Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Laura Smith, as Duly Appointed Representative and Independent Administrator of the Estate of Andrea Manfredi, Deceased, et al., Petitioners v. The Boeing Company, et al.
Supreme Court briefFeb 5, 2025
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APPENDIX
APPENDIX TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
APPENDIX A: Opinion, In re Lion Air Flight
JT610 Crash, 110 F.4th 1007 (7th Cir. 2024) ...
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APPENDIX B: Memorandum Opinion And
Order, In re Lion Air Flight JT610 Crash, No.
1:18-cv-076862, 2023 WL 3653217 (N.D. Ill.
May 25, 2023) ..................................................... 18a
APPENDIX C: Amended Memorandum Opinion
And Order, In re Lion Air Flight JT610 Crash,
No. 19 C 01552, 2023 WL 3653218 (N.D. Ill.
May 25, 2023) ..................................................... 36a
APPENDIX D: Memorandum Opinion And
Order, In re Lion Air Flight JT610 Crash, No.
18 C 07686, 2022 WL 17820965 (N.D. Ill. Dec.
20, 2022) ............................................................. 57a
APPENDIX E: Order Denying Rehearing and
Rehearing En Banc, In re Lion Air Flight
JT610 Crash,y, No. 23-2358 (7th Cir. Sept. 10,
2024) ................................................................... 77a
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APPENDIX A
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS,
SEVENTH CIRCUIT
————
Nos. 23-2358 & 23-2359
————
IN RE: LION AIR FLIGHT JT 610 CRASH
————
Appeal of: Laura Smith, as duly appointed
representative and Independent Administrator of
the Estate of Andrea Manfredi, deceased, et al.
Appeal of: Terrence Buehler, Personal Representative
and Independent Administrator of the
Estate of Liu Chandra, deceased.
————
Argued February 16, 2024
Decided August 6, 2024
————
Opinion
Ripple, Circuit Judge.
These two consolidated cases arose from the crash of
a Boeing commercial jet aircraft into the Java Sea off
the coast of Indonesia. Everyone on board died. The
plaintiffs are family members and representatives of
the estates of two passengers on that flight. They brought
these actions against Boeing and other defendants.
Boeing filed pretrial motions in each of these cases,
raising two issues, both of which are properly before us
in this interlocutory appeal certified under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1292(b). First, is the Death on the High Seas Act
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(“DOHSA”), 46 U.S.C. §§ 30301–08, the sole source
of potential recovery for the plaintiffs, or can the
plaintiffs assert other claims as well? Second, are the
plaintiffs entitled to a jury trial? The district court
concluded that the plaintiffs can only proceed under
DOHSA and that they are not entitled to a jury trial.
We agree with the district court and affirm its rulings.
I
BACKGROUND
On October 29, 2018, Lion Air Flight JT 610 took off
from Jakarta, Indonesia. Almost immediately after
takeoff, the passengers began experiencing the aircraft’s
erratic movements and fluctuations in altitude due to
mechanical issues with the plane, a Boeing 737 MAX.
After a few minutes, the plane flew out over open
water, and approximately five minutes after that, it
crashed into the Java Sea, about eighteen miles off of
the coast of Indonesia. There were no survivors. Boeing
has admitted that a manufacturing defect in its 737
MAX plane caused the crash.
The two cases before us were brought by the families
and representatives of the estates of two passengers
who died in the crash: Liu Chandra, an Indonesian
businessman, and Andrea Manfredi, an Italian entrepreneur and professional cyclist. The Chandra case
was filed initially in Illinois state court. Boeing
subsequently removed it to the United States District
Court for the Northern District of Illinois without
objection. The sole plaintiff in the Chandra matter is a
representative of both Mr. Chandra’s estate and Mr.
Chandra’s heirs. In the operative amended complaint,
the representative has named as defendants two
United States government agencies, three individuals,
and four private entities, one of which is Boeing. The
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representative asserted claims on behalf of both Mr.
Chandra’s estate and Mr. Chandra’s family members
under DOHSA; the Suits in Admiralty Act, 46 U.S.C.
§§ 30901–18; and Illinois state law. He demanded a
jury trial and asserted that the district court has
jurisdiction based on diversity; DOHSA; the Suits in
Admiralty Act; and the Multiparty, Multiforum Trial
Jurisdiction Act (“MMTJA”), 28 U.S.C. § 1369.
The Manfredi case was filed initially in the United
States District Court for the Northern District of
Illinois. The plaintiffs in that case are family members
of Mr. Manfredi and a representative of Mr. Manfredi’s
estate (collectively, the “Manfredi Plaintiffs”). The
Manfredi Plaintiffs asserted claims under state law
and under the Consumer Fraud and Abuse Act, 18
U.S.C. § 1030, on behalf of both Mr. Manfredi’s estate
and Mr. Manfredi’s family members. The Manfredi
Plaintiffs demanded a jury trial and alleged that the
district court has jurisdiction based on both diversity
and the MMTJA.
Boeing filed motions in both cases asking the district
court to rule that DOHSA applies, preempts all of the
plaintiffs’ non-DOHSA claims, and mandates a bench
trial. The district court granted Boeing’s motions. The
district court first explained that DOHSA applies to all
cases, like this one, where the decedent died on the
high seas. The court then held that DOHSA preempted
the plaintiffs’ non-DOHSA claims. It explained that,
where DOHSA applies, it is generally the exclusive
remedy. The court reasoned that, under this principle,
the plaintiffs’ claims for their decedents’ pre-death
pain and suffering and lost property could not proceed.
Accordingly, the court dismissed all state-law-based
claims for pre-death pain and suffering, emotional
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distress, and lost property. It also dismissed all federal
and state fraud claims.
The district court then considered whether the
plaintiffs were entitled to a jury trial. The court ruled
that Congress has “explicitly limited DOHSA to ‘a civil
action in admiralty,’ which does not carry the right to
a jury trial.” In re Lion Air Flight JT 610 Crash, No.
18-cv-07686, 2023 WL 3653218, at *7 (N.D. Ill. May 25,
2023) (quoting 46 U.S.C. § 30302). It rejected the
plaintiffs’ argument that their DOHSA claims could be
brought as non-admiralty claims because there were
non-admiralty sources of jurisdiction. It accordingly
concluded that DOHSA precluded a jury trial on the
plaintiffs’ claims and granted Boeing’s request for a
bench trial.
The plaintiffs asked the district court to certify an
interlocutory appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b). They
identified the question of whether they are entitled to
a jury trial as the question warranting interlocutory
review. The representative in the Chandra case
additionally submitted that the question of whether
DOHSA preempted their non-DOHSA claims was
another question warranting interlocutory review. The
court certified for immediate interlocutory appeal the
question whether a plaintiff is entitled to a jury trial
under DOHSA. The district court declined to certify
the preemption issue.
II
DISCUSSION
A.
A court of appeals may, in its discretion, permit an
appeal to be taken from an order certified for interlocutory appeal by a district court. See 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b).
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The order must present a “controlling question of law,”
difficult enough to leave “substantial ground for difference of opinion,” and whose resolution will “materially
advance the ultimate termination of the litigation.” Id.
In such an appeal, although the district court must
identify a “controlling question of law,” our authority
extends past answering that question. Id.; see Martin
v. Goodrich Corp., 95 F.4th 475, 478 (7th Cir. 2024).
The appeal presents the order for appellate decision,
and a court of appeals “may address any issue fairly
included within the certified order.” Yamaha Motor
Corp., U.S.A. v. Calhoun, 516 U.S. 199, 205, 116 S.Ct.
619, 133 L.Ed.2d 578 (1996).
Here, the district court certified the jury trial
question for interlocutory review. We agree with the
district court that this issue is suitable for interlocutory review. As we noted earlier, the district court
declined to certify the preemption question for
interlocutory review. But, because that issue was
decided in the same order, we can decide that question,
and indeed should resolve it because resolution of that
issue will influence significantly our decision on the
jury trial question. There is authority that parties in
admiralty cases can have a jury trial on claims that
would otherwise be tried by the court, if their claims
arise out of the same set of facts as a claim that can be
tried before a jury. See Fitzgerald v. U.S. Lines Co., 374
U.S. 16, 21, 83 S.Ct. 1646, 10 L.Ed.2d 720 (1963)
(concluding that, when a Jones Act claim and a
maintenance and cure claim arise from the same
accident, district courts must allow a jury trial, even if
the maintenance and cure claim is cognizable only in
admiralty); Red Star Towing & Transp. Co. v. The
“Ming Giant,” 552 F. Supp. 367, 374–75 (S.D.N.Y. 1982)
(concluding that a jury should decide both DOHSA and
Jones Act claims, in case in which plaintiffs asserted
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both types of claims); Gvirtsman v. W. King Co., 263 F.
Supp. 633, 634–35 (C.D. Cal. 1967) (same). Therefore,
if the plaintiffs have valid non-DOHSA claims, then
the district court presumably should have allowed the
plaintiffs to try those claims and their DOHSA claims
before a jury. On the other hand, if DOHSA preempts
the other claims, then the availability of a jury trial
turns on whether DOHSA permits the plaintiffs to
demand a jury trial. Accordingly, we will address both
issues, starting with preemption.
B.
Before 1920, relatives of persons who died on the
“high seas”—waters far enough from any coast to be
outside the territorial waters of a state or country—
generally had no remedy. See Moragne v. States Marine
Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375, 393, 90 S.Ct. 1772, 26 L.Ed.2d
339 (1970). As a result, the family members of victims
of high-seas disasters like the sinking of the Titanic
had no means of recovery. See Robert M. Hughes, Death
Actions in Admiralty, 31 Yale L.J. 115, 117 (1921).
DOHSA, enacted in 1920, helped to fill this void.
DOHSA provides that, “[w]hen the death of an individual is caused by wrongful act, neglect, or default
occurring on the high seas …, the personal representative of the decedent may bring a civil action in
admiralty against the person or vessel responsible.” 46
U.S.C. § 30302. Claims under DOHSA can be brought
in federal court or in state court. Offshore Logistics,
Inc. v. Tallentire, 477 U.S. 207, 232, 106 S.Ct. 2485, 91
L.Ed.2d 174 (1986).
DOHSA functions as a wrongful-death statute in
that it gives “surviving relatives a cause of action for
losses they suffered as a result of the decedent’s death.”
Dooley v. Korean Air Lines Co., 524 U.S. 116, 123, 118
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S.Ct. 1890, 141 L.Ed.2d 102 (1998). Survivors whose
losses can be remedied in a DOHSA action include “the
decedent’s spouse, parent, child, or dependent
relative.” § 30302. DOHSA is not a survival statute. A
survival statute “permits a decedent’s estate to recover
damages that the decedent would have been able to
recover but for his death.” Dooley, 524 U.S. at 123, 118
S.Ct. 1890. Unlike survival statutes, “DOHSA does not
authorize recovery for the decedent’s own losses.” Id.
at 122, 118 S.Ct. 1890.
The Supreme Court has held that, where DOHSA
applies, it preempts all wrongful-death remedies otherwise available under state law and general maritime
law. See Offshore Logistics, 477 U.S. at 232, 106 S.Ct.
2485 (state law); Mobil Oil Corp. v. Higginbotham, 436
U.S. 618, 624–25, 98 S.Ct. 2010, 56 L.Ed.2d 581 (1978)
(general maritime law). Although the plaintiffs included
in their complaints many state-law wrongful-death
claims, they now concede that DOHSA preempts those
claims.
They continue to contend, however, that some of
their state-law survival claims are not preempted by
DOHSA. As they acknowledge, this contention must
grapple with Dooley v. Korean Air Lines, supra. In
Dooley, plaintiffs sought to recover damages under
state law for pain and suffering that their relative,
who died on the high seas, experienced shortly before
his death. The plaintiffs argued that DOHSA did not
preempt their claims because, in their view, DOHSA
had no “bearing on the availability of a survival
action.” Id. at 123, 118 S.Ct. 1890. The Supreme Court
disagreed, stating that “DOHSA expresses Congress’
judgment that there should be no such cause of action
in cases of death on the high seas.” Id. The Court
explained that, in DOHSA, “Congress provided the
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exclusive recovery for deaths that occur on the high
seas.” Id. Because “Congress ha[d] spoken on the
availability of a survival action,” id. at 124, 118 S.Ct.
1890, the Court held that the plaintiffs could not
pursue their state-law survival claims for their
decedent’s pre-death pain and suffering.
The plaintiffs contend that, despite Dooley, they can
seek two types of damages on behalf of their decedents’
estates. First, the plaintiffs contend that they can seek
damages for the pain and suffering that their
decedents experienced on the over-land portion of the
flight. It is difficult, however, to see how this could be
a separate claim than a claim for pain and suffering
the decedents experienced over water, minutes later.
This position is also inconsistent with decisions of
other courts that plaintiffs cannot avoid DOHSA
preemption merely by showing that a fatal accident on
the high seas had some connection to land. See, e.g.,
LaCourse v. PAE Worldwide Inc., 980 F.3d 1350, 1357
(11th Cir. 2020) (accident was governed by DOHSA
because the plane crashed into the high seas, even
though the alleged negligence occurred on land and
much of the flight was scheduled to be over land).
Further, much of the language in Dooley—especially
the reference to the congressional judgment that
“there should be no [survival] cause of action in cases
of death on the high seas,” 524 U.S. at 123, 118 S.Ct.
1890—broadly indicates that DOHSA preempts all
survivor actions grounded in state law or general
maritime law that are based on the same facts as the
fatal accident. Second, the plaintiffs contend that they
can seek damages for property their decedents lost in
the crash. This claim, too, is foreclosed by the
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reasoning in Dooley regarding survival-based claims. 1
The plaintiffs’ non-DOHSA claims grounded in state
law thus cannot go forward.
C.
We now turn to the jury trial question (the question
certified by the district court). We start with some
background.
1.
This background can suitably begin in the years
immediately before the Founding. In that era, individuals in the colonies with maritime claims could
bring those claims either in vice admiralty courts
created by Britain or in the local colonial courts.
Steven L. Snell, Courts of Admiralty and the Common
Law: Origins in the American Experiment in Concurrent
Jurisdiction 204–05 (2007). This arrangement “provided
the litigants with a choice,” and a “potential plaintiff
was able to weigh the alternatives between” the types
of courts. Id. at 205. The vice admiralty courts had the
advantage of different remedial mechanisms and often
greater expertise, but, unlike in the local colonial courts,
claims there were tried without juries. Id. at 182.
The Judiciary Act of 1789 preserved the substance,
but not the precise forms, of this arrangement. In
that statute, Congress gave the federal circuit courts
jurisdiction over diversity cases. 1 Stat. 73, § 11. It also
gave federal district courts exclusive jurisdiction over
Some courts have held that, under DOHSA, plaintiffs are able
to recover damages approximating the value of their decedents’
lost property if they can establish that the property would have
become part of their inheritance. See Snyder v. Whittaker Corp.,
839 F.2d 1085, 1093 (5th Cir. 1988); Nygaard v. Peter Pan
Seafoods, Inc., 701 F.2d 77, 80 (9th Cir. 1983). We have no occasion
to address that issue today.
1
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“all civil causes of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction,” including those “upon the high seas,” but from
this grant of exclusive jurisdiction it “sav[ed] to suitors,
in all cases, the right of a common law remedy, where
the common law is competent to give it.” Id. § 9. 2
This carve-out has been called the saving-to-suitors
clause. It “saves” all in personam claims. See The Moses
Taylor, 71 U.S. 411, 431, 4 Wall. 411, 18 L.Ed. 397
(1867). Thus, the Judiciary Act of 1789 made federal
district courts the exclusive arbiter of all in rem
maritime claims, but not of all in personam maritime
claims. Moreover, because of the saving-to-suitors
clause, unless another statute provided to the contrary,
maritime plaintiffs with in personam claims were not
required to sue in the federal district courts. Instead,
if they so chose, they could sue in state court, or, if
there was diversity, in federal circuit courts. See
Norton v. Switzer, 93 U.S. 355, 356, 23 L.Ed. 903 (1876)
(“Parties in maritime cases are not ... compelled to
proceed in the admiralty at all, as they may resort to
their common-law remedy in the State courts, or in the
Circuit Court, if the party seeking redress and the
other party are citizens of different states.”). In cases
brought “at law” in state courts or the circuit courts,
either party could demand a jury trial. The Sarah, 21
U.S. 391, 394, 8 Wheat. 391, 5 L.Ed. 644 (1823). But in
cases brought “in admiralty” in the federal district
Congress has since revised the language of the saving-tosuitors clause, but “its substance has remained largely
unchanged.” Lewis v. Lewis & Clark Marine, Inc., 531 U.S. 438,
444, 121 S.Ct. 993, 148 L.Ed.2d 931 (2001). The statute now states
that “the district courts shall have original jurisdiction, exclusive
of the courts of the States, of: [a]ny civil case of admiralty or
maritime jurisdiction, saving to suitors in all cases all other
remedies to which they are otherwise entitled.” 28 U.S.C. § 1333(1)
(emphasis added).
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courts, absent a statute to the contrary, the trial was
by the court. Id.
The organizational landscape of the federal courts
changed over time, but the basic choices available to
admiralty plaintiffs generally did not. One significant
change came in the Judicial Code of 1911, when
Congress eliminated the federal circuit courts and
transferred those courts’ original jurisdiction to the
federal district courts. Pub. L. No. 61-475, §§ 1, 24, 36
Stat. 1087, 1087, 1091. Consequently, common law,
equity, and admiralty cases were now all brought in
the same federal court. Because of the differences in
the procedures formerly employed in litigating various
types of cases, each federal district court now was seen
as having a law side, an equity side, and an admiralty
side. See Puget Sound Nav. Co. v. Nelson, 41 F.2d 356,
357–58 (9th Cir. 1930). As before, absent a statute to
the contrary, plaintiffs with in personam actions could
sue in admiralty, in state court, or on the law side (if
diversity existed). See Romero v. Int’l Terminal
Operating Co., 358 U.S. 354, 363, 79 S.Ct. 468, 3
L.Ed.2d 368 (1959). Cases brought on the law side
carried the right to a jury trial, whereas cases brought
on the admiralty side generally did not. Compare Atl.
& Gulf Stevedores, Inc. v. Ellerman Lines, Ltd., 369 U.S.
355, 360, 82 S.Ct. 780, 7 L.Ed.2d 798 (1962) (“This suit
being in the federal courts by reason of diversity of
citizenship carried with it, of course, the right to trial
by jury.”), with Fitzgerald, 374 U.S. at 20, 83 S.Ct. 1646
(noting that “the Seventh Amendment does not
require jury trials in admiralty cases”).
In the ensuing years, a unification process took place
in federal district court practice. By 1966, this
unification was complete, and since then the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure have governed all civil
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actions, including admiralty actions. Fed. R. Civ. P. 1,
cmt. (1966). The United States district courts no longer
have separate “sides.” Id. Critically, this merger of the
law, equity, and admiralty spheres of federal district
court practice did not change materially the choices
available to plaintiffs with maritime claims. See David
W. Robertson, Admiralty Procedure and Jurisdiction
After the 1966 Unification, 74 Mich. L. Rev. 1627, 1630–
31 (1976). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(h), which
became effective at the same time as the unification,
has helped to ensure as much. Under Rule 9(h), a party
whose claim is “within the admiralty or maritime
jurisdiction and also within the court’s subject-matter
jurisdiction on some other ground” can designate his
claim as a non-admiralty, common law claim or as an
admiralty claim. Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(h)(1). “One of the
important procedural consequences [of that designation]
is that in the civil action either party may demand a
jury trial, while in the suit in admiralty there is no
right to jury trial except as provided by statute.” Fed.
R. Civ. P. 9, cmt. (1966).
To summarize: For a long time, maritime plaintiffs
generally have been able to choose the forum in which
they bring in personam claims. Such plaintiffs generally
could sue in federal admiralty courts, in state court, or
if diversity existed, in the federal circuit courts (1789–
1911), on the “law side” of the federal district courts
(1911–1966), or by refraining from designating their
claims as admiralty claims under Rule 9(h) (since
1966). In these various eras, unless a statute provided
otherwise, if the plaintiff sued at law, either party
could demand a jury trial, but if they sued in
admiralty, the case would be tried by the court.
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2.
With this background, we now address whether the
plaintiffs are entitled to a jury trial. The plaintiffs
contend that they need not assert their DOHSA claims
“in admiralty,” as admiralty claims. They analogize
their DOHSA claims to the causes of action described
in the previous section, which, as we explained, can be
brought as common-law claims if there is a nonadmiralty source of jurisdiction. They contend that
non-admiralty sources of jurisdiction such as diversity
and the MMTJA allow them to assert their DOHSA
claims “at law” and to demand a jury trial. 3 The
defendants, for their part, maintain that plaintiffs
with DOHSA claims in federal court can only proceed
“in admiralty,” without a jury trial.
Several considerations lead us to the conclusion that
the defendants have the better reading of the statute.
First, DOHSA states in its first section that a plaintiff
“may bring a civil action in admiralty.” § 30302
(emphasis added). In its original form, it similarly
stated that a plaintiff “may maintain a suit for
damages in the district courts of the United States, in
admiralty.” Pub. L. No. 66-165, § 1, 41 Stat. 537, 537
(1920) (emphasis added). DOHSA has never expressly
Some scholars have, over the years, agreed with various
versions of the plaintiffs’ position. See Steven F. Friedell, Death
at Sea and the Right to Jury Trial, 48 Tul. Mar. L.J. 156 (2024)
(criticizing the district court’s decision in this case on the jury
trial issue); Louis F. Nawrot, Jr., Note, Admiralty: Death on the
High Seas by Wrongful Act, 47 Cornell L.Q. 632, 637 (1962)
(stating that a “[p]reliminary analysis” of DOHSA “unquestionably
favors concurrent jurisdiction with state and federal civil courts”);
Calvert Magruder & Marshall Grout, Wrongful Death Within the
Admiralty Jurisdiction, 35 Yale L.J. 395, 420 (1926) (stating that
“a common law action [under DOHSA] ... probably” could “be
brought in the federal courts”).
3
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stated that plaintiffs with DOHSA claims can
maintain a suit at law or with the right to a jury trial.
The most natural inference to draw from the
combination of the express reference to a suit in
admiralty and the absence of a reference to a suit at
law or with a jury trial is that the cause of action
created by DOHSA is to be brought in admiralty. 4 This
natural, ordinary reading of DOHSA’s first section
supports the defendants’ interpretation. See Leocal v.
Ashcroft, 543 U.S. 1, 9, 125 S.Ct. 377, 160 L.Ed.2d 271
(2004) (“When interpreting a statute, we must give
words their ‘ordinary or natural’ meaning.”) (quoting
Smith v. United States, 508 U.S. 223, 228, 113 S.Ct.
2050, 124 L.Ed.2d 138 (1993)).
Second, courts have construed language similar to
DOHSA’s “may bring a civil action in admiralty”
language to require cases to be brought in admiralty.
Under the Ship Mortgage Act, which was enacted
in 1920, mortgagees can in certain cases bring “a
civil action in personam in admiralty.” 46 U.S.C.
§ 31325(b)(2)(A). Under the Public Vessels Act, which
was enacted in 1925, “[a] civil action in personam in
admiralty may be brought ... against the United States
for damages caused by a public vessel of the United
States.” 46 U.S.C. § 31102(a). Both of these statutes,
like DOHSA, do not specifically address the jury trial
issue. Nevertheless, claims brought under those
provisions do not carry the right to a jury trial.
See Thomas J. Schoenbaum, Admiralty and Maritime
Law § 4:4 (5th ed. 2011). Courts “normally presume
A different provision in DOHSA (46 U.S.C. § 30308(a)) allows
plaintiffs to bring DOHSA claims in state court, see Offshore
Logistics, 477 U.S. at 232, 106 S.Ct. 2485, but that section does
not address whether DOHSA claims that are in federal court
must be brought in admiralty.
4
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that the same language in related statutes carries a
consistent meaning.” United States v. Davis, 588 U.S.
445, 458, 139 S.Ct. 2319, 204 L.Ed.2d 757 (2019); see
Azar v. Allina Health Servs., 587 U.S. 566, 574, 139
S.Ct. 1804, 204 L.Ed.2d 139 (2019) (“This Court does
not lightly assume that Congress silently attaches
different meanings to the same term in the same or
related statutes.”). That presumption applies here and
supports the defendants’ position.
Third, many other courts have for a long time agreed
with the defendants that, if a case involving only
DOHSA claims is in federal court, it must proceed in
admiralty, without a jury trial. See Noel v. Linea
Aeropostal Venezolana, 247 F.2d 677, 680 (2d Cir.
1957); Higa v. Transocean Airlines, 230 F.2d 780, 782–
85 (9th Cir. 1955); Lasky v. Royal Caribbean Cruises,
Ltd., 850 F. Supp. 2d 1309, 1314–15 (S.D. Fla. 2012); In
re Air Disaster Near Honolulu, Hawaii on Feb. 24,
1989, 792 F. Supp. 1541, 1547 (N.D. Cal. 1990);
Friedman v. Mitsubishi Aircraft Int’l, Inc., 678 F. Supp.
1064, 1065–66 (S.D.N.Y. 1988); Favaloro v. S/S Golden
Gate, 687 F. Supp. 475, 481 (N.D. Cal. 1987); Heath v.
American Sail Training Ass’n, 644 F. Supp. 1459, 1471
(D.R.I. 1986); Rairigh v. Erlbeck, 488 F. Supp. 865, 867
(D. Md. 1980). 5 The plaintiffs and the amici supporting
them have not identified any decisions to the contrary.
These cases matter, in part because of the maxim
that, if Congress leaves in place a unanimous or nearSee also LaCourse v. Def. Support Servs. LLC, No. 16-cv-170,
2018 WL 7342153, at *2 (N.D. Fla. Oct. 31, 2018); Modica v. Hill,
No. 96-cv-1121, 1999 WL 52153, at *2 (E.D. La. Jan. 29, 1999). Cf.
Choy v. Pan-American Airways Co., 1941 A.M.C. 483, 487
(S.D.N.Y. 1941) (concluding that DOHSA claims could be brought
on the law side of the federal courts), expressly abrogated by Noel
v. Linea Aeropostal Venezolana, 247 F.2d 677, 680 (2d Cir. 1957).
5
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unanimous judicial interpretation for a sufficiently
long period of time, it can be deemed to have
acquiesced in or ratified that judicial interpretation.
See Texas Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affs. v. Inclusive
Cmtys. Project, Inc., 576 U.S. 519, 536, 135 S.Ct. 2507,
192 L.Ed.2d 514 (2015) (“If a word or phrase has been
... given a uniform interpretation by inferior courts ...,
a later version of that act perpetuating the wording is
presumed to carry forward that interpretation.”);
United States v. Sanapaw, 366 F.3d 492, 495 (7th Cir.
2004) (relying on Congress’s thirty-year acquiescence
in decisions from circuit courts). 6 Here, Congress has
not made any material changes to DOHSA’s first
section in the nearly eighty years since the Second and
Ninth Circuits decided this issue in accord with the
defendants’ position. Much has changed in admiralty
law in the years since, but, with the exception of two
minor alterations not relevant here, 7 Congress has left
DOHSA’s first section unchanged. This history
provides additional support for our conclusion that the
defendants have the better reading of DOHSA.
The plaintiffs rely on what the Supreme Court has
called “the historic option of a maritime suitor pursuing
a common-law remedy to select his forum.” Romero,
358 U.S. at 371, 79 S.Ct. 468. They contend that, in
admiralty law, plaintiffs bringing tort claims are
presumed to be able to proceed at law, with a jury trial,
and that our reading of DOHSA would violate that
See also Manhattan Props., Inc. v. Irving Tr. Co., 291 U.S. 320,
336, 54 S.Ct. 385, 78 L.Ed. 824 (1934) (concluding that congressional amendments that did not change relevant provision, in the
face of consensus interpretation given by courts of appeals,
ratified that judicial interpretation).
6
See Pub. L. 106-181, § 404(a)(1), 114 Stat. 61, 131 (2000); Pub.
L. 109-304, § 6(c), 120 Stat. 1485, 1511 (2006).
7
17a
presumption. Our task in interpreting DOHSA, however,
is not necessarily to neatly harmonize that statute
with other areas of admiralty law. Instead, our task is
to interpret the statute, starting with its text and the
rules of construction aimed at effectuating Congress’s
intent. For the reasons we have provided, we think
that the defendants’ reading is most consistent with
DOHSA’s text and Congress’s intent.
We recognize the potential anomaly in allowing
defendants to effectively extinguish a plaintiff’s jury
trial right by removing a case to federal court. DOHSA
claims, like other wrongful-death tort claims, are
typically tried by juries when they are in state court.
See, e.g., Curcuru v. Rose’s Oil Serv., Inc., 441 Mass. 12,
802 N.E.2d 1032, 1039 (2004); Khung Thi Lam v.
Global Med. Sys., 127 Wash.App. 657, 111 P.3d 1258,
1260, 1262 n.20 (2005). But our analysis indicates that
Congress has spoken on the issue of the availability of
a jury trial on DOHSA claims in federal court. 8
Conclusion
For the reasons stated in this opinion, we affirm the
district court’s rulings.
AFFIRMED
We note the possibility that the Chandra plaintiffs, whose
claims were filed initially in state court, could have tried to object
to removal, relying on certain authorities that interpret the
saving-to-suitors clause to block removal of otherwise removable
admiralty claims. See Lu Junhong v. Boeing Co., 792 F.3d 805, 818
(7th Cir. 2015) (“Perhaps it would be possible to argue that the
saving-to-suitors clause itself forbids removal, without regard to
any language in § 1441.”); Riyanto v. Boeing Co., 638 F. Supp. 3d
902, 911 (N.D. Ill. 2022) (in a case arising out of a different plane
crash in the Java Sea, relying on saving-to-suitors clause for
conclusion that Boeing could not remove the case from state court
to federal court). We have no occasion to address that possibility here.
8
18a
APPENDIX B
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT,
N.D. ILLINOIS, EASTERN DIVISION.
————
No. 18 C 07686
Case No. 19 C 01552,
Case No. 19 C 07091
————
IN RE LION AIR FLIGHT JT 610 CRASH
————
Signed May 25, 2023
————
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Thomas M. Durkin, United States District Judge
This consolidated action arises out of an aviation
accident involving a Boeing commercial jet, which
resulted in the death of everyone on board. On
December 20, 2022, this Court issued a Memorandum
Opinion and Order (“the Order”) holding that the
Death on the High Seas Act, 46 U.S.C. §§ 30301–08
(“DOHSA”), applies to the two remaining actions
(Chandra v. Boeing, case no. 19 C 01552, and Smith v.
Boeing, case no. 19 C 07091), preempts Plaintiffs’ other
claims, and rests in this Court’s admiralty jurisdiction
such that Plaintiffs are not entitled to a jury trial. R.
1460. Plaintiffs in both actions and Defendant Xtra
Aerospace, LLC (“Xtra”) have moved this Court to
amend the Order to certify for immediate interlocutory
appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) the issue of Plaintiffs’
19a
right to a jury trial. R. 1468, 1471, 1474.1 Plaintiffs in
the Chandra matter (“Chandra Plaintiffs”) also request that the preemption question is certified for
interlocutory appeal. For the reasons stated below, the
Court will amend the Order to certify the right to a
jury trial question under § 1292(b) but will not certify
the issue of preemption.
Background
On October 29, 2018, Lion Air Flight JT 610 crashed
into the Java Sea at a high rate of speed just minutes
after takeoff from Jakarta, Indonesia. R. 1391 ¶¶ 43,
44. There were no survivors. Id. at ¶ 5. The crash was
caused by a faulty automatic flight control system
which overrode the pilots and turned the plane into a
nosedive. Id. at ¶¶ 4, 45.
The resulting litigation involved 87 individual
actions against Boeing and other defendants asserting
wrongful death and other claims arising out of the
accident on behalf of 186 decedents. All actions were
either filed in or removed to this Court and eventually
consolidated under the master docket, In Re Lion Air
Flight JT 610 Crash, 18 C 07686. Boeing has fully
settled the claims of 184 decedents. The remaining
two actions are those brought by the families and
representatives of two decedents: Liu Chandra, an
Indonesian businessman (Chandra v. Boeing); and
Andrea Manfredi, an Italian professional cyclist and
entrepreneur (Smith v. Boeing).
Chandra Plaintiffs originally filed suit in the Circuit
Court of Cook County, Illinois. See Chandra, No. 19 C
1
Throughout this Opinion, “R” denotes citations to the record
in the consolidated case, In Re Lion Air Flight JT 610 Crash,
18 C 07686.
20a
01552, Dkt. 1. They alleged wrongful death arising
under DOHSA. See, e.g., R. 1391 at pp. 15–24. They
also made survival claims for property damage and
pre-death fear and injury. Id. Boeing removed the case
to this Court under the Multiparty, Multiforum Trial
Jurisdiction Act (“MMTJA”), 28 U.S.C. § 1369, and the
Court’s admiralty jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1333(1).
Chandra, No. 19 C 01552, Dkt. 1. The operative Third
Amended Complaint demands a jury trial and alleges
the Court has subject matter jurisdiction in diversity
and under the MMTJA and DOHSA. R. 1391 ¶¶ 16,
18–19; id. at p. 57. Mr. Manfredi’s family and the
administrator of Mr. Manfredi’s estate, Laura Smith,
(“Manfredi Plaintiffs”) filed suit in this Court, invoking
its diversity jurisdiction. See Smith, No. 19 C 07091,
Dkt. 1. The Second Amended Complaint asserts
wrongful death and survival claims and demands a
jury trial. See id. at pp. 4, 118–19.
Defendants the Boeing Company, Rockwell Collins,
Inc., and Rosemount Aerospace, Inc. (collectively,
“Defendants”) filed motions in the Chandra and Smith
cases, seeking the Court’s determination that DOHSA
applies, preempts each Plaintiffs’ non-DOHSA claims,
and mandates a bench trial.2 See R. 1399, 1400, 1401,
1402. The Court granted those motions in the Order.
R. 1460. Chandra and Manfredi Plaintiffs now request
that the Court amend the Order to certify the issue of
the jury trial right for interlocutory appeal. R. 1468,
1471. Five admiralty law professors from around the
country, Professors Martin Davies, Robert Force,
Steven F. Friedell, Thomas Galligan, and Thomas J.
Schoenbaum, filed an amici brief in support of
Manfredi Plaintiffs’ motion. R. 1470. Xtra, without
2
Xtra filed a response to the motions stating that it took no
position. R. 1421.
21a
taking a position on the merits of the parties’ substantive positions, also joins Plaintiffs’ request to
certify this issue, arguing that an immediate appeal
would promote judicial efficiency. R. 1474. Chandra
Plaintiffs also ask the Court to certify whether
DOHSA preempts non-DOHSA causes of action for
physical destruction of property and personal injuries
to an aircraft passenger sustained over land during a
flight that ultimately led to a fatal crash. R. 1471.
Though the parties in the Chandra and Smith cases
have informally exchanged some discovery in furtherance
of settlement discussions, they have not engaged in
formal written or expert discovery. Boeing has informed
the Court that, if the Order stands, it would stipulate
to its liability to pay damages such that the only issue
at trial would be the amount of damages. Feb. 22, 2023
Letter to the Court.
Legal Standard
The Circuit Court of Appeals may not entertain
appeals from interlocutory (non-final) orders except in
very limited circumstances. Under 28 U.S.C. 1292(b),
a district court can certify an issue for interlocutory
appeal if the movant shows that (1) there is a question
of law; (2) the question is controlling; (3) the question
is “contestable,” that is, there is substantial grounds
for differences of opinion; and (4) immediate appeal
would speed up the ultimate termination of the
litigation. See Ahrenholz v. Bd. of Trustees of Univ. of
Ill., 219 F.3d 674, 675 (7th Cir. 2000). All four criteria
must be met. Id. at 676. Even if a district court certifies
an issue for appeal, the Circuit Court has discretion to
accept or reject the appeal. 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b).
22a
Discussion
I. Certification of Right to a Jury Trial Issue
Plaintiffs desire to challenge on interlocutory appeal
this Court’s holding that “Congress ... has explicitly
limited DOHSA to ‘a civil action in admiralty,’ which
does not carry the right to a jury trial.” Order at 13
(citing Tallentire v. Offshore Logistics, Inc., 800 F.2d
1390, 1391 (5th Cir. 1986) (where the “sole predicate”
for liability is DOHSA, the plaintiff “is not entitled to
a jury trial”)). Specifically, Manfredi Plaintiffs seek the
certification of the following issue:
Does a DOHSA claim in a case asserting diversity
rather than admiralty jurisdiction carry a
jury-trial right as a “suit at common law” within
the meaning of the Seventh Amendment, the
saving-to-suitors clause of 28 U.S.C. § 1333(1), and
Atlantic & Gulf Stevedores, Inc. v. Ellerman Lines,
Ltd., 369 U.S. 355 (1962)?
R. 1468 at 1. And Chandra Plaintiffs seek certification
of a similar question:
In a diversity case, is a DOHSA plaintiff entitled
to a jury trial under the saving-to-suitors clause
and DOHSA’s savings clause when the plaintiff
originally files suit in a state common law court
pursuant to Offshore Logistics v. Tallentire, demands a jury trial, and reasserts his jury demand
post-removal?
R. 1472 at 2. These questions are substantively
the same. At bottom, they ask whether a plaintiff
in federal court is entitled to a jury trial under the
Seventh Amendment when the plaintiff ’s sole claim
arises under DOHSA, and the plaintiff has a concurrent basis for common law jurisdiction (such as
23a
diversity). Defendants do not contest that the issue of
Plaintiffs’ right to a jury trial under DOHSA is a pure
question of law.3 Therefore, to determine whether an
interlocutory appeal is appropriate, the Court examines
whether the question fulfills the remaining three
factors of the test laid out in § 1292(b) and Ahrenholz.
A. “Controlling” Question
For a district court to certify a question under
§ 1292(b), the movant must show that the question is
“controlling.” The Seventh Circuit does not read this
requirement literally. Instead, it asks whether the
resolution of the question is “quite likely to affect the
further course of the litigation,” Sokaogon Gaming
Enterprise Corp. v. Tushie-Montgomery Assocs., Inc.,
86 F.3d 656, 659 (7th Cir. 1996), and is “serious to the
conduct of the litigation, either practically or legally.”
Johnson v. Burken, 930 F.2d 1202, 1206 (7th Cir. 1991)
(quoting Katz v. Carte Blanche Corp., 496 F.2d 747, 755
(3d Cir. 1974)). Therefore, “a question is controlling ...
if interlocutory reversal might save time for the
district court, and time and expense for the litigants.”
Johnson, 930 F.2d at 1205–06 (quoting 16 Charles A.
Wright, Arthur R. Miller, Edward H. Cooper & Eugene
Gressman, Federal Practice and Procedure § 3930, at
pp. 159–60 (1977)).
The resolution of the proper factfinder—whether
judge or jury—will likely affect the course of the
3
Indeed, determining whether DOHSA claims are limited
exclusively to this Court’s admiralty jurisdiction would likely
require an analysis of the Seventh Amendment, the provisions
of DOHSA and 28 U.S.C. § 1333(1), the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, and persuasive case law. The Seventh Circuit would
not need to hunt through the record—the facts of the case are
irrelevant.
24a
litigation at least practically, with substantial differences
in decision-making authority, jury selection, the way
evidentiary issues are handled, objections, and jury
instructions. Defendants argue that, since Boeing will
stipulate to liability, and the only role of the factfinder
will be to compute damages, the identity of the
factfinder will have no material impact on the outcome
of the litigation. But the issue need not affect the
litigation’s outcome to be controlling—it need only be
“serious to the conduct of the litigation,” even if only in
a practical sense. Johnson, 930 F.2d at 1206.
Other considerations make this question a controlling
one. For example, an interlocutory reversal would save
substantial time for this Court and expenses for the
litigants. In Johnson, the Seventh Circuit accepted a
question of proper service as a controlling question on
interlocutory appeal. Id. The Seventh Circuit noted
that, without taking the issue on interlocutory appeal,
the case would have gone through to judgment,
followed by an appeal that would have resulted in
throwing the entire case out for want of proper service,
and requiring a remand back to the district court to
start at square one. Id. Similarly here, if this case were
to proceed to a bench trial, and Plaintiffs were to
appeal in the regular course and obtain reversal on the
jury trial issue, the case would be remanded back to
this Court to hold another trial, this time by jury. The
Seventh Circuit has explained that avoiding such
inefficiencies is why it takes a flexible approach to
determining whether a question is “controlling.” Id.
Defendants cite two cases which they purport show
that the denial of a jury trial is not the sort of
controlling decision that warrants immediate appeal,
Caldwell-Baker Co. v. Parsons, 392 F.3d 886 (7th Cir.
2004) and National Bank of Waukesha v. Warren, 796
25a
F.2d 999 (7th Cir. 1986). However, neither of those
cases considered whether an interlocutory appeal
was proper under the § 1292(b) standard, but rather,
under the standard for a writ of mandamus, which is
a “drastic remedy traditionally used to confine a lower
court to the lawful exercise of its jurisdiction or to
compel it to exercise its authority when it has a duty
to do so.” United States v. Lapi, 458 F.3d 555, 560–61
(7th Cir. 2006); see also Allied Chemical Corp. v.
Daiflon, Inc., 449 U.S. 33, 35 (1980) (“Only exceptional
circumstances, amounting to a judicial usurpation of
power, will justify the invocation of this extraordinary
remedy.”). And in both cases, the situations would have
required the Circuit Court to conduct factual analyses
such that a § 1292(b) appeal would not have been
proper in the first place. See Caldwell-Baker, 392 F.3d
at 888 (district court’s refusal to withdraw reference to
personal bankruptcy not reviewable because the issue
was not “the procedural decision about which court
would make the initial substantive decision, but
review of the substantive decision itself.”); Warren, 796
F.2d at 1001 (determining right to jury trial depended
on the characterization of banking transactions and
other factual questions on which the Circuit Court did
“not have a complete record on which to resolve them”).
Defendants also cite a number of bankruptcy cases
in which district courts have refused to certify the
question of a jury trial right for appeal under
§ 1292(b). But the right to a jury trial in a bankruptcy
case turns on different rules, appellate procedures, and
factual questions, such as whether a jury request is
waived or timely raised. See, e.g., In re Beale, 410 B.R.
613, 617 (N.D. Ill. 2009) (“[T]he legal question of
whether Defendants are still entitled to a jury trial
under the Seventh Amendment is not before this court.
This is important, for the Bankruptcy Court concluded
26a
that the right had been waived....”); In re Glenn, Nos.
04 A 4493, 02 B 4081, 06 C 3565, 2006 WL 2252529, at
*2 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 3, 2006) (interlocutory appeal only
“raises the questions of whether the [jury] demand was
timely and the judge properly exercised discretion” in
light of “the court’s schedule, prejudice to the adverse
party, and the reason for the moving party’s delay.”).
No such questions are at issue here.
And where the question of a jury trial right is
properly raised and meets the other requirements of
§ 1292(b), the Supreme Court and the Seventh Circuit
have accepted the question as controlling on a § 1292(b)
appeal. See, e.g., Lehman v. Nakshian, 453 U.S. 156, 159
(1981) (right to jury trial in ADEA case determined on
interlocutory appeal); Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575,
576–577 (1978) (same); Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531,
532 (1970) (right to a jury trial in stockholder derivative action reached Supreme Court on interlocutory
appeal); Pavey v. Conley, 544 F.3d 739, 740 (7th Cir.
2008) (interlocutory appeal on right to jury trial
in prisoner litigation); In re Grabill Corp., 967 F.2d
1152, 1152-53 (7th Cir. 1992) (right to a jury trial in
bankruptcy proceeding on interlocutory appeal).4 In
4
Plaintiffs also point to cases in other circuits which accepted
appeals under § 1292(b) on the right to a jury trial, most notably,
Peace v. Fidalgo Island Packing Co., 419 F.2d 371, 371 (9th Cir.
1969), which decided the question of a DOHSA plaintiff’s right to
a jury trial on interlocutory appeal under § 1292(b). Other cases
dealing with a right to a jury trial on interlocutory appeal include:
Cascone v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 702 F.2d 389, 391 (2d Cir.
1983); Rex v. Cia. Pervana de Vapores, S.A., 660 F.2d 61, 62 (3d Cir.
1981); Singletary v. Enersys, Inc., 57 F. App’x 161, 162 (4th Cir.
2003); Luera v. M/V Alberta, 635 F.3d 181, 186 (5th Cir. 2011);
Smith v. Dowden, 47 F.3d 940, 941 (8th Cir. 1995); Zahn v. Geren,
245 F. App’x 696, 697 (9th Cir. 2007); Adams v. Cyprus Amax
27a
sum, none of Defendants’ cited cases create a per se
rule that a right to a jury trial is not a controlling
question. Instead, the determination is heavily case
and context specific. And here, the question is controlling in the practical sense.
B. “Contestable” Question
A question is “contestable” when substantial grounds
for a difference of opinion exist. 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b);
Ahrenholz, 219 F.3d at 675. For a question to be
appealable under § 1292(b), it must be a “difficult
central question of law which is not settled by
controlling authority,” and there must exist a “substantial likelihood” that the district court’s ruling will
be reversed. In re Brand Name Prescription Drugs
Antitrust Litig., 878 F. Supp. 1078, 1081 (N.D. Ill. 1995)
(citations omitted).
First and foremost, there is no controlling Seventh
Circuit or Supreme Court authority which decides this
question. According to Plaintiffs, the Order therefore
“entrenches” a conflict among courts regarding the
right to a jury trial under DOHSA, which makes an
interlocutory appeal especially suitable. In the Order,
this Court followed cases from other district and circuit courts around the country that have held that
there is no jury trial right under DOHSA unless there
is also a non-DOHSA cause of action that carries the
right to a jury trial or that allows the litigant to invoke
diversity jurisdiction. Tallentire, 800 F.2d at 1391
(on remand) (where the “sole predicate” for liability is
DOHSA, the plaintiff “is not entitled to a jury trial”);
Lasky v. Royal Caribbean Cruises, Ltd., 850 F. Supp. 2d
1309, 1313 (S.D. Fla. 2012) (collecting cases); In re
Minerals Co., 149 F.3d 1156, 1158 (10th Cir. 1998); Stewart v.
KHD Deutz of America Corp., 75 F.3d 1522, 1524 (11th Cir. 1996).
28a
Air Crash Disaster Near Honolulu, Hawaii, on Feb. 24,
1989, 783 F. Supp. 1261, 1266 (N.D. Cal. 1992);
Friedman v. Mitsubishi Aircraft Int’l, Inc., 678 F. Supp.
1064, 1066 (S.D.N.Y. 1988); Favaloro v. S/S Golden
Gate, 687 F. Supp. 475, 481 (N.D. Cal. 1987). Though
most courts which have confronted the question hold
this view,5 Defendants rightly point out that other
courts have held that there is a jury trial right under
DOHSA, provided diversity or some other basis for
common law jurisdiction exists. Tozer v. LTV Corp.,
No. HM81-2134, 1983 WL 705, at *6–7 (D. Md. May 27,
1983) (“Although an admiralty claimant is not generally
entitled to a jury trial, where an independent basis for
jurisdiction exists, a claimant may under the saving to
suitors clause, 28 U.S.C. § 1333, assert an admiralty
claim as a nonmaritime civil action ... [and] obtain a
jury trial.”); see also In re Korean Air Lines Disaster of
Sept. 1, 1983, 704 F. Supp. 1135, 1157 (D.D.C. 1988),
affirmed in part, 932 F.2d 1475 (D.C. Cir. 1991); Cucuru
v. Rose’s Oil Serv., Inc., 441 Mass. 12, 20 (2004).
Second, though the Court believes the Order is
rightly decided, there are substantial grounds for a
difference of opinion on a plaintiff ’s jury trial right
under DOHSA. The Court’s ruling was based on the
language of DOHSA, 46 U.S.C. § 30302, which states
that, in the case of wrongful death on the high seas,
the personal representative of the decedent “may bring
a civil action in admiralty.” This language, by the
Court’s reading, stands for the principle that DOHSA
5
According to Defendants, 14 cases have decided a plaintiff’s
entitlement to a jury trial under DOHSA; 12 have ruled that
DOHSA rests exclusively in admiralty jurisdiction such that a
plaintiff does not have a Seventh Amendment jury trial right.
Whether or not this count is correct, the fact remains that this
Court followed the majority view.
29a
exclusively provides a remedy in admiralty. Therefore,
the saving-to-suitors provision in 28 U.S.C. § 1333(1),
which in most admiralty cases reserves the right to
common law remedies, including a trial by jury, is not
applicable. Lewis v. Lewis & Clark Marine, Inc., 531
U.S. 438, 454–55 (2001) (“Trial by jury is an obvious ...
example of the remedies available to suitors.”); Atl. &
Gulf Stevedores, Inc. v. Ellerman Lines, Ltd., 369 U.S.
355, 360 (1962) (“This suit [for breach of a maritime
contract] being in the federal courts by reason of
diversity of citizenship carried with it, of course, the
right to trial by jury.”).
According to amici,6 the Order misreads the
language in DOHSA that the personal representative
“may bring a civil action in admiralty.” 46 U.S.C.
§ 30302. Amici instead argue that the permissive
“may” modifies “in admiralty” such that a claimant
may elect to bring the claim in admiralty or at common
law under the maritime saving clause statute, 28
U.S.C. § 1333(1). This Court reads the provision to
mean that the personal representative “may” file suit
at his or her discretion, but if a case is brought, it is
limited to a civil action in admiralty. And though this
Court believes its reading is the most reasonable,7
there is certainly enough room for a difference of opinion.
6
Amici include Prof. Schoenbaum, who wrote the treatise that
this Court referenced to support its holding that the general
saving-to-suitors clause does not apply to DOHSA actions.
Thomas J. Schoenbaum, 1 Admiralty & Mar. Law § 4:2 (6th ed.)
(“[§ 1333(1)] is subject to [ ] qualifications.... [One is that] Congress, by statute, has vested exclusive admiralty jurisdiction in
the federal courts for certain admiralty claims....”).
7
The Jones Act, which was passed the same year as DOHSA,
expressly provides that a plaintiff “may elect to bring a civil
action at law, with the right of a jury trial.” 46 U.S.C. § 30104.
30a
Plaintiffs also point to Offshore Logistics v. Tallentire,
477 U.S. 207, 231–32 (1986), in which the Supreme
Court held that DOHSA’s own saving-to-suitors clause
allows for concurrent state common law jurisdiction
over DOHSA actions. Id. at 232. Noting that “the
resolution of DOHSA claims does not normally require
the expertise that admiralty courts bring to bear,” the
Supreme Court held that “DOHSA actions are clearly
within the competence of state courts to adjudicate.”
Id. It would be incongruous, Plaintiffs therefore argue,
for DOHSA claimants to have the right to a jury trial
in state common law courts under Tallentire, but not
have the right in federal court once the case is removed.
Further, Plaintiffs point to dicta in a footnote in
Moragne v. States Marine Lines, 398 U.S. 375 (1970),
in which the Supreme Court stated:
If we found from the legislative history [of DOHSA]
that Congress imposed exclusive [admiralty]
jurisdiction because of a desire to avoid the
presentation of wrongful-death claims to juries,
that might support an inference that Congress
meant to forbid nonstatutory maritime actions for
wrongful death, which might come before state
or federal juries. Cf. Fitzgerald v. United States
Lines, 374 U.S. 16, 83 S.Ct. 1646, 10 L.Ed.2d 720
(1963). However, that is not the case.
Id. at 400 n.14. Though this footnote is not directly
on point, it does note that the legislative history of
DOHSA is void of any indication that Congress
intended to foreclose the right to a trial by jury. Id.
No such language explicitly mentioning the right to a jury trial is
found in DOHSA.
31a
This, combined with the language of § 1333(1), the
minority view espoused by other courts, and the amici
argument on the meaning of DOHSA, creates uncertainty. There are substantial grounds for a difference
of opinion, and the Seventh Circuit might reasonably
side with Plaintiffs. The question of Plaintiffs’ entitlement
to a jury trial under DOHSA is therefore contestable.
C. Resolving the Question Would Speed Up
Litigation
The final § 1292(b) element is satisfied if “an
immediate appeal may materially advance the ultimate
termination of the litigation.” Sterk v. Redbox
Automated Retail, LLC, 672 F.3d 535, 536 (7th Cir.
2013). First, Plaintiffs and Xtra primarily assert that,
if the jury question is not certified, and the Seventh
Circuit later concludes, after a bench trial, that Plaintiffs have a right to a jury trial, the case will need to
be retried in front of a jury. In that circumstance, the
bench trial will have been a costly waste of resources
for the parties and the Court. Defendants do not
contest this is true. Instead, they argue that, because
Boeing has stipulated to liability for compensatory
damages under DOHSA, the case should proceed
expeditiously to a bench trial on the only remaining
issue—that of damages.8 But this case can proceed
8
Plaintiffs imply that they may not accept Boeing’s stipulation
and may instead insist on their right to prove liability, which
would further extend discovery. United States v. Allen, 798 F.2d
985, 1001 (7th Cir. 1986) (“[A] party is not required to accept a
judicial admission of his adversary, but may insist on proving the
fact.... [A] cold stipulation can deprive a party of the legitimate
moral force of his evidence, and can never fully substitute
for tangible, physical evidence or the testimony of witnesses.”).
Whether or not Plaintiffs will accept Boeing’s stipulation or insist
on further liability discovery is immaterial to the certification
issue before the Court. Either way, discovery can commence
32a
with discovery while an interlocutory appeal is taken.
Though there may be some disagreement over the
length and extent of the discovery necessary, discovery
is not affected by the jury trial right and can continue
apace while the interlocutory appeal is pending. The
concern that the proceedings would “grind[ ] to a halt”
is therefore unfounded. Ahrenholz, 219 F.3d at 676.
As a final note, Plaintiffs also argue that certifying
the issue for appeal would promote settlement because,
with clarity on whether the cases will be tried before
juries or not, the parties will have a better idea of the
value of their claims. See Sterk, 672 F.3d at 536
(promotion of settlement by way of clearing uncertainty
is “enough to satisfy the ‘may materially advance’
clause of section 1292(b).”). Defendants, however,
argue that an interlocutory appeal would “halt settlement discussions for a year or more,” depending on the
length of the appeal. But if the only issue to be decided
by the trier of fact is the amount of damages, it is
unclear why the valuation of the parties’ cases would
differ drastically depending on the trier of fact or how
an appeal on that issue would either speed up or halt
settlement. It is therefore the Court’s expectation that
the parties will continue to negotiate a settlement in
good faith while an interlocutory appeal is pending.
In sum, this Court will certify for interlocutory
appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) the question of
whether a plaintiff in federal court is entitled to a jury
trial under the Seventh Amendment when the
plaintiff ’s sole claim arises under DOHSA, and the
plaintiff has a concurrent basis for common law
jurisdiction. It is a “controlling question of law as to
during the pendency of the appeal. Plaintiffs can seek a ruling on
the stipulation issue in separate motions if they so desire.
33a
which there is substantial ground for difference of
opinion and ... an immediate appeal ... may materially
advance the ultimate termination of the litigation.”
§ 1292(b).
II. Preemption Question
Chandra Plaintiffs also ask this Court to certify
whether DOHSA preempts their causes of action for
physical destruction of property and personal injuries
to the decedent allegedly sustained over land during
the flight that ultimately led a fatal crash. The issue
of DOHSA’s preemptive scope, however, does not meet
the requirements for certification under § 1292(b)
because it is neither controlling nor contestable.
Chandra Plaintiffs argue that the viability of their
survival personal injury and property damage claims
will impact the course of the litigation by determining
whether additional categories of damages are available
and whether additional discovery will be needed. But
any property lost is minor and incidental. Chandra
Plaintiffs’ Third Amended Complaint does not specify
what property was damaged, but it is likely that
only Mr. Chandra’s personal effects and luggage were
lost. See generally R. 1391. Further, Chandra Plaintiffs
have not pled a pre-impact physical injury, so their
request that the Court certify this question has no real
practical effect on the litigation. Id.
DOHSA’s preemptive effect is also not contestable.
As the Order points out, the Supreme Court has
already held that DOHSA preempts survival actions
for pre-death pain and suffering (without any reference to whether the injury occurred over land or sea)
in Dooley v. Korean Air Lines Co., Ltd., 524 U.S. 116,
123 (1998). There, the Supreme Court stated:
34a
“[b]y authorizing only certain surviving relatives
to recover damages, and by limiting damages to
the pecuniary losses sustained by those relatives,
Congress provided the exclusive recovery for
deaths that occur on the high seas.” [Allowing a]
survival action would necessarily expand the class
of beneficiaries in cases of death on the high seas
by permitting decedents’ estates ... to recover
compensation [and] would expand the recoverable
damages for deaths on the high seas.... Because
Congress has already decided these issues, it has
precluded the judiciary from enlarging either the
class of beneficiaries or the recoverable damages.
Id. And the Supreme Court has stated in no uncertain
terms that “Congress did not limit DOHSA beneficiaries to recovery of their pecuniary losses in order to
encourage the creation of nonpecuniary supplements.”
Mobil Oil Corp. v. Higginbotham, 436 U.S. 618, 625
(1978). It is clear, therefore, that Plaintiffs’ right to
nonpecuniary damages such as property loss and predeath pain and suffering (even if experienced over
land) is not contestable.
Plaintiffs argue that there is at least one case in
which DOHSA did not preempt property loss claims,
Smith v. Pan Air Corp., 684 F.2d 1102 (5th Cir. 1982).
But that case is inapplicable. DOHSA by its terms
applies only to wrongful death actions brought by
personal representatives of the decedent. 46 U.S.C.
§ 30303. And in Smith, a helicopter company, not
the personal representative of the decedent’s estate,
sought recovery for loss of its helicopter. Id. at 1112.
It is therefore not surprising that DOHSA did not
preempt the helicopter company’s claim. In the end,
Chandra Plaintiffs have not cited any other case
showing that the preemption issue is contestable.
35a
Therefore, certifying the issue for interlocutory appeal
is inappropriate.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Manfredi Plaintiffs’ and
Xtra’s motions, R. 1468, 1474, are granted in whole,
and Chandra Plaintiffs’ motion, R. 1471, is granted in
part. This Court will amend the Order to include
language certifying the issue of Plaintiffs’ entitlement
to a jury trial for interlocutory appeal under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1292(b). Chandra Plaintiffs’ request to certify the
issue of claim preemption is denied.
36a
APPENDIX C
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT,
N.D. ILLINOIS, EASTERN DIVISION
————
No. 18 C 07686
Case No. 19 C 01552, Case No. 19 C 07091
————
IN RE LION AIR FLIGHT JT 610 CRASH
————
Signed May 25, 2023
————
AMENDED MEMORANDUM
OPINION AND ORDER
Thomas M. Durkin, United States District Judge
This consolidated action arises out of an aviation
accident involving a Boeing commercial jet which crashed
into the Java Sea off the coast of Indonesia, resulting
in the death of everyone on board. Defendants Boeing,
Rockwell Collins, Inc., and Rosemount Aerospace, Inc.
(collectively, “Defendants”) filed motions seeking
the application of the Death on the High Seas Act,
46 U.S.C. §§ 30301–08 (“DOHSA”) to the two
remaining actions, Chandra v. Boeing, case no. 19 C
01552, and Smith v. Boeing, case no. 19 C 07091. R.
1399, 1401. Defendants also seek a ruling that the
application of DOHSA preempts all other causes of
action and mandates a bench trial in each case. For the
foregoing reasons, Defendants’ motions are granted.
Background
On October 29, 2018, Lion Air Flight JT 610 began
experiencing serious mechanical problems almost
37a
immediately after takeoff from Jakarta, Indonesia.
R. 1391 ¶¶ 43, 44. The passengers on board the Boeing
737 MAX 8 experienced erratic movements and
fluctuations in altitude due to a faulty automatic flight
control system called MCAS, which overrode the pilots
and attempted to turn the plane into a nosedive over
two dozen times. Id. at ¶¶ 4, 45. After a few minutes,
the plane headed out over the ocean, and approximately five minutes after that, the plane crashed into
the Java Sea at a high speed about 18 nautical miles
off the coast of Indonesia. See id. ¶ 46. There were no
survivors. Id. at ¶ 5.
The resulting litigation involved 87 individual actions
asserting wrongful death and other claims arising out
of the accident against Boeing and other defendants
on behalf of 186 decedents. All actions were either filed
in or removed to this Court and eventually consolidated under the master docket, In Re Lion Air Flight
JT 610 Crash, 18 C 07686. Boeing has now fully settled
the claims of 184 decedents. The remaining claims are
those brought by the families and representatives of
two decedents: Liu Chandra, an Indonesian businessman
(Chandra v. Boeing, case no. 19 C 01552); and Andrea
Manfredi, an Italian professional cyclist and entrepreneur
(Smith v. Boeing, case no. 19 C 07091). 1
The plaintiffs in the Chandra matter (the “Chandra
Plaintiffs”) originally filed suit in the Circuit Court of
Cook County, Illinois. See Chandra, No. 19 C 01552,
Dkt. 1. They allege wrongful death arising under
DOHSA and the Illinois Wrongful Death Act based on
At the time the instant motions were filed, another case was
also outstanding. See Sethi v. Boeing, case no. 20 C 01152. In that
case, the parties stipulated to the application of DOHSA and the
Court conducting a damages-only bench trial. See R. 1367. Prior
to trial, the case settled. R. 1457.
1
38a
theories of strict products liability, negligence, and
negligent failure to warn. See, e.g., R. 1391 at pp. 15–
24. They also make survival claims for property
damage and pre-death fear and injury. Id. Boeing
removed the case to this Court, citing the Multiparty,
Multiforum Trial Jurisdiction Act (“MMTJA”), 28
U.S.C. § 1369, and the Court’s admiralty jurisdiction
under 28 U.S.C. § 1331(1). Chandra, No. 19 C 01552,
Dkt. 1. In its removal paperwork, Boeing included a
jury demand. Id. The operative Third Amended
Complaint demands a jury trial and alleges the Court
has subject matter jurisdiction in diversity and under
the MMTJA and DOHSA. R. 1391 ¶¶ 16, 18–19; id. at
p. 57.
Mr. Manfredi’s family and the administrator of
Mr. Manfredi’s estate, Laura Smith, (the “Manfredi
Plaintiffs”) filed suit in this Court, invoking its
diversity jurisdiction. See Smith, No. 19 C 07091,
Dkt. 1. The operative Second Amended Complaint
asserts wrongful death and survival claims under
theories of strict products liability, negligence, and
breach of implied warranties. R. 1378 ¶¶ 201–320,
468–80, 489–95. The Manfredi Plaintiffs also plead
survival claims of pre-death injury, negligent infliction
of emotional distress, and claims arising under various
fraud statutes, including the Illinois Consumer Fraud
and Deceptive Practices Act, 815 ILCS 505/1 (“ICFA”)
and the federal Computer Fraud and Abuse Act,
18 U.S.C. § 1030 (“CFAA”). Id. They seek punitive
damages and demand a jury trial. See id. at pp. 4,
118–19
Defendants filed motions in each of the Chandra
and Smith cases, seeking the Court’s determination
that DOHSA applies, preempts each set of Plaintiffs’
39a
non-DOHSA claims, and mandates a bench trial. 2 See
R. 1399, 1400, 1401, 1402. The Chandra Plaintiffs do
not dispute that DOHSA governs their wrongful death
claims, but nonetheless insist that their survival
claims for property loss and pre-death injury are
not preempted by DOHSA and that they retain their
right to a jury trial. The Manfredi Plaintiffs dispute
DOHSA’s application entirely and similarly argue that
even if it did apply, their survival claims for pre-death
injury and fraud are not preempted and that they have
the right to a jury trial. Though the parties in the
Chandra and Smith cases have informally exchanged
some discovery in furtherance of settlement discussions, they have not engaged in formal written or
expert discovery.
Legal Standard
Defendants do not articulate a standard under
which the Court should decide their motions.
Defendants base their arguments on the pleadings,
however, they do cite to a public crash investigation
report by the Indonesian government (the “Report”).
See, e.g., R. 1400 at 7; R. 1438 at 8. The Manfredi
Plaintiffs, in turn, attach evidentiary material outside
the pleadings to their brief in opposition, argue for the
application of the summary judgment standard, and
request additional discovery under Rule 56(d). R.
1425-1 (attaching expert affidavit). Meanwhile, the
Chandra Plaintiffs argue for the application of the
Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss standard. R. 1422 at 3.
The Report cited by Defendants is a foreign
government report and a matter of public record, and
the Court may take judicial notice of it without
Defendant Xtra Aerospace LLC filed a response to the instant
motions stating that it takes no position. R. 1421.
2
40a
converting Defendants’ motions to ones for summary
judgment. Menominee Indian Tribe of Wis. v.
Thompson, 161 F.3d 449, 456 (7th Cir. 1998) (“Judicial
notice of historical documents, documents contained in
the public record, and reports of administrative bodies
is proper.”); see also Color Switch LLC v. Fortafy Games
DMCC, 377 F. Supp. 3d 1075, 1089 n.6 (E.D. Cal. 2019)
(taking judicial notice of Canadian government
report). The fact that a plaintiff attaches evidentiary
materials outside the pleadings to its brief does not
convert a defendant’s motion to a summary judgment
motion. Thompson v. Illinois Dept. of Prof’l Regulation,
300 F.3d 750, 754 (7th Cir. 2002). Furthermore, it is
within this Court’s discretion to handle this motion as
a straightforward motion to dismiss, especially where
early resolution of an issue, like the application of
DOHSA, would streamline the case. Levenstein v.
Salafsky, 164 F.3d 345, 347 (7th Cir. 1998) (holding
that it was within the district court’s discretion to
treat motion as motion to dismiss where judgment on
qualified immunity should be decided as early in the
case as possible).
Thus, the Court will construe Defendants’ motions
under the Rule 12(b)(6) standard to decide the application of DOHSA as a matter of law on the face of the
pleadings. A Rule 12(b)(6) motion challenges the
“sufficiency of the complaint.” Berger v. Nat. Collegiate
Athletic Assoc., 843 F.3d 285, 289 (7th Cir. 2016). In
applying this standard, the Court accepts all wellpleaded facts as true and draws all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party. Tobey v.
Chibucos, 890 F.3d 634, 646 (7th Cir. 2018).
41a
Discussion
A. DOHSA Applies to the Smith (Manfredi) Action.
Though the Chandra Plaintiffs do not dispute
DOHSA’s application to their wrongful death claims,
the Manfredi Plaintiffs do. DOHSA is the source of law
for deaths resulting from wrongful acts, neglect, or
default on the high seas more than three (or in a
commercial aviation accident, twelve) nautical miles
from the shore of the United States. 46 U.S.C. §§ 30302,
30307. The Supreme Court has consistently applied
DOHSA to aviation accidents occurring on the high
seas, like the crash which occurred here. See Dooley v.
Korean Air Lines Co., Ltd., 524 U.S. 116, 118 S.Ct.
1890, 141 L.Ed.2d 102 (1998); Zicherman v. Korean Air
Lines Co., Ltd., 516 U.S. 217, 116 S.Ct. 629, 133
L.Ed.2d 596 (1996); Offshore Logistics v. Tallentire, 477
U.S. 207, 106 S.Ct. 2485, 91 L.Ed.2d 174 (1986); Mobil
Oil Corp. v. Higginbotham, 436 U.S. 618, 98 S.Ct. 2010,
56 L.Ed.2d 581 (1978); Exec. Jet Aviation, Inc. v. City of
Cleveland, 409 U.S. 249, 263–64, 93 S.Ct. 493, 34
L.Ed.2d 454 (1972) (“[I]t may be considered as settled
today that [DOHSA] gives the federal admiralty courts
jurisdiction of such wrongful-death actions” based on
aircraft crashes into the high seas); see also 46 U.S.C.
§ 30307 (section of DOHSA governing commercial
aviation accidents on the high seas). 3
The weight of the case law in other circuits is that
when a plaintiff is fatally injured over the high seas,
DOHSA applies. LaCourse v. PAE Worldwide Inc., 980
F.3d 1350, 1357 (11th Cir. 2020) (“Where a death
Cases interpreting and applying DOHSA are virtually nonexistent in this Circuit. Where there is no binding law from the
Supreme Court or the Seventh Circuit, this Court considers the
persuasive case law of other circuits.
3
42a
occurs on the high seas, DOHSA applies, full stop.”);
Bergen v. F/V St. Patrick, 816 F.2d 1345, 1348 (9th Cir.
1987); Kennedy v. Carnival Corp., 385 F. Supp. 3d 1302,
1316 (S.D. Fla. 2019) (DOHSA applies where “the
injury that led to the Decedent’s death occurred in the
water); see also Sea-Land Servs., Inc. v. Gaudet, 414
U.S. 573, 599–600 and n.5, 94 S.Ct. 806, 39 L.Ed.2d 9
(1974) (J. Powell, dissenting on other grounds)
(DOHSA “by its terms covers deaths caused by injuries
inflicted at sea, not simply deaths occurring on the
high seas.”).
Citing Motts v. M/V Green Wave, a case in which the
Fifth Circuit held that DOHSA applied when the
injury occurred on the high seas but the prior negligence and the later death occurred onshore, the
Manfredi Plaintiffs argue that the Court should
instead consider the location of where the negligence
is consummated into a “first” injury in determining
whether DOHSA applies. 210 F.3d 565, 569–71 (5th
Cir. 2000). Their argument is that Mr. Manfredi was
first injured during the period that the flight was over
land—they allege he suffered, at a minimum, emotional
distress—and this prevents the application of DOHSA.
But the Motts court specifically held that the proper
test is to “look to the location of the accident in
determining whether DOHSA applies.” Id. at 571. The
Manfredi Plaintiffs can point to no other case law
which adopts their “first injury” test. Therefore, the
situs of a pre-death but non-fatal injury does not matter.
The Manfredi Plaintiffs’ argument that over half of
the flight occurred over land similarly fails. LaCourse,
980 F.3d at 1357 (aviation accident was governed by
DOHSA even where the flight was scheduled almost
entirely over land and only crashed during the short
time when it was “fortuitously” over water). Their
43a
argument that Defendants’ negligence occurred on
land also fails. Id. at 1356; In re Dearborn Marine
Serv., Inc., 499 F.2d 263, 272 n.17 (5th Cir. 1974)
(“DOHSA has been construed to confer admiralty
jurisdiction over claims arising out of airplane crashes
on the high seas though the negligence alleged to have
caused the crash occurred on land.”).
Even so, the Manfredi Plaintiffs argue that it is too
early at this juncture to determine where the fatal
injury occurred, whether over land or sea. They
maintain that because no discovery has occurred, the
record does not show when Mr. Manfredi was fatally
injured during the fated flight path. For example, they
propose for the first time that Mr. Manfredi may have
died over land from a heart attack due to his emotional
distress, from extreme G-forces breaking his neck or
causing brain injury during the plane’s erratic
movements, or from a piece of baggage flying out of an
overhead compartment. Citing Bernard v. World
Learning, Inc., the Manfredi Plaintiffs contend that
this is a “metaphysical” factual question on which the
Court should not speculate without discovery. No. 0920309-CIV, 2010 WL 11505188, at *8 (S.D. Fla. June 4,
2010). But the Bernard court simply held that the
defendant was not entitled to summary judgment on
the application of DOHSA because there were genuine
evidentiary disputes regarding whether the decedent
was mortally injured on land or sea. Id. (detailing the
parties’ dispute over whether the decedent died while
swimming in the ocean or on land as a result of a
landslide and was then pushed out to sea).
Here, the Court agrees it should not speculate or
weigh evidence on the location of Mr. Manfredi’s death
in deciding a 12(b)(6) motion, but instead takes the
facts alleged as true. The Manfredi Plaintiffs’ own
44a
Complaint does not state that Mr. Manfredi died prior
to impact or as a result of the plane’s erratic
movements over land. Rather, it specifically alleges
that Mr. Manfredi died when the aircraft crashed into
the ocean. See, e.g., R. 1378 ¶ 149–153 (describing predeath terror prior to crash into the water); 229, 246,
265, 278, 290, 309, 351, 368, 387, 400, 412, 431, 442,
486, 502 (all paragraphs alleging that Mr. Manfredi
“was able to perceive, process, understand and react to
the impact of the aircraft with the ocean.”). Based on
the pleadings, Mr. Manfredi suffered his fatal injury
on the high seas, and thus DOHSA applies. 4 Because
The Manfredi Plaintiffs request leave to amend their
Complaint to allege alternative theories of death which include
their new land-based scenarios. “The court should freely give
leave to amend ... [u]nless it is certain from the face of the
complaint that any amendment would be futile or otherwise
unwarranted.” Runnion ex rel. Runnion v. Girl Scouts of Greater
Chicago & Nw. Indiana, 786 F.3d 510, 519–20 (7th Cir. 2015)
(cleaned up). An amendment is futile when it “fails to state a valid
theory of liability” or “could not withstand a motion to dismiss.”
Bower v. Jones, 978 F.2d 1004, 1008 (7th Cir. 1992). Defendants
argue that amendment would be futile because the Indonesian
Report demonstrates that the Manfredi Plaintiffs’ speculated
scenarios are very unlikely. For example, the transcript of the
Cockpit Voice Recorder shows that the captain and co-captain
were alive and still conversing until less than 30 seconds
before the crash. See Komite Nasional Keselamatan Transportasi
Republic of Indonesia, Final Aircraft Investigation Report (2019),
https://bit.ly/3xL7Ll5 at 85. While the report makes the Manfredi
Plaintiffs’ new theories improbable, it does not foreclose them
entirely—the report does not discuss what may have happened to
any passengers in the main cabin. So long as the Manfredi
Plaintiffs have “evidentiary support or ... will likely have
evidentiary support after a reasonable opportunity for further
investigation or discovery” for any new allegations, Fed. R. Civ. P.
11(b), they are granted leave to amend their complaint, keeping
in mind that they may be subject to sanctions if their pleading
does not comply with the requirements of Rule 11.
4
45a
DOHSA applies to the Smith and Chandra cases as
pleaded, the Court will determine whether it preempts
Plaintiffs’ other claims and whether it forecloses their
right to a jury trial.
B. Plaintiffs’ Non-DOHSA Claims Are Preempted,
and Plaintiffs Are Not Entitled to a Jury Trial.
Defendants argue that DOHSA acts to preempt
Plaintiffs’ other claims against them, and that Plaintiffs
do not have a right to a trial by jury because DOHSA
is a claim in admiralty. DOHSA provides that where a
death occurs on the high seas as the result of negligence or wrongdoing, the decedent’s spouse, parent,
child, or dependent relative “may bring a civil action
in admiralty” against the wrongdoer. Id. § 30302.
DOHSA allows recovery of pecuniary and non-pecuniary
damages exclusively for those relatives, but explicitly
forbids punitive damages. Id. § 30307. If a person is
injured on the high seas and dies while he or she has
a civil action pending to recover for those injuries,
“the personal representative of the decedent may be
substituted as the plaintiff” and the action proceeds
under the provisions of DOHSA. Id. at § 30305.
The Seventh Amendment does not require jury
trials in cases brought in admiralty. Fitzgerald v. U.S.
Lines Co., 374 U.S. 16, 20, 83 S.Ct. 1646, 10 L.Ed.2d
720 (1963) (citing Waring v. Clarke, 46 U.S. 5 How.
441, 46 U.S. 441, 12 L.Ed. 226 (1847)); Fed. R. Civ. P.
38(e). Nevertheless, jury trials in admiralty are not
forbidden. Fitzgerald, 374 U.S. at 20, 83 S.Ct. 1646.
While the case law is murky and often conflicting, 5 it
appears that a plaintiff’s jury demand in a DOHSA
Indeed, the Supreme Court has described as “tortuous” the
development of the law as it pertains to wrongful death claims in
the maritime context. Tallentire, 477 U.S. at 212, 106 S.Ct. 2485.
5
46a
case may be granted in two instances: (1) where the
plaintiff asserts a non-preempted claim in addition to
the DOHSA claim that carries a right to a jury trial; or
(2) where, “in addition to asserting a DOHSA claim, a
plaintiff also asserts another claim that does not
necessarily entitle her to a jury trial, but that invokes
the court’s diversity jurisdiction.” Lasky v. Royal
Caribbean Cruises, Ltd., 850 F. Supp. 2d 1309, 1313
(S.D. Fla. 2012) (collecting cases).
1. DOHSA Preempts Plaintiffs’ Survival Actions
First, both Plaintiffs argue that they plead nonpreempted claims which grant them a right to a jury
trial. Defendants, however, argue that DOHSA
preempts Plaintiffs’ other claims against them. These
are their wrongful death claims under Illinois law,
their pre-death injury and emotional distress claims,
the Chandra Plaintiffs’ claims for property damage,
and the Manfredi Plaintiffs’ claims under the ICFA
and CFAA.
We start with the principle that where DOHSA
applies, it is generally the exclusive source of law and
preempts all other state wrongful death claims. See
generally Tallentire, 477 U.S. 207, 106 S.Ct. 2485, 91
L.Ed.2d 174. 6 The Supreme Court in Dooley has also
held that survival claims for pre-death pain and
suffering, like those sought by Plaintiffs, are preempted
by the application of DOHSA. 524 U.S. at 124, 118 S.Ct.
1890. Without deciding whether survival claims may
ever be brought in DOHSA cases, the Court explained:
DOHSA expresses Congress’ judgment that there
should be no [pre-death pain and suffering] cause
The Chandra Plaintiffs accordingly concede that their wrongful
death claim under Illinois law is preempted. R. 1422 at 3.
6
47a
of action in cases of death on the high seas. By
authorizing only certain surviving relatives to
recover damages, and by limiting damages to the
pecuniary losses sustained by those relatives,
Congress provided the exclusive recovery for
deaths that occur on the high seas. [Allowing such
a] survival action would necessarily expand the
class of beneficiaries in cases of death on the high
seas by permitting decedents’ estates (and their
various beneficiaries) to recover compensation. [It
also] would expand the recoverable damages for
deaths on the high seas by permitting the recovery
of nonpecuniary losses Because Congress has
already decided these issues, it has precluded the
judiciary from enlarging either the class of
beneficiaries or the recoverable damages. As we
noted in Higginbotham, ‘Congress did not limit
DOHSA beneficiaries to recovery of their pecuniary
losses in order to encourage the creation of
nonpecuniary supplements.’ The comprehensive
scope of DOHSA is confirmed by its survival
provision, ... which limits the recovery in such
cases to the pecuniary losses suffered by surviving
relatives. The Act thus expresses Congress’
‘considered judgment,’ on the availability and
contours of a survival action in cases of death on
the high seas.
Id. (quoting Higginbotham, 436 U.S. at 625, 98 S.Ct.
2010) (emphasis added). The Court also noted that the
Jones Act, which Congress adopted the same year as
DOHSA and which permits seamen injured in the
course of their employment to recover damages for
their injuries, has a specific provision allowing a
survival action for pre-death injury. The Court
consequently reasoned that Congress was “certainly
familiar” with language which would permit a survival
48a
cause of action, and that it likely made a conscious
decision not to include a similar provision in DOHSA.
Dooley, 524 U.S. at 124, 118 S.Ct. 1890. In short,
“Congress has spoken on the availability of a survival
action, the losses to be recovered, and the beneficiaries,
in cases of death on the high seas,” and generally, other
survival actions are preempted. Id. at 123–24, 118
S.Ct. 1890.
Plaintiffs argue that the Supreme Court’s holding in
Dooley does not apply to their pre-death pain and
suffering claims, because some of Mr. Chandra’s and
Mr. Manfredi’s injuries occurred while the plane was
over land. They cite Evans v. John Crane, Inc., C.A. No.
15-681 (MN) (D. Del. Oct. 24, 2019) and Hays v. John
Crane, Inc., Case No. 09-81881-CIV-KAM, 2014 WL
10658453 (S.D. Fla. Oct. 9, 2014), two cases in which
the decedents died from asbestos exposure which
occurred cumulatively over land and sea. However,
these cases are distinguishable—they are “indivisible
injury” cases where the fatal injury occurred over
many years and partially over land. Plaintiffs here do
not allege the decedents suffered “indivisible” fatal
injuries (like asbestos exposure) over land and sea.
DOHSA similarly preempts the Chandra Plaintiffs’
property damage claim and the Manfredi Plaintiffs’
ICFA and CFAA claims. Though the Supreme Court
has never directly addressed whether all other survival
claims arising out of a death on the high seas are
preempted by DOHSA, its dicta is instructive. See, e.g.,
Tallentire, 477 U.S. at 232, 106 S.Ct. 2485. (“[T]he
conclusion that the state statutes are pre-empted by
DOHSA where it applies is inevitable.”). It is clear,
then, that a survival claim for damages to the estate
arising out of a death on the high seas will not lie,
absent a clear indication from Congress to the contrary.
49a
Courts around the country have agreed. 7 See Bowoto v.
Chevron Corp., 621 F.3d 1116, 1124 (9th Cir. 2010);
Jacobs v. N. King Shipping Co., 180 F.3d 713, 717 (5th
Cir. 1999); In re Air Disaster Near Honolulu, Haw.
on Feb. 24, 1989, 792 F. Supp. 1541 (N.D. Cal. 1990)
(DOHSA provides only pecuniary damages to surviving
dependents and precludes the availability of nonpecuniary damages under either general maritime law
or state law, regardless of whether asserted as part of
a wrongful death action or as a survival action); Heath
v. Am. Sail Training Ass’n, 644 F. Supp. 1459, 1471–72
(D.R.I. 1986).
Plaintiffs contend that broad DOHSA preemption
could lead to absurd results. For example, the Chandra
Plaintiffs claim it would be unjust for DOHSA to
preempt an estate from obtaining damages for a preaccident assault at the airport. But DOHSA’s preemption of claims arising out of incidents unconnected to
the fatal accident is not at issue here. Their citation
of Ostrowiecki v. Aggressor Fleet, Ltd. is similarly
inapposite, because the emotional distress in that case
was not preempted because it was “predicated on
entirely different acts of defendants from those which
allegedly caused [the decedent’s] death.” Nos. 07-6598,
07-6931, 2008 WL 3874609, at *5–6 (E.D. La. Aug. 15,
2008).
The few cases which have allowed survivor claims to be
brought concurrently with a DOHSA claim were decided preDooley and were brought under the Jones Act, which was
designed to “work together” with DOHSA, and the Warsaw
Convention. See Peace v. Fidalgo Island Packing Co., 419 F.2d 371,
372 (9th Cir. 1969); In re Korean Air Lines Disaster, 704 F. Supp.
1135, 1152-53 (D.D.C. 1988); Tozer v. LTV Corp., 1983 WL 705, at
*7 (D. Md. May 27, 1983). Neither the Chandra nor the Manfredi
Plaintiffs plead such claims.
7
50a
The Manfredi Plaintiffs also argue that the CFAA is
a federal statute and that federal statutes cannot
preempt each other. However, the Ninth Circuit, in
deciding that DOHSA preempted survival claims
under the federal Alien Tort Statute, explained that
“Dooley ... held that DOHSA preempts all survival
claims for deaths on the high seas unless there is clear
indication that Congress intended otherwise.” Bowoto,
621 F.3d at 1124 (emphasis in original). Here, in
contrast to DOHSA’s comprehensive scope, the CFAA
is a criminal statute that creates a private right of
action. See 18 U.S.C. § 1030. It has a punitive purpose
and does not even speak to the issue of survival claims.
Id. Congress passed the CFAA after DOHSA, and if it
intended such claims to be allowed in conjunction with
a DOHSA claim, it would have said so. Like the Alien
Tort Statute, there is thus “no evidence that Congress
intended [CFAA] survival claims to remain viable”
upon application of DOHSA. Bowoto, 621 F.3d at 1124.8
The Court dismisses the Manfredi Plaintiffs’ ICFA and CFAA
claims because DOHSA preempts them. Nevertheless, those claims
are also meritless as pleaded. Mr. Manfredi was not a “consumer”
of the Boeing 737 MAX 8 aircraft, nor can he make a claim under
the “consumer nexus test.” Tile Unltd., Inc. v. Blanke Corp., 788 F.
Supp. 2d 734, 740 (N.D. Ill. 2011) (argument that consumer can
state a claim under ICFA because he or she ultimately used a
product has been “soundly, repeatedly, and correctly rejected”).
Their CFAA claim also suffers from a host of deficiencies, the most
egregious being that the CFAA specifically bars claims for
negligent design of a computer system, which is precisely what
the Manfredi Plaintiffs allege. 18 U.S.C. § 1030(g). Further, the
Manfredi Plaintiffs lack standing because only an entity which
suffered loss related to its computer system may state a claim
under the CFAA. Von Holdt v. A-1 Tool Corp., 714 F. Supp. 2d 863,
876 (N.D. Ill. 2010). And the Act prohibits only unauthorized
activities. See 18 U.S.C. § 1030(g). Here, the Manfredi Plaintiffs
allege that Boeing loaded the negligently designed MCAS
8
51a
The Court consequently concludes that the Plaintiffs’
other causes of action are preempted by DOHSA and
should be dismissed.
2. “Saving to Suitors” Clauses and Existence of
Diversity Do Not Preserve Right to a Jury
Trial for DOHSA Claims
Plaintiffs next argue that two “saving to suitors”
clauses preserve their right to a jury trial. First, they
argue that 28 U.S.C. § 1331(1), which allows a plaintiff
with a general maritime claim to pursue any other
remedies at law he might have, carries the right to a
jury trial into any suit in admiralty where the court
also sits in diversity. See Atl. & Gulf Stevedores, Inc. v.
Ellerman Lines, Ltd., 369 U.S. 355, 359-60, 82 S.Ct.
780, 7 L.Ed.2d 798 (1962) (“This suit [for breach of a
maritime contract] being in the federal courts by
reason of diversity of citizenship carried with it, of
course, the right to trial by jury.”). Plaintiffs cite many
general maritime cases for this argument. 9 However,
software on its own aircraft, which is obviously authorized, and
which does not affect Mr. Manfredi’s computer systems.
Lewis v. Lewis & Clark Marine, Inc., 531 U.S. 438, 455, 121
S.Ct. 993, 148 L.Ed.2d 931 (2001); Atl. & Gulf Stevedores, Inc. v.
Ellerman Lines, Ltd., 369 U.S. 355, 360, 82 S.Ct. 780, 7 L.Ed.2d
798 (1962); Wingerter v. Chester Quarry Co., 185 F.3d 657, 665 (7th
Cir. 1999); Bhd. Shipping Co. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins., 985
F.2d 323, 326 (7th Cir. 1993); Luera v. M/V Alberta, 635 F.3d 181,
188 (5th Cir. 2011); In re Lockheed Martin Corp., 503 F.3d 351,
354–55 (4th Cir. 2007); Ghotra ex rel. Ghotra v. Bandila Shipping,
Inc., 113 F.3d 1050, 1054–55 (9th Cir. 1997); Odeco Oil & Gas Co.,
Drilling Div. v. Bonnette, 74 F.3d 671, 674 (5th Cir. 1996); Coronel
v. Victory, 1 F. Supp. 3d 1175, 1181–82 (W.D. Wash. 2014);
Manrique v. Fagan, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 61794, at *24, 2009 WL
700999 (S.D. Fla. 2009); Sea-Land Serv., Inc. v. J & W Imp./Exp.,
Inc., 976 F. Supp. 327, 330 (D.N.J. 1997); Neal v. McGinnis, Inc.,
716 F. Supp. 996, 998-99 (E.D. Ky. 1989).
9
52a
none are applicable to a DOHSA case. A plaintiff in a
general maritime claim may have a right to a jury trial
for “suits at common law” under the Seventh Amendment
because § 1331(1) allows in personam maritime claims
to be brought “at law.” Congress, however, has explicitly
limited DOHSA to “a civil action in admiralty,” which
does not carry the right to a jury trial. Tallentire v.
Offshore Logistics, Inc., 800 F.2d 1390, 1391 (5th Cir.
1986) (on remand) (where the “sole predicate” for
liability is DOHSA, the plaintiff “is not entitled to a
jury trial”). As the Manfredi Plaintiffs’ brief acknowledges,
there is an exception to § 1331(1) for claims that can
only be brought in admiralty. See R. 1425 at 6 (citing 1
Schoenbaum § 4-4, pp. 239–40) (explaining that
§ 1331(1) does not apply to statutes where Congress
“has conferred exclusive admiralty jurisdiction upon
the federal courts.”). DOHSA, by its terms, is one of
those statutes. Friedman v. Mitsubishi Aircraft Int’l,
Inc., 678 F. Supp. 1064, 1066 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (“[S]ince
DOHSA provides a remedy in admiralty, admiralty
principles are applicable and a DOHSA plaintiff has
no right to a jury trial”); Favaloro v. S/S Golden Gate,
687 F. Supp. 475, 481 (N.D. Cal. 1987) (“DOHSA
actions, according to the terms of the statute, lie in
admiralty.... Therefore, plaintiffs are not entitled to a
jury under DOHSA.”).
Plaintiffs also argue that DOHSA’s § 7, its own
“saving to suitors clause,” which provides “[t]his
chapter does not affect the law of a state regulating the
right to recover for death,” preserves their right to a
jury trial. 46 U.S.C. § 30308(a). But the Supreme Court
has already decided the meaning of § 7 of DOHSA in
Tallentire. 477 U.S. at 232, 106 S.Ct. 2485. There, the
plaintiffs argued that a state wrongful death statute
was available to supplement recovery under DOHSA
because, they argued, state law applied to the high
53a
seas and was “saved” by Section 7 of DOHSA. The
Supreme Court held, however, that Section 7 of DOHSA
was only intended to provide concurrent jurisdiction to
state courts to adjudicate DOHSA claims. Id. It does
not, as Plaintiffs contend, allow state law causes of
action to be brought in federal court concurrently with
DOHSA, or allow Plaintiffs to invoke common law
jurisdiction. Id.
Plaintiffs argue that, under § 7 of DOHSA and
Tallentire, they could (and the Chandra Plaintiffs did)
bring their claims in Illinois state court. In state court,
they could potentially obtain a right to a trial by jury.
It would be inconsistent, they argue, to be deprived of
that right by accident of the case being removed to or
filed in federal court. They cite Cucuru v. Rose’s Oil
Serv., Inc., 441 Mass. 12, 802 N.E.2d 1032, 1035 (Mass.
2004), a case in which the Massachusetts Supreme
Court held that DOHSA’s § 7 gave the plaintiffs a jury
trial right in state court. But the Cucuru decision
turned on Massachusetts constitutional and procedural
law. Here, however, “federal procedural law controls
the question of whether there is a right to a jury trial”
in federal court. Int’l Fin. Servs. Corp. v. Chromas
Techs. Canada, Inc., 356 F.3d 731, 735 (7th Cir. 2004).
And federal procedural law holds that cases brought
in admiralty do not carry a right to a jury trial. See
Fed. R. Civ. P. 38 (e) (“These rules do not create a right
to a jury trial on issues in a claim that is an admiralty
or maritime claim”).
Plaintiffs also reason that this Court has concurrent
diversity jurisdiction over their claims, which means
their cases can be brought “at law” and they have a
right to a jury trial under the Seventh Amendment.
But the jury trial right turns not on whether the
parties for the DOHSA claim are diverse, but on
54a
whether another claim in diversity is being tried
concurrently with the DOHSA claim. Lasky, 850 F.
Supp. 2d at 1313. For example, the court in Friedman
addressed whether a plaintiff is entitled to a jury trial
on his or her DOHSA claims because the parties are
diverse and held that “[t]he existence of an additional
jurisdictional predicate in this case, i.e., diversity of
citizenship, can lead to no different result. Diversity of
citizenship creates only an additional basis for federal
jurisdiction; it does not enlarge the parameters of the
substantive remedy upon which a claim is based.” 678
F. Supp. at 1066 n.5; see also Lasky, 850 F. Supp. 2d at
1314–15 (holding in part that a plaintiff who brought
a death action under DOHSA was not entitled to a jury
trial notwithstanding the fact that there was diversity
of citizenship). Here, although the parties are diverse,
as discussed above, Plaintiffs’ only remaining claims
arise under DOHSA, which under its clear terms,
limits the claims to this Court’s admiralty jurisdiction.
3. The Presence of a Jury Demand Does Not
Necessitate a Trial by Jury
Finally, the Chandra Plaintiffs argue that they
made a jury demand in their complaint and that
Boeing, too, made a jury trial demand in its removal of
the case. Boeing responds that its jury demand was a
nullity and all Defendants assert that the Chandra
Plaintiffs’ jury demand is waived by virtue of their
invocation of this Court’s admiralty jurisdiction.
Defendants are correct that “there is no basis for” a
jury demand “to the extent that any other causes of
action ... are effectively preempted by DOHSA.” In re
Air Disaster v. Honolulu, Haw. on Feb. 24, 1989, 792 F.
Supp. at 1547; see also LaCourse v. Def. Support Servs.
LLC, No. 3:16cv170-RV/CJK, 2018 WL 7342153, at *2
(N.D. Fla. Oct. 31, 2018) (striking jury demand where
55a
plaintiff’s claims were preempted by DOHSA). A jury
demand by either party does not convert an admiralty
claim to a nonadmiralty claim. Wingerter v. Chester
Quarry Co., 185 F.3d 657, 668 (7th Cir. 1998). “In such
cases the district court should simply deny the
request.” Id. The Court does so here.
C. Certification of Jury
Interlocutory Appeal
Trial
Issue
for
For the reasons stated in the Court’s Opinion
granting Plaintiffs’ and Defendant Xtra’s motions for
certification entered herewith, R. 1489, the Court
certifies for immediate interlocutory appeal under 28
U.S.C. § 1292(b) the issue of Plaintiffs’ right to a jury
trial. Namely, the issue of “whether a plaintiff in
federal court is entitled to a jury trial under the
Seventh Amendment when the plaintiff’s sole claim
arises under DOHSA, and the plaintiff has a concurrent
basis for common law jurisdiction (such as diversity),”
R. 1489 at 5, “involves a controlling question of law as
to which there is substantial ground for difference of
opinion and ... an immediate appeal from the order
may materially advance the ultimate termination of
the litigation.” § 1292(b).
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Defendants’ motions,
R. 1399, 1401, are granted. All pre-death pain and
suffering, emotional distress, property damage, and
state and federal fraud claims in the Chandra and
Smith cases are dismissed. Both cases will be tried
exclusively under DOHSA. Because DOHSA mandates
the cases to be tried pursuant to the Court’s admiralty
jurisdiction, Defendants’ requests for bench trials in
each case are granted. The lone issue of Plaintiffs’
entitlement to a jury trial is certified for immediate
56a
interlocutory appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b).
Plaintiffs may take an appeal within ten days of entry
of this amended order. Id.
57a
APPENDIX D
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT,
N.D. ILLINOIS, EASTERN DIVISION
————
No. 18 C 07686
Case No. 19 C 01552,
Case No. 19 C 07091
————
IN RE LION AIR FLIGHT JT 610 CRASH
————
Signed December 20, 2022
————
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Thomas M. Durkin, United States District Judge
This consolidated action arises out of an aviation
accident involving a Boeing commercial jet which
crashed into the Java Sea off the coast of Indonesia,
resulting in the death of everyone on board. Defendants Boeing, Rockwell Collins, Inc., and Rosemount
Aerospace, Inc. (collectively, “Defendants”) filed motions
seeking the application of the Death on the High Seas
Act, 46 U.S.C. §§ 30301–08 (“DOHSA”) to the two
remaining actions, Chandra v. Boeing, case no. 19
C 01552, and Smith v. Boeing, case no. 19 C 07091.
R. 1399, 1401. Defendants also seek a ruling that the
application of DOHSA preempts all other causes
of action and mandates a bench trial in each case.
For the foregoing reasons, Defendants’ motions are
granted.
58a
Background
On October 29, 2018, Lion Air Flight JT 610 began
experiencing serious mechanical problems almost
immediately after takeoff from Jakarta, Indonesia.
R. 1391 ¶¶ 43, 44. The passengers on board the Boeing
737 MAX 8 experienced erratic movements and fluctuations in altitude due to a faulty automatic flight
control system called MCAS, which overrode the pilots
and attempted to turn the plane into a nosedive over
two dozen times. Id. at ¶¶ 4, 45. After a few minutes,
the plane headed out over the ocean, and approximately five minutes after that, the plane crashed into
the Java Sea at a high speed about 18 nautical miles
off the coast of Indonesia. See id. ¶ 46. There were no
survivors. Id. at ¶ 5.
The resulting litigation involved 87 individual
actions asserting wrongful death and other claims
arising out of the accident against Boeing and other
defendants on behalf of 186 decedents. All actions
were either filed in or removed to this Court and
eventually consolidated under the master docket, In
Re Lion Air Flight JT 610 Crash, 18 C 07686. Boeing
has now fully settled the claims of 184 decedents. The
remaining claims are those brought by the families
and representatives of two decedents: Liu Chandra,
an Indonesian businessman (Chandra v. Boeing, case
no. 19 C 01552); and Andrea Manfredi, an Italian
professional cyclist and entrepreneur (Smith v.
Boeing, case no. 19 C 07091). 1
At the time the instant motions were filed, another case was
also outstanding. See Sethi v. Boeing, case no. 20 C 01152. In that
case, the parties stipulated to the application of DOHSA and the
Court conducting a damages-only bench trial. See R. 1367. Prior
to trial, the case settled. R. 1457.
1
59a
The plaintiffs in the Chandra matter (the “Chandra
Plaintiffs”) originally filed suit in the Circuit Court
of Cook County, Illinois. See Chandra, No. 19 C 01552,
Dkt. 1. They allege wrongful death arising under
DOHSA and the Illinois Wrongful Death Act based
on theories of strict products liability, negligence,
and negligent failure to warn. See, e.g., R. 1391 at
pp. 15–24. They also make survival claims for property
damage and pre-death fear and injury. Id. Boeing
removed the case to this Court, citing the Multiparty,
Multiforum Trial Jurisdiction Act (“MMTJA”),
28 U.S.C. § 1369, and the Court's admiralty jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331(1). Chandra, No. 19
C 01552, Dkt. 1. In its removal paperwork, Boeing
included a jury demand. Id. The operative Third
Amended Complaint demands a jury trial and alleges
the Court has subject matter jurisdiction in diversity
and under the MMTJA and DOHSA. R. 1391 ¶¶ 16,
18–19; id. at p. 57.
Mr. Manfredi's family and the administrator of
Mr. Manfredi's estate, Laura Smith, (the “Manfredi
Plaintiffs”) filed suit in this Court, invoking its diversity jurisdiction. See Smith, No. 19 C 07091, Dkt. 1.
The operative Second Amended Complaint asserts
wrongful death and survival claims under theories
of strict products liability, negligence, and breach of
implied warranties. R. 1378 ¶¶ 201–320, 468–80, 489–
95. The Manfredi Plaintiffs also plead survival claims
of pre-death injury, negligent infliction of emotional
distress, and claims arising under various fraud
statutes, including the Illinois Consumer Fraud and
Deceptive Practices Act, 815 ILCS 505/1 (“ICFA”) and
the federal Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 18 U.S.C.
§ 1030 (“CFAA”). Id. They seek punitive damages and
demand a jury trial. See id. at pp. 4, 118–19.
60a
Defendants filed motions in each of the Chandra
and Smith cases, seeking the Court's determination
that DOHSA applies, preempts each set of Plaintiffs’
non-DOHSA claims, and mandates a bench trial. 2 See
R. 1399, 1400, 1401, 1402. The Chandra Plaintiffs do
not dispute that DOHSA governs their wrongful death
claims, but nonetheless insist that their survival
claims for property loss and pre-death injury are not
preempted by DOHSA and that they retain their right
to a jury trial. The Manfredi Plaintiffs dispute
DOHSA's application entirely and similarly argue
that even if it did apply, their survival claims for predeath injury and fraud are not preempted and that
they have the right to a jury trial. Though the parties
in the Chandra and Smith cases have informally
exchanged some discovery in furtherance of
settlement discussions, they have not engaged in
formal written or expert discovery.
Legal Standard
Defendants do not articulate a standard under
which the Court should decide their motions.
Defendants base their arguments on the pleadings,
however, they do cite to a public crash investigation
report by the Indonesian government (the “Report”).
See, e.g., R. 1400 at 7; R. 1438 at 8. The Manfredi
Plaintiffs, in turn, attach evidentiary material outside
the pleadings to their brief in opposition, argue for the
application of the summary judgment standard, and
request additional discovery under Rule 56(d). R.
1425-1 (attaching expert affidavit). Meanwhile, the
Chandra Plaintiffs argue for the application of the
Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss standard. R. 1422 at 3.
Defendant Xtra Aerospace LLC filed a response to the instant
motions stating that it takes no position. R. 1421.
2
61a
The Report cited by Defendants is a foreign
government report and a matter of public record, and
the Court may take judicial notice of it without
converting Defendants’ motions to ones for summary
judgment. Menominee Indian Tribe of Wis. v.
Thompson, 161 F.3d 449, 456 (7th Cir. 1998) (“Judicial
notice of historical documents, documents contained in
the public record, and reports of administrative bodies
is proper.”); see also Color Switch LLC v. Fortafy
Games DMCC, 377 F. Supp. 3d 1075, 1089 n.6 (E.D.
Cal. 2019) (taking judicial notice of Canadian
government report). The fact that a plaintiff attaches
evidentiary materials outside the pleadings to its brief
does not convert a defendant's motion to a summary
judgment motion. Thompson v. Illinois Dept. of Prof’l
Regulation, 300 F.3d 750, 754 (7th Cir. 2002).
Furthermore, it is within this Court’s discretion to
handle this motion as a straightforward motion to
dismiss, especially where early resolution of an issue,
like the application of DOHSA, would streamline the
case. Levenstein v. Salafsky, 164 F.3d 345, 347 (7th
Cir. 1998) (holding that it was within the district
court's discretion to treat motion as motion to dismiss
where judgment on qualified immunity should be
decided as early in the case as possible).
Thus, the Court will construe Defendants’ motions
under the Rule 12(b)(6) standard to decide the
application of DOHSA as a matter of law on the face of
the pleadings. A Rule 12(b)(6) motion challenges the
“sufficiency of the complaint.” Berger v. Nat. Collegiate
Athletic Assoc., 843 F.3d 285, 289 (7th Cir. 2016). In
applying this standard, the Court accepts all wellpleaded facts as true and draws all reasonable
inferences in favor of the non-moving party. Tobey v.
Chibucos, 890 F.3d 634, 646 (7th Cir. 2018).
62a
Discussion
A. DOHSA Applies to the Smith (Manfredi) Action.
Though the Chandra Plaintiffs do not dispute
DOHSA’s application to their wrongful death claims,
the Manfredi Plaintiffs do. DOHSA is the source of law
for deaths resulting from wrongful acts, neglect, or
default on the high seas more than three (or in a
commercial aviation accident, twelve) nautical miles
from the shore of the United States. 46 U.S.C.
§§ 30302, 30307. The Supreme Court has consistently
applied DOHSA to aviation accidents occurring on the
high seas, like the crash which occurred here. See
Dooley v. Korean Air Lines Co., Ltd., 524 U.S. 116, 118
S.Ct. 1890, 141 L.Ed.2d 102 (1998); Zicherman v.
Korean Air Lines Co., Ltd., 516 U.S. 217, 116 S.Ct. 629,
133 L.Ed.2d 596 (1996); Offshore Logistics v.
Tallentire, 477 U.S. 207, 106 S.Ct. 2485, 91 L.Ed.2d
174 (1986); Mobil Oil Corp. v. Higginbotham, 436 U.S.
618, 98 S.Ct. 2010, 56 L.Ed.2d 581 (1978); Exec. Jet
Aviation, Inc. v. City of Cleveland, 409 U.S. 249, 263–
64, 93 S.Ct. 493, 34 L.Ed.2d 454 (1972) (“[I]t may be
considered as settled today that [DOHSA] gives the
federal admiralty courts jurisdiction of such wrongfuldeath actions” based on aircraft crashes into the high
seas); see also 46 U.S.C. § 30307 (section of DOHSA
governing commercial aviation accidents on the high
seas). 3
The weight of the case law in other circuits is that
when a plaintiff is fatally injured over the high seas,
DOHSA applies. LaCourse v. PAE Worldwide Inc., 980
Cases interpreting and applying DOHSA are virtually nonexistent in this Circuit. Where there is no binding law from the
Supreme Court or the Seventh Circuit, this Court considers the
persuasive case law of other circuits.
3
63a
F.3d 1350, 1357 (11th Cir. 2020) (“Where a death
occurs on the high seas, DOHSA applies, full stop.”);
Bergen v. F/V St. Patrick, 816 F.2d 1345, 1348 (9th
Cir. 1987); Kennedy v. Carnival Corp., 385 F. Supp. 3d
1302, 1316 (S.D. Fla. 2019) (DOHSA applies where
“the injury that led to the Decedent's death occurred
in the water); see also Sea-Land Servs., Inc. v. Gaudet,
414 U.S. 573, 599–600 and n.5, 94 S.Ct. 806, 39
L.Ed.2d 9 (1974) (J. Powell, dissenting on other
grounds) (DOHSA “by its terms covers deaths caused
by injuries inflicted at sea, not simply deaths occurring
on the high seas.”).
Citing Motts v. M/V Green Wave, a case in which the
Fifth Circuit held that DOHSA applied when the
injury occurred on the high seas but the prior
negligence and the later death occurred onshore, the
Manfredi Plaintiffs argue that the Court should
instead consider the location of where the negligence
is consummated into a “first” injury in determining
whether DOHSA applies. 210 F.3d 565, 569–71 (5th
Cir. 2000). Their argument is that Mr. Manfredi was
first injured during the period that the flight was over
land—they allege he suffered, at a minimum,
emotional distress—and this prevents the application
of DOHSA. But the Motts court specifically held that
the proper test is to “look to the location of the accident
in determining whether DOHSA applies.” Id. at 571.
The Manfredi Plaintiffs can point to no other case law
which adopts their “first injury” test. Therefore, the
situs of a pre-death but non-fatal injury does not
matter.
The Manfredi Plaintiffs’ argument that over half of
the flight occurred over land similarly fails. LaCourse,
980 F.3d at 1357 (aviation accident was governed by
DOHSA even where the flight was scheduled almost
64a
entirely over land and only crashed during the short
time when it was “fortuitously” over water). Their
argument that Defendants’ negligence occurred on
land also fails. Id. at 1356; In re Dearborn Marine
Serv., Inc., 499 F.2d 263, 272 n.17 (5th Cir. 1974)
(“DOHSA has been construed to confer admiralty
jurisdiction over claims arising out of airplane crashes
on the high seas though the negligence alleged to have
caused the crash occurred on land.”).
Even so, the Manfredi Plaintiffs argue that it is too
early at this juncture to determine where the fatal
injury occurred, whether over land or sea. They
maintain that because no discovery has occurred, the
record does not show when Mr. Manfredi was fatally
injured during the fated flight path. For example, they
propose for the first time that Mr. Manfredi may have
died over land from a heart attack due to his emotional
distress, from extreme G-forces breaking his neck or
causing brain injury during the plane's erratic
movements, or from a piece of baggage flying out of an
overhead compartment. Citing Bernard v. World
Learning, Inc., the Manfredi Plaintiffs contend that
this is a “metaphysical” factual question on which the
Court should not speculate without discovery. No. 0920309-CIV, 2010 WL 11505188, at *8 (S.D. Fla. June
4, 2010). But the Bernard court simply held that the
defendant was not entitled to summary judgment on
the application of DOHSA because there were genuine
evidentiary disputes regarding whether the decedent
was mortally injured on land or sea. Id. (detailing the
parties’ dispute over whether the decedent died while
swimming in the ocean or on land as a result of a
landslide and was then pushed out to sea).
Here, the Court agrees it should not speculate or
weigh evidence on the location of Mr. Manfredi's death
65a
in deciding a 12(b)(6) motion, but instead takes the
facts alleged as true. The Manfredi Plaintiffs’ own
Complaint does not state that Mr. Manfredi died prior
to impact or as a result of the plane's erratic
movements over land. Rather, it specifically alleges
that Mr. Manfredi died when the aircraft crashed into
the ocean. See, e.g., R. 1378 ¶ 149–153 (describing predeath terror prior to crash into the water); 229, 246,
265, 278, 290, 309, 351, 368, 387, 400, 412, 431, 442,
486, 502 (all paragraphs alleging that Mr. Manfredi
“was able to perceive, process, understand and react to
the impact of the aircraft with the ocean.”). Based on
the pleadings, Mr. Manfredi suffered his fatal injury
on the high seas, and thus DOHSA applies. 4 Because
The Manfredi Plaintiffs request leave to amend their
Complaint to allege alternative theories of death which include
their new land-based scenarios. “The court should freely give
leave to amend ... [u]nless it is certain from the face of the
complaint that any amendment would be futile or otherwise
unwarranted.” Runnion ex rel. Runnion v. Girl Scouts of Greater
Chicago & Nw. Indiana, 786 F.3d 510, 519–20 (7th Cir. 2015)
(cleaned up). An amendment is futile when it “fails to state a valid
theory of liability” or “could not withstand a motion to dismiss.”
Bower v. Jones, 978 F.2d 1004, 1008 (7th Cir. 1992). Defendants
argue that amendment would be futile because the Indonesian
Report demonstrates that the Manfredi Plaintiffs’ speculated
scenarios are very unlikely. For example, the transcript of the
Cockpit Voice Recorder shows that the captain and co-captain
were alive and still conversing until less than 30 seconds before
the crash. See Komite Nasional Keselamatan Transportasi
Republic of Indonesia, Final Aircraft Investigation Report (2019),
https://bit.ly/3xL7Ll5 at 85. While the report makes the Manfredi
Plaintiffs’ new theories improbable, it does not foreclose them
entirely—the report does not discuss what may have happened to
any passengers in the main cabin. So long as the Manfredi
Plaintiffs have “evidentiary support or ... will likely have
evidentiary support after a reasonable opportunity for further
investigation or discovery” for any new allegations, Fed. R. Civ. P.
11(b), they are granted leave to amend their complaint, keeping
4
66a
DOHSA applies to the Smith and Chandra cases as
pleaded, the Court will determine whether it preempts
Plaintiffs’ other claims and whether it forecloses their
right to a jury trial.
B. Plaintiffs’ Non-DOHSA Claims Are Preempted,
and Plaintiffs Are Not Entitled to a Jury Trial.
Defendants argue that DOHSA acts to preempt
Plaintiffs’ other claims against them, and that Plaintiffs
do not have a right to a trial by jury because DOHSA
is a claim in admiralty. DOHSA provides that where a
death occurs on the high seas as the result of
negligence or wrongdoing, the decedent's spouse,
parent, child, or dependent relative “may bring a civil
action in admiralty” against the wrongdoer. Id. §
30302. DOHSA allows recovery of pecuniary and nonpecuniary damages exclusively for those relatives, but
explicitly forbids punitive damages. Id. § 30307. If a
person is injured on the high seas and dies while he or
she has a civil action pending to recover for those
injuries, “the personal representative of the decedent
may be substituted as the plaintiff” and the action
proceeds under the provisions of DOHSA. Id. at
§ 30305.
The Seventh Amendment does not require jury
trials in cases brought in admiralty. Fitzgerald v. U.S.
Lines Co., 374 U.S. 16, 20, 83 S.Ct. 1646, 10 L.Ed.2d
720 (1963) (citing Waring v. Clarke, 46 U.S. 5 How.
441, 12 L.Ed. 226 (1847)); Fed. R. Civ. P. 38(e).
Nevertheless, jury trials in admiralty are not
forbidden. Fitzgerald, 374 U.S. at 20, 83 S.Ct. 1646.
in mind that they may be subject to sanctions if their pleading
does not comply with the requirements of Rule 11.
67a
While the case law is murky and often conflicting, 5 it
appears that a plaintiff's jury demand in a DOHSA
case may be granted in two instances: (1) where the
plaintiff asserts a non-preempted claim in addition to
the DOHSA claim that carries a right to a jury trial;
or (2) where, “in addition to asserting a DOHSA claim,
a plaintiff also asserts another claim that does not
necessarily entitle her to a jury trial, but that invokes
the court's diversity jurisdiction.” Lasky v. Royal
Caribbean Cruises, Ltd., 850 F. Supp. 2d 1309, 1313
(S.D. Fla. 2012) (collecting cases).
1. DOHSA Preempts Plaintiffs’ Survival Actions
First, both Plaintiffs argue that they plead nonpreempted claims which grant them a right to a jury
trial. Defendants, however, argue that DOHSA
preempts Plaintiffs’ other claims against them. These
are their wrongful death claims under Illinois law,
their pre-death injury and emotional distress claims,
the Chandra Plaintiffs’ claims for property damage,
and the Manfredi Plaintiffs’ claims under the ICFA
and CFAA.
We start with the principle that where DOHSA
applies, it is generally the exclusive source of law and
preempts all other state wrongful death claims. See
generally Tallentire, 477 U.S. 207, 106 S.Ct. 2485, 91
L.Ed.2d 174. 6 The Supreme Court in Dooley has also
held that survival claims for pre-death pain and
suffering, like those sought by Plaintiffs, are
preempted by the application of DOHSA. 524 U.S. at
Indeed, the Supreme Court has described as “tortuous” the
development of the law as it pertains to wrongful death claims in
the maritime context. Tallentire, 477 U.S. at 212, 106 S.Ct. 2485.
5
The Chandra Plaintiffs accordingly concede that their wrongful
death claim under Illinois law is preempted. R. 1422 at 3.
6
68a
124, 118 S.Ct. 1890. Without deciding whether
survival claims may ever be brought in DOHSA cases,
the Court explained:
DOHSA expresses Congress’ judgment that there
should be no [pre-death pain and suffering] cause
of action in cases of death on the high seas. By
authorizing only certain surviving relatives
to recover damages, and by limiting damages
to the pecuniary losses sustained by those
relatives, Congress provided the exclusive
recovery for deaths that occur on the high
seas. [Allowing such a] survival action would
necessarily expand the class of beneficiaries in
cases of death on the high seas by permitting
decedents’ estates (and their various beneficiaries) to recover compensation. [It also] would
expand the recoverable damages for deaths on the
high seas by permitting the recovery of nonpecuniary losses.... Because Congress has already
decided these issues, it has precluded the judiciary
from enlarging either the class of beneficiaries
or the recoverable damages. As we noted in
Higginbotham, ‘Congress did not limit DOHSA
beneficiaries to recovery of their pecuniary losses in
order to encourage the creation of nonpecuniary
supplements.’ ... The comprehensive scope of
DOHSA is confirmed by its survival provision, ...
which limits the recovery in such cases to the
pecuniary losses suffered by surviving relatives.
The Act thus expresses Congress’ ‘considered
judgment,’ on the availability and contours of a
survival action in cases of death on the high seas.
Id. (quoting Higginbotham, 436 U.S. at 625, 98 S.Ct.
2010) (emphasis added). The Court also noted that the
Jones Act, which Congress adopted the same year as
69a
DOHSA and which permits seamen injured in the
course of their employment to recover damages for
their injuries, has a specific provision allowing a
survival action for pre-death injury. The Court
consequently reasoned that Congress was “certainly
familiar” with language which would permit a survival
cause of action, and that it likely made a conscious
decision not to include a similar provision in DOHSA.
Dooley, 524 U.S. at 124, 118 S.Ct. 1890. In short,
“Congress has spoken on the availability of a survival
action, the losses to be recovered, and the
beneficiaries, in cases of death on the high seas,” and
generally, other survival actions are preempted. Id. at
123–24, 118 S.Ct. 1890.
Plaintiffs argue that the Supreme Court's holding in
Dooley does not apply to their pre-death pain and
suffering claims, because some of Mr. Chandra's and
Mr. Manfredi's injuries occurred while the plane was
over land. They cite Evans v. John Crane, Inc., C.A.
No. 15-681 (MN) (D. Del. Oct. 24, 2019) and Hays v.
John Crane, Inc., Case No. 09-81881-CIV-KAM, 2014
WL 10658453 (S.D. Fla. Oct. 9, 2014), two cases in
which the decedents died from asbestos exposure
which occurred cumulatively over land and sea.
However, these cases are distinguishable—they are
“indivisible injury” cases where the fatal injury
occurred over many years and partially over land.
Plaintiffs here do not allege the decedents suffered
“indivisible” fatal injuries (like asbestos exposure)
over land and sea.
DOHSA similarly preempts the Chandra Plaintiffs’
property damage claim and the Manfredi Plaintiffs’
ICFA and CFAA claims. Though the Supreme Court
has never directly addressed whether all other
survival claims arising out of a death on the high seas
70a
are preempted by DOHSA, its dicta is instructive. See,
e.g., Tallentire, 477 U.S. at 232, 106 S.Ct. 2485. (“[T]he
conclusion that the state statutes are pre-empted by
DOHSA where it applies is inevitable.”). It is clear,
then, that a survival claim for damages to the estate
arising out of a death on the high seas will not lie,
absent a clear indication from Congress to the
contrary. Courts around the country have agreed. 7 See
Bowoto v. Chevron Corp., 621 F.3d 1116, 1124 (9th Cir.
2010); Jacobs v. N. King Shipping Co., 180 F.3d 713,
717 (5th Cir. 1999); In re Air Disaster Near Honolulu,
Haw. on Feb. 24, 1989, 792 F. Supp. 1541 (N.D. Cal.
1990) (DOHSA provides only pecuniary damages to
surviving dependents and precludes the availability of
non-pecuniary damages under either general maritime
law or state law, regardless of whether asserted as
part of a wrongful death action or as a survival action);
Heath v. Am. Sail Training Ass'n, 644 F. Supp. 1459,
1471–72 (D.R.I. 1986).
Plaintiffs contend that broad DOHSA preemption
could lead to absurd results. For example, the
Chandra Plaintiffs claim it would be unjust for
DOHSA to preempt an estate from obtaining damages
for a pre-accident assault at the airport. But DOHSA's
preemption of claims arising out of incidents
unconnected to the fatal accident is not at issue here.
Their citation of Ostrowiecki v. Aggressor Fleet, Ltd.
The few cases which have allowed survivor claims to be
brought concurrently with a DOHSA claim were decided preDooley and were brought under the Jones Act, which was
designed to “work together” with DOHSA, and the Warsaw
Convention. See Peace v. Fidalgo Island Packing Co., 419 F.2d 371,
372 (9th Cir. 1969); In re Korean Air Lines Disaster, 704 F. Supp.
1135, 1152–53 (D.D.C. 1988); Tozer v. LTV Corp., 1983 WL 705, at
*7 (D. Md. May 27, 1983). Neither the Chandra nor the Manfredi
Plaintiffs plead such claims.
7
71a
is similarly inapposite, because the emotional distress
in that case was not preempted because it was
“predicated on entirely different acts of defendants
from those which allegedly caused [the decedent's]
death.” Nos. 07-6598, 07-6931, 2008 WL 3874609, at
*5–6 (E.D. La. Aug. 15, 2008).
The Manfredi Plaintiffs also argue that the CFAA is
a federal statute and that federal statutes cannot
preempt each other. However, the Ninth Circuit, in
deciding that DOHSA preempted survival claims
under the federal Alien Tort Statute, explained that
“Dooley ... held that DOHSA preempts all survival
claims for deaths on the high seas unless there is clear
indication that Congress intended otherwise.” Bowoto,
621 F.3d at 1124 (emphasis in original). Here, in
contrast to DOHSA’s comprehensive scope, the CFAA
is a criminal statute that creates a private right of
action. See 18 U.S.C. § 1030. It has a punitive purpose
and does not even speak to the issue of survival claims.
Id. Congress passed the CFAA after DOHSA, and if it
intended such claims to be allowed in conjunction with
a DOHSA claim, it would have said so. Like the Alien
Tort Statute, there is thus “no evidence that Congress
intended [CFAA] survival claims to remain viable”
upon application of DOHSA. Bowoto, 621 F.3d at
1124. 8
The Court dismisses the Manfredi Plaintiffs’ ICFA and CFAA
claims because DOHSA preempts them. Nevertheless, those
claims are also meritless as pleaded. Mr. Manfredi was not a
“consumer” of the Boeing 737 MAX 8 aircraft, nor can he make a
claim under the “consumer nexus test.” Tile Unltd., Inc. v. Blanke
Corp., 788 F. Supp. 2d 734, 740 (N.D. Ill. 2011) (argument that
consumer can state a claim under ICFA because he or she
ultimately used a product has been “soundly, repeatedly, and
correctly rejected”). Their CFAA claim also suffers from a host of
deficiencies, the most egregious being that the CFAA specifically
8
72a
The Court consequently concludes that the Plaintiffs’
other causes of action are preempted by DOHSA and
should be dismissed.
2. “Saving to Suitors” Clauses and Existence of
Diversity Do Not Preserve Right to a Jury
Trial for DOHSA Claims
Plaintiffs next argue that two “saving to suitors”
clauses preserve their right to a jury trial. First, they
argue that 28 U.S.C. § 1331(1), which allows a plaintiff
with a general maritime claim to pursue any other
remedies at law he might have, carries the right to a
jury trial into any suit in admiralty where the court
also sits in diversity. See Atl. & Gulf Stevedores, Inc.
v. Ellerman Lines, Ltd., 369 U.S. 355, 359–60, 82 S.Ct.
780, 7 L.Ed.2d 798 (1962) (“This suit [for breach of a
maritime contract] being in the federal courts by
reason of diversity of citizenship carried with it, of
course, the right to trial by jury.”). Plaintiffs cite many
general maritime cases for this argument. 9 However,
bars claims for negligent design of a computer system, which is
precisely what the Manfredi Plaintiffs allege. 18 U.S.C. § 1030(g).
Further, the Manfredi Plaintiffs lack standing because only an
entity which suffered loss related to its computer system may
state a claim under the CFAA. Von Holdt v. A-1 Tool Corp., 714 F.
Supp. 2d 863, 876 (N.D. Ill. 2010). And the Act prohibits only
unauthorized activities. See 18 U.S.C. § 1030(g). Here, the
Manfredi Plaintiffs allege that Boeing loaded the negligently
designed MCAS software on its own aircraft, which is obviously
authorized, and which does not affect Mr. Manfredi's computer
systems.
Lewis v. Lewis & Clark Marine, Inc., 531 U.S. 438, 455, 121
S.Ct. 993, 148 L.Ed.2d 931 (2001); Atl. & Gulf Stevedores, Inc. v.
Ellerman Lines, Ltd., 369 U.S. 355, 360, 82 S.Ct. 780, 7 L.Ed.2d
798 (1962); Wingerter v. Chester Quarry Co., 185 F.3d 657, 665 (7th
Cir. 1999); Bhd. Shipping Co. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins., 985
F.2d 323, 326 (7th Cir. 1993); Luera v. M/V Alberta, 635 F.3d 181,
9
73a
none are applicable to a DOHSA case. A plaintiff in a
general maritime claim may have a right to a jury
trial for “suits at common law” under the Seventh
Amendment because § 1331(1) allows in personam
maritime claims to be brought “at law.” Congress,
however, has explicitly limited DOHSA to “a civil
action in admiralty,” which does not carry the right to
a jury trial. Tallentire v. Offshore Logistics, Inc., 800
F.2d 1390, 1391 (5th Cir. 1986) (on remand) (where the
“sole predicate” for liability is DOHSA, the plaintiff “is
not entitled to a jury trial”). As the Manfredi Plaintiffs’
brief acknowledges, there is an exception to § 1331(1)
for claims that can only be brought in admiralty. See
R. 1425 at 6 (citing 1 Schoenbaum § 4-4, pp. 239–40)
(explaining that § 1331(1) does not apply to statutes
where Congress “has conferred exclusive admiralty
jurisdiction upon the federal courts.”). DOHSA, by its
terms, is one of those statutes. Friedman v. Mitsubishi
Aircraft Int’l, Inc., 678 F. Supp. 1064, 1066 (S.D.N.Y.
1988) (“[S]ince DOHSA provides a remedy in admiralty,
admiralty principles are applicable and a DOHSA
plaintiff has no right to a jury trial”); Favaloro v. S/S
Golden Gate, 687 F. Supp. 475, 481 (N.D. Cal. 1987)
(“DOHSA actions, according to the terms of the
statute, lie in admiralty.... Therefore, plaintiffs are not
entitled to a jury under DOHSA.”).
188 (5th Cir. 2011); In re Lockheed Martin Corp., 503 F.3d 351,
354–55 (4th Cir. 2007); Ghotra ex rel. Ghotra v. Bandila Shipping,
Inc., 113 F.3d 1050, 1054–55 (9th Cir. 1997); Odeco Oil & Gas Co.,
Drilling Div. v. Bonnette, 74 F.3d 671, 674 (5th Cir. 1996); Coronel
v. Victory, 1 F. Supp. 3d 1175, 1181–82 (W.D. Wash. 2014);
Manrique v. Fagan, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 61794, at *24, 2009 WL
700999 (S.D. Fla. 2009); Sea-Land Serv., Inc. v. J & W Imp./Exp.,
Inc., 976 F. Supp. 327, 330 (D.N.J. 1997); Neal v. McGinnis, Inc.,
716 F. Supp. 996, 998-99 (E.D. Ky. 1989).
74a
Plaintiffs also argue that DOHSA’s § 7, its own
“saving to suitors clause,” which provides “[t]his
chapter does not affect the law of a state regulating
the right to recover for death,” preserves their right to
a jury trial. 46 U.S.C. § 30308(a). But the Supreme
Court has already decided the meaning of § 7 of
DOHSA in Tallentire. 477 U.S. at 232, 106 S.Ct. 2485.
There, the plaintiffs argued that a state wrongful
death statute was available to supplement recovery
under DOHSA because, they argued, state law applied
to the high seas and was “saved” by Section 7 of
DOHSA. The Supreme Court held, however, that
Section 7 of DOHSA was only intended to provide
concurrent jurisdiction to state courts to adjudicate
DOHSA claims. Id. It does not, as Plaintiffs contend,
allow state law causes of action to be brought in
federal court concurrently with DOHSA, or allow
Plaintiffs to invoke common law jurisdiction. Id.
Plaintiffs argue that, under § 7 of DOHSA and
Tallentire, they could (and the Chandra Plaintiffs did)
bring their claims in Illinois state court. In state court,
they could potentially obtain a right to a trial by jury.
It would be inconsistent, they argue, to be deprived of
that right by accident of the case being removed to or
filed in federal court. They cite Cucuru v. Rose's Oil
Serv., Inc., 441 Mass. 12, 802 N.E.2d 1032, 1035
(Mass. 2004), a case in which the Massachusetts
Supreme Court held that DOHSA's § 7 gave the
plaintiffs a jury trial right in state court. But the
Cucuru decision turned on Massachusetts constitutional
and procedural law. Here, however, “federal procedural
law controls the question of whether there is a right to
a jury trial” in federal court. Int'l Fin. Servs. Corp. v.
Chromas Techs. Canada, Inc., 356 F.3d 731, 735 (7th
Cir. 2004). And federal procedural law holds that cases
brought in admiralty do not carry a right to a jury
75a
trial. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 38 (e) (“These rules do not
create a right to a jury trial on issues in a claim that
is an admiralty or maritime claim....”).
Plaintiffs also reason that this Court has concurrent
diversity jurisdiction over their claims, which means
their cases can be brought “at law” and they have a
right to a jury trial under the Seventh Amendment.
But the jury trial right turns not on whether the
parties for the DOHSA claim are diverse, but on
whether another claim in diversity is being tried
concurrently with the DOHSA claim. Lasky, 850 F.
Supp. 2d at 1313. For example, the court in Friedman
addressed whether a plaintiff is entitled to a jury trial
on his or her DOHSA claims because the parties are
diverse and held that “[t]he existence of an additional
jurisdictional predicate in this case, i.e., diversity of
citizenship, can lead to no different result.... Diversity
of citizenship creates only an additional basis for
federal jurisdiction; it does not enlarge the parameters
of the substantive remedy upon which a claim is
based.” 678 F. Supp. at 1066 n.5; see also Lasky, 850
F. Supp. 2d at 1314-15 (holding in part that a plaintiff
who brought a death action under DOHSA was not
entitled to a jury trial notwithstanding the fact that
there was diversity of citizenship). Here, although the
parties are diverse, as discussed above, Plaintiffs’ only
remaining claims arise under DOHSA, which under
its clear terms, limits the claims to this Court's
admiralty jurisdiction.
3. The Presence of a Jury Demand Does Not
Necessitate a Trial by Jury
Finally, the Chandra Plaintiffs argue that they
made a jury demand in their complaint and that
Boeing, too, made a jury trial demand in its removal of
the case. Boeing responds that its jury demand was a
76a
nullity and all Defendants assert that the Chandra
Plaintiffs’ jury demand is waived by virtue of their
invocation of this Court's admiralty jurisdiction.
Defendants are correct that “there is no basis for” a
jury demand “to the extent that any other causes of
action ... are effectively preempted by DOHSA.” In re
Air Disaster v. Honolulu, Haw. on Feb. 24, 1989, 792
F. Supp. at 1547; see also LaCourse v. Def. Support
Servs. LLC, No. 3:16cv170-RV/CJK, 2018 WL
7342153, at *2 (N.D. Fla. Oct. 31, 2018) (striking jury
demand where plaintiff's claims were preempted by
DOHSA). A jury demand by either party does not
convert an admiralty claim to a nonadmiralty claim.
Wingerter v. Chester Quarry Co., 185 F.3d 657, 668
(7th Cir. 1998). “In such cases the district court should
simply deny the request.” Id. The Court does so here.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Defendants’ motions, R.
1399, 1401, are granted. All pre-death pain and
suffering, emotional distress, property damage, and
state and federal fraud claims in the Chandra and
Smith cases are dismissed. Both cases will be tried
exclusively under DOHSA. Because DOHSA mandates
the cases to be tried pursuant to the Court’s admiralty
jurisdiction, Defendants’ requests for bench trials in
each case are granted. Should either of the Plaintiffs
decide they want to amend their complaint, they
should submit a proposed amended complaint with a
redline showing any changes and a memorandum of
less than five pages explaining those changes and why
they cure the deficiencies identified in this Opinion
within 21 days of this Order.
77a
APPENDIX E
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT
Chicago, Illinois 60604
————
September 10, 2024
Before
KENNETH F. RIPPLE, Circuit Judge
MICHAEL B. BRENNAN, Circuit Judge
CANDACE JACKSON-AKIWUMI, Circuit Judge
————
No. 23-2358
No. 1:18-cv-07686
(Consolidated with No. 1:19-cv-07091 and
No. 19-cv-01552)
————
IN RE: LION AIR FLIGHT JT 610 CRASH
LAURA SMITH, as duly appointed representative and
Independent Administrator of the ESTATE OF
ANDREA MANFREDI, deceased, et al.,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v.
THE BOEING COMPANY, et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
————
Thomas M. Durkin,
Judge.
————
78a
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.
————
ORDER
On consideration of the Petition for Rehearing or
Rehearing En Banc, filed by the Manfredi PlaintiffsAppellants on August 20, 2024, no judge in active
service has requested a vote on the petition for
rehearing en banc, and all judges on the original panel
have voted to DENY the petition for rehearing 1.
Accordingly, the petition for rehearing or rehearing
en banc filed by the Manfredi Plaintiffs-Appellants is
DENIED.
Circuit Judge Thomas L. Kirsch and Circuit Judge John Z.
Lee did not participate in the consideration of this petition.
1
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.