Amicus Curiae Brief — Chevron USA Incorporated, et al., Petitioners v. Plaquemines Parish, Louisiana, et al.

No. 24-813

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

CHEVRON USA INCORPORATED, ET AL.,

Petitioners,

v.

PLAQUEMINES PARISH, LOUISIANA, ET AL.,

Respondents.

On Writ of Certiorari to the United States

Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

BRIEF OF FORMER GOVERNOR

JOHN BEL EDWARDS AS AMICUS CURIAE

IN SUPPORT OF RESPONDENTS

CHRISTOPHER MEYER

EARTHJUSTICE

48 Wall Street

Fifteenth Floor

New York, NY 10005

CAROLINE A. FLYNN

Counsel of Record

EARTHJUSTICE

1001 G Street NW

Suite 1000

Washington, DC 20001

(202) 667-4500

cflynn@earthjustice.org

Counsel for Amicus Curiae

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page(s)

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES………………………………….ii

INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE.............................1

INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF

ARGUMENT ...............................................................3

ARGUMENT ...............................................................5

I.

These Lawsuits Seek Remedies For Modern-Day

Permitting Violations, Not Petitioners’ Wartime

Activities ...............................................................5

II. Congress Did Not Abrogate This Court’s CausalNexus Requirement In 2011.................................8

A. The Removal Clarification Act Broadened The

Federal-Officer Removal Statute In A

Different And Unrelated Respect ...................8

B. At Most, This Court Should Interpret The

2011 Amendment To Reinforce The CausalNexus Requirement .......................................20

III. Alternatively, Petitioners Were Not “Acting

Under” A Federal Officer In Producing Crude

Oil ........................................................................23

CONCLUSION ..........................................................29

(i)

ii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Page(s)

Cases

Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl,

570 U.S. 637 (2013) ..............................................15

Baker v. Atlantic Richfield Co.,

962 F.3d 937 (7th Cir. 2020) .......................... 20-21

Bennett v. MIS Corp.,

607 F.3d 1076 (6th Cir. 2010) ..............................27

Betzner v. Boeing Co.,

910 F.3d 1010 (7th Cir. 2018) ..............................26

BNSF Railway Co. v. Loos,

586 U.S. 310 (2019) ..............................................15

Board of Cnty. Comm’rs of Boulder Cnty. v. Suncor

Energy (U.S.A.) Inc.,

25 F.3d 1238 (10th Cir. 2022) ..............................27

Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. Williams,

62 F.3d 408 (D.C. Cir. 1995) ................................16

California Div. of Labor Standards Enf’t v.

Dillingham Constr., N.A., Inc.,

519 U.S. 316 (1997) ..............................................21

Colorado v. Symes,

286 U.S. 510 (1932) .......................................... 8, 20

Cyan, Inc. v. Beaver Cnty. Emps. Ret. Fund,

583 U.S. 416 (2018) .......................................... 4, 11

iii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued

Page(s)

DeFiore v. SOC LLC,

85 F.4th 546 (9th Cir. 2023) .......................... 20-21

Director of Rev. of Mo. v. CoBank ACB,

531 U.S. 316 (2001) ........................................ 12, 19

Fidelitad, Inc. v. Insitu, Inc.,

904 F.3d 1095 (9th Cir. 2018) ..............................24

Gay v. Ruff,

292 U.S. 25 (1934) ............................................ 9, 20

Georgia v. Meadows,

88 F.4th 1331 (11th Cir. 2023) ............................20

Government of Puerto Rico v. Express Scripts, Inc.,

119 F.4th 174 (1st Cir. 2024) ...............................27

Graves v. 3M Co.,

17 F.4th 764 (8th Cir. 2021) .......................... 24, 26

I.N.S. v. Stevic,

467 U.S. 407 (1984) ........................................ 13, 15

In re Commonwealth’s Motion to Appoint Counsel

Against or Directed to Def. Ass’n of Phila.,

790 F.3d 457 (3d Cir. 2015) ........................... 14, 18

In re White,

No. 10-185, 2010 WL 923400 (E.D. La. Mar. 10,

2010) .....................................................................16

iv

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued

Page(s)

Jefferson Cnty. v. Acker,

527 U.S. 423 (1999) ........................................ 10, 21

Lindke v. Freed,

601 U.S. 187 (2024) ........................................ 25-26

Maracich v. Spears,

570 U.S. 48 (2013) .......................................... 20-21

Maryland v. Soper (No. 1),

270 U.S. 9 (1926) .................................. 4, 10, 13, 22

Mellouli v. Lynch,

575 U.S. 798 (2015) ..............................................21

Mesa v. California,

489 U.S. 121 (1989) ........................................ 10, 20

New York State Conf. of Blue Cross & Blue Shield

Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co.,

514 U.S. 645 (1995) ..............................................21

Papp v. Fore-Kast Sales Co.,

842 F.3d 805 (3d Cir. 2016) .................................24

Parish of Parish of Cameron v. Auster Oil & Gas,

Inc., 420 F. Supp. 3d 532 (W.D. La 2019) ............6

Plaquemines v. Riverwood Prod. Co.,

No. 18-5217, 2019 WL 2271118 (E.D. La. May 28,

2019) ................................................................... 6-7

v

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued

Page(s)

Plaquemines Parish v. Chevron USA, Inc.,

No. 22-30055, 2022 WL 9914869 (5th Cir. Oct. 17,

2022) .....................................................................28

Price v. Johnson,

No. 3:09-cv-476-M, 2009 WL 10704853 (N.D. Tex.

Apr. 10, 2009) .......................................................15

Pulsifer v. United States,

601 U.S. 124 (2024) ..............................................14

State by Tong v. Exxon Mobil Corp.,

83 F.4th 122 (2d Cir. 2023) ..................................24

United States v. Miller,

604 U.S. 518 (2025) ..............................................21

United States v. Tinklenberg,

563 U.S. 647 (2011) ..............................................23

Watson v. Philip Morris Co.,

551 U.S. 142 (2007) ............ 5, 7-9, 20, 23-25, 27-28

West Virginia ex rel. Hunt v. CaremarkPCS Health,

L.L.C.,

140 F.4th 188 (4th Cir. 2025) ..............................27

Willingham v. Morgan,

395 U.S. 402 (1969) ........................................ 10, 22

Yates v. United States,

574 U.S. 528 (2015) ..............................................15

vi

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued

Statutes

Page(s)

28 U.S.C. § 1442 ......................................................3, 8

28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1) ..................5, 8-9, 11, 13, 23, 26

28 U.S.C. § 1442(d)(1) ...............................................12

42 U.S.C. § 1983 .................................................. 25-26

Act of Aug. 23, 1916, ch. 399, 39 Stat. 532 ...............10

Act of July 13, 1866, ch. 184, § 67, 14 Stat. 98...........9

Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 646, 62 Stat. 938 ..............10

Act of Mar. 2, 1833, ch. 57, 4 Stat. 632.......................9

Customs Act of 1815, ch. 31, § 8, 3 Stat. 198 .............9

La. R.S. § 49:214.22(3) ................................................3

La. R.S. § 49:214.23(13) ..............................................5

La. R.S. § 49:214.30(A)(1) ....................................... 5-6

La. R.S. § 49:214.34(C)(2) ...........................................6

La. R.S. § 49:214.36(D)................................................6

La. R.S. § 49:214.36(E) ................................................6

La. R.S. § 49:214.36(J) ................................................2

vii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued

Page(s)

Removal Clarification Act of 2011,

Pub. L. No. 112-51, 125 Stat. 545 .................. 10-12

Other Authorities

H.R. Rep. No. 112-17 (2011).....................12, 16, 18-19

Jeff Adelson, Nola.com, Gov. Edwards Instructs

Administration to Intervene in Parish Coastal

Suits Against Oil and Gas Companies (Apr. 11,

2016), https://perma.cc/8VDT-DNTQ. ...................1

Louisiana Exec. Dep’t, Proc. No. 43 JBE 2017, State

of Emergency – Coastal Louisiana, at 1 (Apr. 18,

2017) (Coastal Emergency Proclamation),

https://perma.cc/3XR9-KQYP ................................2

Removal Clarification Act of 2010: Hearing on H.R.

5281 Before the Subcomm. on Courts & Comp.

Policy of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th

Cong. (2010) ................................................... 15-17

S. Ct. R. 14.1(a)..........................................................29

Sabrina Wilson, Gov. Edwards Applauds the

Approval of Restoration Plans for La’s Fragile

Coastline, Fox8Live.com (May 26, 2023),

https://perma.cc/86KP-FM2Z.................................2

Samuel L. Bray, The Mischief Rule, 109 Geo. L. J.

967 (2021) .............................................................15

INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE

Amicus John Bel Edwards served as the Governor

of Louisiana from 2016 to 2024. 1 During his time in

office, Governor Edwards prioritized efforts to combat

the rapid deterioration of the Louisiana coastline. He

declared a state of emergency in response to coastal

erosion. His administration invested over $15 billion

in coastal-restoration projects. And when coastal

parishes, including Plaquemines Parish and Cameron

Parish, sued oil and gas companies under state law for

the damage caused by the companies’ drilling,

dredging, and waste-removal operations, Governor

Edwards directed the Louisiana Department of

Natural Resources to intervene in the lawsuits to

protect the State’s interests and ensure that any

recoveries would be dedicated to coastal restoration. 2

He accordingly has firsthand insight into the factual

and legal background of this case, including

petitioners’ protracted efforts to avoid its adjudication

in a Louisiana court.

Governor Edwards also submits this brief to

underscore the State’s interest in seeking redress in

its own courts. Nearly half the State’s population

No counsel for a party authored this brief in whole or in

part, and no such counsel, party, or other person or entity—other

than amicus curiae and his counsel—made a monetary

contribution intended to fund the preparation or submission of

this brief. Amicus files this brief solely in his individual capacity.

1

Jeff Adelson, Nola.com, Gov. Edwards Instructs

Administration to Intervene in Parish Coastal Suits Against Oil

and Gas Companies (Apr. 11, 2016), https://perma.cc/8VDTDNTQ.

2

(1)

2

lives on the coast. 3 It is home to five of the top fifteen

ports in the country. 4 In addition to wildlife and

recreation, the coastal region supports numerous

business sectors, including the energy and seafood

industries. 5 The catastrophic land loss the State is

experiencing—at a rate of one football field of coastal

land every hour and a half—thus poses an existential

threat to Louisiana citizens, its culture, its industrial

base, and its economy. 6

Respondents have pursued these actions under

Louisiana’s State and Local Coastal Resources

Management Act of 1978 (SLCRMA) to ensure that

the firms that contributed to that damage (and

profited from it) pay their fair share of remediation

costs. There is no question that such recoveries will

go to remediation: As a result of a 2022 Louisiana law

that Governor Edwards signed, SLCRMA damages

must be directed to coastline remediation and

mitigation projects. See La. R.S. § 49:214.36(J). And

notwithstanding petitioners’ insinuations to the

contrary, there is no reason to doubt the fairness or

impartiality of the Louisiana citizens serving on

parish juries. Louisiana is the nation’s second largest

producer of oil and gas. 7 Coastal residents are hardly

Louisiana Exec. Dep’t, Proc. No. 43 JBE 2017, State of

Emergency – Coastal Louisiana, at 1 (Apr. 18, 2017) (Coastal

Emergency Proclamation), https://perma.cc/3XR9-KQYP.

3

4

Id.

5

Id.

See Sabrina Wilson, Gov. Edwards Applauds the

Approval of Restoration Plans for La’s Fragile Coastline,

Fox8Live.com (May 26, 2023), https://perma.cc/86KP-FM2Z.

6

7

Coastal Emergency Proclamation 1.

3

hostile to the industry. And in enacting SLCRMA, the

Louisiana legislature likewise recognized the need

“[t]o support and encourage multiple use of coastal

resources” while “provid[ing] for adequate economic

growth and development.” La. R.S. § 49:214.22(3).

These cases simply concern disputes about

petitioners’ unpermitted use of state land—not

petitioners’ incidental status as federal contractors in

the mid-20th century—and those disputes should be

decided in state court.

INTRODUCTION AND

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

Petitioners have spent the past twelve years

attempting to remove these state coastalmanagement suits from the Louisiana courts. In their

latest attempt, petitioners have homed in on their

predecessors’ past role as wartime suppliers of

military aviation fuel (avgas) to argue that they are

entitled to the protection of the federal-officer removal

statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1442. This Court should reject

petitioners’ astonishingly broad understanding of

Section 1442’s scope.

I. As an initial matter, petitioners and their amici

mischaracterize respondents’ claims. Respondents

are not “seek[ing] to impose liability against federal

contractors for their work helping the United States

win World War II.” Barr Br. 2. Petitioners’ oilproduction activities in the 1940s are not the basis for

their post-1980 SLCRMA liability. Instead, those pre1980 activities—to the extent they are relevant at

all—bear on petitioners’ attempted state-law defense.

Given the much-diminished potential for state-court

prejudice in these circumstances, this is far from a

4

heartland case for federal-officer removal.

II. Petitioners also misinterpret Congress’s 2011

amendments to Section 1442. In decisions dating

back nearly a century—and across different iterations

of the statute—this Court has required a causal nexus

between the officer’s exercise of federal authority and

the conduct challenged in the state-law claim. See,

e.g., Maryland v. Soper (No. 1), 270 U.S. 9, 33 (1926).

The linchpin of petitioners’ argument before this

Court is that Congress eliminated this wellestablished causal-nexus requirement in the Removal

Clarification Act of 2011. But the change that

petitioners seize upon was no more than a

“conforming amendment” designed to effectuate the

Removal Clarification Act’s true aim: to enable federal

officers to remove pre-suit discovery proceedings,

which was previously the subject of a circuit split.

That the Act was meant to fix the distinct problem

of pre-suit discovery is evident on the face of the Act’s

text and confirmed throughout the legislative record.

Further, reading the 2011 amendment as petitioners

do would lead to the anomalous conclusion that

Congress maintained the causal-nexus requirement

for federal officers engaged in law-enforcement and

revenue-collection duties, but eliminated it for

everyone else. This Court does not readily conclude

that Congress has made fundamental changes to

statutory regimes through technical or conforming

amendments, see, e.g., Cyan, Inc. v. Beaver Cnty.

Emps. Ret. Fund, 583 U.S. 416, 430-31 (2018), and

certainly not in such a counterintuitive manner. The

Court should reject petitioners’ attempt to ascribe

improbable significance to the Removal Clarification

5

Act and instead adhere to the causal-nexus

requirement entrenched in this Court’s precedent.

III. Even if the 2011 amendment could be read as

expansively as petitioners urge, removal would still be

improper because petitioners were not “acting under”

the federal government, 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1), when

producing oil from the Louisiana coast in the 1940s.

This Court has instructed that Section 1442(a)(1)

authorizes removal only if the private defendant was

“ ‘acting under’ ” a federal officer “in carrying out the

‘act[s]’ that are the subject of [the plaintiffs’]

complaint.” Watson v. Philip Morris Co., 551 U.S. 142,

147 (2007) (first set of brackets in original; citation

omitted; emphasis added). But the complaints in

these cases concern petitioners’ oil-production

activities, and petitioners had no federal contracts to

produce oil. The Court may affirm the judgment on

this alternative basis.

ARGUMENT

I.

These Lawsuits Seek Remedies For

Modern-Day Permitting Violations, Not

Petitioners’ Wartime Activities

In light of petitioners’ and their amici’s

presentation, it is first necessary to clarify the limited

respect in which petitioners’ World War II-era

operations feature in this state resource-management

case.

SLCRMA regulates “any use or activity within the

coastal zone which has a direct and significant impact

on coastal waters,” La. R.S. § 49:214.23(13), and which

is “of state or local concern,” id. § 49:214.30(A)(1).

Beginning on the law’s effective date in 1980, such

6

uses require a permit. Id.; see Pet. App. 3. If an entity

carries out such uses without a permit, or in violation

of permit conditions, it can be liable for actual

restoration, restoration costs, and damages. La. R.S.

§ 49:214.36(D) and (E); see, e.g., Parish of Plaquemines

v. Riverwood Prod. Co., No. 18-5217, 2019 WL

2271118, at *1 (E.D. La. May 28, 2019).

The State and local governments with stateapproved programs may enforce the law’s

requirements.

La. R.S. § 49:214.36(D).

Here,

respondents allege that petitioners violated SLCRMA

by conducting certain oil and gas operations—namely,

drilling, dredging, and waste-disposal activities—

along the Louisiana coast after 1980 without a permit.

See, e.g., 18-cv-05256 D. Ct. Doc. 1-8, at 5, 9-15 (May

23, 2018); see also La. Br. 8-9.

None of respondents’ claims seek to hold

petitioners liable for anything they (or their

predecessors) did prior to 1980. But SLCRMA also

contains a grandfather-clause defense. That clause

provides that “[i]ndividual specific uses” of coastal

resources “legally commenced or established prior to”

1980 “shall not require a coastal use permit.” La. R.S.

§ 49:214.34(C)(2). Five years after the parishes

brought these suits (and after petitioners’ other

attempts at federal removal stalled out), petitioners

pivoted to this grandfather clause. They argued that

some of the improper coastal uses at issue in

respondents’ claims were actually “commenced or

established” before 1980—including as far back as the

1940s—and that petitioners were therefore exempt

from post-1980 SLCRMA permitting obligations. See,

e.g., Parish of Cameron v. Auster Oil & Gas, Inc., 420

7

F. Supp. 3d 532, 536 (W.D. La. 2019); Riverwood, 2019

WL 2271118, at *2-*3. 8

In other words, petitioners were the ones to push

their World War II-era operations to the foreground of

these cases—not respondents. To be clear, SLCRMA

does not impose “retroactive liability.” Barr Br. 3. 9

Nor is it correct to say (as petitioners and their amici

repeatedly assert) that “[t]he Parishes and the State

seek to hold Petitioners liable for their World War II

activities.” Tort Reform Br. 2; see also, e.g., Pet. i; Barr

Br. 2; W. Va. Br. 4; Oil & Gas Ass’ns Br. 3. Having

the removal question turn on this peripheral aspect of

the case amounts to the tail wagging the dog.

And seizing these suits from the Louisiana courts

does not align with the animating purposes behind the

federal-officer removal statute. There is hardly a

“significant risk” of “ ‘local prejudice’ ” when the basis

for petitioners’ liability is their post-1980 uses of the

Louisiana coast, not their long-ago activities as

federal contractors. Watson v. Philip Morris Co., 551

U.S. 142, 150, 152 (2007) (citation omitted). Nor is

state-court consideration of the grandfather-clause

issue “likely to disable federal officials from taking

necessary action designed to enforce federal law,” id.

Petitioners began advancing the federal-removal theory

at issue in this case—the one based on their World War II

contracts for avgas—even later, in 2023. Pet. App. 9; La. Br. 1012.

8

The State’s brief in opposition to certiorari stated that

“[SLCRMA’s] permitting regime is retroactive.” La. Br. in Opp.

4. That sentence inadvertently omitted a word; it was intended

to state that the permitting regime is “not retroactive.” See La.

Br. 7 n.2.

9

8

at 152—because petitioners’ work for the federal

government is at most tangentially relevant to a statelaw defense. To find federal-officer removal proper

under these circumstances would thus “expand the

scope of the statute considerably,” id. at 153, at a

serious cost to federalism and comity. See Colorado v.

Symes, 286 U.S. 510, 518 (1932) (the federal-officer

removal statute must be construed “with highest

regard” for States’ “equal” right “to make and enforce

their own laws”).

II. Congress Did Not Abrogate This Court’s

Causal-Nexus Requirement In 2011

This Court has long interpreted the federal-officer

removal statute to require a causal nexus between the

officer’s federal duties and the claims in the state-law

action. The crux of petitioners’ argument is that

Congress deliberately discarded that well-established

requirement through a 2011 conforming amendment

to the current iteration of the statute, 28 U.S.C.

§ 1442(a)(1).

But text, context, and statutory

background refute that improbable understanding.

At most, Congress’s addition of the indeterminate

phrase “relating to” should be interpreted to reinforce

the causal-nexus test, not to supplant it.

A. The

Removal

Clarification

Act

Broadened

The

Federal-Officer

Removal Statute In A Different And

Unrelated Respect

1. The federal-officer removal statute, 28 U.S.C.

§ 1442, provides that the following category of statecourt cases may be removed to federal court:

9

(a) A civil action or criminal prosecution that is

commenced in a State court and that is against or

directed to . . .

(1) The United States or any agency thereof or

any officer (or any person acting under that

officer) of the United States or of any agency

thereof . . . for or relating to any act under color

of such office or on account of any right, title, or

authority claimed under any Act of Congress

for the apprehension or punishment of

criminals or the collection of the revenue.

28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1).

The current provision has a long pedigree.

Congress first provided for removal of cases against

federal customs officers in 1815. See Watson, 551 U.S.

at 148. That statute permitted officers to remove an

action “for any thing done, or omitted to be done, as

an officer of the customs, or for any thing done by

virtue of this act or under colour thereof.” Customs

Act of 1815, ch. 31, § 8, 3 Stat. 198. To “prevent

paralysis of operations of the federal government,”

Gay v. Ruff, 292 U.S. 25, 32 (1934), Congress later

provided for removal of cases against officers

enforcing the federal revenue laws. Act of Mar. 2,

1833, ch. 57, 4 Stat. 632, 633. That 1833 statute

permitted removal of cases “for or on account of any

act done under the revenue laws of the United States,

or under colour thereof.” Id.

In the ensuing decades, Congress used similar

language to extend the right of removal to other

federal officers and those assisting them. See, e.g., Act

of July 13, 1866, ch. 184, § 67, 14 Stat. 98, 171

(permitting a revenue officer to remove cases brought

10

“on account of any act done under color of his office”);

Act of Aug. 23, 1916, ch. 399, 39 Stat. 532, 532

(permitting an officer of the federal courts to remove

cases brought “for or on account of any act done under

color of his office or in the performance of his duties as

such officer”); Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 646, 62 Stat.

938, 938 (permitting all federal officers to remove

cases brought “for any act under color of [federal]

office”).

But even as Congress steadily extended the

removal right to new categories of officers, one core

requirement remained the same: The officer had to

show a “causal connection,” or “causal nexus,”

between his exercise of federal authority and the

challenged conduct. See Maryland v. Soper (No. 1),

270 U.S. 9, 33 (1926) (federal revenue officers and

their chauffeur; “causal connection”); Willingham v.

Morgan, 395 U.S. 402, 409 (1969) (federal prison

employees; “causal connection”) (citation omitted);

Mesa v. California, 489 U.S. 121, 131-33 (1989) (postal

service employees; “causal connection”) (citation

omitted); Jefferson Cnty. v. Acker, 527 U.S. 423, 43233 (1999) (federal judges; “causal connection” and

“essential nexus”).

2. In 2011, Congress passed the Removal

Clarification Act. Pub. L. No. 112-51, 125 Stat. 545.

Among other changes, the Act amended Section

1442(a)(1) to its current form, with the new language

italicized:

(a) A civil action or criminal prosecution that is

commenced in a State court and that is against or

directed to . . .

11

(1) The United States or any agency thereof or

any officer (or any person acting under that

officer) of the United States or of any agency

thereof . . . for or relating to any act under color

of such office or on account of any right, title, or

authority claimed under any Act of Congress

for the apprehension or punishment of

criminals or the collection of the revenue.

28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1) (emphasis added); see 125

Stat. at 545.

In petitioners’ view, this amendment had a seismic

implication. By adding the phrase “or relating to”—

when that clause of Section 1442(a)(1) had previously

said “for”—Congress deliberately abrogated this

Court’s causal-connection test with respect to federal

officers, agencies, and those acting under their

authority. Pet. Br. 26, 28-32.

Petitioners are mistaken.

The Removal

Clarification Act’s sole substantive change was to

authorize removal of state pre-suit discovery

proceedings targeting federal officials, which was

previously the subject of a circuit split. The addition

of “relating to” was a conforming amendment

designed to reconcile Section 1442(a)(1)’s language

with that change. The amendment text, statutory

background, and the legislative record—which

affirms this Court’s causal-nexus requirement—are

transparent on this point. And where there has been

an “entrenched practice” for allocating jurisdiction

between state and federal courts, this Court has been

skeptical of the claim that Congress “upended” that

practice “by way of a conforming amendment.” Cyan,

Inc. v. Beaver Cnty. Emps. Ret. Fund, 583 U.S. 416,

12

430-31 (2018); see also Director of Rev. of Mo. v.

CoBank ACB, 531 U.S. 316, 324 (2001). The Court

should be equally skeptical of petitioners’

interpretation in this case.

a. As relevant here, the Removal Clarification Act

included two operative provisions and a “[c]onforming

amendment[].” 125 Stat. at 545. The first operative

provision amended Section 1442(a) to state that a

federal officer may remove a state-court civil action or

criminal prosecution that is “against or directed to”

her. See supra at 10. The second added a subsection

newly defining “civil action” and “criminal

prosecution” to include “any proceeding (whether or

not ancillary to another proceeding) to the extent that

in such proceeding a judicial order, including a

subpoena for testimony or documents, is sought or

issued.” 125 Stat. at 545 (currently codified at 28

U.S.C. § 1442(d)(1)). The conforming amendment

then altered Section 1442(a)(1) to refer to actions or

prosecutions “for or relating to an act under color of

[federal] office,” along with another technical change.

Id.; see supra at 11. 10

When viewed alongside the Act’s substantive

changes, the rationale for the conforming amendment

is both obvious and unremarkable. When it comes to

a discovery proceeding that precedes an actual suit or

prosecution—for

instance,

a

subpoena

or

investigatory deposition—it is difficult to say that the

Specifically, Section 1442(a)(1) had previously referred to

a federal officer “sued in an official or individual capacity”; the

Act deleted the word “sued.” 125 Stat. at 545; see also H.R. Rep.

No. 112-17, pt. 1, at 7-8 (2011) (showing all additions and

deletions).

10

13

subpoena or deposition is “for” the officer’s acts under

color of federal law. That is because the subpoena or

deposition seeks information; it does not assert a

claim or charge. But by adding the phrase “relating

to”—thus centering the inquiry on whether the

discovery sought pertains to the officer’s federal

conduct—the conforming amendment removes this

awkwardness. Thus, read in context, the amendment

is “plainly not intended to change the standard” for

federal-officer removal more broadly. I.N.S. v. Stevic,

467 U.S. 407, 428 (1984) (discussing a conforming

amendment).

Petitioners’ interpretation of the conforming

amendment is even more implausible upon observing

what Congress did not change. The federal-officer

removal statute had its origins in the revenueenforcement context, and the statute “is most

obviously implicated” in the context of “enforcement

activity.” Brief for United States at 25, Watson v.

Philip Morris Co., 551 U.S. 142 (2007) (No. 05-1284)

(Watson U.S. Br.); see also supra at 9. But the

Removal Clarification Act did not touch the clause of

Section 1442(a)(1) specifically dealing with lawenforcement and revenue officers. See 28 U.S.C.

§ 1442(a)(1) (allowing for removal of actions brought

“on account of any right, title or authority claimed

under any Act of Congress for the apprehension or

punishment of criminals or the collection of the

revenue”) (emphasis added); see also supra at 11.

Rather, Congress preserved the “on account of”

language in that clause—which is the very language

that first established the causal-nexus test. See

Soper, 270 U.S. at 33 (federal prohibition officers,

which this Court described as revenue officers); see

14

also Pet. Br. 26 (acknowledging that this Court

previously interpreted “on account of ” to require the

causal-connection test).

It would be nonsensical for Congress to have

eliminated the causal-nexus requirement for federal

officers generally and for not those two core

categories. Indeed, petitioners offer no reason why

Congress would have wanted to expand access to

removal except in those instances where the policy

rationale for removal is most acute. 11 Rather than

attributing that wholly counterintuitive intent to

Congress, it makes far more sense to interpret the

addition of “or relating to” in the prior clause as a

nonsubstantive change designed solely to iron out a

textual incongruity. Cf. Pulsifer v. United States, 601

U.S. 124, 149 (2024) (rejecting a construction of a

statute that, while grammatical, “makes a hash of the

scheme Congress devised”).

b. The legislative background of the Removal

Clarification Act forcefully confirms that Congress did

not intend to abrogate this Court’s settled causalconnection standard. When Congress describes an

amendment as “conforming,” this Court has

considered extrinsic evidence to confirm that

The same goes for the courts of appeals that have

interpreted the Removal Clarification Act to eliminate the

causal-nexus requirement—none of whom have grappled with

the incongruity of Congress retaining the requirement only for

certain types of federal officers.

Only one court even

acknowledged the preserved language.

See In re

Commonwealth’s Motion to Appoint Counsel Against or Directed

to Def. Ass’n of Phila., 790 F.3d 457, 470 n.7 (3d Cir. 2015).

11

15

Congress viewed the amendment as non-substantive.

See BNSF Railway Co. v. Loos, 586 U.S. 310, 320

(2019) (crediting IRS reading of legislative history to

conclude that “technical amendments” did not alter

the definition of “compensation” in the Railroad

Retirement Tax Act); Stevic, 467 U.S. at 428 (citing a

House committee report to conclude that Congress

“explicitly recognized” a conforming amendment as

merely clarifying).

More generally, this Court

routinely interprets statutory text in light of the

problem or catalyst that moved Congress to enact it.

See, e.g., Yates v. United States, 574 U.S. 528, 532,

535-36 (2015); Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 570 U.S.

637, 649 (2013); see also Samuel L. Bray, The Mischief

Rule, 109 Geo. L. J. 967, 992-99 (2021) (discussing this

“mischief rule” of interpretation).

Here, Congress could not have been clearer about

the limited scope of the Removal Clarification Act and

the targeted problem the legislation was designed to

fix.

The Act’s sponsor, Representative Henry

Johnson, explained that he introduced it to address

state pre-suit discovery laws that permitted federal

officials to be deposed or subpoenaed “despite the fact

that a civil action ha[d] not yet commenced.” Removal

Clarification Act of 2010: Hearing on H.R. 5281 Before

the Subcomm. on Courts & Comp. Policy of the H.

Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong., at 1 (2010)

(House Hearing). 12

As Representative Johnson

The issue was top of mind because of a Texas state court’s

recent attempted pre-suit deposition of Representative Eddie

Bernice Johnson. See Price v. Johnson, No. 3:09-cv-476-M, 2009

WL 10704853 (N.D. Tex. Apr. 10, 2009), appeal dismissed, 600

F.3d 460 (5th Cir. 2010) (referenced at House Hearing 5, 12, 2324, 38, 58-59, 61-62, 72, 75-77, 81-83, 85 and House Report 3-4).

12

16

explained, the Act would resolve a conflict in the lower

courts and clarify that officers could remove such a

proceeding. Id. at 1-2. Crucially, however, he

“stress[ed]” that the Act would “not chang[e] the

underlying removal law.” Id. at 2 (emphasis added).

During the House committee hearing on the Act,

every testifying witness—including government

witnesses—agreed that its objective was narrow. See

H.R. Rep. No. 112-17, pt. 1, at 2 (2011) (House Report)

(explaining that “[a]ll [witnesses] agreed with the

purpose of ” the bill). Deputy Assistant Attorney

General Beth Brinkmann testified that the law would

“clarify one aspect of [Section 1442] concerning

removal of a matter when a litigant seeks a subpoena

in State court against a Federal official.” House

Hearing 7 (emphasis added). House General Counsel

Irvin Nathan testified that the Act “appropriately

leaves in place the current law and practices

governing Federal officer removal in nearly all

respects,” and would “not alter the standard for

general removal for Federal officers under [Section]

1442.” Id. at 13 (emphasis added); see also id. at 17

(explaining that “each of the currently existing

requirements of the federal officer removal statute

still must be met”). Professor Lonny Hoffman’s

testimony explained that the Act addressed the “vital

policy issue” of “allowing removal of a State pre-suit

Nor was Representative Johnson’s the only case to involve presuit discovery against members of Congress or their aides. See

Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. Williams, 62 F.3d 408

(D.C. Cir. 1995) (referenced at House Hearing 21, 30, 41-43, 6364); In re White, No. 10-185, 2010 WL 923400 (E.D. La. Mar. 10,

2010) (referenced at House Hearing 24-25, 30-31).

17

discovery request.” Id. at 30. And Professor Arthur

Hellman agreed that the Act’s “purpose” was to

“clarify” whether removal applied in, for example, an

“action for pre-suit discovery directed at a Member of

Congress.” Id. at 58; see also id. at 61-64, 81 (noting

the “extensive controversy” over this issue and

discussing the circuit split).

No witness suggested that the Act would eliminate

this Court’s causal-nexus requirement. Nor did they

dispute the sponsor of the Act’s claim that the Act

would not alter the general standard for removal. See

supra at 15-16.

Indeed, multiple witnesses specifically explained

the technical reason for adding the words “or relating

to” in Section 1442(a)(1). As Professor Hellman put it,

“[b]ecause the amended § 1442 would now include

proceedings that do not seek to impose civil liability or

a criminal penalty on the federal officer, [the Act]

allows removal not only in proceedings ‘for’ acts under

color of the federal office but also in proceedings

‘relating to’ such acts.” House Hearing 68. And the

House General Counsel noted that the “relating to”

change was a “language clarification[]” “reaffirm[ing]

that ancillary proceedings, such as subpoena

enforcement matters and pre-suit discovery

proceedings, fall within the scope of Section 1442.” Id.

at 20; see also id. at 44 (Prof. Hoffman explaining that

“[o]ther minor changes to existing § 1442(a) would

make it consistent with the new subsection” defining

the terms civil action and criminal prosecution to

include pre-suit proceedings).

The House committee report further confirms the

Act’s limited scope. The report explains that the Act

18

“responds to recent Federal court cases that reflect an

inter- and intra-circuit split as to whether State ‘presuit discovery’ laws qualify as civil actions or criminal

prosecutions that are removable under § 1442.”

House Report 2. The report explicitly describes the

pre-suit discovery situation as “the problem” the bill

addresses. Id. at 3-4; see also id. (describing a recent

“high-profile case” involving the attempted deposition

of a sitting congresswoman in Texas state court); id.

at 6 (explaining, under the heading “Performance

Goals and Objectives,” that the law “allows any

Federal officer subpoenaed pursuant to a State presuit discovery statute to remove the civil action or

criminal prosecution to U.S. district court”).

In addition, the House committee report affirmed

the causal-nexus requirement, stating that a

removing officer “must demonstrate a causal

connection between the charged conduct and asserted

federal authority.” House Report 3; see also id.

(explaining that under current law, the state-court

action must be “based on acts undertaken pursuant to

color of office”). Nothing in the report qualified this

approving

description

of

the

causal-nexus

requirement or suggested that the requirement would

disappear upon the amendment’s enactment.

To be sure, the committee report also stated that

the addition of “relating to” was “intended to broaden

the universe of acts that enable Federal officers to

remove to Federal court.” House Report 6. Petitioners

and some lower courts have relied on this sentence to

conclude that the Act eliminated the causal-nexus

requirement.

Pet. Br. 19; see, e.g., In re

Commonwealth’s Motion to Appoint Counsel Against

or Directed to Def. Ass’n of Phila., 790 F.3d 457, 471-

19

72 (3d Cir. 2015).

But that is not what the sentence means. Read in

context alongside the remainder of the committee

report—which, like the Act’s text and the rest of the

legislative record, focuses on the Act’s purpose of

including pre-suit discovery—this sentence is best

read to refer to the “acts” in state court that trigger

removal. Specifically, the sentence is noting that the

act of issuing a subpoena or ordering a deposition will

trigger removal, thus broadening the universe of

triggers beyond the actual filing of a lawsuit or the

initiation of a prosecution. House Report 6.

Petitioners instead interpret this sentence in the

committee report to refer to the universe of past “acts”

by the federal officer that qualify for removal. But

under that reading, the sentence would not accurately

characterize the textual change it purports to

describe. Even on petitioners’ interpretation of the

amended Section 1442(a)(1), the addition of “relating

to” expands the universe of civil actions or

prosecutions that can be removed, not the category of

underlying “acts” by the official; the amended text still

refers to “acts under color of such office.” See supra at

10-11.

At bottom, petitioners are arguing that Congress

discarded nearly one hundred years of settled practice

via a technical conforming amendment passed with

minimal fanfare. But as noted, this Court does not

lightly conclude that Congress has made a “radical—

but entirely implicit—change” through “ ‘technical

and conforming amendments.’ ” Director of Rev. of

Mo., 531 U.S. at 324 (citation omitted). And this

Court has refused to “depart from [its] long-standing

20

interpretation” of the federal-officer removal statute

in particular when faced with an ambiguous

amendment to the provision. Mesa, 489 U.S. at 135;

see also Gay, 292 U.S. at 31-32. It should follow the

same course here. 13

B. At Most, This Court Should Interpret

The 2011 Amendment To Reinforce The

Causal-Nexus Requirement

At most, Congress’s addition of “relating to” should

be interpreted to reinforce this Court’s causal-nexus

test, not to supplant it. See Baker v. Atlantic Richfield

Co., 962 F.3d 937, 944 (7th Cir. 2020) (understanding

the new language to “comport[] with the Supreme

Court’s [pre-2011] decisions”); DeFiore v. SOC LLC,

85 F.4th 546, 557 n.6 (9th Cir. 2023) (interpreting the

new language to incorporate the test from “the

Supreme Court’s decisions”); Georgia v. Meadows, 88

F.4th 1331, 1343-44 (11th Cir. 2023) (continuing to

apply the causal-nexus test), cert. denied, 145 S. Ct.

545 (2024).

This Court has repeatedly recognized that,

divorced from context, the phrase “relating to” is

“essentially indeterminate”—because “relations[] stop

nowhere.” Maracich v. Spears, 570 U.S. 48, 59 (2013)

This Court has said that Section 1442 should be

“ ‘liberally construed’ ” to effect removal. Watson, 551 U.S. at 147

(quoting Symes, 286 U.S. at 517).

But even a “liberal

construction nonetheless can find limits in a text’s language,

context, history, and purposes.” Id. And here, the text, context,

and history of the Removal Clarification Act—including the fact

that Congress left unaltered the “on account of” language—

demonstrate that Congress did not overturn the causal-nexus

requirement. See supra at 11-14.

13

21

(brackets, internal quotation marks, and citation

omitted); see also California Div. of Labor Standards

Enf’t v. Dillingham Constr., N.A., Inc., 519 U.S. 316,

335 (1997) (Scalia, J., concurring) (“[A]pplying the

‘relate to’ provision according to its terms was a

project doomed to failure, since, as many a curbstone

philosopher has observed, everything is related to

everything else.”); New York State Conf. of Blue Cross

& Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co., 514 U.S.

645, 655 (1995) (similar).

This Court has accordingly looked elsewhere—

such as to statutory structure, context, and historical

background—to identify workable contours for the

phrase. See, e.g., Maracich, 570 U.S. at 60-61;

Mellouli v. Lynch, 575 U.S. 798, 811-12 (2015); cf.

United States v. Miller, 604 U.S. 518, 533 (2025) (the

meanings of “phrases that govern conceptual

relationships”

“inherently

depend

on

their

surrounding context”).

This Court’s causal-nexus test supplies those

contours. As discussed above, there is no indication

that Congress was dissatisfied with that requirement.

See supra at 14-18. And that standard—which does

not require a particular kind of causal connection—

fits comfortably with the phrase “relating to.” See

Acker, 527 U.S. at 433 (holding that “[t]he

circumstances that gave rise to” the claim against the

federal judges, “not just” the judges’ specific

challenged acts, are enough to show the “essential

nexus”); see also Baker, 962 F.3d at 944 (this Court’s

decisions “have never utilized a rigid causation

standard for removal”); DeFiore, 85 F.4th at 557.

But while the causal-nexus test is sufficiently

22

flexible to apply to a wide variety of circumstances,

there must still be some causal link. In this case, at a

minimum, the standard requires that the contract or

contractual relationship be the but-for cause of the

conduct giving rise to the claim. See Soper, 270 U.S.

at 33 (“It is enough if the [state] prosecution . . . is

based on or arises out of the acts [the officer] did under

authority of federal law in the discharge of his duty

and only by reason thereof.”) (emphasis added);

Willingham, 395 U.S. at 409 (finding it sufficient that

the federal defendants’ “presence at the place” in

question “in performance of [their] official duty” gave

rise to the state prosecution) (brackets in original).

Here, petitioners merely point to the association

between the product they supplied through their

federal contracts (refined avgas) and its input (crude

oil, produced in part from Louisiana). See Pet. Br. 40.

Petitioners make no assertion that they would not

have carried out the oil-production practices at

issue—or have been engaged in production on the

Louisiana coast at all—but for their World War II

avgas contracts. See Pet. Br. 32 (taking the position

that the avgas contracts need not have “specifically

caused” the “challenged conduct”).

Indeed, there is no dispute that the avgas contracts

gave petitioners “complete latitude” to “forego

producing any crude and instead to buy it on the open

market,” as petitioners and others often did. Pet. App.

29-30 (citation omitted); see also id. at 35-36

(explaining that the Petroleum Administration for

War allocated crude oil to refineries based on various

considerations that did not include the producer’s

practices nor whether the refining company had

produced the crude). Petitioners accordingly do not

23

claim that they could satisfy the Court’s causal-nexus

test, and their attempt to remove under Section

1442(a)(1) should fail.

III. Alternatively, Petitioners Were Not

“Acting Under” A Federal Officer In

Producing Crude Oil

Even if “for or relating to” could theoretically be

read as expansively as petitioners urge here, removal

would still be improper because petitioners were not

“acting under” a federal officer in producing oil from

the Louisiana coast in the 1940s. See La. Br. 21-36;

Parishes Br. 16-27. This Court may consider this

alternative basis for affirmance, which respondents

press before this Court and presented below. See, e.g.,

United States v. Tinklenberg, 563 U.S. 647, 661

(2011). Indeed, a proper understanding of the “acting

under” language is necessary to a reasoned

interpretation of the rest of Section 1442(a)(1). See

La. Br. 39.

a. Private defendants may remove state-court

suits under Section 1442(a)(1) only if they were

“acting under [an] officer[] of the United States” with

respect to the subject matter of the claim. 28 U.S.C.

§ 1442(a)(1). This Court has explained that this

acting-under prong includes two sub-requirements.

See Watson, 551 U.S. at 147, 151-52.

First, the private defendant must be engaged in an

“effort to assist, or to help carry out, the duties or tasks

of the federal superior.” Watson, 551 U.S. at 152

(citation omitted). That superior-inferior relationship

must be one involving “ ‘subjection, guidance, or

control.’ ” Id. at 151 (citation omitted).

24

Second, the text of the acting-under prong imposes

its own nexus requirement. As this Court instructed

in Watson, Section 1442(a)(1) “permits removal only if

[the private defendant], in carrying out the ‘act[s]’ that

are the subject of [the plaintiff’s] complaint, was

‘acting under’ any ‘agency’ or ‘officer’ of ‘the United

States.’ ” 551 U.S. at 147 (second set of brackets in

original; emphasis added; citation omitted). That is,

the present participle “acting” requires the defendant

to have harmed the plaintiff while occupying the

federal role. See La. Br. 21-23.

Lower courts have accordingly recognized,

including in cases post-dating the Removal

Clarification Act, that to satisfy “the ‘acting under’

inquiry,” the private defendant must show that “ ‘the

allegations are directed at the relationship between

the defendant and the federal officer.’ ” Papp v. ForeKast Sales Co., 842 F.3d 805, 813 (3d Cir. 2016)

(brackets and citation omitted); see also Graves v. 3M

Co., 17 F.4th 764, 768-69 (8th Cir. 2021); Fidelitad,

Inc. v. Insitu, Inc., 904 F.3d 1095, 1099-1100 (9th Cir.

2018). For instance, just because “a private company

has acted under the close supervision of the federal

government for some discrete period in its history,” it

cannot then “claim ‘acting-under’ status for the rest of

time.” State by Tong v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 83 F.4th

122, 144 (2d Cir. 2023).

Here, petitioners cannot establish that they were

acting under officers of the United States “in carrying

out the ‘act[s]’ that are the subject of ” respondents’

“complaint[s].” Watson, 551 U.S. at 147 (emphasis

added) (first set of brackets in original; citation

omitted); see Pet. App. 86, 91, 118-21. To begin with,

25

respondents seek SLCRMA recovery for post-1980

uses only. See supra at 6-7; La. Br. 27-28. But even

focusing on the conduct implicated in petitioners’

grandfather-clause defense, “the challenged conduct

here pertains to [petitioners’] exploration and

production activities.” Pet. App. 21. And petitioners

were not acting as federal contractors in producing oil

from the Louisiana coast, because they had no

contract with the government for that product. See

La. Br. 28. Petitioners at most acted under federal

officers in refining avgas—but “[r]efinery activities

are not addressed in any complaint” in these cases.

Parishes Br. 16.

Naturally, petitioners have resisted Watson’s

articulation of the acting-under prong, contending

that a private defendant’s status as a federal

contractor suffices for that prong regardless of the

action’s subject matter. See Pet. Cert. Reply 5. But

even petitioners’ own amici do not share that view.

See Chamber Br. 25 (recognizing that “the contractor

must still demonstrate that it was ‘acting under’ a

federal officer,” citing Watson).

Petitioners’ expansive understanding of “acting

under” is also out of sync with how this Court has

understood an analogous phrase in 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

See La. Br. 26 n.5. Like Section 1442, Section 1983

applies only when the defendant is acting pursuant to

governmental authority in committing the alleged

wrong—i.e., when a “person who, under color of any

[state law],” deprives another of federal civil rights. 42

U.S.C. § 1983 (emphasis added); see Lindke v. Freed,

601 U.S. 187, 194 (2024) (explaining that Section

1983’s “under color of ” state law language imposes a

26

state-action requirement).

In Lindke, which

considered Section 1983’s state-action requirement in

the context of a public official’s speech on social media,

this Court explained that the “under color of ”

language requires a nexus between the official’s

“authority rooted in [law or custom] to speak for the

State” and the speech “that caused the alleged rights

deprivation.” Id. at 201. In other words, to have

committed the deprivation “under” state law, the

public official must have been exercising state

authority in committing the act at issue. See id. (“For

social-media activity to constitute state action, an

official must not only have state authority—he must

also purport to use it.”).

Nor does Watson’s interpretation of the actingunder prong drain the causal-nexus requirement (or

as petitioners would have it, the “connection or

association” requirement) of any significance. True,

when it comes to private defendants, the two inquiries

may dovetail.

See Graves, 17 F.4th at 769

(acknowledging that the two prongs may be “closely

related . . . when the party seeking removal is not

itself a federal officer”).

But the causal-nexus

requirement has a more forceful role to play when it

comes to actual federal officers. See id. There is no

question that a federal defendant is an “officer . . . of

the United States or of any agency thereof,” therefore

satisfying Section 1442(a)(1)’s first half. The causalnexus requirement then requires a sufficient

connection between the defendant’s federal authority

and the charged conduct; it precludes such a “bona

fide federal officer” from removing “a trespass suit

that occurred while he was taking out the garbage.”

Betzner v. Boeing Co., 910 F.3d 1010, 1015 (7th Cir.

27

2018) (citation omitted).

Moreover, excising any nexus analysis from the

acting-under prong would give rise to a peculiar

inquiry. In Watson, this Court indicated that a

contractual relationship might meet the acting-under

prong if it is “an unusually close one involving detailed

regulation, monitoring, or supervision.” 551 U.S. at

153. Adhering to that guidance, the courts of appeals

have required federal contractors to show that their

contracts are sufficiently specific and detailed, or that

the relationship is otherwise characterized by a high

degree of direction and supervision, to meet that

standard. See, e.g., West Virginia ex rel. Hunt v.

CaremarkPCS Health, L.L.C., 140 F.4th 188, 197 (4th

Cir. 2025); Government of Puerto Rico v. Express

Scripts, Inc., 119 F.4th 174, 193 (1st Cir. 2024); Board

of Cnty. Comm’rs of Boulder Cnty. v. Suncor Energy

(U.S.A.) Inc., 25 F.4th 1238, 1252-53 (10th Cir. 2022),

cert. denied, 143 S. Ct. 1795 (2023); Bennett v. MIS

Corp., 607 F.3d 1076, 1087-88 (6th Cir. 2010).

But such an inquiry into contractual details and

the nuances of the supervisory relationship makes

little sense if the cause of action need not arise out of

that relationship at all. Here, for instance, whether

the government gave detailed specifications for how

the avgas was to be refined or closely monitored

petitioners’ avgas-refining operations has no bearing

at all on the crude-oil-production-centered dispute.

Petitioners’ removability theory instead focuses on

their ability to articulate a mere logical connection

between the product being sold under the contract and

an input for that product. See Pet. Br. 39 (arguing

that to “fulfill those contracts,” petitioners needed to

28

obtain “quantities of crude oil”). This clear mismatch

between the two sides of the analytical inquiry further

demonstrates that petitioners’ understanding of

Section 1442(a)(1) cannot be correct.

b. Perhaps

recognizing

that

petitioners’

incidental status as avgas suppliers is likely

insufficient to satisfy the “acting under” prong, the

United States offers an alternative theory: that

petitioners were “acting under” the Petroleum

Administration for War (PAW) in conducting their oilproduction operations. U.S. Br. 30-34. Specifically,

the United States asserts that PAW exercised

“supervision” of petitioners’ production and issued

“ ‘recommendations’ ” that determined petitioners’

practices. Id. at 31-32 (brackets and citation omitted).

But this Court has already held that the degree of

federal regulation cannot “transform” a private firm’s

“compliance into the kind of assistance that might

bring the [firm] within the scope of ” the acting-under

requirement. Watson, 551 U.S. at 157. “And that is

so even if the regulation is highly detailed and even if

the private firm’s activities are highly supervised and

monitored.” Id. at 153. Indeed, the United States

advocated for that very result in Watson, telling this

Court that “[p]ermitting removal by private parties

subjected to detailed and specific federal regulation

would potentially shift into federal court a wide range

of traditional state law claims.” Watson U.S. Br. 19

(capitalization altered).

The Fifth Circuit therefore correctly rejected this

theory when petitioners presented it in an earlier

round of this litigation. See Plaquemines Parish v.

Chevron USA, Inc., No. 22-30055, 2022 WL 9914869,

29

at *3 (5th Cir. Oct. 17, 2022) (per curiam). Petitioners

sought certiorari, which this Court denied. 143 S. Ct.

991 (2023). Petitioners did not seek this Court’s

review of that question again in the present petition,

and it is not properly before the Court. See S. Ct. R.

14.1(a). Indeed, petitioners appear to now disclaim

the position that the United States embraces. See Pet.

Br. 36 (“To be sure, compliance with federal

regulations alone does not suffice to show that a

private party is ‘acting under’ federal direction.”); see

also id. (explaining that PAW addressed petitioners’

production activities “by regulation”); id. at 49. So

even if the Court were inclined to create case-by-case

exceptions to Watson, including in the “wartime

context,” U.S. Br. 31, this case does not present a

viable opportunity to do so.

CONCLUSION

The Court should affirm.

Respectfully submitted,

CHRISTOPHER MEYER

EARTHJUSTICE

48 Wall Street

Fifteenth Floor

New York, NY 10005

CAROLINE A. FLYNN

Counsel of Record

EARTHJUSTICE

1001 G Street NW

Suite 1000

Washington, DC 20001

(202) 667-4500

cflynn@earthjustice.org

Counsel for Amicus Curiae

November 20, 2025