Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Laura Smith, as Duly Appointed Representative and Independent Administrator of the Estate of Andrea Manfredi, Deceased, et al., Petitioners v. The Boeing Company, et al.

Supreme Court briefFeb 5, 2025

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APPENDIX

APPENDIX TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

APPENDIX A: Opinion, In re Lion Air Flight

JT610 Crash, 110 F.4th 1007 (7th Cir. 2024) ...

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APPENDIX B: Memorandum Opinion And

Order, In re Lion Air Flight JT610 Crash, No.

1:18-cv-076862, 2023 WL 3653217 (N.D. Ill.

May 25, 2023) ..................................................... 18a

APPENDIX C: Amended Memorandum Opinion

And Order, In re Lion Air Flight JT610 Crash,

No. 19 C 01552, 2023 WL 3653218 (N.D. Ill.

May 25, 2023) ..................................................... 36a

APPENDIX D: Memorandum Opinion And

Order, In re Lion Air Flight JT610 Crash, No.

18 C 07686, 2022 WL 17820965 (N.D. Ill. Dec.

20, 2022) ............................................................. 57a

APPENDIX E: Order Denying Rehearing and

Rehearing En Banc, In re Lion Air Flight

JT610 Crash,y, No. 23-2358 (7th Cir. Sept. 10,

2024) ................................................................... 77a

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APPENDIX A

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS,

SEVENTH CIRCUIT

————

Nos. 23-2358 & 23-2359

————

IN RE: LION AIR FLIGHT JT 610 CRASH

————

Appeal of: Laura Smith, as duly appointed

representative and Independent Administrator of

the Estate of Andrea Manfredi, deceased, et al.

Appeal of: Terrence Buehler, Personal Representative

and Independent Administrator of the

Estate of Liu Chandra, deceased.

————

Argued February 16, 2024

Decided August 6, 2024

————

Opinion

Ripple, Circuit Judge.

These two consolidated cases arose from the crash of

a Boeing commercial jet aircraft into the Java Sea off

the coast of Indonesia. Everyone on board died. The

plaintiffs are family members and representatives of

the estates of two passengers on that flight. They brought

these actions against Boeing and other defendants.

Boeing filed pretrial motions in each of these cases,

raising two issues, both of which are properly before us

in this interlocutory appeal certified under 28 U.S.C.

§ 1292(b). First, is the Death on the High Seas Act

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(“DOHSA”), 46 U.S.C. §§ 30301–08, the sole source

of potential recovery for the plaintiffs, or can the

plaintiffs assert other claims as well? Second, are the

plaintiffs entitled to a jury trial? The district court

concluded that the plaintiffs can only proceed under

DOHSA and that they are not entitled to a jury trial.

We agree with the district court and affirm its rulings.

I

BACKGROUND

On October 29, 2018, Lion Air Flight JT 610 took off

from Jakarta, Indonesia. Almost immediately after

takeoff, the passengers began experiencing the aircraft’s

erratic movements and fluctuations in altitude due to

mechanical issues with the plane, a Boeing 737 MAX.

After a few minutes, the plane flew out over open

water, and approximately five minutes after that, it

crashed into the Java Sea, about eighteen miles off of

the coast of Indonesia. There were no survivors. Boeing

has admitted that a manufacturing defect in its 737

MAX plane caused the crash.

The two cases before us were brought by the families

and representatives of the estates of two passengers

who died in the crash: Liu Chandra, an Indonesian

businessman, and Andrea Manfredi, an Italian entrepreneur and professional cyclist. The Chandra case

was filed initially in Illinois state court. Boeing

subsequently removed it to the United States District

Court for the Northern District of Illinois without

objection. The sole plaintiff in the Chandra matter is a

representative of both Mr. Chandra’s estate and Mr.

Chandra’s heirs. In the operative amended complaint,

the representative has named as defendants two

United States government agencies, three individuals,

and four private entities, one of which is Boeing. The

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representative asserted claims on behalf of both Mr.

Chandra’s estate and Mr. Chandra’s family members

under DOHSA; the Suits in Admiralty Act, 46 U.S.C.

§§ 30901–18; and Illinois state law. He demanded a

jury trial and asserted that the district court has

jurisdiction based on diversity; DOHSA; the Suits in

Admiralty Act; and the Multiparty, Multiforum Trial

Jurisdiction Act (“MMTJA”), 28 U.S.C. § 1369.

The Manfredi case was filed initially in the United

States District Court for the Northern District of

Illinois. The plaintiffs in that case are family members

of Mr. Manfredi and a representative of Mr. Manfredi’s

estate (collectively, the “Manfredi Plaintiffs”). The

Manfredi Plaintiffs asserted claims under state law

and under the Consumer Fraud and Abuse Act, 18

U.S.C. § 1030, on behalf of both Mr. Manfredi’s estate

and Mr. Manfredi’s family members. The Manfredi

Plaintiffs demanded a jury trial and alleged that the

district court has jurisdiction based on both diversity

and the MMTJA.

Boeing filed motions in both cases asking the district

court to rule that DOHSA applies, preempts all of the

plaintiffs’ non-DOHSA claims, and mandates a bench

trial. The district court granted Boeing’s motions. The

district court first explained that DOHSA applies to all

cases, like this one, where the decedent died on the

high seas. The court then held that DOHSA preempted

the plaintiffs’ non-DOHSA claims. It explained that,

where DOHSA applies, it is generally the exclusive

remedy. The court reasoned that, under this principle,

the plaintiffs’ claims for their decedents’ pre-death

pain and suffering and lost property could not proceed.

Accordingly, the court dismissed all state-law-based

claims for pre-death pain and suffering, emotional

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distress, and lost property. It also dismissed all federal

and state fraud claims.

The district court then considered whether the

plaintiffs were entitled to a jury trial. The court ruled

that Congress has “explicitly limited DOHSA to ‘a civil

action in admiralty,’ which does not carry the right to

a jury trial.” In re Lion Air Flight JT 610 Crash, No.

18-cv-07686, 2023 WL 3653218, at *7 (N.D. Ill. May 25,

2023) (quoting 46 U.S.C. § 30302). It rejected the

plaintiffs’ argument that their DOHSA claims could be

brought as non-admiralty claims because there were

non-admiralty sources of jurisdiction. It accordingly

concluded that DOHSA precluded a jury trial on the

plaintiffs’ claims and granted Boeing’s request for a

bench trial.

The plaintiffs asked the district court to certify an

interlocutory appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b). They

identified the question of whether they are entitled to

a jury trial as the question warranting interlocutory

review. The representative in the Chandra case

additionally submitted that the question of whether

DOHSA preempted their non-DOHSA claims was

another question warranting interlocutory review. The

court certified for immediate interlocutory appeal the

question whether a plaintiff is entitled to a jury trial

under DOHSA. The district court declined to certify

the preemption issue.

II

DISCUSSION

A.

A court of appeals may, in its discretion, permit an

appeal to be taken from an order certified for interlocutory appeal by a district court. See 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b).

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The order must present a “controlling question of law,”

difficult enough to leave “substantial ground for difference of opinion,” and whose resolution will “materially

advance the ultimate termination of the litigation.” Id.

In such an appeal, although the district court must

identify a “controlling question of law,” our authority

extends past answering that question. Id.; see Martin

v. Goodrich Corp., 95 F.4th 475, 478 (7th Cir. 2024).

The appeal presents the order for appellate decision,

and a court of appeals “may address any issue fairly

included within the certified order.” Yamaha Motor

Corp., U.S.A. v. Calhoun, 516 U.S. 199, 205, 116 S.Ct.

619, 133 L.Ed.2d 578 (1996).

Here, the district court certified the jury trial

question for interlocutory review. We agree with the

district court that this issue is suitable for interlocutory review. As we noted earlier, the district court

declined to certify the preemption question for

interlocutory review. But, because that issue was

decided in the same order, we can decide that question,

and indeed should resolve it because resolution of that

issue will influence significantly our decision on the

jury trial question. There is authority that parties in

admiralty cases can have a jury trial on claims that

would otherwise be tried by the court, if their claims

arise out of the same set of facts as a claim that can be

tried before a jury. See Fitzgerald v. U.S. Lines Co., 374

U.S. 16, 21, 83 S.Ct. 1646, 10 L.Ed.2d 720 (1963)

(concluding that, when a Jones Act claim and a

maintenance and cure claim arise from the same

accident, district courts must allow a jury trial, even if

the maintenance and cure claim is cognizable only in

admiralty); Red Star Towing & Transp. Co. v. The

“Ming Giant,” 552 F. Supp. 367, 374–75 (S.D.N.Y. 1982)

(concluding that a jury should decide both DOHSA and

Jones Act claims, in case in which plaintiffs asserted

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both types of claims); Gvirtsman v. W. King Co., 263 F.

Supp. 633, 634–35 (C.D. Cal. 1967) (same). Therefore,

if the plaintiffs have valid non-DOHSA claims, then

the district court presumably should have allowed the

plaintiffs to try those claims and their DOHSA claims

before a jury. On the other hand, if DOHSA preempts

the other claims, then the availability of a jury trial

turns on whether DOHSA permits the plaintiffs to

demand a jury trial. Accordingly, we will address both

issues, starting with preemption.

B.

Before 1920, relatives of persons who died on the

“high seas”—waters far enough from any coast to be

outside the territorial waters of a state or country—

generally had no remedy. See Moragne v. States Marine

Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375, 393, 90 S.Ct. 1772, 26 L.Ed.2d

339 (1970). As a result, the family members of victims

of high-seas disasters like the sinking of the Titanic

had no means of recovery. See Robert M. Hughes, Death

Actions in Admiralty, 31 Yale L.J. 115, 117 (1921).

DOHSA, enacted in 1920, helped to fill this void.

DOHSA provides that, “[w]hen the death of an individual is caused by wrongful act, neglect, or default

occurring on the high seas …, the personal representative of the decedent may bring a civil action in

admiralty against the person or vessel responsible.” 46

U.S.C. § 30302. Claims under DOHSA can be brought

in federal court or in state court. Offshore Logistics,

Inc. v. Tallentire, 477 U.S. 207, 232, 106 S.Ct. 2485, 91

L.Ed.2d 174 (1986).

DOHSA functions as a wrongful-death statute in

that it gives “surviving relatives a cause of action for

losses they suffered as a result of the decedent’s death.”

Dooley v. Korean Air Lines Co., 524 U.S. 116, 123, 118

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S.Ct. 1890, 141 L.Ed.2d 102 (1998). Survivors whose

losses can be remedied in a DOHSA action include “the

decedent’s spouse, parent, child, or dependent

relative.” § 30302. DOHSA is not a survival statute. A

survival statute “permits a decedent’s estate to recover

damages that the decedent would have been able to

recover but for his death.” Dooley, 524 U.S. at 123, 118

S.Ct. 1890. Unlike survival statutes, “DOHSA does not

authorize recovery for the decedent’s own losses.” Id.

at 122, 118 S.Ct. 1890.

The Supreme Court has held that, where DOHSA

applies, it preempts all wrongful-death remedies otherwise available under state law and general maritime

law. See Offshore Logistics, 477 U.S. at 232, 106 S.Ct.

2485 (state law); Mobil Oil Corp. v. Higginbotham, 436

U.S. 618, 624–25, 98 S.Ct. 2010, 56 L.Ed.2d 581 (1978)

(general maritime law). Although the plaintiffs included

in their complaints many state-law wrongful-death

claims, they now concede that DOHSA preempts those

claims.

They continue to contend, however, that some of

their state-law survival claims are not preempted by

DOHSA. As they acknowledge, this contention must

grapple with Dooley v. Korean Air Lines, supra. In

Dooley, plaintiffs sought to recover damages under

state law for pain and suffering that their relative,

who died on the high seas, experienced shortly before

his death. The plaintiffs argued that DOHSA did not

preempt their claims because, in their view, DOHSA

had no “bearing on the availability of a survival

action.” Id. at 123, 118 S.Ct. 1890. The Supreme Court

disagreed, stating that “DOHSA expresses Congress’

judgment that there should be no such cause of action

in cases of death on the high seas.” Id. The Court

explained that, in DOHSA, “Congress provided the

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exclusive recovery for deaths that occur on the high

seas.” Id. Because “Congress ha[d] spoken on the

availability of a survival action,” id. at 124, 118 S.Ct.

1890, the Court held that the plaintiffs could not

pursue their state-law survival claims for their

decedent’s pre-death pain and suffering.

The plaintiffs contend that, despite Dooley, they can

seek two types of damages on behalf of their decedents’

estates. First, the plaintiffs contend that they can seek

damages for the pain and suffering that their

decedents experienced on the over-land portion of the

flight. It is difficult, however, to see how this could be

a separate claim than a claim for pain and suffering

the decedents experienced over water, minutes later.

This position is also inconsistent with decisions of

other courts that plaintiffs cannot avoid DOHSA

preemption merely by showing that a fatal accident on

the high seas had some connection to land. See, e.g.,

LaCourse v. PAE Worldwide Inc., 980 F.3d 1350, 1357

(11th Cir. 2020) (accident was governed by DOHSA

because the plane crashed into the high seas, even

though the alleged negligence occurred on land and

much of the flight was scheduled to be over land).

Further, much of the language in Dooley—especially

the reference to the congressional judgment that

“there should be no [survival] cause of action in cases

of death on the high seas,” 524 U.S. at 123, 118 S.Ct.

1890—broadly indicates that DOHSA preempts all

survivor actions grounded in state law or general

maritime law that are based on the same facts as the

fatal accident. Second, the plaintiffs contend that they

can seek damages for property their decedents lost in

the crash. This claim, too, is foreclosed by the

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reasoning in Dooley regarding survival-based claims. 1

The plaintiffs’ non-DOHSA claims grounded in state

law thus cannot go forward.

C.

We now turn to the jury trial question (the question

certified by the district court). We start with some

background.

1.

This background can suitably begin in the years

immediately before the Founding. In that era, individuals in the colonies with maritime claims could

bring those claims either in vice admiralty courts

created by Britain or in the local colonial courts.

Steven L. Snell, Courts of Admiralty and the Common

Law: Origins in the American Experiment in Concurrent

Jurisdiction 204–05 (2007). This arrangement “provided

the litigants with a choice,” and a “potential plaintiff

was able to weigh the alternatives between” the types

of courts. Id. at 205. The vice admiralty courts had the

advantage of different remedial mechanisms and often

greater expertise, but, unlike in the local colonial courts,

claims there were tried without juries. Id. at 182.

The Judiciary Act of 1789 preserved the substance,

but not the precise forms, of this arrangement. In

that statute, Congress gave the federal circuit courts

jurisdiction over diversity cases. 1 Stat. 73, § 11. It also

gave federal district courts exclusive jurisdiction over

Some courts have held that, under DOHSA, plaintiffs are able

to recover damages approximating the value of their decedents’

lost property if they can establish that the property would have

become part of their inheritance. See Snyder v. Whittaker Corp.,

839 F.2d 1085, 1093 (5th Cir. 1988); Nygaard v. Peter Pan

Seafoods, Inc., 701 F.2d 77, 80 (9th Cir. 1983). We have no occasion

to address that issue today.

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“all civil causes of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction,” including those “upon the high seas,” but from

this grant of exclusive jurisdiction it “sav[ed] to suitors,

in all cases, the right of a common law remedy, where

the common law is competent to give it.” Id. § 9. 2

This carve-out has been called the saving-to-suitors

clause. It “saves” all in personam claims. See The Moses

Taylor, 71 U.S. 411, 431, 4 Wall. 411, 18 L.Ed. 397

(1867). Thus, the Judiciary Act of 1789 made federal

district courts the exclusive arbiter of all in rem

maritime claims, but not of all in personam maritime

claims. Moreover, because of the saving-to-suitors

clause, unless another statute provided to the contrary,

maritime plaintiffs with in personam claims were not

required to sue in the federal district courts. Instead,

if they so chose, they could sue in state court, or, if

there was diversity, in federal circuit courts. See

Norton v. Switzer, 93 U.S. 355, 356, 23 L.Ed. 903 (1876)

(“Parties in maritime cases are not ... compelled to

proceed in the admiralty at all, as they may resort to

their common-law remedy in the State courts, or in the

Circuit Court, if the party seeking redress and the

other party are citizens of different states.”). In cases

brought “at law” in state courts or the circuit courts,

either party could demand a jury trial. The Sarah, 21

U.S. 391, 394, 8 Wheat. 391, 5 L.Ed. 644 (1823). But in

cases brought “in admiralty” in the federal district

Congress has since revised the language of the saving-tosuitors clause, but “its substance has remained largely

unchanged.” Lewis v. Lewis & Clark Marine, Inc., 531 U.S. 438,

444, 121 S.Ct. 993, 148 L.Ed.2d 931 (2001). The statute now states

that “the district courts shall have original jurisdiction, exclusive

of the courts of the States, of: [a]ny civil case of admiralty or

maritime jurisdiction, saving to suitors in all cases all other

remedies to which they are otherwise entitled.” 28 U.S.C. § 1333(1)

(emphasis added).

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courts, absent a statute to the contrary, the trial was

by the court. Id.

The organizational landscape of the federal courts

changed over time, but the basic choices available to

admiralty plaintiffs generally did not. One significant

change came in the Judicial Code of 1911, when

Congress eliminated the federal circuit courts and

transferred those courts’ original jurisdiction to the

federal district courts. Pub. L. No. 61-475, §§ 1, 24, 36

Stat. 1087, 1087, 1091. Consequently, common law,

equity, and admiralty cases were now all brought in

the same federal court. Because of the differences in

the procedures formerly employed in litigating various

types of cases, each federal district court now was seen

as having a law side, an equity side, and an admiralty

side. See Puget Sound Nav. Co. v. Nelson, 41 F.2d 356,

357–58 (9th Cir. 1930). As before, absent a statute to

the contrary, plaintiffs with in personam actions could

sue in admiralty, in state court, or on the law side (if

diversity existed). See Romero v. Int’l Terminal

Operating Co., 358 U.S. 354, 363, 79 S.Ct. 468, 3

L.Ed.2d 368 (1959). Cases brought on the law side

carried the right to a jury trial, whereas cases brought

on the admiralty side generally did not. Compare Atl.

& Gulf Stevedores, Inc. v. Ellerman Lines, Ltd., 369 U.S.

355, 360, 82 S.Ct. 780, 7 L.Ed.2d 798 (1962) (“This suit

being in the federal courts by reason of diversity of

citizenship carried with it, of course, the right to trial

by jury.”), with Fitzgerald, 374 U.S. at 20, 83 S.Ct. 1646

(noting that “the Seventh Amendment does not

require jury trials in admiralty cases”).

In the ensuing years, a unification process took place

in federal district court practice. By 1966, this

unification was complete, and since then the Federal

Rules of Civil Procedure have governed all civil

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actions, including admiralty actions. Fed. R. Civ. P. 1,

cmt. (1966). The United States district courts no longer

have separate “sides.” Id. Critically, this merger of the

law, equity, and admiralty spheres of federal district

court practice did not change materially the choices

available to plaintiffs with maritime claims. See David

W. Robertson, Admiralty Procedure and Jurisdiction

After the 1966 Unification, 74 Mich. L. Rev. 1627, 1630–

31 (1976). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(h), which

became effective at the same time as the unification,

has helped to ensure as much. Under Rule 9(h), a party

whose claim is “within the admiralty or maritime

jurisdiction and also within the court’s subject-matter

jurisdiction on some other ground” can designate his

claim as a non-admiralty, common law claim or as an

admiralty claim. Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(h)(1). “One of the

important procedural consequences [of that designation]

is that in the civil action either party may demand a

jury trial, while in the suit in admiralty there is no

right to jury trial except as provided by statute.” Fed.

R. Civ. P. 9, cmt. (1966).

To summarize: For a long time, maritime plaintiffs

generally have been able to choose the forum in which

they bring in personam claims. Such plaintiffs generally

could sue in federal admiralty courts, in state court, or

if diversity existed, in the federal circuit courts (1789–

1911), on the “law side” of the federal district courts

(1911–1966), or by refraining from designating their

claims as admiralty claims under Rule 9(h) (since

1966). In these various eras, unless a statute provided

otherwise, if the plaintiff sued at law, either party

could demand a jury trial, but if they sued in

admiralty, the case would be tried by the court.

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2.

With this background, we now address whether the

plaintiffs are entitled to a jury trial. The plaintiffs

contend that they need not assert their DOHSA claims

“in admiralty,” as admiralty claims. They analogize

their DOHSA claims to the causes of action described

in the previous section, which, as we explained, can be

brought as common-law claims if there is a nonadmiralty source of jurisdiction. They contend that

non-admiralty sources of jurisdiction such as diversity

and the MMTJA allow them to assert their DOHSA

claims “at law” and to demand a jury trial. 3 The

defendants, for their part, maintain that plaintiffs

with DOHSA claims in federal court can only proceed

“in admiralty,” without a jury trial.

Several considerations lead us to the conclusion that

the defendants have the better reading of the statute.

First, DOHSA states in its first section that a plaintiff

“may bring a civil action in admiralty.” § 30302

(emphasis added). In its original form, it similarly

stated that a plaintiff “may maintain a suit for

damages in the district courts of the United States, in

admiralty.” Pub. L. No. 66-165, § 1, 41 Stat. 537, 537

(1920) (emphasis added). DOHSA has never expressly

Some scholars have, over the years, agreed with various

versions of the plaintiffs’ position. See Steven F. Friedell, Death

at Sea and the Right to Jury Trial, 48 Tul. Mar. L.J. 156 (2024)

(criticizing the district court’s decision in this case on the jury

trial issue); Louis F. Nawrot, Jr., Note, Admiralty: Death on the

High Seas by Wrongful Act, 47 Cornell L.Q. 632, 637 (1962)

(stating that a “[p]reliminary analysis” of DOHSA “unquestionably

favors concurrent jurisdiction with state and federal civil courts”);

Calvert Magruder & Marshall Grout, Wrongful Death Within the

Admiralty Jurisdiction, 35 Yale L.J. 395, 420 (1926) (stating that

“a common law action [under DOHSA] ... probably” could “be

brought in the federal courts”).

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stated that plaintiffs with DOHSA claims can

maintain a suit at law or with the right to a jury trial.

The most natural inference to draw from the

combination of the express reference to a suit in

admiralty and the absence of a reference to a suit at

law or with a jury trial is that the cause of action

created by DOHSA is to be brought in admiralty. 4 This

natural, ordinary reading of DOHSA’s first section

supports the defendants’ interpretation. See Leocal v.

Ashcroft, 543 U.S. 1, 9, 125 S.Ct. 377, 160 L.Ed.2d 271

(2004) (“When interpreting a statute, we must give

words their ‘ordinary or natural’ meaning.”) (quoting

Smith v. United States, 508 U.S. 223, 228, 113 S.Ct.

2050, 124 L.Ed.2d 138 (1993)).

Second, courts have construed language similar to

DOHSA’s “may bring a civil action in admiralty”

language to require cases to be brought in admiralty.

Under the Ship Mortgage Act, which was enacted

in 1920, mortgagees can in certain cases bring “a

civil action in personam in admiralty.” 46 U.S.C.

§ 31325(b)(2)(A). Under the Public Vessels Act, which

was enacted in 1925, “[a] civil action in personam in

admiralty may be brought ... against the United States

for damages caused by a public vessel of the United

States.” 46 U.S.C. § 31102(a). Both of these statutes,

like DOHSA, do not specifically address the jury trial

issue. Nevertheless, claims brought under those

provisions do not carry the right to a jury trial.

See Thomas J. Schoenbaum, Admiralty and Maritime

Law § 4:4 (5th ed. 2011). Courts “normally presume

A different provision in DOHSA (46 U.S.C. § 30308(a)) allows

plaintiffs to bring DOHSA claims in state court, see Offshore

Logistics, 477 U.S. at 232, 106 S.Ct. 2485, but that section does

not address whether DOHSA claims that are in federal court

must be brought in admiralty.

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that the same language in related statutes carries a

consistent meaning.” United States v. Davis, 588 U.S.

445, 458, 139 S.Ct. 2319, 204 L.Ed.2d 757 (2019); see

Azar v. Allina Health Servs., 587 U.S. 566, 574, 139

S.Ct. 1804, 204 L.Ed.2d 139 (2019) (“This Court does

not lightly assume that Congress silently attaches

different meanings to the same term in the same or

related statutes.”). That presumption applies here and

supports the defendants’ position.

Third, many other courts have for a long time agreed

with the defendants that, if a case involving only

DOHSA claims is in federal court, it must proceed in

admiralty, without a jury trial. See Noel v. Linea

Aeropostal Venezolana, 247 F.2d 677, 680 (2d Cir.

1957); Higa v. Transocean Airlines, 230 F.2d 780, 782–

85 (9th Cir. 1955); Lasky v. Royal Caribbean Cruises,

Ltd., 850 F. Supp. 2d 1309, 1314–15 (S.D. Fla. 2012); In

re Air Disaster Near Honolulu, Hawaii on Feb. 24,

1989, 792 F. Supp. 1541, 1547 (N.D. Cal. 1990);

Friedman v. Mitsubishi Aircraft Int’l, Inc., 678 F. Supp.

1064, 1065–66 (S.D.N.Y. 1988); Favaloro v. S/S Golden

Gate, 687 F. Supp. 475, 481 (N.D. Cal. 1987); Heath v.

American Sail Training Ass’n, 644 F. Supp. 1459, 1471

(D.R.I. 1986); Rairigh v. Erlbeck, 488 F. Supp. 865, 867

(D. Md. 1980). 5 The plaintiffs and the amici supporting

them have not identified any decisions to the contrary.

These cases matter, in part because of the maxim

that, if Congress leaves in place a unanimous or nearSee also LaCourse v. Def. Support Servs. LLC, No. 16-cv-170,

2018 WL 7342153, at *2 (N.D. Fla. Oct. 31, 2018); Modica v. Hill,

No. 96-cv-1121, 1999 WL 52153, at *2 (E.D. La. Jan. 29, 1999). Cf.

Choy v. Pan-American Airways Co., 1941 A.M.C. 483, 487

(S.D.N.Y. 1941) (concluding that DOHSA claims could be brought

on the law side of the federal courts), expressly abrogated by Noel

v. Linea Aeropostal Venezolana, 247 F.2d 677, 680 (2d Cir. 1957).

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unanimous judicial interpretation for a sufficiently

long period of time, it can be deemed to have

acquiesced in or ratified that judicial interpretation.

See Texas Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affs. v. Inclusive

Cmtys. Project, Inc., 576 U.S. 519, 536, 135 S.Ct. 2507,

192 L.Ed.2d 514 (2015) (“If a word or phrase has been

... given a uniform interpretation by inferior courts ...,

a later version of that act perpetuating the wording is

presumed to carry forward that interpretation.”);

United States v. Sanapaw, 366 F.3d 492, 495 (7th Cir.

2004) (relying on Congress’s thirty-year acquiescence

in decisions from circuit courts). 6 Here, Congress has

not made any material changes to DOHSA’s first

section in the nearly eighty years since the Second and

Ninth Circuits decided this issue in accord with the

defendants’ position. Much has changed in admiralty

law in the years since, but, with the exception of two

minor alterations not relevant here, 7 Congress has left

DOHSA’s first section unchanged. This history

provides additional support for our conclusion that the

defendants have the better reading of DOHSA.

The plaintiffs rely on what the Supreme Court has

called “the historic option of a maritime suitor pursuing

a common-law remedy to select his forum.” Romero,

358 U.S. at 371, 79 S.Ct. 468. They contend that, in

admiralty law, plaintiffs bringing tort claims are

presumed to be able to proceed at law, with a jury trial,

and that our reading of DOHSA would violate that

See also Manhattan Props., Inc. v. Irving Tr. Co., 291 U.S. 320,

336, 54 S.Ct. 385, 78 L.Ed. 824 (1934) (concluding that congressional amendments that did not change relevant provision, in the

face of consensus interpretation given by courts of appeals,

ratified that judicial interpretation).

6

See Pub. L. 106-181, § 404(a)(1), 114 Stat. 61, 131 (2000); Pub.

L. 109-304, § 6(c), 120 Stat. 1485, 1511 (2006).

7

17a

presumption. Our task in interpreting DOHSA, however,

is not necessarily to neatly harmonize that statute

with other areas of admiralty law. Instead, our task is

to interpret the statute, starting with its text and the

rules of construction aimed at effectuating Congress’s

intent. For the reasons we have provided, we think

that the defendants’ reading is most consistent with

DOHSA’s text and Congress’s intent.

We recognize the potential anomaly in allowing

defendants to effectively extinguish a plaintiff’s jury

trial right by removing a case to federal court. DOHSA

claims, like other wrongful-death tort claims, are

typically tried by juries when they are in state court.

See, e.g., Curcuru v. Rose’s Oil Serv., Inc., 441 Mass. 12,

802 N.E.2d 1032, 1039 (2004); Khung Thi Lam v.

Global Med. Sys., 127 Wash.App. 657, 111 P.3d 1258,

1260, 1262 n.20 (2005). But our analysis indicates that

Congress has spoken on the issue of the availability of

a jury trial on DOHSA claims in federal court. 8

Conclusion

For the reasons stated in this opinion, we affirm the

district court’s rulings.

AFFIRMED

We note the possibility that the Chandra plaintiffs, whose

claims were filed initially in state court, could have tried to object

to removal, relying on certain authorities that interpret the

saving-to-suitors clause to block removal of otherwise removable

admiralty claims. See Lu Junhong v. Boeing Co., 792 F.3d 805, 818

(7th Cir. 2015) (“Perhaps it would be possible to argue that the

saving-to-suitors clause itself forbids removal, without regard to

any language in § 1441.”); Riyanto v. Boeing Co., 638 F. Supp. 3d

902, 911 (N.D. Ill. 2022) (in a case arising out of a different plane

crash in the Java Sea, relying on saving-to-suitors clause for

conclusion that Boeing could not remove the case from state court

to federal court). We have no occasion to address that possibility here.

8

18a

APPENDIX B

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT,

N.D. ILLINOIS, EASTERN DIVISION.

————

No. 18 C 07686

Case No. 19 C 01552,

Case No. 19 C 07091

————

IN RE LION AIR FLIGHT JT 610 CRASH

————

Signed May 25, 2023

————

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Thomas M. Durkin, United States District Judge

This consolidated action arises out of an aviation

accident involving a Boeing commercial jet, which

resulted in the death of everyone on board. On

December 20, 2022, this Court issued a Memorandum

Opinion and Order (“the Order”) holding that the

Death on the High Seas Act, 46 U.S.C. §§ 30301–08

(“DOHSA”), applies to the two remaining actions

(Chandra v. Boeing, case no. 19 C 01552, and Smith v.

Boeing, case no. 19 C 07091), preempts Plaintiffs’ other

claims, and rests in this Court’s admiralty jurisdiction

such that Plaintiffs are not entitled to a jury trial. R.

1460. Plaintiffs in both actions and Defendant Xtra

Aerospace, LLC (“Xtra”) have moved this Court to

amend the Order to certify for immediate interlocutory

appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) the issue of Plaintiffs’

19a

right to a jury trial. R. 1468, 1471, 1474.1 Plaintiffs in

the Chandra matter (“Chandra Plaintiffs”) also request that the preemption question is certified for

interlocutory appeal. For the reasons stated below, the

Court will amend the Order to certify the right to a

jury trial question under § 1292(b) but will not certify

the issue of preemption.

Background

On October 29, 2018, Lion Air Flight JT 610 crashed

into the Java Sea at a high rate of speed just minutes

after takeoff from Jakarta, Indonesia. R. 1391 ¶¶ 43,

44. There were no survivors. Id. at ¶ 5. The crash was

caused by a faulty automatic flight control system

which overrode the pilots and turned the plane into a

nosedive. Id. at ¶¶ 4, 45.

The resulting litigation involved 87 individual

actions against Boeing and other defendants asserting

wrongful death and other claims arising out of the

accident on behalf of 186 decedents. All actions were

either filed in or removed to this Court and eventually

consolidated under the master docket, In Re Lion Air

Flight JT 610 Crash, 18 C 07686. Boeing has fully

settled the claims of 184 decedents. The remaining

two actions are those brought by the families and

representatives of two decedents: Liu Chandra, an

Indonesian businessman (Chandra v. Boeing); and

Andrea Manfredi, an Italian professional cyclist and

entrepreneur (Smith v. Boeing).

Chandra Plaintiffs originally filed suit in the Circuit

Court of Cook County, Illinois. See Chandra, No. 19 C

1

Throughout this Opinion, “R” denotes citations to the record

in the consolidated case, In Re Lion Air Flight JT 610 Crash,

18 C 07686.

20a

01552, Dkt. 1. They alleged wrongful death arising

under DOHSA. See, e.g., R. 1391 at pp. 15–24. They

also made survival claims for property damage and

pre-death fear and injury. Id. Boeing removed the case

to this Court under the Multiparty, Multiforum Trial

Jurisdiction Act (“MMTJA”), 28 U.S.C. § 1369, and the

Court’s admiralty jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1333(1).

Chandra, No. 19 C 01552, Dkt. 1. The operative Third

Amended Complaint demands a jury trial and alleges

the Court has subject matter jurisdiction in diversity

and under the MMTJA and DOHSA. R. 1391 ¶¶ 16,

18–19; id. at p. 57. Mr. Manfredi’s family and the

administrator of Mr. Manfredi’s estate, Laura Smith,

(“Manfredi Plaintiffs”) filed suit in this Court, invoking

its diversity jurisdiction. See Smith, No. 19 C 07091,

Dkt. 1. The Second Amended Complaint asserts

wrongful death and survival claims and demands a

jury trial. See id. at pp. 4, 118–19.

Defendants the Boeing Company, Rockwell Collins,

Inc., and Rosemount Aerospace, Inc. (collectively,

“Defendants”) filed motions in the Chandra and Smith

cases, seeking the Court’s determination that DOHSA

applies, preempts each Plaintiffs’ non-DOHSA claims,

and mandates a bench trial.2 See R. 1399, 1400, 1401,

1402. The Court granted those motions in the Order.

R. 1460. Chandra and Manfredi Plaintiffs now request

that the Court amend the Order to certify the issue of

the jury trial right for interlocutory appeal. R. 1468,

1471. Five admiralty law professors from around the

country, Professors Martin Davies, Robert Force,

Steven F. Friedell, Thomas Galligan, and Thomas J.

Schoenbaum, filed an amici brief in support of

Manfredi Plaintiffs’ motion. R. 1470. Xtra, without

2

Xtra filed a response to the motions stating that it took no

position. R. 1421.

21a

taking a position on the merits of the parties’ substantive positions, also joins Plaintiffs’ request to

certify this issue, arguing that an immediate appeal

would promote judicial efficiency. R. 1474. Chandra

Plaintiffs also ask the Court to certify whether

DOHSA preempts non-DOHSA causes of action for

physical destruction of property and personal injuries

to an aircraft passenger sustained over land during a

flight that ultimately led to a fatal crash. R. 1471.

Though the parties in the Chandra and Smith cases

have informally exchanged some discovery in furtherance

of settlement discussions, they have not engaged in

formal written or expert discovery. Boeing has informed

the Court that, if the Order stands, it would stipulate

to its liability to pay damages such that the only issue

at trial would be the amount of damages. Feb. 22, 2023

Letter to the Court.

Legal Standard

The Circuit Court of Appeals may not entertain

appeals from interlocutory (non-final) orders except in

very limited circumstances. Under 28 U.S.C. 1292(b),

a district court can certify an issue for interlocutory

appeal if the movant shows that (1) there is a question

of law; (2) the question is controlling; (3) the question

is “contestable,” that is, there is substantial grounds

for differences of opinion; and (4) immediate appeal

would speed up the ultimate termination of the

litigation. See Ahrenholz v. Bd. of Trustees of Univ. of

Ill., 219 F.3d 674, 675 (7th Cir. 2000). All four criteria

must be met. Id. at 676. Even if a district court certifies

an issue for appeal, the Circuit Court has discretion to

accept or reject the appeal. 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b).

22a

Discussion

I. Certification of Right to a Jury Trial Issue

Plaintiffs desire to challenge on interlocutory appeal

this Court’s holding that “Congress ... has explicitly

limited DOHSA to ‘a civil action in admiralty,’ which

does not carry the right to a jury trial.” Order at 13

(citing Tallentire v. Offshore Logistics, Inc., 800 F.2d

1390, 1391 (5th Cir. 1986) (where the “sole predicate”

for liability is DOHSA, the plaintiff “is not entitled to

a jury trial”)). Specifically, Manfredi Plaintiffs seek the

certification of the following issue:

Does a DOHSA claim in a case asserting diversity

rather than admiralty jurisdiction carry a

jury-trial right as a “suit at common law” within

the meaning of the Seventh Amendment, the

saving-to-suitors clause of 28 U.S.C. § 1333(1), and

Atlantic & Gulf Stevedores, Inc. v. Ellerman Lines,

Ltd., 369 U.S. 355 (1962)?

R. 1468 at 1. And Chandra Plaintiffs seek certification

of a similar question:

In a diversity case, is a DOHSA plaintiff entitled

to a jury trial under the saving-to-suitors clause

and DOHSA’s savings clause when the plaintiff

originally files suit in a state common law court

pursuant to Offshore Logistics v. Tallentire, demands a jury trial, and reasserts his jury demand

post-removal?

R. 1472 at 2. These questions are substantively

the same. At bottom, they ask whether a plaintiff

in federal court is entitled to a jury trial under the

Seventh Amendment when the plaintiff ’s sole claim

arises under DOHSA, and the plaintiff has a concurrent basis for common law jurisdiction (such as

23a

diversity). Defendants do not contest that the issue of

Plaintiffs’ right to a jury trial under DOHSA is a pure

question of law.3 Therefore, to determine whether an

interlocutory appeal is appropriate, the Court examines

whether the question fulfills the remaining three

factors of the test laid out in § 1292(b) and Ahrenholz.

A. “Controlling” Question

For a district court to certify a question under

§ 1292(b), the movant must show that the question is

“controlling.” The Seventh Circuit does not read this

requirement literally. Instead, it asks whether the

resolution of the question is “quite likely to affect the

further course of the litigation,” Sokaogon Gaming

Enterprise Corp. v. Tushie-Montgomery Assocs., Inc.,

86 F.3d 656, 659 (7th Cir. 1996), and is “serious to the

conduct of the litigation, either practically or legally.”

Johnson v. Burken, 930 F.2d 1202, 1206 (7th Cir. 1991)

(quoting Katz v. Carte Blanche Corp., 496 F.2d 747, 755

(3d Cir. 1974)). Therefore, “a question is controlling ...

if interlocutory reversal might save time for the

district court, and time and expense for the litigants.”

Johnson, 930 F.2d at 1205–06 (quoting 16 Charles A.

Wright, Arthur R. Miller, Edward H. Cooper & Eugene

Gressman, Federal Practice and Procedure § 3930, at

pp. 159–60 (1977)).

The resolution of the proper factfinder—whether

judge or jury—will likely affect the course of the

3

Indeed, determining whether DOHSA claims are limited

exclusively to this Court’s admiralty jurisdiction would likely

require an analysis of the Seventh Amendment, the provisions

of DOHSA and 28 U.S.C. § 1333(1), the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure, and persuasive case law. The Seventh Circuit would

not need to hunt through the record—the facts of the case are

irrelevant.

24a

litigation at least practically, with substantial differences

in decision-making authority, jury selection, the way

evidentiary issues are handled, objections, and jury

instructions. Defendants argue that, since Boeing will

stipulate to liability, and the only role of the factfinder

will be to compute damages, the identity of the

factfinder will have no material impact on the outcome

of the litigation. But the issue need not affect the

litigation’s outcome to be controlling—it need only be

“serious to the conduct of the litigation,” even if only in

a practical sense. Johnson, 930 F.2d at 1206.

Other considerations make this question a controlling

one. For example, an interlocutory reversal would save

substantial time for this Court and expenses for the

litigants. In Johnson, the Seventh Circuit accepted a

question of proper service as a controlling question on

interlocutory appeal. Id. The Seventh Circuit noted

that, without taking the issue on interlocutory appeal,

the case would have gone through to judgment,

followed by an appeal that would have resulted in

throwing the entire case out for want of proper service,

and requiring a remand back to the district court to

start at square one. Id. Similarly here, if this case were

to proceed to a bench trial, and Plaintiffs were to

appeal in the regular course and obtain reversal on the

jury trial issue, the case would be remanded back to

this Court to hold another trial, this time by jury. The

Seventh Circuit has explained that avoiding such

inefficiencies is why it takes a flexible approach to

determining whether a question is “controlling.” Id.

Defendants cite two cases which they purport show

that the denial of a jury trial is not the sort of

controlling decision that warrants immediate appeal,

Caldwell-Baker Co. v. Parsons, 392 F.3d 886 (7th Cir.

2004) and National Bank of Waukesha v. Warren, 796

25a

F.2d 999 (7th Cir. 1986). However, neither of those

cases considered whether an interlocutory appeal

was proper under the § 1292(b) standard, but rather,

under the standard for a writ of mandamus, which is

a “drastic remedy traditionally used to confine a lower

court to the lawful exercise of its jurisdiction or to

compel it to exercise its authority when it has a duty

to do so.” United States v. Lapi, 458 F.3d 555, 560–61

(7th Cir. 2006); see also Allied Chemical Corp. v.

Daiflon, Inc., 449 U.S. 33, 35 (1980) (“Only exceptional

circumstances, amounting to a judicial usurpation of

power, will justify the invocation of this extraordinary

remedy.”). And in both cases, the situations would have

required the Circuit Court to conduct factual analyses

such that a § 1292(b) appeal would not have been

proper in the first place. See Caldwell-Baker, 392 F.3d

at 888 (district court’s refusal to withdraw reference to

personal bankruptcy not reviewable because the issue

was not “the procedural decision about which court

would make the initial substantive decision, but

review of the substantive decision itself.”); Warren, 796

F.2d at 1001 (determining right to jury trial depended

on the characterization of banking transactions and

other factual questions on which the Circuit Court did

“not have a complete record on which to resolve them”).

Defendants also cite a number of bankruptcy cases

in which district courts have refused to certify the

question of a jury trial right for appeal under

§ 1292(b). But the right to a jury trial in a bankruptcy

case turns on different rules, appellate procedures, and

factual questions, such as whether a jury request is

waived or timely raised. See, e.g., In re Beale, 410 B.R.

613, 617 (N.D. Ill. 2009) (“[T]he legal question of

whether Defendants are still entitled to a jury trial

under the Seventh Amendment is not before this court.

This is important, for the Bankruptcy Court concluded

26a

that the right had been waived....”); In re Glenn, Nos.

04 A 4493, 02 B 4081, 06 C 3565, 2006 WL 2252529, at

*2 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 3, 2006) (interlocutory appeal only

“raises the questions of whether the [jury] demand was

timely and the judge properly exercised discretion” in

light of “the court’s schedule, prejudice to the adverse

party, and the reason for the moving party’s delay.”).

No such questions are at issue here.

And where the question of a jury trial right is

properly raised and meets the other requirements of

§ 1292(b), the Supreme Court and the Seventh Circuit

have accepted the question as controlling on a § 1292(b)

appeal. See, e.g., Lehman v. Nakshian, 453 U.S. 156, 159

(1981) (right to jury trial in ADEA case determined on

interlocutory appeal); Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575,

576–577 (1978) (same); Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531,

532 (1970) (right to a jury trial in stockholder derivative action reached Supreme Court on interlocutory

appeal); Pavey v. Conley, 544 F.3d 739, 740 (7th Cir.

2008) (interlocutory appeal on right to jury trial

in prisoner litigation); In re Grabill Corp., 967 F.2d

1152, 1152-53 (7th Cir. 1992) (right to a jury trial in

bankruptcy proceeding on interlocutory appeal).4 In

4

Plaintiffs also point to cases in other circuits which accepted

appeals under § 1292(b) on the right to a jury trial, most notably,

Peace v. Fidalgo Island Packing Co., 419 F.2d 371, 371 (9th Cir.

1969), which decided the question of a DOHSA plaintiff’s right to

a jury trial on interlocutory appeal under § 1292(b). Other cases

dealing with a right to a jury trial on interlocutory appeal include:

Cascone v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 702 F.2d 389, 391 (2d Cir.

1983); Rex v. Cia. Pervana de Vapores, S.A., 660 F.2d 61, 62 (3d Cir.

1981); Singletary v. Enersys, Inc., 57 F. App’x 161, 162 (4th Cir.

2003); Luera v. M/V Alberta, 635 F.3d 181, 186 (5th Cir. 2011);

Smith v. Dowden, 47 F.3d 940, 941 (8th Cir. 1995); Zahn v. Geren,

245 F. App’x 696, 697 (9th Cir. 2007); Adams v. Cyprus Amax

27a

sum, none of Defendants’ cited cases create a per se

rule that a right to a jury trial is not a controlling

question. Instead, the determination is heavily case

and context specific. And here, the question is controlling in the practical sense.

B. “Contestable” Question

A question is “contestable” when substantial grounds

for a difference of opinion exist. 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b);

Ahrenholz, 219 F.3d at 675. For a question to be

appealable under § 1292(b), it must be a “difficult

central question of law which is not settled by

controlling authority,” and there must exist a “substantial likelihood” that the district court’s ruling will

be reversed. In re Brand Name Prescription Drugs

Antitrust Litig., 878 F. Supp. 1078, 1081 (N.D. Ill. 1995)

(citations omitted).

First and foremost, there is no controlling Seventh

Circuit or Supreme Court authority which decides this

question. According to Plaintiffs, the Order therefore

“entrenches” a conflict among courts regarding the

right to a jury trial under DOHSA, which makes an

interlocutory appeal especially suitable. In the Order,

this Court followed cases from other district and circuit courts around the country that have held that

there is no jury trial right under DOHSA unless there

is also a non-DOHSA cause of action that carries the

right to a jury trial or that allows the litigant to invoke

diversity jurisdiction. Tallentire, 800 F.2d at 1391

(on remand) (where the “sole predicate” for liability is

DOHSA, the plaintiff “is not entitled to a jury trial”);

Lasky v. Royal Caribbean Cruises, Ltd., 850 F. Supp. 2d

1309, 1313 (S.D. Fla. 2012) (collecting cases); In re

Minerals Co., 149 F.3d 1156, 1158 (10th Cir. 1998); Stewart v.

KHD Deutz of America Corp., 75 F.3d 1522, 1524 (11th Cir. 1996).

28a

Air Crash Disaster Near Honolulu, Hawaii, on Feb. 24,

1989, 783 F. Supp. 1261, 1266 (N.D. Cal. 1992);

Friedman v. Mitsubishi Aircraft Int’l, Inc., 678 F. Supp.

1064, 1066 (S.D.N.Y. 1988); Favaloro v. S/S Golden

Gate, 687 F. Supp. 475, 481 (N.D. Cal. 1987). Though

most courts which have confronted the question hold

this view,5 Defendants rightly point out that other

courts have held that there is a jury trial right under

DOHSA, provided diversity or some other basis for

common law jurisdiction exists. Tozer v. LTV Corp.,

No. HM81-2134, 1983 WL 705, at *6–7 (D. Md. May 27,

1983) (“Although an admiralty claimant is not generally

entitled to a jury trial, where an independent basis for

jurisdiction exists, a claimant may under the saving to

suitors clause, 28 U.S.C. § 1333, assert an admiralty

claim as a nonmaritime civil action ... [and] obtain a

jury trial.”); see also In re Korean Air Lines Disaster of

Sept. 1, 1983, 704 F. Supp. 1135, 1157 (D.D.C. 1988),

affirmed in part, 932 F.2d 1475 (D.C. Cir. 1991); Cucuru

v. Rose’s Oil Serv., Inc., 441 Mass. 12, 20 (2004).

Second, though the Court believes the Order is

rightly decided, there are substantial grounds for a

difference of opinion on a plaintiff ’s jury trial right

under DOHSA. The Court’s ruling was based on the

language of DOHSA, 46 U.S.C. § 30302, which states

that, in the case of wrongful death on the high seas,

the personal representative of the decedent “may bring

a civil action in admiralty.” This language, by the

Court’s reading, stands for the principle that DOHSA

5

According to Defendants, 14 cases have decided a plaintiff’s

entitlement to a jury trial under DOHSA; 12 have ruled that

DOHSA rests exclusively in admiralty jurisdiction such that a

plaintiff does not have a Seventh Amendment jury trial right.

Whether or not this count is correct, the fact remains that this

Court followed the majority view.

29a

exclusively provides a remedy in admiralty. Therefore,

the saving-to-suitors provision in 28 U.S.C. § 1333(1),

which in most admiralty cases reserves the right to

common law remedies, including a trial by jury, is not

applicable. Lewis v. Lewis & Clark Marine, Inc., 531

U.S. 438, 454–55 (2001) (“Trial by jury is an obvious ...

example of the remedies available to suitors.”); Atl. &

Gulf Stevedores, Inc. v. Ellerman Lines, Ltd., 369 U.S.

355, 360 (1962) (“This suit [for breach of a maritime

contract] being in the federal courts by reason of

diversity of citizenship carried with it, of course, the

right to trial by jury.”).

According to amici,6 the Order misreads the

language in DOHSA that the personal representative

“may bring a civil action in admiralty.” 46 U.S.C.

§ 30302. Amici instead argue that the permissive

“may” modifies “in admiralty” such that a claimant

may elect to bring the claim in admiralty or at common

law under the maritime saving clause statute, 28

U.S.C. § 1333(1). This Court reads the provision to

mean that the personal representative “may” file suit

at his or her discretion, but if a case is brought, it is

limited to a civil action in admiralty. And though this

Court believes its reading is the most reasonable,7

there is certainly enough room for a difference of opinion.

6

Amici include Prof. Schoenbaum, who wrote the treatise that

this Court referenced to support its holding that the general

saving-to-suitors clause does not apply to DOHSA actions.

Thomas J. Schoenbaum, 1 Admiralty & Mar. Law § 4:2 (6th ed.)

(“[§ 1333(1)] is subject to [ ] qualifications.... [One is that] Congress, by statute, has vested exclusive admiralty jurisdiction in

the federal courts for certain admiralty claims....”).

7

The Jones Act, which was passed the same year as DOHSA,

expressly provides that a plaintiff “may elect to bring a civil

action at law, with the right of a jury trial.” 46 U.S.C. § 30104.

30a

Plaintiffs also point to Offshore Logistics v. Tallentire,

477 U.S. 207, 231–32 (1986), in which the Supreme

Court held that DOHSA’s own saving-to-suitors clause

allows for concurrent state common law jurisdiction

over DOHSA actions. Id. at 232. Noting that “the

resolution of DOHSA claims does not normally require

the expertise that admiralty courts bring to bear,” the

Supreme Court held that “DOHSA actions are clearly

within the competence of state courts to adjudicate.”

Id. It would be incongruous, Plaintiffs therefore argue,

for DOHSA claimants to have the right to a jury trial

in state common law courts under Tallentire, but not

have the right in federal court once the case is removed.

Further, Plaintiffs point to dicta in a footnote in

Moragne v. States Marine Lines, 398 U.S. 375 (1970),

in which the Supreme Court stated:

If we found from the legislative history [of DOHSA]

that Congress imposed exclusive [admiralty]

jurisdiction because of a desire to avoid the

presentation of wrongful-death claims to juries,

that might support an inference that Congress

meant to forbid nonstatutory maritime actions for

wrongful death, which might come before state

or federal juries. Cf. Fitzgerald v. United States

Lines, 374 U.S. 16, 83 S.Ct. 1646, 10 L.Ed.2d 720

(1963). However, that is not the case.

Id. at 400 n.14. Though this footnote is not directly

on point, it does note that the legislative history of

DOHSA is void of any indication that Congress

intended to foreclose the right to a trial by jury. Id.

No such language explicitly mentioning the right to a jury trial is

found in DOHSA.

31a

This, combined with the language of § 1333(1), the

minority view espoused by other courts, and the amici

argument on the meaning of DOHSA, creates uncertainty. There are substantial grounds for a difference

of opinion, and the Seventh Circuit might reasonably

side with Plaintiffs. The question of Plaintiffs’ entitlement

to a jury trial under DOHSA is therefore contestable.

C. Resolving the Question Would Speed Up

Litigation

The final § 1292(b) element is satisfied if “an

immediate appeal may materially advance the ultimate

termination of the litigation.” Sterk v. Redbox

Automated Retail, LLC, 672 F.3d 535, 536 (7th Cir.

2013). First, Plaintiffs and Xtra primarily assert that,

if the jury question is not certified, and the Seventh

Circuit later concludes, after a bench trial, that Plaintiffs have a right to a jury trial, the case will need to

be retried in front of a jury. In that circumstance, the

bench trial will have been a costly waste of resources

for the parties and the Court. Defendants do not

contest this is true. Instead, they argue that, because

Boeing has stipulated to liability for compensatory

damages under DOHSA, the case should proceed

expeditiously to a bench trial on the only remaining

issue—that of damages.8 But this case can proceed

8

Plaintiffs imply that they may not accept Boeing’s stipulation

and may instead insist on their right to prove liability, which

would further extend discovery. United States v. Allen, 798 F.2d

985, 1001 (7th Cir. 1986) (“[A] party is not required to accept a

judicial admission of his adversary, but may insist on proving the

fact.... [A] cold stipulation can deprive a party of the legitimate

moral force of his evidence, and can never fully substitute

for tangible, physical evidence or the testimony of witnesses.”).

Whether or not Plaintiffs will accept Boeing’s stipulation or insist

on further liability discovery is immaterial to the certification

issue before the Court. Either way, discovery can commence

32a

with discovery while an interlocutory appeal is taken.

Though there may be some disagreement over the

length and extent of the discovery necessary, discovery

is not affected by the jury trial right and can continue

apace while the interlocutory appeal is pending. The

concern that the proceedings would “grind[ ] to a halt”

is therefore unfounded. Ahrenholz, 219 F.3d at 676.

As a final note, Plaintiffs also argue that certifying

the issue for appeal would promote settlement because,

with clarity on whether the cases will be tried before

juries or not, the parties will have a better idea of the

value of their claims. See Sterk, 672 F.3d at 536

(promotion of settlement by way of clearing uncertainty

is “enough to satisfy the ‘may materially advance’

clause of section 1292(b).”). Defendants, however,

argue that an interlocutory appeal would “halt settlement discussions for a year or more,” depending on the

length of the appeal. But if the only issue to be decided

by the trier of fact is the amount of damages, it is

unclear why the valuation of the parties’ cases would

differ drastically depending on the trier of fact or how

an appeal on that issue would either speed up or halt

settlement. It is therefore the Court’s expectation that

the parties will continue to negotiate a settlement in

good faith while an interlocutory appeal is pending.

In sum, this Court will certify for interlocutory

appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) the question of

whether a plaintiff in federal court is entitled to a jury

trial under the Seventh Amendment when the

plaintiff ’s sole claim arises under DOHSA, and the

plaintiff has a concurrent basis for common law

jurisdiction. It is a “controlling question of law as to

during the pendency of the appeal. Plaintiffs can seek a ruling on

the stipulation issue in separate motions if they so desire.

33a

which there is substantial ground for difference of

opinion and ... an immediate appeal ... may materially

advance the ultimate termination of the litigation.”

§ 1292(b).

II. Preemption Question

Chandra Plaintiffs also ask this Court to certify

whether DOHSA preempts their causes of action for

physical destruction of property and personal injuries

to the decedent allegedly sustained over land during

the flight that ultimately led a fatal crash. The issue

of DOHSA’s preemptive scope, however, does not meet

the requirements for certification under § 1292(b)

because it is neither controlling nor contestable.

Chandra Plaintiffs argue that the viability of their

survival personal injury and property damage claims

will impact the course of the litigation by determining

whether additional categories of damages are available

and whether additional discovery will be needed. But

any property lost is minor and incidental. Chandra

Plaintiffs’ Third Amended Complaint does not specify

what property was damaged, but it is likely that

only Mr. Chandra’s personal effects and luggage were

lost. See generally R. 1391. Further, Chandra Plaintiffs

have not pled a pre-impact physical injury, so their

request that the Court certify this question has no real

practical effect on the litigation. Id.

DOHSA’s preemptive effect is also not contestable.

As the Order points out, the Supreme Court has

already held that DOHSA preempts survival actions

for pre-death pain and suffering (without any reference to whether the injury occurred over land or sea)

in Dooley v. Korean Air Lines Co., Ltd., 524 U.S. 116,

123 (1998). There, the Supreme Court stated:

34a

“[b]y authorizing only certain surviving relatives

to recover damages, and by limiting damages to

the pecuniary losses sustained by those relatives,

Congress provided the exclusive recovery for

deaths that occur on the high seas.” [Allowing a]

survival action would necessarily expand the class

of beneficiaries in cases of death on the high seas

by permitting decedents’ estates ... to recover

compensation [and] would expand the recoverable

damages for deaths on the high seas.... Because

Congress has already decided these issues, it has

precluded the judiciary from enlarging either the

class of beneficiaries or the recoverable damages.

Id. And the Supreme Court has stated in no uncertain

terms that “Congress did not limit DOHSA beneficiaries to recovery of their pecuniary losses in order to

encourage the creation of nonpecuniary supplements.”

Mobil Oil Corp. v. Higginbotham, 436 U.S. 618, 625

(1978). It is clear, therefore, that Plaintiffs’ right to

nonpecuniary damages such as property loss and predeath pain and suffering (even if experienced over

land) is not contestable.

Plaintiffs argue that there is at least one case in

which DOHSA did not preempt property loss claims,

Smith v. Pan Air Corp., 684 F.2d 1102 (5th Cir. 1982).

But that case is inapplicable. DOHSA by its terms

applies only to wrongful death actions brought by

personal representatives of the decedent. 46 U.S.C.

§ 30303. And in Smith, a helicopter company, not

the personal representative of the decedent’s estate,

sought recovery for loss of its helicopter. Id. at 1112.

It is therefore not surprising that DOHSA did not

preempt the helicopter company’s claim. In the end,

Chandra Plaintiffs have not cited any other case

showing that the preemption issue is contestable.

35a

Therefore, certifying the issue for interlocutory appeal

is inappropriate.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Manfredi Plaintiffs’ and

Xtra’s motions, R. 1468, 1474, are granted in whole,

and Chandra Plaintiffs’ motion, R. 1471, is granted in

part. This Court will amend the Order to include

language certifying the issue of Plaintiffs’ entitlement

to a jury trial for interlocutory appeal under 28 U.S.C.

§ 1292(b). Chandra Plaintiffs’ request to certify the

issue of claim preemption is denied.

36a

APPENDIX C

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT,

N.D. ILLINOIS, EASTERN DIVISION

————

No. 18 C 07686

Case No. 19 C 01552, Case No. 19 C 07091

————

IN RE LION AIR FLIGHT JT 610 CRASH

————

Signed May 25, 2023

————

AMENDED MEMORANDUM

OPINION AND ORDER

Thomas M. Durkin, United States District Judge

This consolidated action arises out of an aviation

accident involving a Boeing commercial jet which crashed

into the Java Sea off the coast of Indonesia, resulting

in the death of everyone on board. Defendants Boeing,

Rockwell Collins, Inc., and Rosemount Aerospace, Inc.

(collectively, “Defendants”) filed motions seeking

the application of the Death on the High Seas Act,

46 U.S.C. §§ 30301–08 (“DOHSA”) to the two

remaining actions, Chandra v. Boeing, case no. 19 C

01552, and Smith v. Boeing, case no. 19 C 07091. R.

1399, 1401. Defendants also seek a ruling that the

application of DOHSA preempts all other causes of

action and mandates a bench trial in each case. For the

foregoing reasons, Defendants’ motions are granted.

Background

On October 29, 2018, Lion Air Flight JT 610 began

experiencing serious mechanical problems almost

37a

immediately after takeoff from Jakarta, Indonesia.

R. 1391 ¶¶ 43, 44. The passengers on board the Boeing

737 MAX 8 experienced erratic movements and

fluctuations in altitude due to a faulty automatic flight

control system called MCAS, which overrode the pilots

and attempted to turn the plane into a nosedive over

two dozen times. Id. at ¶¶ 4, 45. After a few minutes,

the plane headed out over the ocean, and approximately five minutes after that, the plane crashed into

the Java Sea at a high speed about 18 nautical miles

off the coast of Indonesia. See id. ¶ 46. There were no

survivors. Id. at ¶ 5.

The resulting litigation involved 87 individual actions

asserting wrongful death and other claims arising out

of the accident against Boeing and other defendants

on behalf of 186 decedents. All actions were either filed

in or removed to this Court and eventually consolidated under the master docket, In Re Lion Air Flight

JT 610 Crash, 18 C 07686. Boeing has now fully settled

the claims of 184 decedents. The remaining claims are

those brought by the families and representatives of

two decedents: Liu Chandra, an Indonesian businessman

(Chandra v. Boeing, case no. 19 C 01552); and Andrea

Manfredi, an Italian professional cyclist and entrepreneur

(Smith v. Boeing, case no. 19 C 07091). 1

The plaintiffs in the Chandra matter (the “Chandra

Plaintiffs”) originally filed suit in the Circuit Court of

Cook County, Illinois. See Chandra, No. 19 C 01552,

Dkt. 1. They allege wrongful death arising under

DOHSA and the Illinois Wrongful Death Act based on

At the time the instant motions were filed, another case was

also outstanding. See Sethi v. Boeing, case no. 20 C 01152. In that

case, the parties stipulated to the application of DOHSA and the

Court conducting a damages-only bench trial. See R. 1367. Prior

to trial, the case settled. R. 1457.

1

38a

theories of strict products liability, negligence, and

negligent failure to warn. See, e.g., R. 1391 at pp. 15–

24. They also make survival claims for property

damage and pre-death fear and injury. Id. Boeing

removed the case to this Court, citing the Multiparty,

Multiforum Trial Jurisdiction Act (“MMTJA”), 28

U.S.C. § 1369, and the Court’s admiralty jurisdiction

under 28 U.S.C. § 1331(1). Chandra, No. 19 C 01552,

Dkt. 1. In its removal paperwork, Boeing included a

jury demand. Id. The operative Third Amended

Complaint demands a jury trial and alleges the Court

has subject matter jurisdiction in diversity and under

the MMTJA and DOHSA. R. 1391 ¶¶ 16, 18–19; id. at

p. 57.

Mr. Manfredi’s family and the administrator of

Mr. Manfredi’s estate, Laura Smith, (the “Manfredi

Plaintiffs”) filed suit in this Court, invoking its

diversity jurisdiction. See Smith, No. 19 C 07091,

Dkt. 1. The operative Second Amended Complaint

asserts wrongful death and survival claims under

theories of strict products liability, negligence, and

breach of implied warranties. R. 1378 ¶¶ 201–320,

468–80, 489–95. The Manfredi Plaintiffs also plead

survival claims of pre-death injury, negligent infliction

of emotional distress, and claims arising under various

fraud statutes, including the Illinois Consumer Fraud

and Deceptive Practices Act, 815 ILCS 505/1 (“ICFA”)

and the federal Computer Fraud and Abuse Act,

18 U.S.C. § 1030 (“CFAA”). Id. They seek punitive

damages and demand a jury trial. See id. at pp. 4,

118–19

Defendants filed motions in each of the Chandra

and Smith cases, seeking the Court’s determination

that DOHSA applies, preempts each set of Plaintiffs’

39a

non-DOHSA claims, and mandates a bench trial. 2 See

R. 1399, 1400, 1401, 1402. The Chandra Plaintiffs do

not dispute that DOHSA governs their wrongful death

claims, but nonetheless insist that their survival

claims for property loss and pre-death injury are

not preempted by DOHSA and that they retain their

right to a jury trial. The Manfredi Plaintiffs dispute

DOHSA’s application entirely and similarly argue that

even if it did apply, their survival claims for pre-death

injury and fraud are not preempted and that they have

the right to a jury trial. Though the parties in the

Chandra and Smith cases have informally exchanged

some discovery in furtherance of settlement discussions, they have not engaged in formal written or

expert discovery.

Legal Standard

Defendants do not articulate a standard under

which the Court should decide their motions.

Defendants base their arguments on the pleadings,

however, they do cite to a public crash investigation

report by the Indonesian government (the “Report”).

See, e.g., R. 1400 at 7; R. 1438 at 8. The Manfredi

Plaintiffs, in turn, attach evidentiary material outside

the pleadings to their brief in opposition, argue for the

application of the summary judgment standard, and

request additional discovery under Rule 56(d). R.

1425-1 (attaching expert affidavit). Meanwhile, the

Chandra Plaintiffs argue for the application of the

Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss standard. R. 1422 at 3.

The Report cited by Defendants is a foreign

government report and a matter of public record, and

the Court may take judicial notice of it without

Defendant Xtra Aerospace LLC filed a response to the instant

motions stating that it takes no position. R. 1421.

2

40a

converting Defendants’ motions to ones for summary

judgment. Menominee Indian Tribe of Wis. v.

Thompson, 161 F.3d 449, 456 (7th Cir. 1998) (“Judicial

notice of historical documents, documents contained in

the public record, and reports of administrative bodies

is proper.”); see also Color Switch LLC v. Fortafy Games

DMCC, 377 F. Supp. 3d 1075, 1089 n.6 (E.D. Cal. 2019)

(taking judicial notice of Canadian government

report). The fact that a plaintiff attaches evidentiary

materials outside the pleadings to its brief does not

convert a defendant’s motion to a summary judgment

motion. Thompson v. Illinois Dept. of Prof’l Regulation,

300 F.3d 750, 754 (7th Cir. 2002). Furthermore, it is

within this Court’s discretion to handle this motion as

a straightforward motion to dismiss, especially where

early resolution of an issue, like the application of

DOHSA, would streamline the case. Levenstein v.

Salafsky, 164 F.3d 345, 347 (7th Cir. 1998) (holding

that it was within the district court’s discretion to

treat motion as motion to dismiss where judgment on

qualified immunity should be decided as early in the

case as possible).

Thus, the Court will construe Defendants’ motions

under the Rule 12(b)(6) standard to decide the application of DOHSA as a matter of law on the face of the

pleadings. A Rule 12(b)(6) motion challenges the

“sufficiency of the complaint.” Berger v. Nat. Collegiate

Athletic Assoc., 843 F.3d 285, 289 (7th Cir. 2016). In

applying this standard, the Court accepts all wellpleaded facts as true and draws all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party. Tobey v.

Chibucos, 890 F.3d 634, 646 (7th Cir. 2018).

41a

Discussion

A. DOHSA Applies to the Smith (Manfredi) Action.

Though the Chandra Plaintiffs do not dispute

DOHSA’s application to their wrongful death claims,

the Manfredi Plaintiffs do. DOHSA is the source of law

for deaths resulting from wrongful acts, neglect, or

default on the high seas more than three (or in a

commercial aviation accident, twelve) nautical miles

from the shore of the United States. 46 U.S.C. §§ 30302,

30307. The Supreme Court has consistently applied

DOHSA to aviation accidents occurring on the high

seas, like the crash which occurred here. See Dooley v.

Korean Air Lines Co., Ltd., 524 U.S. 116, 118 S.Ct.

1890, 141 L.Ed.2d 102 (1998); Zicherman v. Korean Air

Lines Co., Ltd., 516 U.S. 217, 116 S.Ct. 629, 133

L.Ed.2d 596 (1996); Offshore Logistics v. Tallentire, 477

U.S. 207, 106 S.Ct. 2485, 91 L.Ed.2d 174 (1986); Mobil

Oil Corp. v. Higginbotham, 436 U.S. 618, 98 S.Ct. 2010,

56 L.Ed.2d 581 (1978); Exec. Jet Aviation, Inc. v. City of

Cleveland, 409 U.S. 249, 263–64, 93 S.Ct. 493, 34

L.Ed.2d 454 (1972) (“[I]t may be considered as settled

today that [DOHSA] gives the federal admiralty courts

jurisdiction of such wrongful-death actions” based on

aircraft crashes into the high seas); see also 46 U.S.C.

§ 30307 (section of DOHSA governing commercial

aviation accidents on the high seas). 3

The weight of the case law in other circuits is that

when a plaintiff is fatally injured over the high seas,

DOHSA applies. LaCourse v. PAE Worldwide Inc., 980

F.3d 1350, 1357 (11th Cir. 2020) (“Where a death

Cases interpreting and applying DOHSA are virtually nonexistent in this Circuit. Where there is no binding law from the

Supreme Court or the Seventh Circuit, this Court considers the

persuasive case law of other circuits.

3

42a

occurs on the high seas, DOHSA applies, full stop.”);

Bergen v. F/V St. Patrick, 816 F.2d 1345, 1348 (9th Cir.

1987); Kennedy v. Carnival Corp., 385 F. Supp. 3d 1302,

1316 (S.D. Fla. 2019) (DOHSA applies where “the

injury that led to the Decedent’s death occurred in the

water); see also Sea-Land Servs., Inc. v. Gaudet, 414

U.S. 573, 599–600 and n.5, 94 S.Ct. 806, 39 L.Ed.2d 9

(1974) (J. Powell, dissenting on other grounds)

(DOHSA “by its terms covers deaths caused by injuries

inflicted at sea, not simply deaths occurring on the

high seas.”).

Citing Motts v. M/V Green Wave, a case in which the

Fifth Circuit held that DOHSA applied when the

injury occurred on the high seas but the prior negligence and the later death occurred onshore, the

Manfredi Plaintiffs argue that the Court should

instead consider the location of where the negligence

is consummated into a “first” injury in determining

whether DOHSA applies. 210 F.3d 565, 569–71 (5th

Cir. 2000). Their argument is that Mr. Manfredi was

first injured during the period that the flight was over

land—they allege he suffered, at a minimum, emotional

distress—and this prevents the application of DOHSA.

But the Motts court specifically held that the proper

test is to “look to the location of the accident in

determining whether DOHSA applies.” Id. at 571. The

Manfredi Plaintiffs can point to no other case law

which adopts their “first injury” test. Therefore, the

situs of a pre-death but non-fatal injury does not matter.

The Manfredi Plaintiffs’ argument that over half of

the flight occurred over land similarly fails. LaCourse,

980 F.3d at 1357 (aviation accident was governed by

DOHSA even where the flight was scheduled almost

entirely over land and only crashed during the short

time when it was “fortuitously” over water). Their

43a

argument that Defendants’ negligence occurred on

land also fails. Id. at 1356; In re Dearborn Marine

Serv., Inc., 499 F.2d 263, 272 n.17 (5th Cir. 1974)

(“DOHSA has been construed to confer admiralty

jurisdiction over claims arising out of airplane crashes

on the high seas though the negligence alleged to have

caused the crash occurred on land.”).

Even so, the Manfredi Plaintiffs argue that it is too

early at this juncture to determine where the fatal

injury occurred, whether over land or sea. They

maintain that because no discovery has occurred, the

record does not show when Mr. Manfredi was fatally

injured during the fated flight path. For example, they

propose for the first time that Mr. Manfredi may have

died over land from a heart attack due to his emotional

distress, from extreme G-forces breaking his neck or

causing brain injury during the plane’s erratic

movements, or from a piece of baggage flying out of an

overhead compartment. Citing Bernard v. World

Learning, Inc., the Manfredi Plaintiffs contend that

this is a “metaphysical” factual question on which the

Court should not speculate without discovery. No. 0920309-CIV, 2010 WL 11505188, at *8 (S.D. Fla. June 4,

2010). But the Bernard court simply held that the

defendant was not entitled to summary judgment on

the application of DOHSA because there were genuine

evidentiary disputes regarding whether the decedent

was mortally injured on land or sea. Id. (detailing the

parties’ dispute over whether the decedent died while

swimming in the ocean or on land as a result of a

landslide and was then pushed out to sea).

Here, the Court agrees it should not speculate or

weigh evidence on the location of Mr. Manfredi’s death

in deciding a 12(b)(6) motion, but instead takes the

facts alleged as true. The Manfredi Plaintiffs’ own

44a

Complaint does not state that Mr. Manfredi died prior

to impact or as a result of the plane’s erratic

movements over land. Rather, it specifically alleges

that Mr. Manfredi died when the aircraft crashed into

the ocean. See, e.g., R. 1378 ¶ 149–153 (describing predeath terror prior to crash into the water); 229, 246,

265, 278, 290, 309, 351, 368, 387, 400, 412, 431, 442,

486, 502 (all paragraphs alleging that Mr. Manfredi

“was able to perceive, process, understand and react to

the impact of the aircraft with the ocean.”). Based on

the pleadings, Mr. Manfredi suffered his fatal injury

on the high seas, and thus DOHSA applies. 4 Because

The Manfredi Plaintiffs request leave to amend their

Complaint to allege alternative theories of death which include

their new land-based scenarios. “The court should freely give

leave to amend ... [u]nless it is certain from the face of the

complaint that any amendment would be futile or otherwise

unwarranted.” Runnion ex rel. Runnion v. Girl Scouts of Greater

Chicago & Nw. Indiana, 786 F.3d 510, 519–20 (7th Cir. 2015)

(cleaned up). An amendment is futile when it “fails to state a valid

theory of liability” or “could not withstand a motion to dismiss.”

Bower v. Jones, 978 F.2d 1004, 1008 (7th Cir. 1992). Defendants

argue that amendment would be futile because the Indonesian

Report demonstrates that the Manfredi Plaintiffs’ speculated

scenarios are very unlikely. For example, the transcript of the

Cockpit Voice Recorder shows that the captain and co-captain

were alive and still conversing until less than 30 seconds

before the crash. See Komite Nasional Keselamatan Transportasi

Republic of Indonesia, Final Aircraft Investigation Report (2019),

https://bit.ly/3xL7Ll5 at 85. While the report makes the Manfredi

Plaintiffs’ new theories improbable, it does not foreclose them

entirely—the report does not discuss what may have happened to

any passengers in the main cabin. So long as the Manfredi

Plaintiffs have “evidentiary support or ... will likely have

evidentiary support after a reasonable opportunity for further

investigation or discovery” for any new allegations, Fed. R. Civ. P.

11(b), they are granted leave to amend their complaint, keeping

in mind that they may be subject to sanctions if their pleading

does not comply with the requirements of Rule 11.

4

45a

DOHSA applies to the Smith and Chandra cases as

pleaded, the Court will determine whether it preempts

Plaintiffs’ other claims and whether it forecloses their

right to a jury trial.

B. Plaintiffs’ Non-DOHSA Claims Are Preempted,

and Plaintiffs Are Not Entitled to a Jury Trial.

Defendants argue that DOHSA acts to preempt

Plaintiffs’ other claims against them, and that Plaintiffs

do not have a right to a trial by jury because DOHSA

is a claim in admiralty. DOHSA provides that where a

death occurs on the high seas as the result of negligence or wrongdoing, the decedent’s spouse, parent,

child, or dependent relative “may bring a civil action

in admiralty” against the wrongdoer. Id. § 30302.

DOHSA allows recovery of pecuniary and non-pecuniary

damages exclusively for those relatives, but explicitly

forbids punitive damages. Id. § 30307. If a person is

injured on the high seas and dies while he or she has

a civil action pending to recover for those injuries,

“the personal representative of the decedent may be

substituted as the plaintiff” and the action proceeds

under the provisions of DOHSA. Id. at § 30305.

The Seventh Amendment does not require jury

trials in cases brought in admiralty. Fitzgerald v. U.S.

Lines Co., 374 U.S. 16, 20, 83 S.Ct. 1646, 10 L.Ed.2d

720 (1963) (citing Waring v. Clarke, 46 U.S. 5 How.

441, 46 U.S. 441, 12 L.Ed. 226 (1847)); Fed. R. Civ. P.

38(e). Nevertheless, jury trials in admiralty are not

forbidden. Fitzgerald, 374 U.S. at 20, 83 S.Ct. 1646.

While the case law is murky and often conflicting, 5 it

appears that a plaintiff’s jury demand in a DOHSA

Indeed, the Supreme Court has described as “tortuous” the

development of the law as it pertains to wrongful death claims in

the maritime context. Tallentire, 477 U.S. at 212, 106 S.Ct. 2485.

5

46a

case may be granted in two instances: (1) where the

plaintiff asserts a non-preempted claim in addition to

the DOHSA claim that carries a right to a jury trial; or

(2) where, “in addition to asserting a DOHSA claim, a

plaintiff also asserts another claim that does not

necessarily entitle her to a jury trial, but that invokes

the court’s diversity jurisdiction.” Lasky v. Royal

Caribbean Cruises, Ltd., 850 F. Supp. 2d 1309, 1313

(S.D. Fla. 2012) (collecting cases).

1. DOHSA Preempts Plaintiffs’ Survival Actions

First, both Plaintiffs argue that they plead nonpreempted claims which grant them a right to a jury

trial. Defendants, however, argue that DOHSA

preempts Plaintiffs’ other claims against them. These

are their wrongful death claims under Illinois law,

their pre-death injury and emotional distress claims,

the Chandra Plaintiffs’ claims for property damage,

and the Manfredi Plaintiffs’ claims under the ICFA

and CFAA.

We start with the principle that where DOHSA

applies, it is generally the exclusive source of law and

preempts all other state wrongful death claims. See

generally Tallentire, 477 U.S. 207, 106 S.Ct. 2485, 91

L.Ed.2d 174. 6 The Supreme Court in Dooley has also

held that survival claims for pre-death pain and

suffering, like those sought by Plaintiffs, are preempted

by the application of DOHSA. 524 U.S. at 124, 118 S.Ct.

1890. Without deciding whether survival claims may

ever be brought in DOHSA cases, the Court explained:

DOHSA expresses Congress’ judgment that there

should be no [pre-death pain and suffering] cause

The Chandra Plaintiffs accordingly concede that their wrongful

death claim under Illinois law is preempted. R. 1422 at 3.

6

47a

of action in cases of death on the high seas. By

authorizing only certain surviving relatives to

recover damages, and by limiting damages to the

pecuniary losses sustained by those relatives,

Congress provided the exclusive recovery for

deaths that occur on the high seas. [Allowing such

a] survival action would necessarily expand the

class of beneficiaries in cases of death on the high

seas by permitting decedents’ estates (and their

various beneficiaries) to recover compensation. [It

also] would expand the recoverable damages for

deaths on the high seas by permitting the recovery

of nonpecuniary losses Because Congress has

already decided these issues, it has precluded the

judiciary from enlarging either the class of

beneficiaries or the recoverable damages. As we

noted in Higginbotham, ‘Congress did not limit

DOHSA beneficiaries to recovery of their pecuniary

losses in order to encourage the creation of

nonpecuniary supplements.’ The comprehensive

scope of DOHSA is confirmed by its survival

provision, ... which limits the recovery in such

cases to the pecuniary losses suffered by surviving

relatives. The Act thus expresses Congress’

‘considered judgment,’ on the availability and

contours of a survival action in cases of death on

the high seas.

Id. (quoting Higginbotham, 436 U.S. at 625, 98 S.Ct.

2010) (emphasis added). The Court also noted that the

Jones Act, which Congress adopted the same year as

DOHSA and which permits seamen injured in the

course of their employment to recover damages for

their injuries, has a specific provision allowing a

survival action for pre-death injury. The Court

consequently reasoned that Congress was “certainly

familiar” with language which would permit a survival

48a

cause of action, and that it likely made a conscious

decision not to include a similar provision in DOHSA.

Dooley, 524 U.S. at 124, 118 S.Ct. 1890. In short,

“Congress has spoken on the availability of a survival

action, the losses to be recovered, and the beneficiaries,

in cases of death on the high seas,” and generally, other

survival actions are preempted. Id. at 123–24, 118

S.Ct. 1890.

Plaintiffs argue that the Supreme Court’s holding in

Dooley does not apply to their pre-death pain and

suffering claims, because some of Mr. Chandra’s and

Mr. Manfredi’s injuries occurred while the plane was

over land. They cite Evans v. John Crane, Inc., C.A. No.

15-681 (MN) (D. Del. Oct. 24, 2019) and Hays v. John

Crane, Inc., Case No. 09-81881-CIV-KAM, 2014 WL

10658453 (S.D. Fla. Oct. 9, 2014), two cases in which

the decedents died from asbestos exposure which

occurred cumulatively over land and sea. However,

these cases are distinguishable—they are “indivisible

injury” cases where the fatal injury occurred over

many years and partially over land. Plaintiffs here do

not allege the decedents suffered “indivisible” fatal

injuries (like asbestos exposure) over land and sea.

DOHSA similarly preempts the Chandra Plaintiffs’

property damage claim and the Manfredi Plaintiffs’

ICFA and CFAA claims. Though the Supreme Court

has never directly addressed whether all other survival

claims arising out of a death on the high seas are

preempted by DOHSA, its dicta is instructive. See, e.g.,

Tallentire, 477 U.S. at 232, 106 S.Ct. 2485. (“[T]he

conclusion that the state statutes are pre-empted by

DOHSA where it applies is inevitable.”). It is clear,

then, that a survival claim for damages to the estate

arising out of a death on the high seas will not lie,

absent a clear indication from Congress to the contrary.

49a

Courts around the country have agreed. 7 See Bowoto v.

Chevron Corp., 621 F.3d 1116, 1124 (9th Cir. 2010);

Jacobs v. N. King Shipping Co., 180 F.3d 713, 717 (5th

Cir. 1999); In re Air Disaster Near Honolulu, Haw.

on Feb. 24, 1989, 792 F. Supp. 1541 (N.D. Cal. 1990)

(DOHSA provides only pecuniary damages to surviving

dependents and precludes the availability of nonpecuniary damages under either general maritime law

or state law, regardless of whether asserted as part of

a wrongful death action or as a survival action); Heath

v. Am. Sail Training Ass’n, 644 F. Supp. 1459, 1471–72

(D.R.I. 1986).

Plaintiffs contend that broad DOHSA preemption

could lead to absurd results. For example, the Chandra

Plaintiffs claim it would be unjust for DOHSA to

preempt an estate from obtaining damages for a preaccident assault at the airport. But DOHSA’s preemption of claims arising out of incidents unconnected to

the fatal accident is not at issue here. Their citation

of Ostrowiecki v. Aggressor Fleet, Ltd. is similarly

inapposite, because the emotional distress in that case

was not preempted because it was “predicated on

entirely different acts of defendants from those which

allegedly caused [the decedent’s] death.” Nos. 07-6598,

07-6931, 2008 WL 3874609, at *5–6 (E.D. La. Aug. 15,

2008).

The few cases which have allowed survivor claims to be

brought concurrently with a DOHSA claim were decided preDooley and were brought under the Jones Act, which was

designed to “work together” with DOHSA, and the Warsaw

Convention. See Peace v. Fidalgo Island Packing Co., 419 F.2d 371,

372 (9th Cir. 1969); In re Korean Air Lines Disaster, 704 F. Supp.

1135, 1152-53 (D.D.C. 1988); Tozer v. LTV Corp., 1983 WL 705, at

*7 (D. Md. May 27, 1983). Neither the Chandra nor the Manfredi

Plaintiffs plead such claims.

7

50a

The Manfredi Plaintiffs also argue that the CFAA is

a federal statute and that federal statutes cannot

preempt each other. However, the Ninth Circuit, in

deciding that DOHSA preempted survival claims

under the federal Alien Tort Statute, explained that

“Dooley ... held that DOHSA preempts all survival

claims for deaths on the high seas unless there is clear

indication that Congress intended otherwise.” Bowoto,

621 F.3d at 1124 (emphasis in original). Here, in

contrast to DOHSA’s comprehensive scope, the CFAA

is a criminal statute that creates a private right of

action. See 18 U.S.C. § 1030. It has a punitive purpose

and does not even speak to the issue of survival claims.

Id. Congress passed the CFAA after DOHSA, and if it

intended such claims to be allowed in conjunction with

a DOHSA claim, it would have said so. Like the Alien

Tort Statute, there is thus “no evidence that Congress

intended [CFAA] survival claims to remain viable”

upon application of DOHSA. Bowoto, 621 F.3d at 1124.8

The Court dismisses the Manfredi Plaintiffs’ ICFA and CFAA

claims because DOHSA preempts them. Nevertheless, those claims

are also meritless as pleaded. Mr. Manfredi was not a “consumer”

of the Boeing 737 MAX 8 aircraft, nor can he make a claim under

the “consumer nexus test.” Tile Unltd., Inc. v. Blanke Corp., 788 F.

Supp. 2d 734, 740 (N.D. Ill. 2011) (argument that consumer can

state a claim under ICFA because he or she ultimately used a

product has been “soundly, repeatedly, and correctly rejected”).

Their CFAA claim also suffers from a host of deficiencies, the most

egregious being that the CFAA specifically bars claims for

negligent design of a computer system, which is precisely what

the Manfredi Plaintiffs allege. 18 U.S.C. § 1030(g). Further, the

Manfredi Plaintiffs lack standing because only an entity which

suffered loss related to its computer system may state a claim

under the CFAA. Von Holdt v. A-1 Tool Corp., 714 F. Supp. 2d 863,

876 (N.D. Ill. 2010). And the Act prohibits only unauthorized

activities. See 18 U.S.C. § 1030(g). Here, the Manfredi Plaintiffs

allege that Boeing loaded the negligently designed MCAS

8

51a

The Court consequently concludes that the Plaintiffs’

other causes of action are preempted by DOHSA and

should be dismissed.

2. “Saving to Suitors” Clauses and Existence of

Diversity Do Not Preserve Right to a Jury

Trial for DOHSA Claims

Plaintiffs next argue that two “saving to suitors”

clauses preserve their right to a jury trial. First, they

argue that 28 U.S.C. § 1331(1), which allows a plaintiff

with a general maritime claim to pursue any other

remedies at law he might have, carries the right to a

jury trial into any suit in admiralty where the court

also sits in diversity. See Atl. & Gulf Stevedores, Inc. v.

Ellerman Lines, Ltd., 369 U.S. 355, 359-60, 82 S.Ct.

780, 7 L.Ed.2d 798 (1962) (“This suit [for breach of a

maritime contract] being in the federal courts by

reason of diversity of citizenship carried with it, of

course, the right to trial by jury.”). Plaintiffs cite many

general maritime cases for this argument. 9 However,

software on its own aircraft, which is obviously authorized, and

which does not affect Mr. Manfredi’s computer systems.

Lewis v. Lewis & Clark Marine, Inc., 531 U.S. 438, 455, 121

S.Ct. 993, 148 L.Ed.2d 931 (2001); Atl. & Gulf Stevedores, Inc. v.

Ellerman Lines, Ltd., 369 U.S. 355, 360, 82 S.Ct. 780, 7 L.Ed.2d

798 (1962); Wingerter v. Chester Quarry Co., 185 F.3d 657, 665 (7th

Cir. 1999); Bhd. Shipping Co. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins., 985

F.2d 323, 326 (7th Cir. 1993); Luera v. M/V Alberta, 635 F.3d 181,

188 (5th Cir. 2011); In re Lockheed Martin Corp., 503 F.3d 351,

354–55 (4th Cir. 2007); Ghotra ex rel. Ghotra v. Bandila Shipping,

Inc., 113 F.3d 1050, 1054–55 (9th Cir. 1997); Odeco Oil & Gas Co.,

Drilling Div. v. Bonnette, 74 F.3d 671, 674 (5th Cir. 1996); Coronel

v. Victory, 1 F. Supp. 3d 1175, 1181–82 (W.D. Wash. 2014);

Manrique v. Fagan, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 61794, at *24, 2009 WL

700999 (S.D. Fla. 2009); Sea-Land Serv., Inc. v. J & W Imp./Exp.,

Inc., 976 F. Supp. 327, 330 (D.N.J. 1997); Neal v. McGinnis, Inc.,

716 F. Supp. 996, 998-99 (E.D. Ky. 1989).

9

52a

none are applicable to a DOHSA case. A plaintiff in a

general maritime claim may have a right to a jury trial

for “suits at common law” under the Seventh Amendment

because § 1331(1) allows in personam maritime claims

to be brought “at law.” Congress, however, has explicitly

limited DOHSA to “a civil action in admiralty,” which

does not carry the right to a jury trial. Tallentire v.

Offshore Logistics, Inc., 800 F.2d 1390, 1391 (5th Cir.

1986) (on remand) (where the “sole predicate” for

liability is DOHSA, the plaintiff “is not entitled to a

jury trial”). As the Manfredi Plaintiffs’ brief acknowledges,

there is an exception to § 1331(1) for claims that can

only be brought in admiralty. See R. 1425 at 6 (citing 1

Schoenbaum § 4-4, pp. 239–40) (explaining that

§ 1331(1) does not apply to statutes where Congress

“has conferred exclusive admiralty jurisdiction upon

the federal courts.”). DOHSA, by its terms, is one of

those statutes. Friedman v. Mitsubishi Aircraft Int’l,

Inc., 678 F. Supp. 1064, 1066 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (“[S]ince

DOHSA provides a remedy in admiralty, admiralty

principles are applicable and a DOHSA plaintiff has

no right to a jury trial”); Favaloro v. S/S Golden Gate,

687 F. Supp. 475, 481 (N.D. Cal. 1987) (“DOHSA

actions, according to the terms of the statute, lie in

admiralty.... Therefore, plaintiffs are not entitled to a

jury under DOHSA.”).

Plaintiffs also argue that DOHSA’s § 7, its own

“saving to suitors clause,” which provides “[t]his

chapter does not affect the law of a state regulating the

right to recover for death,” preserves their right to a

jury trial. 46 U.S.C. § 30308(a). But the Supreme Court

has already decided the meaning of § 7 of DOHSA in

Tallentire. 477 U.S. at 232, 106 S.Ct. 2485. There, the

plaintiffs argued that a state wrongful death statute

was available to supplement recovery under DOHSA

because, they argued, state law applied to the high

53a

seas and was “saved” by Section 7 of DOHSA. The

Supreme Court held, however, that Section 7 of DOHSA

was only intended to provide concurrent jurisdiction to

state courts to adjudicate DOHSA claims. Id. It does

not, as Plaintiffs contend, allow state law causes of

action to be brought in federal court concurrently with

DOHSA, or allow Plaintiffs to invoke common law

jurisdiction. Id.

Plaintiffs argue that, under § 7 of DOHSA and

Tallentire, they could (and the Chandra Plaintiffs did)

bring their claims in Illinois state court. In state court,

they could potentially obtain a right to a trial by jury.

It would be inconsistent, they argue, to be deprived of

that right by accident of the case being removed to or

filed in federal court. They cite Cucuru v. Rose’s Oil

Serv., Inc., 441 Mass. 12, 802 N.E.2d 1032, 1035 (Mass.

2004), a case in which the Massachusetts Supreme

Court held that DOHSA’s § 7 gave the plaintiffs a jury

trial right in state court. But the Cucuru decision

turned on Massachusetts constitutional and procedural

law. Here, however, “federal procedural law controls

the question of whether there is a right to a jury trial”

in federal court. Int’l Fin. Servs. Corp. v. Chromas

Techs. Canada, Inc., 356 F.3d 731, 735 (7th Cir. 2004).

And federal procedural law holds that cases brought

in admiralty do not carry a right to a jury trial. See

Fed. R. Civ. P. 38 (e) (“These rules do not create a right

to a jury trial on issues in a claim that is an admiralty

or maritime claim”).

Plaintiffs also reason that this Court has concurrent

diversity jurisdiction over their claims, which means

their cases can be brought “at law” and they have a

right to a jury trial under the Seventh Amendment.

But the jury trial right turns not on whether the

parties for the DOHSA claim are diverse, but on

54a

whether another claim in diversity is being tried

concurrently with the DOHSA claim. Lasky, 850 F.

Supp. 2d at 1313. For example, the court in Friedman

addressed whether a plaintiff is entitled to a jury trial

on his or her DOHSA claims because the parties are

diverse and held that “[t]he existence of an additional

jurisdictional predicate in this case, i.e., diversity of

citizenship, can lead to no different result. Diversity of

citizenship creates only an additional basis for federal

jurisdiction; it does not enlarge the parameters of the

substantive remedy upon which a claim is based.” 678

F. Supp. at 1066 n.5; see also Lasky, 850 F. Supp. 2d at

1314–15 (holding in part that a plaintiff who brought

a death action under DOHSA was not entitled to a jury

trial notwithstanding the fact that there was diversity

of citizenship). Here, although the parties are diverse,

as discussed above, Plaintiffs’ only remaining claims

arise under DOHSA, which under its clear terms,

limits the claims to this Court’s admiralty jurisdiction.

3. The Presence of a Jury Demand Does Not

Necessitate a Trial by Jury

Finally, the Chandra Plaintiffs argue that they

made a jury demand in their complaint and that

Boeing, too, made a jury trial demand in its removal of

the case. Boeing responds that its jury demand was a

nullity and all Defendants assert that the Chandra

Plaintiffs’ jury demand is waived by virtue of their

invocation of this Court’s admiralty jurisdiction.

Defendants are correct that “there is no basis for” a

jury demand “to the extent that any other causes of

action ... are effectively preempted by DOHSA.” In re

Air Disaster v. Honolulu, Haw. on Feb. 24, 1989, 792 F.

Supp. at 1547; see also LaCourse v. Def. Support Servs.

LLC, No. 3:16cv170-RV/CJK, 2018 WL 7342153, at *2

(N.D. Fla. Oct. 31, 2018) (striking jury demand where

55a

plaintiff’s claims were preempted by DOHSA). A jury

demand by either party does not convert an admiralty

claim to a nonadmiralty claim. Wingerter v. Chester

Quarry Co., 185 F.3d 657, 668 (7th Cir. 1998). “In such

cases the district court should simply deny the

request.” Id. The Court does so here.

C. Certification of Jury

Interlocutory Appeal

Trial

Issue

for

For the reasons stated in the Court’s Opinion

granting Plaintiffs’ and Defendant Xtra’s motions for

certification entered herewith, R. 1489, the Court

certifies for immediate interlocutory appeal under 28

U.S.C. § 1292(b) the issue of Plaintiffs’ right to a jury

trial. Namely, the issue of “whether a plaintiff in

federal court is entitled to a jury trial under the

Seventh Amendment when the plaintiff’s sole claim

arises under DOHSA, and the plaintiff has a concurrent

basis for common law jurisdiction (such as diversity),”

R. 1489 at 5, “involves a controlling question of law as

to which there is substantial ground for difference of

opinion and ... an immediate appeal from the order

may materially advance the ultimate termination of

the litigation.” § 1292(b).

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Defendants’ motions,

R. 1399, 1401, are granted. All pre-death pain and

suffering, emotional distress, property damage, and

state and federal fraud claims in the Chandra and

Smith cases are dismissed. Both cases will be tried

exclusively under DOHSA. Because DOHSA mandates

the cases to be tried pursuant to the Court’s admiralty

jurisdiction, Defendants’ requests for bench trials in

each case are granted. The lone issue of Plaintiffs’

entitlement to a jury trial is certified for immediate

56a

interlocutory appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b).

Plaintiffs may take an appeal within ten days of entry

of this amended order. Id.

57a

APPENDIX D

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT,

N.D. ILLINOIS, EASTERN DIVISION

————

No. 18 C 07686

Case No. 19 C 01552,

Case No. 19 C 07091

————

IN RE LION AIR FLIGHT JT 610 CRASH

————

Signed December 20, 2022

————

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Thomas M. Durkin, United States District Judge

This consolidated action arises out of an aviation

accident involving a Boeing commercial jet which

crashed into the Java Sea off the coast of Indonesia,

resulting in the death of everyone on board. Defendants Boeing, Rockwell Collins, Inc., and Rosemount

Aerospace, Inc. (collectively, “Defendants”) filed motions

seeking the application of the Death on the High Seas

Act, 46 U.S.C. §§ 30301–08 (“DOHSA”) to the two

remaining actions, Chandra v. Boeing, case no. 19

C 01552, and Smith v. Boeing, case no. 19 C 07091.

R. 1399, 1401. Defendants also seek a ruling that the

application of DOHSA preempts all other causes

of action and mandates a bench trial in each case.

For the foregoing reasons, Defendants’ motions are

granted.

58a

Background

On October 29, 2018, Lion Air Flight JT 610 began

experiencing serious mechanical problems almost

immediately after takeoff from Jakarta, Indonesia.

R. 1391 ¶¶ 43, 44. The passengers on board the Boeing

737 MAX 8 experienced erratic movements and fluctuations in altitude due to a faulty automatic flight

control system called MCAS, which overrode the pilots

and attempted to turn the plane into a nosedive over

two dozen times. Id. at ¶¶ 4, 45. After a few minutes,

the plane headed out over the ocean, and approximately five minutes after that, the plane crashed into

the Java Sea at a high speed about 18 nautical miles

off the coast of Indonesia. See id. ¶ 46. There were no

survivors. Id. at ¶ 5.

The resulting litigation involved 87 individual

actions asserting wrongful death and other claims

arising out of the accident against Boeing and other

defendants on behalf of 186 decedents. All actions

were either filed in or removed to this Court and

eventually consolidated under the master docket, In

Re Lion Air Flight JT 610 Crash, 18 C 07686. Boeing

has now fully settled the claims of 184 decedents. The

remaining claims are those brought by the families

and representatives of two decedents: Liu Chandra,

an Indonesian businessman (Chandra v. Boeing, case

no. 19 C 01552); and Andrea Manfredi, an Italian

professional cyclist and entrepreneur (Smith v.

Boeing, case no. 19 C 07091). 1

At the time the instant motions were filed, another case was

also outstanding. See Sethi v. Boeing, case no. 20 C 01152. In that

case, the parties stipulated to the application of DOHSA and the

Court conducting a damages-only bench trial. See R. 1367. Prior

to trial, the case settled. R. 1457.

1

59a

The plaintiffs in the Chandra matter (the “Chandra

Plaintiffs”) originally filed suit in the Circuit Court

of Cook County, Illinois. See Chandra, No. 19 C 01552,

Dkt. 1. They allege wrongful death arising under

DOHSA and the Illinois Wrongful Death Act based

on theories of strict products liability, negligence,

and negligent failure to warn. See, e.g., R. 1391 at

pp. 15–24. They also make survival claims for property

damage and pre-death fear and injury. Id. Boeing

removed the case to this Court, citing the Multiparty,

Multiforum Trial Jurisdiction Act (“MMTJA”),

28 U.S.C. § 1369, and the Court's admiralty jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331(1). Chandra, No. 19

C 01552, Dkt. 1. In its removal paperwork, Boeing

included a jury demand. Id. The operative Third

Amended Complaint demands a jury trial and alleges

the Court has subject matter jurisdiction in diversity

and under the MMTJA and DOHSA. R. 1391 ¶¶ 16,

18–19; id. at p. 57.

Mr. Manfredi's family and the administrator of

Mr. Manfredi's estate, Laura Smith, (the “Manfredi

Plaintiffs”) filed suit in this Court, invoking its diversity jurisdiction. See Smith, No. 19 C 07091, Dkt. 1.

The operative Second Amended Complaint asserts

wrongful death and survival claims under theories

of strict products liability, negligence, and breach of

implied warranties. R. 1378 ¶¶ 201–320, 468–80, 489–

95. The Manfredi Plaintiffs also plead survival claims

of pre-death injury, negligent infliction of emotional

distress, and claims arising under various fraud

statutes, including the Illinois Consumer Fraud and

Deceptive Practices Act, 815 ILCS 505/1 (“ICFA”) and

the federal Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 18 U.S.C.

§ 1030 (“CFAA”). Id. They seek punitive damages and

demand a jury trial. See id. at pp. 4, 118–19.

60a

Defendants filed motions in each of the Chandra

and Smith cases, seeking the Court's determination

that DOHSA applies, preempts each set of Plaintiffs’

non-DOHSA claims, and mandates a bench trial. 2 See

R. 1399, 1400, 1401, 1402. The Chandra Plaintiffs do

not dispute that DOHSA governs their wrongful death

claims, but nonetheless insist that their survival

claims for property loss and pre-death injury are not

preempted by DOHSA and that they retain their right

to a jury trial. The Manfredi Plaintiffs dispute

DOHSA's application entirely and similarly argue

that even if it did apply, their survival claims for predeath injury and fraud are not preempted and that

they have the right to a jury trial. Though the parties

in the Chandra and Smith cases have informally

exchanged some discovery in furtherance of

settlement discussions, they have not engaged in

formal written or expert discovery.

Legal Standard

Defendants do not articulate a standard under

which the Court should decide their motions.

Defendants base their arguments on the pleadings,

however, they do cite to a public crash investigation

report by the Indonesian government (the “Report”).

See, e.g., R. 1400 at 7; R. 1438 at 8. The Manfredi

Plaintiffs, in turn, attach evidentiary material outside

the pleadings to their brief in opposition, argue for the

application of the summary judgment standard, and

request additional discovery under Rule 56(d). R.

1425-1 (attaching expert affidavit). Meanwhile, the

Chandra Plaintiffs argue for the application of the

Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss standard. R. 1422 at 3.

Defendant Xtra Aerospace LLC filed a response to the instant

motions stating that it takes no position. R. 1421.

2

61a

The Report cited by Defendants is a foreign

government report and a matter of public record, and

the Court may take judicial notice of it without

converting Defendants’ motions to ones for summary

judgment. Menominee Indian Tribe of Wis. v.

Thompson, 161 F.3d 449, 456 (7th Cir. 1998) (“Judicial

notice of historical documents, documents contained in

the public record, and reports of administrative bodies

is proper.”); see also Color Switch LLC v. Fortafy

Games DMCC, 377 F. Supp. 3d 1075, 1089 n.6 (E.D.

Cal. 2019) (taking judicial notice of Canadian

government report). The fact that a plaintiff attaches

evidentiary materials outside the pleadings to its brief

does not convert a defendant's motion to a summary

judgment motion. Thompson v. Illinois Dept. of Prof’l

Regulation, 300 F.3d 750, 754 (7th Cir. 2002).

Furthermore, it is within this Court’s discretion to

handle this motion as a straightforward motion to

dismiss, especially where early resolution of an issue,

like the application of DOHSA, would streamline the

case. Levenstein v. Salafsky, 164 F.3d 345, 347 (7th

Cir. 1998) (holding that it was within the district

court's discretion to treat motion as motion to dismiss

where judgment on qualified immunity should be

decided as early in the case as possible).

Thus, the Court will construe Defendants’ motions

under the Rule 12(b)(6) standard to decide the

application of DOHSA as a matter of law on the face of

the pleadings. A Rule 12(b)(6) motion challenges the

“sufficiency of the complaint.” Berger v. Nat. Collegiate

Athletic Assoc., 843 F.3d 285, 289 (7th Cir. 2016). In

applying this standard, the Court accepts all wellpleaded facts as true and draws all reasonable

inferences in favor of the non-moving party. Tobey v.

Chibucos, 890 F.3d 634, 646 (7th Cir. 2018).

62a

Discussion

A. DOHSA Applies to the Smith (Manfredi) Action.

Though the Chandra Plaintiffs do not dispute

DOHSA’s application to their wrongful death claims,

the Manfredi Plaintiffs do. DOHSA is the source of law

for deaths resulting from wrongful acts, neglect, or

default on the high seas more than three (or in a

commercial aviation accident, twelve) nautical miles

from the shore of the United States. 46 U.S.C.

§§ 30302, 30307. The Supreme Court has consistently

applied DOHSA to aviation accidents occurring on the

high seas, like the crash which occurred here. See

Dooley v. Korean Air Lines Co., Ltd., 524 U.S. 116, 118

S.Ct. 1890, 141 L.Ed.2d 102 (1998); Zicherman v.

Korean Air Lines Co., Ltd., 516 U.S. 217, 116 S.Ct. 629,

133 L.Ed.2d 596 (1996); Offshore Logistics v.

Tallentire, 477 U.S. 207, 106 S.Ct. 2485, 91 L.Ed.2d

174 (1986); Mobil Oil Corp. v. Higginbotham, 436 U.S.

618, 98 S.Ct. 2010, 56 L.Ed.2d 581 (1978); Exec. Jet

Aviation, Inc. v. City of Cleveland, 409 U.S. 249, 263–

64, 93 S.Ct. 493, 34 L.Ed.2d 454 (1972) (“[I]t may be

considered as settled today that [DOHSA] gives the

federal admiralty courts jurisdiction of such wrongfuldeath actions” based on aircraft crashes into the high

seas); see also 46 U.S.C. § 30307 (section of DOHSA

governing commercial aviation accidents on the high

seas). 3

The weight of the case law in other circuits is that

when a plaintiff is fatally injured over the high seas,

DOHSA applies. LaCourse v. PAE Worldwide Inc., 980

Cases interpreting and applying DOHSA are virtually nonexistent in this Circuit. Where there is no binding law from the

Supreme Court or the Seventh Circuit, this Court considers the

persuasive case law of other circuits.

3

63a

F.3d 1350, 1357 (11th Cir. 2020) (“Where a death

occurs on the high seas, DOHSA applies, full stop.”);

Bergen v. F/V St. Patrick, 816 F.2d 1345, 1348 (9th

Cir. 1987); Kennedy v. Carnival Corp., 385 F. Supp. 3d

1302, 1316 (S.D. Fla. 2019) (DOHSA applies where

“the injury that led to the Decedent's death occurred

in the water); see also Sea-Land Servs., Inc. v. Gaudet,

414 U.S. 573, 599–600 and n.5, 94 S.Ct. 806, 39

L.Ed.2d 9 (1974) (J. Powell, dissenting on other

grounds) (DOHSA “by its terms covers deaths caused

by injuries inflicted at sea, not simply deaths occurring

on the high seas.”).

Citing Motts v. M/V Green Wave, a case in which the

Fifth Circuit held that DOHSA applied when the

injury occurred on the high seas but the prior

negligence and the later death occurred onshore, the

Manfredi Plaintiffs argue that the Court should

instead consider the location of where the negligence

is consummated into a “first” injury in determining

whether DOHSA applies. 210 F.3d 565, 569–71 (5th

Cir. 2000). Their argument is that Mr. Manfredi was

first injured during the period that the flight was over

land—they allege he suffered, at a minimum,

emotional distress—and this prevents the application

of DOHSA. But the Motts court specifically held that

the proper test is to “look to the location of the accident

in determining whether DOHSA applies.” Id. at 571.

The Manfredi Plaintiffs can point to no other case law

which adopts their “first injury” test. Therefore, the

situs of a pre-death but non-fatal injury does not

matter.

The Manfredi Plaintiffs’ argument that over half of

the flight occurred over land similarly fails. LaCourse,

980 F.3d at 1357 (aviation accident was governed by

DOHSA even where the flight was scheduled almost

64a

entirely over land and only crashed during the short

time when it was “fortuitously” over water). Their

argument that Defendants’ negligence occurred on

land also fails. Id. at 1356; In re Dearborn Marine

Serv., Inc., 499 F.2d 263, 272 n.17 (5th Cir. 1974)

(“DOHSA has been construed to confer admiralty

jurisdiction over claims arising out of airplane crashes

on the high seas though the negligence alleged to have

caused the crash occurred on land.”).

Even so, the Manfredi Plaintiffs argue that it is too

early at this juncture to determine where the fatal

injury occurred, whether over land or sea. They

maintain that because no discovery has occurred, the

record does not show when Mr. Manfredi was fatally

injured during the fated flight path. For example, they

propose for the first time that Mr. Manfredi may have

died over land from a heart attack due to his emotional

distress, from extreme G-forces breaking his neck or

causing brain injury during the plane's erratic

movements, or from a piece of baggage flying out of an

overhead compartment. Citing Bernard v. World

Learning, Inc., the Manfredi Plaintiffs contend that

this is a “metaphysical” factual question on which the

Court should not speculate without discovery. No. 0920309-CIV, 2010 WL 11505188, at *8 (S.D. Fla. June

4, 2010). But the Bernard court simply held that the

defendant was not entitled to summary judgment on

the application of DOHSA because there were genuine

evidentiary disputes regarding whether the decedent

was mortally injured on land or sea. Id. (detailing the

parties’ dispute over whether the decedent died while

swimming in the ocean or on land as a result of a

landslide and was then pushed out to sea).

Here, the Court agrees it should not speculate or

weigh evidence on the location of Mr. Manfredi's death

65a

in deciding a 12(b)(6) motion, but instead takes the

facts alleged as true. The Manfredi Plaintiffs’ own

Complaint does not state that Mr. Manfredi died prior

to impact or as a result of the plane's erratic

movements over land. Rather, it specifically alleges

that Mr. Manfredi died when the aircraft crashed into

the ocean. See, e.g., R. 1378 ¶ 149–153 (describing predeath terror prior to crash into the water); 229, 246,

265, 278, 290, 309, 351, 368, 387, 400, 412, 431, 442,

486, 502 (all paragraphs alleging that Mr. Manfredi

“was able to perceive, process, understand and react to

the impact of the aircraft with the ocean.”). Based on

the pleadings, Mr. Manfredi suffered his fatal injury

on the high seas, and thus DOHSA applies. 4 Because

The Manfredi Plaintiffs request leave to amend their

Complaint to allege alternative theories of death which include

their new land-based scenarios. “The court should freely give

leave to amend ... [u]nless it is certain from the face of the

complaint that any amendment would be futile or otherwise

unwarranted.” Runnion ex rel. Runnion v. Girl Scouts of Greater

Chicago & Nw. Indiana, 786 F.3d 510, 519–20 (7th Cir. 2015)

(cleaned up). An amendment is futile when it “fails to state a valid

theory of liability” or “could not withstand a motion to dismiss.”

Bower v. Jones, 978 F.2d 1004, 1008 (7th Cir. 1992). Defendants

argue that amendment would be futile because the Indonesian

Report demonstrates that the Manfredi Plaintiffs’ speculated

scenarios are very unlikely. For example, the transcript of the

Cockpit Voice Recorder shows that the captain and co-captain

were alive and still conversing until less than 30 seconds before

the crash. See Komite Nasional Keselamatan Transportasi

Republic of Indonesia, Final Aircraft Investigation Report (2019),

https://bit.ly/3xL7Ll5 at 85. While the report makes the Manfredi

Plaintiffs’ new theories improbable, it does not foreclose them

entirely—the report does not discuss what may have happened to

any passengers in the main cabin. So long as the Manfredi

Plaintiffs have “evidentiary support or ... will likely have

evidentiary support after a reasonable opportunity for further

investigation or discovery” for any new allegations, Fed. R. Civ. P.

11(b), they are granted leave to amend their complaint, keeping

4

66a

DOHSA applies to the Smith and Chandra cases as

pleaded, the Court will determine whether it preempts

Plaintiffs’ other claims and whether it forecloses their

right to a jury trial.

B. Plaintiffs’ Non-DOHSA Claims Are Preempted,

and Plaintiffs Are Not Entitled to a Jury Trial.

Defendants argue that DOHSA acts to preempt

Plaintiffs’ other claims against them, and that Plaintiffs

do not have a right to a trial by jury because DOHSA

is a claim in admiralty. DOHSA provides that where a

death occurs on the high seas as the result of

negligence or wrongdoing, the decedent's spouse,

parent, child, or dependent relative “may bring a civil

action in admiralty” against the wrongdoer. Id. §

30302. DOHSA allows recovery of pecuniary and nonpecuniary damages exclusively for those relatives, but

explicitly forbids punitive damages. Id. § 30307. If a

person is injured on the high seas and dies while he or

she has a civil action pending to recover for those

injuries, “the personal representative of the decedent

may be substituted as the plaintiff” and the action

proceeds under the provisions of DOHSA. Id. at

§ 30305.

The Seventh Amendment does not require jury

trials in cases brought in admiralty. Fitzgerald v. U.S.

Lines Co., 374 U.S. 16, 20, 83 S.Ct. 1646, 10 L.Ed.2d

720 (1963) (citing Waring v. Clarke, 46 U.S. 5 How.

441, 12 L.Ed. 226 (1847)); Fed. R. Civ. P. 38(e).

Nevertheless, jury trials in admiralty are not

forbidden. Fitzgerald, 374 U.S. at 20, 83 S.Ct. 1646.

in mind that they may be subject to sanctions if their pleading

does not comply with the requirements of Rule 11.

67a

While the case law is murky and often conflicting, 5 it

appears that a plaintiff's jury demand in a DOHSA

case may be granted in two instances: (1) where the

plaintiff asserts a non-preempted claim in addition to

the DOHSA claim that carries a right to a jury trial;

or (2) where, “in addition to asserting a DOHSA claim,

a plaintiff also asserts another claim that does not

necessarily entitle her to a jury trial, but that invokes

the court's diversity jurisdiction.” Lasky v. Royal

Caribbean Cruises, Ltd., 850 F. Supp. 2d 1309, 1313

(S.D. Fla. 2012) (collecting cases).

1. DOHSA Preempts Plaintiffs’ Survival Actions

First, both Plaintiffs argue that they plead nonpreempted claims which grant them a right to a jury

trial. Defendants, however, argue that DOHSA

preempts Plaintiffs’ other claims against them. These

are their wrongful death claims under Illinois law,

their pre-death injury and emotional distress claims,

the Chandra Plaintiffs’ claims for property damage,

and the Manfredi Plaintiffs’ claims under the ICFA

and CFAA.

We start with the principle that where DOHSA

applies, it is generally the exclusive source of law and

preempts all other state wrongful death claims. See

generally Tallentire, 477 U.S. 207, 106 S.Ct. 2485, 91

L.Ed.2d 174. 6 The Supreme Court in Dooley has also

held that survival claims for pre-death pain and

suffering, like those sought by Plaintiffs, are

preempted by the application of DOHSA. 524 U.S. at

Indeed, the Supreme Court has described as “tortuous” the

development of the law as it pertains to wrongful death claims in

the maritime context. Tallentire, 477 U.S. at 212, 106 S.Ct. 2485.

5

The Chandra Plaintiffs accordingly concede that their wrongful

death claim under Illinois law is preempted. R. 1422 at 3.

6

68a

124, 118 S.Ct. 1890. Without deciding whether

survival claims may ever be brought in DOHSA cases,

the Court explained:

DOHSA expresses Congress’ judgment that there

should be no [pre-death pain and suffering] cause

of action in cases of death on the high seas. By

authorizing only certain surviving relatives

to recover damages, and by limiting damages

to the pecuniary losses sustained by those

relatives, Congress provided the exclusive

recovery for deaths that occur on the high

seas. [Allowing such a] survival action would

necessarily expand the class of beneficiaries in

cases of death on the high seas by permitting

decedents’ estates (and their various beneficiaries) to recover compensation. [It also] would

expand the recoverable damages for deaths on the

high seas by permitting the recovery of nonpecuniary losses.... Because Congress has already

decided these issues, it has precluded the judiciary

from enlarging either the class of beneficiaries

or the recoverable damages. As we noted in

Higginbotham, ‘Congress did not limit DOHSA

beneficiaries to recovery of their pecuniary losses in

order to encourage the creation of nonpecuniary

supplements.’ ... The comprehensive scope of

DOHSA is confirmed by its survival provision, ...

which limits the recovery in such cases to the

pecuniary losses suffered by surviving relatives.

The Act thus expresses Congress’ ‘considered

judgment,’ on the availability and contours of a

survival action in cases of death on the high seas.

Id. (quoting Higginbotham, 436 U.S. at 625, 98 S.Ct.

2010) (emphasis added). The Court also noted that the

Jones Act, which Congress adopted the same year as

69a

DOHSA and which permits seamen injured in the

course of their employment to recover damages for

their injuries, has a specific provision allowing a

survival action for pre-death injury. The Court

consequently reasoned that Congress was “certainly

familiar” with language which would permit a survival

cause of action, and that it likely made a conscious

decision not to include a similar provision in DOHSA.

Dooley, 524 U.S. at 124, 118 S.Ct. 1890. In short,

“Congress has spoken on the availability of a survival

action, the losses to be recovered, and the

beneficiaries, in cases of death on the high seas,” and

generally, other survival actions are preempted. Id. at

123–24, 118 S.Ct. 1890.

Plaintiffs argue that the Supreme Court's holding in

Dooley does not apply to their pre-death pain and

suffering claims, because some of Mr. Chandra's and

Mr. Manfredi's injuries occurred while the plane was

over land. They cite Evans v. John Crane, Inc., C.A.

No. 15-681 (MN) (D. Del. Oct. 24, 2019) and Hays v.

John Crane, Inc., Case No. 09-81881-CIV-KAM, 2014

WL 10658453 (S.D. Fla. Oct. 9, 2014), two cases in

which the decedents died from asbestos exposure

which occurred cumulatively over land and sea.

However, these cases are distinguishable—they are

“indivisible injury” cases where the fatal injury

occurred over many years and partially over land.

Plaintiffs here do not allege the decedents suffered

“indivisible” fatal injuries (like asbestos exposure)

over land and sea.

DOHSA similarly preempts the Chandra Plaintiffs’

property damage claim and the Manfredi Plaintiffs’

ICFA and CFAA claims. Though the Supreme Court

has never directly addressed whether all other

survival claims arising out of a death on the high seas

70a

are preempted by DOHSA, its dicta is instructive. See,

e.g., Tallentire, 477 U.S. at 232, 106 S.Ct. 2485. (“[T]he

conclusion that the state statutes are pre-empted by

DOHSA where it applies is inevitable.”). It is clear,

then, that a survival claim for damages to the estate

arising out of a death on the high seas will not lie,

absent a clear indication from Congress to the

contrary. Courts around the country have agreed. 7 See

Bowoto v. Chevron Corp., 621 F.3d 1116, 1124 (9th Cir.

2010); Jacobs v. N. King Shipping Co., 180 F.3d 713,

717 (5th Cir. 1999); In re Air Disaster Near Honolulu,

Haw. on Feb. 24, 1989, 792 F. Supp. 1541 (N.D. Cal.

1990) (DOHSA provides only pecuniary damages to

surviving dependents and precludes the availability of

non-pecuniary damages under either general maritime

law or state law, regardless of whether asserted as

part of a wrongful death action or as a survival action);

Heath v. Am. Sail Training Ass'n, 644 F. Supp. 1459,

1471–72 (D.R.I. 1986).

Plaintiffs contend that broad DOHSA preemption

could lead to absurd results. For example, the

Chandra Plaintiffs claim it would be unjust for

DOHSA to preempt an estate from obtaining damages

for a pre-accident assault at the airport. But DOHSA's

preemption of claims arising out of incidents

unconnected to the fatal accident is not at issue here.

Their citation of Ostrowiecki v. Aggressor Fleet, Ltd.

The few cases which have allowed survivor claims to be

brought concurrently with a DOHSA claim were decided preDooley and were brought under the Jones Act, which was

designed to “work together” with DOHSA, and the Warsaw

Convention. See Peace v. Fidalgo Island Packing Co., 419 F.2d 371,

372 (9th Cir. 1969); In re Korean Air Lines Disaster, 704 F. Supp.

1135, 1152–53 (D.D.C. 1988); Tozer v. LTV Corp., 1983 WL 705, at

*7 (D. Md. May 27, 1983). Neither the Chandra nor the Manfredi

Plaintiffs plead such claims.

7

71a

is similarly inapposite, because the emotional distress

in that case was not preempted because it was

“predicated on entirely different acts of defendants

from those which allegedly caused [the decedent's]

death.” Nos. 07-6598, 07-6931, 2008 WL 3874609, at

*5–6 (E.D. La. Aug. 15, 2008).

The Manfredi Plaintiffs also argue that the CFAA is

a federal statute and that federal statutes cannot

preempt each other. However, the Ninth Circuit, in

deciding that DOHSA preempted survival claims

under the federal Alien Tort Statute, explained that

“Dooley ... held that DOHSA preempts all survival

claims for deaths on the high seas unless there is clear

indication that Congress intended otherwise.” Bowoto,

621 F.3d at 1124 (emphasis in original). Here, in

contrast to DOHSA’s comprehensive scope, the CFAA

is a criminal statute that creates a private right of

action. See 18 U.S.C. § 1030. It has a punitive purpose

and does not even speak to the issue of survival claims.

Id. Congress passed the CFAA after DOHSA, and if it

intended such claims to be allowed in conjunction with

a DOHSA claim, it would have said so. Like the Alien

Tort Statute, there is thus “no evidence that Congress

intended [CFAA] survival claims to remain viable”

upon application of DOHSA. Bowoto, 621 F.3d at

1124. 8

The Court dismisses the Manfredi Plaintiffs’ ICFA and CFAA

claims because DOHSA preempts them. Nevertheless, those

claims are also meritless as pleaded. Mr. Manfredi was not a

“consumer” of the Boeing 737 MAX 8 aircraft, nor can he make a

claim under the “consumer nexus test.” Tile Unltd., Inc. v. Blanke

Corp., 788 F. Supp. 2d 734, 740 (N.D. Ill. 2011) (argument that

consumer can state a claim under ICFA because he or she

ultimately used a product has been “soundly, repeatedly, and

correctly rejected”). Their CFAA claim also suffers from a host of

deficiencies, the most egregious being that the CFAA specifically

8

72a

The Court consequently concludes that the Plaintiffs’

other causes of action are preempted by DOHSA and

should be dismissed.

2. “Saving to Suitors” Clauses and Existence of

Diversity Do Not Preserve Right to a Jury

Trial for DOHSA Claims

Plaintiffs next argue that two “saving to suitors”

clauses preserve their right to a jury trial. First, they

argue that 28 U.S.C. § 1331(1), which allows a plaintiff

with a general maritime claim to pursue any other

remedies at law he might have, carries the right to a

jury trial into any suit in admiralty where the court

also sits in diversity. See Atl. & Gulf Stevedores, Inc.

v. Ellerman Lines, Ltd., 369 U.S. 355, 359–60, 82 S.Ct.

780, 7 L.Ed.2d 798 (1962) (“This suit [for breach of a

maritime contract] being in the federal courts by

reason of diversity of citizenship carried with it, of

course, the right to trial by jury.”). Plaintiffs cite many

general maritime cases for this argument. 9 However,

bars claims for negligent design of a computer system, which is

precisely what the Manfredi Plaintiffs allege. 18 U.S.C. § 1030(g).

Further, the Manfredi Plaintiffs lack standing because only an

entity which suffered loss related to its computer system may

state a claim under the CFAA. Von Holdt v. A-1 Tool Corp., 714 F.

Supp. 2d 863, 876 (N.D. Ill. 2010). And the Act prohibits only

unauthorized activities. See 18 U.S.C. § 1030(g). Here, the

Manfredi Plaintiffs allege that Boeing loaded the negligently

designed MCAS software on its own aircraft, which is obviously

authorized, and which does not affect Mr. Manfredi's computer

systems.

Lewis v. Lewis & Clark Marine, Inc., 531 U.S. 438, 455, 121

S.Ct. 993, 148 L.Ed.2d 931 (2001); Atl. & Gulf Stevedores, Inc. v.

Ellerman Lines, Ltd., 369 U.S. 355, 360, 82 S.Ct. 780, 7 L.Ed.2d

798 (1962); Wingerter v. Chester Quarry Co., 185 F.3d 657, 665 (7th

Cir. 1999); Bhd. Shipping Co. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins., 985

F.2d 323, 326 (7th Cir. 1993); Luera v. M/V Alberta, 635 F.3d 181,

9

73a

none are applicable to a DOHSA case. A plaintiff in a

general maritime claim may have a right to a jury

trial for “suits at common law” under the Seventh

Amendment because § 1331(1) allows in personam

maritime claims to be brought “at law.” Congress,

however, has explicitly limited DOHSA to “a civil

action in admiralty,” which does not carry the right to

a jury trial. Tallentire v. Offshore Logistics, Inc., 800

F.2d 1390, 1391 (5th Cir. 1986) (on remand) (where the

“sole predicate” for liability is DOHSA, the plaintiff “is

not entitled to a jury trial”). As the Manfredi Plaintiffs’

brief acknowledges, there is an exception to § 1331(1)

for claims that can only be brought in admiralty. See

R. 1425 at 6 (citing 1 Schoenbaum § 4-4, pp. 239–40)

(explaining that § 1331(1) does not apply to statutes

where Congress “has conferred exclusive admiralty

jurisdiction upon the federal courts.”). DOHSA, by its

terms, is one of those statutes. Friedman v. Mitsubishi

Aircraft Int’l, Inc., 678 F. Supp. 1064, 1066 (S.D.N.Y.

1988) (“[S]ince DOHSA provides a remedy in admiralty,

admiralty principles are applicable and a DOHSA

plaintiff has no right to a jury trial”); Favaloro v. S/S

Golden Gate, 687 F. Supp. 475, 481 (N.D. Cal. 1987)

(“DOHSA actions, according to the terms of the

statute, lie in admiralty.... Therefore, plaintiffs are not

entitled to a jury under DOHSA.”).

188 (5th Cir. 2011); In re Lockheed Martin Corp., 503 F.3d 351,

354–55 (4th Cir. 2007); Ghotra ex rel. Ghotra v. Bandila Shipping,

Inc., 113 F.3d 1050, 1054–55 (9th Cir. 1997); Odeco Oil & Gas Co.,

Drilling Div. v. Bonnette, 74 F.3d 671, 674 (5th Cir. 1996); Coronel

v. Victory, 1 F. Supp. 3d 1175, 1181–82 (W.D. Wash. 2014);

Manrique v. Fagan, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 61794, at *24, 2009 WL

700999 (S.D. Fla. 2009); Sea-Land Serv., Inc. v. J & W Imp./Exp.,

Inc., 976 F. Supp. 327, 330 (D.N.J. 1997); Neal v. McGinnis, Inc.,

716 F. Supp. 996, 998-99 (E.D. Ky. 1989).

74a

Plaintiffs also argue that DOHSA’s § 7, its own

“saving to suitors clause,” which provides “[t]his

chapter does not affect the law of a state regulating

the right to recover for death,” preserves their right to

a jury trial. 46 U.S.C. § 30308(a). But the Supreme

Court has already decided the meaning of § 7 of

DOHSA in Tallentire. 477 U.S. at 232, 106 S.Ct. 2485.

There, the plaintiffs argued that a state wrongful

death statute was available to supplement recovery

under DOHSA because, they argued, state law applied

to the high seas and was “saved” by Section 7 of

DOHSA. The Supreme Court held, however, that

Section 7 of DOHSA was only intended to provide

concurrent jurisdiction to state courts to adjudicate

DOHSA claims. Id. It does not, as Plaintiffs contend,

allow state law causes of action to be brought in

federal court concurrently with DOHSA, or allow

Plaintiffs to invoke common law jurisdiction. Id.

Plaintiffs argue that, under § 7 of DOHSA and

Tallentire, they could (and the Chandra Plaintiffs did)

bring their claims in Illinois state court. In state court,

they could potentially obtain a right to a trial by jury.

It would be inconsistent, they argue, to be deprived of

that right by accident of the case being removed to or

filed in federal court. They cite Cucuru v. Rose's Oil

Serv., Inc., 441 Mass. 12, 802 N.E.2d 1032, 1035

(Mass. 2004), a case in which the Massachusetts

Supreme Court held that DOHSA's § 7 gave the

plaintiffs a jury trial right in state court. But the

Cucuru decision turned on Massachusetts constitutional

and procedural law. Here, however, “federal procedural

law controls the question of whether there is a right to

a jury trial” in federal court. Int'l Fin. Servs. Corp. v.

Chromas Techs. Canada, Inc., 356 F.3d 731, 735 (7th

Cir. 2004). And federal procedural law holds that cases

brought in admiralty do not carry a right to a jury

75a

trial. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 38 (e) (“These rules do not

create a right to a jury trial on issues in a claim that

is an admiralty or maritime claim....”).

Plaintiffs also reason that this Court has concurrent

diversity jurisdiction over their claims, which means

their cases can be brought “at law” and they have a

right to a jury trial under the Seventh Amendment.

But the jury trial right turns not on whether the

parties for the DOHSA claim are diverse, but on

whether another claim in diversity is being tried

concurrently with the DOHSA claim. Lasky, 850 F.

Supp. 2d at 1313. For example, the court in Friedman

addressed whether a plaintiff is entitled to a jury trial

on his or her DOHSA claims because the parties are

diverse and held that “[t]he existence of an additional

jurisdictional predicate in this case, i.e., diversity of

citizenship, can lead to no different result.... Diversity

of citizenship creates only an additional basis for

federal jurisdiction; it does not enlarge the parameters

of the substantive remedy upon which a claim is

based.” 678 F. Supp. at 1066 n.5; see also Lasky, 850

F. Supp. 2d at 1314-15 (holding in part that a plaintiff

who brought a death action under DOHSA was not

entitled to a jury trial notwithstanding the fact that

there was diversity of citizenship). Here, although the

parties are diverse, as discussed above, Plaintiffs’ only

remaining claims arise under DOHSA, which under

its clear terms, limits the claims to this Court's

admiralty jurisdiction.

3. The Presence of a Jury Demand Does Not

Necessitate a Trial by Jury

Finally, the Chandra Plaintiffs argue that they

made a jury demand in their complaint and that

Boeing, too, made a jury trial demand in its removal of

the case. Boeing responds that its jury demand was a

76a

nullity and all Defendants assert that the Chandra

Plaintiffs’ jury demand is waived by virtue of their

invocation of this Court's admiralty jurisdiction.

Defendants are correct that “there is no basis for” a

jury demand “to the extent that any other causes of

action ... are effectively preempted by DOHSA.” In re

Air Disaster v. Honolulu, Haw. on Feb. 24, 1989, 792

F. Supp. at 1547; see also LaCourse v. Def. Support

Servs. LLC, No. 3:16cv170-RV/CJK, 2018 WL

7342153, at *2 (N.D. Fla. Oct. 31, 2018) (striking jury

demand where plaintiff's claims were preempted by

DOHSA). A jury demand by either party does not

convert an admiralty claim to a nonadmiralty claim.

Wingerter v. Chester Quarry Co., 185 F.3d 657, 668

(7th Cir. 1998). “In such cases the district court should

simply deny the request.” Id. The Court does so here.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Defendants’ motions, R.

1399, 1401, are granted. All pre-death pain and

suffering, emotional distress, property damage, and

state and federal fraud claims in the Chandra and

Smith cases are dismissed. Both cases will be tried

exclusively under DOHSA. Because DOHSA mandates

the cases to be tried pursuant to the Court’s admiralty

jurisdiction, Defendants’ requests for bench trials in

each case are granted. Should either of the Plaintiffs

decide they want to amend their complaint, they

should submit a proposed amended complaint with a

redline showing any changes and a memorandum of

less than five pages explaining those changes and why

they cure the deficiencies identified in this Opinion

within 21 days of this Order.

77a

APPENDIX E

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT

Chicago, Illinois 60604

————

September 10, 2024

Before

KENNETH F. RIPPLE, Circuit Judge

MICHAEL B. BRENNAN, Circuit Judge

CANDACE JACKSON-AKIWUMI, Circuit Judge

————

No. 23-2358

No. 1:18-cv-07686

(Consolidated with No. 1:19-cv-07091 and

No. 19-cv-01552)

————

IN RE: LION AIR FLIGHT JT 610 CRASH

LAURA SMITH, as duly appointed representative and

Independent Administrator of the ESTATE OF

ANDREA MANFREDI, deceased, et al.,

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

v.

THE BOEING COMPANY, et al.,

Defendants-Appellees.

————

Thomas M. Durkin,

Judge.

————

78a

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.

————

ORDER

On consideration of the Petition for Rehearing or

Rehearing En Banc, filed by the Manfredi PlaintiffsAppellants on August 20, 2024, no judge in active

service has requested a vote on the petition for

rehearing en banc, and all judges on the original panel

have voted to DENY the petition for rehearing 1.

Accordingly, the petition for rehearing or rehearing

en banc filed by the Manfredi Plaintiffs-Appellants is

DENIED.

Circuit Judge Thomas L. Kirsch and Circuit Judge John Z.

Lee did not participate in the consideration of this petition.

1

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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