Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Seafreeze Shoreside, Inc., et al., Petitioners v. Department of the Interior, et al.

Supreme Court briefMar 4, 2025

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No. 24In the

Supreme Court of the United States

SEAFREEZE SHORESIDE, INC.; LONG

ISLAND COMMERCIAL FISHING ASSOC., INC.;

XIII NORTHEAST FISHERY SECTOR, INC.;

HERITAGE FISHERIES, INC.; NAT. W., INC.;

OLD SQUAW FISHERIES, INC.,

Petitioners,

v.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT

OF THE INTERIOR; et al.,

Respondents.

On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the United

States Court of A ppeals for the First Circuit

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Robert Henneke

Chance Weldon

Theodore Hadzi-A ntich*

*Counsel of Record

Connor Mighell

Texas Public Policy Foundation

901 Congress Avenue

Austin, TX 78701

(512) 472-2700

tha@texaspolicy.com

Counsel for Petitioners

120240

A

(800) 274-3321 • (800) 359-6859

i

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

In 2021, the federal government launched an ambitious

initiative to diminish demand for fossil fuels by approving

dozens of wind energy generation projects in federal waters

on the outer Continental Shelf (“OCS”) off the Atlantic,

Pacific and Gulf Coasts. Pursuant to that initiative, the

Departments of the Interior, Commerce, and Defense,

acting through their sub-agencies and officers (“Federal

Respondents”), jointly prepared an environmental impact

statement under the National Environmental Policy Act

(“NEPA”) leading to the approval of the construction and

operations plan of the Vineyard Wind 1 project, the first

of many such large-scale, industrial offshore wind energy

projects slated for the OCS. Prior to this case, no court

had ever reviewed such an approval.

Petitioners challenged the Vineyard Wind 1 project

approval as contrary to the texts of the Outer Continental

Shelf Lands Act (“OCSLA”) and NEPA. The record showed

the project would result in momentous adverse impacts

on marine navigation, public safety, the environment, and

national security. The First Circuit rejected the challenge

by adopting the lower court’s uncritical reliance on the

Federal Respondents’ presumed discretion to interpret

the statutory texts.

The questions presented are:

1. Whether the First Circuit’s decision conflicts

with Loper Bright Enters v. Raimondo, 603

U.S. 369 (2024), which requires courts to

independently determine the meaning of

federal statutes rather than deferring to

agency interpretations.

ii

2. W hether the First Circuit’s decision

conflicts with La. Pub. Serv. Comm’n v.

FCC, 476 U.S. 355, 374 (1986), which held

that “an agency literally has no power to

act . . . unless and until Congress confers

power upon it.”

iii

PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING

Petitioners are Seafreeze Shoreside, Inc., Long Island

Commercial Fishing Association, Inc., XIII Northeast

Fishery Sector, Inc., Heritage Fisheries, Inc., Nat. W.,

Inc., and Old Squaw Fisheries, Inc.

Respondents are the United States Department of

the Interior, Doug Burgum, in his official capacity as

Secretary of the Department of the Interior, the Bureau of

Ocean Energy Management, Walter Cruickshank, Ph.D.,

in his official capacity as the Director of the Bureau of

Ocean Energy Management, United States Department

of Commerce, Honorable Howard Lutnick, in his official

capacity as the Secretary of the Department of Commerce,

Steve Feldgus, in his official capacity as Principal Deputy

Assistant Secretary, Land and Minerals Management, the

National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, the

National Marine Fisheries Service, Vice Admiral Nancy

Hann, in her official capacity as Administrator of the

National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, the

United States Department of Defense, Pete Hegseth, in

his official capacity as the Secretary of the Department

of Defense, the United States Army Corps of Engineers,

Lt. Gen. William H. “Butch” Graham, Jr., in his official

capacity as the Commander and Chief of Engineers of the

U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Colonel Justin R. Pabis,

P.E., in his official capacity as the District Engineer of

the New England District of the U.S. Army Corps of

Engineers, and Vineyard Wind 1, LLC.

iv

RULE 29.6 DISCLOSURE STATEMENT

Petitioner Seafreeze Shoreside, Inc. (“Seafreeze”)

is a commercial seafood processing company. It has one

parent company, namely Yoplant LLC, which holds 100

percent ownership interest in Seafreeze. There are no

other publicly held companies that have a 10 percent or

greater ownership interest in Seafreeze.

Petitioner Long Isla nd Commercia l Fishi ng

Association, Inc. (“LICFA”) is an organization of

commercial fishermen and fishing companies supporting

and advocating for sustainable fishery management,

including clean, fishable waters free from pollution and

navigational obstruction. It has no parent companies and

there are no publicly held companies that have a 10 percent

or greater ownership interest in LICFA.

Petitioner XIII Northeast Fishery Sector, Inc. (“XIII

Northeast”) is a non-profit membership organization of

commercial fishermen and fishing companies. It has no

parent companies and there are no publicly held companies

that have a 10 percent or greater ownership interest in

XIII Northeast.

Petitioner Heritage Fisheries, Inc. (“Heritage”) is a

commercial fishing company. It has no parent companies

and there are no publicly held companies that have a 10

percent or greater ownership interest in Heritage.

Petitioner Nat W., Inc. (“Nat W.”) is a commercial

fishing company. It has no parent companies and there

are no publicly held companies that have a 10 percent or

greater ownership interest in Nat W.

v

Petitioner Old Squaw Fisheries, Inc. (“Old Squaw”) is

a commercial fishing company. It has no parent companies

and there are no publicly held companies that have a 10

percent or greater ownership interest in Old Squaw.

vi

RELATED PROCEEDINGS

United States Court of Appeals (1st Cir.):

Responsible Offshore Development Alliance v.

United States Department of the Interior

et al., No. 23-2051 (Dec. 5, 2024)

vii

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

QUESTIONS PRESENTED . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . i

PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iii

RULE 29.6 DISCLOSURE STATEMENT . . . . . . . . . . iv

RELATED PROCEEDINGS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vi

TABLE OF CONTENTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vii

TABLE OF APPENDICES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . x

TABLE OF CITED AUTHORITIES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xi

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI . . . . . . . . . 1

INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

OPINIONS BELOW . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

JURISDICTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED . . . . . . . . . . 3

STATEMENT OF THE CASE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

A. Legal and Regulatory Background . . . . . . . . . . . 3

1.

Legal Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

viii

Table of Contents

Page

2.

Regulatory Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

B. Proceedings Below . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

1.

Administrative Proceedings . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

2.

Legal Proceedings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION . . . . 10

I.

The First Circuit’s OCSLA decision

warrants this Court’s review . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12

A. The question presented is of national

importance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12

B. The decision below is inconsistent with

prior decisions of this Court . . . . . . . . . . . . 16

C. The decision below is wrong . . . . . . . . . . . . 25

II. The First Circuit’s NEPA decision warrants

this Court’s review . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28

A. The question presented is of national

importance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29

B. The decision below conflicts with prior

decisions of this Court . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31

ix

Table of Contents

Page

i.

T h e Fe d e r a l R e s p o n d e n t s

impermissibly pre-determined

“reasonable alternatives” . . . . . . . . . . . 32

ii. T h e Fe d e r a l R e s p o n d e n t s

impermissibly revived the EIS

without public comment . . . . . . . . . . . . 33

C. The decision below creates a conflict

among the courts of appeal . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34

D. The decision below is wrong . . . . . . . . . . . . 35

CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37

x

TABLE OF APPENDICES

Page

A P P E N DI X A — O P I N ION O F T H E

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR T H E F I R S T CI RCU I T, F I L ED

DECEMBER 5, 2024 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1a

A PPENDI X B — J U DGMENT OF THE

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT, ENTERED

DECEMBER 5, 2024 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .48a

APPENDIX C — MEMORANDUM & ORDER

OF THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT

COURT, DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS,

FILED OCTOBER 12, 2023 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51a

A PPENDI X D — J U DGMENT OF THE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT,

DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS, FILED

OCTOBER 12, 2023 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112a

APPENDIX E — RELEVANT STATUTES AND

REGULATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114a

xi

TABLE OF CITED AUTHORITIES

Cases:

Page

Adkins v. VIM Recycling, Inc.,

644 F.3d 483 (7th Cir. 2011) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29

Alabama v. North Carolina,

560 U.S. 330 (2010) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28

Batterton v. Francis,

432 U.S. 416 (1977) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18

Bennett v. Spear,

520 U.S. 154 (1997) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31, 35

Beyond Nuclear v. U.S. Nuclear Regul. Comm’n,

704 F.3d 12 (1st Cir. 2013) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29

Bruner v. United States,

343 U.S. 112 (1952) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35

Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC, Inc.,

467 U.S. 837 (1984) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17

Chicago & N. W. Transp. Co. v.

Kalo Brick & Tile Co.,

450 U.S. 311 (1981) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27

Chickasaw Nation v. United States,

534 U.S. 84 (2001) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28

xii

Cited Authorities

Page

City of Arlington v. FCC,

569 U.S. 290 (2013) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31

Del. Riverkeeper Network v. FERC,

753 F.3d 1304 (D.C. Cir. 2014) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36

Duncan v. Walker,

533 U.S. 167 (2001) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28

FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp.,

529 U.S. 120 (2000) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31

Gonzales v. Oregon,

546 U.S. 243 (2006) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31

Gozlon-Peretz v. United States,

498 U.S. 395 (1991) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27

La. Pub. Serv. Comm’n v. FCC,

476 U.S. 355 (1986) . . . . . . . . . . . . 2, 9, 11, 17, 21, 31-34

Lambert v. Wicklund,

520 U.S. 292 (1997) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11, 25

Loper Bright Enters. v. Raimondo,

603 U.S. 369 (2024) . . . . . . . . . 2, 9, 10, 12, 16-19, 22-25

Marin Audubon Soc’y v. FAA,

121 F.4th 902 (D.C. Cir. 2024) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5, 34

xiii

Cited Authorities

Page

Marsh v. Or. Nat. Res. Council,

490 U.S. 360 (1989) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31

Michigan v. EPA,

576 U.S. 743 (2015) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18

Mock v. Garland,

75 F.4th 563 (5th Cir. 2023) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34

Moctezuma-Reyes v. Garland,

124 F.4th 416 (6th Cir. 2024) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18

Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v.

State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.,

463 U.S. 29 (1983) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32

Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders v.

Defenders of Wildlife,

551 U.S. 644 (2007) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27

Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. DOL, OSHA,

595 U.S. 109, 142 S. Ct. 661 (2022) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21

National Org. for Women, Inc. v. Scheidler,

510 U.S. 249 (1994) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29

Relentless, Inc. v. United States DOC,

62 F.4th 621 (1st Cir. 2023) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19

xiv

Cited Authorities

Page

Rothensies v. Electric Storage Battery Co.,

329 U.S. 296 (1946) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16, 30

Thompson v. Keohane,

516 U.S. 99 (1995) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34

United States v. Coleman,

390 U.S. 599 (1968) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16

United States v. Doe,

465 U.S. 605 (1984) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11, 32, 34

Utah Power & Light Co. v. United States,

243 U.S. 389 (1917) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34

Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. NRDC,

435 U.S. 519 (1978) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32

Wayman v. Southard,

10 Wheat. 1 (1825) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18

West Virginia v. EPA,

597 U.S. 697 (2022) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2, 31

WildWest Inst. v. Bull,

547 F.3d 1162 (9th Cir. 2008) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33

Wood v. GMC,

865 F.2d 395 (1st Cir. 1988) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29

xv

Cited Authorities

Page

Statutes & Regulations:

5 U.S.C.

§ 706(2) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34

28 U.S.C.

§ 1254(1) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

42 U.S.C.

§ 4332(B) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .4

§ 4332(C)(i)-(iii) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

43 U.S.C.

§§ 1331-1356 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

§ 1332(1) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

§ 1332(2) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4, 27

§ 1332(3) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4

§ 1337(p)(4) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1, 9, 10, 17, 19-21, 24

§ 1337(p)(4)(A) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4

§ 1337(p)(4)(B) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4

§ 1337(p)(4)(F) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4

xvi

Cited Authorities

Page

40 C.F.R.

§ 1500.1(a) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4

§ 1502.14(a) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

§ 1508.7 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35

79 Fed. Reg. 70545 (Nov. 26, 2014) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

85 Fed. Reg. 81486 (Dec. 16, 2020) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

86 Fed. Reg. 12495 (Mar. 3, 2021) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

86 Fed. Reg. 14153 (Mar. 12, 2021) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

86 Fed. Reg. 26541 (May 14, 2021) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

Fed. R. App. P. 28(j) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

Other Authorities:

Fact Sheet: Biden Administration Jumpstarts

Offshore Wind Energy Projects to Create

Jobs, T he White House (Mar. 29, 2021),

https://tinyurl.com/str7ymwf . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

First Circuit Oral Argument: 23-1853, Seafreeze

Shoreside, Inc. v. US Dep’t of the Interior, U.S.

First Cir. Court of A pp. (July 25, 2024), at

https://tinyurl.com/mry68r3p . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22

xvii

Cited Authorities

Page

GCube Scr utinizes Bla de Breaka ges,

N. A m . C l e a n E n er g y (Sept . 8 , 2 014),

https://tinyurl.com/358e6fsy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15

Justice Harlan, Some Aspects of the Judicial

Process in the Supreme Court of the United

States, 33 Austl. L. J. 108 (1959) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12

Letter to Ms. Rachel Pachter, U.S. Dep’t of Interior

(Jan. 17, 2025), https://tinyurl.com/mwnf4x73 . . . . . 27

Temporary Withdrawal of All Areas on the

Outer Continental Shelf From Offshore

Wind Leasing and Review of the Federal

Gover nment’s Leasing and Per mitting

Practices for Wind Projects, The White House

(Jan. 20, 2025), https://tinyurl.com/bde3dkez . . . . . 13

Vineyard Wind Construction and Operations

Pl a n A d d e n d u m , B u r e a u o f O c e a n

Energy M anagement (Dec. 5, 2024) at § 1.0,

https://tinyurl.com/5eb8wmr4 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15, 26

1

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Petitioners Seafreeze Shoreside, Inc., Long Island

Commercial Fishing Association, Inc., XIII Northeast

Fishery Sector, Inc., Heritage Fisheries, Inc., Nat.

W., Inc., and Old Squaw Fisheries, Inc. (“Petitioners’)

respectfully petition for a writ of certiorari to review the

judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the

First Circuit.

INTRODUCTION

In a rush to replace fossil fuels as this nation’s

primary source of electricity, the federal government

launched an aggressive, nationwide program to approve

30 gigawatts (“GW”) of offshore wind energy projects

across all three American coasts by 2030. To accomplish

this enormous task, the Department of the Interior’s

Bureau of Ocean Energy Management (“BOEM”) led a

whole-of-government effort to approve as many offshore

wind projects as possible, as quickly as possible. The first

approval under this massive program was the Vineyard

Wind 1 project (“Project”), located in the North Atlantic

off the coast of Massachusetts.

During the approval process, the Departments of

the Interior, Commerce, and Defense, acting through

their sub-agencies and officers (“Federal Respondents”),

acknowledged that the Project would harm safety, the

environment, and national security but permitted it

anyway—skirting their mandatory duties under the

Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act (“OCSLA”), 43 U.S.C.

§ 1337(p)(4), to “ensure” offshore wind projects are carried

out “in a manner that provides for safety, protection of the

environment, [and] . . . national security.” In the process,

2

the Federal Respondents sidestepped their procedural

duties under the National Environmental Policy Act

(“NEPA”).

This Court’s recent decision in Loper Bright Enters.

v. Raimondo, 603 U.S. 369 (2024), held that courts must

“exercise their independent judgment in deciding whether

an agency has acted within its statutory authority. . . .”

Id. at 412. And this Court previously held that “an agency

literally has no power to act . . . unless and until Congress

confers power upon it.” La. Pub. Serv. Comm’n v. FCC, 476

U.S. 355, 374 (1986); see also West Virginia v. EPA, 597

U.S. 697, 723 (2022) (opining that administrative agencies

“have only those powers given to them by Congress”).

The First Circuit failed to adhere to those precedents

and impermissibly deferred to Federal Respondents’

interpretations of OCSLA and NEPA, thereby creating

conflicts between its ruling in the instant case and prior

decisions of this Court. In so doing, the First Circuit

unlawfully sanctioned the federal government’s approval

of the first of many such planned, enormous wind energy

projects scheduled to industrialize the pristine waters

of America’s outer Continental Shelf (“OCS”), a decision

that has grave adverse consequences for marine safety,

the environment, and national security.

In addition, the First Circuit’s decision created a

conflict with the D.C. Circuit regarding the validity of

regulations issued by the Council on Environmental

Quality (“CEQ”) under NEPA. Specifically, the D.C.

Circuit held that CEQ’s NEPA regulations were ultra

vires and void, while the First Circuit subsequently

applied those very regulations to uphold the Federal

Respondents’ approval of the Project.

3

OPINIONS BELOW

The opinion of the court of appeals (Appx. at 1a–47a)

is reported at 123 F.4th 1.

JURISDICTION

The court of appeals entered judgment on December

5, 2024. This Court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.

§ 1254(1).

STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED

Relevant statutory provisions are reproduced in the

appendix to this petition. Appx. at 114a–140a.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

A. Legal and Regulatory Background

1.

Legal Background

Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act (“OCSLA”)

Congress enacted OCSLA, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1331–1356,

in August 1953, recognizing “the subsoil and seabed of

the outer Continental Shelf” (“OCS”) are “subject to

[the] jurisdiction, control, and power of disposition” of

the United States. 43 U.S.C. § 1332(1)1; Appx. at 120a.

1. Unless otherwise specified, all statutes and regulations

cited in this petition are from the United States Code or the

United States Code of Federal Regulations, as the case may be,

as codified in 2020.

4

Congress directed that the OCS “should be made available

for expeditious and orderly development, subject to

environmental safeguards,” and instructed that “this Act

shall be construed in such a manner that the character of

the waters above the [OCS] as high seas and the right to

navigation and fishing therein shall not be affected.” Id.

at §§ 1332(2), (3). Appx. at 120a.

Until 2005, OCSLA governed the development of oil

and gas resources on the OCS but not renewable energy

resources. In 2005, Congress amended OCSLA to add

mandatory legal obligations for permitting offshore

renewable energy leases. It required the Secretary of

the Interior to “ensure that any [OCS renewable energy

leasing] activity . . . is carried out in a manner that provides

for” a list of twelve items, including “safety, protection of

the environment, [and] protection of national security

interests of the United States. . . .” 43 U.S.C. § 1337(p)(4)

(A), (B), (F). Appx. at 121a.

NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ACT

(“NEPA”)

NEPA is our “basic national charter for the protection

of the environment.” 40 C.F.R. § 1500.1(a), Appx. at 135a.

It requires agencies to “identify and develop methods

and procedures” to ensure “environmental amenities and

values may be given appropriate consideration in decisionmaking. . . .” 42 U.S.C. § 4332(B). Appx. at 118a. Agencies

do so by preparing a “detailed statement” for major agency

actions “significantly affecting the quality of the human

environment” that specifies, among other things, the

“environmental impact” of the action and “any adverse

environmental effects which cannot be avoided should

5

the proposal be implemented,” along with “alternatives

to the proposed action[.]” Id. at § 4332(C)(i)–(iii). Appx.

at 118a–119a. Such a statement is generally referred to

as an environmental impact statement (“EIS”).

2.

Regulatory Background

The alternatives section is the “heart” of an EIS

required by NEPA. 40 C.F.R. § 1502.14; Appx. at 138a. An

EIS must (1) “rigorously explore and objectively evaluate

all reasonable alternatives” to proposed federal agency

actions and (2) “for alternatives which were eliminated

from detailed study, briefly discuss the reasons for their

having been eliminated.” Id. at § 1502.14(a). Appx. at 138a.

The D.C. Circuit recently held in Marin Audubon

Soc’y v. FAA, 121 F.4th 902, 908 (D.C. Cir. 2024), that these

NEPA regulations “are ultra vires” because they were

promulgated by the Council on Environmental Quality

(“CEQ”), which had no rulemaking authority. After that

decision, the First Circuit relied on those very regulations

to hold in this case that the Federal Respondents complied

with NEPA when approving the Project. Appx. at 36a. The

D.C. Circuit denied rehearing of Marin Audubon Soc’y on

January 31, 2025. See 2025 U.S. App. LEXIS 2280 (denial

of panel rehearing); 2025 U.S. App. LEXIS 2237 (denial of

rehearing en banc). Accordingly, there is a conflict among

the First and D.C. Circuits regarding whether the CEQ

regulations applied by the First Circuit in this case have

any validity. See infra. at II.C.

6

B. Proceedings Below

1.

Administrative Proceedings

BOEM awarded a lease in the OCS to the company

that would become Vineyard Wind 1, LLC (“Project

Developer”). 79 Fed. Reg. 70545 (Nov. 26, 2014). Project

Developer submitted a construction and operations plan

(“COP”) for NEPA review. Well before the completion

of the COP’s environmental impact statement (“EIS”),

Project Developer entered into binding power purchase

agreements (“PPAs”) to sell electricity generated by the

Project to Massachusetts-based electric utility companies.

These contracts were intended to meet Massachusetts’s

efforts to switch from fossil fuels to renewable energy

sources for electricity generation.

Federal Respondents issued a Draft Environmental

Impact Statement (“DEIS”) on Dec. 7, 2018, and a

supplemental DEIS on June 12, 2020. Those documents

showed that the Project would erect multiple turbine

structures that interfere with navigational and defense

radar and would pollute the ocean environment. Six

months after the issuance of the supplemental DEIS,

on December 1, 2020, Project Developer withdrew the

COP from federal review. Within two weeks, BOEM

published notice that “[s]ince the COP has been withdrawn

from review and decision-making, there is no longer

. . . a decision pending before BOEM[,]” and because

“the preparation and completion of an EIS is no longer

necessary, . . . the process is hereby terminated.” 85 Fed.

Reg. 81486 (Dec. 16, 2020).

The very next month, on January 22, 2021, immediately

after a new presidential administration took office in

7

Washington, D.C., Project Developer asked BOEM to

resume the terminated NEPA review and revive the

Project. See 86 Fed. Reg. 12495 (Mar. 3, 2021). Acting

under the new administration, BOEM acquiesced without

providing opportunity for public comment. Id. Nine days

after resuming NEPA review, BOEM published the final

EIS. See 86 Fed. Reg. 14153 (Mar. 12, 2021).

Two weeks later, on March 29, 2021, that same new

administration announced “a set of bold actions that will

catalyze offshore wind energy” as part of its environmental

agenda. Fact Sheet: Biden Administration Jumpstarts

Offshore Wind Energy Projects to Create Jobs, The White

House (Mar. 29, 2021), https://tinyurl.com/str7ymwf

(“the Offshore Wind Policy”). The Offshore Wind Policy

launched “a shared goal to deploy 30 gigawatts (GW) of

offshore wind in the United States by 2030 . . . [and] 110

GW by 2050.” Id. BOEM pledged as part of this effort “to

advance new lease sales and complete review of at least

16 Construction and Operations Plans (COPs) by 2025,

representing more than 19 GW” of offshore wind. Id.

Approximately six weeks after publication of the

Offshore Wind Policy, Federal Respondents issued a

Record of Decision (“ROD”) approving the Project on

May 10, 2021. 86 Fed. Reg. 26541 (May 14, 2021). The

Project was the first of many slated for the OCS under

the Offshore Wind Policy. The ROD stated that the

purpose of the Project was to meet Project Developer’s

contractual commitments made to Massachusetts’ electric

generating companies to achieve that state’s renewable

energy goals and that several alternatives were rejected

during NEPA review because they would not meet that

8

purpose. BOEM_0076823. 2 The ROD also stated that

the Project would likely cause commercial fishermen to

abandon the entire Project lease area “due to difficulties

with navigation.” BOEM_0076837. Shortly thereafter,

BOEM deferred its requirements that Project Developer

provide financial assurance for decommissioning and

removal of the Project “until 15 years after construction.”

BOEM_0077110. To date, no decommissioning plan exists

for the Project, and due to BOEM’s deferral, no financial

assurance exists to implement removal of the Project from

the OCS at the end of the Project’s useful life. See Pet.

First Cir. Op. Br. Appx. at 01409.

2.

Legal Proceedings

Because the Project is located in prime fishing

grounds and represents a threat to their livelihoods,

several commercial fishing companies and a shoreside

seafood processing business (“Petitioners”) sued the

Federal Respondents on December 15, 2021. Project

Developer joined the lawsuit as a defendant-intervenor.

The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment

in the U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts

(“the district court”) on April 3, 2023, and filed a motion

for stay of the construction of the project on May 10, 2023.

The district court denied the motion for stay on May 25,

2023, and Petitioners filed an interlocutory appeal with the

First Circuit. On October 12, 2023, while the interlocutory

appeal was pending, the district court granted summary

2. Citations formatted in this manner reference the

administrative record, which was before the district court and

the First Circuit.

9

judgment to the Federal Respondents and Project

Developer, holding that the Federal Respondents had

discretion to determine whether the statutory criteria

found in OCSLA Section 1337(p)(4) were satisfied, and that

Petitioners lacked standing to bring their NEPA claims.

Appx. at 88a–90a, 103a–109a.

Petitioners voluntarily dismissed their interlocutory

appeal and immediately appealed the district court’s

summary judgment ruling, arguing that the district court

impermissibly deferred to the Federal Respondents’

reading of OCSLA Section 1337(p)(4), that Petitioners

had standing to bring their NEPA claims, and that the

Federal Respondents failed to comply with numerous

requirements of both OCSLA and NEPA. Pet. First Cir.

Op. Br. at 49–64. 3 Petitioners stated the district court’s

judgment “flies in the face of Supreme Court precedent[,]”

id. at 54, namely, the holding that “an agency literally

has no power to act . . . unless and until Congress confers

power upon it.” La. Pub. Serv. Comm’n v. FCC, 476 U.S.

355, 374 (1986).

After briefing but before oral argument, Petitioners

notified the First Circuit on July 9, 2024, pursuant to

Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 28(j), of this Court’s

decision in Loper Bright Enters. v. Raimondo, 603 U.S.

369 (2024). Specifically, Petitioners advised the First

Circuit that Loper Bright required courts to “decide all

relevant questions of law arising on review of agency

action[,]” Loper Bright, 603 U.S. at 392 (quotations

omitted), rather than relying on agency discretion, as had

been done by the district court.

3. When citing to filings on the First Circuit appellate docket,

this petition uses the Bates page numbering.

10

The case was argued before the First Circuit on July

25, 2024. On December 5, 2024, the First Circuit issued

its opinion affirming in part the judgment of the district

court. Regarding OCSLA, the First Circuit approvingly

cited the district court’s statement “that the BOEM must

have ‘discretion’ in considering whether each statutory

criterion is satisfied, and that the BOEM must ‘balance’

the statutory mandate to develop energy projects on the

Outer Continental Shelf with the twelve statutory criteria

[in Section 1337(p)(4)] for which it must provide.” Appx. at

44a–45a. Regarding NEPA, the First Circuit found that

Petitioners did have standing to bring their NEPA claims

but also that Federal Respondents did not violate NEPA.

Id. at 32a–38a. At no point in its opinion did the First

Circuit address this Court’s decisions in Loper Bright or

La. Pub. Serv. Comm’n.

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION

The First Circuit’s rulings deal with important and

recurring issues of federal law and conflict with rulings

of this Court and those of the D.C. Circuit. The issues

include protection of public safety, the environment, and

national security.

By deferring to Federal Respondents’ interpretations

of OCSLA and NEPA without conducting independent

statutory analyses of the best readings of those statutes,

the First Circuit impermissibly failed to adhere to this

Court’s instructions to “exercise their independent

judgment in deciding whether an agency has acted within

its statutory authority.” Loper Bright, 603 U.S. at 412. The

First Circuit also failed to follow this Court’s instruction

that courts must conduct their reviews “independent of

11

the political branches when interpreting the laws those

branches enact” and that “the APA . . . bars judges from

disregarding that responsibility just because an Executive

Branch agency views a statute differently.” Id. (emphasis

in original). Because the First Circuit did not provide

independent analysis of the OCSLA and NEPA language

central to the issues in this case involving the first of

dozens of massive wind energy projects slated for the

OCS, certiorari is appropriate. See United States v. Doe,

465 U.S. 605, 610 (1984) (granting certiorari to “resolve the

apparent conflict between the Court of Appeals’ holding

and the reasoning underlying this Court’s holding” in a

prior case).

Moreover, the First Circuit failed to apply this Court’s

ruling that “an agency literally has no power to act . . .

unless and until Congress confers power upon it.” La.

Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 476 U.S. at 374. Instead, the First

Circuit assumed that the Federal Respondents had the

powers they claimed. But a careful reading of the relevant

statutory provisions of OCSLA and NEPA would have

shown that the Federal Respondents were not delegated

such claimed powers by Congress. Id.; see also Lambert

v. Wicklund, 520 U.S. 292, 293 (1997) (granting petition

where lower court’s decision is “in direct conflict with [this

Court’s] precedents”).

Beyond the facts of this case, there are dozens of

pending, similar offshore wind projects scheduled to be

built on the OCS awaiting approval from the Federal

Respondents. Accordingly, the First Circuit’s legal errors

that conflict with this Court’s rulings would have longlasting, nationwide impact that can only be remedied by

this Court’s prompt action.

12

Finally, as indicated in the Regulatory Background

section, supra, there is a conflict among the courts of

appeal regarding whether the CEQ’s NEPA regulations

are null and void. Because that question is central to the

NEPA issues in this case, and would be central to all

future COP approval challenges under NEPA, certiorari

is appropriate. See Justice Harlan, Some Aspects of the

Judicial Process in the Supreme Court of the United

States, 33 Austl . L. J. 108 (1959) (observing that “a

conflict of decisions may safely be relied on as a ground for

certiorari . . . [if] the conflict is one that can be effectively

resolved only by the prompt action of the Supreme Court”).

I.

The First Circuit’s OCSLA decision warrants this

Court’s review

The First Circuit impermissibly disregarded Loper

Bright while deciding issues of national importance.

Accordingly, this Court should grant certiorari to ensure

that other lower courts adhere to Loper Bright in the

future.

A.

The question presented is of national

importance

This case concerns the first step in a massive federal

program to industrialize the OCS on all three American

coasts. Record evidence establishes that the Project

and the planned follow-on projects under the Offshore

Wind Policy will degrade marine navigation and military

readiness by interfering with marine and defense radar.

See D. Mass. MSJ at 28, 44; D. Mass. MSJ Reply at 56–57;

Pet. First Cir. Op. Br. at 24, 65, 68–69, 71. These projects

will also displace vast marine resources by altering the

13

ocean floor, upending established fisheries, and upsetting

the benthic environment across all three American coasts.

See D. Mass. MSJ at 44–45; Pet. First Cir. Op. Br. at

65–68. They will affect endangered species, especially

species that use sound to communicate like the critically

endangered North Atlantic right whale (“NARW”), which

inhabits the Vineyard Wind 1 project area. See D. Mass.

MSJ at 22 (referencing Project’s effects on NARW).

These impacts are acknowledged in a recently issued

executive order. See Temporary Withdrawal of All

Areas on the Outer Continental Shelf From Offshore

Wind Leasing and Review of the Federal Government’s

Leasing and Permitting Practices for Wind Projects,

The White House (Jan. 20, 2025), https://tinyurl.com/

bde3dkcz. The executive order recognizes the issues

Petitioners raise in this case as significant problems

worthy of re-examination. It states that there are “various

alleged legal deficiencies” in permitting processes for

offshore wind, “the consequences of which may lead to

grave harm—including negative impacts on navigational

safety interests, transportation interests, national

security interests, commercial interests, and marine

mammals. . . .” Id. And it admits “potential inadequacies

in various environmental review required by [NEPA]” in

permitting offshore wind projects. Id. Accordingly, the

executive order calls for a “comprehensive assessment and

review of Federal wind leasing and permitting practices”

to be carried out by no fewer than seven agencies or subagencies. Id.

But this presidential decree does not lessen this case’s

urgency or importance. It provides no deadline for the

agencies’ reassessment of federal wind leasing. To date,

14

39 commercial wind leases have been granted on all three

coasts, and the executive order does not halt construction

at any approved offshore wind projects, including the

Project at issue.4 The threats these projects present to the

nation’s commercial fishing industry, ocean environment,

public safety, and national security capabilities remain.

Even if the current administration were to permanently

halt all ongoing offshore wind construction, which has not

happened, the Offshore Wind Program may continue in a

future administration without change unless this Court

acts now to clarify the meaning of Section 1337(p)(4) and

the limitations that section sets on development of the

OCS for renewable energy projects.

Additionally, BOEM impermissibly waived all required

decommissioning payments from Project Developer

during the first 15 years of the Project’s operation. Pet.

First Cir. Op. Br. at 76 (quoting administrative record

at BOEM_0077110). Furthermore, Project Developer

has no approved decommissioning plan, and has never

demonstrated that one exists, even in draft form. See

Pet. First Cir. Op. Br. Appx. at 01409 (cross-examination

of Project Developer CEO). Certiorari should be granted

so that future wind energy projects are not approved

without robust decommissioning plans backed by palpable

financial security guarantees.

4. Offshore wind projects currently in various phases of

construction include South Fork Wind (approved 2022), Coastal

Virginia Offshore Wind (approved 2023), Revolution Wind

(approved 2023), and the instant Project. In 2011, a decade

before the Offshore Wind Policy was initiated in 2021, BOEM’s

predecessor agency approved the Cape Wind offshore wind

project, a small project involving only five wind turbines, but Cape

Wind was abandoned by its developer in 2017.

15

This matters because recent events show that the

Project already has caused substantial environmental

damage and is likely to cause more. One of the Project’s

blades (the size of a football field) broke apart and fell

into the ocean in pieces soon after installation in July

2024, scattering fiberglass debris across Massachusetts

beaches and depositing microplastics into the ocean,

potentially polluting it forever. Upon reviewing the Project

after the blade incident, BOEM’s Bureau of Safety and

Environmental Enforcement (“BSEE”) found that up to

66 already-installed blades of equal size located on 22 of

the already-constructed turbines had the same danger

of failure and ordered their removal—providing further

proof of the Project’s unsafe and environmentally perilous

nature. See Vineyard Wind Construction and Operations

Plan Addendum, Bureau of Ocean Energy Management

(Dec. 5, 2024) at § 1.0, https://tinyurl.com/5eb8wmr4. The

risks of blade failure are well known, yet the Federal

Respondents failed to account for such risks in the

EIS. 5 Without this Court’s intervention, every one of the

Project’s anticipated 186 turbine blades located on a total

of 62 approved wind turbines, each of which is 298 feet

taller than the Washington Monument, will hang over

America’s pristine OCS waters for the foreseeable future,

with the potential of dropping into the ocean and causing

further environmental harm. And other pending offshore

wind projects may well create the same dangers if other

lower courts defer to government agency “discretion”

regarding the meaning of Section 1337(p)(4), just as

the First Circuit did in the instant case. That section is

reproduced in full at Appx. 121a-122a and is analyzed

infra in Section I.B.

5. See GCube Scrutinizes Blade Breakages, N. A m. Clean

Energy (Sept. 8, 2014), https://tinyurl.com/358e6fsy.

16

Thus, this case concerns issues of national importance

involving the use of public lands on the OCS that only

this Court can definitively resolve. The First Circuit’s

failure to provide independent judicial guidance as to how

Section 1337(p)(4) applies in such instances should not be

permitted to stand. See United States v. Coleman, 390

U.S. 599, 601 (1968) (granting certiorari “because of the

importance of the decision to the utilization of the public

lands”). Here, due to the First Circuit’s deference to the

Federal Respondents “discretion” in interpreting Section

1337(p)(4), the Federal Defendants have been given a

virtual green light to determine how the public lands of

the OCS will be used for renewable energy development.

Significantly, all the other approved offshore wind

projects undergoing construction have been challenged.6

See Rothensies v. Electric Storage Battery Co., 329 U.S.

296 (1946) (granting certiorari due to serious hinderance

to effective legal administration caused by lower court

decision). To ensure uniformity among courts in dealing

with the risks posed by these enormous offshore wind

energy projects, this Court must provide guidance that

will satisfy OCSLA’s requirements for all OCS offshore

wind development.

B. The decision below is inconsistent with prior

decisions of this Court

Contrary to this Court’s recent decision in Loper

Br ight , the First Circuit failed to independently

determine the best reading of Section 1337(p)(4) but

instead uncritically adopted the district court’s judgment

6. See supra at n.4 for identification of approved offshore wind

projects in various stages of construction.

17

that the Federal Respondents “retain” discretion as to

how to apply Section 1337(p)(4). See Appx. at 107a. As set

forth in detail infra, that position matches precisely the

view taken in a legal memorandum of the Department of

the Interior addressing Section 1337(p)(4)’s meaning. Such

uncritical deference to agency interpretation of a statutory

provision directly conflicts with Loper Bright. The First

Circuit’s approach is also contrary to this Court’s ruling

in La. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 476 U.S. at 374 (1986) (opining

that “an agency literally has no power to act . . . unless

and until Congress confers power upon it”).

In Loper Bright, this Court rejected the doctrine

of assumptive judicial deference to agency readings of

ambiguous statutory language prescribed in Chevron,

U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). See

Loper Bright, 603 U.S. at 398 (describing Chevron

and its progeny as “heedless of the original design of

the APA” (quotations omitted)). Not only that, but the

Loper Bright Court erased Chevron’s presumption that

ambiguous language always reflects “implicit delegations

to agencies.” Id. at 399. Now, courts must “use every tool

at their disposal to determine the best reading of the

statute and resolve the ambiguity.” Id. at 400.

Importantly, this Court did not rule in Loper Bright

that the duty to independently interpret statutory law only

applied in a narrow set of cases. “Courts interpret statutes,

no matter the context, based on the traditional tools of

statutory construction, not individual policy preferences”

and “exercise judgment free from the influence of the

political branches.” Id. at 403 (emphasis added). Neither

may courts reflexively defer to agency readings of statutes

when that agency’s technical expertise may be relevant

18

to a term’s meaning. “Congress expects courts to handle

technical statutory questions.” Id. at 402. In any such

instance, “the court will go about its task with the agency’s

body of experience and informed judgment, among other

information, at its disposal.” Id. (quotations omitted).

Independent interpretation of laws matters especially

in cases involving the extent of agency authority. Loper

Bright, id. at 394–95, recognizes that some statutes allow

agencies “a degree of discretion” in three primary ways:

• Express delegation to determine what a

statute’s terms mean. See Batterton v.

Francis, 432 U.S. 416, 425 (1977).

• Rulemaking to fill in a statute’s details.

See Wayman v. Southard, 10 Wheat. 1, 43

(1825).

• Regulation subject to “a term or phrase

that ‘leaves agencies with flexibility,’ such as

‘appropriate’ or ‘reasonable.’” Loper Bright,

603 U.S. at 395 (quoting Michigan v. EPA,

576 U.S. 743, 752 (2015)).

Other appellate courts recognize that the statutes

cited as examples of deference in Loper Bright “pair that

language with words that expressly empower the agency

to exercise judgment.” Moctezuma-Reyes v. Garland,

124 F.4th 416, 420 (6th Cir. 2024) (citing Loper Bright

for the proposition that courts must use independent

judgment to determine the scope of agency discretion and

authority). “When the best reading of a statute is that it

delegates discretionary authority to an agency, the role

19

of the reviewing court under the APA is, as always, to

independently interpret the statute and effectuate the

will of Congress subject to constitutional limits,” Loper

Bright, 603 U.S. at 395, and to “police the outer statutory

boundaries” of delegations of authority from Congress to

agencies. Id. at 374.

Despite this Court’s vacatur of the First Circuit’s

judgment in Loper Bright’s sister case, Relentless, Inc.

v. United States DOC, 62 F.4th 621 (1st Cir. 2023), the

First Circuit refused to apply Loper Bright here but

instead adopted the district court’s pre-Loper Bright

opinion, which was profoundly deferential to the Federal

Defendant’s statutory interpretation of Section 1337(p)(4),

on the ground that “the APA affords great deference to

agency decision-making and agency actions are presumed

valid. . . .” Appx. at 62a. But OCSLA does not afford the

Federal Respondents “great deference” in reviewing

proposed wind energy projects on the OCS.

In relevant part, Section 1337(p)(4) of OCSLA reads

as follows:

Requirements. The Secretary [of the Interior]

shall ensure that any activity under this

subsection is carried out in a manner that

provides for—

(A) safety;

(B) protection of the environment;

(C) prevention of waste;

20

(D) conservation of the natural resources

of the outer Continental Shelf;

(E) coordination with relevant Federal

agencies; [and]

(F) prot ect ion of nat iona l secu r ity

interests of the United States. . . .

Appx. at 121a (emphasis added). As Petitioners explained

in their First Circuit briefing, Section 1337(p)(4) sets forth

mandatory criteria that must be met before any renewable

energy development project is approved on the OCS. The

statutory language does not provide the Secretary of

the Interior with authority to “balance” or “reasonably”

ensure that the requirements of Section 1337(p)(4)

are met. On the contrary, it requires the Secretary to

ensure, e.g., safety, protection of the environment, and

national security for “any activity” on the OCS involving

renewable energy development. If any of the enumerated

“requirements” are not met, the Secretary does not have

the authority to approve the project. And nothing in the

statute provides that the Secretary “retains” discretion

regarding the extent to which the criteria of Section

1337(p)(4) must be met. See Appx. at 121a–122a (text of

Section 1337(p)(4)); but see Appx. at 107a (district court

opinion); 44a–45a (First Circuit affirming district court).

The mistaken view that Federal Respondents

retain discretion under Section 1337(p)(4) stems from

the Federal Respondents’ misreading of the statute.

As indicated supra, the Department of the Interior’s

Principal Deputy Solicitor General issued a memorandum

interpreting OCSLA Section 1337(p)(4). See U.S. Dept. of

21

Interior, M-37067, Secretary’s Duties under Subsection

8(p)(4) of the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act When

Authorizing Activities on the Outer Continental Shelf

(Apr. 9, 2021) (“the M-Opinion”). The M-Opinion rescinded

an earlier administration’s interpretation of Section

1337(p)(4) and found the section “require[s] only that the

Secretary strike a rational balance between Congress’s

enumerated goals. . . . In making this determination, the

Secretary retains wide discretion to weigh those goals

as an application of her technical expertise and policy

judgment.” Id. at 2 (emphasis added). The M-Opinion

weakens the mandatory requirements of the statute into

aspirational goals, and alters the statute’s plain language.

In the district court, the Federal Respondents

advocated for the M-Opinion’s interpretation of Section

1337(p)(4). See, e.g., Pet. First Cir. Op. Br. Appx. at 01296

(Federal Respondents’ counsel referencing M-Opinion);

Federal Respondents’ MSJ at 44–45. Without independent

analysis of Section 1337(p)(4), the district court deferred

to the M-Opinion’s interpretation (albeit without specific

citation) by assuming that “[t]he Secretary still retains

some discretion in considering whether the enumerated

statutory criteria have been satisfied, even when the

statute does not state so expressly.” Appx. at 107a

(emphasis added).

But Congress must speak clearly if it wishes to

delegate authority to agencies. See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep.

Bus. v. DOL, OSHA, 595 U.S. 109, 142 S. Ct. 661, 665

(2022) (per curiam) (because “[a]dministrative agencies

are creatures of statute, [t]hey accordingly possess only

the authority that Congress has provided”); La. Pub. Serv.

Comm’n, 476 U.S. at 374 (1986) (“an agency literally has no

22

power to act . . . unless and until Congress confers power

upon it”). Accordingly, the only discretion permitted is

that which the statutory text of OCSLA allows. There

is no discretion “retained” by the Federal Respondents

under OCSLA that is not found in the statutory language.

The First Circuit skirted this bedrock principle of

separation of powers by refusing to reverse the ruling of

the district court. Moreover, it profoundly misunderstood

the scope of Loper Bright.

During oral argument7, the First Circuit asked the

parties to address Loper Bright. First Circuit Oral

Argument: 23-1853, Seafreeze Shoreside, Inc. v. US Dep’t

of the Interior, U.S. First Cir. Court of A pp. (July 25,

2024), at https://tinyurl.com/mry68r3p. The court stated

the following:

JUDGE GELPI: And I will say, at least I’m

speaking for myself, but it would appear to

me . . . that this is not a case where we’re

not deferring to agency interpretation of a

regulation, this is an agency that’s granting

permits and it’s involved in the permit-making

process, so it would appear that it’s a different

scenario. . . .

Id. at 01:05–01:28. But Loper Bright is not limited to

statutory interpretation in the context of challenges to

agency regulations. It applies with equal force to other

7. The First Circuit does not make transcripts of oral

argument available to parties but publishes them as audio files

on its website.

23

agency actions, including the issuance of permits. In

all such cases, courts must independently interpret the

meaning of the relevant statutes that are at issue.

The First Circuit continued during oral argument:

JUDGE GELPI: Isn’t this permit granting

that’s not like—we’re not deferring to agency

interpretation. We’re reviewing whether, you

know, the permit administratively . . . complies

with our standard of review.

MR. HADZI-ANTICH [Counsel for Petitioners]:

The question is whether the district court

deferred to the agency judgment, and the

answer is yes, and again—

JUDGE GELPI: Won’t that happen in probably

every case we affirm an agency, because it’s an

agency judgment and we’re affirming it?

MR. HADZI-ANTICH: But they deferred to

the agency’s judgment regarding the meaning

of 1337(p)(4). That’s a statutory interpretation

issue that the Supreme Court in Loper Bright

reserved strictly for courts, for the judicial

branch.

Id. at 48:48–49:30.

The First Circuit’s opinion does not discuss, cite, or

even acknowledge Loper Bright. Rather, it simply adopts

the district court’s ruling that the Federal Respondents

retain discretion to decide when their actions meet

24

statutory requirements. See Appx. at 44a–45a. The opinion

states:

The district court held only that the BOEM

must have “discretion” in considering whether

each statutory criterion is satisfied, and that the

BOEM must “balance” the statutory mandate

to develop energy projects on the Outer

Continental Shelf with the twelve statutory

criteria for which it must provide. . . .

Id. But, as set forth in more detail in I.C. infra, nothing

in OCSLA authorizes BOEM to “balance” the statutory

criteria. Nor does OCSLA provide BOEM with any

“discretion” regarding whether the statutory criteria

must be met. Furthermore, OCSLA does not “mandate”

the development of OCS renewable energy projects but

merely authorizes such projects if BOEM ensures that

the statutory criteria are met. Accordingly, the statutory

criteria serve as limitations on BOEM’s authority to

approve offshore wind projects.

Moreover, the First Circuit’s questioning at oral

argument demonstrates that it mistakenly believed Loper

Bright did not apply to this case because the Petitioners

did not challenge a regulation per se but only challenged

a permit, i.e., the COP approval. Thus, the First Circuit

“presum[ed]” that Section 1337(p)(4) contained “implicit

delegations to agencies,” a presumption that “does not

approximate reality.” Loper Bright, 603 U.S. at 373.

Uncritically adopting an agency construal of a statute

that is contraindicated by the statute’s text elevates the

agencies’ interpretive power over that of the judiciary.

Id. at 400–401.

25

This Court must clarify that Loper Bright applies

to all cases involving agency action, and that it requires

courts to provide the best reading of statutes using the

traditional tools of statutory construction—“the reading

the court would have reached if no agency were involved.”

Id. at 400 (quotation omitted). The First Circuit’s opinion

directly conflicts with Loper Bright’s instructions to lower

courts, which provides ample reason for this Court to

grant certiorari. See Lambert, 520 U.S. at 293.

C.

The decision below is wrong

For at least two additional reasons, the First Circuit’s

decision regarding OCSLA is wrong.

First, the First Circuit ignored the massive amount

of data in the record showing that the Project will cause

substantial negative impacts on safety and the environment,

thereby failing to meet OCSLA’s requirement to “ensure”

safety and environmental protection. In their First Circuit

brief, Petitioners cited to record evidence from the final

EIS and other agency documents demonstrating that:

• Pile driving, other construction activity, and

the operations of the constructed Project

will harm the ocean environment, displace

marine species, and adversely impact public

safety;

• The Project’s turbines are untested in

w ind speeds exceeding 112 mph and

turbine failure will cause environmental

devastation;

26

• The Project will increase vessel collision

risk and interfere with marine navigation,

with major overall cumulative impacts

expected; and

• The Project’s turbines will interfere with

military radar.

See Pet. First Cir. Op. Br. at 65–66. Declarations from

commercial fishermen affirmed these risks. Id. at 69–71.

As indicated supra, events unfortunately proved

Petitioners right. Shortly before oral argument, a turbine

blade at the Project broke off and fell into the ocean,

scattering fiberglass in all directions at the surface and

subsurface. Project Developer failed to contain this debris,

which washed up on the shores of nearby communities

including Nantucket Island, requiring beach closures and

a massive cleanup effort. The impact of the microplastics

and harmful industrial materials that polluted the ocean

because of a single blade’s failure at the Project is still

not yet fully understood. BSEE later discovered that

up to 66 blades had the same flaw as the one that fell.

See Vineyard Wind Construction and Operations Plan

Addendum at § 1.0.

After this disaster, Petitioners notified the First

Circuit of the blade failure and argued that the Federal

Respondents’ post facto investigation and mitigation were

too little, too late to halt the environmental harm that

even a single blade failure wrought. 8 Unfortunately, the

8. The Federal Respondents did not revoke Project

Developer’s COP and require them to remove their harmful

27

First Circuit turned a blind eye to the risks reported by

the Petitioners and convinced itself that “the mitigation

requirements that the BOEM imposed in response to the

safety and environmental concerns raised” were enough

to satisfy OCSLA. Appx. at 47a. But as the blade failure

incident and the record and declaratory evidence set forth

in the Petitioners’ First Circuit briefing demonstrate, Pet.

First Cir. Op. Br. at 65–66, those mitigation measures are

far too few in number and scope to “ensure” safety and

environmental protection, as required by Section 1337(p)

(4). Accordingly, this Court should grant certiorari to

correct this serious error. See Chicago & N. W. Transp.

Co. v. Kalo Brick & Tile Co., 450 U.S. 311 (1981) (granting

certiorari to correct obviously incorrect legal decision).

Second, as brief ly mentioned in I.B. supra, by

enacting Section 1337(p)(4) Congress specifically limited

BOEM’s general authority to permit renewable energy

development, see 43 U.S.C. § 1332(2), by imposing a set

of nondiscretionary requirements. See Gozlon-Peretz

v. United States, 498 U.S. 395, 407 (1991) (“A specific

provision controls one of more general application.”).

Section 1337(p)(4) cannot be read as a list of aspirational

goals to be balanced against each other. The statute

employs the mandatory term “shall” to make clear that

the requirements of Section 1337(p)(4) must be met

to satisfy the statute. Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders v.

Project when the blade failure occurred. On January 17, 2025,

three days before a new administration entered office, BOEM

approved Project Developer’s COP Addendum without opportunity

for comment and allowed construction to continue, provided that

up to 66 offending blades were removed. See Letter to Ms. Rachel

Pachter, U.S. Dep’t of Interior (Jan. 17, 2025), https://tinyurl.

com/mwnf4x73.

28

Defenders of Wildlife, 551 U.S. 644, 661–62 (2007) (the

term “shall” imposes a mandatory duty). This means that

if the criteria are not met, the activity in question may not

move forward. Far from an “absolutist argument,” Appx.

at 46a, Petitioners’ interpretation gives effect to every jot

and tittle of the statute. Allowing Federal Respondents

an implied, amorphous “retained” discretion to balance

among Section 1337(p)(4)’s criteria renders its mandatory

language meaningless. Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167,

174 (2001) (interpretation that renders a term meaningless

should be avoided); see also Chickasaw Nation v. United

States, 534 U.S. 84, 93 (2001) (holding that “every clause

and word of a statute should, if possible, be given effect”).

And courts “cannot . . . add provisions to a federal statute.”

Alabama v. North Carolina, 560 U.S. 330, 352 (2010); see

also Pet. First Cir. Op. Br. at 60 (citing Alabama). Given

the national importance of this first-of-its-kind case,

the First Circuit’s erroneous interpretation should be

corrected.

II. The First Circuit’s NEPA decision warrants this

Court’s review.

Joining the district court’s unquestioning deference to

the Federal Respondents’ EIS process, the First Circuit

permitted the Federal Respondents to cut corners by

tightly tethering the purpose of the action to Project

Developer’s compliance with private contracts. Pursuing

that purpose, the Federal Respondents impermissibly (1)

ignored reasonable alternatives, (2) segmented the EIS’s

analysis by neglecting environmental impacts from related

projects, and (3) revived a terminated EIS without public

comment. The First Circuit’s approval of such actions

impacts future EISs performed by federal agencies, and

29

constitutes a novel, indefensible interpretation of NEPA.

See National Org. for Women, Inc. v. Scheidler, 510 U.S.

249, 252 (1994) (granting certiorari due to importance of

novel interpretation of statute).

A.

The question presented is of national

importance

The First Circuit’s decision allows third-party

offshore wind developers like Project Developer to

exercise undue control over the wind energy approval

process on the OCS. Though this Court has never directly

spoken on this issue, “agency capture” is “the undesirable

scenario where the regulated industry gains influence

over the regulators, and the regulators end up serving

the interests of the industry, rather than the general

public.” Wood v. GMC, 865 F.2d 395, 418 (1st Cir. 1988).

Congress allowed Americans to sue federal agencies

partially because “regulatory agencies are subject to the

phenomenon known as ‘agency capture.’” Adkins v. VIM

Recycling, Inc., 644 F.3d 483, 499 (7th Cir. 2011).

The Federal Respondents refused to consider certain

alternatives because they would require further surveying

work from Project Developer, “which . . . could impact the

[Project Developer’s] ability to meet the requirements of

its power purchase agreements” and therefore “would not

meet the [Project’s] purpose and need.” Pet. First Cir. Op.

Br. at 50 (quoting DEIS and ROD). Such subservience

to Project Developer’s priorities goes well beyond the

“substantial weight” that the First Circuit found agencies

may give to a project sponsor’s preferences. See Appx. at

37a (relying on Beyond Nuclear v. U.S. Nuclear Regul.

Comm’n, 704 F.3d 12, 19 (1st Cir. 2013)); see also infra at

30

II.D. (explaining why the First Circuit’s ruling is wrong).

The type of agency capture at play here will have farreaching effects over project permitting if allowed to

stand because the First Circuit’s decision sets a precedent

allowing agencies to defer to project sponsors rather

than conducting the robust environmental reviews NEPA

requires.

The Federal Respondents also unilaterally determined

they could restart a previously-terminated NEPA review

process for the Project solely because Project Developer

falsely claimed the process was still a “decision pending

before BOEM.” Pet. First Cir. Op. Br. at 52–55. The

district court found nothing wrong with this decision,

and the First Circuit affirmed and faulted Petitioners for

failing to point to a comment they “were precluded from

submitting to the BOEM.” First Cir. Op. at 42.

Allowing the First Circuit’s NEPA procedural

decisions to stand would sanction a practice by which

agencies may ignore the plain text of NEPA and make

decisions that benefit commercial project sponsors without

considering full environmental impacts. In its supervisory

role over federal courts, this Court should put a halt to this

type of agency behavior before it infects other offshore

wind project approvals. Indeed, if allowed to stand, the

First Circuit’s decision could be viewed as a green light for

any agency to circumvent NEPA’s mandated procedures

in order to further the goals of a project sponsor. Such a

practice would only serve to invite more NEPA challenges.

Rothensies, 329 U.S. 296 (granting certiorari due to

lower court’s decision hindering effective administration

of the laws). “It is rudimentary administrative law that

discretion as to the substance of the ultimate decision does

31

not confer discretion to ignore the required procedures

of decisionmaking.” Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 172

(1997).

B. The decision below conf licts with prior

decisions of this Court

“An agency literally has no power to act . . . unless

and until Congress confers power upon it.” La. Pub.

Serv. Comm’n, 476 U.S. at 374. Administrative agencies’

“power to act and how they are to act are authoritatively

prescribed by Congress, so that when they act improperly,

no less when they act beyond their jurisdiction, what they

do is ultra vires.” City of Arlington v. FCC, 569 U.S. 290,

297 (2013). And an agency’s authority to regulate in the

public interest is limited to that authority which is spelled

out in the grant of power. Congress does not broadly confer

authority “through an implicit delegation.” West Virginia

v. EPA, 597 U.S. 697, 722 (2022) (quoting Gonzales v.

Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 267 (2006)); see also FDA v. Brown

& Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 161 (2000)

(holding such regulatory power “must always be grounded

in a valid grant of authority from Congress”).

NEPA “require[s] that agencies take a hard look at the

environmental effects of their planned action. . . .” Marsh v.

Or. Nat. Res. Council, 490 U.S. 360, 374 (1989). This “hard

look” is accomplished through an EIS. At “the heart”

of the EIS is the determination of alternatives to the

project, which an agency must “[r]igorously explore and

objectively evaluate.” 40 C.F.R. § 1502.14(a); Appx. at 138a.

The First Circuit found that the following two procedures

conducted by BOEM satisfied this requirement. Neither of

these procedures were rigorous or objective, as required

32

by NEPA. As such, the First Circuit’s decision that the

Federal Respondents had authority not found within

NEPA’s plain text runs afoul of La. Pub. Serv. Comm’n

and warrants certiorari. See Doe, 465 U.S. at 610.

i.

The Federal Respondents impermissibly

pre-determined “reasonable alternatives”

The First Circuit authorized the Federal Respondents’

decision to eliminate several alternatives from full

consideration in the EIS because those alternatives could

lead Project Developer to violate its prematurely-signed

PPAs. See infra at II.C.; Appx. at 36a–37a. The First

Circuit found the Federal Respondents’ consideration of

alternatives under NEPA should be “bounded by some

notion of [technical and economic] feasibility.” Id. at 37a

(quoting Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. NRDC,

435 U.S. 519, 551 (1978)). But alternatives that do not

satisfy a project sponsor’s contractual commitments are

not necessarily technically or economically infeasible.

Pointing to those contractual commitments to limit

decisionmaking constitutes reliance “on factors which

Congress has not intended [the agency] to consider,” and is

therefore arbitrary and capricious under the APA. Motor

Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463

U.S. 29, 43 (1983).

Congress has not conferred power on agencies to

ignore otherwise reasonable alternatives during EIS

review solely because those alternatives may not fully

permit a project developer to meet its pre-EIS contractual

obligations. By holding that Federal Respondents

could ignore reasonable alternatives that would not

assist Project Developer in meeting its contracts, the

33

First Circuit allowed ultra vires action. Appx. at 37a.

Accordingly, the First Circuit’s decision runs counter to

this Court’s holding in La. Pub. Serv. Comm’n.

ii.

The Federal Respondents impermissibly

revived the EIS without public comment.

The Federal Respondents decided they could restart

a previously-terminated NEPA review process for the

Project without providing opportunity for public comment,

and the First Circuit assumed the Federal Respondents

had such authority under NEPA.

But NEPA does not authorize federal agencies to

revive a terminated EIS without any opportunity for

public comment. See, e.g., WildWest Inst. v. Bull, 547 F.3d

1162, 1169 (9th Cir. 2008) (stating that “NEPA dictates

that federal agencies shall to the fullest extent possible

encourage and facilitate public involvement in decisions

which affect the quality of the human environment”)

(cleaned up) (emphasis added). At the very least, the

Federal Respondents should have provided an opportunity

for comment before resuscitating the terminated COP.

Accordingly, the Federal Respondents “literally ha[d]

no power to act” in the manner they did. La. Pub. Serv.

Comm’n, 476 U.S. at 374.

By foregoing public comment, the Federal Respondents

unilaterally and impermissibly revived the terminated

Project. That decision resulted in the Project’s approval.

This is the “taint from the . . . procedural error [that]

had a causal effect on the BOEM’s ultimate approval of

the COP.” Appx. at 38a (First Circuit contrafactually

ruling that no such taint exists). Petitioners do not need

34

to demonstrate they would have submitted a comment

to BOEM had the comment period been reopened. See

Mock v. Garland, 75 F.4th 563, 586 (5th Cir. 2023) (finding

prejudicial error where “plaintiffs were not on notice, nor

could they comment on the expanded rule”). Courts must

“hold unlawful and set aside agency action . . . found to be

. . . without observance of procedure required by law[,]”

including the procedural requirement of public comment.

5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(D); Appx. at 115a; cf. Bennett, 520 U.S.

at 172. Because it approved ultra vires agency action, the

First Circuit’s decision conflicts with this Court’s holding

in La. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, meriting certiorari. See Doe,

465 U.S. at 610.

C.

The decision below creates a conflict among

the courts of appeal

The First Circuit’s decision held that Project

Sponsor’s compliance with regulations promulgated by

the CEQ was enough to satisfy NEPA. It did so despite

a prior ruling by the D.C. Circuit that those regulations

were ultra vires because CEQ has no rulemaking

authority granted by Congress. See Marin Audubon

Soc’y, 121 F.4th at 908. “If any [agency] regulations go

beyond what Congress can authorize or beyond what it

has authorized, those regulations are void and may be

disregarded. . . .” Utah Power & Light Co. v. United

States, 243 U.S. 389, 410 (1917); see also 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)

(instructing courts to “hold unlawful and set aside” such

regulations). This serious NEPA conflict between circuit

courts itself warrants certiorari. See, e.g., Thompson v.

Keohane, 516 U.S. 99, 106 (1995) (granting certiorari to

resolve disagreement between circuit courts “[b]ecause

uniformity among federal courts is important on questions

of this order”).

35

D.

The decision below is wrong

The First Circuit’s merits ruling on the NEPA claims

was wrong for two additional reasons.

First, because the First Circuit found that the district

court erred when it ruled Petitioners lacked standing to

bring their NEPA claims, Appx. at 35a, it should have

remanded the case to the district court to determine the

extent to which Petitioners’ NEPA procedural arguments

were meritorious. See Bennett, 520 U.S. at 172. Because

the district court held Petitioners lacked standing, it

devoted no appreciable effort to determining whether

Petitioners’ NEPA arguments had merit. Therefore, the

district court’s record on those arguments was insufficient

for the First Circuit to properly rule on the NEPA issues

raised by the Petitioners. Nevertheless, the First Circuit

ruled on the NEPA merits. Appx. at 35a–40a. This Court

should exercise its supervisory role to correct that serious

error made in the context of a challenge to the first of likely

many challenges to COP approvals for renewable energy

projects on the OCS. See Bruner v. United States, 343 U.S.

112 (1952) (granting certiorari because of supervisory role

over lower courts).

Second, after confirming the adverse effects the

Project would have on the environment in the supplement to

the DEIS, the Federal Respondents conveniently excluded

that analysis from the final EIS and undercounted planned

offshore wind development. See Pet. First Cir. Op. Br. at

55–56. In so doing, they failed to account for the Project’s

“incremental impact . . . when added to . . . reasonably

foreseeable future actions.” 40 C.F.R. § 1508.7; Appx. at

139a. And in failing to consider the impact of the federal

36

government’s offshore wind program as a whole, the

Federal Respondents improperly segmented their NEPA

analysis. See Del. Riverkeeper Network v. FERC, 753

F.3d 1304, 1313 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (faulting federal agency

for “divid[ing] connected, cumulative, or similar federal

actions into separate projects” and thus violating NEPA).

The First Circuit held Petitioners did not develop this

argument and “therefore have not put the correctness

of the district court’s ruling into issue.” First Cir. Op.

at 43. But the district court ruled Petitioners could not

bring this argument due to a perceived lack of standing.

Again, given that the First Circuit found the Petitioners

had standing to bring their NEPA claims, it should have

remanded the cumulative impacts issue to the district

court for a merits ruling.

37

CONCLUSION

The petition for a writ of certiorari should be granted.

Respectfully submitted,

Robert Henneke

Chance Weldon

Theodore Hadzi-A ntich*

*Counsel of Record

Connor Mighell

Texas Public Policy Foundation

901 Congress Avenue

Austin, TX 78701

(512) 472-2700

tha@texaspolicy.com

Counsel for Petitioners

Date: March 4, 2025

APPENDIX

i

TABLE OF APPENDICES

Page

A P P E N DI X A — O P I N ION O F T H E

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR T H E F I R S T CI RCU I T, F I L ED

DECEMBER 5, 2024 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1a

A PPENDI X B — J U DGMENT OF THE

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT, ENTERED

DECEMBER 5, 2024 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .48a

APPENDIX C — MEMORANDUM & ORDER

OF THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT

COURT, DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS,

FILED OCTOBER 12, 2023 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51a

A PPENDI X D — J U DGMENT OF THE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT,

DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS, FILED

OCTOBER 12, 2023 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112a

APPENDIX E — RELEVANT STATUTES AND

REGULATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114a

1a

Appendix

A

APPENDIX A — OPINION

OF THE

UNITED STATES

COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT,

FILED DECEMBER 5, 2024

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT

No. 23-1853

No. 23-2051

SEAFREEZE SHORESIDE, INC.; LONG

ISLAND COMMERCIAL FISHING ASSOC., INC.;

XIII NORTHEAST FISHERY SECTOR, INC.;

HERITAGE FISHERIES, INC.; NAT. W., INC.;

OLD SQUAW FISHERIES, INC.,

Plaintiffs, Appellants,

v.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE

INTERIOR; HONORABLE DEBRA HAALAND,

IN HER OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS SECRETARY

OF THE DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR;

BUREAU OF OCEAN ENERGY MANAGEMENT;

LIZ KLEIN, IN HER OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS

THE DIRECTOR OF THE BUREAU OF OCEAN

ENERGY MANAGEMENT; LAURA DANIELDAVID, IN HER OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS

PRINCIPAL DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY,

LAND AND MINERALS MANAGEMENT;

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE;

HONORABLE GINA M. RAIMONDO, IN HER

OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS THE SECRETARY

OF THE DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE;

NATIONAL OCEANIC AND ATMOSPHERIC

ADMINISTRATION, NATIONAL MARINE

2a

Appendix A

FISHERIES SERVICE; CATHERINE MARZIN,

IN HER OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS THE DEPUTY

DIRECTOR OF THE NATIONAL OCEANIC

AND ATMOSPHERIC ADMINISTRATION;

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE;

HONORABLE LLOYD J. AUSTIN, III, IN HIS

OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS THE SECRETARY OF

THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE; UNITED

STATES ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS; LT.

GEN. SCOTT A. SPELLMON, IN HIS OFFICIAL

CAPACITY AS THE COMMANDER AND CHIEF

OF ENGINEERS OF THE U.S. ARMY CORPS OF

ENGINEERS; COLONEL JOHN A. ATILANO, II,

IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS THE DISTRICT

ENGINEER OF THE NEW ENGLAND DISTRICT

OF THE U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS;

VINEYARD WIND 1, LLC,

Defendants, Appellees,

RESPONSIBLE OFFSHORE DEVELOPMENT

ALLIANCE, A D.C. NONPROFIT CORPORATION,

Plaintiff, Appellant,

v.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE

INTERIOR; DEBRA HAALAND, IN HER

OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS THE SECRETARY OF

THE INTERIOR; BUREAU OF OCEAN ENERGY

MANAGEMENT; LIZ KLEIN, IN HER OFFICIAL

CAPACITY AS THE DIRECTOR OF THE BUREAU

OF OCEAN ENERGY MANAGEMENT; NATIONAL

3a

Appendix A

MARINE FISHERIES SERVICE; RICHARD W.

SPINRAD, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS THE

ADMINISTRATOR OF THE NATIONAL OCEANIC

AND ATMOSPHERIC ADMINISTRATION;

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY;

CHRISTINE WORMUTH, IN HER OFFICIAL

CAPACITY AS SECRETARY OF THE ARMY;

UNITED STATES ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS;

JAMIE A. PINKHAM, IN HIS OFFICIAL

CAPACITY AS THE ACTING ASSISTANT

SECRETARY OF THE ARMY FOR CIVIL WORKS;

VINEYARD WIND 1, LLC,

Defendants, Appellees.

APPEALS FROM THE UNITED STATES

DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT

OF MASSACHUSETTS

[Hon. Indira Talwani, U.S. District Judge]

Before Gelpí, Montecalvo, and Aframe

Circuit Judges.

December 5, 2024

AFRAME, Circuit Judge. These appeals challenge

the federal government’s process for approving a plan to

construct and operate a large-scale commercial offshore

wind energy facility.1 The facility, which began delivering

power to the New England grid in early 2024, is located

on the Outer Continental Shelf, some fourteen miles south

1. The appeals were briefed and argued separately, but we

address them together in this opinion.

4a

Appendix A

of Martha’s Vineyard and Nantucket. The plaintiffs are

entities involved in or associated with the commercial

fishing industry. The defendants are federal departments,

agencies, and officials responsible for the plan approval

process, as well as the business entity that successfully

submitted the proposed plan and is constructing and

operating the facility. The plaintiffs sued to obtain

declaratory and injunctive relief, asserting thirty-nine

claims under the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”),

5 U.S.C. §§ 701-706, and several environmental statutes,

described below. The district court entered summary

judgment for the defendants on all claims. The plaintiffs

appeal, arguing that the district court erred in multiple

respects. We affirm.

I.

A. The Parties

The plaintiffs in case no. 23-1853 are Seafreeze

Shoreside, Inc., a Rhode Island seafood dealer; the Long

Island Commercial Fishing Association, Inc., a trade

group representing New York’s commercial fishing

industry (“LICFA”); XIII Northeast Fishery Sector, Inc.,

a private organization of commercial fishermen located in

the Northeast; and three commercial fishing companies:

Heritage Fisheries, Inc.; Nat. W., Inc.; and Old Squaw

Fisheries, Inc. We refer to these entities collectively as

the “Seafreeze plaintiffs” and to case no. 23-1853 as the

“Seafreeze appeal.”

The defendants in the Seafreeze appeal are the

Department of the Interior; the Honorable Debra Haaland,

5a

Appendix A

in her official capacity as Secretary of the Interior; the

Bureau of Ocean Energy Management (“BOEM”); Liz

Klein, in her official capacity as the BOEM’s Director;

Laura Daniel-David, in her official capacity as the Interior

Department’s Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of

Land and Minerals Management; the Department of

Commerce; the Honorable Gina M. Raimondo, in her

official capacity as Secretary of Commerce; the National

Oceanic and Atmospheric Association (“NOAA”); the

National Marine Fisheries Service (“NMFS”); Catherine

Marzin, in her official capacity as Deputy Director of

the NOAA; the Department of Defense; the Honorable

Lloyd J. Austin III, in his official capacity as Secretary

of Defense; the Army Corps of Engineers (“the Corps”);

Lt. Gen. Scott A. Spellmon, in his official capacity as the

Corps’ Commander and Chief of Engineers; Col. John A.

Atilano, II, in his official capacity as the Corps’ District

Engineer of the New England District; and Vineyard

Wind 1, LLC, which submitted the approved plan and is

constructing and operating the facility. Vineyard Wind

1 was not initially sued but successfully intervened as a

defendant. We use “Vineyard Wind” to refer both to the

project and its developer.

The plaintiff in case no. 23-2051 is Responsible

Offshore Development Alliance (“Alliance”), a D.C.

nonprofit whose membership includes fishing associations,

seafood dealers, seafood processors, fishing vessels, and

affiliated businesses. We refer to case no. 23-2051 as the

“Alliance appeal.”

The defendants in the Alliance appeal are the Interior

Department; Secretary Haaland in her official capacity;

6a

Appendix A

the BOEM; Director Klein in her official capacity;2 the

NMFS; Richard W. Spinrad, in his official capacity as

the NOAA’s Administrator; the Department of the Army;

Christine Wormuth, in her official capacity as Secretary

of the Army; the Corps; Jamie A. Pinkham, in his official

capacity as Acting Assistant Secretary of the Army for

Civil Works; and Vineyard Wind.

B. Statutory Background

1.

The Seafreeze Appeal

The Seafreeze appeal involves claims pursuant to,

inter alia, the APA and the following environmental

statutes:

a.

The Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act

The Outer Continental Shelf consists of all submerged

lands beyond those reserved to the States and up to the

edge of the United States’ jurisdiction and control. 43

U.S.C. § 1331(a)(1). The Outer Continental Shelf Lands

Act (“OCSLA”) regulates the federal government’s

leasing of mineral and energy resources on these lands.

See id. §§ 1331-1356c. The OCSLA establishes the Outer

Continental Shelf as a “vital national resource reserve”

that “should be made available for expeditious and orderly

development, subject to environmental safeguards, in

a manner which is consistent with the maintenance of

competition and other national needs.” Id. § 1332(3).

2. The case caption lists Amanda Lefton as the BOEM’s

Director. Director Klein replaced Director Lefton in 2023.

7a

Appendix A

To further these goals, the OCSLA authorizes the

Department of the Interior, in consultation with other

federal agencies and acting through the BOEM, to grant

leases on the Outer Continental Shelf for the purpose of,

inter alia, renewable wind energy production. Id. § 1337

(p)(1)(C); 30 C.F.R. § 585.100. When granting such leases,

the BOEM must “ensure that any activity under [the

OCSLA] is carried out in a manner that provides for”

twelve criteria including, insofar as is relevant, safety;

protection of the environment; conservation of natural

resources of the Outer Continental Shelf; prevention of

interference with reasonable uses of the Outer Continental

Shelf (as determined by the Interior Secretary); and

consideration of any other use of the sea or seabed,

including use for fishing and navigation. 43 U.S.C.

§ 1337(p)(4); 30 C.F.R. § 585.102(a).

The BOEM’s issuance of a lease does not itself authorize

development of the site. See 30 C.F.R. § 585.200(a). To

proceed to development, a lessee must formulate a site

assessment plan, obtain the BOEM’s approval of that plan,

and then obtain the BOEM’s approval of a construction

and operations plan (“COP”). See generally id. §§ 585.600,

585.605-607, 585.610-614, 585.620-622, and 585.626-628.

No construction may begin until the BOEM approves the

COP. Id. § 585.620(c).

The OCSLA contains a citizen-suit provision. 43

U.S.C. § 1349(a)(1).

8a

Appendix A

b.

The National Environmental Policy Act

T he BOEM mu st comply w it h t he Nat iona l

Environmental Policy Act (“NEPA”) when approving

a COP. 30 C.F.R. § 585.628. The NEPA is a procedural

statute that requires federal agencies to take a “hard

look” at the environmental impacts of and alternatives

to a proposed action. Beyond Nuclear v. U.S. Nuclear

Regul. Comm’n, 704 F.3d 12, 19 (1st Cir. 2013). Generally,

the vehicle for the required analysis is an environmental

impact statement (“EIS”). See 42 U.S.C. § 4332(C). The

EIS must analyze, inter alia, the “‘reasonably foreseeable

environmental effects’ of the proposed action, the

‘reasonable range of technically and economically feasible

alternatives’ to the proposed action, and reasonable

measures to mitigate the environmental effects of

the proposed action.” Nantucket Residents Against

Turbines v. U.S. Bureau of Ocean Energy Mgmt., 100

F.4th 1, 9 (1st Cir. 2024) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 4332(C)).

The NEPA “‘does not mandate particular results, but

simply prescribes the necessary process’ for evaluating

an agency action’s environmental effects.” Id. (quoting

Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S.

332, 350, 109 S. Ct. 1835, 104 L. Ed. 2d 351 (1989)). This

process is designed to prevent uninformed agency action

and to provide information about environmental impact

to the public and other government agencies so that they

have an opportunity to respond. See Town of Winthrop v.

FAA, 535 F.3d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 2008).

The NEPA does not contain a citizen-suit provision

and is enforced through the judicial review provisions of

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Appendix A

the APA. See Scarborough Citizens Protecting Res. v.

U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 674 F.3d 97, 102 (1st Cir. 2012).

c.

The Endangered Species Act

The BOEM also must comply with the Endangered

Species Act (“ESA”) when approving a COP. Section 7 of

the ESA requires agencies to ensure that their actions

are “not likely to jeopardize the continued existence of

any endangered species or threatened species or result

in the destruction or adverse modification of habitat of

such species . . . .” 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2). To this end,

a lead agency (here, the BOEM) must consult with the

NMFS whenever an agency action “may affect” a listed

marine species or critical habitat. 50 C.F.R. § 402.14(a);

see also Nantucket Residents, 100 F.4th at 8. When such a

consultation is required, the NMFS must issue a “biological

opinion” stating whether the contemplated agency action

is “likely to jeopardize the continued existence” of any

listed species or “result in the destruction or adverse

modification of critical habitat.” 50 C.F.R. § 402.14(g)(4), (h).

If so, the NMFS also must determine whether “reasonable

and prudent alternatives” are available. Id. § 402.14(g)(5).

The opinion must be based on the “best scientific and

commercial data available.” Id. § 402.14(g)(8); see also 16

U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2).

A lead agency must request reinitiation of consultation

following the NMFS’s issuance of a biological opinion if

the agency has retained discretionary involvement in or

control over the contemplated action, and certain other

conditions, including new information becoming available,

are satisfied. See 50 C.F.R. § 402.16(a).

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Appendix A

Generally, Section 9 of the ESA prohibits the “take”

of an endangered species within the United States or

the territorial seas of the United States. See Nantucket

Residents, 100 F.4th at 8; 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a)(1)(B). A

“take” includes the harassment of or harm to the species.

Id. § 1532(19). A section 9 prohibition also can be applied

to “threatened” (as opposed to endangered) species. See

16 U.S.C. § 1533(d).

One form of take is an “incidental take.” During

consultation, the NMFS may conclude that proposed

agency action is not likely to jeopardize an endangered

or threatened species but is reasonably certain to

incidentally affect the species. In such a situation, the

NMFS issues an “incidental take statement” along with

its biological statement. See id. § 1536(b)(4); 50 C.F.R

§ 402.14(i). An incidental take statement details the extent

of the anticipated take, reasonable and prudent measures

to minimize and monitor it, and the terms and conditions

under which such measures will be implemented. See 16

U.S.C. § 1536(b)(4); 50 C.F.R. § 402.14(i). A take authorized

in compliance with the incidental take statement is exempt

from the ESA’s take prohibition. See 16 U.S.C. § 1536(o).

The ESA contains a citizen-suit provision. 16 U.S.C.

§ 1540(g).

2.

The Alliance Appeal

The Alliance appeal involves claims pursuant to, inter

alia, the APA, the OCSLA, the NEPA, the ESA, and two

additional environmental statutes.

11a

Appendix A

a.

The Marine Mammal Protection Act

Congress enacted the Marine Mammal Protection

Act (“MMPA”) to prevent marine mammals from

“diminish[ing] beyond the point at which they cease to be

a significant functioning element in the ecosystem of which

they are a part . . . .” 16 U.S.C. § 1361(2). While the MMPA

generally prohibits the take (including the harassment)

of marine mammals, id. §§ 1372(a), 1371(a) 1362(13); 50

C.F.R. § 216.3, it permits the NMFS to authorize, for a

period not exceeding one year, the incidental “taking . . . of

small numbers of marine mammals” if it concludes that

“such taking . . . will have a negligible impact on such

species,” 16 U.S.C. § 1371(a)(5)(D)(i)(I).

Under the MMPA, there are two types of harassment:

Level A and Level B. Relevant here is Level B harassment,

which is “‘any act of pursuit, torment, or annoyance’ that

has the ‘potential to disturb a marine mammal or marine

mammal stock in the wild by causing disruption of behavior

patterns.’” Nantucket Residents, 100 F.4th at 9 (quoting 16

U.S.C. § 1362(18)(A)(ii), (18)(D)). The required contents of

an incidental harassment authorization (“IHA”), and the

process for obtaining such an authorization, are described

in 16 U.S.C. § 1371(a)(5)(D)(ii)(I), (II), (III), and 50 C.F.R.

§ 216.104, respectively.

The MMPA does not contain a citizen-suit provision

and is enforced through the judicial review provisions of

the APA. See Cetacean Cmty. v. Bush, 386 F.3d 1169, 1178

(9th Cir. 2004).

12a

Appendix A

b.

The Clean Water Act and the Rivers and

Harbors Act

Congress enacted the Clean Water Act (“CWA”) “to

restore and maintain the chemical, physical, and biological

integrity of the Nation’s waters.” 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a).

The CWA prohibits the “discharge of any pollutant”

into “navigable waters,” including the “territorial seas,”

unless done in compliance with the Act. Id. §§ 1311(a),

1344(a), 1362(7); 33 C.F.R. §§ 328.2, 328.3(a)(1), 328.4(a).

The territorial seas generally include waters extending

seaward three nautical miles from the coast but may also

include other waters in contact with the open sea such as

waters within three nautical miles from islands. See 33

U.S.C. § 1362(8); 33 C.F.R. §§ 328.4(a), 329.12(a).

Section 404 of the CWA authorizes the Secretary of

the Army, acting through the Corps, to issue permits for

discharges of dredged or fill material into waters of the

United States. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1344, 1362(6)-(7). Permits

must be issued in compliance with both the Corps’

permitting regulations, 33 C.F.R. pt. 320, and regulations

jointly developed by the U.S. Environmental Protection

Agency (“EPA”) and the Corps, known as the “Section

404(b)(1) Guidelines,” 40 C.F.R. pt. 230.

The Corps’ regulations require that a permitting

decision be based on “an evaluation of the probable impacts,

including cumulative impacts, of the proposed activity

and its intended use on the public interest.” 33 C.F.R.

§ 320.4(a)(1). Similarly, the Section 404(b)(1) Guidelines

require the Corps to determine the potential impacts,

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Appendix A

including cumulative impacts, of proposed discharges.

40 C.F.R. § 230.11. The Section 404(b)(1) Guidelines also

state that the Corps should not issue a permit “if there is

a practicable alternative to the proposed discharge which

would have less adverse impact on the aquatic ecosystem,

so long as the alternative does not have other significant

adverse environmental consequences.” Id. § 230.10(a). The

purpose of the analysis required by the Section 404(b)(1)

Guidelines is to ensure that proposed discharges will

not have a significant adverse effect on human health or

welfare, aquatic life, aquatic ecosystems, or recreational,

aesthetic, or economic values. See id. § 230.10(c)(1).

The Corps also may issue permits to authorize the

installation of structures in navigable U.S. waters more

than three nautical miles from the coast. But it must do

so pursuant to Section 10 of the Rivers and Harbors Act

(“RHA”), see 33 U.S.C. § 403; 33 C.F.R. §§ 320.2(b) &

322.3(a)-(b), and not the CWA.

The CWA contains a citizen-suit provision. 33 U.S.C.

§ 1365(a). The RHA does not contain a citizen-suit

provision and is enforced through the judicial review

provisions of the APA. See Huron Mountain Club v. U.S.

Army Corps of Eng’rs, 545 F. App’x 390, 393 & n.2 (6th

Cir. 2013).

C. Factual and Procedural Background

We recently decided two appeals involving challenges

to the Vineyard Wind project brought by different

plaintiffs. See Melone v. Coit, 100 F.4th 21 (1st Cir. 2024);

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Appendix A

Nantucket Residents, 100 F.4th at 1. We draw from

our opinions in those cases to set forth the factual and

procedural background of the Vineyard Wind project.

We then provide additional relevant facts as necessary.

In 2009, the BOEM began evaluating the possibility of

wind energy development on the Outer Continental Shelf

off the coast of Massachusetts, pursuant to its authority

under the OCSLA. Melone, 100 F.4th at 26. After several

years of review, in 2014, the BOEM made “a small portion

of the Massachusetts Wind Energy Area -- a section of the

Outer Continental Shelf -- available for lease.” Nantucket

Residents, 100 F.4th at 10 (citing 79 Fed. Reg. 34771 (June

18, 2014)). In 2015, the BOEM leased a 166,886-acre (or

675-square-kilometer) portion of the area to Vineyard

Wind. Melone, 100 F.4th at 26.

In December 2017, Vineyard Wind submitted to the

BOEM a COP that proposed building an offshore wind

project in an approximately 76,000-acre zone of the

lease area. Id. The COP contemplated the construction

of turbines and additional wind energy infrastructure

capable of generating approximately 800 megawatts of

clean wind energy, enough to power approximately 400,000

homes. Melone, 100 F.4th at 26; Nantucket Residents, 100

F.3d at 10. In response to Vineyard Wind’s submission,

several federal agencies initiated an environmental review

process.

In March 2018, the BOEM published a notice of intent

to prepare an EIS responsive to the Vineyard Wind

proposal. 83 Fed. Reg. 13777 (Mar. 30, 2018). Following

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Appendix A

this notice, the BOEM held five public “scoping” meetings

in the vicinity of the proposed project to identify issues

and potential alternatives to the COP for consideration in

the EIS. In November 2018, Vineyard Wind applied for

permits under CWA Section 404 and the RHA to construct

an offshore cable transmission system that would connect

the turbines to a landfall site at Covell’s Beach in Hyannis,

Massachusetts. In December 2018, the BOEM issued a

draft EIS, 83 Fed. Reg. 63184-02 (Dec. 7, 2018), which it

supplemented in June 2020.

Meanwhile, on December 6, 2018, the BOEM

requested consultation with the NMFS out of concern

about the impact the COP might have on the endangered

right whale. Consultation commenced in May 2019.

On September 11, 2020, the NMFS issued a biological

opinion concluding that the Vineyard Wind project would

likely not jeopardize the continued existence of the right

whale. The opinion also contained reasonable and prudent

mitigation measures deemed necessary to reduce the

project’s potential effects on the right whale. See generally

Nantucket Residents, 100 F.4th at 10. On May 21, 2021,

the NMFS issued to Vineyard Wind an IHA allowing the

non-lethal, “incidental Level B harassment of no more than

twenty” right whales. Melone, 100 F.4th at 26.

On May 7, 2021, the BOEM requested that the NMFS

reinitiate consultation in response to two developments.

First, the BOEM had concluded that the September 11,

2020, biological opinion did not fully assess the potential

impacts on the right whale of fish monitoring surveys to

be conducted by Vineyard Wind if its COP were approved.

16a

Appendix A

Second, more up-to-date information regarding the right

whale population had become available since completion of

the September 11, 2020, biological opinion. In requesting

reinitiation of consultation, the BOEM documented its

understanding that the September 11, 2020, biological

opinion “will remain valid and effective until consultation

is completed.” The BOEM also represented that, if

the COP were to be approved, “it would not allow the

commencement of the aforementioned [fish monitoring]

surveys until [the reinitiated consultation] is concluded.” 3

3. In a contemporaneously issued file memorandum, the BOEM

explained that, while it had requested reinitiation of consultation on

the fishery monitoring plan, approval of the project would “neither

jeopardize the continued existence of ESA-listed species nor destroy

or adversely modify designated critical habitat.” Supp. App. at 1683,

Seafreeze Appeal. The memorandum emphasized that reinitiation

of consultation to consider fishery monitoring plans as part of the

proposed action would “not provide any new information concerning

potential effects on threatened and endangered species from

construction, operation, and decommissioning of the project and,

therefore, [would] not change the determinations of the [September

11, 2020, biological opinion] for the rest of the project already

considered in the Opinion.” Id. at 1684; see also id. at 1683 (“The

authorization of Vineyard Wind I and the fishery monitoring plan

are not interdependent. Although approval of the fishery monitoring

plan . . . would not occur but for the project, the authorization of [the

project] is not dependent upon approval of the fishery monitoring

plan.”). The memorandum also stated that, if the BOEM were to

approve the COP, “commencement of any monitoring activities

would be conditioned on the conclusion of this reinitiation and

compliance with any NMFS survey mitigation measures that may

be identified and included in the revised Incidental Take Statement

and implementing Terms and Conditions in the revised Opinion.”

Id. at 1684.

17a

Appendix A

The NMFS agreed to reinitiate consultation and, on

October 18, 2021, issued an updated biological opinion. The

updated opinion again concluded that the project would

likely not jeopardize the right whale’s continued existence.

Both the 2020 and 2021 biological opinions also included

incidental take statements which concluded that, after

mitigation measures were implemented, the maximum

anticipated take from project construction was Level B

harassment of twenty right whales caused by construction

noise.

Between the issuance of the September 11, 2020,

and October 18, 2021, biological opinions, several other

relevant events took place. On December 1, 2020, Vineyard

Wind notified the BOEM that it was withdrawing its

proposed COP from review in order to conduct a technical

and logistical analysis of the wind turbine generator it

had decided to use in the final project design. See 86 Fed.

Reg. 12494 (Mar. 3, 2021). This analysis sought to “review

updated project parameters to confirm that [they] fell

within the project design envelope” that the BOEM had

used in conducting its earlier review. Id. The notice stated

that Vineyard Wind intended to rescind its withdrawal of

the COP upon completion of its analysis. Less than two

months later, on January 22, 2021, Vineyard Wind notified

the BOEM that it had completed its analysis and concluded

that it did not need to modify the COP. Vineyard Wind

also requested that the BOEM resume its review of the

COP, and the BOEM did so, see 86 Fed. Reg. at 12494-95.

The BOEM issued a final EIS (“FEIS”) on March

12, 2021. 86 Fed. Reg. 14153 (Mar. 12, 2021). The FEIS

18a

Appendix A

considered five action alternatives (one of which had two

sub-alternatives) to the project proposed by Vineyard

Wind in the COP. It also considered a no-action alternative.

The FEIS identified the COP, with modifications drawn

from several of the alternatives that the BOEM had

considered, as the preferred alternative. The FEIS also

included a lengthy assessment of potential impacts from

the project on the natural and human environment.

It acknowledged that the project would likely have a

negative economic impact on commercial fishing. But it

suggested that potential revenue losses could be offset

by compensatory funds that Vineyard Wind had agreed

to set aside. It also proposed mitigation measures that

would reduce negative impacts.

On May 10, 2021, the BOEM, the Corps, and the

NMFS issued a joint record of decision (“ROD”). The

ROD memorialized the BOEM’s selection of the preferred

alternative in the FEIS, the Corps’ decision to issue the

necessary CWA/RHA permits, and the NMFS’s decision

to issue the IHA. The ROD stated that the preferred

alternative would allow eighty-four or fewer wind turbines

to be installed in 100 of the 106 locations proposed in the

COP. It also required that the turbines be placed in an

east-west orientation with each turbine separated by one

nautical mile.

The BOEM’s approval of the COP was subject to

several non-discretionary mitigation, monitoring, and

reporting measures. The BOEM attached to the ROD a

memorandum explaining why the preferred alternative

satisfied the requirements of the OCSLA and other

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Appendix A

applicable regulatory authority. On July 15, 2021, the

BOEM issued its final approval of the COP. The approval

was subject to more than 100 pages of terms and conditions,

including compliance with any substantive amendments to

the September 11, 2020, biological opinion that might arise

from the ongoing reinitiated consultation. On January

20, 2022, after receiving the October 18, 2021, biological

opinion from the NMFS, the BOEM confirmed its final

approval of the COP subject to the terms and conditions,

and prescribed reasonable and prudent measures, set

forth in the updated opinion.

The Seafreeze plaintiffs and the Alliance filed the

lawsuits underlying these appeals on December 15, 2021,

and January 31, 2022, respectively. As explained, the

Seafreeze plaintiffs sued under the APA, the ESA, the

NEPA, and the OCSLA. The Alliance sued under the

APA, the NEPA, the MMPA, the ESA, the OCSLA, and

the CWA/RHA. In both cases, the parties cross-moved for

summary judgment, and the district court, in a thoughtful

order, granted the defendants’ motions and denied the

plaintiffs’ motions.

The district court concluded, inter alia, that (1) the

plaintiffs’ ESA claims were non-justiciable under Article

III of the Constitution, (2) the plaintiffs were outside

of the zone of interests protected by the NEPA, (3) the

Alliance was outside of the zone of interests protected by

the MMPA, (4) the Alliance had failed to identify a genuine

issue of material fact as to whether the Corps’ issuance

of the CWA Section 404 permit was arbitrary, capricious,

an abuse of discretion, unsupported by substantial

20a

Appendix A

evidence, or otherwise not in accordance with law, and

(5) the plaintiffs had failed to identify a genuine issue of

material fact as to whether the BOEM’s approval of the

project under the OCSLA was arbitrary, capricious, an

abuse of discretion, unsupported by substantial evidence,

or otherwise not in accordance with law. These appeals

followed.

II.

We review the district court’s summary judgment

rulings de novo. See, e.g., Melone, 100 F.4th at 29;

Nantucket Residents, 100 F.4th at 12. These include

the court’s Article III standing and zones-of-interests

rulings, the challenges to which raise legal questions. In

re Evenflo Co., Inc. Mktg., Sales Pracs. & Prods. Liab.

Litig., 54 F.4th 28, 34 (1st Cir. 2022) (reviewing de novo

the district court’s ruling on Article III standing); T.S.

ex rel. T.M.S. v. Heart of CarDon, LLC, 43 F.4th 737, 741

(7th Cir. 2022) (reviewing de novo the district court’s

zone-of-interests ruling).

We also review de novo the district court’s summary

judgment determinations that the defendants did not act

in a manner that was “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of

discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law,” or

that was “unsupported by substantial evidence.” Melone,

100 F.4th at 29 (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A), (E)); see also

Nantucket Residents, 100 F.4th at 12. An agency action

or inaction is arbitrary or capricious if the agency relied

on factors Congress did not intend it to consider, failed to

consider an important aspect of the problem, explained

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Appendix A

the decision in terms that run counter to the evidence, or

reached a decision so implausible that it cannot be ascribed

to a difference in view or the product of agency expertise.

See Melone, 100 F.4th at 29; see also Motor Vehicle Mfrs.

Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43,

103 S. Ct. 2856, 77 L. Ed. 2d 443 (1983)).

Finally, we may affirm the district court’s judgments

on any independent ground supported by the record. E.g.,

Puerto Rico Fast Ferries LLC v. SeaTran Marine, LLC,

102 F.4th 538, 549 (1st Cir. 2024).

III.

A. The APA/ESA Claims

We first consider the challenges to the district court’s

grant of summary judgment to the defendants on the

plaintiffs’ APA/ESA claims. As previously noted, the

court dismissed these claims as non-justiciable under

Article III. Whether a claim satisfies the demands of

Article III implicates our subject matter jurisdiction,

e.g., United States v. Texas, 599 U.S. 670, 686, 143 S. Ct.

1964, 216 L. Ed. 2d 624 (2023), and so we must satisfy

ourselves that we have subject-matter jurisdiction before

addressing the merits of a claim, see Steel Co. v. Citizens

for a Better Environment, 523 U.S. 83, 93-102, 118 S. Ct.

1003, 140 L. Ed. 2d 210 (1998) (prohibiting the exercise

of “hypothetical jurisdiction”). We therefore begin by

reviewing whether the court properly concluded that the

plaintiffs’ ESA claims were non-justiciable based on the

summary judgment record.

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Appendix A

The plaintiffs presented the district court with three

developed theories of how the defendants violated the

ESA. The first two, advanced by the Seafreeze plaintiffs,

targeted aspects of the September 11, 2020, biological

opinion, but not the superseding October 18, 2021,

biological opinion. The third, advanced by the Alliance,

argued that the sequence in which the defendants acted

resulted in the issuance of the ROD and approval of the

COP without there being in place a valid biological opinion.

The district court rejected all three arguments

for a lack of standing and, alternatively, mootness. As

to standing, the court first assessed the nature of the

injuries that the plaintiffs were entitled to assert. See,

e.g., FDA v. All. for Hippocratic Med., 602 U.S. 367, 380,

144 S. Ct. 1540, 219 L. Ed. 2d 121 (2024) (observing that,

to establish standing, “a plaintiff must demonstrate (i)

that she has suffered or likely will suffer an injury in fact,

(ii) that the injury likely was caused or will be caused by

the defendant, and (iii) that the injury likely would be

redressed by the requested judicial relief”). The court

concluded that, while each plaintiff had adduced sufficient

evidence of economic injury due to the project’s potential

adverse effects on commercial fishing, no plaintiff had

adduced admissible evidence of non-economic injury. In

reaching this latter conclusion, the court rejected the

plaintiffs’ arguments that they were appropriate parties

to assert environmental and aesthetic interests that would

be harmed by the project.

The district court then turned to whether the

plaintiffs’ evidence of economic injury, causation, and

23a

Appendix A

redressability was sufficient to establish that they had

Article III standing to press their ESA claims. See

Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561, 112 S. Ct.

2130, 119 L. Ed. 2d 351 (1992) (emphasizing that, at the

summary judgment stage, a party claiming standing

cannot rest on general allegations of injury resulting from

the defendant’s conduct but rather must adduce evidence

to support the specific facts necessary to substantiate its

standing theory); see also Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154,

167-68, 117 S. Ct. 1154, 137 L. Ed. 2d 281 (1997). The court

concluded that the plaintiffs’ evidence was insufficient to

meet this burden as a matter of law.

With respect to the Seafreeze plaintiffs, who, again,

only sought to challenge aspects of the superseded

September 11, 2020, biological opinion, the district court

determined that they had failed to adduce evidence that

their economic injuries were likely caused by the project’s

alleged negative impact on any endangered species. With

respect to the Alliance, the court determined that it had

failed to adduce evidence that the procedural actions

of which it complained regarding the two biological

opinions either likely caused its alleged injury or likely

caused any erroneous government decision. See Ctr. for

Biological Diversity v. EPA, 861 F.3d 174, 184, 430 U.S.

App. D.C. 15 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (observing that a plaintiff

alleging procedural injury must show both a connection

between the error and a substantive agency outcome and

a connection between that outcome and the plaintiff’s

particularized injury). In support of the latter ruling,

the court observed that the October 18, 2021, biological

opinion, which the Alliance did not challenge, served to

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Appendix A

break the chain of causation underlying the Alliance’s

standing theory.

Alternatively, the district court concluded that all of

plaintiffs’ claims were moot. As to the Seafreeze plaintiffs,

their ESA claims were moot because they had targeted

the September 11, 2020, biological opinion, and not the

superseding October 18, 2021, biological opinion, which

was the ultimate basis for the BOEM approving the COP.

As to the Alliance, its ESA claim was moot because the

alleged procedural error was rendered immaterial by the

subsequent issuance of the superseding biological opinion,

which the Alliance did not challenge, and which, again,

was the ultimate basis for approving the COP.

On appeal, the Seafreeze plaintiffs present only one

developed argument challenging the district court’s

standing and mootness rulings on their ESA claims.4

4. The section of the Seafreeze plaintiffs’ brief challenging

the district court’s ESA rulings contains three subparts. The first

presents the developed argument we are about to address. The

second, titled “The Commercial Fishermen’s ESA Claims Were Not

Mooted And The [September 11, 2020, Biological Opinion] Violated

ESA In Multiple Ways,” contains five brief arguments. Two reiterate

the Seafreeze plaintiffs’ merits challenges to the September 11, 2020,

biological opinion and add nothing to the justiciability analysis. The

other three involve variations on a single theme: that challenges to

the September 11, 2020, biological opinion are not moot because

that was the opinion in effect when the agency defendants issued

the ROD and approved the COP. We shall have more to say about

this argument in our discussion of the Alliance’s challenge to the

court’s dismissal of its ESA claim. The third, titled “The District

Court Erred In Holding That The Commercial Fishermen Waived

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Appendix A

They assert that the court erred in refusing to recognize

the LICFA’s associational standing to assert, on behalf

of LICFA member David Aripotch, certain non-economic

environmental and aesthetic injuries arising from

Vineyard Wind’s impact on the project area. Aripotch,

who is not a party, owns plaintiff Old Squaw and captains

its boat. In the district court, he submitted a declaration

detailing the aesthetic and spiritual pleasures he derives

from fishing and photographing right whales and other

marine life in the project area.

The district court rejected the argument for two

reasons. First, it concluded that Aripotch’s personal

injuries and interests could not be imputed to Old Squaw,

the corporation he owns. Second, the court refused to

allow the LICFA to assert Aripotch’s non-economic

interests in the project area because the LICFA did

Certain ESA Arguments,” asserts that the district court erred in

regarding as waived for lack of summary judgment briefing nine

additional ESA claims the Seafreeze plaintiffs had asserted in their

complaint. But the record citations the Seafreeze plaintiffs provide in

support of this argument only point to a few passing mentions of these

claims and attempts to incorporate by reference arguments made

elsewhere, often by parties to other Vineyard Wind lawsuits. The

record therefore confirms that the merits of these claims were not

developed and argued in the summary judgment papers. See Rocafort

v. IBM, Corp., 334 F.3d 115, 121-22 (1st Cir. 2003) (arguments raised

in the complaint but not developed in summary judgment papers are

waived); Exec. Leasing Corp. v. Banco Popular de P.R., 48 F.3d 66,

67-68 (1st Cir. 1995) (parties must include within the four corners

of their briefs any arguments they wish the court to consider and

cannot circumvent page limits through incorporation by reference

of arguments made elsewhere). The district court appropriately

declined to address the merits of these claims.

26a

Appendix A

not demonstrate that those interests are germane to its

purpose of supporting fisheries management. See Friends

of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Env’tl Servs. (TOC), Inc.,

528 U.S. 167, 181, 120 S. Ct. 693, 145 L. Ed. 2d 610 (2000)

(observing that an association may have standing to sue

on behalf of its members when, inter alia, the member

interest it is asserting is “germane to the organization’s

purpose”).

The Seafreeze plaintiffs challenge the ruling that

the LICFA failed to demonstrate that protection of

Aripotch’s aesthetic and spiritual interests in the project

area is germane to its purpose. They call our attention

to the LICFA’s articles of incorporation. Those articles

indicate that the preservation, maintenance, and welfare

of the environment in the saltwater fisheries “in Suffolk

County [New York] and its environs,” now and for future

generations, are among the purposes for which the LICFA

was formed in October 2001. The Seafreeze plaintiffs

sought to introduce the articles into the summary

judgment record by means of a motion for judicial notice

filed after the summary judgment briefing deadline had

passed. The court denied the motion as an untimely effort

to supplement the summary judgment record.

The Seafreeze plaintiffs first say that this was

reversible error because “no timeliness requirement

exists for matters of judicial notice pertaining to standing,

as jurisdictional rules like standing may be raised at any

time.” This argument is incorrect. Trial courts possess

considerable case-management authority, which includes

the authority to set deadlines for filing pretrial motions.

27a

Appendix A

Rosario-Díaz v. González, 140 F.3d 312, 315 (1st Cir. 1998)

(citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(b)(2)); see also Fed. R. Civ. P.

16(b)(3) (mandating that when federal trial courts issue

scheduling orders, those orders limit the time for, inter

alia, filing motions); L.R., D. Mass. 7.1(a)(1) (authorizing

the establishment of briefing deadlines). If information

calling into question the court’s subject-matter jurisdiction

becomes available after such a deadline has passed, the

expiration of the deadline does not preclude an inquiry

into the court’s power to hear the underlying claim. See

Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3) (stating that a court must dismiss

an action if “at any time” it determines “that it lacks

subject-matter jurisdiction” (emphasis supplied)). But this

principle has no bearing on the court’s authority to place

reasonable time limits on the ability of a party asserting

federal subject-matter jurisdiction to produce proof that

Article III standing exists. See Town of Milton v. FAA,

87 F.4th 91, 95 (1st Cir. 2023) (party asserting federal

jurisdiction bears the burden of establishing Article III

standing).

The Seafreeze plaintiffs also invoke Fed. R. Evid.

201(c)(2), which states that a court “must take judicial

notice if a party requests it and the court is supplied with

the necessary information,” and Fed. R. Evid. 201(d), which

states that a court “may take judicial notice at any stage

of the proceeding.” According to the Seafreeze plaintiffs,

these Rules obliged the court to take judicial notice of

the LICFA’s articles of incorporation, even though the

deadline for summary judgment briefing had passed. But

even if the articles of incorporation are a proper subject

of judicial notice because the LICFA had filed them with

28a

Appendix A

the New York Secretary of State, they would not provide

grounds for the LICFA to represent Aripotch’s personal

interests in the project area.

The articles of incorporation establish only that a

stated purpose for incorporating the LICFA in October

2001 was to protect the welfare of the environment in the

saltwater fisheries in Suffolk County and its environs.

They do not establish, as a matter of law, that this has

been one of the LICFA’s actual purposes in the years

since its founding. It would deprive the defendants of

their procedural right to contest the issue if we were to

draw the broader inference from a document introduced

into the record after the summary judgment briefing

had closed. Moreover, a commercial fishing association’s

interest in protecting the welfare of the area in which

its members carry on their business does not, ipso facto,

encompass an individual member’s observational interests

in the right whale or recreational interests in fishing and

photography. And finally, the area to which the LICFA’s

environmental interests allegedly extend do not appear

to include the project area, which is more than sixty-five

miles away from Suffolk County.

We turn now to the Alliance’s challenge to the district

court’s rejection of its ESA claim on justiciability grounds.

The Alliance does not explicitly engage the particulars of

the court’s standing and mootness rulings. The section of

the Alliance’s opening brief addressing the rejection of its

ESA claim contains two subparts. The first reiterates the

merits of its ESA claim. That claim, as we understand it,

is that issuance of an ROD based on a biological opinion

29a

Appendix A

that is subject to reinitiated consultation is a per se

violation of the ESA, regardless of (1) what the agencies

say about the ongoing validity and effectiveness of the

earlier opinion, (2) the limited and discrete nature of the

reinitiated consultation, and (3) steps the agencies take

to ensure that the terms and conditions and reasonable

and prudent measures contained within the updated

opinion will be both enforceable and enforced. The second

subpart argues that the Alliance has properly alleged and

demonstrated both economic and environmental injuries

and a basis for representing the interests of its members.

The Alliance’s lack of direct engagement with the

substance of the court’s justiciability rulings in its opening

brief is itself grounds for rejecting its challenge to the

entry of summary judgment on its ESA claim. E.g., Cioffi

v. Gilbert Enters., Inc., 769 F.3d 90, 93-94 (1st Cir. 2014)

(observing that an appealing party must explain “why

a particular order is erroneous”); Sparkle Hill, Inc. v.

Interstate Mat Corp., 788 F.3d 25, 29 (1st Cir. 2015) (“[W]e

do not consider arguments for reversing a decision of a

district court when the argument is not raised in a party’s

opening brief.”). But, in any event, there is no basis for

disturbing the court’s justiciability rulings on their merits.

We assume solely for the sake of argument, but with

skepticism, that the ESA prohibits the issuance of an ROD

and approval of a COP while reinitiated consultation over a

biological opinion is ongoing, regardless of circumstances.

Compare Defenders of Wildlife v. BOEM, 684 F.3d

1242, 1252 (11th Cir. 2012) (rejecting argument that the

“BOEM’s choice to reinitiate consultation . . . automatically

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Appendix A

renders . . . former biological opinions invalid,” particularly

where the prior opinions were “reconfirmed” and “have

not been withdrawn despite reinitiation of consultations”),

with Env’tl Prot. Info. Ctr. v. Simpson Timber Co., 255

F.3d 1073, 1076 (9th Cir. 2001) (stating in dicta and without

elaboration that “[r]einitiation of consultation requires

. . . the NMFS to issue a new Biological Opinion before

the agency action may continue”) (citation and internal

quotation marks omitted)). Even so, this assumption does

not undermine the court’s justiciability rulings.

As explained above, the district court concluded,

based on the summary judgment record, that the Alliance

lacked standing to press its ESA claim because an event

occurring after the alleged procedural error (the initial

issuance of the ROD and approval of the COP without a

valid biological opinion) broke the causal chain between

that error and both the agencies’ substantive action

(approval of the COP) and the Alliance’s alleged Article

III injury (economic harm from the operation of the

project). For the same reasons, the court concluded that

the Alliance’s ESA claim was moot because an event

occurring after the alleged procedural error had rendered

it immaterial.

The event on which both conclusions rest was the

NMFS’s issuance of the superseding October 18, 2021,

biological opinion, whose merits the Alliance does not

challenge. Once that superseding biological opinion

issued, the district court reasoned, the Alliance could no

longer claim that the alleged procedural error remained

a legal cause of either the relevant substantive agency

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Appendix A

actions (the final COP approval) or the Alliance’s injury

(economic harm caused by the COP approval). Seafreeze

Shoreside, Inc., et al. v. U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, et al.,

Nos. 1:22-cv-11091-IT, 1:22-cv-11172-IT, 2023 U.S. Dist.

LEXIS 183483, 2023 WL 6691015, at *28-29 (D. Mass. Oct.

12, 2023). Nor could the court provide a remedy that might

affect the matter at issue because the Alliance alleged

only an error that was no longer relevant to the agency

action under review. See 2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 183483,

[WL] at *27 n.19 (citing Church of Scientology of Cal. v.

United States, 506 U.S. 9, 12, 113 S. Ct. 447, 121 L. Ed.

2d 313 (1992) (describing the essential characteristic of a

moot case) and Rio Grande Silvery Minnow v. Bureau of

Reclamation, 601 F.3d 1096, 1114 (10th Cir. 2010) (holding

moot an ESA claim that did not challenge a superseding

biological opinion)).

In its reply brief, the Alliance addresses the district

court’s analysis by stating that the issuance of the

superseding October 18, 2021, biological opinion, and the

January 20, 2022, confirmation of the prior COP approval,

“cannot cure” the BOEM’s earlier procedural error of

issuing the ROD and approving the COP while the 2020

biological opinion was under reinitiated consultation.

“Because the iron-clad rule of ESA is to look before

you leap,” the Alliance says, “the later-issued [October

18, 2021, biological opinion] is irrelevant to the BOEM’s

procedural duty to comply with the ESA in rendering its

decision [to issue the ROD] on May 10, 2021.”

This argument misses the point. The significance of

the NMFS’s issuance of the unchallenged superseding

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Appendix A

October 18, 2021, biological opinion (and, we might

add, the BOEM’s January 20, 2022, confirmation of its

prior approval of the COP given the conclusions in that

unchallenged superseding opinion) does not lie in whether

they “cured” any earlier-occurring procedural error.

Rather, these later agency actions, taken as part of an

ongoing and legally authorized consultation process,

precluded any basis for finding that taint to the COP

approval arising from its allegedly having been issued

without a valid biological opinion was having any ongoing

effect. And, if there was no basis in the summary judgment

record for finding that the procedural violation complained

of was having an ongoing effect, there was no basis in the

record for either enjoining or unwinding the project, which

is the specific relief the Alliance sought, or for concluding

that the Alliance’s injury was redressable in any way.

The district court thus did not err in awarding

summary judgment to the defendants on the plaintiffs’

APA/ESA claims.

B. The APA/NEPA and APA/MMPA Claims

We next consider the challenges to the district court’s

grant of summary judgment to the defendants on the

plaintiffs’ APA/NEPA claims and the Alliance’s APA/

MMPA claim. We consider these challenges together

because the court dismissed both sets of claims for being

outside the zones of interests of the environmental statutes

that the plaintiffs invoked. With respect to the APA/NEPA

claims, the court held that the plaintiffs did not put forth

competent evidence as to an environmental harm that

33a

Appendix A

would impact their commercial fishing. With respect to

the APA/MMPA claim, the court held that the Alliance

had not established a cognizable interest in right whales

or any other marine mammal.

An APA claimant must establish that the claim

arguably falls within the zone of interests to be protected

or regulated by the underlying statute. See Lexmark

Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 572 U.S.

118, 129-30, 134 S. Ct. 1377, 188 L. Ed. 2d 392 (2014). As

the word “arguably” suggests, the zone-of-interests test

“is not ‘especially demanding.’” Id. at 130 (quoting MatchE-Be-Nash-She-Wish Band of Pottawatomi Indians v.

Patchak, 567 U.S. 209, 225, 132 S. Ct. 2199, 183 L. Ed. 2d

211 (2012)). Congress enacted the APA “to make agency

action presumptively reviewable,” and we do not require

“any indication of congressional purpose to benefit the

would-be plaintiff.” Match-E-Be-Nash-She-Wish Band

of Pottawatomi Indians, 567 U.S. at 225 (internal

quotation marks omitted) (quoting Clarke v. Secs. Indus.

Ass’n, 479 U.S. 388, 399, 107 S. Ct. 750, 93 L. Ed. 2d

757 (1987)). Thus, the zone-of-interests test “forecloses

suit only when a plaintiff’s interests are so marginally

related to or inconsistent with the purposes implicit in

the statute that it cannot reasonably be assumed that

Congress authorized that plaintiff to sue.” Lexmark, 572

U.S. at 130 (quoting Match-E-Be-Nash-She-Wish Band of

Pottawatomi Indians, 567 U.S. at 225 (internal quotation

marks omitted)).

The zone-of-interests test was once treated as a

justiciability doctrine implicating the court’s subject-

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Appendix A

matter jurisdiction. See id. at 128 n.4 (citations omitted).

But in Lexmark, the Supreme Court clarified that the

test is not jurisdictional but rather goes to whether the

claimant has stated a viable claim. See id. (citations

omitted). Therefore, we may affirm a zone-of-interestsbased dismissal on other grounds supported by the record.

See Puerto Rico Fast Ferries, 102 F.4th at 549. But cf.

Steel Co., 523 U.S. at 93-102 (prohibiting affirmance of

the dismissal of a claim based on lack of subject-matter

jurisdiction by rejecting the claim on its merits). 5

Here, we agree with the district court’s zone-ofinterests ruling as to the Alliance’s APA/MMPA claim.

The Alliance argues that it may assert the aesthetic and

recreational interests in marine mammals (including the

right whale) of “Alliance member” David Aripotch. But this

argument is based on a misstatement. Aripotch’s company,

Old Squaw, is a member of the Alliance, but Aripotch is

not.6 Moreover, and in any event, the protection of marine

5. The plaintiffs’ APA/NEPA challenges come to us in an odd

procedural posture. The Seafreeze plaintiffs challenge both the

district court’s zone-of-interests ruling and the lawfulness under the

NEPA of the BOEM’s actions. The Alliance, however, challenges only

the court’s zone-of-interests ruling. It does not address the merits

of its APA/NEPA challenge in either its opening brief or its reply

brief, even though the government calls the lapse to its attention, and

even though the success of its zone-of-interests argument would lead

naturally to our consideration of the merits given the fully developed

administrative record and opportunity the Alliance had to develop

its APA/NEPA claims in the summary judgment briefing. Thus, to

the extent that the Alliance intends to press any APA/NEPA claims

that differ from those of the Seafreeze plaintiffs, they are waived.

6. In their responsive briefs, the defendants called our attention

to the fact that Aripotch is neither a member of the Alliance nor

35a

Appendix A

mammals such as the right whale is not germane to the

Alliance’s purpose, which is to represent the interests

of commercial fisheries and related organizations. See

Friends of the Earth, 528 U.S. at 181. The court properly

awarded the defendants summary judgment on the

Alliance’s APA/MMPA claim.

But we disagree with the district court’s zone-ofinterests ruling as to the plaintiffs’ APA/NEPA claims.

While the court was correct to reject as incompetent much

of the plaintiffs’ evidence of environmental injury, the

ROD itself acknowledges that the discharge of fill material

associated with the project will have major adverse

impacts on mollusks, fish, and crustaceans in the project

area. Moreover, the plaintiffs have plausibly linked these

adverse impacts to the expected adverse economic effects

of the project on their commercial fishing interests. This is

enough to satisfy the zone-of-interests test. See Monsanto

Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms, 561 U.S. 139, 155-56, 130

S. Ct. 2743, 177 L. Ed. 2d 461 (2010) (recognizing that

plaintiffs whose alleged injuries from agency deregulation

had both environmental and economic components fell

within the APA and the NEPA’s zone of interest).

Despite this, we affirm the dismissal of these

claims. On appeal, the Seafreeze plaintiffs develop

three arguments that the BOEM violated the NEPA’s

procedural requirements. They explicitly premise all

a party to either of these consolidated appeals. The Alliance did

not correct the misstatement in its opening brief or reply; rather,

it simply changed its characterization of Aripotch from being

an “Alliance member” to being a “representative” of an Alliance

member.

36a

Appendix A

three arguments on an underlying assertion that the

BOEM was improperly motivated to reach decisions

so that Vineyard Wind could timely honor its prior

contractual commitments surrounding the project. The

first argument is that this improper motivation led the

BOEM to limit its consideration of reasonable alternatives

to the project. The second is that it led the BOEM to

inappropriately revive the EIS process after Vineyard

Wind’s December 1, 2020, provisional withdrawal of

its proposed COP from review to test the wind turbine

generator it had decided to use. The third is that it led the

BOEM to fail to appropriately consider the incremental

impact of the project in combination with the likely impact

of other future, reasonably foreseeable offshore wind

development projects.

As an initial matter, the premise of the Seafreeze

plaintiffs’ arguments is misguided. By regulation, the

BOEM was under an obligation to “briefly summariz[e]

[in the FEIS] the purpose and need to which the agency is

responding,” 40 C.F.R. § 1502.13; to “[r]igorously explore

and objectively evaluate all reasonable alternatives,” id.

§ 1502.14(a); and, most importantly for present purposes,

to consider “the needs and goals of the parties involved in

the application or permit as well as the public interest,”

43 C.F.R. § 46.420(a)(2).7 Thus, where the agency is

7. The FEIS identified the BOEM’s purpose and need as

“whether to approve, approve with modifications, or disapprove the

COP to construct, operate, and decommission an approximately

800 MW, commercial-scale wind energy facility within the area

of [Vineyard Wind’s] lease to meet New England’s demand for

renewable energy.” Supp. App. at 972, Seafreeze Appeal. It also

noted, inter alia, that the “BOEM’s decision on Vineyard Wind’s COP

37a

Appendix A

not itself the project’s sponsor, it may give substantial

weight to an applicant’s preferences, at least insofar as

it considers alternatives. See Beyond Nuclear, 704 F.3d

at 19. This principle derives from the fact that, under

the NEPA, agencies must consider only “reasonable”

alternatives, meaning alternatives “bounded by some

notion of [technical and economic] feasibility,” id. (quoting

Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council,

Inc., 435 U.S. 519, 551, 98 S. Ct. 1197, 55 L. Ed. 2d 460

(1978)), and only alternatives that would “‘bring about

the ends of the proposed action,’” id. (quoting Citizens

Against Burlington, Inc. v. Busey, 938 F.2d 190, 195, 290

U.S. App. D.C. 371 (D.C. Cir. (1991)).

Apart from the erroneous premise, the Seafreeze

plaintiffs’ APA/NEPA arguments fail to establish that the

BOEM engaged in arbitrary or capricious decisionmaking.

The Seafreeze plaintiffs challenge the BOEM’s failure

to consider alternatives that would have required

construction outside the lease area. But the BOEM

supportably concluded that these were effectively new

proposed actions that were not responsive to the agency’s

regulatory obligation to address the Vineyard Wind

proposal, which was of course limited to the Vineyard

Wind lease area. The BOEM also supportably explained

that it would consider proposals on other lease areas

through separate regulatory processes.

is needed to execute [the BOEM’s] duty to approve, approve with

modifications, or disapprove, the proposed Project in furtherance of

the United States’ policy to make [Outer Continental Shelf] energy

resources available to expeditious and orderly development.” Id.

The plaintiffs do not challenge the lawfulness of this purpose and

need statement.

38a

Appendix A

The Seafreeze plaintiffs also challenge the BOEM’s

termination of the EIS process in response to Vineyard

Wind’s request to provisionally withdraw the proposed

COP from review, and the agency’s subsequent decision to

permit Vineyard Wind to rescind its withdrawal without

providing an additional notice and comment period.

Vineyard Wind asserts that the Seafreeze plaintiffs lack

Article III standing to make this claim.

We agree, for reasons that track those explaining our

ruling that the plaintiffs lack standing to complain about

the allegedly improper issuance of the ROD and approval

of the COP while reinitiation of ESA consultation was

underway. See supra Part III-A. Here too, even if we

assume (again, with skepticism) that a second notice-andcomment period was required, the summary judgment

record does not permit a conclusion that any taint from

the alleged procedural error had a causal effect on the

BOEM’s ultimate approval of the COP. See Lujan, 504 U.S.

at 561. The Seafreeze plaintiffs point to no comment that

they, or anyone else, were precluded from submitting to

the BOEM, and they suggest no other practical effect that

flowed from the absence of a second notice-and-comment

period. Any possibility of such an effect is, moreover,

implausible, given that the COP was unchanged and

already had been subject to extensive notice and comment.

Thus, the alleged procedural error was not a likely cause

of the Seafreeze plaintiffs’ injury. See Ctr. for Bio. Div.,

861 F.3d at 184. Nor, therefore, could it justify enjoining

or unwinding the project. 8

8. In addition to complaining about the lack of an additional

notice-and-comment period, the Seafreeze plaintiffs say that

39a

Appendix A

Finally, the Seafreeze plaintiffs argue that the BOEM

failed to appropriately consider the incremental impact of

the project in combination with the likely impact of other

future, reasonably foreseeable offshore wind development

projects. They support this argument only with two

conclusory allegations: (1) “the Federal Defendants gutted

the core of the cumulative impacts analysis set forth in

the Supplemental Draft EIS by removing much of it from

the [FEIS], thereby violating NEPA’s regulations”; and

(2) “the Federal Defendants improperly segmented their

NEPA analysis” by “undercounting reasonably foreseeable

offshore wind development outside the lease area.” The

Seafreeze plaintiffs do not elaborate upon either of these

allegations.9 They therefore have not put the correctness

resuming review of the Vineyard Wind COP was ultra vires because

nothing in the NEPA or the OCSLA “provides the BOEM with

authority to resume review of a terminated COP.” But again, even

if we assume that to be so, the Seafreeze plaintiffs have provided

no basis in evidence or argument for concluding that this alleged

procedural error likely tainted the injury-causing event: ultimate

approval of the COP. There is no likelihood of a different outcome

had the BOEM been required to formalistically reconduct its review

process from the start rather than picking up where it left off.

Moreover, without a basis for finding a likely causal effect, there

would be no proper basis for enjoining or unwinding the project.

9. In their reply brief, in response to the defendants’ arguments

that the Seafreeze plaintiffs’ briefing of the cumulative-impacts issue

was inadequate, the Seafreeze plaintiffs point to a portion of the

executive summary of the supplement to the EIS that, they say, did

not make its way into the FEIS. They also seek to clarify that their

position with respect to the BOEM’s alleged improper segmenting

of its cumulative effects analysis is that the BOEM improperly failed

to treat certain aspirational goals that the Biden administration set

for offshore wind development as “reasonably foreseeable future

40a

Appendix A

of the district court’s ruling into issue. See United States v.

Zannino, 895 F.2d 1, 17 (1st Cir. 1990) (“[I]ssues adverted

to in a perfunctory manner, unaccompanied by some

effort at developed argumentation, are deemed waived.”)

(citations omitted); see also id. (“It is not enough merely

to mention a possible argument in the most skeletal way,

leaving the court to do counsel’s work . . . .”).

The district court did not err in awarding summary

judgment to the defendants on the plaintiffs’ APA/NEPA

and APA/MMPA claims.

C. The APA/CWA Claims

We next consider the challenge to the district court’s

grant of summary judgment to the defendants on the

Alliance’s APA /CWA claims. Although the Alliance

makes three arguments on appeal, only one was properly

preserved: that the Corps’ decision to issue a CWA Section

404 permit for the discharge of dredged or fill material

arbitrarily and capriciously failed to properly account for

the effect of the project on commercial fisheries, wildlife,

and the marine environment.10 The court did not explicitly

address this argument in its summary judgment order.10

actions,” within the meaning of 43 C.F.R. § 46.30, to be accounted for

in the cumulative-impacts analysis. Arguments raised for the first

time in a reply brief are ordinarily deemed waived, see Lahens v.

AT&T Mobility P.R., Inc., 28 F.4th 325, 328 n.1 (1st Cir. 2022), and

we see no reason to depart from that principle here.

10. The Alliance also claims that certain misstatements

regarding the scope of the project contained in the Corps’ section

of the ROD, later corrected as clerical errors in an August 4, 2021,

41a

Appendix A

The Alliance argues that the Corps issued the

permit under the mistaken belief that the impacts of the

project on commercial fisheries, wildlife, and the marine

environment would be minor. In support of this argument,

the Alliance points to several statements in the FEIS

which, if read in isolation, appear to project more-thanminor impacts from the project on commercial fisheries,

commercial shipping, recreational vessel businesses,

mollusks, fish, and crustaceans. But the Alliance’s brief

omits context that qualifies the statements in a manner

that supports the Corps’ conclusion.

For example, the Alliance cites to a page in the FEIS

allegedly stating that the project will have “moderate

ROD Supplement, reveal that the Corps did not understand the

scope of the project it was permitting. This claim is not preserved.

The district court held it waived because it was not pleaded in the

Alliance’s complaint, and the Alliance does not engage this ruling

in its opening brief. See Lahens, 28 F.4th at 328 n.1. The Alliance

also claims that, in issuing the permit, the Corps violated the CWA

by failing to consider the cumulative impacts of Vineyard Wind

and other surrounding offshore wind projects. But the Alliance did

not raise this concern with the Corps during its public comment

process. It therefore cannot now seek to establish that the Corps

acted arbitrarily or capriciously on this basis. See Dep’t of Transp.

v. Pub. Citizen, 541 U.S. 752, 764-65, 124 S. Ct. 2204, 159 L. Ed. 2d

60 (2004); see also Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp., 435 U.S. at 55355 (emphasizing that a party must have presented a position during

the administrative process to later challenge an agency decision

as arbitrary and capricious for failure to have taken the position

adequately into account). In so ruling, we reject the Alliance’s

assertion, made in its reply brief without supporting record citation,

that it preserved its litigation rights on this point through comments

it submitted to the BOEM during the EIS’s public comment period.

42a

Appendix A

to major impacts on commercial fisheries.” App. at 141,

Alliance Appeal. But in fact, that statement refers to the

impacts of activities “other than offshore wind.” Id. at

141. Similarly, the Alliance cites to alleged admissions

that “offshore wind structures and hard coverage for

cables would have long-term impacts on commercial

fishing operations and support businesses such as seafood

processing,” and that “the impacts would increase in

intensity as more offshore structures are completed.”

Id. at 139. But the very same sentence concludes that

“the fishing industry is anticipated to be able to adjust

fishing practices over time in order to maintain the

commercial fishing industry in the context of offshore

wind structures.” Id. And while the FEIS acknowledged

that increased vehicle traffic from the construction of

future offshore wind projects could result in congestion

and delays that could decrease productivity for commercial

shipping, fishing, and recreational vessel businesses, it

also concluded that the project would have negligible to

moderate impacts on navigation and vehicle traffic after

required mitigation measures were implemented.

The Alliance also cites to pages in the Corps’ section

of the ROD noting anticipated adverse project impacts on

the aquatic ecosystems. But those same pages note that

some of these effects will be temporary, that required

mitigation measures will reduce impacts, and that there

may also be some environmental benefits from the project.

Overall, after extensive analysis, the FEIS concluded that

the project would have a moderate impact on fish and other

aquatic organisms.

43a

Appendix A

The record does not support a conclusion that the

Corps acted arbitrarily or capriciously in issuing the CWA

Section 404 permit because the Corps misunderstood

the findings in the administrative record. The district

court did not err in awarding summary judgment to the

defendants on the Alliance’s APA/CWA claim.

D. The APA/OCSLA Claims

Finally, we consider the challenges to the district

court’s grant of summary judgment to the defendants

on the plaintiffs’ APA/OCSLA claims. The plaintiffs’

principal appellate argument is that the district court

misunderstood OCSLA’s core statutory provision

governing the approval of offshore wind projects, 43

U.S.C. § 1337(p)(4), in holding that the BOEM had not

acted arbitrarily or capriciously in approving the COP.

Again, that provision imposes an obligation on the

BOEM to “ensure that any activity [under the OCSLA] is

carried out in a manner that provides for” twelve criteria

including, insofar as is relevant, safety; protection of

the environment; conservation of natural resources of

the Outer Continental Shelf; prevention of interference

with reasonable uses of the Outer Continental Shelf (as

determined by the Interior Secretary); and consideration

of any other use of the sea or seabed, including use for

fishing and navigation. Id. The plaintiffs also argue that

the court impermissibly discounted their evidence of safety

concerns, environmental harms, and the devastating effect

on commercial fishing that the project would cause.

44a

Appendix A

The plaintiffs’ principal argument is based upon

mischaracterizations of the district court’s reading of

OCSLA § 1337(p)(4). The Alliance says that the court

interpreted “the twelve mandatory requirements” as

“discretionary considerations that [the BOEM] could

consider and balance.” The Seafreeze plaintiffs say that

the court “decided to insert the word ‘reasonably’ into

the statutory text to allow [the BOEM] to ostensibly

‘balance’ [its] mandatory duties under Section 1337(p)

(4) against other considerations.” The Alliance also says

that the court read the statutory phrase “shall ensure”

to “‘reflect[] Congress’s intent to confer flexibility . . . .’”

And it further states that “the district court erroneously

held” that Congress gave the BOEM “the discretion to

ignore [the twelve OCSLA criteria] or to balance one off

another. . . .”

The district court did not (1) treat the twelve OCSLA

criteria as discretionary considerations that the BOEM

“could consider,” (2) read the word “reasonably” into

the OCSLA, (3) say anything close to what the Alliance

purports to quote it as saying, or (4) hold that the BOEM

has the discretion to ignore or balance criteria. In fact,

the court explicitly acknowledged that the OCSLA criteria

are “mandatory,” Seafreeze Shoreside, Inc., et al. 2023

U.S. Dist. LEXIS 183483, 2023 WL 6691015, at *44, and

proceeded from the premise that the BOEM must ensure

that “each criterion is met” in a manner that is “not to the

detriment of the other criteria.” Id.

The district court held only that the BOEM must

have “discretion” in considering whether each statutory

45a

Appendix A

criterion is satisfied, and that the BOEM must “balance”

the statutory mandate to develop energy projects on the

Outer Continental Shelf with the twelve statutory criteria

for which it must provide. The plaintiffs do not contest

either of these points; in fact, they appear to concede them.

See Reply Br. for Alliance at 3 (“[Defendants] incorrectly

argue that the Alliance takes an absolutist position,

arguing that [the BOEM] lacks any discretion at all in how

to satisfy OCSLA’s requirements. But this is not true.”).

In any event, the plaintiffs have not provided us with any

basis for concluding that the district court’s award of

summary judgment to the defendants was infected by a

misreading of OCSLA § 1337(p)(4).

Nor have the plaintiffs provided any other reason

to find that the BOEM acted arbitrarily or capriciously

under the OCSLA in approving the project. In focusing

exclusively on the district court’s alleged errors, the

plaintiffs ignore the joint ROD and a May 10, 2021,

information memorandum in which James F. Bennett, the

Program Manager for the BOEM’s Office of Renewable

Energy Programs, explains the conditions that the

BOEM imposed on the project and why approval of

the project, with those conditions, satisfies the OCSLA

§ 1337(p)(4) criteria. Instead, the plaintiffs simply point

to portions of the record which, when read in isolation,

appear to raise safety and environmental concerns.11

11. The plaintiffs also argue that the project likely will cause

commercial fisheries to abandon the project area due to difficulties

with navigation, in violation of OCSLA § 1337(p)(4). The plaintiffs

support the argument by pointing to a statement to this effect

that the Corps initially included in its section of the ROD but later

46a

Appendix A

The plaintiffs’ position appears to be that, if a project is

likely to have any modicum of impact on one or more of

the twelve OCSLA criteria, the BOEM cannot approve it.

See, e.g., Corrected Opening Br. for Seafreeze Pls. at 44

(challenging the district court’s conclusion that the BOEM

“still retains some discretion in considering whether the

enumerated statutory criteria have been satisfied, even

when the statute does not state so explicitly”) (citations

omitted). But see Reply Br. for Alliance at 3 (“[Defendants]

incorrectly argue that the Alliance takes an absolutist

position, arguing that [the BOEM] lacks any discretion

at all in how to satisfy the OCSLA’s requirements. But

this is not true.”).

This absolutist argument fails. A statute encouraging

the development of offshore wind projects but obligating

the BOEM to ensure that such projects be carried out in

a manner that provides for safety, for example, cannot

be read to prohibit project approval simply because one

could imagine the project being involved in an accident.

removed with a clarifying statement, issued in the form of an ROD

supplement, that inclusion of the statement “was based solely upon

comments of interested parties submitted to BOEM during the

public comment period” and “was not based upon any separate

or independent [Corps’] or other agency evaluation or study, and

accordingly does not represent the position of the [Corps] . . . .” The

plaintiffs contest the veracity of the Corps’ representation in the

ROD supplement, but the ROD, taken as a whole, bears out the Corps’

statement. See Supp. App. at 2016, Seafreeze Appeal (noting that the

proposed discharge of fill “will likely have minor, long-term effects on

recreational and commercial fisheries”); id. at 2023 (noting that the

project “will have neutral impacts to navigation during construction

and operation with the incorporation of mitigation”).

47a

Appendix A

If that is the plaintiffs’ position, we reject it. Moreover,

as was the case with their APA/CWA arguments, see

supra Part III-D, the plaintiffs’ record citations in

support of the claim that the BOEM did not ensure that

the COP would be carried out in a manner that provides

for the statutory criteria omit necessary context. They

fail to acknowledge either the mitigation requirements

that the BOEM imposed in response to the safety and

environmental concerns raised, or that the concerns were

raised in connection with alternatives that the BOEM had

rejected.

The district court did not err in awarding summary

judgment to the defendants on the plaintiffs’ APA/OCSLA

claims.

IV.

Before and after oral argument, we have received Fed.

R. App. P. 28(j) letters alerting us to recent developments

that have caused federal regulators to pause the project.

These incidents, occurring after the challenged agency

decisions, are not relevant to the arguments made in these

appeals. See Town of Winthrop, 535 F.3d at 14 (“[T]he

focal point for judicial review should be the administrative

record already in existence, not some new record made

initially in the reviewing court.”) (quoting Camp v. Pitts,

411 U.S. 138, 142, 93 S. Ct. 1241, 36 L. Ed. 2d 106 (1973)).

For the reasons explained, we affirm the judgments

of the district court.

48a

B

APPENDIX BAppendix

— JUDGMENT

OF THE

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE

FIRST CIRCUIT, ENTERED DECEMBER 5, 2024

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT

No. 23-1853

No. 23-2051

SEAFREEZE SHORESIDE, INC.; LONG

ISLAND COMMERCIAL FISHING ASSOC., INC.;

XIII NORTHEAST FISHERY SECTOR, INC.;

HERITAGE FISHERIES, INC.; NAT. W., INC.;

OLD SQUAW FISHERIES, INC.,

Plaintiffs, Appellants,

v.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE

INTERIOR; HONORABLE DEBRA HAALAND, in

her official capacity as Secretary of the Department

of the Interior; BUREAU OF OCEAN ENERGY

MANAGEMENT; LIZ KLEIN, in her official capacity

as the Director of the Bureau of Ocean Energy

Management; LAURA DANIEL-DAVID, in her official

capacity as Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary,

Land and Minerals Management; UNITED STATES

DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE; HONORABLE

GINA M. RAIMONDO, in her official capacity as

the Secretary of the Department of Commerce;

NATIONAL OCEANIC AND ATMOSPHERIC

ADMINISTRATION, NATIONAL MARINE

FISHERIES SERVICE; CATHERINE MARZIN,

in her official capacity as the Deputy Director of the

49a

Appendix B

National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration;

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE;

HONORABLE LLOYD J. AUSTIN, III, in his

official capacity as the Secretary of the Department

of Defense; UNITED STATES ARMY CORPS OF

ENGINEERS; LT. GEN. SCOTT A. SPELLMON,

in his official capacity as the Commander and Chief

of Engineers of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers;

COLONEL JOHN A. ATILANO, II, in his official

capacity as the District Engineer of the New England

District of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers;

VINEYARD WIND 1, LLC,

Defendants, Appellees,

RESPONSIBLE OFFSHORE DEVELOPMENT

ALLIANCE, a D.C. nonprofit corporation,

Plaintiff, Appellant,

v.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE

INTERIOR; DEBRA HAALAND, in her official

capacity as the Secretary of the Interior; BUREAU OF

OCEAN ENERGY MANAGEMENT; LIZ KLEIN,

in her official capacity as the Director of the Bureau of

Ocean Energy Management; NATIONAL MARINE

FISHERIES SERVICE; RICHARD W. SPINRAD,

in his official capacity as the Administrator of the

National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration;

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY;

CHRISTINE WORMUTH, in her official capacity as

Secretary of the Army; UNITED STATES ARMY

50a

Appendix B

CORPS OF ENGINEERS; JAMIE A. PINKHAM, in

his official capacity as the Acting Assistant Secretary of

the Army for Civil Works; VINEYARD WIND 1, LLC,

Defendants, Appellees.

Entered: December 5, 2024

JUDGMENT

This cause came on to be heard on appeal from

the United States District Court for the District of

Massachusetts and was argued by counsel.

Upon consideration whereof, it is now here ordered,

adjudged and decreed as follows: The judgments of the

district court are affirmed.

By the Court:

Anastasia Dubrovsky, Clerk

cc: Roger J. Marzulla, Ira H. Zaleznik, Nancie G.

Marzulla, Perry M. Rosen, Donald Campbell Lockhart,

Thekla Hansen-Young, Lea J. Tyhach, Kevin W. McArdle,

Peter R. Steenland, Jack Woodruff Pirozzolo, Kathleen

Moriarty Mueller, James Wedeking, Peter Whitfield,

Brooklyn Hildebrandt, Theodore Hadzi-Antich, Chance

Weldon, Connor William Mighell, Robert Henneke, Pedro

Melendez-Arreaga

51a

Appendix C

APPENDIX C — MEMORANDUM

& ORDER

OF THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT,

DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS,

FILED OCTOBER 12, 2023

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

Case No. 1:22-cv-11091-IT; Case No. 1:22-cv-11172-IT

SEAFREEZE SHORESIDE, INC., et al.,

Plaintiffs,

v.

THE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT

OF THE INTERIOR, et al.,

Defendants,

and

VINEYARD WIND 1, LLC,

Intervenor-Defendant.

RESPONSIBLE OFFSHORE

DEVELOPMENT ALLIANCE,

Plaintiff,

v.

52a

Appendix C

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT

OF THE INTERIOR, et al.,

Defendants,

and

VINEYARD WIND 1, LLC,

Intervenor-Defendant.

Filed October 12, 2023

MEMORANDUM & ORDER

TALWANI, D.J.

Plaintiffs Seafreeze Shoreside, Inc. (“Seafreeze

Shor e side” ), Long Isl a nd Com mer c i a l F i sh i ng

Association, Inc. (“LICFA”), XIII Northeast Fishery

Sector, Inc. (“Sector XIII”), Heritage Fisheries, Inc.

(“Heritage Fisheries”), Nat. W., Inc. (“Nat. W.”) and Old

Squaw Fisheries, Inc. (“Old Squaw”) (collectively, the

“Seafreeze Plaintiffs”) and Plaintiff Responsible Offshore

Development Alliance (“Alliance”) brought the abovecaptioned lawsuits challenging actions taken by several

federal agencies and associated officials in the approval

of an offshore-wind energy project to be constructed and

operated by Intervenor-Defendant Vineyard Wind 1 LLC

(“Vineyard Wind”) in the Outer Continental Shelf off the

coast of Martha’s Vineyard and Nantucket, Massachusetts

(the “Vineyard Wind Project” or the “Project”).1

1. Seafreeze Shoreside, Inc., et al. v. The United States Dept.

of the Interior, et al., 1:22-cv-11091, and Responsible Offshore

53a

Appendix C

Before the court in a consolidated proceeding are

cross-motions for summary judgment in Seafreeze, 1:22cv-11091, see Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment,

Doc. No. 66, Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment,

Doc. No. 72, Vineyard Wind’s Motion for Summary

Judgment, Doc. No. 86; and in Responsible, 1:22-cv-11172,

see Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment, Doc. No.

52, Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment, Doc.

No. 59, Vineyard Wind’s Motion for Summary Judgment,

Doc. No. 73. For the reasons that follow, Plaintiffs’ Motions

for Summary Judgment are DENIED and Defendants’

and Vineyard Wind’s Motions for Summary Judgment

are GRANTED.

I.

Background

A.

Procedural Background

The Procedural Background is set forth in detail in

the court’s Memorandum and Order, 1:22-cv-11091, Doc.

No. 137; 1:22-cv-11172, Doc. No. 104, denying Plaintiffs’

Motions to Strike Documents from and Supplement the

Administrative Record, 1:22-cv-11091, Doc. No. 56; 1:22cv-11172, Doc. No. 43, and is incorporated by reference

herein.

Development Alliance v. United States Dept. of the Interior, et

al., 1:22-cv-11172, are referred to herein by their respective case

numbers.

Two other challenges to the Project were filed in this District and

are now on appeal. See Melone v. Coit, et al., 1:21-cv-11171-IT,

appeal docketed, No. 23-1736 (1st Cir. Sept. 8, 2023); Nantucket

Residents Against Turbines et al. v. U.S. Bureau of Ocean Energy

Mgmt., 1:21-cv-11390-IT, appeal docketed, 2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS

86176, (together “the Related Actions”).

54a

Appendix C

B. Background Concerning the Project

The Background Concerning the Project is also set

forth in detail in the court’s Memorandum and Order,

1:22-cv-11091, Doc. No. 137; 1:22-cv-11172, Doc. No. 104,

and is incorporated by reference herein. The Background

Concerning the Project is derived from the Administrative

Record common to the pending challenges and the Related

Actions. 2

The following further background concerning the

Project is also drawn from the Administrative Record, is

specific to the pending challenges, and was not at issue in

the Related Actions.

In considering Vineyard Wind’s application for a

permit under Section 404 of the Clean Water Act (“Section

404 Permit”) pertaining to the discharge of dredged and

fill materials that would occur along a 23.3 mile long

corridor as part of Vineyard Wind’s installation of the wind

energy facility, electronic service platforms, connections

between the wind turbine generators, service platforms,

and export cables, the A rmy Corps of Engineers

(“Corps”) considered the practicability of the following

2. Certified Indices of the Administrative Record and

addenda were docketed electronically, see 1:22-cv-11091, Federal

Defendants’ Notices, Doc. Nos. 26, 30, 34, 36; 1:22-cv-11172,

Federal Defendants’ Notices, Doc. Nos. 17, 23; portions of the

Administrative Record reflected in the parties briefing are

docketed electronically as part of the parties’ Joint Appendices

filed in connection with the cross-motions for summary judgment,

1:22-cv-11091, Doc. Nos. 104, 105; 1:22-cv-11172, Doc. Nos. 97, 98.

55a

Appendix C

alternatives to the proposed Vineyard Wind Project:

(a) one no-action alternative; (b) a largely land-based

alternative; (c) alternatives that would bring the cable on

shore in a different location; (d) two off-site alternatives

in other zones of the ocean; and (e) seven different onsite alternatives identified by Bureau of Ocean Energy

Management (“BOEM”) in the Environmental Impact

Statement (“Final EIS”). Joint Record of Decision (“Joint

ROD”), BOEM_0076799 at -6830-31.

The Corps stated that in order to consider an

alternative “practicable,” the alternative “must be

available, achieve the overall project purpose (as defined

by USACE) and be feasible when considering cost,

logistics, and existing technology.” Id.

In issuing the Section 404 Permit to Vineyard Wind,

the Corps imposed certain “Special Conditions” on

Vineyard Wind as the permittee, including compliance

with all “mandatory terms and conditions to implement

the reasonable and prudent measures that are associated

with ‘incidental take’ that is also specified in the [Biological

Opinion (‘BiOp’)].” The Permit further specified that the

Permit is conditional on Vineyard Wind’s “compliance

with all of the mandatory terms and conditions associated

with incidental take of the attached [BiOp], and any future

[BiOp] that replaces it, which terms and conditions are

incorporated by reference into this [P]ermit.” Dep’t of

Army Permit, USACE_AR_012635 at -36.

C.

Plaintiffs’ Pending Claims

In reviewing the pending motions, the court consider

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Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Seafreeze Shoreside, Inc., et al., Petitioners v. Department of the Interior, et al. | Frix