Amicus Curiae Brief — Chevron USA Incorporated, et al., Petitioners v. Plaquemines Parish, Louisiana, et al.

Supreme Court briefSep 11, 2025

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No. 24-813

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

CHEVRON U.S.A. INCORPORATED, ET AL.,

Petitioners,

PLAQUEMINES PARISH, LOUISIANA, ET AL.,

Respondents.

On Writ of Certiorari

to the United States Court of Appeals

for the Fifth Circuit

BRIEF FOR THE CHAMBER OF COMMERCE OF

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND

THE NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF

MANUFACTURERS AS AMICI CURIAE

SUPPORTING PETITIONERS

ANDREW R. VARCOE

JANET GALERIA

U.S. CHAMBER

LITIGATION CENTER

1615 H Street, NW

Washington, DC 20062

Counsel for the Chamber of

Commerce of the United

States of America

WILLIAM M. JAY

Counsel of Record

ANDREW KIM

GOODWIN PROCTER LLP

1900 N Street, NW

Washington, DC 20036

wjay@goodwinlaw.com

(202) 346-4000

Counsel for Amici Curiae

(Additional Counsel Listed on Inside Cover)

September 11, 2025

ERICA KLENICKI

CAROLINE MCAULIFFE

NATIONAL ASSOCIATION

OF MANUFACTURERS

733 10th Street, N.W.

Suite 700

Washington, D.C. 20001

Counsel for the National

Association of Manufacturers

TABLE OF CONTENTS

PAGE

INTEREST OF THE AMICI CURIAE ....................... 1

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT ..................................... 2

ARGUMENT ............................................................... 5

Federal contractors have long relied on

the liberal construction of federal-officer

removal that this Court has promised

and Congress has ratified. ............................... 5

II.

The Fifth Circuit’s “contractual

directive” requirement is not, and has

never been, the correct standard for

federal-officer removal by private

parties carrying out the federal

government’s work.......................................... 15

III.

The Fifth Circuit’s restrictive, atextual

reading of “relating to” would inevitably

discourage private contractors from

working for the federal government. ............. 22

CONCLUSION .......................................................... 29

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Page(s)

Cases

In re “Agent Orange” Prod. Liab. Litig.,

304 F. Supp. 2d 442 (E.D.N.Y. 2004) .................. 14

Akin v. Big Three Indus., Inc.,

851 F. Supp. 819 (E.D. Tex. 1994) ....................... 10

Anesthesiology Assocs. of Tallahassee,

Fla., P.A. v. Blue Cross Blue Shield

of Fla., Inc.,

No. 03-15664, 2005 WL 6717869

(11th Cir. Mar. 18, 2005) ..................................... 11

Baker v. Atl. Richfield Co.,

962 F.3d 937 (7th Cir. 2020) .......................... 10, 18

Bartel v. Alcoa S.S. Co.,

805 F.3d 169 (5th Cir. 2015) ................................ 18

Bell v. Thornburg,

743 F.3d 84 (5th Cir. 2014) .................................. 12

Bennett v. MIS Corp.,

607 F.3d 1076 (6th Cir. 2010) .............................. 11

Blake Constr. Co. v. United States,

987 F.2d 743 (Fed. Cir. 1993) .............................. 24

Camacho v. Autoridad de

Telefonos de P.R.,

868 F.2d 482 (1st Cir. 1989) ................................ 12

Cnty. Bd. of Arlington Cnty. v.

Express Scripts Pharmacy, Inc.,

996 F.3d 243 (4th Cir. 2021) ................................ 21

Colorado v. Symes,

286 U.S. 510 (1932) .......................................... 5, 28

In re Commonwealth’s Motion to

Appoint Counsel Against or Directed

to Defender Ass’n of Phila.,

790 F.3d 457 (3d Cir. 2015) ..................... 12, 13, 17

Crutchfield v. Sewerage &

Water Bd. of New Orleans,

829 F.3d 370 (5th Cir. 2016) ................................ 24

Davis v. South Carolina,

107 U.S. 597 (1883) .................................... 3, 7, 8, 9

Einhorn v. CarePlus Health Plans, Inc.,

43 F. Supp. 3d 1268 (S.D. Fla. 2014)................... 11

Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co. v.

United States,

92 Fed. Cl. 598 (2010) .......................................... 24

First Nat’l Bank of Bellevue v.

Bank of Bellevue,

341 F. Supp. 960 (D. Neb. 1972) .......................... 10

Freeze v. Coastal Bend Foot Specialist,

No. C-06-481, 2006 WL 3487405

(S.D. Tex. Dec. 1, 2006) ........................................ 11

Fung v. Abex Corp.,

816 F. Supp. 569 (N.D. Cal. 1992) ....................... 10

iii

Genereux v. Am. Beryllia Corp.,

577 F.3d 350 (1st Cir. 2009) .......................... 10, 21

Goncalves ex rel. Goncalves v. Rady

Children’s Hosp. San Diego,

865 F.3d 1237 (9th Cir. 2017) .............................. 11

Gordon v. Air & Liquid Sys. Corp.,

990 F. Supp. 2d 311 (E.D.N.Y. 2014) .................. 10

Government of Puerto Rico v. Express

Scripts, Inc.,

119 F.4th 174 (1st Cir. 2024) ............................... 22

Grp. Health Inc. v. Blue Cross Ass’n,

587 F. Supp. 887 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) ........................ 11

Gurda Farms, Inc. v. Monroe Cnty.

Legal Assistance Corp.,

358 F. Supp. 841 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) ........................ 12

Hagen v. Benjamin Foster Co.,

739 F. Supp. 2d 770 (E.D. Pa. 2010) ................... 10

Holton v. Blue Cross &

Blue Shield of S.C.,

56 F. Supp. 2d 1347 (M.D. Ala. 1999) ................. 10

Isaacson v. Dow Chem. Co.,

517 F.3d 129 (2d Cir. 2008) ............... 10, 12, 17, 22

Jacks v. Meridian Res. Co., LLC,

701 F.3d 1224 (8th Cir. 2012) .............................. 11

Jefferson Cnty. v. Acker,

527 U.S. 423 (1999) .......................... 5, 9, 16, 25, 26

Latiolais v. Huntington Ingalls, Inc.,

951 F.3d 286 (5th Cir. 2020)

(en banc) ................................... 9, 17, 18, 19, 20, 28

Magnin v. Teledyne Cont'l Motors,

91 F.3d 1424 (11th Cir. 1996) .............................. 23

Malsch v. Vertex Aerospace, LLC,

361 F. Supp. 2d 583

(S.D. Miss. 2005) .................................................. 10

Mansfield v. Fed. Land Bank of Omaha,

No. 4:14-CV-3232, 2015 WL 4546610

(D. Neb. July 28, 2015) ........................................ 11

Maryland v. 3M Co.,

130 F.4th 380 (4th Cir. 2025) .............................. 10

Maryland v. Soper,

270 U.S. 9 (1926) ............................................ 2, 7, 8

Maryland v. Soper,

270 U.S. 36 (1926) ............................................ 8, 20

McMahon v. Presidential Airways, Inc.,

410 F. Supp. 2d 1189

(M.D. Fla. 2006) ................................................... 10

Moore v. Elec. Boat Corp.,

25 F.4th 30 (1st Cir. 2022) ............................... 9, 20

Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc.,

504 U.S. 374 (1992) .............................................. 17

In re Nat’l Sec. Agency Telecomms.

Records Litig.,

483 F. Supp. 2d 934 (N.D. Cal. 2007) ............ 12, 13

P.R. Burke Corp. v. United States,

277 F.3d 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2002) ............................ 25

Pani v. Empire Blue Cross Blue Shield,

No. 93 Civ. 8215 (SHS),

1996 WL 734889

(S.D.N.Y. Dec. 23, 1996) ...................................... 11

Papp v. Fore-Kast Sales Co.,

842 F.3d 805 (3d Cir. 2016) ................................... 9

Peterson v. Blue Cross/

Blue Shield of Tex.,

508 F.2d 55 (5th Cir. 1975) .................................. 11

Ruppel v. CBS Corp.,

701 F.3d 1176 (7th Cir. 2012) ................................ 9

Sawyer v. Foster Wheeler LLC,

860 F.3d 249 (4th Cir. 2017) .......... 9, 17, 20, 27, 28

Stuyvesant Dredging Co. v.

United States,

834 F.2d 1576 (Fed. Cir. 1987) ............................ 24

Taylor Energy Co., L.L.C. v. Luttrell,

3 F.4th 172 (5th Cir. 2021) .................................. 23

Tennessee v. Davis,

100 U.S. 257 (1879) ................................................ 7

Texas ex rel. Falkner v.

Nat’l Bank of Com. of San Antonio,

290 F.2d 229 (5th Cir. 1961) ................................ 10

Vietnam Ass’n for Victims of Agent

Orange v. Dow Chem. Co.,

517 F.3d 104 (2d Cir. 2008) ................................. 13

Watson v. Philip Morris Cos.,

551 U.S. 142 (2007) ......................... 2, 6, 7, 8, 9, 16,

20, 21, 22, 23, 25, 26

West Virginia ex rel. Hunt v.

CaremarkPCS Health, L.L.C.,

140 F.4th 188 (4th Cir. 2025) .............................. 21

Willingham v. Morgan,

395 U.S. 402 (1969) ................ 5, 6, 7, 13, 15, 16, 27

Winters v. Diamond

Shamrock Chem. Co.,

149 F.3d 387 (5th Cir. 1998) ................................ 18

Zeringue v. Crane Co.,

846 F.3d 785 (5th Cir. 2017) .................... 18, 20, 25

Statutes

28 U.S.C. § 1442(a) ................................................ 2, 26

28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1) (2006) .................................... 15

28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(3) ............................................... 16

Removal Clarification Act of 2011,

Pub. L. No. 112-51, 125 Stat. 545.................... 6, 17

vii

Other Authorities

Jeffrey A. Belkin & Donald G. Brown,

The Soldier of Fortune in Federal

Court: An Analysis of the Federal

Officer Removal Statute, 22 No. 6

Andrews Gov't Cont. Litig. Rep. 1

(July 28, 2008) ...................................................... 22

H.R. Rep. No. 112-17 (2011).......................... 2, 4, 5, 17

14C Wright & Miller, Fed. Prac. & Proc.

Juris. § 3726 (4th ed. 2022) ................................... 9

viii

INTEREST OF THE AMICI CURIAE 1

The Chamber of Commerce of the United States of

America is the world’s largest business federation. It

represents approximately 300,000 direct members and

indirectly represents the interests of more than 3

million companies and professional organizations of

every size, in every industry sector, and from every

region of the country. An important function of the

Chamber is to represent the interests of its members in

matters before Congress, the Executive Branch, and

the courts. To that end, the Chamber regularly files

amicus curiae briefs in cases, like this one, that raise

issues of concern to the nation’s business community.

The National Association of Manufacturers (“NAM”)

is the largest manufacturing association in the United

States, representing small and large manufacturers in

all fifty states and in every industrial sector.

Manufacturing employs nearly 13 million people,

contributes $2.9 trillion to the economy annually, has

the largest economic impact of any major sector, and

accounts for over half of all private-sector research and

development in the nation, fostering the innovation

that is vital for this economic ecosystem to thrive. The

NAM is the voice of the manufacturing community and

leading advocate for a policy agenda that helps

manufacturers compete in the global economy and

create jobs across the United States.

Many of the amici’s members perform vital

functions for the United States while acting under the

direction and control of federal officers. The amici’s

1 No counsel for any party authored this brief in whole or in part,

and no entity or person, aside from amici curiae, their members,

or their counsel, made any monetary contribution intended to

fund the preparation or submission of this brief.

members are sometimes exposed to potential liability

for the performance of those functions. Thus, the amici

curiae have a strong interest in ensuring that the

federal-officer removal statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a), is

correctly interpreted so that claims subject to the

statute are heard in federal courts, and not in state

courts where local interests may sometimes be given

undue weight.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

I. More than two centuries ago, Congress created

federal-officer removal jurisdiction to give those

carrying out the work of the federal government access

to federal courts. Federal courts provided fair forums

for “[f]ederal officers or agents,” who Congress

concluded “should not be forced to answer for conduct

asserted within their Federal duties in a state forum

that invites ‘local interests or prejudice’ to color

outcomes.” H.R. Rep. No. 112-17, at 3 (2011).

At the height of Prohibition, this Court confirmed

that federal-officer removal is available to private

parties, too. Maryland v. Soper, 270 U.S. 9, 30 (1926).

After all, federal contractors, like federal employees,

could perform work that was nationally important but

locally unpopular. Since then, federal contractors of all

stripes—manufacturers of military hardware,

administrators of federal healthcare programs, and

contractors performing environmental cleanup among

them—have invoked the federal-officer removal statute

to gain access to a federal court. In that time, the

touchstone of federal-officer removal by private parties

has always remained the same: whether the suit

“involve[s] an effort to assist, or to help carry out, the

duties or tasks of the federal superior.” Watson v.

Philip Morris Cos., 551 U.S. 142, 152 (2007) (citing

Davis v. South Carolina, 107 U.S. 597, 600 (1883)).

II. In 2011, Congress amended § 1442 to make it

easier for federal officers and private parties alike to

remove cases to federal court. The amendment

expanded the statute to cover not just actions “for any

act under color of [federal] office,” but actions “for or

relating to” such acts. Most federal courts recognized

the expansion for what it was: the old “for” standard

required a causal connection between the charged

conduct and the acts under federal office, but the “for

or relating to” standard meant that a “connection” or

“association” between the two would suffice.

The Fifth Circuit, however, raised the bar higher

than where it was before. According to the court of

appeals, the words “relating to” can be satisfied by

private parties only if the suit is connected to a

“directive” in “the contents of the relevant federal

contracts.” Pet. App. 25, 29. There is no dispute that

there is a connection between the conduct alleged by

respondents and petitioners’ work producing refined

avgas for the federal government. But in the view of

the court of appeals, the two were not sufficiently

connected because the subject matter of respondents’

suit—the extraction and production of raw crude—was

nowhere to be found in the four corners of petitioners’

federal contracts. That position is not consistent with

the statute as Congress amended it in 2011. Section

1442’s “for or relating to” prong is satisfied where a

private party renders aid or assistance to the federal

government, and the suit challenges conduct that is

connected to, or associated with, that work—regardless

of whether the federal government instructed the

defendant to perform that specific conduct and

inscribed that instruction in a written agreement.

III.The Fifth Circuit’s “contractual directive”

requirement would create enormous uncertainty

regarding when a private party may remove a case to

federal court under § 1442. That uncertainty, in turn,

would inevitably cause private contractors to think

twice before taking on work for the federal

government.

Indeed, the court’s restrictive

interpretation of “for or relating to” is entirely

unmoored from the realities of modern government

contracting—where the level of the federal

government’s involvement can range from dictating

every last detail of the contract to according nearcomplete discretion to the contractor.

Respondents complain that honoring the plain text

of the words “relating to” would render the words

meaningless, as “virtually every remote and tenuous

activity could be deemed related to a government

contract.” State Br. in Opp. 21. But a broader,

textually faithful standard would not open the

floodgates to federal court; Section 1442 has other

preconditions to federal-officer removal, such as the

“acting

under”

and

colorable-federal-defense

requirements. By contrast, if this Court were to adopt

the Fifth Circuit’s “contractual directive” requirement,

it may leave federal-officer removal even more elusive

for private contractors than before, which would

contravene Congress’s decision to “broaden the

universe of acts that enable Federal officers to remove

to Federal court.” H.R. Rep. No. 112-17, at 6 (emphasis

added).

ARGUMENT

Federal contractors have long relied on

the liberal construction of federal-officer

removal that this Court has promised

and Congress has ratified.

Time and again, this Court has held that § 1442’s

right of removal for federal officers must not be treated

as “narrow” or “limited,” but “liberally construed.”

Colorado v. Symes, 286 U.S. 510, 517 (1932). That

promise of broad protection is part of the commitment

that the federal government makes to its contractors—

and contractors rely on that promise as part of the bargain they strike when they agree to do work for the

federal government.

Throughout its history, the purpose of federalofficer removal jurisdiction has always been to ensure

that those performing federal work may litigate federal

“defenses … in the federal courts.” Willingham v.

Morgan, 395 U.S. 402, 406-07 (1969). From the statute’s enactment to its recent amendment, Congress has

deemed the ability to secure a federal forum for federal

officers’ federal defenses to be “essential to the integrity and preeminence of the Federal Government within

its realm of authority.” H.R. Rep. No. 112-17, at 3.

Federal-officer removal is “exceptional” in that it is

based on “an anticipated or actual federal defense …

despite the nonfederal cast of the complaint.” Jefferson

Cnty. v. Acker, 527 U.S. 423, 431 (1999).

The statute was first used to protect federal officers

facing state action for acts they undertook in performance of their duties. “[W]here state courts might

prove hostile to federal law … the removal statute

would ‘give a chance to the [federal] officer to defend

himself where the authority of the law was recognized,’” i.e., in federal court. Watson, 551 U.S. at 148

(quoting 9 Cong. Deb. 461 (1833) (statement of Sen.

Daniel Webster)). But it did not take long for this

Court to recognize that private parties, too, could avail

themselves of federal-officer removal, so long as the action being removed arose out of assistance that the private party rendered to a federal officer performing his

official duty. See id. at 149-50.

1. “The federal officer removal statute has had a

long history.” Willingham, 395 U.S. at 405. The statute’s earliest predecessor was a customs law enacted

during the War of 1812, when several New England

states opposed efforts to embargo trade with England.

Id. The statute included a removal provision designed

“to protect federal officers from interference by hostile

state courts,” permitting customs officers “to remove to

the federal courts any suit or prosecution commenced

because of any act done ‘under colour’ of the statute.”

Id. Similar statutes protecting customs and revenue

officers were passed in 1833 in the face of state nullification efforts, and again during the Civil War. Id. at

405-06. Congress expanded the availability of federalofficer removal in 1948, by removing subject-matter

limitations. See id. at 406. Most recently, and crucially for this case, Congress amended the statute in 2011

to further broaden its scope. See Removal Clarification

Act of 2011, Pub. L. No. 112-51, 125 Stat. 545.

“The purpose of all these enactments is not hard to

discern”: to ensure robust access to federal court for the

“officers and agents” through whom the federal government must act. Willingham, 395 U.S. at 406. In

cases where those officers and agents face potential liability for acts undertaken “within the scope of their

authority,” “if their protection must be left to the action

of the State court,” then “the operations of the general

government may at any time be arrested at the will of

one of its members.” Id. (quoting Tennessee v. Davis,

100 U.S. 257, 263 (1879)).

2. The federal-officer removal statutes have historically provided a federal forum not just to federal officers themselves, but also to private parties assisting

them. See Watson, 551 U.S. at 147-49 (discussing history of current statute and its predecessors). During

Prohibition, this Court confirmed that private parties

“ha[d] the same right to the benefit of” federal-officer

removal as the federal officers whom they served.

Maryland v. Soper, 270 U.S. 9, 30 (1926). In Soper,

Maryland had charged four federal prohibition officers

and a private individual acting as their chauffeur with

murder; a person had died during a distillery raid conducted by the prohibition officers. Id. at 27. (An official of the federal Prohibition Unit, which was responsible for enforcing the Volstead Act, had hired the

chauffeur’s company. Id.) Relying on Davis v. South

Carolina, 107 U.S. 597 (1883), the Court concluded

that the private defendant was just as entitled to removal as the federal prohibition officers, given that the

private defendant had been “acting as a chauffeur and

helper to the four officers under their orders and by direction of the prohibition director for the state.” Soper,

270 U.S. at 30; see also Davis, 107 U.S. at 600 (“[T]he

protection which the law thus furnishes to the marshal

and his deputy, also shields all who lawfully assist him

in the performance of his official duty.”).

In a companion case (with the same name), the

Court also stressed that federal-officer removal was not

limited to only those acts “expressly authorized by the

federal statutes.” Maryland v. Soper, 270 U.S. 36, 4142 (1926). Rather, it was enough that the acts were

“an inevitable outgrowth of the officer’s discharge of his

federal duty and … closely interrelated with it.” Id. at

42. In both cases, the Court recognized that nothing in

the statute “require[d] that the [lawsuit] must be for

the very acts which the [defendant] admits to have

been done … under federal authority.” Soper, 270 U.S.

at 33.

This Court did not revisit the issue of private parties invoking federal-officer removal until Watson. In

Watson, the Court clarified when a private party is

“acting under” a federal officer for purposes of § 1442.

There, Philip Morris sought to remove a lawsuit regarding allegedly deceptive cigarette advertisements.

Watson, 551 U.S. at 146. To establish the required

connection to federal office, Philip Morris pointed to

extensive FTC oversight over the tobacco industry—

including a testing process that the FTC had delegated

to “an industry-financed testing laboratory,” which had

been “extensively supervised” and “closely monitored”

by the FTC. Id. at 154 (alterations omitted).

To the Court, that oversight was not enough to justify federal-officer removal, as Philip Morris’s relationship with the FTC was not “distinct from the usual

regulator/regulated relationship.” Id. at 157. In support of that conclusion, the Watson Court harked back

to Davis and Soper, observing that “precedent and

statutory purpose make clear that the private person’s

‘acting under’ must involve an effort to assist, or to

help carry out, the duties or tasks of the federal superior.” Id. at 152.

While Watson did not consider how private contractors might show the causal connection that was required by the version of § 1442 in force at the time, Jefferson Cnty., 527 U.S. at 424, it reaffirmed the centuryold principle that those “‘who lawfully assist’ the federal officer ‘in the performance of his federal duty’”

should be able to benefit from the federal-officer removal statute. 551 U.S. at 151 (quoting Davis, 107

U.S. at 600).

3. A diverse array of private businesses working

with the government, acting in all kinds of circumstances, have long relied on the federal-officer removal

statute’s protections. See generally 14C Wright & Miller, Fed. Prac. & Proc. Juris. § 3726 (4th ed. 2022)

(“[T]he statute has been applied in cases involving a

wide spectrum of civil and criminal substantive contexts, and the right to remove has been invoked by a

tremendous variety of federal officers and persons acting under the direction of federal officers.”) (footnotes

omitted).

Federal contractors of various stripes frequently

remove under § 1442 when they are named in lawsuits

relating to their work for the government. Military

contractors, in particular, have invoked the federalofficer removal statute in numerous cases. Such

contractors include manufacturers of military

hardware such as helicopters, submarines, and

warships; 2 manufacturers of chemicals and chemical

2 See Moore v. Elec. Boat Corp., 25 F.4th 30, 32 (1st Cir. 2022)

(submarines); Latiolais v. Huntington Ingalls, Inc., 951 F.3d 286,

289 (5th Cir. 2020) (en banc) (naval vessels); Sawyer v. Foster

Wheeler LLC, 860 F.3d 249, 252 (4th Cir. 2017) (boilers for naval

vessels); Papp v. Fore-Kast Sales Co., 842 F.3d 805, 809 (3d Cir.

2016) (aircraft); Ruppel v. CBS Corp., 701 F.3d 1176, 1178 (7th

components of other supplies; 3 administrators of

military health care programs; 4 and other providers of

services to the military, 5 including banks that operate

on military bases. 6

Another notable category of cases concerns private

businesses working with federal health care programs

outside the military context. In a number of cases,

courts have held that private companies that contract

to administer Medicare benefits were “acting under”

Cir. 2012) (turbines for naval vessels); Gordon v. Air & Liquid

Sys. Corp., 990 F. Supp. 2d 311, 314 (E.D.N.Y. 2014) (turbines and

steam generators for warships); Malsch v. Vertex Aerospace, LLC,

361 F. Supp. 2d 583, 584-85 (S.D. Miss. 2005) (helicopters); Akin

v. Big Three Indus., Inc., 851 F. Supp. 819, 823-24 (E.D. Tex.

1994) (jet engines); Fung v. Abex Corp., 816 F. Supp. 569, 573

(N.D. Cal. 1992) (submarines).

3 See, e.g., Maryland v. 3M Co., 130 F.4th 380, 384 (4th Cir. 2025)

(firefighting foam for the military); Baker v. Atl. Richfield Co., 962

F.3d 937, 939-41, 942, 946-47 (7th Cir. 2020) (various “critical

wartime commodities” during World War II, including zinc oxide

and lead carbonate); Genereux v. Am. Beryllia Corp., 577 F.3d 350,

353-54, 357 & n.9 (1st Cir. 2009) (beryllium oxide ceramics used in

nuclear weapons, radar tubes, jet brake pads, and jet engine

blades); Isaacson v. Dow Chem. Co., 517 F.3d 129, 138-39 (2d Cir.

2008) (Agent Orange).

4 Holton v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of S.C., 56 F. Supp. 2d 1347,

1350-52 & n.3 (M.D. Ala. 1999) (administrator of medical program

for dependents of military personnel).

5 See Hagen v. Benjamin Foster Co., 739 F. Supp. 2d 770, 772-73

(E.D. Pa. 2010) (civilian contractor that employed machinist who

worked on Navy vessel); McMahon v. Presidential Airways, Inc.,

410 F. Supp. 2d 1189, 1192, 1195 (M.D. Fla. 2006) (contractor that

flew planes for Department of Defense in Afghanistan).

6 Texas ex rel. Falkner v. Nat’l Bank of Com. of San Antonio, 290

F.2d 229, 231 (5th Cir. 1961); First Nat’l Bank of Bellevue v. Bank

of Bellevue, 341 F. Supp. 960, 961-62 (D. Neb. 1972).

federal officers. See, e.g., Peterson v. Blue Cross/Blue

Shield of Tex., 508 F.2d 55, 57 (5th Cir. 1975); Einhorn

v. CarePlus Health Plans, Inc., 43 F. Supp. 3d 1268,

1270 (S.D. Fla. 2014); Freeze v. Coastal Bend Foot

Specialist, No. C-06-481, 2006 WL 3487405, at *3 (S.D.

Tex. Dec. 1, 2006); Pani v. Empire Blue Cross Blue

Shield, No. 93 Civ. 8215 (SHS), 1996 WL 734889, at *1

(S.D.N.Y. Dec. 23, 1996), aff’d, 152 F.3d 67 (2d Cir.

1998); Grp. Health Inc. v. Blue Cross Ass’n, 587 F.

Supp. 887, 891 (S.D.N.Y. 1984). So too for companies

administering health benefits for federal employees.

See Goncalves ex rel. Goncalves v. Rady Children’s

Hosp. San Diego, 865 F.3d 1237, 1243-51 (9th Cir.

2017); Jacks v. Meridian Res. Co., LLC, 701 F.3d 1224,

1232-35 (8th Cir. 2012), abrogated in part on other

grounds by BP p.l.c. v. Mayor & City Council of Balt.,

141 S. Ct. 1532 (2021); Anesthesiology Assocs. of

Tallahassee, Fla., P.A. v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of

Fla., Inc., No. 03-15664, 2005 WL 6717869, at *2 (11th

Cir. Mar. 18, 2005).

Other contractors have also availed themselves of

the protections of the federal-officer removal statute.

For example, a business hired to eliminate toxic mold

from an air-traffic control tower was held to be “acting

under” the Federal Aviation Administration and, on

that basis, successfully removed a negligence lawsuit.

Bennett v. MIS Corp., 607 F.3d 1076, 1088, 1091 (6th

Cir. 2010). Businesses relying on § 1442 have also

included federal land banks operating under the Farm

Credit Administration, which exist only to “further a

government interest”; 7 and telecommunications

7 Mansfield v. Fed. Land Bank of Omaha, No. 4:14-CV-3232, 2015

WL 4546610, at *5 (D. Neb. July 28, 2015).

companies providing information to federal lawenforcement or national-security authorities. 8

Contractors are not always for-profit businesses:

nonprofits also benefit from the protection of § 1442.

For example, entities providing legal services to

disadvantaged individuals have availed themselves of

the removal statute. See In re Commonwealth’s Motion

to Appoint Counsel Against or Directed to Defender

Ass’n of Phila., 790 F.3d 457, 462-63, 468, 472 (3d Cir.

2015) (Federal Community Defender Organization,

which provided legal services pursuant to the Criminal

Justice Act, was “acting under” the Administrative

Office of the U.S. Courts); Gurda Farms, Inc. v. Monroe

Cnty. Legal Assistance Corp., 358 F. Supp. 841, 842-47

(S.D.N.Y. 1973) (nonprofit providing legal advice to

migrant workers was “acting under” the Office of

Economic Opportunity). Even a “private citizen[]”

serving as a Chapter 13 trustee under the Bankruptcy

Code can avail himself of the right to remove. E.g.,

Bell v. Thornburg, 743 F.3d 84, 89 (5th Cir. 2014)

(permitting “private citizen[]” serving as standing

Chapter 13 trustee under the Bankruptcy Code to

remove under § 1442).

4. Removal under § 1442 is important to these

individuals, nonprofits, and businesses working under

the federal government. That is especially so when the

work is risky or politically controversial.

One prominent example, the Agent Orange litigation, see Isaacson v. Dow Chem. Co., 517 F.3d 129, 13839 (2d Cir. 2008), took place against the backdrop of

8 Camacho v. Autoridad de Telefonos de P.R., 868 F.2d 482, 486-87

(1st Cir. 1989); In re Nat’l Sec. Agency Telecomms. Records Litig.,

483 F. Supp. 2d 934, 943 (N.D. Cal. 2007).

the government’s controversial decision to use herbicides in the Vietnam War. The Vietnam conflict itself

was the subject of considerable debate, to say the least.

See, e.g., Vietnam Ass’n for Victims of Agent Orange v.

Dow Chem. Co., 517 F.3d 104, 119 (2d Cir. 2008).

Similar examples abound. One involved a challenge

to a controversial practice of sharing customer phone

records with the National Security Agency—a case in

which the United States was prepared to intervene to

ensure its interests were adequately protected. See

Nat’l Sec. Agency Telecomms. Records Litig., 483 F.

Supp. 2d at 945. In yet another case, Pennsylvania

state courts sought a blanket disqualification of federally-funded lawyers from state habeas proceedings, animated by what one circuit judge concluded was “simple animosity or a difference in opinion regarding how

capital cases should be litigated.” In re Commonwealth’s Motion, 790 F.3d at 486 (McKee, J., concurring).

In politically charged cases, there is a significant

risk that local prosecutors, judges, or jurors will disagree with the decisions of the federal government—and

allow that disagreement to affect how federal agents

are treated in local courts. Such political disagreements (over the War of 1812 and the federal trade embargo of England) are what prompted Congress to enact the earliest predecessor of § 1442 in 1815. See

Willingham, 395 U.S. at 405.

The value of the protection afforded by § 1442 to

private businesses—and the drawbacks of narrowly

construing the statute to preclude removal—have not

escaped judicial attention. One district judge, who

presided for decades over multi-district litigation

concerning Agent

observation:

Orange,

made

the

following

If cases such as those in this present

wave of Agent Orange claims were scattered throughout state courts, manufacturers would have to seriously consider

whether they would serve as procurement

agents to the federal government. Since

the advent of the Agent Orange litigation

in 1979, mass tort law has become more

hazardous for defendants. While on balance state tort law does more good than

harm, its vagaries and hazards would

provide a significant deterrent to necessary military procurement.

In re “Agent Orange” Prod. Liab. Litig., 304 F. Supp. 2d

442, 451 (E.D.N.Y. 2004) (holding that case was

removable under § 1442), aff’d sub nom. Isaacson, 517

F.3d at 129.

For private businesses “acting under” federal officials, availability of a federal forum is particularly important. Private officials do not make the policy choices that they help the government to carry out; they

should not be the ones to bear the brunt of political

disagreements over those policy choices. And so it is

hardly surprising that, as noted above, a variety of different businesses have availed themselves of removal

under § 1442.

II.

The Fifth Circuit’s “contractual directive” requirement is not, and has never been, the correct standard for federalofficer removal by private parties carrying out the federal government’s work.

Congress’s 2011 amendment to the statute has particular importance here: it made removable any claim

“relating to” work performed under a federal officer.

Before that amendment, lower courts had considered

reading a causation requirement into the statute. After that amendment, it is clear no such requirement

can stand. Accordingly, this Court should reject the

Fifth Circuit’s “contractual directive” standard. That

standard re-adopts causation requirements that are

patently incorrect after the 2011 amendment and, indeed, may be stricter than what the law required before

the amendment.

1. Until 2011, the federal-officer removal statute

permitted “any [federal] officer (or any person acting

under that officer)” to remove a civil action to federal

court “for any act under color of such office.” 28 U.S.C.

§ 1442(a)(1) (2006) (emphasis added). This Court construed this phrase to require that a suit “grow[] out of

conduct under color of office,” i.e., that there be a

“‘causal connection’ between the charged conduct and

asserted official authority.” Willingham, 395 U.S. at

407, 409 (emphasis added) (citation omitted).

The causal-connection requirement was never particularly demanding. In Willingham, for example, this

Court determined that the warden and chief medical

officer of a federal prison could remove a civil action

alleging that the two had assaulted the plaintiff, an

inmate at the prison. The Court concluded that the

causal-connection requirement had been satisfied,

“simply enough,” by the ”fact that [the defendants]

were on duty, at their place of federal employment, at

all the relevant times.” Willingham, 395 U.S. at 409.

The Court did not require the defendants to demonstrate that their alleged actions fell within the scope of

their federal employment; if there had been a question

about “whether they were engaged in some kind of ‘frolic on their own’ in relation to [the plaintiff],” the defendants were still to be given “the opportunity to present their version of the facts to a federal, not a state,

court.” Id.

Three decades later, this Court held that two federal judges could remove an Alabama county’s action to

collect a local occupational tax from them. Jefferson

Cnty., 527 U.S. at 429-30. Although the tax, on its

face, was not aimed at federal judges or federal employees, the Court nevertheless determined that the

suits were “for a[n] act under color of office.” Id. at 432

(quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(3)). The Court rejected

the Solicitor General’s view that the causal-connection

requirement had not been satisfied because the tax was

imposed upon the judges personally, and “not upon the

United States or upon any instrumentality of the United States.” Id. Such a rigid conception of the requirement, the Court observed, “would defeat the purpose of

the removal statute.” Id. An “airtight case on the merits” would not be necessary to “show the required causal connection.” Id.

2. Although § 1442 had been liberally construed,

see Watson, 551 U.S. at 147, and the causal-nexus requirement was not a taxing one, Congress nevertheless

decided in 2011 to amend the statute to allow removal

not just of any civil action or criminal prosecution “for

any act under color of such office,” but of any such action or prosecution “relating to any act under color of

such office.” § 2(b)(1)(A), 125 Stat. 545. That addition

self-evidently “broaden[s] the universe of acts that enable Federal officers to remove to Federal court,” H.R.

Rep. No. 112-17, at 6.

As the Fifth Circuit itself eventually recognized, the

addition of “or relating to” was not “a radical change.”

Latiolais v. Huntington Ingalls, Inc., 951 F.3d 286, 294

(5th Cir. 2020) (en banc). Rather, by adding the phrase

“or relating to,” the Act expanded the types of civil actions and criminal prosecutions eligible for removal

under § 1442 to include those actions that “stand in

some relation” to, or have an “association with,” acts

taken under color of federal office. See Morales v.

Trans World Airlines, Inc., 504 U.S. 374, 383 (1992) (citation omitted).

3. Several circuits readily recognized that Congress’s amendment marked the demise of the causation

requirement. The Third Circuit, in one of the first decisions interpreting the phrase “for or relating to,” noted that the old standard required private contractors to

show that they were being sued “at least in part ‘because of what they were asked to do by the Government.’” In re Commonwealth’s Motion, 790 F.3d at 471

(quoting Isaacson, 517 F.3d at 137). But with the addition of “relating to,” the court observed, “a ‘connection’

or ‘association’ between the act in question and the federal office” would suffice. Id. The Fourth Circuit found

the Third Circuit’s decision persuasive and adopted its

reasoning, dispensing with causation entirely in favor

of “connection” or “association.” Sawyer v. Foster

Wheeler LLC, 860 F.3d 249, 258 (4th Cir. 2017) (reversing the district court’s determination that a “strict

causal connection” was necessary under the federalofficer removal statute, and discerning a “connection or

association” sufficient for removal). The Seventh and

Eleventh Circuits kept the “causal connection” label

but disposed of it in practice. See Baker v. Atl. Richfield Co., 962 F.3d 937, 944 (7th Cir. 2020) (explaining

that, up until 2020, the Seventh and Eleventh Circuits

had “stopped short of abandoning the ‘causal connection’ test, though [they] both had ‘essentially implemented a connection rationale for removal’”).

The Fifth Circuit, for a while, stood by the causalconnection test, in form and substance. It continued to

rely on pre-2011 caselaw to hold that § 1442 required a

showing that “a causal nexus exists between the defendants’ actions under color of federal office and the

plaintiff’s claims.” Bartel v. Alcoa S.S. Co., 805 F.3d

169, 172 (5th Cir. 2015) (quoting Winters v. Diamond

Shamrock Chem. Co., 149 F.3d 387, 398-400 (5th Cir.

1998)). Although the court of appeals recognized that

the words “relating to” meant “some attenuation is

permissible,” Zeringue v. Crane Co., 846 F.3d 785, 794

(5th Cir. 2017), it was clear that the Fifth Circuit was

not giving the phrase “relating to” the same expansive

reading as its sister circuits—even those that kept the

causal-connection requirement in name only. Latiolais,

951 F.3d at 295 n.8 (noting that other circuits that retained the causal-nexus requirement had applied it

“more expansively … than [the Fifth Circuit] in recent

cases”).

Nine years after the Removal Clarification Act of

2011, the Fifth Circuit, sitting en banc, held that the

Act meant that the causal-connection test was no more,

and the “for or relating to” prong requires only that

“the charged conduct is connected or associated with an

act pursuant to a federal officer’s directions.” See Latiolais, 951 F.3d at 296.

4. Latiolais’ course correction did not last long. In

this case, the Fifth Circuit panel held that the challenged conduct must have a “sufficient connection with

directives in … federal … contracts,” Pet. App. 29 (emphasis added), and that the connection must be found

in “the contents of the relevant federal contracts.” Pet.

App. 25. That marks a return not just to an outdated

standard, but to a standard that is stricter than the

one the court had previously applied.

Although the court of appeals insisted it was not

holding that § 1442 requires a showing that “a federal

officer directed the specific … activities being challenged,” Pet. App. 29, that is exactly what it did. The

court found removal unwarranted because petitioners’

federal contracts “lack[ed] … any contractual provision

pertaining to oil production” or any direction “to use

only oil they produced.” Pet. App. 30. That requirement is nowhere to be found in the plain text of “relating to.” Indeed, the court of appeals admitted as much:

it actually acknowledged that petitioners’ “refinery activities … [had] some relation to oil production,” as

“crude oil is a necessary component of avgas, and one

way of obtaining crude oil is to produce it.” Pet. App.

28-29 (emphasis added). The court rejected petitioners’

right to remove only by raising the bar above where

Congress had set it—wrongly treating as dispositive

the fact that the government itself did not mention

production in its contracts with petitioners.

The “contractual directive” requirement is not only

contrary to the current “relating to” standard, it may

be too taxing even under the now-abandoned “causal

connection” standard. Consider, for example, the fact

that federal-officer removal has historically been available even for “acts not expressly authorized by the federal statutes” that are “an inevitable outgrowth of the

officer’s discharge of his federal duty.” Soper, 270 U.S.

at 42. Crude-oil production was an “inevitable outgrowth” of refining activity. Pet. App. 46 (Oldham, J.,

dissenting) (“And given their contractual obligations to

produce avgas, defendants had to get the crude oil from

somewhere….”). And even under the half-causation,

half-connection standard that the Fifth Circuit applied

after the enactment of the Removal Clarification Act

but before Latiolais, the Fifth Circuit rejected the notion that “precise federal direction” was necessary to

satisfy its causal-nexus test. Zeringue, 846 F.3d at

794.

Regardless of whether the “contractual directive”

requirement was defensible under the old standard, it

is certainly not defensible now. “[D]emanding a showing of a specific government direction” goes “beyond

what § 1442(a)(1) requires, which is only that the

charged conduct relate to an act under color of federal

office.” Sawyer, 860 F.3d at 258; Moore v. Elec. Boat

Corp., 25 F.4th 30, 36 (1st Cir. 2022).

5. The court of appeals’ insistence that “relating to”

requires a contractual directive makes little sense, given that federal-officer removal for private parties is not

limited only to those parties who have direct contracts

with the federal government. To be sure, such a relationship is often a reliable way to establish federalofficer removal jurisdiction. See Watson, 551 U.S. at

153. But it is not the only way; “the absence of a direct

contractual relationship with the federal government is

not a bar to removing an action under § 1442(a)(1).”

Cnty. Bd. of Arlington Cnty. v. Express Scripts Pharmacy, Inc., 996 F.3d 243, 254 (4th Cir. 2021). Indeed,

there are many circumstances in which a private party

may assist in the performance of federal duties under

federal oversight, even if there is no contract between

the government itself and that party.

Consider, for example, subcontracted work. The

government may contract a private party to assist in

performing the functions of the federal government,

and give that contractor the discretion to retain other

parties to do the government’s work. A manufacturer

of military hardware, for example, might enter into

contracts with a supplier to obtain specialized parts

needed to make the hardware. E.g., Genereux v. Am.

Beryllia Corp., 577 F.3d 350, 357 n.9 (1st Cir. 2009). 9

Or a private insurance carrier administering health

benefits for federal employees may, at their discretion,

contract with pharmacy benefit managers (“middlemen”) to assist in that administration. E.g., West Virginia ex rel. Hunt v. CaremarkPCS Health, L.L.C., 140

F.4th 188, 198 (4th Cir. 2025). In both instances, the

subcontractor is “involve[d in] an effort to assist, or to

help carry out, the duties or tasks of the federal superior.” Watson, 551 U.S. at 152. There is no basis for depriving these subcontractors of the benefit of federalofficer removal for their federal work, simply because

the federal government has not issued to them specific

contractual directives to follow.

9 See also Notice of Removal at 3, Genereux v. Am. Beryllia Corp.,

No. 04-cv-12137 (D. Mass. Oct. 8, 2004), ECF No. 1 (explaining

that the removing defendant “supplied beryllium oxide ceramic

rods” to a defense contractor that “were used as electrical standoffs in military communications and/or electronic countermeasures equipment”).

III.

The Fifth Circuit’s restrictive, atextual

reading of “relating to” would inevitably

discourage private contractors from

working for the federal government.

Assisting the federal government is not always

easy. Some companies choose not to work with the

government—and one reason is the potential for contractors to incur liability for the implementation of controversial government policies. Federal-officer removal represents the government’s most powerful tool to

assuage this worry. Weakening federal-officer removal

would weaken the federal government’s ability to attract and retain contractors, especially on projects that

are important but controversial.

1. Being forced to defend against a “scattering of …

claims throughout the state courts” over work performed for the federal government would “have a

chilling effect” on the “acceptance of government contracts.” Isaacson, 517 F.3d at 134. Just as federal officials needed access to a federal forum to “assert federal

immunity defenses” at the incipience of the federalofficer removal statute, Watson, 551 U.S. at 150-51,

contractors, too, require a federal forum free of “local

prejudice,” id. at 150, so that they have a fair opportunity to invoke federal immunity and other federal defenses. See, e.g., Government of Puerto Rico v. Express

Scripts, Inc., 119 F.4th 174, 187-88 (1st Cir. 2024)

(Puerto Rico cannot deprive a federal contractor of the

right to have its “immunity litigated in federal court”

by disclaiming claims based on acts under color of federal office); see also Jeffrey A. Belkin & Donald G.

Brown, The Soldier of Fortune in Federal Court: An

Analysis of the Federal Officer Removal Statute, 22 No.

6 Andrews Gov’t Cont. Litig. Rep. 1, at *2 (July 28,

2008) (noting that, under the old causal-connection

standard, “removal under the [federal-officer removal]

statute and immunity for a government contractor are

closely related issues”).

Reading the phrase “for or relating to” as requiring

that the “charged conduct be related to a federal officer’s directions in a contract,” Parish Br. in Opp. 20,

would deprive a great many contractors of a federal forum. Indeed, the Fifth Circuit’s standard invites a peculiar outcome where a “barebones” federal contract

that commits considerable discretion to a federal contractor may be good enough for federally conferred immunity, e.g., Taylor Energy Co., L.L.C. v. Luttrell, 3

F.4th 172, 174-76 (5th Cir. 2021), but not for federalofficer removal under a “liberally construed” statute,

Watson, 551 U.S. at 147.

A federal forum ensures reliable access—free from

the heightened risk of local prejudice—to substantive

defenses beyond immunity. For example, access to a

federal forum may ensure that a contractor does not

find itself defending a lawsuit in an inconvenient jurisdiction just because a state court refuses to allow the

case to be heard elsewhere. E.g., Magnin v. Teledyne

Cont’l Motors, 91 F.3d 1424 (11th Cir. 1996) (affirming

(1) denial of motion to remand case removed under

§ 1442 and (2) dismissal for forum non conveniens, as

Alabama was not a convenient forum for an aviation

accident that happened in France, even though the defendant manufacturer was based in Alabama). Or,

when a contractor faces a putative class action for work

done under a federal officer, the contractor can find

comfort in the fact that a federal court will apply the

rigors of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23, and will

not yield to more relaxed legal standards that may fa-

vor putative class plaintiffs. E.g., Crutchfield v. Sewerage & Water Bd. of New Orleans, 829 F.3d 370 (5th

Cir. 2016). In denying access to federal court absent a

relevant “contractual directive,” the Fifth Circuit’s approach to removal risks depriving federal contractors of

these protections.

2. Premising federal-officer removal on “a federal

officer’s directions in a contract” is also unmoored from

the realities of federal government contracting. While

the government often lays out in fine print how it

wants a contractor to provide its goods or services, that

is not always the case; in many other instances, the

government leaves those details to the discretion of the

contractor. For example, when the government directs

a contractor to manufacture a product, it can provide

“design specifications,” which “describe in precise detail

the materials to be employed and the manner in which

the work is to be performed”; the contractor has “no

discretion to deviate from the specifications.” Blake

Constr. Co. v. United States, 987 F.2d 743, 745 (Fed.

Cir. 1993). Alternatively, the government can provide

“performance specifications,” which “specify the results

to be obtained, and leave it to the contractor to determine how to achieve those results.” Stuyvesant Dredging Co. v. United States, 834 F.2d 1576, 1582 (Fed. Cir.

1987). A contractor carrying out performance specifications is “expected to exercise his ingenuity in achieving

[the] objective or standard of performance, selecting the

means and assuming a corresponding responsibility for

that selection.” Blake Constr., 987 F.2d at 745 (citation

omitted). Performance specifications “anticipate a contractor’s exercise of discretion,” Fireman’s Fund Ins.

Co. v. United States, 92 Fed. Cl. 598, 652 (2010), as it is

possible that “nothing in the contract’s description

[will] dictate[] the ‘manner’ in which [the contractor]

must perform.” P.R. Burke Corp. v. United States, 277

F.3d 1346, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2002).

Regardless of whether the government has given a

contractor no discretion or complete “latitude,” Pet.

App. 29-30, the contractor’s function is the same: “to

assist, or to help carry out, the duties or tasks of the

federal superior.” Watson, 551 U.S. at 152. That includes the scenario here, where a private contractor

“help[s] the Government to produce an item that it

needs.” Id. at 153. A contractor’s actions do not lose

their “connection” or “association” with a federal contract simply because the contractor exercised discretion

in how to fulfill the contract.

3. Despite respondents’ assertions to the contrary,

honoring the plain text of the words “relating to”—by

requiring no more than a connection or association between the charged conduct and a federal contract—

does not mean that “any federal contract will do,” Parish Br. in Opp. 20, or that the “relating to” requirement

will become “meaningless.” State Br. in Opp. 20-21.

As the Fifth Circuit itself once recognized, the fact that

“some attenuation is permissible” does not mean the

“relating to” requirement sinks to “the point of irrelevance.” Zeringue, 846 F.3d at 794.

Applying the phrase “relating to” expansively, as

Congress intended, does not mean every case involving

a private contractor for the federal government will be

removable to federal court. For example, the contractor must still demonstrate that it was “acting under” a

federal officer, Watson, 551 U.S. at 152, and that it has

a colorable federal defense, Jefferson Cnty., 527 U.S. at

431. Moreover, the touchstone of “relating to” remains

whether the charged conduct relates to “an effort to assist, or to help carry out, the duties or tasks of the federal superior.” Watson, 551 U.S. at 152. If the conduct

in question was not part of a contractor’s efforts to aid

the federal government, then it is not “for or relating

to” acts under federal office.

In this case, no one seriously contends that there is

no “connection” or “association” between petitioners’

federal contracts to produce avgas and their production

of raw crude. Pet. App. 45 (Oldham, J., dissenting)

(explaining that “defendants could not simply snap

their fingers and, voilà, make avgas”). Even the Fifth

Circuit could not deny that “Defendants’ federal contracts,” which “clearly pertain[ed] to their refinement

of avgas and other petroleum products,” also had “some

relation to oil production,” because “one way of obtaining crude oil is to produce it.” Pet. App. 28-29.

Rather, respondents’ gripe is that petitioners’ federal work was not related enough to the charged conduct.

In their view, anything short of a specific contractual

directive from the federal government is “insufficient”

to satisfy the “for or relating to” requirement, as the

Fifth Circuit so held. Pet. App. 29.

But the “relating to” requirement simply is not demanding in the way that respondents want it to be.

Section 1442(a) does not require federal courts to decide how “grandly” or “narrowly” the charged conduct is

connected to the performance of federal responsibilities—only to confirm that a plausible connection is

there. Cf. Jefferson Cnty., 527 U.S. at 432-33. Even

under the old “causal connection” standard, this Court

has rejected invitations to apply federal-officer removal

in a manner that scrutinizes the closeness of the

charged conduct to the federal government’s work. In

Willingham, for example, it was enough that the defendants encountered the plaintiff through their federal employment. Whether they actually acted within

the scope of their federal duties when interacting with

the plaintiff (or were on “some kind of ‘frolic of their

own’”) was an issue to be decided later—by “a federal,

not a state, court.” 395 U.S. at 409.

Treating the “relating to” standard as a search for

specific contractual instructions would create considerable uncertainty as to how and when private contractors can access federal court. Consider, for example,

defense contractors—such as those who assemble and

manufacture military hardware or components for various defense technologies and systems. Defense contractors often invoke federal-officer removal—

particularly in litigation, such as asbestos or other toxic-tort cases, that may be several degrees removed from

the specifications (to the extent such specifications are

present) that govern the performance of their contracts.

See pp. 9-10, supra. While a defense manufacturing

contract might have “strict specifications” for how a

product is to be manufactured, it will almost certainly

not have specifications for everything that a potential

plaintiff may sue about. For example, such specifications are unlikely to cover the working conditions of

those assembling the product. E.g., Sawyer, 860 F.3d

at 252-53 (government provided “strict specifications”

for how Navy boilers were to be manufactured, and

what kind of labels were to be affixed on those boilers,

but not about warnings given to “individuals constructing the boilers of the presence of asbestos and their

need to take proper precautions”). In that example, respondents’ reading of “relating to” would force defense

contractors to draw a detailed connection between

working conditions and specific equipment specifications, and for courts to decide whether the two are “related” enough. That plainly goes “beyond what

§ 1442(a)(1) requires.” Sawyer, 860 F.3d at 258.

As Latiolais correctly explains, the nexus requirement is, and has always been, “minimal.” 951 F.3d at

295. But the Fifth Circuit’s interpretation of “for or relating to” in this case is anything but minimal. If this

Court were to endorse that interpretation, the resulting uncertainty would only deter private contractors

from taking on federal work. Far from giving “full effect to the purpose[] for which” § 1442 and the Removal

Clarification Act were enacted, Symes, 286 U.S. at 517,

the court of appeals’ interpretation of the statute would

leave federal-officer removal more elusive and unpredictable than before for private parties, undermining

Congress’s decision in 2011 to make removal more

available.

CONCLUSION

The decision of the court of appeals should be reversed.

Respectfully submitted.