Amicus Curiae Brief — James Harper, Petitioner v. Michael Faulkender, Acting Commissioner of Internal Revenue Service, et al.

Supreme Court briefMar 28, 2025

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NO. 24-922

In the

Supreme Court of the United States

________________

JAMES HARPER,

Petitioner,

DOUGLAS O’DONNELL, ACTING COMMISSIONER OF

INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, ET AL.

________________

Respondents.

On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the United

States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit

________________

MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE BRIEF AND BRIEF

FOR AMICUS CURIAE

PROFESSOR ADAM J. MACLEOD

IN SUPPORT OF PETITIONER

________________

A. Kristina Littman

Counsel of Record

Jeremy Bylund

WILLKIE FARR

& GALLAGHER LLP

1875 K Street N.W.

Washington, DC 20006

(202) 303-1209

aklittman@willkie.com

Counsel for Amicus Curiae

March 28, 2025

Professor Adam J. MacLeod respectfully seeks

leave of this Court to file an amicus brief in support of

the petitioner, despite a failure to provide the required

notice under Supreme Court Rule 37.2. Professor

MacLeod is Professor of Law at St. Mary’s University

in Texas. He is also a Research Fellow of the Center

for Religion, Culture, and Democracy and a Senior

Scholar and former Thomas Edison Fellow in the

Center for Intellectual Property x Innovation Policy at

George Mason University. He researches and writes

about foundational, common-law doctrines and

concepts and their application to contemporary legal

issues. Professor MacLeod is co-editor of Christie and

Martin’s Jurisprudence (4th edition, West Academic

2020) and Foundations of Law (Carolina Academic

Press 2017). He is the author of Property and Practical

Reason (Cambridge University Press 2015), The Age of

Selfies: Reasoning About Rights When the Stakes Are

Personal (Rowman and Littlefield 2020), and articles,

essays, and book reviews in peer-reviewed journals

and law reviews in the United States, United

Kingdom, and Australia. He is interested in helping

courts to develop a sound understanding, and to make

correct use, of legal doctrines such as the rules that

govern property at common law, in order to shape

rights in intangible resources, such as personal

information and private data.

Lead counsel for Professor MacLeod, A. Kristina

Littman, only took over this representation yesterday,

after Professor MacLeod’s previous counsel withdrew

unexpectedly from the representation.

counsel for Professor MacLeod had failed to provide

the required notice of intent to file this brief under

Rule 37.2. Immediately upon discovering this, counsel

for Professor MacLeod emailed counsel for petitioner

and counsel for respondents, apologizing for failing to

provide the required notice and seeking their consent

to file this brief. Counsel for petitioner gave consent,

while counsel for respondents has not yet responded

to counsel for Professor MacLeod’s outreach.

Previous counsel’s failure to notify petitioner and

respondents as per this Court’s Rules was inexcusable.

But current counsel for Professor MacLeod took steps

to ameliorate that failure as soon as they learned of it.

And respondents (who have not consented to filing this

brief) will not suffer any prejudice from the late notice;

they waived their right to respond to petitioner’s brief,

and will have ample opportunity to respond to this

brief if this Court were to call for response. Under

those circumstances, and given the unique and

important contribution that Professor MacLeod can

offer, this Court should grant the motion and permit

the filing of Professor MacLeod’s amicus brief in

support of petitioner.

For the foregoing reasons, the motion should be

granted.

Respectfully submitted,

A. Kristina Littman

Counsel of Record

Jeremy Bylund

WILLKIE FARR

& GALLAGHER LLP

1875 K Street N.W.

Washington, DC 20006

(202) 303-1209

aklittman@willkie.com

Counsel for Amicus Curiae

March 28, 2025

TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ....................................... ii

STATEMENT OF INTEREST ................................... 1

INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF

ARGUMENT ............................................................ 2

ARGUMENT ............................................................... 2

Personal Information is Private Property in

Our Fundamental Law ........................................ 2

II. Property Norms and Institutions Determine

Who Has Rights to Access Private Data............. 6

A. Property Defines Rights in Intangible as

Well as Tangible Personal Property. ........... 7

B. Bailments of Personal Information Are

Bailments. ..................................................... 8

C. Bailments of Personal Information

Preserve Private Property Rights. ............. 12

III. The First Circuit’s Decision Failed to

Acknowledge That Longstanding Right ........... 13

CONCLUSION ......................................................... 14

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases

Page(s)

American Sur. Co. of N.Y. v. Baker,

172 F.2d 689 (4th Cir. 1949) ................................ 12

Carpenter v. United States,

484 U.S. 19 (1987) .................................................. 7

Carpenter v. United States,

585 U.S. 296 (2018) ................................................ 7

Eisenstadt v. Baird,

405 U.S. 438 (1972) ................................................ 4

Entick v. Carrington

(1765), 95 Eng. Rep. 807 (KB) ............................... 6

George Bohannon Transp., Inc. v. Davis,

323 F.2d 755 (10th Cir. 1963) .............................. 12

Goldin v. Pub. Utilities Comm’n,

592 P.2d 289 (Cal. 1979) ...................................... 11

Howard v. United States,

101 Ct. Cl. 823 (1944)........................................... 12

Roe v. Wade,

410 U.S. 113 (1973) ................................................ 4

Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto,

467 U.S. 986 (1984) ................................................ 7

iii

The W.C. Block, 71 F.2d 682 (2d Cir.

1934), cert. denied 293 U.S. 579

(1934) .................................................................... 12

Statutes

47 U.S.C. §153(11) ..................................................... 10

Other Authorities

TYLER BERRY, COMMUNICATIONS BY

WIRE AND RADIO: A TREATISE (1937).................... 11

2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES

ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND ................................ 3, 11

MICHAEL BRIDGE, PERSONAL PROPERTY

LAW (3d ed. 2002) ............................................... 3, 8

RAY ANDREWS BROWN, THE LAW OF

PERSONAL PROPERTY (Walter B.

Raushenbush ed., 3d ed. 1975) .............. 8, 9, 10, 12

H. Tomás Gómez-Arostegui, Copyright

at Common Law in 1774, 47 CONN.

L. REV. 1 (2014)................................................... 5, 6

Mark A. Hall, Common Carriers Under

the Communications Act, 48 U. CHI.

L. REV. 409 (1981) ................................................ 11

Jim Harper, Personal Information is

Property, 73 U. Kan. L. Rev. 113

(2024) ...................................................................... 7

Orin S. Kerr, Norms of Computer

Trespass, 116 COLUM. L. REV. 1143

(2016) ...................................................................... 7

Jake Linford, A Second Look at the

Right of First Publication, 58 J.

Adam J. MacLeod, Cyber Trespass and

Property Concepts, 10 IP THEORY 4

(2021) ...................................................................... 7

THOMAS W. MERRILL AND HENRY E.

SMITH, THE OXFORD INTRODUCTIONS

TO U.S. LAW: PROPERTY (2010) ............................... 9

Melville B. Nimmer, Copyright

Publication, 56 COLUM. L. REV. 185

(1956) ...................................................................... 9

Eric Schnapper, Unreasonable Searches

and Seizures of Papers, 71 VA. L.

REV. 869 (1985)................................................... 5, 6

JAMES SCHOULER, A TREATISE ON THE

LAW OF PERSONAL PROPERTY (5th ed.

1918) ....................................................................... 3

JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE

LAW OF BAILMENTS (8th ed. 1870).......................... 9

Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis,

The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV.

193 (1890) ........................................................... 4, 5

Who Is a Carrier, Generally, 13 AM. JUR.

2D CARRIERS § 1 (2024) ......................................... 11

STATEMENT OF INTEREST1

Adam J. MacLeod is Professor of Law at St.

Mary’s University in Texas. He is also a Research

Fellow of the Center for Religion, Culture, and

Democracy and a Senior Scholar and former Thomas

Edison Fellow in the Center for Intellectual Property

x Innovation Policy at George Mason University. He

researches and writes about foundational, commonlaw doctrines and concepts and their application to

contemporary legal issues. Professor MacLeod is coeditor of Christie and Martin’s Jurisprudence (4th

edition, West Academic 2020) and Foundations of Law

(Carolina Academic Press 2017). He is the author of

Property and Practical Reason (Cambridge University

Press 2015), The Age of Selfies: Reasoning About

Rights When the Stakes Are Personal (Rowman and

Littlefield 2020), and articles, essays, and book

reviews in peer-reviewed journals and law reviews in

the United States, United Kingdom, and Australia. He

is interested in helping courts to develop a sound

understanding, and to make correct use, of legal

doctrines such as the rules that govern property at

common law, in order to shape rights in intangible

1 Counsel for amicus curiae failed to notify the parties of the

filing of this brief at least 10 days ahead of time, as Supreme

Court Rule 37.2 requires, and as such this brief is preceded by a

motion for leave to file it. Pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 37.6,

counsel for amicus curiae states that no counsel for any party

authored this brief in whole or in part and that no entity or

person, aside from amicus curiae and his counsel, made any

monetary contribution toward the preparation or submission of

this brief.

resources, such as personal information and private

data.

INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF

ARGUMENT

Fundamental property law answers the question

who may access personal information, without resort

to judicial assessments of privacy rights. The rights of

property in personal information are defined and

alienated by classic property institutions, such as

bailment, license, and assignment. The doctrine of

bailment, in particular, has long played a crucial role

in defining and identifying rights in personal

information. Under that doctrine, persons entrusted

with personal information, such as telephone

companies and cryptocurrency exchanges, have the

right to prevent persons foreign to the bailment from

accessing the information entrusted to them.

The First Circuit did not address that

longstanding interest in the decision below, instead

asserting that Harper failed to define a property

interest that could be bailed. This was error. Such

error could result in courts concluding that personal

information is not private property subject to the

rights and protections afforded by the doctrine of

bailment. This Court should grant the petition and

correct such error.

ARGUMENT

Personal Information is Private Property in

Our Fundamental Law

For centuries, our fundamental law has

understood private information to be private property

in certain circumstances. Rather than using an

abstract notion of privacy, the law employs longestablished property concepts to draw the boundary

between mine and yours, private and public. The

rights and duties of trespass, bailment, carriage, and

license determine what belongs to different persons,

what remains private, and what has been made

public. This history and tradition of dealing with

information as property can be traced from

eighteenth-century English cases about illegal

searches and common law copyright through

twentieth-century laws that govern telephone

companies as carriers to contemporary cases

concerning private data entrusted to Internet service

providers and email services.

Property at common law and in American

constitutional doctrine includes, and always has

included, both tangible and intangible resources. In

his Commentaries, Blackstone devoted an entire

chapter of the volume concerning property to the law

of incorporeal hereditaments. 2 William Blackstone,

COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND *20–43.

These are property rights in things that cannot be

“seen and handled by the body” but “are creatures of

the mind.” Id. at *17. They are nonetheless objects of

property. Personal and intellectual property became

more important in the decades after Blackstone wrote

his Commentaries, and later treatises emphasize

choses in action, debts, and other forms of intangible

property not tied to land. See JAMES SCHOULER, A

TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PERSONAL PROPERTY 9–16

(5th ed. 1918); MICHAEL BRIDGE, PERSONAL PROPERTY

LAW 144–47 (3d ed. 2002). As new types of property

have entered mainstream culture and commerce,

jurists have repeatedly employed established property

concepts to identify them and to discern the rights

people have in them.

Property is a source of legal concepts for defining

rights and duties in personal information and data.

Our fundamental law, the common law, has secured

private rights in personal information, opinions, and

records for many centuries. Since at least the

eighteenth century (and probably earlier), information

that could reveal a person’s opinions and expressions

remains protected property of the person unless and

until it is published, that is, until the person whose

information it is makes it public. This fundamental

doctrine of our law is an important legal safeguard for

intangible, personal property. It is specified in

distinct, fundamental, legal rights which American

constitutions take as given, including the common law

right against illegal searches, and the right against

self-incrimination.

The modern right now known as the “right to

privacy” is plausible insofar as it is derived from the

common law right to keep one’s information to oneself.

Today, the term “right to privacy” is associated with

the judicially-created doctrine of substantive due

process, as stated in judicial opinions in Eisenstadt v.

Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) and Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S.

113 (1973). But the fundamental common law secured

a right to keep one’s personal information private

centuries before this Court considered challenges to

contraception and abortion laws. See generally

Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to

Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193, 195–202 (1890). The

more fundamental and older right is a right to keep

one’s written expressions and personal information to

oneself. Id. at 198–204.

At common law, every person has the right to keep

his writings, correspondence, opinions, intellectual

creations, and other personal data secret and to

determine the conditions on which he is willing to

make them public. Warren and Brandeis, at 198–204;

Eric Schnapper, Unreasonable Searches and Seizures

of Papers, 71 VA. L. REV. 869, 882 (1985); Jake Linford,

A Second Look at the Right of First Publication, 58 J.

right is a fundamental, common-law right because it

is grounded in natural right, custom, and usage, as

contrasted with the statutory privilege of copyright

protection in intellectual works after publication,

which is contingent upon positive law. Indeed,

English courts, which declared the right in landmark

decisions in the eighteenth century, dated its

authority at least as far back as Magna Carta.

Schnapper, at 877, 912.

One instance of this fundamental right is

sometimes known as the common law copyright. H.

Tomás Gómez-Arostegui, Copyright at Common Law

in 1774, 47 CONN. L. REV. 1, 5–6 (2014). Like the rights

against illegal searches and seizures, jurists

understood this right to be grounded in natural law

and usage, rather than to be contingent on positive

enactments. Id. at 28–46. The common law copyright

is particularly important during times of social appeal

and civic division, such as ours. The privacy of

personal information is never more important than

when information can be used unjustly against a

person.

The right to keep personal information private

became the official doctrine of our fundamental law

long before this Court’s twentieth-century privacy

decisions. The constitutions of the United States and

of the several states declare some specific instances of

the right, such as the prohibitions against illegal

searches and seizures. Schnapper, at 912–24. Others,

such as the right to determine the first publication of

one’s writings and the right against selfincrimination, are simply taken as given. Linford, at

604–20; Schnapper, at 924–28.

All of the specific instances of the right to keep

one’s information private share a common feature—

they all treat one’s private information, expressions,

and writings as private property. Linford, at 621–22.

Like other forms of property, the common law

copy of one’s writings to a second person is not an act

of publication that would alienate or abolish the

private right. Id. at 597. Similarly, jurists have long

thought of the right to keep one’s papers free from

search or seizure by public officials as a type of

property. Schnapper, at 866, 882, 890–91, 902–03. As

one jurist expressed the idea in a landmark case,

private “papers are often the dearest property a man

can have.” Entick v. Carrington (1765), 95 Eng. Rep.

807, 817–18 (KB).

II. Property Norms and Institutions Determine

Who Has Rights to Access Private Data.

A. Property Defines Rights in Intangible as

Well as Tangible Personal Property.

As members of this Court have recognized in

earlier decisions, personal property concepts, such as

bailment and assignment, can explain a lot about

rights and duties with respect to intangible resources,

such as personal data, commercial data, and trade

secrets. See Carpenter v. United States, 484 U.S. 19,

25–26 (1987) (“Confidential business information has

long been recognized as property.”); Ruckelshaus v.

Monsanto, 467 U.S. 986, 1002–04 (1984); see also

Carpenter v. United States, 585 U.S. 296, 383–85

(2018) (Alito, J., dissenting); id. at 399–400 (Gorsuch,

J., dissenting). See generally Jim Harper, Personal

Information is Property, 73 U. KAN. L. REV. 113, 136–

43 (2024). The doctrine of trespass can determine, for

example, who has a right to exclude whom from

certain confidential information. Orin S. Kerr, Norms

of Computer Trespass, 116 COLUM. L. REV. 1143

(2016). The doctrines of bailment and license

determine who has access to it and on what terms.

Adam J. MacLeod, Cyber Trespass and Property

Concepts, 10 IP THEORY 4 (2021).

The information created in a cryptocurrency

exchange differs from the personal papers and effects

that were at issue in the seventeenth and eighteenth

centuries in a couple of respects. But neither respect

makes an important difference. First, the data are

stored as intangible things rather than on tangible

papers. But as with the private papers at issue in

eighteenth-century England and in copyright cases

throughout the centuries, it is the intangible

information that is of interest, not the medium on

which is it stored or expressed.

Second, some intangible data are created by two

or more persons rather than one. Traders of digital

currency and the host of the exchange collaborate to

generate data about the transaction and its

participants. But the data they generate are not

public; the information remains private, unless it is

published. So, it is jointly owned by its creators.

Information created and owned jointly by more than

one person is much like the concurrent ownership of

siblings in a family business, or husband and wife in

the marital home. That more than one person has

access to it does not destroy the private rights in it.

Though the co-creators may share access, and may

exercise their powers of ownership to allow third

persons to access the information, they may also

exclude third persons.

B. Bailments of Personal Information Are

Bailments.

Owners of property rights assign rights and

duties using established property institutions. One of

the most important property rights for both personal

and intangible property is the bailment. A bailment

can function in a similar way for intangible things,

such as telephone messages and emails, as it does for

tangible things, such as cars and coins. This is because

the bailment is not the thing itself but the rights and

duties that are transferred from the bailor to the

bailee. MICHAEL BRIDGE, PERSONAL PROPERTY LAW

33–43 (3d ed. 2002); RAY ANDREWS BROWN, THE LAW

OF PERSONAL PROPERTY

209–389 (Walter B.

Raushenbush ed., 3d ed. 1975); JOSEPH STORY,

COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF BAILMENTS (8th ed.

1870).

In all bailments, the bailor yields rights of

possession and control of the resource to the bailee

subject to the bailee’s duty either to redeliver the

resource or to deliver it to another person at the

bailor’s direction. THOMAS W. MERRILL AND HENRY E.

SMITH, THE OXFORD INTRODUCTIONS TO U.S. LAW:

PROPERTY 87–89 (2010); R.H. Helmholz, Bailment

Theories and the Liability of Bailees: The Elusive

Uniform Standard of Reasonable Care, 41 U. KAN. L.

REV. 97, 124–29 (1992). During the course of the

bailment, the bailee has possessory rights in rem,

meaning he has the right to prohibit third parties from

accessing or using the resource and responsibilities to

avoid injuries to the resource. Law of Personal

Property, supra, 300–08, 311–18.

A bailment can structure the rights and duties of

the parties in these familiar forms regardless whether

the thing entrusted to the bailee is tangible or

intangible. In bailments of intangible resources, the

bailee’s right to exclude third parties is the security

for the bailor’s right to what lawyers now call

“privacy.” This fundamental right of privacy—a

property right in intangible resources—is neither

relinquished nor extinguished when one entrusts one’s

personal correspondence or data to another person in

bailment. Only an act of general publication, either

performed or authorized by the owner of the private

data, can extinguish the common law right. GómezArostegui, supra, at 11, 21; Melville B. Nimmer,

(1956). Because the bailee has a right to prevent third

persons from accessing or using the personal data, the

creation of the bailment is not an act of general

publication that could extinguish the common-law

Therefore, a bailment does not convert private

property into public property. The bailment transfers

some rights, especially the right of exclusive

possession, from the bailor to the bailee. Far from

being an act of devotion to the public use, this transfer

of exclusive right also transfers to the bailee the

responsibility to exclude third parties from accessing

or using the entrusted res.

Nearly a century ago, Congress employed the

bailment to solve several practical problems arising

out of telephone communications. Then a new

technology,

land-based

telephones

and

the

infrastructure which made them operable carried

valuable,

private,

intangible

information—

conversations between two persons. To codify the rules

governing

telecommunications

interstate

commerce, Congress employed the common law

concept of carriage and identified telephone

companies as carriers. 47 U.S.C. §153(11). Carriage is

a special type of bailment, and a carrier is a special

type of bailee. RAY ANDREWS BROWN, THE LAW OF

PERSONAL PROPERTY 399–504 (2d ed. 1955). At the

root of the Communications Act of 1934, therefore, is

the recognition that the information passed through

telephone communications is a type of property.

A carrier is any person, whether natural (i.e., a

human being) or artificial (e.g., a corporation), who

“undertakes the transportation of persons or

property or one employed in or engaged in the

business of carrying goods for others for a fee.” George

L. Blum et al., Who Is a Carrier, Generally, 13 AM. JUR.

2D CARRIERS § 1 (2024). Carriage is a type of bailment

because the carrier takes custody, possession, or

control of another person or another person’s property

while undertaking to deliver the person or property or

to keep them safe. 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE,

COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND *396. The

carrier has a duty to deliver the person or property, or

to make such property available for use, upon the

demand of the person who entrusted possession to the

carrier. The status of carrier is deeply rooted in our

fundamental, common law. Congress recognized that

telephone companies naturally fit into this established

legal category.

Thus, from the beginning, the doctrines of

bailment and common carriage have shaped the law

governing

shared

access

intangible

communications. See TYLER BERRY, COMMUNICATIONS

BY WIRE AND RADIO: A TREATISE 32–102 (1937); Mark

A. Hall, Common Carriers Under the Communications

Act, 48 U. CHI. L. REV. 409 (1981). Consistent with this

tradition, the California Supreme Court reasonably

interpreted a California statute governing common

carriers to include carriers of intangible, telephone

communications. Goldin v. Pub. Utilities Comm’n, 592

P.2d 289, 304 (Cal. 1979).

There is no reason in law or general jurisprudence

why bailments should be limited to tangible goods. As

Congress and the California courts recognize, the

rights of custody and control of property need not be

transferred by a transfer of physical possession, if the

thing transferred is intangible. As the leading treatise

on the subject teaches, carriage by bailment “may be

by any instrumentality.” Law of Personal Property,

supra, at 419. The bailment generates and determines

the carrier’s duties to the bailor and the carrier’s

rights toward third persons. Bailees such as telephone

companies,

Internet

service

providers,

and

cryptocurrency exchanges take possession of

intangible resources, such as information and

intellectual creations. But the rights and duties

governing their bailments are the same as those

governing bailments of tangible goods, such as food

and furniture.

C. Bailments of Personal Information

Preserve Private Property Rights.

A telephone communication is a private sharing of

information, not an act of publication to the public at

large. And the bailment entrusted to the telephone

company is a private right. For the same reason, a

bailment of personal information in digital form is a

private right, not a public right. Both the bailor and

the bailee have the right to exclude all persons who

are not intended to access the information. Indeed, the

bailee has legal remedies against third persons who

interfere with the bailment by taking, destroying, or

injuring the res. The W.C. Block, 71 F.2d 682, 683 (2d

Cir. 1934), cert. denied 293 U.S. 579 (1934); Howard

v. United States, 101 Ct. Cl. 823, 829–30 (1944);

American Sur. Co. of N.Y. v. Baker, 172 F.2d 689, 690–

91 (4th Cir. 1949); George Bohannon Transp., Inc. v.

Davis, 323 F.2d 755, 757 (10th Cir. 1963). From the

perspective of third parties, both the bailor and the

bailee have all the rights of full ownership, including

the right to exclude third persons.

When applied to intangible information, the

doctrine of bailment defines rights with clarity. The

information entrusted by the bailor to the bailee

remains private property. Entrusting personal

information to a bailee, such as a telephone company,

Internet service provider, or cryptocurrency exchange,

does not confer on any third parties any legal rights to

access the information. To the contrary, both the

bailor and the bailee have the right to exclude third

persons from it, including public officials, and rights

to recover for any wrongful appropriation of it.

III. The First Circuit’s Decision Failed

Acknowledge That Longstanding Right

In the decision below, the First Circuit rejected an

argument by Petitioner that Coinbase served as a

bailee of his private property, and that the IRS’s

inspection of them therefore served as an intrusion on

his property rights, which the Fourth Amendment

prohibits. Pet. App. 20a. It rejected that argument on

the ground that the petitioner “failed to explain the

legal source of the interest he asserts.” Pet. App. 20a;

see also Pet. App. 21a–24a. But, as discussed above,

there is a longstanding recognition in the common law

of just the kind of property interest that petitioner

asserted here. The First Circuit’s failure to recognize

that interest merits correction by this Court.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the petition should be

granted.

Respectfully submitted,

A. Kristina Littman

Counsel of Record

Jeremy Bylund

WILLKIE FARR

& GALLAGHER LLP

1875 K Street N.W.

Washington, DC 20006

(202) 303-1209

aklittman@willkie.com

Counsel for Amicus Curiae

March 28, 2025

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.