Opposition Brief — CoinMarketCap OpCo, LLC, et al., Petitioners v. Ryan Cox

No. 24-960

In the

Supreme Court of the United States

COINMARKETCAP OPCO, LLC AND

BAM TRADING SERVICES, INC.,

v.

RYAN COX,

Petitioners,

Respondent.

On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the U.S. Court

of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO PETITION FOR

WRIT OF CERTIORARI

ALEXANDER KOLODIN

Counsel of Record

KOLODIN LAW GROUP PLLC

4105 North 20th Street, Suite 110

Phoenix, Arizona 85016

(602) 730-2985

alexander.kolodin@kolodinlaw.com

SCHMIDT LAW CORPORATION

MATTHEW W. SCHMIDT

116A Main Street

Tiburon, California 94920

(415) 390-6075

matt@schmidtlc.com

Counsel for Respondent Ryan Cox

i

TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES....................................ii

STATEMENT ........................................................... 1

REASONS FOR DENYING THE

PETITION .............................................................. 3

A. This Case is a Poor Vehicle as it

Concerns

the

Commodities

Exchange Act, not the WidelyLitigated Clayton Act ................................... 3

B. The Disagreement Between the

Circuits is Still Percolating, with a 3to-3 Split and Six Circuits Still

Silent .............................................................. 8

C. On the Merits, the Ninth Circuit’s

Interpretation is Correct and Based

on a Careful Reading of the Text and

the CEA’s Legislative History..................... 14

CONCLUSION ..................................................... 18

ii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Page(s)

Cases

Access Telecomms., Inc. v. MCI Telecomms. Corp.,

197 F.3d 694 (5th Cir. 1999)............................. 9, 11

Action Embroidery Corp. v. Atl. Embroidery, Inc.,

368 F.3d 1174 (9th Cir. 2004)........................... 4, 10

Cortez Byrd Chips, Inc. v. Bill Harbert Constr. Co.,

529 U.S. 193 (2000) ................................................. 4

Daniel v. Am. Bd. of Emergency Med.,

428 F.3d 408 (2d Cir. 2005) .................4, 5, 9, 10, 12

Fire & Police Pension Ass’n of Colo. v. Bank of

Montreal,

368 F. Supp. 3d 681 (S.D.N.Y 2019)..................... 13

Goldlawr, Inc. v. Heiman,

288 F.2d 579 (2d Cir. 1961), rev’d on other

grounds, 369 U.S. 463 (1962) ..............2, 8, 9, 11, 12

Go-Video, Inc. v. Akai Elec. Co.,

885 F.2d 1406 (9th Cir. 1989)...2, 4, 8, 9, 10, 11, 15,

16, 17

GTE New Media Servs. v. BellSouth Corp.,

199 F.3d 1343 (D.C. Cir. 2000) ................4, 9, 12, 14

iii

In re Auto. Refinishing Paint Antitrust Litig.,

358 F.3d 288 (3d Cir. 2004) ...............4, 9, 10, 12, 14

KM Enterprises, Inc. v. Global Traffic Technologies,

Inc.,

725 F.3d 718 (7th Cir. 2013)....................... 2, 10, 12

Omni Cap. Int’l, Ltd. v. Rudolf Wolff & Co.,

484 U.S. 97 (1987) ................................................. 17

Sec. Inv’r Prot. Corp. v. Vigman,

764 F.2d 1309 (9th Cir. 1985)................................. 4

SEC v. Ross,

504 F.3d 1130 (9th Cir. 2007)................................. 4

Va. Military Inst. v. United States,

508 U.S. 946 (1993) ................................................. 8

Statutes

7 U.S.C. § 25(c) ............................................. 1, 5, 6, 16

15 U.S.C. § 22 ............................................................. 5

15 U.S.C. § 78aa ..................................................... 5, 6

15 U.S.C. § 12 ............................................................. 1

Federal Courts Jurisdiction and Venue Clarification

Act of 2011, Pub. L. No. 112-63, 125 Stat. 758 .... 17

iv

Rules

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) ................... 8

Other Authorities

2A Norman J. Singer & Shambie Singer, Sutherland

Statutory Constriction (7th ed. 2023 update) ...... 15

H.R. Rep. No. 102-6 (Mar. 1, 1991) ......................... 17

H.R. Rep. No. 112-10 (2011) .................................... 18

1

BRIEF IN OPPOSITION

Respondent Ryan Cox respectfully requests

that the Court deny Petitioners’ request for

certiorari.

STATEMENT

This petition concerns a slowly-percolating

circuit split over statutory interpretation that has

developed over 35 years, with the disagreement

arising most commonly under Section 12 of the

Clayton Act of 1914 (the “Clayton Act,” 15 U.S.C. §§

12, et seq.), not the Commodities Exchange Act (the

“CEA”, 7 U.S.C. §§ 25(c), et seq.) at issue here. While

Petitioners warn of “far-reaching consequences” and

violations of “principles of constitutional due

process,” (Pet. 2) this disagreement has lasted for

decades, with half the Circuits having not yet decided

this issue and the six that have decided evenly split

between following the approach first applied by

United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

and that first raised by United States Court of

Appeals for the Second Circuit. There is no need to

decide this issue now and, even if this was the time,

this case—which is under the CEA—is not the case

to do so.

And, indeed, the CEA's legislative history—

enacted well after the Clayton Act and the venue

provision specifically amended well after the Ninth

Circuit adapted this approach (see infra at 17)

necessitates a different review from what would be

required for the Clayton Act.

2

To

finally

decide

this

long-existing

disagreement between Circuits as to what is

primarily an issue of the language of the Clayton Act

in the context of the CEA is far from ideal. If the

Court decides narrowly and only decides on the

language of the CEA, this creates substantial

uncertainty as to the interpretation of similar

language in the Clayton Act. If the Court decides

broadly and decides for all statutes with similar

language, then it must decide substantial issues that

are not relevant to this case at all. Indeed, nearly all

cases that Petitioners cite for this issue concern the

Clayton Act, and none concern the CEA.

This disagreement is long-running, going back

35 years, when the Ninth Circuit in Go-Video, Inc. v.

Akai Elec. Co., 885 F.2d 1406 (9th Cir. 1989),

declined to follow the Second Circuit’s interpretation

of Section 12 of the Clayton Act set forth in Goldlawr,

Inc. v. Heiman, 288 F.2d 579, 581 (2d Cir. 1961).

Other Circuits gradually decided on the issue, with

the most recent being the Seventh Circuit in 2013 in

KM Enterprises, Inc. v. Global Traffic Technologies,

Inc., 725 F.3d 718 (7th Cir. 2013). In all, three

Circuits (Third, Fifth, and Ninth) follow the approach

originally set forth by the Ninth Circuit allowing

nationwide service; three follow the narrower

reading first set forth by the Second Circuit (D.C.,

Second, and Seventh); and the remaining six (First,

Fourth, Sixth, Eighth, Tenth, and Eleventh) appear

to have yet not reached the issue.

3

Thus, there is no urgency here to rule on this

issue as it continues to percolate through the

Circuits, and particularly no urgency to decide such

an issue under a different statute than where the

dispute mostly arises. If this Court is to review this

issue, it is best done for a case under the Clayton Act.

Nor is this a pressing matter where a

misguided court of appeals has ignored the law and

risks dangerous consequences. The Ninth Circuit’s

approach is based on thoughtful interpretation of the

statutory text and legislative intent and has since

been followed by the Third and Fifth circuits.

The Court should respectfully deny the

petition.

REASONS FOR DENYING THE PETITION

A. This Case is a Poor Vehicle as it

Concerns the Commodities Exchange

Act, not the Widely-Litigated Clayton

Act

This case is a poor vehicle to resolve this issue

because it overwhelmingly arises in disputes over the

Clayton Act—and less commonly the Securities Act

or Securities Exchange Act—and only rarely under

the CEA. While it may be true that private plaintiffs

file “thousands of actions each year under federal

commodities, securities, and antitrust laws,” (Pet.

21) few of those appear to turn on this issue under

the CEA. In fact, this seems to be the first time that

this issue has arisen under the CEA in the Ninth

4

Circuit, despite a disagreement amongst the Circuits

existing for decades. If the Court is to visit this issue,

it is best done in the context of the Clayton Act, where

most of the disputes arise.

Indeed, nearly every single case that

Petitioners rely on for interpretation of the language

at issue concerns the Clayton Act. See Action

Embroidery Corp. v. Atl. Embroidery, Inc., 368 F.3d

1174, 1177 (9th Cir. 2004) (Section 22 of Clayton Act);

Daniel, 428 F.3d at 422 (same); Go-Video, 885 F.2d

1406 at 1411 (same); GTE New Media Servs. v.

BellSouth Corp., 199 F.3d 1343, 1350 (D.C. Cir. 2000)

(same); In re Auto. Refinishing Paint Antitrust Litig.,

358 F.3d 288, 290 (3d Cir. 2004); KM Enters., Inc.,

725 F.3d at 723 (same). The only exception is a pair

of Ninth Circuit cases analyzing, respectively, the

Securities Act and the Exchange Act. SEC v. Ross,

504 F.3d 1130, 1139 (9th Cir. 2007) (Securities Act);

Sec. Inv’r Prot. Corp. v. Vigman, 764 F.2d 1309, 1315

(9th Cir. 1985) (Exchange Act).

This is not a minor quibble. The Second Circuit

in Daniel specifically cautioned against analyzing

the venue provisions of the Clayton Act and the

Exchange Act as interchangeable, because despite

their similar language, “‘analysis of special venue

provisions must be specific to the statute’ because

Congress’s intent may be permissive in some

circumstances and restrictive in others.” Daniel, 428

F.3d 408, 426 (2d Cir. 2005) (quoting Cortez Byrd

Chips, Inc., 529 U.S. at 204). Indeed, in addition to

5

potential differences in Congressional intent, the

Second Circuit in Daniel recognized that subtle

differences between the language in the Clayton Act

and Exchange Act could necessitate a different

outcome. See id. As the Second Circuit noted, the

Exchange Act (which language the CEA tracks in

relevant part) allows venue where “any act or

transaction constituting the violation occurred,” but

the Clayton Act does not—it only allows venue where

the defendant is “an inhabitant,” “may be found,” or

“transacts business.” See Daniel, 428 F.3d at 426

(quoting 15 U.S.C. § 78aa; 15 U.S.C. § 22); see also 7

U.S.C. § 25(c).

part:

Specifically, the Clayton Act reads in relevant

Any suit, action, or proceeding under

the antitrust laws against a corporation

may be brought not only in the judicial

district whereof it is an inhabitant, but

also in any district wherein it may be

found or transacts business; and all

process in such cases may be served in

the district of which it is an inhabitant,

or wherever it may be found.

15 U.S.C. § 22 (emphasis added). But the Exchange

Act additionally allows for venue where “any act of

transaction constituting the violation occurred”:

Any criminal proceeding may be

brought in the district wherein any act

6

or transaction constituting the violation

occurred. Any suit or action to enforce

any liability or duty created by this

chapter or rules and regulations

thereunder, or to enjoin any violation of

such chapter or rules and regulations,

may be brought in any such district or in

the district wherein the defendant is

found or is an inhabitant or transacts

business, and process in such cases may

be served in any other district of which

the defendant is an inhabitant or

wherever the defendant may be found.

15 U.S.C. § 78aa (emphasis added).

The CEA more closely tracks the language of the

Exchange Act, allowing venue where “any act of

transaction constituting the violation occurs”:

Any action brought under subsection (a)

of this section may be brought in any

judicial district wherein the defendant

is found, resides, or transacts business,

or in the judicial district wherein any

act or transaction constituting the

violation occurs. Process in such action

may be served in any judicial district of

which the defendant is an inhabitant or

wherever the defendant may be found.

7 U.S.C. § 25(c).

7

While the Ninth Circuit found here that those

distinctions were not relevant to applications of its

existing precedent on the facts of this case—as the

final clause of each section is the same—it does mean

that deciding this issue under the CEA as a proxy for

the more commonly-litigated Clayton Act introduces

potential complexities even based on simply the

statutory text. And, even aside from the language,

the distinct policy differences between antitrust law

and commodities law could come into play, as well as

different amendment history.

Thus, to resolve this split under the CEA—

rather than the Clayton Act where the split actually

exists—the Court would have to walk a narrow line.

If it rules narrowly to only apply to the CEA itself,

then this would risk significantly more confusion

than currently exists, as litigants and lower courts

would be uncertain what rule would properly apply.

On the other hand, if the Court were to decide

broadly and rule on the language as it applies to the

Clayton Act and Exchange Act, it would do so based

on a case that does not involve any specific issues

unique to either of those statutes. That difference

specifically militates against review of a CEA case,

as this issue rarely arises under the CEA, but does so

significantly more commonly under the Clayton Act;

this was an issue of first impression before the Ninth

Circuit despite the rule being in place for more than

three decades. Far better, even if this is the time to

decide the issue—rather than at least wait for some

of the remaining Circuits to take a position—to wait

8

for one of the more numerous Clayton Act cases to be

ripe for such review.

Lastly, this case is not final, but just at the

start, giving yet another reason to not review now:

the Ninth Circuit remanded for proceedings on the

merits of Petitioners’ Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

12(b)(6) motion. (Pet. App. 3a.) See Va. Military Inst.

v. United States, 508 U.S. 946, 946 (1993) (“We

generally await final judgment in the lower courts

before exercising our certiorari jurisdiction.”) (Scalia,

J., concurring). This case is a poor vehicle for review.

B. The Disagreement Between the

Circuits is Still Percolating, with a 3to-3 Split and Six Circuits Still Silent

The Ninth Circuit’s decision here was not

novel, but followed the Circuit’s 35-year precedent,

which even then explicitly rejected a contrary

reading from the Second Circuit in Goldlawr, Inc. v.

Heiman of 28-years earlier still. See Go-Video, Inc.,

885 F.2d at 1411 (“we see no conflict between our

holding today and that of the Second Circuit some

twenty-eight years ago”) (citing Goldlawr, Inc. v.

Heiman, 288 F.2d 579, 581 (2d Cir. 1961)); see

Goldlawr, Inc., 288 F.2d at 581 (under Clayton Act

Section 12, “if a corporation is not an inhabitant of, is

not found in, and does not transact business in, the

district, suit may not be so brought”), rev’d on other

grounds, 369 U.S. 463 (1962). The Fifth Circuit later

adopted the Ninth Circuit’s reasoning in 1999,

holding that when “jurisdiction is invoked under the

9

Clayton Act, the court examines the defendant’s

contacts with the United States as a whole to

determine whether the requirements of due process

have been met.” Access Telecomms., Inc. v. MCI

Telecomms. Corp., 197 F.3d 694, 718 (5th Cir. 1999)

(citing Go-Video, Inc., 885 F.2d at 1406); see In re

Auto. Refinishing Paint Antitrust Litig., 358 F.3d at

297 (recognizing Fifth Circuit rule as in accord with

Ninth Circuit interpretation; “At least two sister

Circuits have held that when personal jurisdiction is

invoked under the Clayton Act, jurisdiction is based

on the defendants’ contacts with the United States as

a whole.”).

The D.C. Circuit first held a differing view in

2000; while the Ninth and Second Circuits both

recognized that the language in Goldlawr was dicta,

the D.C. Circuit found Goldlawr persuasive and

expressly “disagree[d]” with the Ninth Circuit’s

interpretation of Section 12 of the Clayton Act. GTE

New Media Servs., 199 F.3d at 1351; see Daniel, 428

F.3d at 423 (recognizing Goldlawr’s “observation” as

“dictum” but holding that Section 12 of the Clayton

Act “indicates that its service of process provision

applies (and, therefore, establishes personal

jurisdiction) only in cases in which its venue

provision is satisfied”); Go-Video, Inc., 885 F.2d at

1411 (recognizing Goldlawr language as dicta). Five

years later, the Second Circuit “b[rought] the process

full circle” after more than 40 years, adopting the

D.C. Circuit rule that had relied on its dicta in

Goldlawr, in Daniel v. American Board of Emergency

10

Medicine. 428 F.3d at 423.

The Third Circuit ruled on the issue in 2004.

In re Auto. Refinishing Paint Antitrust Litig., 358

F.3d 297. While Petitioners interpret the Third

Circuit’s rule as an approach distinct from that

followed by other Circuits, this interpretation is

based on a footnote explaining further why the Third

Circuit found the Ninth Circuit’s approach in GoVideo “convincing and well reasoned.” In re Auto.

Refinishing Paint Antitrust Litig., 358 F.3d 297 &

n.10. Not only does In re Automotive Refinishing

Paint Antitrust Litigation not give any clear

indication that the Third Circuit sought to break

from the Ninth Circuit, but the Second Circuit has

also interpreted the Third Circuit’s rule as being the

same as that of the Ninth Circuit. See Daniel, 428

F.3d 408 at 423 (“Our sister circuits are split over the

proper interpretation of the venue and process

provisions of Section 12. The Third and Ninth

Circuits hold that Section 12’s service of process

provision is ‘independent of and does not require

satisfaction of’ the section's venue provision.”)

(quoting In re Auto. Refinishing Paint Antitrust

Litig., 358 F.3d 297; citing Action Embroidery Corp.

v. Atlantic Embroidery, Inc., 368 F.3d 1174, 1179-80

(9th Cir. 2004)).

The most recent Circuit to rule on this issue

was the Seventh Circuit, in 2012, in KM Enterprises,

Inc. v. Glob. Traffic Technologies, Inc., 725 F.3d 718

(7th Cir. 2013). The First, Fourth, Sixth, Eighth,

11

Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits appear to have not yet

reached this issue.

Thus, three circuits—the Third, Fifth, and

Ninth Circuits—read the relevant language broadly

to allow for nationwide service; three—the D.C.,

Second, and Seventh—read it narrowly; and six—the

First, Fourth, Sixth, Eighth, and Eleventh—had not

yet reached the issue. To summarize the timeline of

cases addressing the relevant language in the context

of Section 12 of the Clayton Act:

Year

Case

1961 Goldlawr,

Inc.

v.

Heiman, 288 F.2d 579,

581 (2d Cir. 1961)

1989 Go-Video, Inc. v. Akai

Elec. Co., 885 F.2d 1406,

1411 (9th Cir. 1989)

1999

Summary

Addressing

issue in dicta

First court of

appeals to rule

on

issue,

disagreeing

with Goldlawr

dicta,

suggesting

future split

Access Telecomms., Inc. Second court

v.

MCI

Telecomms. of appeals to

Corp., 197 F.3d 694, 718 rule on issue—

(5th Cir. 1999)

adopting

Ninth Circuit

interpretation

12

2000

GTE New Media Servs.

Inc. v. Bellsouth Corp.,

199 F.3d 1343 (D.C. Cir.

2000)

2004

In re Auto. Refinishing

Paint Antitrust Litig.,

358 F.3d 288, 297 (3d

Cir. 2004)

2005

Daniel v. Am. Bd. of

Emergency Med., 428

F.3d 408, 422 (2d Cir.

2005)

2013

KM Enterprises, Inc. v.

Glob.

Traffic

Technologies, Inc., 725

F.3d 718 (7th Cir. 2013)

Third court of

appeals to rule

on

issue—

adopting

Goldlawr

dicta, formally

creating

2-1

split

Fourth court

of appeals to

rule on issue,

adopting

Ninth Circuit

interpretation,

bringing split

to 3-1

Fifth court of

appeals to rule

on

issue,

adopting same

holding

as

Goldlawr

dicta 40 years

prior, bringing

split to 3-2

Sixth court of

appeals to rule

on

issue,

adopting

Goldlawr

interpretation,

13

bringing split

to 3-3

In other words, even to the extent this dispute

concerns Section 12 of the Clayton Act, this has been

a slowly percolating disagreement with the different

circuits, in turn, finding one approach or another

persuasive, and it now sits at an even split as to the

six Circuits that have decided, with the remaining six

Circuits still silent.

This is not a situation where the Ninth Circuit

has stubbornly followed an interpretation that is

unaccepted and risks serious harm. Instead, a

disagreement between at least the Second and Ninth

Circuits has existed for 35 years, with each view

having proven persuasive to another two Circuits

each. Nor has there been a flood of CEA cases seeking

to forum shop. While other cases have addressed the

similar language under other statutes, the

interpretation of this provision of the CEA appears to

be an issue of first impression before any Circuit;

when this issue was before the United States District

Court for the District of Arizona, it relied on a

footnote in a case from the Southern District of New

York as the other persuasive authority on the statute

that had been presented. (Pet. App. 38(a).) See Fire

& Police Pension Ass’n of Colo. v. Bank of Montreal,

368 F. Supp. 3d 681, 695 n.11 (S.D.N.Y 2019). There

14

is no pressing need to review this issue, which has

not meaningfully changed in more than decade.

C. On the Merits, the Ninth Circuit’s

Interpretation is Correct and Based

on a Careful Reading of the Text and

the CEA’s Legislative History

Despite Petitioners’ arguments that the Ninth

Circuit’s interpretation of the relevant language is

not properly based on the statutory text, it is in fact

based on both a careful reading of the text and

relevant statutory history and purpose.

First, while Petitioners insist without

argument that the relevant language is “plain,” that

is not only contradicted by the substantial and

ongoing dispute, but by the Third Circuit, in the

same footnote that Petitioners invoke to seek to

portray its view as distinct from that of the Ninth

Circuit. In re Auto. Refinishing Paint Antitrust Litig.,

358 F.3d 288 at 296 (“because we do not find the

language of Section 12 to be clear and unambiguous,

we are not persuaded by the ‘plain’ or ‘unadorned’

reading of the statutory language by the GTE court”)

(emphasis added). While in part that opens a dispute

on the statutory purpose—which, again, may differ

between the Clayton Act’s enforcement of antitrust

prohibitions and the CEA’s policing of commodities

manipulation—it also necessitates parsing the

ambiguous language in the statute, particularly

what “in such action” means.

15

The Ninth Circuit specifically engaged in this

careful textual analysis 35 years ago in Go-Video. 885

F.2d at 1412. There, it found explicitly that “such” in

the second sentence of the relevant language referred

to any antitrust action brought under the statute,

based on the standard grammatical rule that “when

used to modify a noun, ‘such’ is always presumed to

refer back to that noun as it appeared previously in

the text; ‘such’ does not modify other clauses or

nouns.” Go-Video, Inc, 885 F.2d at 1412. The Ninth

Circuit below expanded upon this, quoting a guide to

statutory interpretation, which went on to note that

“such,” when used in this context, “refers to a

particular antecedent noun and any dependent

adjective or adjectival clauses modifying that noun,

but not to any other part of the preceding clause or

sentence.” (Pet. App. 15a (citing 2A Norman J. Singer

&

Shambie

Singer,

Sutherland

Statutory

Construction § 47:33 n.1 (7th ed. 2023 update)

(emphasis added).)

Put another way, both sentences refer to “[an]

action brought” under the statute—there is no

textual reason to necessarily read the second

sentence to refer specifically to an action brought

only in a judicial district referred in the preceding

sentence:

Any action brought under subsection (a)

of this section may be brought in any

judicial district wherein the defendant

is found, resides, or transacts business,

16

or in the judicial district wherein any

act or transaction constituting the

violation occurs. Process in such action

may be served in any judicial district of

which the defendant is an inhabitant or

wherever the defendant may be found.

7 U.S.C. § 25(c) (emphasis added).

Petitioners read this use of “such action” as

narrower, to mean “the action qualifying for venue in

the immediately preceding sentence,” but rely only

on a definition from Webster’s Third New

International Dictionary (Unabridged) 2283 (1986),

indicating that “such” means “’character, quality, or

extent’ of ‘the sort or degree previously indicated.’”

(Pet. 18). But that fails to address the key textual

finding of the Go-Video court, that “such” is

presumed to refer to the previous noun, not the entire

previous phrase. Go-Video, Inc, 885 F.2d at 1412. The

Ninth Circuit rule—as followed by the Third and

Fifth Circuits—does deeply engage with the text of

the statute.

Beyond the statutory interpretation, the

CEA’s legislative history also indicates, as the Ninth

Circuit recognized, that Congress specifically

intended it to convey nationwide jurisdiction—and

such intent may not necessarily apply to the Clayton

Act or other statutes. Congress affirmatively

amended the CEA’s service and venue processions in

1992 in response to a decision from this Court finding

17

that nationwide service of process “was not implicit”

in the Act. (Pet. App. 16a (quoting Omni Cap. Int’l,

Ltd. v. Rudolf Wolff & Co., 484 U.S. 97 (1987)).

Importantly, 1992 was only three years after the

Ninth Circuit had interpreted similar language

broadly in Go-Video, and Congress indicated that its

purpose in amendment was to provide for expanded

“‘nationwide service of process and expanded venue

provisions’ . . . not for nationwide service only if

venue is first established.” (Pet. App. 17a (emphasis

in original) (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 102-6, at 23 (Mar.

1, 1991))). And even if the statement is read as

ambiguous, it was contained in a report by the House

of Representatives Committee on Agriculture—thus

creating an issue of Congressional intent distinct

from any that is likely to arise in interpretation of the

Clayton Act of Exchange Act.

Lastly, nothing in the Venue Clarification Act

of 2011 (the “VCA,” Pub. L. No. 112-63, 125 Stat. 758)

contradicts the rule followed by the Third, Fifth, and

Ninth Circuits. The Ninth Circuit correctly rejected

this argument below: even if the Venue Clarification

Act modified the venue provision of the CEA and

other statutes, Defendants-Appellees have “pointed

to nothing” that “would impact [the] interpretation of

the service of process” or jurisdiction provisions of the

statute. (Pet. App. 19a.) To the extent that

Petitioners have clarified their argument here, it still

begs the question: they argue that the VCA was

“‘intended to avoid the possibility of an overly broad

assertion of venue,” and the Ninth Circuit’s approach

18

“does exactly that—allows plaintiffs to bypass the

actual language of the statute.” (Pet. 21 (citing H.R.

Rep. No. 112-10, at 20 (2011).) But the textual

analysis requires more than asserting one

interpretation is correct when three Circuits have

reached the contrary conclusion.

The Ninth Circuit correctly found that the

CEA conveys nationwide jurisdiction.

CONCLUSION

The petition for a writ of certiorari should be

denied.

Dated: May 29, 2025

Respectfully submitted,

ALEXANDER KOLODIN

Counsel of Record

KOLODIN LAW GROUP PLLC

4105 North 20th Street, Suite 110

Phoenix, Arizona 85016

(602) 730-2985

alexander.kolodin@kolodinlaw.com

SCHMIDT LAW CORPORATION

MATTHEW W. SCHMIDT

116A Main Street

Tiburon, California 94920

(415) 390-6075

matt@schmidtlc.com

Counsel for Respondent Ryan Cox