LLC,
Defendants, Appellees.
APPEALS FROM THE UNITED STATES
DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT
OF MASSACHUSETTS
[Hon. Indira Talwani, U.S. District Judge]
Before Gelpí, Montecalvo, and Aframe
Circuit Judges.
December 5, 2024
AFRAME, Circuit Judge. These appeals challenge
the federal government’s process for approving a plan to
construct and operate a large-scale commercial offshore
wind energy facility.1 The facility, which began delivering
power to the New England grid in early 2024, is located
on the Outer Continental Shelf, some fourteen miles south
1. The appeals were briefed and argued separately, but we
address them together in this opinion.
4a
Appendix A
of Martha’s Vineyard and Nantucket. The plaintiffs are
entities involved in or associated with the commercial
fishing industry. The defendants are federal departments,
agencies, and officials responsible for the plan approval
process, as well as the business entity that successfully
submitted the proposed plan and is constructing and
operating the facility. The plaintiffs sued to obtain
declaratory and injunctive relief, asserting thirty-nine
claims under the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”),
5 U.S.C. §§ 701-706, and several environmental statutes,
described below. The district court entered summary
judgment for the defendants on all claims. The plaintiffs
appeal, arguing that the district court erred in multiple
respects. We affirm.
I.
A. The Parties
The plaintiffs in case no. 23-1853 are Seafreeze
Shoreside, Inc., a Rhode Island seafood dealer; the Long
Island Commercial Fishing Association, Inc., a trade
group representing New York’s commercial fishing
industry (“LICFA”); XIII Northeast Fishery Sector, Inc.,
a private organization of commercial fishermen located in
the Northeast; and three commercial fishing companies:
Heritage Fisheries, Inc.; Nat. W., Inc.; and Old Squaw
Fisheries, Inc. We refer to these entities collectively as
the “Seafreeze plaintiffs” and to case no. 23-1853 as the
“Seafreeze appeal.”
The defendants in the Seafreeze appeal are the
Department of the Interior; the Honorable Debra Haaland,
5a
Appendix A
in her official capacity as Secretary of the Interior; the
Bureau of Ocean Energy Management (“BOEM”); Liz
Klein, in her official capacity as the BOEM’s Director;
Laura Daniel-David, in her official capacity as the Interior
Department’s Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of
Land and Minerals Management; the Department of
Commerce; the Honorable Gina M. Raimondo, in her
official capacity as Secretary of Commerce; the National
Oceanic and Atmospheric Association (“NOAA”); the
National Marine Fisheries Service (“NMFS”); Catherine
Marzin, in her official capacity as Deputy Director of
the NOAA; the Department of Defense; the Honorable
Lloyd J. Austin III, in his official capacity as Secretary
of Defense; the Army Corps of Engineers (“the Corps”);
Lt. Gen. Scott A. Spellmon, in his official capacity as the
Corps’ Commander and Chief of Engineers; Col. John A.
Atilano, II, in his official capacity as the Corps’ District
Engineer of the New England District; and Vineyard
Wind 1, LLC, which submitted the approved plan and is
constructing and operating the facility. Vineyard Wind
1 was not initially sued but successfully intervened as a
defendant. We use “Vineyard Wind” to refer both to the
project and its developer.
The plaintiff in case no. 23-2051 is Responsible
Offshore Development Alliance (“Alliance”), a D.C.
nonprofit whose membership includes fishing associations,
seafood dealers, seafood processors, fishing vessels, and
affiliated businesses. We refer to case no. 23-2051 as the
“Alliance appeal.”
The defendants in the Alliance appeal are the Interior
Department; Secretary Haaland in her official capacity;
6a
Appendix A
the BOEM; Director Klein in her official capacity;2 the
NMFS; Richard W. Spinrad, in his official capacity as
the NOAA’s Administrator; the Department of the Army;
Christine Wormuth, in her official capacity as Secretary
of the Army; the Corps; Jamie A. Pinkham, in his official
capacity as Acting Assistant Secretary of the Army for
Civil Works; and Vineyard Wind.
B. Statutory Background
1.
The Seafreeze Appeal
The Seafreeze appeal involves claims pursuant to,
inter alia, the APA and the following environmental
statutes:
a.
The Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act
The Outer Continental Shelf consists of all submerged
lands beyond those reserved to the States and up to the
edge of the United States’ jurisdiction and control. 43
U.S.C. § 1331(a)(1). The Outer Continental Shelf Lands
Act (“OCSLA”) regulates the federal government’s
leasing of mineral and energy resources on these lands.
See id. §§ 1331-1356c. The OCSLA establishes the Outer
Continental Shelf as a “vital national resource reserve”
that “should be made available for expeditious and orderly
development, subject to environmental safeguards, in
a manner which is consistent with the maintenance of
competition and other national needs.” Id. § 1332(3).
2. The case caption lists Amanda Lefton as the BOEM’s
Director. Director Klein replaced Director Lefton in 2023.
7a
Appendix A
To further these goals, the OCSLA authorizes the
Department of the Interior, in consultation with other
federal agencies and acting through the BOEM, to grant
leases on the Outer Continental Shelf for the purpose of,
inter alia, renewable wind energy production. Id. § 1337
(p)(1)(C); 30 C.F.R. § 585.100. When granting such leases,
the BOEM must “ensure that any activity under [the
OCSLA] is carried out in a manner that provides for”
twelve criteria including, insofar as is relevant, safety;
protection of the environment; conservation of natural
resources of the Outer Continental Shelf; prevention of
interference with reasonable uses of the Outer Continental
Shelf (as determined by the Interior Secretary); and
consideration of any other use of the sea or seabed,
including use for fishing and navigation. 43 U.S.C.
§ 1337(p)(4); 30 C.F.R. § 585.102(a).
The BOEM’s issuance of a lease does not itself authorize
development of the site. See 30 C.F.R. § 585.200(a). To
proceed to development, a lessee must formulate a site
assessment plan, obtain the BOEM’s approval of that plan,
and then obtain the BOEM’s approval of a construction
and operations plan (“COP”). See generally id. §§ 585.600,
585.605-607, 585.610-614, 585.620-622, and 585.626-628.
No construction may begin until the BOEM approves the
COP. Id. § 585.620(c).
The OCSLA contains a citizen-suit provision. 43
U.S.C. § 1349(a)(1).
8a
Appendix A
b.
The National Environmental Policy Act
T he BOEM mu st comply w it h t he Nat iona l
Environmental Policy Act (“NEPA”) when approving
a COP. 30 C.F.R. § 585.628. The NEPA is a procedural
statute that requires federal agencies to take a “hard
look” at the environmental impacts of and alternatives
to a proposed action. Beyond Nuclear v. U.S. Nuclear
Regul. Comm’n, 704 F.3d 12, 19 (1st Cir. 2013). Generally,
the vehicle for the required analysis is an environmental
impact statement (“EIS”). See 42 U.S.C. § 4332(C). The
EIS must analyze, inter alia, the “‘reasonably foreseeable
environmental effects’ of the proposed action, the
‘reasonable range of technically and economically feasible
alternatives’ to the proposed action, and reasonable
measures to mitigate the environmental effects of
the proposed action.” Nantucket Residents Against
Turbines v. U.S. Bureau of Ocean Energy Mgmt., 100
F.4th 1, 9 (1st Cir. 2024) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 4332(C)).
The NEPA “‘does not mandate particular results, but
simply prescribes the necessary process’ for evaluating
an agency action’s environmental effects.” Id. (quoting
Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S.
332, 350, 109 S. Ct. 1835, 104 L. Ed. 2d 351 (1989)). This
process is designed to prevent uninformed agency action
and to provide information about environmental impact
to the public and other government agencies so that they
have an opportunity to respond. See Town of Winthrop v.
FAA, 535 F.3d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 2008).
The NEPA does not contain a citizen-suit provision
and is enforced through the judicial review provisions of
9a
Appendix A
the APA. See Scarborough Citizens Protecting Res. v.
U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 674 F.3d 97, 102 (1st Cir. 2012).
c.
The Endangered Species Act
The BOEM also must comply with the Endangered
Species Act (“ESA”) when approving a COP. Section 7 of
the ESA requires agencies to ensure that their actions
are “not likely to jeopardize the continued existence of
any endangered species or threatened species or result
in the destruction or adverse modification of habitat of
such species . . . .” 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2). To this end,
a lead agency (here, the BOEM) must consult with the
NMFS whenever an agency action “may affect” a listed
marine species or critical habitat. 50 C.F.R. § 402.14(a);
see also Nantucket Residents, 100 F.4th at 8. When such a
consultation is required, the NMFS must issue a “biological
opinion” stating whether the contemplated agency action
is “likely to jeopardize the continued existence” of any
listed species or “result in the destruction or adverse
modification of critical habitat.” 50 C.F.R. § 402.14(g)(4), (h).
If so, the NMFS also must determine whether “reasonable
and prudent alternatives” are available. Id. § 402.14(g)(5).
The opinion must be based on the “best scientific and
commercial data available.” Id. § 402.14(g)(8); see also 16
U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2).
A lead agency must request reinitiation of consultation
following the NMFS’s issuance of a biological opinion if
the agency has retained discretionary involvement in or
control over the contemplated action, and certain other
conditions, including new information becoming available,
are satisfied. See 50 C.F.R. § 402.16(a).
10a
Appendix A
Generally, Section 9 of the ESA prohibits the “take”
of an endangered species within the United States or
the territorial seas of the United States. See Nantucket
Residents, 100 F.4th at 8; 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a)(1)(B). A
“take” includes the harassment of or harm to the species.
Id. § 1532(19). A section 9 prohibition also can be applied
to “threatened” (as opposed to endangered) species. See
16 U.S.C. § 1533(d).
One form of take is an “incidental take.” During
consultation, the NMFS may conclude that proposed
agency action is not likely to jeopardize an endangered
or threatened species but is reasonably certain to
incidentally affect the species. In such a situation, the
NMFS issues an “incidental take statement” along with
its biological statement. See id. § 1536(b)(4); 50 C.F.R
§ 402.14(i). An incidental take statement details the extent
of the anticipated take, reasonable and prudent measures
to minimize and monitor it, and the terms and conditions
under which such measures will be implemented. See 16
U.S.C. § 1536(b)(4); 50 C.F.R. § 402.14(i). A take authorized
in compliance with the incidental take statement is exempt
from the ESA’s take prohibition. See 16 U.S.C. § 1536(o).
The ESA contains a citizen-suit provision. 16 U.S.C.
§ 1540(g).
2.
The Alliance Appeal
The Alliance appeal involves claims pursuant to, inter
alia, the APA, the OCSLA, the NEPA, the ESA, and two
additional environmental statutes.
11a
Appendix A
a.
The Marine Mammal Protection Act
Congress enacted the Marine Mammal Protection
Act (“MMPA”) to prevent marine mammals from
“diminish[ing] beyond the point at which they cease to be
a significant functioning element in the ecosystem of which
they are a part . . . .” 16 U.S.C. § 1361(2). While the MMPA
generally prohibits the take (including the harassment)
of marine mammals, id. §§ 1372(a), 1371(a) 1362(13); 50
C.F.R. § 216.3, it permits the NMFS to authorize, for a
period not exceeding one year, the incidental “taking . . . of
small numbers of marine mammals” if it concludes that
“such taking . . . will have a negligible impact on such
species,” 16 U.S.C. § 1371(a)(5)(D)(i)(I).
Under the MMPA, there are two types of harassment:
Level A and Level B. Relevant here is Level B harassment,
which is “‘any act of pursuit, torment, or annoyance’ that
has the ‘potential to disturb a marine mammal or marine
mammal stock in the wild by causing disruption of behavior
patterns.’” Nantucket Residents, 100 F.4th at 9 (quoting 16
U.S.C. § 1362(18)(A)(ii), (18)(D)). The required contents of
an incidental harassment authorization (“IHA”), and the
process for obtaining such an authorization, are described
in 16 U.S.C. § 1371(a)(5)(D)(ii)(I), (II), (III), and 50 C.F.R.
§ 216.104, respectively.
The MMPA does not contain a citizen-suit provision
and is enforced through the judicial review provisions of
the APA. See Cetacean Cmty. v. Bush, 386 F.3d 1169, 1178
(9th Cir. 2004).
12a
Appendix A
b.
The Clean Water Act and the Rivers and
Harbors Act
Congress enacted the Clean Water Act (“CWA”) “to
restore and maintain the chemical, physical, and biological
integrity of the Nation’s waters.” 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a).
The CWA prohibits the “discharge of any pollutant”
into “navigable waters,” including the “territorial seas,”
unless done in compliance with the Act. Id. §§ 1311(a),
1344(a), 1362(7); 33 C.F.R. §§ 328.2, 328.3(a)(1), 328.4(a).
The territorial seas generally include waters extending
seaward three nautical miles from the coast but may also
include other waters in contact with the open sea such as
waters within three nautical miles from islands. See 33
U.S.C. § 1362(8); 33 C.F.R. §§ 328.4(a), 329.12(a).
Section 404 of the CWA authorizes the Secretary of
the Army, acting through the Corps, to issue permits for
discharges of dredged or fill material into waters of the
United States. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1344, 1362(6)-(7). Permits
must be issued in compliance with both the Corps’
permitting regulations, 33 C.F.R. pt. 320, and regulations
jointly developed by the U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency (“EPA”) and the Corps, known as the “Section
404(b)(1) Guidelines,” 40 C.F.R. pt. 230.
The Corps’ regulations require that a permitting
decision be based on “an evaluation of the probable impacts,
including cumulative impacts, of the proposed activity
and its intended use on the public interest.” 33 C.F.R.
§ 320.4(a)(1). Similarly, the Section 404(b)(1) Guidelines
require the Corps to determine the potential impacts,
13a
Appendix A
including cumulative impacts, of proposed discharges.
40 C.F.R. § 230.11. The Section 404(b)(1) Guidelines also
state that the Corps should not issue a permit “if there is
a practicable alternative to the proposed discharge which
would have less adverse impact on the aquatic ecosystem,
so long as the alternative does not have other significant
adverse environmental consequences.” Id. § 230.10(a). The
purpose of the analysis required by the Section 404(b)(1)
Guidelines is to ensure that proposed discharges will
not have a significant adverse effect on human health or
welfare, aquatic life, aquatic ecosystems, or recreational,
aesthetic, or economic values. See id. § 230.10(c)(1).
The Corps also may issue permits to authorize the
installation of structures in navigable U.S. waters more
than three nautical miles from the coast. But it must do
so pursuant to Section 10 of the Rivers and Harbors Act
(“RHA”), see 33 U.S.C. § 403; 33 C.F.R. §§ 320.2(b) &
322.3(a)-(b), and not the CWA.
The CWA contains a citizen-suit provision. 33 U.S.C.
§ 1365(a). The RHA does not contain a citizen-suit
provision and is enforced through the judicial review
provisions of the APA. See Huron Mountain Club v. U.S.
Army Corps of Eng’rs, 545 F. App’x 390, 393 & n.2 (6th
Cir. 2013).
C. Factual and Procedural Background
We recently decided two appeals involving challenges
to the Vineyard Wind project brought by different
plaintiffs. See Melone v. Coit, 100 F.4th 21 (1st Cir. 2024);
14a
Appendix A
Nantucket Residents, 100 F.4th at 1. We draw from
our opinions in those cases to set forth the factual and
procedural background of the Vineyard Wind project.
We then provide additional relevant facts as necessary.
In 2009, the BOEM began evaluating the possibility of
wind energy development on the Outer Continental Shelf
off the coast of Massachusetts, pursuant to its authority
under the OCSLA. Melone, 100 F.4th at 26. After several
years of review, in 2014, the BOEM made “a small portion
of the Massachusetts Wind Energy Area -- a section of the
Outer Continental Shelf -- available for lease.” Nantucket
Residents, 100 F.4th at 10 (citing 79 Fed. Reg. 34771 (June
18, 2014)). In 2015, the BOEM leased a 166,886-acre (or
675-square-kilometer) portion of the area to Vineyard
Wind. Melone, 100 F.4th at 26.
In December 2017, Vineyard Wind submitted to the
BOEM a COP that proposed building an offshore wind
project in an approximately 76,000-acre zone of the
lease area. Id. The COP contemplated the construction
of turbines and additional wind energy infrastructure
capable of generating approximately 800 megawatts of
clean wind energy, enough to power approximately 400,000
homes. Melone, 100 F.4th at 26; Nantucket Residents, 100
F.3d at 10. In response to Vineyard Wind’s submission,
several federal agencies initiated an environmental review
process.
In March 2018, the BOEM published a notice of intent
to prepare an EIS responsive to the Vineyard Wind
proposal. 83 Fed. Reg. 13777 (Mar. 30, 2018). Following
15a
Appendix A
this notice, the BOEM held five public “scoping” meetings
in the vicinity of the proposed project to identify issues
and potential alternatives to the COP for consideration in
the EIS. In November 2018, Vineyard Wind applied for
permits under CWA Section 404 and the RHA to construct
an offshore cable transmission system that would connect
the turbines to a landfall site at Covell’s Beach in Hyannis,
Massachusetts. In December 2018, the BOEM issued a
draft EIS, 83 Fed. Reg. 63184-02 (Dec. 7, 2018), which it
supplemented in June 2020.
Meanwhile, on December 6, 2018, the BOEM
requested consultation with the NMFS out of concern
about the impact the COP might have on the endangered
right whale. Consultation commenced in May 2019.
On September 11, 2020, the NMFS issued a biological
opinion concluding that the Vineyard Wind project would
likely not jeopardize the continued existence of the right
whale. The opinion also contained reasonable and prudent
mitigation measures deemed necessary to reduce the
project’s potential effects on the right whale. See generally
Nantucket Residents, 100 F.4th at 10. On May 21, 2021,
the NMFS issued to Vineyard Wind an IHA allowing the
non-lethal, “incidental Level B harassment of no more than
twenty” right whales. Melone, 100 F.4th at 26.
On May 7, 2021, the BOEM requested that the NMFS
reinitiate consultation in response to two developments.
First, the BOEM had concluded that the September 11,
2020, biological opinion did not fully assess the potential
impacts on the right whale of fish monitoring surveys to
be conducted by Vineyard Wind if its COP were approved.
16a
Appendix A
Second, more up-to-date information regarding the right
whale population had become available since completion of
the September 11, 2020, biological opinion. In requesting
reinitiation of consultation, the BOEM documented its
understanding that the September 11, 2020, biological
opinion “will remain valid and effective until consultation
is completed.” The BOEM also represented that, if
the COP were to be approved, “it would not allow the
commencement of the aforementioned [fish monitoring]
surveys until [the reinitiated consultation] is concluded.” 3
3. In a contemporaneously issued file memorandum, the BOEM
explained that, while it had requested reinitiation of consultation on
the fishery monitoring plan, approval of the project would “neither
jeopardize the continued existence of ESA-listed species nor destroy
or adversely modify designated critical habitat.” Supp. App. at 1683,
Seafreeze Appeal. The memorandum emphasized that reinitiation
of consultation to consider fishery monitoring plans as part of the
proposed action would “not provide any new information concerning
potential effects on threatened and endangered species from
construction, operation, and decommissioning of the project and,
therefore, [would] not change the determinations of the [September
11, 2020, biological opinion] for the rest of the project already
considered in the Opinion.” Id. at 1684; see also id. at 1683 (“The
authorization of Vineyard Wind I and the fishery monitoring plan
are not interdependent. Although approval of the fishery monitoring
plan . . . would not occur but for the project, the authorization of [the
project] is not dependent upon approval of the fishery monitoring
plan.”). The memorandum also stated that, if the BOEM were to
approve the COP, “commencement of any monitoring activities
would be conditioned on the conclusion of this reinitiation and
compliance with any NMFS survey mitigation measures that may
be identified and included in the revised Incidental Take Statement
and implementing Terms and Conditions in the revised Opinion.”
Id. at 1684.
17a
Appendix A
The NMFS agreed to reinitiate consultation and, on
October 18, 2021, issued an updated biological opinion. The
updated opinion again concluded that the project would
likely not jeopardize the right whale’s continued existence.
Both the 2020 and 2021 biological opinions also included
incidental take statements which concluded that, after
mitigation measures were implemented, the maximum
anticipated take from project construction was Level B
harassment of twenty right whales caused by construction
noise.
Between the issuance of the September 11, 2020,
and October 18, 2021, biological opinions, several other
relevant events took place. On December 1, 2020, Vineyard
Wind notified the BOEM that it was withdrawing its
proposed COP from review in order to conduct a technical
and logistical analysis of the wind turbine generator it
had decided to use in the final project design. See 86 Fed.
Reg. 12494 (Mar. 3, 2021). This analysis sought to “review
updated project parameters to confirm that [they] fell
within the project design envelope” that the BOEM had
used in conducting its earlier review. Id. The notice stated
that Vineyard Wind intended to rescind its withdrawal of
the COP upon completion of its analysis. Less than two
months later, on January 22, 2021, Vineyard Wind notified
the BOEM that it had completed its analysis and concluded
that it did not need to modify the COP. Vineyard Wind
also requested that the BOEM resume its review of the
COP, and the BOEM did so, see 86 Fed. Reg. at 12494-95.
The BOEM issued a final EIS (“FEIS”) on March
12, 2021. 86 Fed. Reg. 14153 (Mar. 12, 2021). The FEIS
18a
Appendix A
considered five action alternatives (one of which had two
sub-alternatives) to the project proposed by Vineyard
Wind in the COP. It also considered a no-action alternative.
The FEIS identified the COP, with modifications drawn
from several of the alternatives that the BOEM had
considered, as the preferred alternative. The FEIS also
included a lengthy assessment of potential impacts from
the project on the natural and human environment.
It acknowledged that the project would likely have a
negative economic impact on commercial fishing. But it
suggested that potential revenue losses could be offset
by compensatory funds that Vineyard Wind had agreed
to set aside. It also proposed mitigation measures that
would reduce negative impacts.
On May 10, 2021, the BOEM, the Corps, and the
NMFS issued a joint record of decision (“ROD”). The
ROD memorialized the BOEM’s selection of the preferred
alternative in the FEIS, the Corps’ decision to issue the
necessary CWA/RHA permits, and the NMFS’s decision
to issue the IHA. The ROD stated that the preferred
alternative would allow eighty-four or fewer wind turbines
to be installed in 100 of the 106 locations proposed in the
COP. It also required that the turbines be placed in an
east-west orientation with each turbine separated by one
nautical mile.
The BOEM’s approval of the COP was subject to
several non-discretionary mitigation, monitoring, and
reporting measures. The BOEM attached to the ROD a
memorandum explaining why the preferred alternative
satisfied the requirements of the OCSLA and other
19a
Appendix A
applicable regulatory authority. On July 15, 2021, the
BOEM issued its final approval of the COP. The approval
was subject to more than 100 pages of terms and conditions,
including compliance with any substantive amendments to
the September 11, 2020, biological opinion that might arise
from the ongoing reinitiated consultation. On January
20, 2022, after receiving the October 18, 2021, biological
opinion from the NMFS, the BOEM confirmed its final
approval of the COP subject to the terms and conditions,
and prescribed reasonable and prudent measures, set
forth in the updated opinion.
The Seafreeze plaintiffs and the Alliance filed the
lawsuits underlying these appeals on December 15, 2021,
and January 31, 2022, respectively. As explained, the
Seafreeze plaintiffs sued under the APA, the ESA, the
NEPA, and the OCSLA. The Alliance sued under the
APA, the NEPA, the MMPA, the ESA, the OCSLA, and
the CWA/RHA. In both cases, the parties cross-moved for
summary judgment, and the district court, in a thoughtful
order, granted the defendants’ motions and denied the
plaintiffs’ motions.
The district court concluded, inter alia, that (1) the
plaintiffs’ ESA claims were non-justiciable under Article
III of the Constitution, (2) the plaintiffs were outside
of the zone of interests protected by the NEPA, (3) the
Alliance was outside of the zone of interests protected by
the MMPA, (4) the Alliance had failed to identify a genuine
issue of material fact as to whether the Corps’ issuance
of the CWA Section 404 permit was arbitrary, capricious,
an abuse of discretion, unsupported by substantial
20a
Appendix A
evidence, or otherwise not in accordance with law, and
(5) the plaintiffs had failed to identify a genuine issue of
material fact as to whether the BOEM’s approval of the
project under the OCSLA was arbitrary, capricious, an
abuse of discretion, unsupported by substantial evidence,
or otherwise not in accordance with law. These appeals
followed.
II.
We review the district court’s summary judgment
rulings de novo. See, e.g., Melone, 100 F.4th at 29;
Nantucket Residents, 100 F.4th at 12. These include
the court’s Article III standing and zones-of-interests
rulings, the challenges to which raise legal questions. In
re Evenflo Co., Inc. Mktg., Sales Pracs. & Prods. Liab.
Litig., 54 F.4th 28, 34 (1st Cir. 2022) (reviewing de novo
the district court’s ruling on Article III standing); T.S.
ex rel. T.M.S. v. Heart of CarDon, LLC, 43 F.4th 737, 741
(7th Cir. 2022) (reviewing de novo the district court’s
zone-of-interests ruling).
We also review de novo the district court’s summary
judgment determinations that the defendants did not act
in a manner that was “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of
discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law,” or
that was “unsupported by substantial evidence.” Melone,
100 F.4th at 29 (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A), (E)); see also
Nantucket Residents, 100 F.4th at 12. An agency action
or inaction is arbitrary or capricious if the agency relied
on factors Congress did not intend it to consider, failed to
consider an important aspect of the problem, explained
21a
Appendix A
the decision in terms that run counter to the evidence, or
reached a decision so implausible that it cannot be ascribed
to a difference in view or the product of agency expertise.
See Melone, 100 F.4th at 29; see also Motor Vehicle Mfrs.
Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43,
103 S. Ct. 2856, 77 L. Ed. 2d 443 (1983)).
Finally, we may affirm the district court’s judgments
on any independent ground supported by the record. E.g.,
Puerto Rico Fast Ferries LLC v. SeaTran Marine, LLC,
102 F.4th 538, 549 (1st Cir. 2024).
III.
A. The APA/ESA Claims
We first consider the challenges to the district court’s
grant of summary judgment to the defendants on the
plaintiffs’ APA/ESA claims. As previously noted, the
court dismissed these claims as non-justiciable under
Article III. Whether a claim satisfies the demands of
Article III implicates our subject matter jurisdiction,
e.g., United States v. Texas, 599 U.S. 670, 686, 143 S. Ct.
1964, 216 L. Ed. 2d 624 (2023), and so we must satisfy
ourselves that we have subject-matter jurisdiction before
addressing the merits of a claim, see Steel Co. v. Citizens
for a Better Environment, 523 U.S. 83, 93-102, 118 S. Ct.
1003, 140 L. Ed. 2d 210 (1998) (prohibiting the exercise
of “hypothetical jurisdiction”). We therefore begin by
reviewing whether the court properly concluded that the
plaintiffs’ ESA claims were non-justiciable based on the
summary judgment record.
22a
Appendix A
The plaintiffs presented the district court with three
developed theories of how the defendants violated the
ESA. The first two, advanced by the Seafreeze plaintiffs,
targeted aspects of the September 11, 2020, biological
opinion, but not the superseding October 18, 2021,
biological opinion. The third, advanced by the Alliance,
argued that the sequence in which the defendants acted
resulted in the issuance of the ROD and approval of the
COP without there being in place a valid biological opinion.
The district court rejected all three arguments
for a lack of standing and, alternatively, mootness. As
to standing, the court first assessed the nature of the
injuries that the plaintiffs were entitled to assert. See,
e.g., FDA v. All. for Hippocratic Med., 602 U.S. 367, 380,
144 S. Ct. 1540, 219 L. Ed. 2d 121 (2024) (observing that,
to establish standing, “a plaintiff must demonstrate (i)
that she has suffered or likely will suffer an injury in fact,
(ii) that the injury likely was caused or will be caused by
the defendant, and (iii) that the injury likely would be
redressed by the requested judicial relief”). The court
concluded that, while each plaintiff had adduced sufficient
evidence of economic injury due to the project’s potential
adverse effects on commercial fishing, no plaintiff had
adduced admissible evidence of non-economic injury. In
reaching this latter conclusion, the court rejected the
plaintiffs’ arguments that they were appropriate parties
to assert environmental and aesthetic interests that would
be harmed by the project.
The district court then turned to whether the
plaintiffs’ evidence of economic injury, causation, and
23a
Appendix A
redressability was sufficient to establish that they had
Article III standing to press their ESA claims. See
Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561, 112 S. Ct.
2130, 119 L. Ed. 2d 351 (1992) (emphasizing that, at the
summary judgment stage, a party claiming standing
cannot rest on general allegations of injury resulting from
the defendant’s conduct but rather must adduce evidence
to support the specific facts necessary to substantiate its
standing theory); see also Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154,
167-68, 117 S. Ct. 1154, 137 L. Ed. 2d 281 (1997). The court
concluded that the plaintiffs’ evidence was insufficient to
meet this burden as a matter of law.
With respect to the Seafreeze plaintiffs, who, again,
only sought to challenge aspects of the superseded
September 11, 2020, biological opinion, the district court
determined that they had failed to adduce evidence that
their economic injuries were likely caused by the project’s
alleged negative impact on any endangered species. With
respect to the Alliance, the court determined that it had
failed to adduce evidence that the procedural actions
of which it complained regarding the two biological
opinions either likely caused its alleged injury or likely
caused any erroneous government decision. See Ctr. for
Biological Diversity v. EPA, 861 F.3d 174, 184, 430 U.S.
App. D.C. 15 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (observing that a plaintiff
alleging procedural injury must show both a connection
between the error and a substantive agency outcome and
a connection between that outcome and the plaintiff’s
particularized injury). In support of the latter ruling,
the court observed that the October 18, 2021, biological
opinion, which the Alliance did not challenge, served to
24a
Appendix A
break the chain of causation underlying the Alliance’s
standing theory.
Alternatively, the district court concluded that all of
plaintiffs’ claims were moot. As to the Seafreeze plaintiffs,
their ESA claims were moot because they had targeted
the September 11, 2020, biological opinion, and not the
superseding October 18, 2021, biological opinion, which
was the ultimate basis for the BOEM approving the COP.
As to the Alliance, its ESA claim was moot because the
alleged procedural error was rendered immaterial by the
subsequent issuance of the superseding biological opinion,
which the Alliance did not challenge, and which, again,
was the ultimate basis for approving the COP.
On appeal, the Seafreeze plaintiffs present only one
developed argument challenging the district court’s
standing and mootness rulings on their ESA claims.4
4. The section of the Seafreeze plaintiffs’ brief challenging
the district court’s ESA rulings contains three subparts. The first
presents the developed argument we are about to address. The
second, titled “The Commercial Fishermen’s ESA Claims Were Not
Mooted And The [September 11, 2020, Biological Opinion] Violated
ESA In Multiple Ways,” contains five brief arguments. Two reiterate
the Seafreeze plaintiffs’ merits challenges to the September 11, 2020,
biological opinion and add nothing to the justiciability analysis. The
other three involve variations on a single theme: that challenges to
the September 11, 2020, biological opinion are not moot because
that was the opinion in effect when the agency defendants issued
the ROD and approved the COP. We shall have more to say about
this argument in our discussion of the Alliance’s challenge to the
court’s dismissal of its ESA claim. The third, titled “The District
Court Erred In Holding That The Commercial Fishermen Waived
25a
Appendix A
They assert that the court erred in refusing to recognize
the LICFA’s associational standing to assert, on behalf
of LICFA member David Aripotch, certain non-economic
environmental and aesthetic injuries arising from
Vineyard Wind’s impact on the project area. Aripotch,
who is not a party, owns plaintiff Old Squaw and captains
its boat. In the district court, he submitted a declaration
detailing the aesthetic and spiritual pleasures he derives
from fishing and photographing right whales and other
marine life in the project area.
The district court rejected the argument for two
reasons. First, it concluded that Aripotch’s personal
injuries and interests could not be imputed to Old Squaw,
the corporation he owns. Second, the court refused to
allow the LICFA to assert Aripotch’s non-economic
interests in the project area because the LICFA did
Certain ESA Arguments,” asserts that the district court erred in
regarding as waived for lack of summary judgment briefing nine
additional ESA claims the Seafreeze plaintiffs had asserted in their
complaint. But the record citations the Seafreeze plaintiffs provide in
support of this argument only point to a few passing mentions of these
claims and attempts to incorporate by reference arguments made
elsewhere, often by parties to other Vineyard Wind lawsuits. The
record therefore confirms that the merits of these claims were not
developed and argued in the summary judgment papers. See Rocafort
v. IBM, Corp., 334 F.3d 115, 121-22 (1st Cir. 2003) (arguments raised
in the complaint but not developed in summary judgment papers are
waived); Exec. Leasing Corp. v. Banco Popular de P.R., 48 F.3d 66,
67-68 (1st Cir. 1995) (parties must include within the four corners
of their briefs any arguments they wish the court to consider and
cannot circumvent page limits through incorporation by reference
of arguments made elsewhere). The district court appropriately
declined to address the merits of these claims.
26a
Appendix A
not demonstrate that those interests are germane to its
purpose of supporting fisheries management. See Friends
of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Env’tl Servs. (TOC), Inc.,
528 U.S. 167, 181, 120 S. Ct. 693, 145 L. Ed. 2d 610 (2000)
(observing that an association may have standing to sue
on behalf of its members when, inter alia, the member
interest it is asserting is “germane to the organization’s
purpose”).
The Seafreeze plaintiffs challenge the ruling that
the LICFA failed to demonstrate that protection of
Aripotch’s aesthetic and spiritual interests in the project
area is germane to its purpose. They call our attention
to the LICFA’s articles of incorporation. Those articles
indicate that the preservation, maintenance, and welfare
of the environment in the saltwater fisheries “in Suffolk
County [New York] and its environs,” now and for future
generations, are among the purposes for which the LICFA
was formed in October 2001. The Seafreeze plaintiffs
sought to introduce the articles into the summary
judgment record by means of a motion for judicial notice
filed after the summary judgment briefing deadline had
passed. The court denied the motion as an untimely effort
to supplement the summary judgment record.
The Seafreeze plaintiffs first say that this was
reversible error because “no timeliness requirement
exists for matters of judicial notice pertaining to standing,
as jurisdictional rules like standing may be raised at any
time.” This argument is incorrect. Trial courts possess
considerable case-management authority, which includes
the authority to set deadlines for filing pretrial motions.
27a
Appendix A
Rosario-Díaz v. González, 140 F.3d 312, 315 (1st Cir. 1998)
(citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(b)(2)); see also Fed. R. Civ. P.
16(b)(3) (mandating that when federal trial courts issue
scheduling orders, those orders limit the time for, inter
alia, filing motions); L.R., D. Mass. 7.1(a)(1) (authorizing
the establishment of briefing deadlines). If information
calling into question the court’s subject-matter jurisdiction
becomes available after such a deadline has passed, the
expiration of the deadline does not preclude an inquiry
into the court’s power to hear the underlying claim. See
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3) (stating that a court must dismiss
an action if “at any time” it determines “that it lacks
subject-matter jurisdiction” (emphasis supplied)). But this
principle has no bearing on the court’s authority to place
reasonable time limits on the ability of a party asserting
federal subject-matter jurisdiction to produce proof that
Article III standing exists. See Town of Milton v. FAA,
87 F.4th 91, 95 (1st Cir. 2023) (party asserting federal
jurisdiction bears the burden of establishing Article III
standing).
The Seafreeze plaintiffs also invoke Fed. R. Evid.
201(c)(2), which states that a court “must take judicial
notice if a party requests it and the court is supplied with
the necessary information,” and Fed. R. Evid. 201(d), which
states that a court “may take judicial notice at any stage
of the proceeding.” According to the Seafreeze plaintiffs,
these Rules obliged the court to take judicial notice of
the LICFA’s articles of incorporation, even though the
deadline for summary judgment briefing had passed. But
even if the articles of incorporation are a proper subject
of judicial notice because the LICFA had filed them with
28a
Appendix A
the New York Secretary of State, they would not provide
grounds for the LICFA to represent Aripotch’s personal
interests in the project area.
The articles of incorporation establish only that a
stated purpose for incorporating the LICFA in October
2001 was to protect the welfare of the environment in the
saltwater fisheries in Suffolk County and its environs.
They do not establish, as a matter of law, that this has
been one of the LICFA’s actual purposes in the years
since its founding. It would deprive the defendants of
their procedural right to contest the issue if we were to
draw the broader inference from a document introduced
into the record after the summary judgment briefing
had closed. Moreover, a commercial fishing association’s
interest in protecting the welfare of the area in which
its members carry on their business does not, ipso facto,
encompass an individual member’s observational interests
in the right whale or recreational interests in fishing and
photography. And finally, the area to which the LICFA’s
environmental interests allegedly extend do not appear
to include the project area, which is more than sixty-five
miles away from Suffolk County.
We turn now to the Alliance’s challenge to the district
court’s rejection of its ESA claim on justiciability grounds.
The Alliance does not explicitly engage the particulars of
the court’s standing and mootness rulings. The section of
the Alliance’s opening brief addressing the rejection of its
ESA claim contains two subparts. The first reiterates the
merits of its ESA claim. That claim, as we understand it,
is that issuance of an ROD based on a biological opinion
29a
Appendix A
that is subject to reinitiated consultation is a per se
violation of the ESA, regardless of (1) what the agencies
say about the ongoing validity and effectiveness of the
earlier opinion, (2) the limited and discrete nature of the
reinitiated consultation, and (3) steps the agencies take
to ensure that the terms and conditions and reasonable
and prudent measures contained within the updated
opinion will be both enforceable and enforced. The second
subpart argues that the Alliance has properly alleged and
demonstrated both economic and environmental injuries
and a basis for representing the interests of its members.
The Alliance’s lack of direct engagement with the
substance of the court’s justiciability rulings in its opening
brief is itself grounds for rejecting its challenge to the
entry of summary judgment on its ESA claim. E.g., Cioffi
v. Gilbert Enters., Inc., 769 F.3d 90, 93-94 (1st Cir. 2014)
(observing that an appealing party must explain “why
a particular order is erroneous”); Sparkle Hill, Inc. v.
Interstate Mat Corp., 788 F.3d 25, 29 (1st Cir. 2015) (“[W]e
do not consider arguments for reversing a decision of a
district court when the argument is not raised in a party’s
opening brief.”). But, in any event, there is no basis for
disturbing the court’s justiciability rulings on their merits.
We assume solely for the sake of argument, but with
skepticism, that the ESA prohibits the issuance of an ROD
and approval of a COP while reinitiated consultation over a
biological opinion is ongoing, regardless of circumstances.
Compare Defenders of Wildlife v. BOEM, 684 F.3d
1242, 1252 (11th Cir. 2012) (rejecting argument that the
“BOEM’s choice to reinitiate consultation . . . automatically
30a
Appendix A
renders . . . former biological opinions invalid,” particularly
where the prior opinions were “reconfirmed” and “have
not been withdrawn despite reinitiation of consultations”),
with Env’tl Prot. Info. Ctr. v. Simpson Timber Co., 255
F.3d 1073, 1076 (9th Cir. 2001) (stating in dicta and without
elaboration that “[r]einitiation of consultation requires
. . . the NMFS to issue a new Biological Opinion before
the agency action may continue”) (citation and internal
quotation marks omitted)). Even so, this assumption does
not undermine the court’s justiciability rulings.
As explained above, the district court concluded,
based on the summary judgment record, that the Alliance
lacked standing to press its ESA claim because an event
occurring after the alleged procedural error (the initial
issuance of the ROD and approval of the COP without a
valid biological opinion) broke the causal chain between
that error and both the agencies’ substantive action
(approval of the COP) and the Alliance’s alleged Article
III injury (economic harm from the operation of the
project). For the same reasons, the court concluded that
the Alliance’s ESA claim was moot because an event
occurring after the alleged procedural error had rendered
it immaterial.
The event on which both conclusions rest was the
NMFS’s issuance of the superseding October 18, 2021,
biological opinion, whose merits the Alliance does not
challenge. Once that superseding biological opinion
issued, the district court reasoned, the Alliance could no
longer claim that the alleged procedural error remained
a legal cause of either the relevant substantive agency
31a
Appendix A
actions (the final COP approval) or the Alliance’s injury
(economic harm caused by the COP approval). Seafreeze
Shoreside, Inc., et al. v. U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, et al.,
Nos. 1:22-cv-11091-IT, 1:22-cv-11172-IT, 2023 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 183483, 2023 WL 6691015, at *28-29 (D. Mass. Oct.
12, 2023). Nor could the court provide a remedy that might
affect the matter at issue because the Alliance alleged
only an error that was no longer relevant to the agency
action under review. See 2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 183483,
[WL] at *27 n.19 (citing Church of Scientology of Cal. v.
United States, 506 U.S. 9, 12, 113 S. Ct. 447, 121 L. Ed.
2d 313 (1992) (describing the essential characteristic of a
moot case) and Rio Grande Silvery Minnow v. Bureau of
Reclamation, 601 F.3d 1096, 1114 (10th Cir. 2010) (holding
moot an ESA claim that did not challenge a superseding
biological opinion)).
In its reply brief, the Alliance addresses the district
court’s analysis by stating that the issuance of the
superseding October 18, 2021, biological opinion, and the
January 20, 2022, confirmation of the prior COP approval,
“cannot cure” the BOEM’s earlier procedural error of
issuing the ROD and approving the COP while the 2020
biological opinion was under reinitiated consultation.
“Because the iron-clad rule of ESA is to look before
you leap,” the Alliance says, “the later-issued [October
18, 2021, biological opinion] is irrelevant to the BOEM’s
procedural duty to comply with the ESA in rendering its
decision [to issue the ROD] on May 10, 2021.”
This argument misses the point. The significance of
the NMFS’s issuance of the unchallenged superseding
32a
Appendix A
October 18, 2021, biological opinion (and, we might
add, the BOEM’s January 20, 2022, confirmation of its
prior approval of the COP given the conclusions in that
unchallenged superseding opinion) does not lie in whether
they “cured” any earlier-occurring procedural error.
Rather, these later agency actions, taken as part of an
ongoing and legally authorized consultation process,
precluded any basis for finding that taint to the COP
approval arising from its allegedly having been issued
without a valid biological opinion was having any ongoing
effect. And, if there was no basis in the summary judgment
record for finding that the procedural violation complained
of was having an ongoing effect, there was no basis in the
record for either enjoining or unwinding the project, which
is the specific relief the Alliance sought, or for concluding
that the Alliance’s injury was redressable in any way.
The district court thus did not err in awarding
summary judgment to the defendants on the plaintiffs’
APA/ESA claims.
B. The APA/NEPA and APA/MMPA Claims
We next consider the challenges to the district court’s
grant of summary judgment to the defendants on the
plaintiffs’ APA/NEPA claims and the Alliance’s APA/
MMPA claim. We consider these challenges together
because the court dismissed both sets of claims for being
outside the zones of interests of the environmental statutes
that the plaintiffs invoked. With respect to the APA/NEPA
claims, the court held that the plaintiffs did not put forth
competent evidence as to an environmental harm that
33a
Appendix A
would impact their commercial fishing. With respect to
the APA/MMPA claim, the court held that the Alliance
had not established a cognizable interest in right whales
or any other marine mammal.
An APA claimant must establish that the claim
arguably falls within the zone of interests to be protected
or regulated by the underlying statute. See Lexmark
Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 572 U.S.
118, 129-30, 134 S. Ct. 1377, 188 L. Ed. 2d 392 (2014). As
the word “arguably” suggests, the zone-of-interests test
“is not ‘especially demanding.’” Id. at 130 (quoting MatchE-Be-Nash-She-Wish Band of Pottawatomi Indians v.
Patchak, 567 U.S. 209, 225, 132 S. Ct. 2199, 183 L. Ed. 2d
211 (2012)). Congress enacted the APA “to make agency
action presumptively reviewable,” and we do not require
“any indication of congressional purpose to benefit the
would-be plaintiff.” Match-E-Be-Nash-She-Wish Band
of Pottawatomi Indians, 567 U.S. at 225 (internal
quotation marks omitted) (quoting Clarke v. Secs. Indus.
Ass’n, 479 U.S. 388, 399, 107 S. Ct. 750, 93 L. Ed. 2d
757 (1987)). Thus, the zone-of-interests test “forecloses
suit only when a plaintiff’s interests are so marginally
related to or inconsistent with the purposes implicit in
the statute that it cannot reasonably be assumed that
Congress authorized that plaintiff to sue.” Lexmark, 572
U.S. at 130 (quoting Match-E-Be-Nash-She-Wish Band of
Pottawatomi Indians, 567 U.S. at 225 (internal quotation
marks omitted)).
The zone-of-interests test was once treated as a
justiciability doctrine implicating the court’s subject-
34a
Appendix A
matter jurisdiction. See id. at 128 n.4 (citations omitted).
But in Lexmark, the Supreme Court clarified that the
test is not jurisdictional but rather goes to whether the
claimant has stated a viable claim. See id. (citations
omitted). Therefore, we may affirm a zone-of-interestsbased dismissal on other grounds supported by the record.
See Puerto Rico Fast Ferries, 102 F.4th at 549. But cf.
Steel Co., 523 U.S. at 93-102 (prohibiting affirmance of
the dismissal of a claim based on lack of subject-matter
jurisdiction by rejecting the claim on its merits). 5
Here, we agree with the district court’s zone-ofinterests ruling as to the Alliance’s APA/MMPA claim.
The Alliance argues that it may assert the aesthetic and
recreational interests in marine mammals (including the
right whale) of “Alliance member” David Aripotch. But this
argument is based on a misstatement. Aripotch’s company,
Old Squaw, is a member of the Alliance, but Aripotch is
not.6 Moreover, and in any event, the protection of marine
5. The plaintiffs’ APA/NEPA challenges come to us in an odd
procedural posture. The Seafreeze plaintiffs challenge both the
district court’s zone-of-interests ruling and the lawfulness under the
NEPA of the BOEM’s actions. The Alliance, however, challenges only
the court’s zone-of-interests ruling. It does not address the merits
of its APA/NEPA challenge in either its opening brief or its reply
brief, even though the government calls the lapse to its attention, and
even though the success of its zone-of-interests argument would lead
naturally to our consideration of the merits given the fully developed
administrative record and opportunity the Alliance had to develop
its APA/NEPA claims in the summary judgment briefing. Thus, to
the extent that the Alliance intends to press any APA/NEPA claims
that differ from those of the Seafreeze plaintiffs, they are waived.
6. In their responsive briefs, the defendants called our attention
to the fact that Aripotch is neither a member of the Alliance nor
35a
Appendix A
mammals such as the right whale is not germane to the
Alliance’s purpose, which is to represent the interests
of commercial fisheries and related organizations. See
Friends of the Earth, 528 U.S. at 181. The court properly
awarded the defendants summary judgment on the
Alliance’s APA/MMPA claim.
But we disagree with the district court’s zone-ofinterests ruling as to the plaintiffs’ APA/NEPA claims.
While the court was correct to reject as incompetent much
of the plaintiffs’ evidence of environmental injury, the
ROD itself acknowledges that the discharge of fill material
associated with the project will have major adverse
impacts on mollusks, fish, and crustaceans in the project
area. Moreover, the plaintiffs have plausibly linked these
adverse impacts to the expected adverse economic effects
of the project on their commercial fishing interests. This is
enough to satisfy the zone-of-interests test. See Monsanto
Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms, 561 U.S. 139, 155-56, 130
S. Ct. 2743, 177 L. Ed. 2d 461 (2010) (recognizing that
plaintiffs whose alleged injuries from agency deregulation
had both environmental and economic components fell
within the APA and the NEPA’s zone of interest).
Despite this, we affirm the dismissal of these
claims. On appeal, the Seafreeze plaintiffs develop
three arguments that the BOEM violated the NEPA’s
procedural requirements. They explicitly premise all
a party to either of these consolidated appeals. The Alliance did
not correct the misstatement in its opening brief or reply; rather,
it simply changed its characterization of Aripotch from being
an “Alliance member” to being a “representative” of an Alliance
member.
36a
Appendix A
three arguments on an underlying assertion that the
BOEM was improperly motivated to reach decisions
so that Vineyard Wind could timely honor its prior
contractual commitments surrounding the project. The
first argument is that this improper motivation led the
BOEM to limit its consideration of reasonable alternatives
to the project. The second is that it led the BOEM to
inappropriately revive the EIS process after Vineyard
Wind’s December 1, 2020, provisional withdrawal of
its proposed COP from review to test the wind turbine
generator it had decided to use. The third is that it led the
BOEM to fail to appropriately consider the incremental
impact of the project in combination with the likely impact
of other future, reasonably foreseeable offshore wind
development projects.
As an initial matter, the premise of the Seafreeze
plaintiffs’ arguments is misguided. By regulation, the
BOEM was under an obligation to “briefly summariz[e]
[in the FEIS] the purpose and need to which the agency is
responding,” 40 C.F.R. § 1502.13; to “[r]igorously explore
and objectively evaluate all reasonable alternatives,” id.
§ 1502.14(a); and, most importantly for present purposes,
to consider “the needs and goals of the parties involved in
the application or permit as well as the public interest,”
43 C.F.R. § 46.420(a)(2).7 Thus, where the agency is
7. The FEIS identified the BOEM’s purpose and need as
“whether to approve, approve with modifications, or disapprove the
COP to construct, operate, and decommission an approximately
800 MW, commercial-scale wind energy facility within the area
of [Vineyard Wind’s] lease to meet New England’s demand for
renewable energy.” Supp. App. at 972, Seafreeze Appeal. It also
noted, inter alia, that the “BOEM’s decision on Vineyard Wind’s COP
37a
Appendix A
not itself the project’s sponsor, it may give substantial
weight to an applicant’s preferences, at least insofar as
it considers alternatives. See Beyond Nuclear, 704 F.3d
at 19. This principle derives from the fact that, under
the NEPA, agencies must consider only “reasonable”
alternatives, meaning alternatives “bounded by some
notion of [technical and economic] feasibility,” id. (quoting
Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council,
Inc., 435 U.S. 519, 551, 98 S. Ct. 1197, 55 L. Ed. 2d 460
(1978)), and only alternatives that would “‘bring about
the ends of the proposed action,’” id. (quoting Citizens
Against Burlington, Inc. v. Busey, 938 F.2d 190, 195, 290
U.S. App. D.C. 371 (D.C. Cir. (1991)).
Apart from the erroneous premise, the Seafreeze
plaintiffs’ APA/NEPA arguments fail to establish that the
BOEM engaged in arbitrary or capricious decisionmaking.
The Seafreeze plaintiffs challenge the BOEM’s failure
to consider alternatives that would have required
construction outside the lease area. But the BOEM
supportably concluded that these were effectively new
proposed actions that were not responsive to the agency’s
regulatory obligation to address the Vineyard Wind
proposal, which was of course limited to the Vineyard
Wind lease area. The BOEM also supportably explained
that it would consider proposals on other lease areas
through separate regulatory processes.
is needed to execute [the BOEM’s] duty to approve, approve with
modifications, or disapprove, the proposed Project in furtherance of
the United States’ policy to make [Outer Continental Shelf] energy
resources available to expeditious and orderly development.” Id.
The plaintiffs do not challenge the lawfulness of this purpose and
need statement.
38a
Appendix A
The Seafreeze plaintiffs also challenge the BOEM’s
termination of the EIS process in response to Vineyard
Wind’s request to provisionally withdraw the proposed
COP from review, and the agency’s subsequent decision to
permit Vineyard Wind to rescind its withdrawal without
providing an additional notice and comment period.
Vineyard Wind asserts that the Seafreeze plaintiffs lack
Article III standing to make this claim.
We agree, for reasons that track those explaining our
ruling that the plaintiffs lack standing to complain about
the allegedly improper issuance of the ROD and approval
of the COP while reinitiation of ESA consultation was
underway. See supra Part III-A. Here too, even if we
assume (again, with skepticism) that a second notice-andcomment period was required, the summary judgment
record does not permit a conclusion that any taint from
the alleged procedural error had a causal effect on the
BOEM’s ultimate approval of the COP. See Lujan, 504 U.S.
at 561. The Seafreeze plaintiffs point to no comment that
they, or anyone else, were precluded from submitting to
the BOEM, and they suggest no other practical effect that
flowed from the absence of a second notice-and-comment
period. Any possibility of such an effect is, moreover,
implausible, given that the COP was unchanged and
already had been subject to extensive notice and comment.
Thus, the alleged procedural error was not a likely cause
of the Seafreeze plaintiffs’ injury. See Ctr. for Bio. Div.,
861 F.3d at 184. Nor, therefore, could it justify enjoining
or unwinding the project. 8
8. In addition to complaining about the lack of an additional
notice-and-comment period, the Seafreeze plaintiffs say that
39a
Appendix A
Finally, the Seafreeze plaintiffs argue that the BOEM
failed to appropriately consider the incremental impact of
the project in combination with the likely impact of other
future, reasonably foreseeable offshore wind development
projects. They support this argument only with two
conclusory allegations: (1) “the Federal Defendants gutted
the core of the cumulative impacts analysis set forth in
the Supplemental Draft EIS by removing much of it from
the [FEIS], thereby violating NEPA’s regulations”; and
(2) “the Federal Defendants improperly segmented their
NEPA analysis” by “undercounting reasonably foreseeable
offshore wind development outside the lease area.” The
Seafreeze plaintiffs do not elaborate upon either of these
allegations.9 They therefore have not put the correctness
resuming review of the Vineyard Wind COP was ultra vires because
nothing in the NEPA or the OCSLA “provides the BOEM with
authority to resume review of a terminated COP.” But again, even
if we assume that to be so, the Seafreeze plaintiffs have provided
no basis in evidence or argument for concluding that this alleged
procedural error likely tainted the injury-causing event: ultimate
approval of the COP. There is no likelihood of a different outcome
had the BOEM been required to formalistically reconduct its review
process from the start rather than picking up where it left off.
Moreover, without a basis for finding a likely causal effect, there
would be no proper basis for enjoining or unwinding the project.
9. In their reply brief, in response to the defendants’ arguments
that the Seafreeze plaintiffs’ briefing of the cumulative-impacts issue
was inadequate, the Seafreeze plaintiffs point to a portion of the
executive summary of the supplement to the EIS that, they say, did
not make its way into the FEIS. They also seek to clarify that their
position with respect to the BOEM’s alleged improper segmenting
of its cumulative effects analysis is that the BOEM improperly failed
to treat certain aspirational goals that the Biden administration set
for offshore wind development as “reasonably foreseeable future
40a
Appendix A
of the district court’s ruling into issue. See United States v.
Zannino, 895 F.2d 1, 17 (1st Cir. 1990) (“[I]ssues adverted
to in a perfunctory manner, unaccompanied by some
effort at developed argumentation, are deemed waived.”)
(citations omitted); see also id. (“It is not enough merely
to mention a possible argument in the most skeletal way,
leaving the court to do counsel’s work . . . .”).
The district court did not err in awarding summary
judgment to the defendants on the plaintiffs’ APA/NEPA
and APA/MMPA claims.
C. The APA/CWA Claims
We next consider the challenge to the district court’s
grant of summary judgment to the defendants on the
Alliance’s APA /CWA claims. Although the Alliance
makes three arguments on appeal, only one was properly
preserved: that the Corps’ decision to issue a CWA Section
404 permit for the discharge of dredged or fill material
arbitrarily and capriciously failed to properly account for
the effect of the project on commercial fisheries, wildlife,
and the marine environment.10 The court did not explicitly
address this argument in its summary judgment order.10
actions,” within the meaning of 43 C.F.R. § 46.30, to be accounted for
in the cumulative-impacts analysis. Arguments raised for the first
time in a reply brief are ordinarily deemed waived, see Lahens v.
AT&T Mobility P.R., Inc., 28 F.4th 325, 328 n.1 (1st Cir. 2022), and
we see no reason to depart from that principle here.
10. The Alliance also claims that certain misstatements
regarding the scope of the project contained in the Corps’ section
of the ROD, later corrected as clerical errors in an August 4, 2021,
41a
Appendix A
The Alliance argues that the Corps issued the
permit under the mistaken belief that the impacts of the
project on commercial fisheries, wildlife, and the marine
environment would be minor. In support of this argument,
the Alliance points to several statements in the FEIS
which, if read in isolation, appear to project more-thanminor impacts from the project on commercial fisheries,
commercial shipping, recreational vessel businesses,
mollusks, fish, and crustaceans. But the Alliance’s brief
omits context that qualifies the statements in a manner
that supports the Corps’ conclusion.
For example, the Alliance cites to a page in the FEIS
allegedly stating that the project will have “moderate
ROD Supplement, reveal that the Corps did not understand the
scope of the project it was permitting. This claim is not preserved.
The district court held it waived because it was not pleaded in the
Alliance’s complaint, and the Alliance does not engage this ruling
in its opening brief. See Lahens, 28 F.4th at 328 n.1. The Alliance
also claims that, in issuing the permit, the Corps violated the CWA
by failing to consider the cumulative impacts of Vineyard Wind
and other surrounding offshore wind projects. But the Alliance did
not raise this concern with the Corps during its public comment
process. It therefore cannot now seek to establish that the Corps
acted arbitrarily or capriciously on this basis. See Dep’t of Transp.
v. Pub. Citizen, 541 U.S. 752, 764-65, 124 S. Ct. 2204, 159 L. Ed. 2d
60 (2004); see also Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp., 435 U.S. at 55355 (emphasizing that a party must have presented a position during
the administrative process to later challenge an agency decision
as arbitrary and capricious for failure to have taken the position
adequately into account). In so ruling, we reject the Alliance’s
assertion, made in its reply brief without supporting record citation,
that it preserved its litigation rights on this point through comments
it submitted to the BOEM during the EIS’s public comment period.
42a
Appendix A
to major impacts on commercial fisheries.” App. at 141,
Alliance Appeal. But in fact, that statement refers to the
impacts of activities “other than offshore wind.” Id. at
141. Similarly, the Alliance cites to alleged admissions
that “offshore wind structures and hard coverage for
cables would have long-term impacts on commercial
fishing operations and support businesses such as seafood
processing,” and that “the impacts would increase in
intensity as more offshore structures are completed.”
Id. at 139. But the very same sentence concludes that
“the fishing industry is anticipated to be able to adjust
fishing practices over time in order to maintain the
commercial fishing industry in the context of offshore
wind structures.” Id. And while the FEIS acknowledged
that increased vehicle traffic from the construction of
future offshore wind projects could result in congestion
and delays that could decrease productivity for commercial
shipping, fishing, and recreational vessel businesses, it
also concluded that the project would have negligible to
moderate impacts on navigation and vehicle traffic after
required mitigation measures were implemented.
The Alliance also cites to pages in the Corps’ section
of the ROD noting anticipated adverse project impacts on
the aquatic ecosystems. But those same pages note that
some of these effects will be temporary, that required
mitigation measures will reduce impacts, and that there
may also be some environmental benefits from the project.
Overall, after extensive analysis, the FEIS concluded that
the project would have a moderate impact on fish and other
aquatic organisms.
43a
Appendix A
The record does not support a conclusion that the
Corps acted arbitrarily or capriciously in issuing the CWA
Section 404 permit because the Corps misunderstood
the findings in the administrative record. The district
court did not err in awarding summary judgment to the
defendants on the Alliance’s APA/CWA claim.
D. The APA/OCSLA Claims
Finally, we consider the challenges to the district
court’s grant of summary judgment to the defendants
on the plaintiffs’ APA/OCSLA claims. The plaintiffs’
principal appellate argument is that the district court
misunderstood OCSLA’s core statutory provision
governing the approval of offshore wind projects, 43
U.S.C. § 1337(p)(4), in holding that the BOEM had not
acted arbitrarily or capriciously in approving the COP.
Again, that provision imposes an obligation on the
BOEM to “ensure that any activity [under the OCSLA] is
carried out in a manner that provides for” twelve criteria
including, insofar as is relevant, safety; protection of
the environment; conservation of natural resources of
the Outer Continental Shelf; prevention of interference
with reasonable uses of the Outer Continental Shelf (as
determined by the Interior Secretary); and consideration
of any other use of the sea or seabed, including use for
fishing and navigation. Id. The plaintiffs also argue that
the court impermissibly discounted their evidence of safety
concerns, environmental harms, and the devastating effect
on commercial fishing that the project would cause.
44a
Appendix A
The plaintiffs’ principal argument is based upon
mischaracterizations of the district court’s reading of
OCSLA § 1337(p)(4). The Alliance says that the court
interpreted “the twelve mandatory requirements” as
“discretionary considerations that [the BOEM] could
consider and balance.” The Seafreeze plaintiffs say that
the court “decided to insert the word ‘reasonably’ into
the statutory text to allow [the BOEM] to ostensibly
‘balance’ [its] mandatory duties under Section 1337(p)
(4) against other considerations.” The Alliance also says
that the court read the statutory phrase “shall ensure”
to “‘reflect[] Congress’s intent to confer flexibility . . . .’”
And it further states that “the district court erroneously
held” that Congress gave the BOEM “the discretion to
ignore [the twelve OCSLA criteria] or to balance one off
another. . . .”
The district court did not (1) treat the twelve OCSLA
criteria as discretionary considerations that the BOEM
“could consider,” (2) read the word “reasonably” into
the OCSLA, (3) say anything close to what the Alliance
purports to quote it as saying, or (4) hold that the BOEM
has the discretion to ignore or balance criteria. In fact,
the court explicitly acknowledged that the OCSLA criteria
are “mandatory,” Seafreeze Shoreside, Inc., et al. 2023
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 183483, 2023 WL 6691015, at *44, and
proceeded from the premise that the BOEM must ensure
that “each criterion is met” in a manner that is “not to the
detriment of the other criteria.” Id.
The district court held only that the BOEM must
have “discretion” in considering whether each statutory
45a
Appendix A
criterion is satisfied, and that the BOEM must “balance”
the statutory mandate to develop energy projects on the
Outer Continental Shelf with the twelve statutory criteria
for which it must provide. The plaintiffs do not contest
either of these points; in fact, they appear to concede them.
See Reply Br. for Alliance at 3 (“[Defendants] incorrectly
argue that the Alliance takes an absolutist position,
arguing that [the BOEM] lacks any discretion at all in how
to satisfy OCSLA’s requirements. But this is not true.”).
In any event, the plaintiffs have not provided us with any
basis for concluding that the district court’s award of
summary judgment to the defendants was infected by a
misreading of OCSLA § 1337(p)(4).
Nor have the plaintiffs provided any other reason
to find that the BOEM acted arbitrarily or capriciously
under the OCSLA in approving the project. In focusing
exclusively on the district court’s alleged errors, the
plaintiffs ignore the joint ROD and a May 10, 2021,
information memorandum in which James F. Bennett, the
Program Manager for the BOEM’s Office of Renewable
Energy Programs, explains the conditions that the
BOEM imposed on the project and why approval of
the project, with those conditions, satisfies the OCSLA
§ 1337(p)(4) criteria. Instead, the plaintiffs simply point
to portions of the record which, when read in isolation,
appear to raise safety and environmental concerns.11
11. The plaintiffs also argue that the project likely will cause
commercial fisheries to abandon the project area due to difficulties
with navigation, in violation of OCSLA § 1337(p)(4). The plaintiffs
support the argument by pointing to a statement to this effect
that the Corps initially included in its section of the ROD but later
46a
Appendix A
The plaintiffs’ position appears to be that, if a project is
likely to have any modicum of impact on one or more of
the twelve OCSLA criteria, the BOEM cannot approve it.
See, e.g., Corrected Opening Br. for Seafreeze Pls. at 44
(challenging the district court’s conclusion that the BOEM
“still retains some discretion in considering whether the
enumerated statutory criteria have been satisfied, even
when the statute does not state so explicitly”) (citations
omitted). But see Reply Br. for Alliance at 3 (“[Defendants]
incorrectly argue that the Alliance takes an absolutist
position, arguing that [the BOEM] lacks any discretion
at all in how to satisfy the OCSLA’s requirements. But
this is not true.”).
This absolutist argument fails. A statute encouraging
the development of offshore wind projects but obligating
the BOEM to ensure that such projects be carried out in
a manner that provides for safety, for example, cannot
be read to prohibit project approval simply because one
could imagine the project being involved in an accident.
removed with a clarifying statement, issued in the form of an ROD
supplement, that inclusion of the statement “was based solely upon
comments of interested parties submitted to BOEM during the
public comment period” and “was not based upon any separate
or independent [Corps’] or other agency evaluation or study, and
accordingly does not represent the position of the [Corps] . . . .” The
plaintiffs contest the veracity of the Corps’ representation in the
ROD supplement, but the ROD, taken as a whole, bears out the Corps’
statement. See Supp. App. at 2016, Seafreeze Appeal (noting that the
proposed discharge of fill “will likely have minor, long-term effects on
recreational and commercial fisheries”); id. at 2023 (noting that the
project “will have neutral impacts to navigation during construction
and operation with the incorporation of mitigation”).
47a
Appendix A
If that is the plaintiffs’ position, we reject it. Moreover,
as was the case with their APA/CWA arguments, see
supra Part III-D, the plaintiffs’ record citations in
support of the claim that the BOEM did not ensure that
the COP would be carried out in a manner that provides
for the statutory criteria omit necessary context. They
fail to acknowledge either the mitigation requirements
that the BOEM imposed in response to the safety and
environmental concerns raised, or that the concerns were
raised in connection with alternatives that the BOEM had
rejected.
The district court did not err in awarding summary
judgment to the defendants on the plaintiffs’ APA/OCSLA
claims.
IV.
Before and after oral argument, we have received Fed.
R. App. P. 28(j) letters alerting us to recent developments
that have caused federal regulators to pause the project.
These incidents, occurring after the challenged agency
decisions, are not relevant to the arguments made in these
appeals. See Town of Winthrop, 535 F.3d at 14 (“[T]he
focal point for judicial review should be the administrative
record already in existence, not some new record made
initially in the reviewing court.”) (quoting Camp v. Pitts,
411 U.S. 138, 142, 93 S. Ct. 1241, 36 L. Ed. 2d 106 (1973)).
For the reasons explained, we affirm the judgments
of the district court.
48a
B
APPENDIX BAppendix
— JUDGMENT
OF THE
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE
FIRST CIRCUIT, ENTERED DECEMBER 5, 2024
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
No. 23-1853
No. 23-2051
SEAFREEZE SHORESIDE, INC.; LONG
ISLAND COMMERCIAL FISHING ASSOC., INC.;
XIII NORTHEAST FISHERY SECTOR, INC.;
HERITAGE FISHERIES, INC.; NAT. W., INC.;
OLD SQUAW FISHERIES, INC.,
Plaintiffs, Appellants,
v.
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE
INTERIOR; HONORABLE DEBRA HAALAND, in
her official capacity as Secretary of the Department
of the Interior; BUREAU OF OCEAN ENERGY
MANAGEMENT; LIZ KLEIN, in her official capacity
as the Director of the Bureau of Ocean Energy
Management; LAURA DANIEL-DAVID, in her official
capacity as Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary,
Land and Minerals Management; UNITED STATES
DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE; HONORABLE
GINA M. RAIMONDO, in her official capacity as
the Secretary of the Department of Commerce;
NATIONAL OCEANIC AND ATMOSPHERIC
ADMINISTRATION, NATIONAL MARINE
FISHERIES SERVICE; CATHERINE MARZIN,
in her official capacity as the Deputy Director of the
49a
Appendix B
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration;
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE;
HONORABLE LLOYD J. AUSTIN, III, in his
official capacity as the Secretary of the Department
of Defense; UNITED STATES ARMY CORPS OF
ENGINEERS; LT. GEN. SCOTT A. SPELLMON,
in his official capacity as the Commander and Chief
of Engineers of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers;
COLONEL JOHN A. ATILANO, II, in his official
capacity as the District Engineer of the New England
District of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers;
VINEYARD WIND 1, LLC,
Defendants, Appellees,
RESPONSIBLE OFFSHORE DEVELOPMENT
ALLIANCE, a D.C. nonprofit corporation,
Plaintiff, Appellant,
v.
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE
INTERIOR; DEBRA HAALAND, in her official
capacity as the Secretary of the Interior; BUREAU OF
OCEAN ENERGY MANAGEMENT; LIZ KLEIN,
in her official capacity as the Director of the Bureau of
Ocean Energy Management; NATIONAL MARINE
FISHERIES SERVICE; RICHARD W. SPINRAD,
in his official capacity as the Administrator of the
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration;
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY;
CHRISTINE WORMUTH, in her official capacity as
Secretary of the Army; UNITED STATES ARMY
50a
Appendix B
CORPS OF ENGINEERS; JAMIE A. PINKHAM, in
his official capacity as the Acting Assistant Secretary of
the Army for Civil Works; VINEYARD WIND 1, LLC,
Defendants, Appellees.
Entered: December 5, 2024
JUDGMENT
This cause came on to be heard on appeal from
the United States District Court for the District of
Massachusetts and was argued by counsel.
Upon consideration whereof, it is now here ordered,
adjudged and decreed as follows: The judgments of the
district court are affirmed.
By the Court:
Anastasia Dubrovsky, Clerk
cc: Roger J. Marzulla, Ira H. Zaleznik, Nancie G.
Marzulla, Perry M. Rosen, Donald Campbell Lockhart,
Thekla Hansen-Young, Lea J. Tyhach, Kevin W. McArdle,
Peter R. Steenland, Jack Woodruff Pirozzolo, Kathleen
Moriarty Mueller, James Wedeking, Peter Whitfield,
Brooklyn Hildebrandt, Theodore Hadzi-Antich, Chance
Weldon, Connor William Mighell, Robert Henneke, Pedro
Melendez-Arreaga
51a
Appendix C
APPENDIX C — MEMORANDUM
& ORDER
OF THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT,
DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS,
FILED OCTOBER 12, 2023
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
Case No. 1:22-cv-11091-IT; Case No. 1:22-cv-11172-IT
SEAFREEZE SHORESIDE, INC., et al.,
Plaintiffs,
v.
THE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT
OF THE INTERIOR, et al.,
Defendants,
and
VINEYARD WIND 1, LLC,
Intervenor-Defendant.
RESPONSIBLE OFFSHORE
DEVELOPMENT ALLIANCE,
Plaintiff,
v.
52a
Appendix C
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT
OF THE INTERIOR, et al.,
Defendants,
and
VINEYARD WIND 1, LLC,
Intervenor-Defendant.
Filed October 12, 2023
MEMORANDUM & ORDER
TALWANI, D.J.
Plaintiffs Seafreeze Shoreside, Inc. (“Seafreeze
Shor e side” ), Long Isl a nd Com mer c i a l F i sh i ng
Association, Inc. (“LICFA”), XIII Northeast Fishery
Sector, Inc. (“Sector XIII”), Heritage Fisheries, Inc.
(“Heritage Fisheries”), Nat. W., Inc. (“Nat. W.”) and Old
Squaw Fisheries, Inc. (“Old Squaw”) (collectively, the
“Seafreeze Plaintiffs”) and Plaintiff Responsible Offshore
Development Alliance (“Alliance”) brought the abovecaptioned lawsuits challenging actions taken by several
federal agencies and associated officials in the approval
of an offshore-wind energy project to be constructed and
operated by Intervenor-Defendant Vineyard Wind 1 LLC
(“Vineyard Wind”) in the Outer Continental Shelf off the
coast of Martha’s Vineyard and Nantucket, Massachusetts
(the “Vineyard Wind Project” or the “Project”).1
1. Seafreeze Shoreside, Inc., et al. v. The United States Dept.
of the Interior, et al., 1:22-cv-11091, and Responsible Offshore
53a
Appendix C
Before the court in a consolidated proceeding are
cross-motions for summary judgment in Seafreeze, 1:22cv-11091, see Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment,
Doc. No. 66, Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment,
Doc. No. 72, Vineyard Wind’s Motion for Summary
Judgment, Doc. No. 86; and in Responsible, 1:22-cv-11172,
see Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment, Doc. No.
52, Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment, Doc.
No. 59, Vineyard Wind’s Motion for Summary Judgment,
Doc. No. 73. For the reasons that follow, Plaintiffs’ Motions
for Summary Judgment are DENIED and Defendants’
and Vineyard Wind’s Motions for Summary Judgment
are GRANTED.
I.
Background
A.
Procedural Background
The Procedural Background is set forth in detail in
the court’s Memorandum and Order, 1:22-cv-11091, Doc.
No. 137; 1:22-cv-11172, Doc. No. 104, denying Plaintiffs’
Motions to Strike Documents from and Supplement the
Administrative Record, 1:22-cv-11091, Doc. No. 56; 1:22cv-11172, Doc. No. 43, and is incorporated by reference
herein.
Development Alliance v. United States Dept. of the Interior, et
al., 1:22-cv-11172, are referred to herein by their respective case
numbers.
Two other challenges to the Project were filed in this District and
are now on appeal. See Melone v. Coit, et al., 1:21-cv-11171-IT,
appeal docketed, No. 23-1736 (1st Cir. Sept. 8, 2023); Nantucket
Residents Against Turbines et al. v. U.S. Bureau of Ocean Energy
Mgmt., 1:21-cv-11390-IT, appeal docketed, 2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
86176, (together “the Related Actions”).
54a
Appendix C
B. Background Concerning the Project
The Background Concerning the Project is also set
forth in detail in the court’s Memorandum and Order,
1:22-cv-11091, Doc. No. 137; 1:22-cv-11172, Doc. No. 104,
and is incorporated by reference herein. The Background
Concerning the Project is derived from the Administrative
Record common to the pending challenges and the Related
Actions. 2
The following further background concerning the
Project is also drawn from the Administrative Record, is
specific to the pending challenges, and was not at issue in
the Related Actions.
In considering Vineyard Wind’s application for a
permit under Section 404 of the Clean Water Act (“Section
404 Permit”) pertaining to the discharge of dredged and
fill materials that would occur along a 23.3 mile long
corridor as part of Vineyard Wind’s installation of the wind
energy facility, electronic service platforms, connections
between the wind turbine generators, service platforms,
and export cables, the A rmy Corps of Engineers
(“Corps”) considered the practicability of the following
2. Certified Indices of the Administrative Record and
addenda were docketed electronically, see 1:22-cv-11091, Federal
Defendants’ Notices, Doc. Nos. 26, 30, 34, 36; 1:22-cv-11172,
Federal Defendants’ Notices, Doc. Nos. 17, 23; portions of the
Administrative Record reflected in the parties briefing are
docketed electronically as part of the parties’ Joint Appendices
filed in connection with the cross-motions for summary judgment,
1:22-cv-11091, Doc. Nos. 104, 105; 1:22-cv-11172, Doc. Nos. 97, 98.
55a
Appendix C
alternatives to the proposed Vineyard Wind Project:
(a) one no-action alternative; (b) a largely land-based
alternative; (c) alternatives that would bring the cable on
shore in a different location; (d) two off-site alternatives
in other zones of the ocean; and (e) seven different onsite alternatives identified by Bureau of Ocean Energy
Management (“BOEM”) in the Environmental Impact
Statement (“Final EIS”). Joint Record of Decision (“Joint
ROD”), BOEM_0076799 at -6830-31.
The Corps stated that in order to consider an
alternative “practicable,” the alternative “must be
available, achieve the overall project purpose (as defined
by USACE) and be feasible when considering cost,
logistics, and existing technology.” Id.
In issuing the Section 404 Permit to Vineyard Wind,
the Corps imposed certain “Special Conditions” on
Vineyard Wind as the permittee, including compliance
with all “mandatory terms and conditions to implement
the reasonable and prudent measures that are associated
with ‘incidental take’ that is also specified in the [Biological
Opinion (‘BiOp’)].” The Permit further specified that the
Permit is conditional on Vineyard Wind’s “compliance
with all of the mandatory terms and conditions associated
with incidental take of the attached [BiOp], and any future
[BiOp] that replaces it, which terms and conditions are
incorporated by reference into this [P]ermit.” Dep’t of
Army Permit, USACE_AR_012635 at -36.
C.
Plaintiffs’ Pending Claims
In reviewing the pending motions, the court consider
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