Amicus Curiae Brief — Chevron USA Incorporated, et al., Petitioners v. Plaquemines Parish, Louisiana, et al.

No. 24-813

In the Supreme Court of the United States

CHEVRON USA INCORPORATED, ET AL., PETITIONERS

v.

PLAQUEMINES PARISH, LOUISIANA, ET AL.

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI

TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

BRIEF FOR THE UNITED STATES

AS AMICUS CURIAE SUPPORTING PETITIONERS

D. JOHN SAUER

Solicitor General

Counsel of Record

ERIC J. HAMILTON

Deputy Assistant

Attorney General

CURTIS E. GANNON

Deputy Solicitor General

AARON Z. ROPER

Assistant to the

Solicitor General

MICHAEL S. RAAB

SARAH N. SMITH

Attorneys

Department of Justice

Washington, D.C. 20530-0001

SupremeCtBriefs@usdoj.gov

(202) 514-2217

QUESTION PRESENTED

Petitioners are oil and gas companies whose predecessors had federal contracts to refine aviation gasoline

for the federal government during World War II. These

lawsuits in part challenge those predecessors’ wartime

production of crude oil that they used to help fulfill their

federal contracts. The question presented is:

Whether petitioners are “person[s] acting under”

a federal officer who face suits “relating to any act under color of [federal] office,” as required to invoke the

federal-officer-removal statute, 28 U.S.C. 1442(a)(1).

(I)

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

Interest of the United States....................................................... 1

Introduction................................................................................... 1

Statement ...................................................................................... 4

A. Federal-officer removal .................................................. 4

B. World War II–era oil production ................................... 6

C. The present controversy ................................................. 8

Summary of argument ............................................................... 11

Argument:

Petitioners are persons acting under a federal officer

who face suits relating to acts under color of federal

office ........................................................................................ 14

A. Persons assisting and supervised by a federal

officer may remove suits that have a connection

with or reference to any act causally connected to

asserted federal authority ............................................ 15

B. Petitioners’ avgas refining supports removal ............. 20

1. Petitioners’ wartime avgas contracts make

them “person[s] acting under” a federal officer .... 20

2. Respondents’ suits are ones “relating to”

petitioners’ avgas refining ....................................... 23

3. The court of appeals unduly cabined the

“relating to” requirement ........................................ 27

C. PAW ’s supervision of wartime oil production

independently supports removal .................................. 30

Conclusion ................................................................................... 35

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases:

American Airlines, Inc. v. Wolens,

513 U.S. 219 (1995).............................................................. 27

Arizona v. Manypenny, 451 U.S. 232 (1981) ...................... 26

(III)

IV

Cases—Continued:

Page

Board of County Comm’rs v. Suncor Energy

(U.S.A.), 25 F.4th 1238 (10th Cir. 2022),

cert. denied, 143 S. Ct. 1795 (2023) ................................... 20

Colorado v. Symes, 286 U.S. 510 (1932) .............................. 18

Dart Cherokee Basin Operating Co. v. Owens,

574 U.S. 81 (2014) ................................................................. 4

Davis v. South Carolina, 107 U.S. 597 (1883) .............. 15, 29

Defense Supplies Corp. v. Lawrence Warehouse Co.,

336 U.S. 631 (1949).............................................................. 21

Egelhoff v. Egelhoff ex rel. Breiner,

532 U.S. 141 (2001).................................................. 18, 19, 24

Jefferson County v. Acker, 527 U.S. 423 (1999) ................ 2, 5

Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, 14 U.S. 304 (1816) ..................... 5

Maryland v. Soper (No. 1), 270 U.S. 9 (1926) ... 15-17, 19, 29

Mesa v. California, 489 U.S. 121 (1989) .......................... 4, 16

Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc.,

504 U.S. 374 (1992).........................................2, 17, 18, 23, 28

New York State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue

Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co.,

514 U.S. 645 (1995).............................................................. 19

Plaquemines Parish v. Chevron USA, Inc.,

No. 22-30055, 2022 WL 9914869

(5th Cir. Oct. 17, 2022), cert. denied,

143 S. Ct. 991 (2023) ......................................... 10, 30, 33, 34

Rowe v. New Hampshire Motor Transp. Ass’n,

552 U.S. 364 (2008).................................................. 18, 19, 24

Rutledge v. Pharmaceutical Care Mgmt. Ass’n,

592 U.S. 80 (2020) ............................................................... 27

Sawyer v. Foster Wheeler LLC,

860 F.3d 249 (4th Cir. 2017) ............................................... 27

Shell Oil Co. v. United States,

751 F.3d 1282 (Fed. Cir. 2014) ............................. 6, 7, 21, 31

Tennessee v. Davis, 100 U.S. 257 (1880) ................... 5, 17, 28

V

Cases—Continued:

Page

Watson v. Philip Morris Cos.,

551 U.S. 142 (2007).....................1, 2, 4, 10, 12, 15, 16, 19-21,

26, 28, 29, 31-34

Willingham v. Morgan,

395 U.S. 402 (1969)......................... 4, 5, 12, 16, 18, 19, 23, 28

Winters v. Diamond Shamrock Chem. Co.,

149 F.3d 387 (5th Cir. 1998),

cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1034 (1999) ..................................... 20

Statutes:

Act of Feb. 4, 1815, ch. 31, § 8, 3 Stat. 198 ............................ 5

Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 646, § 1442(a)(1),

62 Stat. 938 ............................................................................ 5

Airline Deregulation Act of 1978,

49 U.S.C. 41713(b)(1) .......................................................... 18

Coastal Zone Management Act of 1972,

16 U.S.C. 1451 et seq. ............................................................ 9

Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974,

29 U.S.C. 1144(a)........................................................... 17, 27

Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act

of 1994, 49 U.S.C. 14501(c)(1) ............................................ 18

Removal Clarification Act of 2011,

Pub. L. No. 112-51, § 2(b), 125 Stat. 545....................... 2, 17

28 U.S.C. 1442(a)(1) .................. 1, 2, 4, 5, 10-16, 18, 20, 22, 23,

28, 29-31, 33, 34

28 U.S.C. 1442(a)(1) (2006) .............................................. 2, 17

State and Local Coastal Resources Management Act

of 1978, La. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 49:214.21 et seq.

(2023 & Supp. 2025) .......................................................... 8, 9

La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 49:214.34.C(2) (2023) .................... 9

VI

Miscellaneous:

Page

Max W. Ball, Fueling a Global War,

45 Ohio J. Sci. 29 (1945) ...................................................... 25

Black’s Law Dictionary 1158 (5th ed. 1979)....................... 17

Exec. Order No. 9276, 7 Fed. Reg. 10,091

(Dec. 4, 1942) ................................................................... 6, 33

6 Fed. Reg. 2760 (June 7, 1941) .............................................. 6

6 Fed. Reg. 2972 (June 19, 1941) .......................................... 21

6 Fed. Reg. 5013 (Oct. 2, 1941) ............................................. 22

6 Fed. Reg. 5536 (Oct. 30, 1941) ........................................... 25

6 Fed. Reg. 5880 (Nov. 19, 1941) .......................................... 31

6 Fed. Reg. 6329 (Dec. 10, 1941) .......................................... 22

6 Fed. Reg. 6433 (Dec. 16, 1941) ...................................... 8, 22

6 Fed. Reg. 6687 (Dec. 24, 1941) .......................................... 32

7 Fed. Reg. 41 (Jan. 1, 1942) ................................................. 22

7 Fed. Reg. 164 (Jan. 8, 1942) ............................................... 26

7 Fed. Reg. 5142 (July 7, 1942) ............................................ 32

7 Fed. Reg. 6393 (Aug. 14, 1942) .......................................... 22

8 Fed. Reg. 3955 (Mar. 31, 1943) ...................................... 6, 31

8 Fed. Reg. 1815 (Feb. 10, 1943) .......................................... 33

8 Fed. Reg. 12,571 (Sept. 14, 1943) ...................................... 32

8 Fed. Reg. 14,315 (Oct. 21, 1943) .......................................... 7

9 Fed. Reg. 7448 (July 4, 1944) ............................................ 31

9 Fed. Reg. 8933 (July 25, 1944)........................................... 22

H.R. Rep. No. 17, 112th Cong., 1st Sess. (2011) ............. 5, 17

Letter from Francis Biddle, Acting Att’y Gen., to

Harold L. Ickes, Petroleum Coordinator for Nat’l

Defense (June 18, 1941) ..................................................... 33

Letter from Robert H. Jackson, Att’y Gen., to John

Lord O’Brian, Gen. Counsel, Office of Production

Mgmt. (Apr. 29, 1941) ......................................................... 33

J. Howard Marshall II, Done in Oil (1994) ........................ 32

VII

Miscellaneous—Continued:

Page

Oil Operations Geared to War Conditions Through

PAW, Oil Wkly., Jan. 31, 1944 ............................................. 7

Petroleum Administration for War (PAW):

A History of the Petroleum Administration for

War 1941-1945 (John W. Frey & H. Chandler

Ide eds., 1946) .............................. 6-8, 22, 24, 25, 30-34

Public Relations Div., A Handbook on 100 Octane

Number Aviation Fuel: 100 Octane

Production Program (Nov. 27, 1943) ........................ 8

Petroleum Investigation (Gasoline and Rubber):

Hearings Before a Subcomm. of the House Comm.

on Interstate & Foreign Commerce,

77th Cong., 2d Sess. (1943) .................................................. 6

Wartime Petroleum Policy Under the Petroleum

Administration for War: Hearings Before a Special Comm. Investigating Petroleum Resources,

79th Cong., 1st Sess. (1946) ....................................... 7, 8, 33

In the Supreme Court of the United States

No. 24-813

CHEVRON USA INCORPORATED, ET AL., PETITIONERS

v.

PLAQUEMINES PARISH, LOUISIANA, ET AL.

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI

TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

BRIEF FOR THE UNITED STATES

AS AMICUS CURIAE SUPPORTING PETITIONERS

INTEREST OF THE UNITED STATES

This case involves the application of the federalofficer-removal statute, 28 U.S.C. 1442(a)(1), to companies that had federal contracts during World War II.

The United States has a substantial interest in the

proper interpretation of that statute, which governs removal by federal officers themselves and protects federal operations from state-court interference.

INTRODUCTION

The federal-officer-removal statute, 28 U.S.C.

1442(a)(1), ensures the availability of a neutral federal

forum to guard against the risk that state-court proceedings might interfere with the operations of the federal government. That statute has long been “broad.”

Watson v. Philip Morris Cos., 551 U.S. 142, 147 (2007).

Before 2011, Congress authorized “any person acting

(1)

2

under [a federal] officer” to remove any state-court suit

“for any act under color of such office.” 28 U.S.C.

1442(a)(1) (2006). This Court interpreted that language

to authorize any person who assisted and was supervised by a federal officer in carrying out his duties to

remove any suit targeting conduct causally connected

to asserted federal authority. See Watson, 551 U.S. at

152; Jefferson County v. Acker, 527 U.S. 423, 431 (1999).

In 2011, Congress made the statute broader still, authorizing removal to federal court of any suit “for or relating to any act under color of [federal] office.” 28

U.S.C. 1442(a)(1) (emphasis added); see Removal Clarification Act of 2011, Pub. L. No. 112-51, § 2(b), 125 Stat.

545. As this Court has often observed, the ordinary

meaning of “relating to” is expansive, reaching anything

that “has a connection with, or reference to,” the object.

Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 504 U.S. 374,

383-384 (1992) (citation omitted).

The 2011 amendment thus layered one broad connection test on top of another, offering a federal forum for

state-law claims that have the mere potential to interfere with federal operations. Combining this Court’s established understanding of “relating to” with the pre2011 removal test, persons acting under federal officers

may now remove suits that have a connection with or

refer to acts causally connected to asserted federal authority.

While capacious, the new federal-officer-removal

statute is not infinite. This Court’s precedents interpreting “relating to” in the preemption context impose

meaningful constraints, including by tethering the

phrase to the statutory objectives. So too here, removal

is appropriately tied to the kinds of connections that

risk state-court interference with federal operations.

3

Those principles support removal in this case. During

World War II, petitioners’ corporate predecessors (included in our references to petitioners) worked for the

federal government to refine aviation gasoline—a vital

wartime product that powered Allied air forces to victory. Respondents do not challenge the refining itself.

But they challenge petitioners’ production of crude oil

that petitioners used in part to make that gasoline. The

close link between oil production and refining—as reflected in petitioners’ federal contracts and in the federal government’s supervision of the wartime oil industry more generally—establishes the requisite connection for removal. In denying removal, the court of appeals demanded an unduly tight connection to a specific

directive in petitioners’ federal contracts—a requirement nowhere in the statutory text.

Alternatively, the federal government’s supervision

of the wartime oil industry—including some of the very

practices that respondents challenge—independently

supports removal. During World War II, the oil industry operated as a unique public–private partnership

with a special wartime agency, the Petroleum Administration for War, overseeing the industry’s operations

in service of the Nation’s shared wartime mission. That

special relationship supports the removal of these suits

challenging wartime production practices.

At the same time, a federal forum is just that: a forum.

If respondents’ claims have merit (a question on which

the United States takes no position), they may proceed

before impartial federal judges and juries in Louisiana,

just upriver from the respondent parishes.

4

STATEMENT

A. Federal-Officer Removal

1. The federal-officer-removal statute, 28 U.S.C.

1442(a)(1), offers a federal forum to the federal government, its officers, and those acting under them for suits

related to their federal acts. Specifically, “[t]he United

States or any agency thereof or any officer (or any person acting under that officer) of the United States or of

any agency thereof ” may remove any civil or criminal

action “for or relating to any act under color of such office.” 28 U.S.C. 1442(a)(1). The statute’s “ ‘basic’ purpose” is to protect the federal government from statecourt “interference with its ‘operations.’ ” Watson v.

Philip Morris Cos., 551 U.S. 142, 150 (2007) (quoting

Willingham v. Morgan, 395 U.S. 402, 406 (1969)).

A removing defendant must satisfy three requirements. First, the defendant must be the United States,

a federal agency, a federal officer, or a person acting

under a federal officer. 28 U.S.C. 1442(a)(1). Second,

for federal officers and those acting under them, the

suit must be “for or relating to any act under color of

such office.” Ibid. And third, the defendant must assert

a “colorable” federal defense. Mesa v. California, 489

U.S. 121, 129 (1989). In evaluating those requirements,

the court must accept the defendant’s “version of the

facts,” Willingham, 395 U.S. at 409, applying the ordinary civil pleading standard for federal complaints,

Dart Cherokee Basin Operating Co. v. Owens, 574 U.S.

81, 87 (2014).

2. Federal-officer removal originated in response to

state resistance to federal wartime authority. During

the War of 1812, New England shipowners filed statecourt claims against federal customs officials enforcing

an unpopular trade embargo with England. Watson,

5

551 U.S. at 147. In response, Congress authorized customs officials “or any other person aiding or assisting”

them to remove state-court actions “for any thing done

by virtue of [the customs laws] or under colour thereof.”

Act of Feb. 4, 1815, ch. 31, § 8, 3 Stat. 198. That statute

was “[o]bviously * * * an attempt to protect federal officers from interference by hostile state courts.”

Willingham, 395 U.S. at 405. The Civil War and its

lead-up prompted additional removal statutes, id. at

405-406, which likewise served to “ ‘protect[]’ ” the federal government “ ‘in the exercise of its constitutional

powers’ ” lest a state court “paralyze the operations of

the government,” Tennessee v. Davis, 100 U.S. 257, 263

(1880) (quoting Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, 14 U.S. 304,

363 (1816)).

Starting in 1948, Congress authorized “[a]ny officer

of the United States or any agency thereof, or any person acting under him,” to remove a civil or criminal case

“for any act under color of such office.” Act of June 25,

1948, ch. 646, § 1442(a)(1), 62 Stat. 938. That language,

which continued largely unchanged for over 60 years,

required the defendant to “show a nexus, a ‘ “causal connection” between the charged conduct and asserted official authority.’ ” Jefferson County v. Acker, 527 U.S.

423, 431 (1999) (quoting Willingham, 395 U.S. at 409).

In 2011, Congress further expanded removal to

state-court suits “for or relating to any act under color

of [federal] office.” 28 U.S.C. 1442(a)(1) (emphasis

added). That amendment was “intended to broaden the

universe of acts” supporting removal. H.R. Rep. No. 17,

112th Cong., 1st Sess., Pt. 1, at 6 (2011) (House Report).

6

B. World War II–Era Oil Production

This case involves the removal of suits challenging

the production of crude oil used to make aviation gasoline for the federal government during World War II.

1. “World War II, from beginning to end, was a war

of oil.” Petroleum Admin. for War, A History of the Petroleum Administration for War, 1941-1945, at 1 (John

W. Frey & H. Chandler Ide eds., 1946) (PAW History).

Over the course of the war, Allied forces consumed

seven billion barrels of oil—six billion of which came

from American wells. Ibid.

To produce that quantity of oil and “accommodate[]

[it] to the needs of the Nation and the national defense

program,” President Roosevelt created the Office of the

Petroleum Coordinator for National Defense, later renamed the Petroleum Administration for War (PAW).

6 Fed. Reg. 2760, 2760 (June 7, 1941); see Exec. Order

No. 9276, 7 Fed. Reg. 10,091 (Dec. 4, 1942). The agency’s

“primary purpose” was to “furnish[] central direction to

the oil industry during the war period.” Petroleum Investigation (Gasoline and Rubber): Hearings Before a

Subcomm. of the House Comm. on Interstate & Foreign

Commerce, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1943) (testimony of

Ralph K. Davies, Deputy Petroleum Coordinator).

PAW “exercised substantial wartime regulatory control over almost every aspect of the petroleum industry.” Shell Oil Co. v. United States, 751 F.3d 1282, 1285

(Fed. Cir. 2014). PAW identified how much oil was

needed for the war effort, what resources the oil industry needed to produce that oil, and how to get that oil

where it needed to go. PAW History 70, 75, 110. PAW

meticulously regulated oil production down to the spacing and angle of wells and how much producers could

spend on oil lines. E.g., 8 Fed. Reg. 3955, 3956-3957

7

(Mar. 31, 1943); 8 Fed. Reg. 14,315, 14,315 (Oct. 21,

1943). And PAW controlled the industry’s access to raw

materials, such as steel, requiring permission from

Washington for large orders. PAW History 163-165.

PAW routinely directed what oil went where, treating “the refineries of the country * * * as a unit, to

give maximum yield of the products most urgently

needed.” Wartime Petroleum Policy Under the Petroleum Administration for War: Hearings Before a Special Comm. Investigating Petroleum Resources, 79th

Cong., 1st Sess. 12 (1946) (testimony of Ralph K. Davies, Deputy Petroleum Administrator for War) (Wartime Petroleum Policy). And PAW oversaw outputs, including by negotiating military contracts for refined petroleum products alongside the Defense Supplies Corporation. PAW History 204. In sum, PAW oversaw “a

complete reorganization of the American oil industry”

under “federal direction.” Oil Operations Geared to

War Conditions Through PAW, Oil Wkly., Jan. 31,

1944, at 179, reprinted in 23-30294 C.A. ROA 36,045.

2. The “ ‘most critically needed refinery product’

during World War II” was aviation gasoline, or avgas.

Shell Oil, 751 F.3d at 1285 (citation omitted). Avgas

allowed planes “to fly faster and higher, with improved

rates of climb and higher payload carrying capacity.”

Ibid. Avgas is what “winged our fighters over Africa

and Europe” and “powered our bombers from Midway

to Hiroshima.” PAW History 193.

In an order signed two days after Pearl Harbor, the

Petroleum Coordinator for National Defense—Secretary of the Interior Harold Ickes—declared it “essential, in the national interest, that the supplies of all

grades of aviation gasoline for military, defense and essential civilian uses be increased immediately to the

8

maximum.” 6 Fed. Reg. 6433, 6433 (Dec. 16, 1941). He

directed the preparation of plans “to increase to a maximum the production of all grades of aviation gasoline,”

including plans for “the use of all sources of the components of such gasoline,” such as crude oil. Id. at 64336434. PAW thereafter strove to “totally mobilize[] and

integrate[]” “the entire American oil industry” into “one

vast national refinery devoted to maximum production

of 100 octane [aviation] gasoline.” Public Relations Div.,

PAW, A Handbook on 100 Octane Number Aviation

Fuel: 100 Octane Production Program 1 (Nov. 27,

1943), reprinted in 23-30294 C.A. ROA 35,178.

PAW ’s avgas program was “a spectacular success.”

PAW History 213. The United States achieved a 1185%

increase in avgas production during the war, Pet. App.

44 (Oldham, J., dissenting), with that output providing

“the lifeblood of the United Nations in the air,” Wartime Petroleum Policy 12.

C. The Present Controversy

1. Petitioners are oil and gas companies whose predecessors produced crude oil along the Louisiana coast

during World War II. Pet. App. 9-10. In each consolidated case, at least one petitioner refined avgas for the

federal government during the war using some crude oil

that the same company produced in Louisiana. Ibid.

Beginning in 2013, coastal parishes in Louisiana, including the two respondent parishes, filed 42 statecourt lawsuits against oil and gas companies, including

petitioners, alleging violations of Louisiana’s State and

Local Coastal Resources Management Act of 1978

(SLCRMA), La. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 49:214.21 et seq.

(2023 & Supp. 2025). Pet. App. 3. The SLCRMA is part

of a cooperative-federalism program administered by

the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration,

9

which allows participating States to manage their

coastal zones with federal support. See Coastal Zone

Management Act of 1972, 16 U.S.C. 1451 et seq.

In each suit, which respondents Louisiana and its

Department of Energy and Natural Resources later

joined, the plaintiffs allege that the defendant companies produced oil along the Louisiana coast without

valid “coastal use permits.” Pet. App. 3-4 (citation omitted). Although the SLCRMA does not require permits

for uses that were “legally commenced” before 1980, La.

Rev. Stat. Ann. § 49:214.34.C(2) (2023), the plaintiffs

contend that the defendants’ activities were not legally

commenced because they allegedly deviated from “prudent industry practices,” Pet. App. 6.

The defendants’ initial attempts at removing the

cases to federal court were unsuccessful, and the cases

proceeded in state court. Pet. App. 5. In 2018, the

plaintiffs produced an expert report clarifying that the

suits challenge some activities that began during World

War II. Id. at 5-6. Specifically, the report faulted the

defendants for failing to build saltwater reinjection

wells and for using canals rather than overland roads,

vertical rather than directional drilling, and earthen

pits rather than steel tanks. Id. at 19-21. The report

also at least “indirectly” challenged “the rate at which

[the defendants] extracted crude oil” since some of the

plaintiffs’ preferred practices “would have slowed [the

defendants’] production rates during World War II.”

Id. at 21.

The defendants again removed to the United States

District Courts for the Eastern and Western Districts

of Louisiana, asserting that PAW ’s pervasive supervision of the wartime oil industry supported federalofficer removal. See Pet. App. 6. The district courts

10

each designated a lead case (not the cases here) and remanded those cases to state court. Ibid. The defendants in those cases did not identify any federal contract

and instead relied on PAW ’s industry-wide regulation

to support removal. See Plaquemines Parish v. Chevron USA, Inc. (Plaquemines II ), No. 22-30055, 2022

WL 9914869, at *1 (5th Cir. Oct. 17, 2022) (per curiam),

cert. denied, 143 S. Ct. 991 (2023).

After one set of appeals, in which the lead cases were

sent back to the district courts for further consideration

following an intervening en banc decision, the court of

appeals affirmed. Pet. App. 6-8. The court concluded

that the defendants were not “ ‘acting under’ ” a federal

officer because they had not identified any government

contracts and PAW ’s wartime control of the oil industry

“merely” showed compliance with “federal regulations,”

not “ ‘help or assistance’ ” to the federal government.

Plaquemines II, 2022 WL 9914869, at *3 (quoting Watson, 551 U.S. at 152).

2. The district courts then reopened the two cases

here. Pet. App. 9-10. Petitioners contended that, unlike

the defendants in Plaquemines II, they were “acting

under” a federal officer given their federal contracts to

refine avgas. Ibid. Both district courts rejected that

argument and remanded the cases. Ibid.

A divided court of appeals affirmed. Pet. App. 1-63.

The majority agreed with petitioners that their avgasrefining contracts made this an “ ‘archetypal case’ of a

defendant ‘acting under’ a federal officer.” Id. at 15-16

(citations omitted). But the majority concluded that

these suits were not “for or relating to” acts under color

of federal office because they challenge oil production,

not refining. 28 U.S.C. 1442(a)(1); Pet. App. 17-38.

11

The majority analyzed the “relating to” requirement

by asking whether “the relevant federal directives in

[petitioners’] refinery contracts” were sufficiently “ ‘connected or associated with’ ” “the conduct challenged in

[respondents’] complaints.” Pet. App. 19. That test was

not met, the majority held, given “[t]he lack of any contractual provision pertaining to oil production.” Id. at

30. The majority declined to consider PAW ’s control of

the wartime oil industry and “limit[ed]” its analysis “to

directives in [petitioners’] federal refining contracts.”

Id. at 26. If anything, the majority asserted, PAW ’s

control over the oil supply “severed any connection between [petitioners’] production and refinement activities.” Id. at 36.

Judge Oldham dissented. Pet. App. 40-63. He agreed

that petitioners “acted under” a federal officer but

would have also held that these suits “relate to” acts under color of federal office. Id. at 40. In his view, oil

production is “undeniably ‘related to’ ” avgas refining

since “crude oil is an indispensable, necessary, and direct step to producing avgas.” Id. at 45-46. That is particularly so here, Judge Oldham explained, because respondents’ preferred practices would have slowed output and “hampered the federal interest in refined avgas

explicitly outlined in the contracts.” Id. at 52. Judge

Oldham also rejected the majority’s view that PAW ’s

control over the oil supply “ ‘severed’ the causal chain.”

Id. at 54 (citation omitted). To the contrary, PAW

“simply insert[ed] the Government into another layer of

control.” Id. at 55.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

A. To invoke the federal-officer-removal statute, a

defendant must be a “person acting under” a federal officer. 28 U.S.C. 1442(a)(1). A defendant meets that re-

12

quirement when he assists a federal officer in carrying

out his official duties while subject to the federal officer’s supervision, guidance, or control. Watson v.

Philip Morris Cos., 551 U.S. 142, 151-152 (2007).

A suit must also be “for or relating to any act under

color of [federal] office.” 28 U.S.C. 1442(a)(1). An act

occurs under color of federal office when it is causally

connected to asserted federal authority. Willingham v.

Morgan, 395 U.S. 402, 409 (1969). And “relating to”

means to have a connection with or reference to. Putting the two together, eligible defendants may remove

suits that have some connection with or reference to any

act that is causally connected to asserted federal authority. To identify the types of connections that qualify, courts should consider the objectives of federalofficer removal—most importantly, protecting federal

operations from state-court interference.

B. Petitioners’ avgas refining supports removal of

these suits.

1. The court of appeals correctly held that petitioners are “person[s] acting under” federal officers. 28

U.S.C. 1442(a)(1). Petitioners assisted the federal government by providing a critical military product—

avgas—under detailed federal contracts within a wartime oil industry that was heavily supervised by the federal government in relevant respects.

Petitioners did not need to “act[] under” a federal officer while engaged in the challenged conduct, as respondents appear to contend. Otherwise, the “person

acting under” requirement—which identifies who may

remove—would nullify Congress’s broader specification of which suits may be removed—those “for or relating to any act under color of [federal] office.” 28

U.S.C. 1442(a)(1).

13

2. These suits are ones “relating to” petitioners’

avgas refining. Respondents challenge the way petitioners produced crude oil—the principal component of

avgas. PAW managed the oil industry as a vertically

integrated whole because crude oil and refinery outputs

like avgas were inherently connected. Petitioners’ contracts reflected that link by tying avgas prices to the

price of crude. And the connection was even tighter because the crude oil from some of petitioners’ oil fields

was especially well suited for making avgas. Removal

would further the statute’s objectives by providing a

federal forum for these challenges to petitioners’ wartime acts to assist the federal government.

3. In holding otherwise, the court of appeals incorrectly demanded a specific federal directive related to

oil production in petitioners’ contracts. The test for

federal-officer removal is not so limited. The statutory

text requires a relationship between the plaintiff ’s suit

and the defendant’s “act under color of [federal] office,”

28 U.S.C. 1442(a)(1)—language which this Court has interpreted to require that the relevant act be causally

connected to asserted federal authority. Requiring a

specific directive, much less one in a contract, has never

been the rule.

The court of appeals also erred in treating PAW—a

federal agency—as severing the link between petitioners’ production and refining activities. An additional

layer of federal involvement should strengthen, not

weaken, the case for removal. To the extent that removal would create an asymmetry with related cases

that the Fifth Circuit previously remanded, the answer

should have been to permit removal in those cases, not

to deny it here.

14

C. PAW ’s supervision of petitioners’ production

activities independently supports removal. The federal

government extensively regulated the wartime oil industry, including some of the production practices for

which respondents bring these suits. While regulation

alone does not make someone a “person acting under” a

federal officer, the regulation here suffices because it

enlisted petitioners to assist federal officers in the national war effort.

ARGUMENT

PETITIONERS ARE PERSONS ACTING UNDER A FEDERAL OFFICER WHO FACE SUITS RELATING TO ACTS

UNDER COLOR OF FEDERAL OFFICE

Private persons who assist and are supervised by

federal officers in carrying out their official duties may

invoke the federal-officer-removal statute, 28 U.S.C.

1442(a)(1). To obtain removal, such a person must show

that the suit is “for or relating to any act under color of

[federal] office,” ibid.—in other words, that the suit has

a connection with or refers to any act causally connected

to asserted federal authority. Petitioners satisfy those

requirements to remove these suits targeting their

World War II–era oil-production activities. Those activities are connected to petitioners’ actions under federal officers to refine some of that same oil into avgas

for the federal government. Alternatively, those production activities are themselves acts under color of federal office given the government’s pervasive supervision of the wartime oil industry to further federal wartime objectives.

15

A. Persons Assisting And Supervised By A Federal Officer

May Remove Suits That Have A Connection With Or

Reference To Any Act Causally Connected To Asserted

Federal Authority

Section 1442(a)(1) authorizes the removal of any

state-court civil or criminal action against “[t]he United

States or any agency thereof or any officer (or any person acting under that officer) of the United States or of

any agency thereof, in an official or individual capacity,

for or relating to any act under color of such office.”

That text imposes two requirements pertinent here.

First, the statute identifies who may seek removal:

“[t]he United States,” a federal “agency,” a federal “officer,” or—relevant here—“any person acting under

that officer.” 28 U.S.C. 1442(a)(1). A private person

“ ‘act[s] under’ ” a federal officer when he acts in “an effort to assist, or to help carry out, the duties or tasks of

the federal superior” while under the officer’s “ ‘subjection, guidance, or control.’ ” Watson v. Philip Morris

Cos., 551 U.S. 142, 151-152 (2007) (citation omitted).

While “not limitless,” the “ ‘acting under’ ” standard is

“broad.” Id. at 147.

For example, an army corporal detailed to assist a

deputy United States marshal in making an arrest “lawfully assist[ed]” the marshal “in the performance of his

official duty” and could therefore remove a state murder prosecution arising from the arrest. Davis v. South

Carolina, 107 U.S. 597, 600 (1883). Likewise, a chauffeur for prohibition agents met the “acting under” requirement because he “was assisting them and was acting under the authority of the prohibition director.”

Maryland v. Soper (No. 1), 270 U.S. 9, 22 (1926); see

Watson, 551 U.S. at 150. Conversely, cigarette makers

subject to extensive federal regulation were not “acting

16

under” a federal officer because “simply complying

with the law” does not demonstrate “the help or assistance necessary to bring a private person within the

scope of the statute.” Watson, 551 U.S. at 152.

Second, the statute identifies which suits may be removed: those “for or relating to any act under color of

such office.” 28 U.S.C. 1442(a)(1). To satisfy that requirement, the defendant must identify an “act under

color of [federal] office” and further show that the plaintiff ’s suit is “for or relating to” that act. Ibid.

The “act under color of such office” requirement

evokes the statute’s earlier reference to a “person acting under” a federal officer. 28 U.S.C. 1442(a)(1). But

here, Congress inserted “color of,” indicating that removal is not limited to acts dictated by a federal superior. Instead, “the ‘color of office’ test” requires only “a

showing of a ‘causal connection’ between the charged

conduct and asserted official authority.” Willingham v.

Morgan, 395 U.S. 402, 409 (1969) (quoting Soper, 270

U.S. at 33). Such a connection will be present, for instance, when a federal officer takes an act “in the performance of his duties.” Mesa v. California, 489 U.S.

121, 135 (1989).

For example, a federal prison warden and doctor accused of assaulting a prisoner (an allegation they denied) could remove the prisoner’s civil suit. Willingham, 395 U.S. at 410. Because the officials’ “only contact with [the prisoner] occurred inside the penitentiary, while they were performing their duties,” the officials had “demonstrated the required ‘causal connection’ ” to their federal office. Id. at 409. Likewise, a federal revenue collector who killed a suspect during a raid

could remove a state murder prosecution because his

17

acts occurred “in the discharge of his duty as a Federal

officer.” Tennessee v. Davis, 100 U.S. 257, 262 (1880).

Conversely, prohibition agents and their chauffeur

could not remove state murder prosecutions when they

failed to show that the prosecutions had anything to do

with their official duties. Soper, 270 U.S. at 35. Although the agents allegedly came upon the victim while

returning from a raid, their removal petition did not assert that their “acts or [their] presence at the place in

performance of [their] official dut[ies] constitute[d] the

basis, though mistaken or false, of the state prosecution.” Id. at 33; see id. at 24. Absent that causal link to

official duties, the agents could not show that the suit

targeted acts “under color of federal authority.” Id. at

33.

Before 2011, a removing defendant had to show that

a suit was “for” the act under color of federal office. 28

U.S.C. 1442(a)(1) (2006). But in 2011, Congress amended

the statute to permit the removal of a suit for “or relating to” such an act. Pub. L. No. 112-51, § 2(b), 125 Stat.

545. The insertion of “or relating to” self-evidently

“broaden[ed] the universe of acts that enable Federal

officers to remove to Federal court.” House Report 6.

As the state respondents agree (Br. in Opp. 9), “the

ordinary meaning of ” “ ‘relating to’ ” is “broad.” Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 504 U.S. 374, 383

(1992). The phrase means “to stand in some relation; to

have bearing or concern; to pertain; refer; to bring into

association with or connection with.” Ibid. (quoting

Black’s Law Dictionary 1158 (5th ed. 1979)). This

Court has thus interpreted the Employee Retirement

Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), which preempts

laws “relate[d] to” ERISA plans, 29 U.S.C. 1144(a), to

preempt laws which have “a connection with or refer-

18

ence to such a plan,” Egelhoff v. Egelhoff ex rel. Breiner,

532 U.S. 141, 146-147 (2001) (citation omitted). And this

Court has interpreted “relat[ing] to” the same way for

similar preemption clauses in the Airline Deregulation

Act of 1978, 49 U.S.C. 41713(b)(1), and the Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act of 1994, 49

U.S.C. 14501(c)(1). Morales, 504 U.S. at 384; Rowe v.

New Hampshire Motor Transp. Ass’n, 552 U.S. 364, 370

(2008).

A similar definition logically applies here. “[W]hen

judicial interpretations have settled the meaning of an

existing statutory provision, repetition of the same language in a new statute indicates, as a general matter,

the intent to incorporate its judicial interpretations as

well.” Rowe, 552 U.S. at 370 (citation omitted). In 2011,

Congress inserted “relating to” in the federal-officerremoval statute against the backdrop of that phrase’s

well-settled meaning in the preemption context—an

area, like removal, where federal authority supplants

potentially inconsistent state authority. In doing so,

Congress presumptively incorporated the same broad

understanding of “relating to.”

That inference is particularly apt given that Congress layered “relating to” on top of an already broad

causal-connection test. Congress also enacted the 2011

amendment following this Court’s repeated instruction

that the federal-officer-removal statute be “liberally

construed,” Colorado v. Symes, 286 U.S. 510, 517 (1932),

and not “frustrated by a narrow, grudging interpretation,” Willingham, 395 U.S. at 407. Nothing in Section

1442(a)(1)’s text or context suggests that Congress intended an unusually narrow definition of “relating to.”

Similar to the analysis in preemption cases, a court

applying the “relating to” requirement should ask

19

whether the suit “has a connection with or reference to”

an act causally connected to asserted federal authority.

Egelhoff, 532 U.S. at 147 (citation omitted). In practice,

those two layers of connections reduce to whether the

suit is connected—in a broad sense—to asserted federal

authority. An “indirect” connection can support removal, but a “tenuous, remote, or peripheral” one cannot. Rowe, 552 U.S. at 370-371 (citations omitted).*

To avoid potentially “infinite connections,” courts

should be guided by “the objectives of ” federal-officer

removal, just as statutory objectives guide the analysis

in preemption cases. New York State Conference of Blue

Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co., 514

U.S. 645, 656 (1995); accord Rowe, 552 U.S. at 371 (considering “Congress’ deregulatory and pre-emptionrelated objectives”). Watson synthesized the objectives

of federal-officer removal four years before the 2011

amendment: “[T]he removal statute’s ‘basic’ purpose is

to protect the Federal Government from the interference with its ‘operations’ ” that could arise from unsympathetic state courts. 551 U.S. at 150 (quoting Willingham, 395 U.S. at 406). State courts might exhibit “ ‘local

prejudice’ against unpopular federal laws or federal officials,” “impede through delay” federal law enforcement, or “deprive federal officials of a federal forum in

which to assert federal immunity defenses.” Ibid.

(quoting Soper, 270 U.S. at 32). Where removal would

* Because the “relating to” requirement is satisfied when the suit

refers to asserted federal authority, the United States has argued

in a case currently pending before the Second Circuit that the requirement is satisfied when evidence of the President’s official acts

is used in a state criminal prosecution. See U.S. Amicus Br. at 1214, New York v. Trump, No. 24-2299 (2d Cir. filed May 27, 2025).

20

further those objectives, courts should more readily

find the requisite connection.

B. Petitioners’ Avgas Refining Supports Removal

Applying the principles above, petitioners have adequately alleged that respondents’ suits challenging

their oil-production activities are actions “relating to”

“act[s] under color of ” federal office to refine avgas. 28

U.S.C. 1442(a)(1).

1. Petitioners’ wartime avgas contracts make them

“person[s] acting under” a federal officer

a. The court of appeals correctly held that petitioners present an “ ‘archetypal case’ of a defendant ‘acting

under’ a federal officer.” Pet. App. 15 (citation omitted).

To “ ‘act[] under’ ” a federal officer, a private party

must “assist, or * * * help carry out, the duties or tasks

of the federal superior.” Watson, 551 U.S. at 152 (emphasis omitted). While not all federal contractors will

satisfy that test, “[w]artime production is the paradigmatic example for th[e] special relationship” needed to

satisfy the “ ‘acting under’ ” element. Board of County

Comm’rs v. Suncor Energy (U.S.A.), Inc., 25 F.4th

1238, 1253 (10th Cir. 2022), cert. denied, 143 S. Ct. 1795

(2023). In Watson, this Court observed that courts of

appeals have found the “ ‘acting under’ ” requirement

met for contractors who “provid[ed] the Government

with a product that it used to help conduct a war” and

which the government “at least arguably” would otherwise have had to produce for itself. 551 U.S. at 153-154

(discussing Winters v. Diamond Shamrock Chem. Co.,

149 F.3d 387 (5th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1034

(1999)).

Petitioners’ avgas refining fits that description to a

T. Petitioners contracted with the Defense Supplies

21

Corporation, Pet. App. 175, a federal instrumentality

responsible for acquiring “strategic or critical materials

and supplies of all kinds, which may be necessary or appropriate in connection with the national-defense program of the Government,” 6 Fed. Reg. 2972, 2972 (June

19, 1941); see Defense Supplies Corp. v. Lawrence

Warehouse Co., 336 U.S. 631, 633 (1949). By providing

avgas—the “ ‘most critically needed refinery product’

during World War II,” Shell Oil Co. v. United States,

751 F.3d 1282, 1285 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (citation omitted)—

petitioners helped the Defense Supplies Corporation

fulfill its wartime mission.

Petitioners also entered “an unusually close” relationship with the government, “involving detailed regulation, monitoring, or supervision.” Watson, 551 U.S. at

153. Petitioner Chevron’s predecessor, the Texas Company (Texaco), agreed to work “day and night” to quadruple its production capacity within 16 months. Pet.

App. 151; see J.A. 116-117 (discussing further expansion

in subsequent contract). And the government agreed to

loan Texaco $16.25 million—nearly $330 million today—

to complete that expansion. See Pet. App. 162. Texaco

also gave the United States the right “at any time to

purchase” all of the refinery’s excess avgas and promised to “operate the facilities at full capacity” if necessary. Id. at 155-156. And the United States could compel Texaco to buy components from other refineries for

which Texaco could seek federal reimbursement. Id. at

160; see also J.A. 168-196 (similar contract between the

Defense Supplies Corporation and Shell).

Beyond those contractual provisions, PAW was “the

virtual czar of 100-octane in the United States,” instructing the industry “ ‘to whatever extent may be necessary

to facilitate the maximum production of all grades of avi-

22

ation gasoline.’ ” PAW History 199 (quoting 6 Fed. Reg.

6433, 6434 (Dec. 16, 1941)). PAW “[c]ontrol[led] all

transfers within the petroleum industry of ” the components of avgas. 9 Fed. Reg. 8933, 8933 (July 25, 1944).

PAW told each producer how to blend its avgas, where

to get the components, and where to ship its outputs.

PAW History 200; see, e.g., 6 Fed. Reg. 5013, 5017 (Oct.

2, 1941); 6 Fed. Reg. 6329, 6329 (Dec. 10, 1941). PAW

even instructed refineries to share intellectual property

to make avgas production more efficient. 7 Fed. Reg.

41, 42 (Jan. 1, 1942); 7 Fed. Reg. 6393, 6393 (Aug. 14,

1942). In effect, the wartime petroleum industry operated as “one huge refinery” “[u]nder PAW direction.”

PAW History 192.

b. Respondents do not dispute that petitioners were

“acting under” a federal officer when they refined avgas

for the federal government. But respondents appear to

contend (La. Br. in Opp. 20; Plaquemines Br. in Opp. 2930) that petitioners must further show that they were

“acting under” a federal officer while engaged in the

specific conduct challenged by the suit. Here, respondents say (La. Br. in Opp. 20), their suits are “based on

[petitioners’] exploration and production activities” and

petitioners “were not acting under a United States officer” in producing crude oil.

The court of appeals correctly rejected that argument, which “impermissibly conflates” the “acting under” and “for or relating to” elements of federal-officer

removal. Pet. App. 16 (citations and internal quotation

marks omitted); 28 U.S.C. 1442(a)(1). As explained,

pp. 15-16, supra, the “acting under” element answers

the who question: A “person acting under [a federal]

officer” can invoke the removal statute just like a federal officer, a federal agency, or the United States itself.

23

28 U.S.C. 1442(a)(1) (emphasis added). The “for or relating to” element answers which suits may be removed:

those “for or relating to any act under color of such office.” Ibid. The two elements are connected insofar as

the suit must “relat[e] to” an “act under color of [federal] office.” Ibid. (emphasis added). But nothing in the

text requires that the defendant “act[] under” the federal officer when engaged in the specific challenged conduct.

Otherwise, Congress’s specification of a different,

broader test for which acts support removal would be a

nullity. In defining which suits support removal, Congress went beyond suits “for” an “act under” federal officers to suits “for or relating to any act under color of

[federal] office.” 28 U.S.C. 1442(a)(1) (emphases added).

Respondents’ approach would “simply read[] the words

‘relating to’ out of the statute,” Morales, 504 U.S. at 385,

and would do the same for “color of.”

2. Respondents’ suits are ones “relating to” petitioners’

avgas refining

Petitioners have also adequately asserted that respondents’ suits target conduct “relating to an[] act under color of [federal] office.” 28 U.S.C. 1442(a)(1).

a. The statutory text first requires an “act under

color of [federal] office,” 28 U.S.C. 1442(a)(1)—i.e., an

act with a “ ‘causal connection’ ” to “asserted official authority,” Willingham, 395 U.S. at 409 (citation omitted);

see pp. 16-17, supra. Petitioners’ avgas refining satisfies that standard. Refining avgas plainly has a causal

connection to detailed federal contracts governing the

production and sale of that same avgas.

The key question is whether respondents’ suits are

ones “relating to” that avgas refining. Recall the core

allegations at issue: Petitioners engaged in various oil-

24

exploration and oil-production practices during World

War II that deviated from “prudent industry practices.”

Pet. App. 6; see id. at 19-21. Petitioners’ activities along

the Louisiana coast, respondents therefore allege, were

not “legally commenced” and required a permit after

1980. Id. at 3 (citation omitted); see id. at 5-6. Those

allegations do not expressly “reference” petitioners’

avgas refining. Egelhoff, 532 U.S. at 147 (citation omitted). But they have a sufficient “connection with” petitioners’ refining to support removal. Ibid. (citation

omitted).

That connection is evident as a matter of basic economics and chemistry. Crude oil is the central component of avgas. To oversimplify, petitioners first refined

crude oil into base stock, which they further refined into

high-octane avgas. See PAW History 194 (diagram of

refining process). As Judge Oldham explained, petitioners “could not simply snap their fingers and, voilà,

make avgas. They had to make it out of something, and

that something was crude oil.” Pet. App. 45. The majority therefore recognized that petitioners’ “refining

contracts indirectly required increased amounts of

crude oil” and that avgas refining had “some relation to

oil production.” Id. at 28, 38; see id. at 28 (“[C]rude oil

is a necessary component of avgas.”). On the facts here,

that should have sufficed. An “indirect” connection, after all, is still a connection. Rowe, 552 U.S. at 370 (citation omitted).

The connection between oil production and avgas refining was obvious to those steeped in the wartime oil

industry. As the government’s official 1946 history of

PAW explained, “[i]n so closely interrelated an industry

as oil,” “synchronization” between “refinery throughput[s],” “crude oil” production, and transportation “was

25

indispensable.” PAW History 110. PAW therefore directed crude-oil supplies to the “refineries that were in

the greatest need of them,” getting “specific volumes of

crude to specific refiners * * * to assure maximum

output of war products.” Id. at 215. “Every part of the

wartime petroleum program was interlocked with another part,” from “refineries” to transportation networks to “producing oil fields.” Id. at 158.

Petitioners’ federal avgas contracts expressly linked

their refining to oil production. The contracts tied the

price of avgas to the price of crude, Pet. App. 157-159;

J.A. 174-175, reflecting crude’s role as the main input

for avgas. The government also promised to pay any

new “taxes on crude petroleum” if the government could

not obtain an exemption. Pet. App. 170; J.A. 185; see

Pet. App. 170-171; J.A. 186. Although petitioners were

not contractually obligated to use their own crude to

make avgas, producing crude was an obvious way for a

vertically integrated oil company to fulfill its refining

contracts.

Further tightening the connection, some of the oil

fields at issue were particularly well suited to avgas production. Not all crude oil is alike. As one PAW official

observed, “[s]ome crudes are well adapted to making

aviation fuel, some are not.” Max W. Ball, Fueling a

Global War, 45 Ohio J. Sci. 29, 31 (1945). PAW therefore had to coordinate “production development * * *

in harmony with the refining branch of the industry” to

supply not only “enough crude but the kinds needed for

aviation gasoline and other war products.” PAW History 176. PAW sought the “maximum economic recovery” from wells that were “especially desirable” for

avgas. 6 Fed. Reg. 5536, 5537 (Oct. 30, 1941). And PAW

designated some of petitioners’ fields “ ‘Critical Fields

26

Essential to the War Program,’ in part because they

produced crude oil that was particularly suited for making avgas.” Pet. App. 23 n.64. That designation underscores the close connection between petitioners’ production and refining activities.

b. Permitting removal would align with the recognized objectives of federal-officer removal. Oil production and avgas played a vital role in World War II. A

month after Pearl Harbor, PAW declared that the “essential” “national interest” in a “maximum” supply of

avgas required “ready and adequate supplies of aviation

grade crude petroleum.” 7 Fed. Reg. 164, 164 (Jan. 8,

1942). For a State and its localities to question the “pruden[ce]” of wartime oil production 80 years later, Pet.

App. 6, threatens to inflict the sort of “interference with

[federal] ‘operations’ ” that the removal statute is designed to avoid, Watson, 551 U.S. at 150 (citation omitted). Whether or not that threat ultimately materializes, Congress offered a neutral federal forum to guard

against the mere potential of “ ‘local prejudice’ against

unpopular federal laws or federal officials.” Ibid. (citation omitted).

At the same time, removal of these suits would not

affect “the rights of the parties” or “alter the underlying law to be applied.” Arizona v. Manypenny, 451 U.S.

232, 242 (1981). If respondents’ claims survive motions

practice, they will be heard by a jury of Louisianians,

applying Louisiana law, in Louisiana. The federal

courthouse in New Orleans where the lead case would

be tried is less than six miles from Plaquemines Parish.

While the parishes criticize (Br. in Opp. 7) the delay engendered by the removal litigation, that delay is as

much a product of their choice to fight for a state forum

as it is petitioners’ choice to seek a federal one.

27

Contrary to the State’s suggestion, removal would

not render the “ ‘for or relating to’ ” requirement “meaningless.” Br. in Opp. 20; accord Pet. App. 33-35. When

applying a parallel test in the preemption context, this

Court has imposed meaningful constraints and found

that various connections invoked by defendants were insufficient for laws to be “relate[d]” or “relating” to the

necessary subject. E.g., Rutledge v. Pharmaceutical

Care Mgmt. Ass’n, 592 U.S. 80, 86-88 (2020) (collecting

ERISA cases); American Airlines, Inc. v. Wolens, 513

U.S. 219, 232 (1995).

The phrase “ ‘relating to’ ” inherently raises casespecific questions about where “to draw the line.”

Wolens, 513 U.S. at 223, 234 (citation omitted). But this

case clearly falls on the removal side of that line. Permitting removal based on the relatively close nexus between petitioners’ oil production and refining would not

open the floodgates to “virtually every remote and tenuous activity” conducted by a federal contractor. Contra La. Br. in Opp. 21.

3. The court of appeals unduly cabined the “relating to”

requirement

In ordering remand, the court of appeals made two

key legal errors.

First, the court of appeals incorrectly asked whether

respondents’ suits are related to “the relevant federal

directives in [petitioners’] refinery contracts,” rather

than to the refining itself. Pet. App. 19. That framing

was fatal, in the court’s view, given “the lack of any reference, let alone direction, pertaining to crude oil production in [petitioners’] federal contracts.” Id. at 33.

But the federal-officer-removal statute does not require “a specific government direction.” Sawyer v. Foster Wheeler LLC, 860 F.3d 249, 258 (4th Cir. 2017). As

28

this Court has observed in the preemption context, a

law can “ ‘relate to’ ” a forbidden topic without “specifically address[ing]” it. Morales, 504 U.S. at 386 (citation

omitted).

Moreover, the relevant topic to which the suit must

relate is an “act under color of [federal] office,” 28

U.S.C. 1442(a)(1), not a specific directive in a federal

contract. Even before the 2011 amendment, this Court

had interpreted the “color of office” language to require

only a “causal connection” to asserted federal authority,

not a specific direction. Willingham, 395 U.S. at 409

(citation omitted). In Willingham, the defendant prison

warden and doctor obviously had not received a directive to assault a prisoner. Id. at 403. Yet the alleged

assault supported removal because the allegations were

causally connected to the defendants’ duties at the

prison. Id. at 409. Likewise, a federal revenue officer

accused of murdering a suspect acted “under color of

his office” even though he had no directive to commit

murder. Tennessee v. Davis, 100 U.S. at 261; see id. at

259 (certified facts). Despite repeating its “federal directive[]” requirement ten times, Pet. App. 19, 21, 2324, 26, 31, 34, 36, 38, the court of appeals did not explain

how that requirement is consistent with the statutory

text and with this Court’s precedents.

The court of appeals relatedly erred in limiting its

analysis to petitioners’ refining contracts and declining

to consider PAW ’s control over the wartime oil industry. Pet. App. 23-26. Noting that this Court has held

that “complying with federal regulations” does not satisfy the “ ‘act[ing] under’ ” element, the court of appeals

reasoned that regulatory compliance should not support

the “ ‘relating to’ ” element either. Id. at 18, 24 (citing

Watson, 551 U.S. at 153).

29

But federal regulation is not rendered irrelevant

simply because mere regulation is insufficient by itself

to trigger removal. A federal officer may issue directives

to a subordinate in various forms, whether through a

regulation, a guidance document, a telephone call, or an

email. As petitioners observe (Br. 35-36), a government

contract may not need to address a given topic because

the subject matter is already addressed by regulation

or otherwise. Nothing in the text of Section 1442(a)(1)

suggests that courts must ignore directions that are not

memorialized in a contract. This Court has often found

the “acting under” element met without identifying a

specific contract. E.g., Soper, 270 U.S. at 22; Davis v.

South Carolina, 107 U.S. at 600.

Second, the court of appeals erred in treating PAW

as an intervening actor that “severed any connection”

between petitioners’ oil-production and oil-refining activities. Pet. App. 36. As the court noted, PAW “controlled the distribution and transportation of produced

crude oil from the fields to specific refineries based on

various factors that would maximize the output of war

products.” Id. at 35.

That extensive federal involvement in the distribution of crude oil does not lessen the connection between

petitioners’ refining and the production activities that

respondents challenge. Without PAW, vertically integrated oil companies like petitioners may well have used

their own crude to make avgas. That the federal government often compelled them to do so only underscores the connection. Given that the “ ‘basic’ purpose”

of federal-officer removal is to avoid “interference” in

the federal government’s “ ‘operations,’ ” Watson, 551

U.S. at 150 (citation omitted), it would be perverse to

30

penalize petitioners because they faced another layer of

federal supervision beyond their contracts.

The court of appeals noted that it had previously remanded related cases against vertically integrated oil

companies who could not prove that PAW sent them

their own crude to refine. Pet. App. 36-37; see Plaquemines Parish v. Chevron USA, Inc. (Plaquemines II ),

No. 22-30055, 2022 WL 9914869 (5th Cir. Oct. 17, 2022)

(per curiam), cert. denied, 143 S. Ct. 991 (2023). The

court deemed it “illogical and disparate” to treat these

cases differently when it was mere “ ‘happenstance’ ”

whether PAW sent each company its own crude. Pet.

App. 36-37 (citation omitted); accord Plaquemines Br.

in Opp. 4.

But PAW ’s crude-oil allocations were not mere happenstance. PAW sent “specific volumes of crude to specific refiners” to maximize war outputs. PAW History

215. That petitioners received their own crude may

have reflected PAW ’s judgment that petitioners’ crude

was well suited to making avgas. See pp. 25-26, supra.

Regardless, any disparity here results from the court of

appeals’ erroneous decision in Plaquemines II. As explained further below, pp. 30-34, infra, PAW ’s extensive supervision of the wartime oil industry in furtherance of overriding federal objectives should support removal. Denying removal here, where the connection to

federal acts is especially clear, would only compound

the court of appeals’ earlier error.

C. PAW’s Supervision Of Wartime Oil Production Independently Supports Removal

Even setting aside petitioners’ avgas refining, petitioners were “acting under” PAW when they engaged in

the wartime oil-production activities that respondents

challenge. 28 U.S.C. 1442(a)(1). Respondents’ suits are

31

therefore necessarily “for * * * act[s] under color of

[federal] office.” Ibid. (emphasis added).

1. In the unique wartime context, the oil industry

had an “unusually close” relationship with the federal

government, “involving detailed regulation, monitoring,

or supervision.” Watson, 551 U.S. at 153. As explained,

pp. 6-8, supra, PAW “exercised substantial wartime

regulatory control over almost every aspect of the petroleum industry.” Shell Oil, 751 F.3d at 1285; contra

Pet. App. 25 (calling this regulation “minimal” without

explanation). Government and industry were merged

so effectively that it was “frequently difficult to distinguish the[ir] activities.” PAW History 2. Nevertheless,

“it was always the role of Government to determine

plans and policies, to direct and supervise operations

requisite to their fulfillment, and to assume over-all

governmental responsibility for all aspects of the oil

program.” Ibid.

That supervision extended to many of the specific

acts that respondents challenge. For example, respondents fault petitioners for using vertically rather than directionally drilled oil wells. Pet. App. 20. But PAW expressly required producers “to maintain a vertical wellbore.” 8 Fed. Reg. at 3957; but see 9 Fed. Reg. 7448,

7448 (July 4, 1944) (later allowing directional drilling in

Louisiana). Respondents criticize petitioners for using

earthen pits rather than steel tanks at wells. Pet. App.

20. But steel was highly controlled during the war, and

PAW discouraged the use of steel containers to “the

greatest possible degree” given the “urgent” “needs of

the defense program.” 6 Fed. Reg. 5880, 5880 (Nov. 19,

1941); see p. 7, supra. And respondents challenge petitioners’ use of canals rather than building overland

roads. Pet. App. 19-20. But PAW commanded that “no

32

asphalt” be used absent government approval for the

“paving, surfacing or resurfacing” of “any roadway.”

7 Fed. Reg. 5142, 5142 (July 7, 1942); see also 8 Fed.

Reg. 12,571, 12,571 (Sept. 14, 1943) (prohibiting use of

road oil for paving).

More generally, respondents urge practices that

would have at least “indirectly” affected “the rate at

which [petitioners] extracted crude oil.” Pet. App. 21.

For example, respondents criticize “the 24/7 nature of

operations,” which “erode[d] levees and destroy[ed]

marshes.” 23-30294 C.A. ROA 98. But PAW ’s overriding “imperative [for] an effective prosecution of th[e]

war” was “a maximum recovery of petroleum.” 6 Fed.

Reg. 6687, 6687 (Dec. 24, 1941). Respondents’ efforts to

second-guess those wartime demands contradict federal policy.

To be sure, some of PAW ’s early orders were styled

as “[r]ecommendation[s].” PAW History 402-405 (collecting citations). But federal supervision does not need

to be compulsory to satisfy the “acting under” element,

as the parishes appear to believe (Br. in Opp. 5, 13).

Even “guidance” can suffice. Watson, 551 U.S. at 151

(citation omitted). In any event, once the war began,

the notion that an oil company could or would ignore a

PAW recommendation was, as PAW ’s chief counsel later

explained, a “fiction.” J. Howard Marshall II, Done in

Oil 140 (1994). PAW ’s directions “were followed ‘voluntarily’ for the simple reason that the PAW controlled

the supply of all critical materials and all operating supplies needed by almost every operator.” Ibid.

2. “[T]he fact of federal regulation alone” does not

suffice for removal. Watson, 551 U.S. at 153. But in the

unique setting of World War II, petitioners’ oil production served “to assist, or to help carry out, the duties or

33

tasks of the federal superior,” making petitioners persons “ ‘acting under’ ” federal officers. Id. at 152. Respondents’ suits challenging those same acts are thus

suits “for * * * act[s] under color of [federal] office.”

28 U.S.C. 1442(a)(1).

President Roosevelt charged PAW with “providing

adequate supplies of petroleum for the successful prosecution of the war.” 7 Fed. Reg. at 10,091. “PAW acted

as the general staff of the American oil campaign,” with

the industry implementing those demands “under the

guidance of PAW.” Wartime Petroleum Policy 6. Industry and government thus formed “a dynamic partnership” to make “a major contribution to the winning

of the war.” Id. at 18-19. As PAW ’s orders made clear,

its “directions” to “the petroleum industry” were “necessary” “to promote the national defense.” 8 Fed. Reg.

1815, 1815 (Feb. 10, 1943). The Department of Justice

even certified that the oil industry’s coordinated actions

“under the direction of public authority” did not violate

the antitrust laws because they were “designed to promote public interest and not to achieve private ends.”

Letter from Robert H. Jackson, Att’y Gen., to John Lord

O’Brian, Gen. Counsel, Office of Production Mgmt. (Apr.

29, 1941), reprinted in PAW History 384 (articulating

general policy); see Letter from Francis Biddle, Acting

Att’y Gen., to Harold L. Ickes, Petroleum Coordinator

for Nat’l Defense (June 18, 1941) (applying that policy

to oil-industry actions in compliance with PAW ’s directions and recommendations), reprinted in PAW History

383.

In Plaquemines II, the court of appeals rejected

PAW ’s supervision as a basis for removal. 2022 WL

9914869, at *3. In so holding, the court did not dispute

that the federal government exercised an “unprece-

34

dented level of control over oil production” during

World War II in service of “military and domestic wartime needs.” Ibid. (citation omitted). But the court

deemed that federal oversight irrelevant because “pervasive federal regulation alone is not sufficient to confer

federal jurisdiction.” Ibid. (citation omitted).

That reasoning tracks the court of appeals’ erroneous refusal in this case to consider PAW ’s role connecting petitioners’ oil production and avgas refining. See

pp. 29-30, supra. The key to the “acting under” requirement is that the defendant assisted the federal officer

in carrying out his federal duties. Watson, 551 U.S. at

152. Compliance with federal law and regulation—even

highly detailed regulation—is not enough because heavily regulated parties, like the cigarette makers in Watson, frequently do not assist the federal government.

But in our “time of national peril,” PAW and the oil

industry joined together in “an unprecedented and effective partnership” to “mobiliz[e] the full oil resources

and facilities of the Nation to serve the war program.”

PAW History 15. Together, both served a “single purpose”: “winning the war.” Id. at 67. On these facts, petitioners were “person[s] acting under” a federal officer

who are entitled to seek a federal forum for these suits

“for” their wartime activities. 28 U.S.C. 1442(a)(1).

35

CONCLUSION

The court of appeals’ judgment should be reversed.

Respectfully submitted.

D. JOHN SAUER

Solicitor General

ERIC J. HAMILTON

Deputy Assistant

Attorney General

CURTIS E. GANNON

Deputy Solicitor General

AARON Z. ROPER

Assistant to the

Solicitor General

MICHAEL S. RAAB

SARAH N. SMITH

Attorneys

SEPTEMBER 2025