Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Eddie Lee Evans, Petitioner v. James Hill, Warden

No. __________

_________________________________________________

In The

Supreme Court of the United States

EDDIE LEE EVANS,

Petitioner,

v.

KEVIN HIXON, WARDEN,

Respondent.

_________________________________________________

PETITION FOR CERTIORARI

TO THE CALIFORNIA COURT OF APPEAL

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

_________________________________________________

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

_________________________________________________

MARILEE MARSHALL

Attorney at Law

State Bar No. 101046

20 North Raymond Ave.

Suite 240

Pasadena, CA 91103

(626) 564-1136

marshall101046@gmail.com

Attorney for Petitioner

Eddie Lee Evans

LEGAL PRINTERS LLC ! Washington, DC ! 202-747-2400 ! legalprinters.com

QUESTION PRESENTED

Did a 17 year unjustified delay in filing a

murder charge violate petitioner’s due process rights

under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments and

the clearly established precedent of this Court such

that a Certificate of Appealability should be

granted?

i

RELATED PROCEEDINGS

People v. Evans

Los Angeles Superior Court Case

No. FWV17002253

People v. Evans

California Court of Appeal

E07 0871

Evans v. Warden Kelly Santoro

United States District Court

No. 2:21-CV-04812

Evans v. Warden Kelly Santoro

Ninth Circuit Court of Appeal

No. 23-55630

ii

TABLE OF CONTENTS

QUESTION PRESENTED . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . i

RELATED PROCEEDINGS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iv

JURISDICTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

STATUTORY AND CONSTITUTIONAL

PROVISIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

STATEMENT OF THE CASE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

INTRODUCTION & SUMMARY

OF ARGUMENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

FACTUAL BACKGROUND . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

ARGUMENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12

THE 17 YEAR DELAY IN FILING THE

MURDER CHARGE VIOLATED

PETITIONER’S DUE PROCESS RIGHTS

UNDER THE FIFTH AND FOURTEENTH

AMENDMENTS AND THE STATE COURT’S

CONTRARY DECISION VIOLATED

CLEARLY ESTABLISHED SUPREME

COURT PRECEDENT. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12

CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22

iii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

FEDERAL CASES

Hohn v. United States,

524 U.S. 236 (1998) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

King v. Schriro,

537 F.3d 1062 (9th Cir. 2009) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

Miller-El v. Cockrell,

537 U.S. 322 (2003) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

Silva v. Woodford,

279 F.3d 825 (9th Cir. 2002) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

United States v. Gouveia,

467 U.S. 180 (1984) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12-13, 22

United States v. Lovasco,

431 U.S. 783 (1977) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13, 14, 22

United States v. Marion,

404 U.S. 307 (1971) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13, 22

STATE CASES

People v. Nelson,

43 Cal.4th 1242 (2008) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13-14

STATUTES

28 U.S.C. § 2254 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2, 22

iv

28 U.S.C. § 2253 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

Penal Code section 187 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

Penal Code section 11108.3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20

Penal Code sections 12022.53 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

v

IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_________________________________________________

EDDIE LEE EVANS

v.

KEVIN HIXON, WARDEN

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEAL FOR THE

NINTH CIRCUIT

Petitioner, Eddie Lee Evans, respectfully

petitions this Court for a writ of certiorari to review

the judgment of the United States Court of Appeals

for the Ninth Circuit.

JURISDICTION

The Ninth Circuit order, under review,

denying a Certificate of Appealability, under review,

in Case No. 23-55630 was issued on August 23, 2024.

(Appendix A.) The Ninth Circuit denied a timely

petition for rehearing on November 1, 2024.

(Appendix F.) The jurisdiction of this Court is timely

invoked under 28 USC § 1254 (1). Hohn v. United

States , 524 U.S. 236 (1998).

STATUTORY AND CONSTITUTIONAL

PROVISIONS

United States Constitution, Fifth and

1

Fourteenth Amendments.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

On June 1st, 2017, a felony complaint was

filed against Eddie Evans alleging that on February

15, 2000, he murdered Robert Goodson in violation

of Penal Code section 187, subdivision (a). (1CT

11-1.) On September 17th, 2017, an amended

information was filed alleging the same. (1CT 31-32.)

Gun use enhancements pursuant to Penal Code

sections 12022.53, subdivisions (b)-(d) were also

alleged. (1CT 32.) Before trial and after the

preliminary hearing, defense counsel moved to

dismiss the charges based on unjustified

pre-accusation delay in that the offense was alleged

to have occurred on February 16th, 2000. (2CT

291-323.) The motion was denied after a jury trial.

(2CT 545; 1RT 3-3; 4RT 964, 971.) The jury convicted

petitioner of the murder charge and found the gun

use enhancements to be true. (2CT 483, 485-489.) He

was sentenced to 25 years-to-life in state prison

along with a consecutive 25 years-to-life term for the

gun use enhancement found true pursuant to section

12022.53,subdivision (d), for a total term of 50

years-to-life. (2CT 546.) Petitioner filed an appeal

and the California Court of Appeal issued an opinion

on January 6th, 2020, affirming the judgment in its

entirety. (Appendix E.) Petitioner then filed a

petition for review with the California Supreme

Court on February 6th, 2020, which the court denied

on April 1, 2020, without citation or comment. On

June 4, 2021, Petitioner filed a Petition for writ of

habeas corpus (28 U.S.C. § 2254) in the United

2

States District Court (Case No. 2:21-cv-04812-SSMAA, On March 31, 2023, the Magistrate issued a

Recommendation that the Petition be denied.

(Appendix D.) On May 5, 2023, the district judge

adopted the report, entered judgement, denying the

petition and denying a Certificate of Appealability.

(Appendix B, Appendix C.) As stated above, the

Ninth Circuit subsequently denied a Certificate of

Appealability. (Appendix A.)

INTRODUCTION & SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

A 17 year delay in filing a murder charge

violated petitioner’s due process rights under the

Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments and the state

court’s contrary decision violated clearly established

Supreme Court precedent. Petitioner was charged

with the murder of Robert Goodson, 17 years after

the killing. Petitioner did not know Goodson prior to

the killing. Goodson had gambling and drug

problems, and may have been a drug dealer. His wife

Arlene had been having an affair with Robert

Gordon who lived in the house with the Goodsons.

They all used methamphetamine, and there had

been fighting and domestic violence incidents in

their home. In fact, Arlene and Goodson had been

arguing the night before he was killed. Goodson

knew about the affair between Arlene and Gordon,

and he was abusive towards Gordon. And forensic

testing showed that Gordon had gunshot residue

ingredients on his arm after the shooting.

Petitioner was charged on the theory that one

day he approached the house looking for a woman

3

named “Yolly,” who he had never met, and thereafter

shot Goodson for no apparent reason.

The 17 year investigative delay was not due to

the police discovering new evidence, or new

witnesses coming forward. There was no evidentiary

breakthrough that justified the charging delay.

Petitioner was charged primarily because of the

similarities between the shotgun used in the killing

and the one he was found to possess at about the

same time. Even though the computerized tracing

system (Etrace) was developed in 2003, three years

after the killing, the state made no attempt at that

time to determine whether petitioner possessed the

shotgun used to kill Goodson. They didn’t make use

of the Etrace system, and made no attempt to use

the tracing procedures that law enforcement had

been previously using. Petitioner had also made a

statement to his brother-in-law, George Lewis, in

2009 suggesting he wanted his wife killed (after

learning that she had an affair), and telling Lewis

this wasn’t his “first rodeo.” Police lost the audio

recording of a subsequent interview they had with

Lewis. Petitioner never told Lewis that he had been

involved in a previous murder, and when Lewis

arranged a pretext call with petitioner at the

direction of the police, and mentioned petitioner’s

interest in killing his wife, petitioner said he didn’t

know what Lewis was talking about.

By the time of trial many of the witnesses

had forgotten key facts. Other witnesses including

Arlene Goodson and Robert Gordon both

“remembered” new facts — things that were

4

prejudicial to petitioner that they had not previously

mentioned.

Evidence had also been lost, including

Goodson’s phone records, which would have shown

who he had been talking with in the days before the

killing, and evidence of an alibi that petitioner had.

Petitioner contends in his petition that the 17

year investigative delay violated his right to due

process, the California Court of Appeal unreasonably

rejected his claim, the California Supreme Court

denied review, the United States District Court

unreasonably rejected his claim, and unreasonably

denied his request for a certificate of appealability.

The Ninth Circuit also unreasonably denied his

request for a Certificate of Appealability. This Court

should certify the issue for appeal as it is arguably

meritorious. A habeas petitioner may not appeal a

final order in a federal habeas corpus proceeding

without first obtaining a COA. (28 U.S.C., § 2253(c);

Fed. R. App. P. 22(b).)

In order to obtain a COA, Petitioner does not

have to demonstrate that he would ultimately win

the appeal. Silva v. Woodford, 279 F.3d 825, 833 (9th

Cir. 2002). Petitioner, only needs to show that jurists

of reason could disagree with the district court’s

resolution of the claim. Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S

473, 484-85 (2000). This standard is liberally

construed in favor of appellate review and is not

onerous. Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 327

(2003); King v. Schriro, 537 F.3d 1062, 1075 (9th Cir.

2009).

5

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

The following evidence was presented at trial

and restated by the California Court of Appeal:

(Appendix E.)

Robert Goodson was killed in his

home in Rancho Cucamonga on

February 16, 2000. He had moved into

the home just a few months prior with

his wife Arlene Goodson, their young

daughter, and a friend, Patrick Gordon.

Before, all had lived in Guam for a

number of years.

In January 2000, defendant

approached the home and asked for

someone whose name sounded like

“Yolie.” Gordon told defendant that no

one by that name lived there, and

defendant left. A week or two later,

defendant returned and again asked for

“Yolie.” Gordon answered, again telling

the man that no one by that name lived

there. On either this visit or the first

one, defendant handed Gordon a

business card.

Around 12:30 p.m. on February

12, 2000, four days before Robert was

killed, defendant appeared at the house

a third time, again asking for “Yolie.”

Several people were in the house at the

time. Gordon answered and again told

6

defendant that “Yolie” did not live there.

Defendant then became “loud,” “very

aggressive,” and “threatening,” saying:

“Tell her to come out of the house. I

know she’s in there.” According to

Gordon, defendant also stated that “if

we didn’t get out of the house and

produce Yolie ... people were going to

get hurt.” Robert’s father, Allen

Goodson, pushed Gordon aside, stepped

in front of defendant, and insisted that

defendant leave.

Unbeknownst to the residents at

the time, a woman named Yolanda

Estrada dated a married man in the

late 1990’s whose mother once lived at

that house. The woman, who goes by the

nickname “Yolly,” had once spent a

night at the home.1

In the early afternoon on the day

Robert was killed, Arlene was away at

work, Robert was asleep on the couch,

and Gordon, who often took care of

Robert and Arlene’s daughter, went to

help a friend move, taking Robert and

Arlene’s daughter with him. Gordon

usually did not lock the front door if

there were others inside when he left.

1

Estrada testified at trial that she had never met petitioner.

(2 RT 472.)

7

While driving to the friend’s home,

Gordon saw defendant walking on the

street toward the home. When Gordon

returned home sometime later, he found

Robert dead on the couch. Robert had

been shot in the head at very close

range with a shotgun. No valuables had

been taken from the home. Law

enforcement interviewed defendant on

February 18 and March 16, 2000.

During the March 16 interview,

defendant denied ever being at the

Rancho Cucamonga home; ever knowing

Arlene, Gordon, or “Yolie”; or being in

Rancho Cucamonga on the day of the

murder. Defendant also stated that he

was “[a]bsolutely not” in the Rancho

Cucamonga area between 11:00 a.m.

and 1:00 p.m. on February 12 and that

he remained in the “general area” of his

home in Glendora on the day of the

murder. Defendant stated that his truck

had been broken down and that he did

not get rides from others during those

times. When asked how his business

card ended up at the house, defendant

stated that he hands them out in “a lot

of places.” Defendant denied owning any

firearms and stated that he had not

shot a firearm in several years.

Late in the night after that

interview—that is, in the early morning

hours of March 17—defendant was

8

arrested for carrying a loaded shotgun

into a bar. When interrogated later that

day, defendant told law enforcement: “I

have a shotgun. I bought it from a

friend.” Defendant could not remember

when he purchased the firearm, other

than that it was “[a] while back” and

that “[i]t’s been a while.” Defendant said

he purchased it from Lawrence Kraus,

although he did not know how to spell

the name. Defendant denied owning the

shotgun, saying “it doesn’t belong to

me,” but did state that he “bought it

from” Kraus.

A criminalist who examined the

shotgun at the time observed that it had

recently been cleaned and contained

biological material which “very likely ...

came from a blow back event.” The

criminalist concluded that the

ammunition recovered with defendant’s

shotgun was consistent with that

recovered at the murder scene.

According to the analyst who first

tested the biological material recovered

from the shotgun in 2000, the biological

material contained a “very low level of

human DNA.” Law enforcement also

ran the serial number of defendant’s

shotgun through two databases in 2000,

CLETS and NCIC, neither of which

yielded results. Law enforcement did

9

not run the serial number through the

ATF database at the time.

In 2017, when the file for Robert’s

murder was reopened, a search of the

serial number through the ATF

database showed Kraus as the

registered owner. Police then

interviewed Kraus in May 2017, who

said that he gave the shotgun to

defendant in 1999 as partial payment

for some carpentry work defendant had

done for Kraus. Defendant was charged

with the murder shortly thereafter.

Evidence of defendant’s cell

location on the day of the murder also

contradicted his post arrest statements.

Cell tower data showed that a call was

made from defendant’s number at 12:27

p.m. on February 12 within one to one

and a half miles from a tower located in

Rancho Cucamonga. Data also showed

that defendant’s number received or

placed two calls on February 16, one at

11:14 a.m. near Glendora, and the other

at 12:27 p.m. in the Rubidoux area.

Furthermore, according to defendant’s

landlord at the time, defendant both

had access to other vehicles when his

truck was broken, and was seen with a

shotgun in the months surrounding

Robert’s murder.

10

As well, the prosecution relied on

statements defendant made about nine

years after the murder. In 2009,

defendant drove to Las Vegas with

George Lewis, his brother-in-law; at the

time, defendant and George were

married to sisters. According to George,

during the drive, defendant stated that

he was having personal problems with

his wife and “basically ... said he wanted

her whacked.” Defendant stated that he

was “going to do her that day,” that he

needed to “get on with his own life,”

that he “knew how to do it without

being caught,” and that he was “going to

get drunk and take care of it.” On the

return drive, defendant thought aloud

about how he was going to have his wife

killed. When George objected, defendant

stated something to the effect that “it

was in his blood.” On the phone a few

days later, defendant told George that

he “needed to go to bat for” defendant.

Defendant also stated on that phone call

that “it wasn’t his first rodeo.”

Defendant’s theory at trial was that

Gordon was the real killer. The defense

asserted, for instance, that Gordon and

Arlene began having an affair after

moving to Rancho Cucamonga; that

Robert and Arlene’s marriage was

deteriorating; that Gordon and Arlene

had lunch together on Valentine’s Day,

two days before Robert’s death; that

11

Gordon recently inherited a large sum

of money; and that Gordon and Arlene

had sex two days after the murder.

(Appendix E.)

ARGUMENT

THE 17 YEAR DELAY IN FILING THE MURDER

CHARGE VIOLATED PETITIONER’S DUE

PROCESS RIGHTS UNDER THE FIFTH AND

FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS AND THE STATE

COURT’S CONTRARY DECISION VIOLATED

CLEARLY ESTABLISHED SUPREME COURT

PRECEDENT.

In his direct appeal, petitioner argued that he

was denied due process of law and his right to a fair

trial due to the unjustified pre-accusation delay of 17

years, requiring dismissal of the first-degree murder

conviction. The California Court of Appeal rejected

petitioner’s arguments, explaining that he had not

shown prejudice. More specifically, the court

concluded that (1) petitioner had not demonstrated

how testimony by the five witnesses who died during

the 17 year delay would have been material or

admissible, (2) his arguments regarding witnesses’

memory loss were unsupported, (3) the fact that the

Rancho Cucamonga house no longer exists did not

prejudice petitioner, and (4) petitioner’s argument

regarding the usefulness of the destroyed audio

recording of George’s 2009 statement to law

enforcement was speculative. (Ibid.) These

conclusions were an unreasonable application of the

clearly established precedent of United States v.

12

Gouveia, United States v. Lovasco, and United

States v. Marion..

“[T]he Fifth Amendment requires the

dismissal of an indictment, even if it is brought

within the statute of limitations, if the defendant can

prove that the Government’s delay in bringing the

indictment was a deliberate device to gain an

advantage over him and that it caused him actual

prejudice in presenting his defense.” (United States

v. Gouveia, 467 U.S. 180, 192 (1984) (citations

omitted).) But “investigative delay is fundamentally

unlike delay undertaken by the Government solely

‘to gain tactical advantage over the accused[.]’”

(United States v. Lovasco, 431 U.S. 783, 795 (1977)

(citation omitted).) Rather, “to prosecute a defendant

following investigative delay does not deprive him of

due process, even if his defense might have been

somewhat prejudiced by the lapse of time.” (Id. at

796; cf. United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 324

(1971) (citations omitted) (footnote omitted) (“[T]he

Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment would

require dismissal of the indictment if it were shown

at trial that the pre-indictment delay in this case

caused substantial prejudice to appellant’s rights to

a fair trial and that the delay was an intentional

device to gain tactical advantage over the accused.”).)

Due process is also violated upon a showing of delay

incurred by reckless disregard for circumstances

known to the prosecution suggesting that there

existed an appreciable risk that delay would impair

the defendant’s ability to mount an effective defense.

(United States v. Lovasco, supra, 431 U.S. at p. 795,

fn. 17, and People v. Nelson, 43 Cal.4th 1242, 1254

13

(2008).) that there existed an appreciable risk that

delay would impair the defendant’s ability to mount

an effective defense. (United States v. Lovasco,

supra, 431 U.S. at p. 795, fn. 17, and People v.

Nelson, 43 Cal.4th 1242, 1254 (2008).)

Contrary to the trial court’s ruling in this

case, the more than 17 year delay between February

16th, 2000, when Robert Goodson was killed and

June 1st, 2017, when a felony complaint was first

filed against petitioner, was prejudicial. The

prosecutor presented no evidence to establish that

the delay was justified, and the charge should have

been dismissed.

The delay was prejudicial for the reasons

defense counsel argued both before and after trial.

Material witnesses had died during the 17 year

delay, including Allen Goodson (Robert’s father), as

well as Charlie Cioni (his best friend), Vivian Cioni,

Shana Hebner, and Detective Duffy. (3RT 630; 4RT

833.)

Detective Duffy interviewed Arlene Goodson

on the night of the killing. Goodson was impeached

with her statements to Duffy. During her interviews,

she never said she saw petitioner or that he tried to

enter the house or that petitioner accused them of

lying. (2RT 141, 142.)

Arlene could not remember whether she had

spoken to Gordon between her first interview with

Detective Duffy and her second interview with

Officer Espinoza on February 16th, 2000. (2RT 161.)

14

Duffy also interviewed petitioner on February

18th, 2000, at the Rancho Cucamonga Sheriff’s

Department. (4RT 862; 3CT 605.) Those reports were

available but importantly, the officer himself was not

there to testify as to his memory of the events of the

crucial first interviews with Arlene Goodson and

Gordon a few hours after Goodson’s body was

discovered.

Charlie Cioni was perhaps the most important

witness who had died by the time of trial. He was

Goodson’s close friend and frequently stayed over at

the house. (1CT 85.) He was allegedly present the

last time petitioner came to the Baseline house. (1CT

84; 1RT 241.) He would have testified the individual

(petitioner) who came to the house was polite. (2CT

297.) During his preliminary hearing testimony,

Gordon testified he told officers that Charlie would

know who killed Robert Goodson. (1CT 87.) Charlie

knew Robert Goodson well and knew about his

gambling and drug problems. (2CT 296.) There was

some indication that Robert Goodson not only used

drugs but was a drug dealer. (1RT 93.) Gordon and

Arlene were also heavy methamphetamine users.

(2RT 320, 322, 388-389, 436.)

Charlie was also present the night before

Robert was killed when Arlene and Robert were

arguing. (1RT 249, 250; 2RT 390.) There was a

domestic violence incident where police made

Goodson leave the house; their fighting was out of

control. (2 CT 296.) Robert Goodson was afraid to

sleep at home and carried a knife with him. (2 CT

297.) Goodson was verbally abusive to Gordon and

15

pushed Gordon too far. Goodson was aware of the

affair between Gordon and Arlene. (2CT 296-298.)

Cioni would have been a critical defense witness.

The record shows that the jury was focused on

petitioner’s third-party culpability defense. The jury

deliberated for three and a half days (2CT 422-423,

472-473, 475, 477-478, 482) and asked many

questions regarding Gordon and Arlene’s testimony.

(See, e.g., 2CT 469 [requests for Arlene Goodson’s

testimony]; 2CT 470 [question whether Arlene said

Goodson was sleeping in blue chair on February 16];

2CT 470 [question regarding when Arlene resumed

sex with Gordon after Goodson’s death]; 2CT 470

[requests for Arlene’s testimony indicating Allen

Goodson would not let them stay at his house the

night his son was killed]; 2CT 470 [request for

Gordon’s testimony regarding where Goodson was

sleeping when he left on February 16]; 2CT 471

[request for playback of Gordon’s “911" call]; 2CT 474

[request for Sprint engineer’s testimony regarding

where Petitioner’ cell phone pinged on February 12,

2000; 2CT 474 [question as to whether Gordon

identified Petitioner’ shirt color as “orange” when

Gordon did an in-court identification]; 2CT 476

[request for criminalist’s testimony regarding GSR

levels on Gordon’s hands as well as the threshold

level of barium required for a GSR finding]; 2CT 479

[request for Gordon’s and Goodson’s barium and

antimony (GSR) levels]; 2CT 479 [GSR “cutoff levels”

to determine when sufficient chemicals present for a

positive GSR finding]; 2CT 479 [request for Gordon’s

police interview where he abruptly ended the

interview]; 2CT 480 [question as to whether Gordon

16

testified or told police he touched Goodson’s dead

body].) The jury was obviously troubled regarding

the evidence and was focused on the defense theory

that Gordon, not petitioner, was the shooter. The

police had tested Gordon after the shooting and

found that he had gunshot residue ingredients on his

hands. (2 RT 482.) The missing witnesses would

have strengthened petitioner’s theory that Gordon

killed the victim. Of the witnesses who did testify at

trial, memory loss was perhaps the most common

feature of their testimony. This would make sense.

As to the majority of the witnesses, the testimony

largely consisted of the attorneys reading previous

statements the witnesses had made and asking if

that was their testimony.

There was also “memory gain.” Both Gordon

and Arlene remembered significantly more details

about petitioner and his visit 17 years earlier than

either did at the time of Goodson’s death. For

example, Arlene testified she was headed to the door

and the man (petitioner) saw her and accused Robert

of lying. Robert then told her to run so she ran back

into the bedroom and tried to comfort her frightened

daughter. (2RT 392-393.) Even though she was

questioned four times after Robert’s death in

February and March 2000, she did not tell police the

man accused them of lying about who was in the

house, that he tried to enter the house or that she

actually saw him. (2RT 393-394, 415-417.) Gordon

was the only one who “identified” petitioner. Arlene

did not provide any of these important details or

even that she had seen the man until years later.

(2RT 394-395, 416, 418.) Gordon also had an

17

improved memory by the time of trial. For example,

despite his testimony at trial, Gordon never

mentioned that petitioner said “I know she’s in

there, I know she’s in there” or that “Yell” was

hiding in the house. (2RT 503.) It was only the third

time that petitioner came to the house that he

indicated “Yell” was a female. He did not tell the

detective that petitioner said to tell her to come out

or that if she did not come out, people were going to

get hurt. (2RT 504-505.) Gordon never indicated that

petitioner was loud or threatening in any way. These

were critical facts, and would have been in Detective

Bolt’s report if they had been reported. (2RT 505.)

There was also a great deal of lost evidence in

this case, including the house where the killing took

place, and phone records for defense review to

determine who Goodson had communicated with on

the day of his death and earlier. (Petitioner’s phone

records were never pulled.) The recording of George

Lewis’s interview with police in 2009 had been

destroyed. Lewis said his mother, Eleanor Lewis,

assured him that petitioner had an alibi on the day

that Robert Goodson was killed. (3RT 540-541, 542,

543, 547, 548.)

At the preliminary hearing and at trial,

Eleanor Lewis testified she did not tell her son

petitioner had an alibi. (1CT 57; 4RT 818.) Because

the police summary indicated only that there was an

alibi, but the actual interview recording was

destroyed (see 2CT 294-295) and the interviewing

officer did not remember any other specifics,

petitioner lost the ability to establish evidence of the

18

alibi 17 years later.

Petitioner has demonstrated that the passage

of time prejudiced him. The District Attorney’s

stated reasons for the delay were too little to defeat

prejudice. The primary justification for the delay was

that efforts to trace the shotgun petitioner carried in

March 2000 did not yield any instant results. First,

petitioner told officers in his March 2000 interview

that he obtained the shotgun from Lawrence Kraus,

but they made no attempt to trace the gun at the

time. The prosecutor complained that he did not tell

officers how to spell Kraus’s name or where Kraus

lived or when the gun changed hands. (1RT 105-113.)

While there may be different ways of spelling

“Kraus” such as “Krauss” or “Krause,” officers

competently investigating a murder could easily

have tried different spellings.

The prosecution argued there were additional

reasons for the 17 year delay — new evidence from

Lawrence Kraus and that the computerized system

used to trace guns (Etrace) was not available until

2003 — but these claims do not withstand scrutiny.

The shotgun was not entered into Etrace until April

2017. (3RT 773.) Moreover, the same information

available later through Etrace had always been

available by phone, written request, fax, basically

any other method except through a computer. The

police had been using that process since 1968. (3RT

777.)

Detective Wolf attempted to find the owner of

the shotgun in the CLETS system using the

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shotgun’s serial number but his search did not

return an owner. (2RT 610.) He also ran it through

the National Crime Information database (NCIC)

and did not recall any hits. (3RT 628.) He did not run

it through CNI, a county-based system. (3RT 629.)

He did not run the gun through the Alcohol, Tobacco

and Firearms agency, although he was aware that

there were local ATF offices through which the serial

number could have been run, and law enforcement

agencies were required under Penal Code section

11108.3, to report to the ATF all available

information necessary to trace and identify the

history of firearms believed to have been used in

crimes. (3RT 629.)

Shotguns are not registered with the ATF.

(3RT 770.) However, they could be traced like all

other firearms through ATF records. Every business

that buys or sells firearms has an ATF license and

keeps records of every firearm they buy or sell and

who they sell it to. (3RT 771.) The businesses must

respond within 24 hours when ATF contacts them

regarding a trace on a specific firearm. (3RT 772.)

In 2000, the ATF had a firearm trace request

form that law enforcement officers could execute and

file with ATF by fax or mail, and they could call and

request a trace be processed. (3RT 769.) In the late

1990s and early 2000s, there was ETS (Electronic

Trace Submission) where law enforcement could

submit information if they had the software or could

request a trace through ATF. (3RT 770.)

Therefore, in 2000, the same information

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could have been requested by email, mail or

telephone. (3RT 774, 769.) A request could have been

made at any local ATF office. There were offices in

Riverside, San Diego, and Los Angeles counties in

2000. (3RT 778.) The request would have been

fulfilled within 24 to 48 hours if urgent or about a

week if routine. (3RT 776.) Further, Etrace became

available in 2003. (3RT 769.) However, it was not

until April 2017 that an Etrace request was

submitted to ATF for the shotgun at issue in this

case. (3RT 773.) The 14 year delay in submitting a

request for information that had been in the system

the entire time was not justified on this record.

There was also no justification for the failure to

adequately investigate other areas. For instance,

there was no follow-up interview to determine if

“Marty” even existed although Gordon told officers

that is who he had been with all day. (3RT 605.)

There also was no attempt to interview Marty’s

girlfriend, Janet, also allegedly present with Gordon

during the day on February 16th. (3RT 666.)

Interestingly, the police briefly looked at the

case again in 2007, when a sheriff’s department

criminalist retested a sample of biological material

that had been scraped off the shotgun. (3RT

732-734.) While the criminalist found human DNA in

the sample, he could not identify the source of the

DNA. (3 RT 736.) No other efforts to reinvestigate

were made.

The prosecutor’s stated reasons for the 17 year

charging delay (new interview with Lawrence Kraus

and ability to Etrace the shotgun [see 2CT 337]) lack

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the legitimacy found in the case law upholding

precharging delays. Here, there was no delay due to

the need for further investigation or because of new

evidence, new witnesses, new technology, or new

procedures that would have brought more evidence

to light or allowed the existing evidence to be

interpreted in a different way. The case simply

languished for 17 years for no good reason. So there

were two theories regarding Robert Goodson’s

murder. He was either shot and killed by petitioner

who he did not know, who knocked on the door

looking for a woman he had never met, or he was

killed by Gordon or Arlene, who were having an

affair, using meth, and constantly fighting with

Goodson. They both had an obvious motive to kill

Goodson, whereas petitioner had no motive.

Thus, the 17 year delay in prosecuting

petitioner violated the “fundamental conceptions of

justice which lie at the base of our civil and political

institutions and which define the community’s sense

of fair play an d decency.” (People v. Dunn-Gonzalez,

supra, 47 Cal.App.4th at p. 914.) The California

Court of Appeal’s opposite conclusion was contrary to

the clearly established Supreme Court precedent of

United States v. Gouveia, United States v. Lovasco,

and United States v. Marion. (See 28 U.S.C. §

2254(d)(1).)

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, Petitioner respectfully

requests that this Court grant his petition for writ of

certiorari and certify the issue for appeal.

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Dated: January 21, 2025,

Respectfully submitted,

MARILEE MARSHALL

Attorney at Law

State Bar No. 101046

20 North Raymond Ave.

Suite 240

Pasadena, CA 91103

(626) 564-1136

marshall101046@gmail.com

Attorney for Petitioner

Eddie Lee Evans

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