Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Laura Smith, as Duly Appointed Representative and Independent Administrator of the Estate of Andrea Manfredi, Deceased, et al., Petitioners v. The Boeing Company, et al.

No. 24IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

___________

LAURA SMITH, as Duly Appointed Representative

of the Estate of Andrea Manfredi, et al.,

Petitioners,

v.

THE BOEING CO., et al.,

Respondents.

___________

On Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the United

States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit

___________

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

___________

TOBIAS S. LOSS-EATON

DANIELLE HAMILTON

THE CARTER G. PHILLIPS/

SIDLEY AUSTIN LLP

SUPREME COURT CLINIC

NORTHWESTERN PRITZKER

SCHOOL OF LAW

375 East Chicago Avenue

Chicago, IL 60611

JOHN HILLSMAN

MCGUINN, HILLSMAN &

PALEFSKY

535 Pacific Avenue

San Francisco, CA 94133

JEFFREY T. GREEN

Counsel of Record

GREEN LAUERMAN

CHARTERED P.L.L.C.

1050 30th Street NW

Washington, D.C. 20007

(240) 286-5686

jeff@glclaw.net

FILIPPO MARCHINO

THOMAS E. GRAY

THE X-LAW GROUP, P.C.

625 Fair Oaks Ave. #390

South Pasadena, CA 91030

MICHAEL F. STURLEY

727 East Dean Keeton St.

Austin, TX 78705

February 5, 2025

Counsel for Petitioners

i

QUESTION PRESENTED

This wrongful-death case, arising out of the tragic

Boeing 737 MAX crash into the Java Sea, raises a fundamental question of admiralty jurisdiction.

The estate and family of Andrea Manfredi, who died

in the crash, brought in personam wrongful-death

claims against Boeing and others under the Death on

the High Seas Act (DOHSA), 46 U.S.C. §§ 30301–

30308. These claims can be heard in admiralty, but

they also satisfy the requirements for diversity and

multiparty, multiforum jurisdiction. “If a claim for relief is within the admiralty or maritime jurisdiction

and also within the court’s subject-matter jurisdiction

on some other ground, the pleading may”—but need

not—“designate the claim as an admiralty or maritime

claim.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(h). The Manfredis did not so

designate their claims.

The Seventh Circuit nevertheless held that these

DOHSA claims are subject to exclusive admiralty jurisdiction in federal court, meaning no jury-trial right

applies. The court so held despite recognizing that the

same claims could be heard in state court, where they

“are typically tried by juries.” The question presented

is:

Whether a federal court can have exclusive admiralty jurisdiction over a claim when a non-admiralty

state court would have concurrent jurisdiction over the

same claim.

ii

PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING

Petitioners are Laura Smith, the duly-appointed

personal representative of the estate of Andrea

Manfredi, and Maurizo Manfredi, Sonia Lorenzoni,

and Linda Manfredi.

Respondents are The Boeing Company, Boeing International Sales Corporation, Boeing Domestic Sales

Corporation, Boeing Sales Corporation, Boeing Financial Corporation, Rockwell Collins, Inc., Rosemount

Aerospace, Inc., and Xtra Aerospace, LLC.

The family and representative of the estate of Liu

Chandra brought a related wrongful-death action in

state court, which Boeing removed to the Northern

District of Illinois. The Chandra plaintiffs’ appeal was

consolidated with the Manfredis’ appeal before the

Seventh Circuit, but they have since settled their

claims in principle and are not parties to this case.

RULE 14.1(b)(iii) STATEMENT

This case arises from the following proceedings in

the Northern District of Illinois and the Seventh Circuit:

In re Lion Air Flight JT 610 Crash, Nos. 18-cv-7686,

19-cv-1552, 19-cv-7091 (N.D. Ill.); and

In re Lion Air Flight JT 610 Crash, Nos. 23-2358, 232359 (7th Cir.).

No other proceedings in state or federal trial or appellate courts, or in this Court, directly relate to this case.

iii

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

Question presented ....................................................... i

Parties to the proceeding ............................................. ii

Rule 14.1(b)(iii) statement........................................... ii

Table of authorities...................................................... v

Petition for a writ of certiorari .................................... 1

Opinions below ............................................................. 1

Jurisdiction .................................................................. 1

Pertinent statutory provisions and rules.................... 1

Introduction ................................................................. 3

Statement of the case .................................................. 5

A. Factual background. ......................................... 5

B. Admiralty jurisdiction background. ................. 6

C. DOHSA background.......................................... 9

D. Procedural history. .......................................... 10

Reasons for granting the petition ............................. 13

I. The “anomal[ous]” decision below creates a

split on the meaning of exclusive admiralty

jurisdiction. ........................................................... 13

II. The decision below is wrong................................. 18

III. This case provides an ideal vehicle to decide

this important issue. ............................................ 22

Conclusion .................................................................. 24

Appendices

iv

Appendix A: Opinion, In re Lion Air Flight

JT610 Crash, 110 F.4th 1007 (7th Cir. 2024) ..

1a

Appendix B: Memorandum Opinion And Order,

In re Lion Air Flight JT610 Crash, No. 1:18-cv076862, 2023 WL 3653217 (N.D. Ill. May 25,

2023) ................................................................... 18a

Appendix C: Amended Memorandum Opinion

And Order, In re Lion Air Flight JT610 Crash,

No. 19 C 01552, 2023 WL 3653218 (N.D. Ill.

May 25, 2023) .................................................... 36a

Appendix D: Memorandum Opinion And Order,

In re Lion Air Flight JT610 Crash, No. 18 C

07686, 2022 WL 17820965 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 20,

2022) ................................................................... 57a

Appendix E: Order Denying Rehearing and

Rehearing En Banc, In re Lion Air Flight

JT610 Crash, No. 23-2358 (7th Cir. Sept. 10,

2024) ................................................................... 77a

v

CASES

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Page

Am. Dredging Co. v. Miller, 510 U.S. 443

(1994) ......................................................... 4, 8

Armstrong v. Ala. Power Co., 667 F.2d 1385

(11th Cir. 1982) .........................................

15

Aurora Mar. Co. v. Abdullah Mohamed

Fahem & Co., 85 F.3d 44 (2d Cir. 1996)...

15

Baris v. Sulpicio Lines, Inc., 932 F.2d 1540

(5th Cir. 1991) ................................ 8, 17, 18, 23

Beluga Holding, Ltd. v. Com. Cap. Corp.,

212 F.3d 1199 (11th Cir. 2000) .................

14

Boudreau v. Boat Andrea G. Corp., 350

Mass. 473 (Mass. 1966) .............................

14

Buccina v. Grimsby, 889 F.3d 256 (6th Cir.

2018 ........................................................... 8, 18

Cairl v. Boeing Co., 113 Cal. Rptr. 925

(Cal. Ct. App. 1974). ..................................

15

Coast Engine & Equip. Corp. v. Sea

Harvester, Inc., 641 F.2d 723 (9th Cir.

1981) ..........................................................

14

Cove Shipping, Inc. v. Doss, 485 So. 2d

1326 (Fla. Ct. App. 1986) ......................... 15, 16

Curcucu v. Rose’s Oil Serv., Inc., 802

N.E.2d 1032 (Mass. 2004) ........................ 16, 17

Delisions v. La Compagnie Generale

Transatlantique, 210 U.S. 95 (1908) ........

9

Detroit Tr. Co. v. The Thomas Barlum, 293

U.S. 21 (1934) ............................................

21

Ghotra ex rel. Ghotra v. Bandila Shipping,

Inc., 113 F.3d 1050 (9th Cir. 1997)...........

17

Guidry v. Durkin, 834 F.2d 1465 (9th Cir.

1987) ......................................................... 14, 21

Higa v. Transocean Airlines, 230 F.2d 780

(9th Cir. 1955) .................................... 14, 21, 22

vi

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—continued

Page

Jerman v. Carlisle, McNellie, Rini, Kramer

& Ulrich LPA, 559 U.S. 573 (2010) ..........

22

Lewis v. Lewis & Clark Marine, Inc., 531

U.S. 438 (2001) ..........................................

6

In re Lockheed Martin Corp., 503 F.3d 351

(4th Cir. 2007) ...........................................

17

Midlantic Nat’l Bank v. N.J. Dep’t of Env’t

Prot., 474 U.S. 494 (1986) .........................

20

Mims v. Arrow Fin. Servs., LLC, 565 U.S.

368 (2012) ..................................................

20

Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 398

U.S. 375 (1970) .......................................... 9, 19

In re Muer, 146 F.3d 410 (6th Cir. 1998).....

15

Noel v. Linea Aeropostal Venezolana, 247

F.2d 677 (2d Cir. 1957) ............................ 21, 22

Norton v. Switzer, 93 U.S. 355 (1876) .........

7

Offshore Logistics, Inc. v. Tallentire, 477

U.S. 207 (1986) ................... 4, 10, 14, 20, 21, 23

Old Dominion S.S. Co. v. Gilmore, 207

U.S. 398 (1907) ..........................................

9

The Sarah, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 391 (1823)...

7

Sindia Expedition, Inc. v. Wrecked &

Abandoned Vessel, Known as The Sindia,

895 F.2d 116 (3d Cir. 1990) ......................

15

Sw. Marine of S.F., Inc. v. United States,

896 F.2d 532 (Fed. Cir. 1990) ...................

16

United States v. Calamaro, 354 U.S. 351

(1957) .........................................................

22

STATUTES

28 U.S.C. § 1254(1) .......................................

1

§ 1332 ........................................... 2, 10

§ 1333(1) ....................................... 2, 6

§ 1369 ........................................... 2, 10

vii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—continued

Page

46 U.S.C. § 30302 ..................................... 1, 9, 19

§ 30308(a) ................................. 2, 9, 20

§§ 30501–30530 ........................... 8, 15

§§ 30901–30918 ...........................

8

§§ 31101–31113 ........................... 8, 21

§§ 31301–31343 ........................... 8, 21

First Judiciary Act, ch. 20, 1 Stat 73

(1789) .........................................................

6

Pub. L. No. 109-304, 120 Stat. 1485 (2006).

19

RULES

Fed. R. Civ. P. 1 ............................................

7

Fed. R. Civ. P. 1 advisory committee’s note

to 1966 amendment ..................................

7

Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(h) ....................................... 2, 7

Fed. R. Civ. P. 9 advisory committee’s note

to 1966 amendment ..................................

8

SCHOLARLY AUTHORITIES

David W. Robertson, Admiralty Procedure

and Jurisdiction After the 1966

Unification, 74 Mich. L. Rev. 1627

(1976) ........................................................

7

OTHER AUTHORITIES

Thomas J. Schoenbaum, Admiralty & Maritime Law (6th ed. 2018) ........................... 7, 8

Steven L. Snell, Courts of Admiralty and the

Common Law: Origins in the American

Experiment in Concurrent Jurisdiction

(2007) ......................................................... 6, 20

viii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—continued

Ian Urbina, Is the World’s Deadliest Profession Among the Most Violent?, CBS News

(Sept. 26, 2022)..........................................

14A Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and

Procedure—Jurisdiction § 3672 (4th ed.

June 2024) .................................................

Page

23

8

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Petitioners respectfully petition for a writ of certiorari to review the judgment of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in this case.

OPINIONS BELOW

The Seventh Circuit’s opinion is reported at 110

F.4th 1007 and reproduced at Pet. App. 1a–17a. The

District Court’s opinions are reproduced at Pet. App.

18a–35a, available at 2023 WL 3653217 (May 25,

2023); at Pet. App. 36a–56a, available at 2023 WL

3653218 (May 25, 2023); and at Pet. App. 57a–76a,

available at 2022 WL 17820965 (Dec. 20, 2022).

JURISDICTION

The Seventh Circuit entered judgment on August 6,

2024, and denied a timely petition for rehearing on

September 10, 2024. On December 5, 2024, Justice

Barrett granted an extension of time to file this petition to January 8, 2025. On January 2, 2025, Justice

Barrett granted a second extension to February 5,

2025. This Court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.

§ 1254(1).

PERTINENT STATUTORY

PROVISIONS AND RULES

The Death on the High Seas Act (DOHSA), 46 U.S.C.

§ 30302, provides:

When the death of an individual is caused by wrongful act, neglect, or default occurring on the high seas

beyond 3 nautical miles from the shore of the United

States, the personal representative of the decedent

may bring a civil action in admiralty against the person or vessel responsible. The action shall be for the

2

exclusive benefit of the decedent’s spouse, parent,

child, or dependent relative.

DOHSA further provides: “This chapter does not affect the law of a State regulating the right to recover

for death.” 46 U.S.C. § 30308(a).

28 U.S.C. § 1332 vests federal district courts with

original jurisdiction in all civil actions between a citizen of a state and a subject of a foreign state if the

amount in controversy exceeds $75,000.

28 U.S.C. § 1333(1) provides: “The district courts

shall have original jurisdiction, exclusive of the courts

of the States, of: . . . Any civil case of admiralty or maritime jurisdiction, saving to suitors in all cases all

other remedies to which they are otherwise entitled.”

28 U.S.C. § 1369 vests federal district courts with

original jurisdiction in civil actions arising from a single accident where at least 75 persons die and minimal

diversity exists between the parties.

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(h) provides:

(h) Admiralty or Maritime Claim.

(1) How Designated. If a claim for relief is within

the admiralty or maritime jurisdiction and also

within the court’s subject-matter jurisdiction on

some other ground, the pleading may designate

the claim as an admiralty or maritime claim for

purposes of Rules 14(c), 38(e), and 82 and the Supplemental Rules for Admiralty or Maritime Claims

and Asset Forfeiture Actions. A claim cognizable

only in the admiralty or maritime jurisdiction is an

admiralty or maritime claim for those purposes,

whether or not so designated.

(2) Designation of Appeal. A case that includes an

admiralty or maritime claim within this

3

subdivision (h) is an admiralty case within 28

U.S.C. § 1292(a)(3).

INTRODUCTION

Admiralty jurisdiction is either exclusive—meaning

it precludes non-admiralty courts from hearing claims

within its scope—or it is not. This is a basic maritime

law principle, applied by courts across the country.

But the Seventh Circuit has broken rank and invented

a novel form of quasi-exclusive jurisdiction, where the

same claim between the same parties is sometimes

subject to exclusive admiralty jurisdiction and sometimes subject to concurrent jurisdiction. This conflict

must be resolved. At stake is whether crash victims

like petitioners here enjoy the right to have their claim

decided by a jury, just as all other crash victims do.

Since the founding, the law has historically provided

for concurrent jurisdiction in admiralty and non-admiralty courts over in personam maritime claims. That

concept is now reflected in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(h), which provides that a plaintiff asserting

claims “within the admiralty or maritime jurisdiction

and also within the court’s subject-matter jurisdiction

on some other ground” “may”—but need not—“designate the claim as an admiralty or maritime claim” subject to federal admiralty jurisdiction. So if a claim has

another, non-admiralty basis for federal jurisdiction,

the plaintiff may proceed on the “law side” of federal

court or may invoke the court’s admiralty jurisdiction.

This concurrent-jurisdiction scheme governs all maritime claims except for in rem claims and a select few

statutory claims, which may be brought only in admiralty. For those few claims, no other court is available;

they must be brought in federal court, and they must

proceed in admiralty. Exclusive means exclusive—except in the Seventh Circuit.

4

The Seventh Circuit acknowledged that it has created an “anomaly” that departs from other lower

courts on this basic issue. Pet. App. 17a. The court

correctly recognized that DOHSA claims can be heard

in state court (where they typically are tried to juries)

or in federal court. Id.; id. at 6a–7a. Yet the court

below held that anytime a DOHSA claim is brought in

federal court or removed there from state court, the

claim is subject to “exclusive” admiralty jurisdiction,

meaning there is no jury-trial right. Id. at 10a–17a.

That is so, the court held, even if the claim meets the

requirements for a non-admiralty source of jurisdiction. In other words, the Seventh Circuit held that admiralty jurisdiction over DOHSA claims can be concurrent (with state courts) and exclusive (within federal

courts).

No other court has adopted such a rule. Rather,

other circuits and state courts rightly hold that federal

admiralty jurisdiction must either be exclusive or concurrent. It cannot be both. That approach follows this

Court’s precedent, holding that “the consequence of exclusive federal jurisdiction” in “admiralty” is that

“state courts ‘may not provide a remedy.’” Am. Dredging Co. v. Miller, 510 U.S. 443, 446 (1994). But if jurisdiction is “concurrent,” then a claim is “clearly

within the competence of state courts”—or the law side

of a federal court—“to adjudicate.” See Offshore Logistics, Inc. v. Tallentire, 477 U.S. 207, 232 (1986).

This issue is important. It cuts across every in personam maritime claim and implicates the constitutional right to a jury. The Seventh Circuit’s “anomaly”

extinguishes the parties’ jury-trial rights anytime

their claims end up in federal court—even if the plaintiff filed in state court and the defendant removed the

case. The decision below thus invites manipulation

and unfairness.

5

This question is also likely to recur. DOHSA provides the only remedy for most people whose loved

ones are tortiously killed in international waters. For

example, the 737 MAX air crash at issue produced 87

wrongful death actions. DOHSA claims can also arise

from the deaths of offshore oil and gas workers, cruise

ship accidents, and deaths caused by pirates or terrorists. The parties in all those cases should have the

same jury-trial rights as in wrongful-death cases arising on dry land.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

A. Factual background.

On October 29, 2018, a Boeing 737 MAX 8, operating

as Lion Air Flight 610, took off from Jakarta, Indonesia. Almost immediately, serious problems arose. Pet.

App. 36a–37a. Because of bad input data, a faulty automatic flight control system overrode the pilots and

repeatedly tried to force the plane into a nosedive. Id.

Twelve minutes into the flight, the plane crashed into

the Java Sea, roughly 18 nautical miles off the coast of

Indonesia. All 189 people on board died, including Andrea Manfredi. Id. at 1a.

Mr. Manfredi’s parents, Maurizio Manfredi and

Sonia Lorenzoni; his dependent twin sister, Linda

Manfredi; and Laura Smith, the duly appointed representative and independent administrator of Mr.

Manfredi’s estate, brought a wrongful-death action in

the Northern District of Illinois against Boeing and

various manufacturers responsible for servicing components of the aircraft and developing the computer

and software code for the aircraft system responsible

for the crash.

6

B. Admiralty jurisdiction background.

1. Maritime law’s tradition of concurrent jurisdiction stretches back before the Founding. Colonial

plaintiffs could choose to bring maritime claims either

in vice admiralty courts or in the local colonial courts.

Steven L. Snell, Courts of Admiralty and the Common

Law: Origins in the American Experiment in Concurrent Jurisdiction 204–05 (2007). The vice admiralty

courts often came with greater expertise, but no jury

trials. Jury trials on maritime claims, however, were

an option in the local colonial courts. Id. at 182, 205;

Pet. App. 9a. These courts had concurrent jurisdiction.

Upon ratification, the Constitution “vest[ed] federal

courts with jurisdiction over all cases of admiralty and

maritime jurisdiction.” Lewis v. Lewis & Clark Marine, Inc., 531 U.S. 438, 443 (2001). But the tradition

of concurrent admiralty jurisdiction continued. The

First Judiciary Act of 1789 codified the federal courts’

jurisdiction over “all civil causes of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction,” while carving out an exception

called the “saving-to-suitors” clause. Ch. 20, 1 Stat 73,

77 § 9. That clause “sav[ed] to suitors, in all cases, the

right of a common law remedy, where the common law

is competent to give it.” Id. Though Congress has

since revised this language, its import is the same.

Lewis, 531 U.S. at 443–44. It now reads: “The district

courts shall have original jurisdiction, exclusive of the

courts of the States, of [a]ny civil case of admiralty or

maritime jurisdiction, saving to suitors in all cases all

other remedies to which they are otherwise entitled.”

28 U.S.C. § 1333(1).

After the First Judiciary Act, then, litigants had admiralty and non-admiralty options. In rem claims

were subject to exclusive admiralty jurisdiction in federal court. But parties could “waive [maritime]

lien[s]”—which had to proceed in rem in admiralty—

7

and instead “proceed in personam.” In this latter scenario, litigants could “resort to their common-law remedy in the State courts, or in the [federal] Circuit

Court, if” there was diversity of citizenship. See Norton v. Switzer, 93 U.S. 355, 356 (1876). This scheme

reflected “[t]he intention of the drafters of the Judiciary Act,” which “was to make clear that admiralty

‘suitors’ would not be second-class litigants in the

United States” and that admiralty suitors would “have

full access to common law remedies if they so choose.”

Thomas J. Schoenbaum, Admiralty & Maritime Law

§ 4.2, at 257 (6th ed. 2018). And “[i]n all cases at common law, the trial must be by jury.” The Sarah, 21

U.S. (8 Wheat.) 391, 394 (1823).

2. Before 1966, federal courts were viewed as having

an “‘admiralty side’ and a ‘civil’ or ‘law side,’” with a

separate “set of procedural rules” for each. David W.

Robertson, Admiralty Procedure and Jurisdiction After the 1966 Unification, 74 Mich. L. Rev. 1627, 1630

(1976). The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were

amended in 1966 “to effect unification of the civil and

admiralty procedure.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 1. Now the Federal Rules govern all civil actions, including in admiralty, Fed. R. Civ. P. 1 advisory committee’s note to

1966 amendment, but certain “specialized admiralty

procedures” still apply in admiralty cases. Robertson,

supra, at 1631.

This change did not, however, affect maritime plaintiffs’ forum options. When § 1333(1)’s saving-to-suitors clause applies, plaintiffs can choose to bring their

claims in any of three places: (1) on the admiralty side

of federal district court, as an admiralty claim, see

Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(h); (2) on the law side of federal district court, if there is a non-admiralty ground for jurisdiction, see id.; or (3) in a state court, just like any

other civil claim within the court’s authority. See

8

generally 14A Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and

Procedure—Jurisdiction § 3672 (4th ed. June 2024);

Buccina v. Grimsby, 889 F.3d 256, 260–61 (6th Cir.

2018) (Sutton, J.).

In federal court, if both admiralty and non-admiralty

jurisdictional grounds exist, the law side is the default.

Thus, when there are multiple “ground[s] for federal

jurisdiction, the plaintiff must identify the claim as

one in admiralty to make it plain that he wishes to invoke that jurisdictional basis rather than some other.”

Baris v. Sulpicio Lines, Inc., 932 F.2d 1540, 1547 (5th

Cir. 1991) (emphasis omitted). That identification is

the Rule 9(h) declaration. As the Advisory Committee

noted, “[m]any claims . . . are cognizable by the district

courts whether asserted in admiralty or in a civil action, assuming the existence of a nonmaritime ground

of jurisdiction.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 9 advisory committee’s

note to 1966 amendment (citing the “classic privilege

given by the saving-to-suitors clause” in such cases).

3. This concurrent-jurisdiction scheme has certain

well-established exceptions. An in rem suit, for example, is subject to exclusive admiralty jurisdiction. See

Am. Dredging Co., 510 U.S. at 446–47. And claims under four specific statutes have been identified as falling within federal courts’ exclusive admiralty jurisdiction: (1) certain claims under the Limitation Act, 46

U.S.C. §§ 30501–30530; (2) the Suits in Admiralty Act,

46 U.S.C. §§ 30901–30918; (3) the Public Vessels Act,

46 U.S.C. §§ 31101–31113; and (4) certain claims under the Ship Mortgage Act, 46 U.S.C. §§ 31301–31343.

See generally Schoenbaum, supra, § 4.2, at 259.

Claims in these exceptional categories must be

brought in federal court, as admiralty claims.

9

C. DOHSA background.

Before 1920, there was no federal “remedy for death

on the high seas caused by breach of one of the duties

imposed by federal maritime law.” See Moragne v.

States Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375, 393 (1970).

Other laws, however, did allow for wrongful-death and

other recoveries for accidents on the high seas. And

federal courts adjudicated such claims.

State laws, for example, allowed for wrongful-death

recoveries. This Court permitted such state-law

claims for deaths on the high seas to be “applied in . . .

admiralty.” Old Dominion S.S. Co. v. Gilmore (“The

Hamilton”), 207 U.S. 398, 405–06 (1907). In The Hamilton, this Court held that a Delaware wrongful-death

claim could proceed in federal court in admiralty, even

where the death occurred seven miles off the coast of

Virginia. The Court explained that, in those circumstances, “all claims to which the admiralty does not

deny existence must be recognized.” Id. at 406; see

also Delisions v. La Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 210 U.S. 95, 139–41 (1908) (applying French law

to an accident between French and British ships where

the collision occurred on the high seas).

DOSHA was enacted in 1920 to fill this gap in federal law. “When the death of an individual is caused

by wrongful act, neglect, or default occurring on the

high seas beyond 3 nautical miles from the shore of the

United States, the personal representative of the decedent may bring a civil action in admiralty against the

person or vessel responsible.” 46 U.S.C. § 30302.

DOHSA “does not affect the law of a State regulating

the right to recover for death.” Id. § 30308(a). This

Court has interpreted § 30308(a)’s language as a jurisdictional saving clause, holding that it “bears a

marked similarity to the ‘saving to suitors clause’” in

28 U.S.C. § 1333, which (as explained above) permits

10

state courts to exercise “concurrent jurisdiction” with

federal admiralty courts over admiralty claims. See

Tallentire, 477 U.S. at 222–23, 230–32. DOHSA plaintiffs are thus “able to choose the forum in which they

prefer to proceed,” state or federal. Id. at 232.

D. Procedural history.

1. The Lion Air 610 crash produced 87 individual

actions asserting wrongful death and other claims

against Boeing and other defendants. All actions were

either filed in, removed to, or eventually transferred to

the Northern District of Illinois. Pet. App. 58a. The

district court consolidated the actions under a master

docket. All but two claims ultimately settled. The remaining actions were the Manfredis’ and an action

brought by the family and representative of the estate

of Liu Chandra. Id.

The Manfredis brought this case in the district court.

They invoked diversity jurisdiction and multiparty,

multiforum jurisdiction on the district court’s “law

side.” See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332, 1369; Pet. App. 3a. They

could have invoked admiralty jurisdiction under

§ 1333, but they chose not to. They declined to make a

Rule 9(h) declaration; their complaint did not cite

§ 1333 or even mention the term “admiralty”; and they

“demand[ed] a trial by jury on all issues so triable.”

See Compl. 83, No. 1:19-cv-7091 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 28,

2019), ECF No. 1.

Boeing also demanded a jury trial. Pet. App. 75a.

Later, however, it changed course and moved for a

bench trial. It argued that DOHSA was the exclusive

source of law and that the plaintiffs had no jury-trial

rights under the statute. Id. at 36a.

The district court agreed, concluding that DOHSA’s

“clear terms [ ] limit[ ] the claims to this Court’s admiralty jurisdiction.” Pet. App. 54a. The court then

11

certified for interlocutory appeal the question

“whether a plaintiff in federal court is entitled to a jury

trial under the Seventh Amendment when the plaintiff’s sole claim arises under DOHSA, and the plaintiff

has a concurrent basis for common law jurisdiction

(such as diversity).” Id. at 55a. Both the Manfredis

and the Chandras appealed. The Seventh Circuit consolidated the appeals, but only the Manfredis are a

party to this petition, as the Chandras have since settled their claims in principle.

2. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. First, it highlighted DOHSA’s language providing that a plaintiff

“may bring a civil action in admiralty” and noted that

the statute “has never expressly stated that plaintiffs

with DOHSA claims can maintain a suit at law or with

the right to a jury trial.” Pet. App. 13a–14a (first emphasis added). According to the Seventh Circuit, “[t]he

most natural inference to draw from the combination

of the express reference to a suit in admiralty and the

absence of a reference to a suit at law or with a jury

trial is that the cause of action created by DOHSA is

to be brought in admiralty.” Id. at 14a.

The court dismissed this Court’s reasoning in Tallentire in a footnote. Despite recognizing that “[a] different provision in DOHSA . . . allows plaintiffs to

bring DOHSA claims in state court,” Pet. App. 14a n.4

(citing Tallentire, 477 U.S. at 232), the Seventh Circuit

concluded that DOHSA’s saving clause “does not address whether DOHSA claims that are in federal court

must be brought in admiralty.” Id.

The Seventh Circuit next observed that “courts have

construed language similar to DOHSA’s ‘may bring a

civil action in admiralty’ language to require cases to

be brought in admiralty.” Pet. App. 14a. The court

cited both the Ship Mortgage Act, which allows mortgagees in certain cases to bring “a civil action in

12

personam in admiralty,” and the Public Vessels Act,

which provides that “[a] civil action in personam in admiralty may be brought . . . against the United States

for damages caused by a public vessel of the United

States.”

Id. (citing 46 U.S.C. §§ 31325(b)(2)(A),

31102(a)). Overlooking the fact that claims under

these statutes may be brought only in admiralty—so

not in state court—the Seventh Circuit reasoned that

“the same language in” these separate “statutes carries a consistent meaning,” and thus held that DOHSA

created exclusive admiralty jurisdiction with no jurytrial right. 1 Id. at 15a.

Finally, citing two pre-Tallentire circuit decisions

and a few district court opinions whose reasoning

harkened back to that era, the Seventh Circuit concluded that “other courts have for a long time

agreed . . . that, if a case involving only DOHSA claims

is in federal court, it must proceed in admiralty, without a jury trial.” Pet. App. 15a (collecting cases). It

observed that Congress “has not made any material

changes to DOHSA’s first section” since the 1950s. Id.

at 16a. In the Seventh Circuit’s view, then, Congress

“can be deemed to have acquiesced in or ratified” those

decisions. Id.

The Seventh Circuit “recognize[d] the potential

anomaly in allowing defendants to effectively extinguish a plaintiff’s jury trial right by removing a case to

federal court.” Pet. App. 17a (collecting cases). After

all, “DOHSA claims, like other wrongful-death tort

claims, are typically tried by juries when they are in

state court.” Id. But because the court believed “Congress has spoken on the issue of the availability of a

1 Litigation under the Ship Mortgage Act proceeds in rem, and

the Public Vessels Act’s immunity waiver extends only to suits in

admiralty. In other words, neither remedy was saved to suitors.

See infra pp. 13–14.

13

jury trial on DOHSA claims in federal court,” it

brushed past that problem. Id. And despite explaining the Judiciary Act’s saving-to-suitors clause before

conducting its analysis, id. at 10a, the court made no

other mention of Tallentire or this Court’s holding that

DOHSA’s saving clause “bears a marked similarity to

the ‘saving to suitors clause’” in 28 U.S.C. § 1333. 477

U.S. at 232.

The Seventh Circuit then denied the Manfredis’

timely rehearing petition. Pet. App. 78a.

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION

I. The “anomal[ous]” decision below creates a

split on the meaning of exclusive admiralty

jurisdiction.

Only the Seventh Circuit holds that a claim “in federal court can only proceed ‘in admiralty,’ without a

jury trial,” even when it has “non-admiralty sources of

jurisdiction.” Pet. App. 13a. On this view, DOHSA

claims “must proceed in admiralty” in federal court

(meaning admiralty jurisdiction is exclusive) even

though DOHSA claims are within the jurisdiction of

“state court[s]” (meaning admiralty jurisdiction is concurrent). Id. at 14a–15a. Other circuits and state

courts, by contrast, hold that admiralty jurisdiction is

either fully exclusive or fully concurrent—not a unique

hybrid.

1. At least five circuits hold that if a claim is subject

to exclusive admiralty jurisdiction, other courts lack

jurisdiction. State courts agree. And the Federal Circuit has applied the same logic to hold that it lacked

jurisdiction over an original claim that was exclusively

within a federal district court’s admiralty jurisdiction.

a. The Ninth Circuit has held that, because claims

under the Suits in Admiralty Act and Public Vessels

14

Act were subject to “exclusive” admiralty jurisdiction,

a “state court lacked subject matter jurisdiction.”

Guidry v. Durkin, 834 F.2d 1465, 1473–74 (9th Cir.

1987). “Implicit” in this analysis, the court reasoned,

was that “the ‘saving to suitors’ clause” did “not [ ] apply to actions under” these statutes. Id. at 1473 n.10.

The question of jurisdiction thus “hinge[d] on whether

a statutory remedy . . . could be pursued within the exclusive or concurrent admiralty jurisdiction of the federal courts.” Id. at 1474 n.11. Because the answer was

the former, the district court also lacked “subject matter jurisdiction over those claims upon removal” (based

on the now-repealed doctrine of derivative jurisdiction). Id. at 1474.

So too for in rem Ship Mortgage Act claims, which

“lie within the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal

courts.” Coast Engine & Equip. Corp. v. Sea Harvester, Inc., 641 F.2d 723, 728 (9th Cir. 1981). Thus,

in Coast Engine, “state procedures ha[d] no effect” on

an in rem proceeding to foreclose a preferred ship

mortgage. Id.; see also Beluga Holding, Ltd. v. Com.

Cap. Corp., 212 F.3d 1199, 1202–03 (11th Cir. 2000)

(“The Ship’s Mortgage Act allows a mortgagee to bring

a cause of action in rem for the foreclosure of a preferred ship’s mortgage and gives federal district courts

exclusive original jurisdiction to hear that cause of action”).

And in Higa v. Transocean Airlines, the Ninth Circuit held that DOHSA claims could “be asserted solely

in the federal courts in admiralty.” 230 F.2d 780, 783

(9th Cir. 1955); accord Boudreau v. Boat Andrea G.

Corp., 350 Mass. 473, 474–76 (Mass. 1966). This Court

has since abrogated Higa’s DOHSA-specific holding by

ruling that state courts have concurrent jurisdiction

over DOHSA claims, Tallentire, 477 U.S. at 232, but

15

not Higa’s conception of what exclusive admiralty jurisdiction means when it exists.

The Second Circuit has also made clear that a “consequence of exclusive federal admiralty jurisdiction is

that state courts ‘may not provide a remedy in rem for

any cause of action within the admiralty jurisdiction.’”

Aurora Mar. Co. v. Abdullah Mohamed Fahem & Co.,

85 F.3d 44, 47 (2d Cir. 1996). For in personam cases,

however, state courts can exercise jurisdiction and

“adopt such remedies” as they “see[ ] fit so long as” the

state courts do “not attempt to make changes in the

substantive maritime law.” Id.

The Third Circuit has likewise recognized that “federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction over” “admiralty

in rem action[s].” Sindia Expedition, Inc. v. Wrecked

& Abandoned Vessel, Known as The Sindia, 895 F.2d

116, 122–23 (3d Cir. 1990). The result of that exclusive

admiralty jurisdiction: the plaintiff did “not have an

alternative forum to pursue its action.” Id. at 123.

Similarly, the Sixth Circuit has held that that actions under the Limitation Act, 46 U.S.C. §§ 30501–

30530, are subject to “exclusive admiralty jurisdiction.” In re Muer, 146 F.3d 410, 417 (6th Cir. 1998).

And the Eleventh Circuit has held that the Suits in

Admiralty Act’s provision of “exclusive federal [admiralty] jurisdiction absolutely precluded the state

court’s exercise of jurisdiction.” Armstrong v. Ala.

Power Co., 667 F.2d 1385, 1387–88 (11th Cir. 1982).

Again, “exclusive” meant that the claim could only be

brought in “federal district court” on the admiralty

side. Id. at 1388 n.4.

State courts agree. For example, in Cove Shipping,

Inc. v. Doss, a Florida appellate court held that a state

trial court “lacked subject matter jurisdiction” over a

Suits in Admiralty Act and Public Vessels Act case

16

“because only an admiralty proceeding in federal court

may be maintained” for such claims. 485 So. 2d 1326,

1328 (Fla. Ct. App. 1986); see also Cairl v. Boeing Co.,

113 Cal. Rptr. 925, 926 (Cal. Ct. App. 1974) (holding,

before Tallentire, that “state courts are not granted jurisdiction over” DOHSA claims, and “since the suit

must be brought in admiralty, United States courts

have exclusive jurisdiction”), abrogated by Tallentire,

477 U.S. at 232.

b. The same logic applies when the issue is whether

a claim must be brought in federal admiralty court or

can also be brought in a non-admiralty federal court.

For example, the Federal Circuit has held that suits

concerning maritime contracts that must be brought

under the Suits in Admiralty Act are subject to federal

“district courts’ exclusive jurisdiction” in “admiralty,”

which in turn precluded the Federal Circuit itself from

exercising jurisdiction. Sw. Marine of S.F., Inc. v.

United States, 896 F.2d 532, 534–35 (Fed. Cir. 1990)

(ordering the case be transferred to a district court).

Southwest Marine involved a government contract,

and another statute (28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)) gave the

Federal Circuit jurisdiction over such cases. Even so,

the Federal Circuit reasoned that § 1295(a) did not

“create[ ] an exception to the district courts’ exclusive

jurisdiction over maritime contracts” in the Suits in

Admiralty Act context. Id. at 534. Because admiralty

jurisdiction is truly exclusive, the Federal Circuit

could not exercise concurrent jurisdiction.

2. Conversely, if jurisdiction is concurrent, courts

hold that “some nonadmiralty court has jurisdiction

and accords jury trials.” Curcuru v. Rose’s Oil Serv.,

Inc., 802 N.E.2d 1032, 1038 (Mass. 2004). Massachusetts’s highest court, for example, has held that

DOHSA claims specifically could be tried to a jury. Id.

at 1039. Curcuru explained that “it has long been

17

recognized that various forms of ‘admiralty’ claims,”

including under DOHSA, “may be tried to a jury if the

Federal court’s jurisdiction has been invoked on the

basis of diversity of citizenship.” Id. at 1038.

As the Ninth Circuit has similarly held, “the proper

focus is on . . . whether the court ha[s] an independent

basis for jurisdiction and whether this was the type of

claim that historically could be brought in state court

or on the law side of district court.” Ghotra ex rel.

Ghotra v. Bandila Shipping, Inc., 113 F.3d 1050,

1055–58 (9th Cir. 1997). Ghotra held that claims under the Longshore and Harbor Workers Compensation

Act could be “brought ‘at common law,’” and thus on

the law side of federal court, with a right to a jury—

specifically noting that “common law courts traditionally exercised concurrent jurisdiction over maritime

cases.” Id. at 1055.

The Fourth Circuit has also held that, for a breach

of contract claim regarding insurance coverage for a

ship damaged at sea, the district court’s admiralty side

and the law side both had “concurrent jurisdiction.” In

re Lockheed Martin Corp., 503 F.3d 351, 359 (4th Cir.

2007). Accordingly, the ship owner was entitled to a

jury trial for the breach of contract claim under the

Seventh Amendment. Id. at 359–60. The ship owner

was entitled to a jury because “maritime in personam

claims [can] be pursued in federal court as maritime

(and thus non-jury) claims, in state court as legal

claims, or in federal court as legal claims (for which a

jury trial is available) if an independent basis for federal court jurisdiction exists.” Id. at 356.

And the Fifth Circuit, addressing a DOHSA claim in

a case where “there [was] no diversity,” has observed

that “in federal court (and absent diversity of citizenship), a DOHSA claim can be brought only on the admiralty ‘side’ of the docket.” Baris, 932 F.2d at 1547–

18

48 (emphasis added). The court also noted that “where

there exists an additional ground for federal jurisdiction, the plaintiff must identify the claim as one in admiralty to make it plain that he wishes to invoke that

jurisdictional basis rather than some other.” Id. at

1547. That means when other, non-admiralty grounds

for jurisdiction exist, the default is for the claim to proceed “at law” unless the plaintiff specifically invokes

the court’s admiralty jurisdiction—including for

DOHSA claims like those brought here.

These cases reflect the principle that there are “two

routes in a federal court case” where non-admiralty

sources of jurisdiction exist. Buccina, 889 F.3d at 259

(Sutton, J.). “Route A is to invoke federal admiralty

procedures”; “Route B is to invoke the traditional federal civil procedures,” which includes “the guarantee

of a jury trial right, as long as [the plaintiff] can show

that the matter arises under the court’s diversity jurisdiction as well.” Id. at 259–60.

Not so in the Seventh Circuit. Under the decision

below, only Route A is available, even if a claim satisfies the statutory requirements for another ground for

federal jurisdiction, like diversity. The decision below

thus breaks from other courts’ approach to concurrent

admiralty jurisdiction.

*

*

*

The Seventh Circuit’s decision below is indeed an

“anomaly.” Pet. App. 17a. It breaks from the uniform

rule applied to maritime claims across the country.

The result is a lopsided but important split.

II. The decision below is wrong.

The Seventh Circuit’s decision is wrong several

times over. The most basic problem is that it creates

a unique quasi-exclusive jurisdiction that is unknown

19

to the law. As just explained, admiralty jurisdiction

has always been either fully concurrent or fully exclusive. See supra pp. 13–18. That principle applies in

every other maritime context. By itself, this departure

from centuries of history and the uniform view of other

courts makes clear that the decision below went awry.

The Seventh Circuit’s reasoning confirms its error.

As noted, the court emphasized that DOHSA’s “first

section” provides “that a plaintiff may bring a civil action in admiralty”; in the Seventh Circuit’s view, this

“express reference to a suit in admiralty”—combined

with “the absence of a reference to a suit at law or with

a jury trial”—shows that DOHSA claims must “be

brought in admiralty” only. Pet. App. 14a. But this

Court has already rejected that precise premise in

holding that DOHSA creates concurrent jurisdiction.

In Moragne v. States Marine Lines, this Court noted

that some courts had construed DOHSA § 1—which

then, much like now, authorized “a suit for damages in

the district courts of the United States, in admiralty” 2—as creating “exclusive jurisdiction on the admiralty side of the federal courts.” 398 U.S. at 400

n.14. But that view was “erroneous,” the Court explained, because it “disregards the ‘saving clause’ in 28

U.S.C. § 1333, and the fact that federal maritime law

is applicable to suits brought in state courts under the

permission of that clause.” Id.

Tallentire then applied and expanded on Moragne’s

reasoning. Looking “to language of the Act as a whole,

the legislative history of [DOHSA] § 7, the congressional purposes underlying the Act, and the importance of uniformity of admiralty law,” Tallentire

2 In 2006, Congress recodified DOHSA, including the original

§ 1, without substantive change. See Pub. L. No. 109-304, § 6(c),

120 Stat. 1485, 1511 (2006); 46 U.S.C. § 30302.

20

held that DOHSA § 7 serves as a “jurisdictional saving

clause, ensuring that state courts enjoyed the right to

entertain causes of action and provide wrongful death

remedies both for accidents arising on territorial waters and, under DOHSA, for accidents occurring more

than one marine league from shore.” 3 477 U.S. at 221.

Indeed, the Court recognized, “the resolution of

DOHSA claims does not normally require the expertise that admiralty courts bring to bear.” Id. at 232.

DOHSA jurisdiction is thus concurrent with state

courts, not exclusive. Id.

These precedents show that the Seventh Circuit’s

textual analysis is wrong: Statutory language allowing suits in admiralty does not foreclose such claims

from being raised in non-admiralty forums. Indeed,

this Court has long held “the grant of jurisdiction to

one court does not, of itself, imply that the jurisdiction

is to be exclusive.” Mims v. Arrow Fin. Servs., LLC,

565 U.S. 368, 380 (2012) (cleaned up). And as already

explained, maritime statutes have historically provided for concurrent jurisdiction between admiralty

and non-admiralty courts over in personam claims.

See Snell, supra, at 204–05. DOHSA claims, which are

in personam, must be understood against this backdrop. See Midlantic Nat’l Bank v. N.J. Dep’t of Env’t

Prot., 474 U.S. 494, 501 (1986) (“The normal rule of

statutory construction is that if Congress intends for

legislation to change the interpretation of a judicially

created concept, it makes that intent specific.”). Yet

the Seventh Circuit felt no duty to “harmonize

[DOHSA] with other areas of admiralty law,” so it

brushed this history aside. See Pet. App. 17a.

3 The original § 7 was also recodified without substantive

change. See 46 U.S.C. § 30308(a).

21

And Tallentire specifically held that DOHSA itself

creates concurrent jurisdiction. 477 U.S. at 232. The

Seventh Circuit should have started from that premise

instead of trying to parse the statute on a blank slate.

Yet it declared in a footnote that Tallentire is essentially irrelevant—along with the statutory language

that explicitly “allows plaintiffs to bring DOHSA

claims in state court.” Pet. App. 14a n.4.

For similar reasons, the Seventh Circuit erred in

analogizing DOHSA to other statutes that do create

exclusive admiralty jurisdiction. See Pet. App. 14a–

15a. The court relied on the Ship Mortgage Act of

1920, see 46 U.S.C. §§ 31301–31343, and the Public

Vessels Act, see id. §§ 31101–31113. But unlike

DOHSA in Tallentire, these statutes have never been

held to create concurrent jurisdiction with state

courts. On the contrary, the Court has explained that

these statutes create exclusive jurisdiction—meaning

that claims cannot be heard in any non-admiralty

court, including a state court. See Detroit Tr. Co. v.

The Thomas Barlum, 293 U.S. 21, 42 (1934); Guidry,

834 F.2d at 1472–74. Thus, these statutes differ fundamentally from DOHSA. That is true despite the presumption “that the same language in related statutes

carries a consistent meaning.” Pet. App. 14a–15a.

DOHSA’s savings clause and this Court’s decisions interpreting these various statutes already overcome

that presumption.

Finally, contrary to the decision below, Congress

never “acquiesced in or ratified” the view that, “if a

case involving only DOHSA claims is in federal court,

it must proceed in admiralty, without a jury trial.”

Pet. App. 15a–16a. In so holding, the Seventh Circuit

pointed to Higa, 230 F.2d at 786; Noel v. Linea Aeropostal Venezolana, 247 F.2d 677 (2d Cir. 1957); and a

smattering of district court decisions. But Higa and

22

Noel both concluded that DOHSA jurisdiction is completely exclusive—meaning it excludes state courts too.

See Noel, 247 F.2d at 680 (“any rights created by that

Act are cognizable only in admiralty,” so a “suit could

[not] be maintained in other forums”); Higa, 230 F.2d

at 784–85 (rejecting the argument that DOHSA creates concurrent jurisdiction because Congress did not

mean to exclude state courts). And that is precisely

the view this Court rejected in Moragne and Tallentire.

The interpretation urged in these abrogated decisions

hardly gained the wide acceptance necessary to support ratification—especially since “there is nothing to

indicate that it was ever called to the attention of Congress.” United States v. Calamaro, 354 U.S. 351, 359

(1957). That a few district courts expressed the same

view, Pet. App. 15a, is irrelevant. See Jerman v. Carlisle, McNellie, Rini, Kramer & Ulrich LPA, 559 U.S.

573, 589 n.10 (2010) (questioning whether “Congress

would have looked to district court, rather than court

of appeals, opinions in discerning the meaning of the

statutory language”).

∗

∗

∗

DOHSA’s text, its history, and this Court’s precedents all make clear that DOHSA confers concurrent,

not exclusive, jurisdiction—both across courts and

within them. The Seventh Circuit’s contrary holding

is wrong.

III. This case provides an ideal vehicle to decide

this important issue.

This case is an ideal vehicle to decide the question

presented. First, this case presents a clean legal issue.

As the district court noted, “the facts of the case are

irrelevant” to the resolution of the “pure question of

law” at issue. Pet. App. 23a & n.3. And no one disputes that non-admiralty grounds for federal

23

jurisdiction exist here: The Manfredis properly involved diversity and multiparty, multiforum jurisdiction; they demanded a jury trial; and they declined to

designate the claim as an admiralty claim under Rule

9(h). The question presented is thus dispositive: If the

decision below is reversed, a remand for a jury trial is

required.

Finally, this is an important issue. Even setting

aside high-profile air crashes like this one, maritime

fatalities are estimated between 32,000 and 100,000

annually. See Ian Urbina, Is the World’s Deadliest

Profession Among the Most Violent?, CBS News (Sept.

26, 2022), https://www.cbc.ca/news/world/outlawocean-lawless-seas-1.6595578. And as this case and

others like it illustrate, a single maritime accident can

create hundreds, or even thousands, of DOHSA claims.

See, e.g., Baris, 932 F.2d at 1541–42 (noting that approximately 5,000 people died in a ferry crash, giving

rise to many DOHSA claims).

Congress enacted DOHSA “to provide a uniform and

effective wrongful death remedy for survivors of persons killed on the high seas.” Tallentire, 477 U.S. at

214; see id. at 221 (reemphasizing “the importance of

uniformity of admiralty law”). The decision below,

however, threatens “to destroy the uniformity of

wrongful death remedies on the high seas.” Id. at 232.

True concurrent jurisdiction in this area “prevents disunity in the provision of forums to survivors of those

killed on the high seas; it ensures that if [two people]

are killed at sea in the same accident, the beneficiaries

of both are able to choose the forum in which they prefer to proceed.” Id. Under the Seventh Circuit’s rule,

however, a plaintiff seeking a jury trial must avoid federal court—and even then, a defendant can often defeat the jury-trial right by removing the case to federal

court. Allowing this kind of manipulation badly

24

undermines Congress’s scheme, warranting this

Court’s intervention.

CONCLUSION

For these reasons, the Court should grant the petition.

Respectfully submitted,

TOBIAS S. LOSS-EATON

DANIELLE HAMILTON

THE CARTER G. PHILLIPS/

SIDLEY AUSTIN LLP

SUPREME COURT CLINIC

NORTHWESTERN PRITZKER

SCHOOL OF LAW

375 East Chicago Avenue

Chicago, IL 60611

JOHN HILLSMAN

MCGUINN, HILLSMAN &

PALEFSKY

535 Pacific Avenue

San Francisco, CA 94133

February 5, 2025

JEFFREY T. GREEN

Counsel of Record

GREEN LAUERMAN

CHARTERED P.L.L.C.

1050 30th Street NW

Washington, D.C. 20007

(240) 286-5686

jeff@glclaw.net

FILIPPO MARCHINO

THOMAS E. GRAY

THE X-LAW GROUP, P.C.

625 Fair Oaks Ave. #390

South Pasadena, CA 91030

MICHAEL F. STURLEY

727 East Dean Keeton St.

Austin, TX 78705

Counsel for Petitioners