Amicus Curiae Brief — Chevron USA Incorporated, et al., Petitioners v. Plaquemines Parish, Louisiana, et al.

Supreme Court briefSep 11, 2025

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No. 24-813

In the Supreme Court of the United States

__________

CHEVRON USA INCORPORATED, ET AL.,

Petitioners,

PLAQUEMINES PARISH, LOUISIANA, ET AL.,

Respondents.

____________________

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES

COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

_______________

BRIEF FOR U.S. SENATORS MIKE LEE, TED

BUDD, TED CRUZ, JOHN CORNYN, CINDY

HYDE-SMITH, AND JOHN HOEVEN AS AMICI

CURIAE IN SUPPORT OF PETITIONERS

__________

DANIEL Z. EPSTEIN

ANDREW J. BLOCK

RYAN T. GIANNETTI

America First Legal

Foundation

611 Pennsylvania Ave. SE

#231

Washington, DC 20003

CHRISTOPHER E. MILLS

Counsel of Record

Spero Law LLC

557 East Bay St.

#22251

Charleston, SC 29413

(843) 606-0640

cmills@spero.law

Counsel for Amici Curiae

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

Table of Authorities.................................................... ii

Interest of Amici Curiae and

Summary of Argument .......................................... 1

Argument ..................................................................... 2

I. Congress has repeatedly broadened the

removal statute to protect federal officers and

agents. ................................................................ 2

A. Federal officer removal has consistently

expanded over centuries. .............................. 3

B. Congress offered even greater protection to

federal officers and agents in the statute’s

latest iteration. ............................................. 5

II. The Fifth Circuit’s decision strips the statute of

its force and endangers federal interests. ......... 9

A. The decision below disregards Congress’s

intentional expansion of the statute. ......... 10

B. The unduly narrow reading below would

harm important federal interests. ............. 14

Conclusion ................................................................. 22

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Page(s)

CASES

Ali v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons,

552 U.S. 214 (2008)................................................ 12

Baker v. Atl. Richfield Co.,

962 F.3d 937 (CA7 2020) ................................. 12, 16

Boumediene v. Bush,

553 U.S. 723 (2008)................................................ 12

Colorado v. Symes,

286 U.S. 510 (1932)................................................ 10

Connecticut Nat’l Bank v. Germain,

503 U.S. 249 (1992)................................................ 10

Dubin v. United States,

599 U.S. 110 (2023)................................................ 11

Exxon Mobil Corp. v. United States,

2020 WL 5573048 (S.D. Tex. Sept. 16, 2020) ....... 14

Faulk v. Owens-Corning Fiberglass Corp.,

48 F. Supp. 2d 653 (E.D. Tex. 1999) .......................7

Ford Motor Co. v. Montana Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct.,

592 U.S. 351 (2021)................................................ 11

Gay v. Ruff,

292 U.S. 25 (1934).................................................. 15

Georgia v. Meadows,

88 F.4th 1331 (CA11 2023) ......................................9

Hibbs v. Winn,

542 U.S. 88 (2004).................................................. 10

iii

Hilbert v. Aeroquip, Inc.,

486 F. Supp. 2d 135 (D. Mass. 2007) ......................7

Jefferson Cnty. v. Acker,

527 U.S. 423 (1999)................................................ 15

Lamie v. U.S. Tr.,

540 U.S. 526 (2004)................................................ 12

Latiolais v. Huntington Ingalls, Inc.,

951 F.3d 286 (CA5 2020) ............................. 9, 16, 17

Maryland v. Soper,

270 U.S. 9 (1926).............................................. 12, 15

Menocal v. The GEO Group, Inc.,

113 F. Supp. 3d 1125 (D. Colo. 2015) .................... 21

Menocal v. The GEO Group, Inc.,

635 F. Supp. 3d 1151 (D. Colo. 2022) .................... 21

Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc.,

504 U.S. 374 (1992).......................................... 11, 13

Price v. Johnson,

2009 WL 10704853 (N.D. Tex. Apr. 10, 2009),

aff’d, 370 F. App’x 449 (CA5 2010)..........................7

Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC,

395 U.S. 367 (1969)..................................................6

Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc.,

463 U.S. 85 (1995).................................................. 11

State v. Exxon Mobil Corp.,

83 F.4th 122 (CA2 2023)..........................................9

Stokeling v. United States,

586 U.S. 73 (2019)....................................................6

Tennessee v. Davis,

100 U.S. 257 (1880)............................................ 2, 15

Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill,

437 U.S. 153 (1978)..................................................5

Watson v. Philip Morris Cos.,

551 U.S. 142 (2007).................................. 2, 4, 11, 15

Willingham v. Morgan,

395 U.S. 402 (1969).............................. 3, 4, 5, 11, 15

STATUTES

28 U.S.C. § 1442 ........ 1, 2, 5, 6, 7, 8, 11, 15, 16, 17, 20

40 U.S.C. § 101 et seq................................................ 18

40 U.S.C. § 121 .......................................................... 18

Act of Feb. 4, 1815, 3 Stat. 195 ...................................4

Act of July 13, 1866, 14 Stat. 171 ...............................5

Act of June 25, 1948, 62 Stat. 938 ..............................5

Act of Mar. 2, 1833, 4 Stat. 633 ..................................4

Act of Mar. 3, 1863, 12 Stat. 755 ................................4

Conn. Gen. Stat. § 46a-58 ......................................... 20

Conn. Gen. Stat. § 46a-71(b) ..................................... 20

Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 93A, § 6(1) ...................... 20

N.J. Stat. Ann. § 56:8-3 ............................................. 20

N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 343 ......................................... 20

N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 352 ......................................... 20

Removal Clarification Act of 2011,

Pub. L. No. 112-51, 125 Stat. 545 ..... 1, 3, 6, 8, 9, 11

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS

U.S. Const. art. I, § 7, cl. 2 ........................................ 10

REGULATIONS

48 C.F.R. § 1.101 et seq. ............................................ 18

48 C.F.R. § 1.601 ....................................................... 18

48 C.F.R. § 1.602-1 .................................................... 18

48 C.F.R. § 3001.103 et seq. ...................................... 18

48 C.F.R. § 3035.017 ................................................. 18

48 C.F.R. § 3037.104-70 ............................................ 18

OTHER AUTHORITIES

9 Cong. Deb. 461 (1833) ..............................................3

A. Scalia & B. Garner, Reading Law: The

Interpretation of Legal Texts (2012) ...................... 10

Black’s Law Dictionary (5th ed. 1979)...................... 11

C. Duffy, ‘I wanted to do something to fight back’:

This iPhone App Alerts Users to Nearby ICE

Sightings, CNN (June 30, 2025),

https://perma.cc/8HRZ-BKJK................................ 19

E. Johnson, Removal of Suits Against Federal

Officers: Does the Malfeasant Mailman Merit A

Federal Forum?, 88 Colum. L. Rev. 1098 (1988) ....5

Exec. Order No. 14159, Protecting the American

People Against Invasion, 90 Fed. Reg. 8443 (Jan.

20, 2025) ................................................................. 18

Exec. Order No. 14165, Securing Our Borders,

90 Fed. Reg. 8467 (Jan. 20, 2025) ......................... 18

Exec. Order No. 9276, Establishing the Petroleum

Administration for War, 7 Fed. Reg. 10091

(Dec. 2, 1942).......................................................... 14

H.R. Rep. No. 112-17(I) (2011) .......... 6, 7, 8, 11, 16, 19

J. Rose, Budget Airline Avelo Faces Backlash for

Signing Up to Fly Deportation Flights for ICE,

NPR (Apr. 30, 2025),

https://perma.cc/P8VM-FB26 ................................ 19

L. MacLellan, These are the Fortune 500 Companies

that have Active Contracts with ICE, Fortune

(June 26, 2025), https://perma.cc/5P2F-CMA6 ..... 19

Proclamation No. 10888, Guaranteeing the States

Protection Against Invasion, 90 Fed. Reg. 8333

(Jan. 20, 2025)........................................................ 18

R. Fallon et al., Hart and Wechsler’s The Federal

Courts and the Federal System

(6th ed. 2009) ................................................... 3, 4, 5

R. Fish, Mesa County Sheriff: AG Lawsuit Over

Alleged Immigration Enforcement Violation is

About Politics, Not Fairness, Denver7 ABC

(Jul. 31, 2025), https://perma.cc/XVF8-M2U2 ...... 21

Readout of U.S. Immigration and Customs

Enforcement Meeting with Private Detention

Contractor (Apr. 5, 2024),

https://perma.cc/4RBL-A4EJ ................................. 21

S. Wilson, Three New ICE Detention Centers

Reportedly Planned in Colorado, Colo. Newsline

(Aug. 15, 2025), https://perma.cc/AJ7W-K8SR ..... 21

W. Tong, Avelo Airlines Contract to Operate Flights

for U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Off.

Att’y Gen. Conn. (Apr. 8, 2025),

https://perma.cc/5DFQ-RLGP ............................... 20

vii

W. Wiecek, The Reconstruction of Federal Judicial

Power, 1863–1875, 13 Am. J. Legal Hist. 333

(1969)........................................................................4

INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE AND

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

Amici curiae are United States Senators Mike Lee

(UT), Ted Budd (NC), Ted Cruz (TX), John Cornyn

(TX), Cindy Hyde-Smith (MS), and John Hoeven

(ND). * As Senators, they have a strong interest in the

federal courts correctly interpreting and preserving

the federal officer removal provision that Congress

expanded in the Removal Clarification Act of 2011.

That Act amended 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1) to offer

greater assurance that legal disputes involving

federal officers or their agents can be removed from

potentially hostile state courts and heard in federal

district courts. By flouting the Act’s plain language,

the Fifth Circuit’s approach undermines the

separation of powers and usurps Congress’s

constitutional role in determining federal court

jurisdiction. It also threatens important federal

interests by depriving federal officers and agents of a

federal forum in which they can be free of local biases

or political pressures. The history of federal officer

removal has been one of steady expansion over

centuries, and Congress repeatedly has had to correct

unduly narrow judicial interpretations. It is time for

courts to stop fighting the statute. The Court should

reverse and give the statute the full effect that

Congress intended in its 2011 amendment, thereby

ensuring protection for federal officers and agents

carrying out critical federal duties.

* No counsel for a party authored this brief in whole or in part,

and no person other than amici curiae or their counsel made a

monetary contribution to its preparation or submission.

Amici Senators have clear interests here. The

separation of powers is predicated in part on the

premise that when Congress carefully, deliberately,

and explicitly amends the law through a new statute,

the judiciary must recognize Congress’s action by fully

effectuating the amended language. Lead signatory

Senator Mike Lee has an additional interest here as

Chairman of the Committee on Energy and Natural

Resources, responsible for overseeing legislation and

policy related to the Nation’s energy production,

natural resource management, and public lands.

Every other Senator joining this brief likewise plays a

leading role in policy arenas where contractors are

essential to achieving vitally important policy goals.

ARGUMENT

I. Congress has repeatedly broadened the

removal statute to protect federal officers

and agents.

From early in the Republic, Congress sought to

protect federal officers and agents from potentially

hostile state and local venues by providing a

mechanism for them to remove cases implicating their

federal duties to federal court. As this Court has long

recognized, removal helps “prevent hostile States

from ‘paralyzing’ the Federal Government and its

initiatives.” Watson v. Philip Morris Cos., 551 U.S.

142, 149 (2007) (cleaned up) (quoting Tennessee v.

Davis, 100 U.S. 257, 263 (1880)). The current removal

provision, found in 28 U.S.C. § 1442, is “a

generalization of more specialized grants of removal

jurisdiction that from 1815 on had been enacted in

times of sharp federal-state conflict.” R. Fallon et al.,

Hart and Wechsler’s The Federal Courts and the

Federal System 816 (6th ed. 2009).

Congress expanded this provision even further in

the Removal Clarification Act of 2011, broadening

removal to claims “for or relating to any act” under

federal directives. The textually evident purpose of

this amendment was to eliminate the causation

standard that some courts had adopted and instead

require only some connection between the legal action

and federally directed acts. The reason for this

expansion was also evident: to provide greater

protection to federal officers and private entities

working on the government’s behalf, thereby

promoting important federal interests.

A. Federal officer removal has consistently

expanded over centuries.

Over time, the mechanisms for federal officer

removal have steadily expanded, always operating on

the principle that a party acting on behalf of the

federal government should not have to litigate claims

in potentially hostile venues. As Daniel Webster

explained, the purpose of these removal statutes is to

“give a chance to the [federal] officer to defend himself

where the authority of the law [is] recognized.” 9

Cong. Deb. 461 (1833).

“The federal officer removal statute has had a long

history.” Willingham v. Morgan, 395 U.S. 402, 405

(1969). First, during the War of 1812, an embargo

against the United Kingdom was unpopular with New

England’s ship-building industry. “New England

shipowners harassed federal customs officers [with]

vexatious lawsuits.” W. Wiecek, The Reconstruction of

Federal Judicial Power, 1863–1875, 13 Am. J. Legal

Hist. 333, 337 (1969). Congress responded by

“insert[ing] into an act for the collection of customs

duties a provision—of limited duration—authorizing

removal of all suits or prosecutions against federal

officers or other persons as a result of enforcement of

the act.” Fallon et al., supra, at 816 n.6 (citing Act of

Feb. 4, 1815, § 8, 3 Stat. 195, 198, and two extensions).

“Obviously, the removal provision was an attempt to

protect federal officers from interference by hostile

state courts.” Willingham, 395 U.S. at 405.

A couple decades later, Congress enacted another

removal statute after South Carolina “passed a

Nullification Act declaring federal tariff laws

unconstitutional and authorizing prosecution of the

federal agents who collected the tariffs.” Watson, 551

U.S. at 148. The statute allowed federal officers “or

other person[s]” to remove to federal court cases

brought against them for enforcing the customs laws.

Ibid. (emphasis omitted) (quoting Act of Mar. 2, 1833,

ch. 57, § 3, 4 Stat. 633, 633).

Fast forward another couple decades, and “[t]he

Civil War brought a wave of removal acts.” Fallon

et al., supra, at 817 n.6. “In 1863, Congress

authorized, for the period only of the rebellion, the

removal of cases brought against federal officers or

others for acts committed during the rebellion and

justified under the authority of the President or

Congress.” Ibid.; see Act of Mar. 3, 1863, § 5, 12 Stat.

755, 756–57. Congress then permitted removal of any

suit against any revenue officer “on account of any act

done under color of his office” by the revenue officer

and “any person acting under or by authority of any

such officer.” Act of July 13, 1866, ch. 184, § 67, 14

Stat. 171, 171–72. The statute limited these latter

persons to those engaged in acts “for the collection of

taxes.” Id. § 67, 14 Stat. at 172. This removal

provision “became permanent and w[as] codified in

1911.” E. Johnson, Removal of Suits Against Federal

Officers: Does the Malfeasant Mailman Merit A

Federal Forum?, 88 Colum. L. Rev. 1098, 1100 (1988).

And it was “the antecedent for” the current final

“clause of § 1442(a)(1), which continued through

successive codifications to be limited to cases growing

out of the revenue laws.” Fallon et al., supra, at 817

n.6.

But these limitations on removal were made

obsolete in 1948. At that point, Congress again revised

the statute, “extend[ing] [it] to cover all federal

officers when it passed the current provision as part

of the Judicial Code of 1948.” Willingham, 395 U.S. at

406; see Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 646, § 1442(a), 62

Stat. 938, 938. The addition of “general language”

made the “more specialized provision for removal,”

along with the one for officers engaged in criminal

enforcement, no longer “serve any purpose.” Fallon et

al., supra, at 818. In other words, § 1442’s removal

provision is no longer “limited to particular federal

officers or federal functions.” Id. at 397.

B. Congress offered even greater protection

to federal officers and agents in the

statute’s latest iteration.

This Court has repeatedly recognized that “the

totality of congressional action” is the “measure” of

statutory meaning. Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill,

437 U.S. 153, 184 (1978); see also Red Lion Broad. Co.

v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 380–81, 383 (1969) (looking to

legislative history to determine the effect of an

amendment); cf. Stokeling v. United States, 586 U.S.

73, 79–80 (2019) (drawing inferences about statutory

meaning from Congress’s retention and expansion of

terms in later amendments).

Here, after centuries of broadening federal officer

removal, Congress further expanded it in 2011. Before

2011, the statute covered officers (or persons acting

under them) who were “sued in an official or

individual capacity for any act under color of [their]

office.” 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1) (1996). In the Removal

Clarification Act of 2011, Pub. L. No. 112-51, 125 Stat.

545, Congress “broaden[ed] the universe of” federal

officers’ removal rights under § 1442(a)(1). H.R. Rep.

No. 112-17(I), at 6 (2011). Acting in response to

widespread inter- and intra-circuit conflicts over the

scope of federal officer removal, Congress sought to

provide clear statutory guidance. Id. at 2.

The Act’s overarching purpose was “to ensure that

any individual drawn into a State legal proceeding

based on that individual’s” federal work “has the right

to remove the proceeding to a U.S. district court.” Id.

at 1. To that end, Congress rejected narrow judicial

interpretations and expanded the statute’s scope by

inserting the phrase “or relating to.” See id. at 3–4, 6;

Pub. L. No. 112-51, § 2(b)(1)–(2). This broader

language covered not only suits brought “for” acts

performed under federal authority but any legal

actions even “relating to” such acts.

As the House Judiciary Committee report

explained, § 1442 was designed “to take from State

courts the indefensible power to hold a federal officer

or agent criminally or civilly liable for any act

allegedly performed in the execution of their federal

duties.” H.R. Rep. No. 112-17(I), at 3. Congress

recognized that “the right to remove under these

conditions [is] essential to the integrity and

preeminence of the federal government within its

realm of authority.” Id. at 3. Federal government

officers and agents “should not be forced to answer for

conduct asserted within their federal duties in a state

forum that invites ‘local interests or prejudice’ to color

outcomes.” Ibid. Without such protections, federal

officers and agents “could be subject to political

harassment, and Federal operations generally would

be needlessly hampered.” Ibid.

Congress acted after decisions that limited federal

officer removal, including a Fifth Circuit ruling that a

pre-suit deposition of a federal representative was not

a “civil cause of action” under the Act. Id. at 3–4 (citing

Price v. Johnson, 2009 WL 10704853, at *1 (N.D. Tex.

Apr. 10, 2009), aff’d, 370 F. App’x 449 (CA5 2010)).

Congress noted this was merely one example of many

such decisions, and that the widespread inconsistency

with which “federal courts . . . applied” § 1442

necessitated the 2011 amendment. Id. at 4; see also,

e.g., Hilbert v. Aeroquip, Inc., 486 F. Supp. 2d 135, 146

(D. Mass. 2007) (finding insufficient an affidavit

stating the Navy had “ultimate control” over a

contractor’s asbestos warnings because the statute

purportedly required “direct orders or comprehensive

and detailed regulations”); Faulk v. Owens-Corning

Fiberglass Corp., 48 F. Supp. 2d 653, 664 (E.D. Tex.

1999)

(finding

that

“detailed,

government

specifications” for asbestos products were insufficient

to satisfy the statute’s requirements without specific

federal direction).

Thus, Congress designed the Removal Clarification Act with a singular purpose: to “clarify when

Federal employees can transfer their case from a state

court to a Federal district court.” H.R. Rep. No. 11217(I), at 5. Congress made clear that “‘civil actions’

and ‘criminal prosecution’ include ‘any proceeding.’”

Ibid. And Congress emphasized “that State courts

lack the authority to hold Federal officers criminally

or civilly liable for acts performed in the execution of

their duties.” Id. at 2. Congress wanted to avoid

interpretations that “would potentially subject

Federal officers to harassment” in state courts. Ibid.

With the specific addition of “or relating to,”

Congress “intended to broaden the universe of acts

that enable Federal officers to remove to Federal

Court.” Id. at 6. As explained by the House Judiciary

report, the amendment “rewrites § 1442 by permitting

removal by Federal officers ‘in an official or individual

capacity, for or relating to any conduct under color of

their office.’” Ibid.

Congress also struck the previous reference “to

Federal officers who are ‘sued’ under the statute.”

Ibid. This deletion too was designed to expand the

statute’s reach by “deemphasiz[ing] the . . . need for a

suit to be brought in advance of a motion to remove.”

Ibid.

These changes show Congress’s intent to provide

expanded protections for federal officers, including by

loosening the required nexus between the legal action

involving the officer or agent and the underlying

federal acts. As the en banc Fifth Circuit previously

summarized, Congress “broadened federal officer

removal to actions, not just causally connected, but

alternatively connected or associated, with acts under

color of federal office.” Latiolais v. Huntington Ingalls,

Inc., 951 F.3d 286, 292 (CA5 2020).

II. The Fifth Circuit’s decision strips the statute

of its force and endangers federal interests.

Despite this expansion of federal officer removal in

the 2011 amendment, the Fifth Circuit here still

applied a heightened causation requirement. The

panel majority held that the Petitioners fell “short of

meeting [the ‘relating to’] requirement because” the

federal refining contracts did not have any explicit

“directive pertaining to [crude] oil production.” Pet. 29a, 38a. Some other courts have similarly

glossed over the 2011 amendment. See, e.g., State v.

Exxon Mobil Corp., 83 F.4th 122, 145 n.7 (CA2 2023)

(“reject[ing] . . . that the causal-nexus requirement

recognized in pre-2011 cases” “was abrogated by the

Removal Clarification Act”); Georgia v. Meadows, 88

F.4th 1331, 1343 (CA11 2023) (“[A federal] officer

must establish a causal connection between the

charged conduct and asserted official authority.”

(cleaned up)).

These

decisions

shortchange

Congress’s

intentional amendment of the statute, which

employed broad language specifically to expand

removal rights and eliminate strict causation

requirements. And these erroneous decisions threaten

significant consequences for federal interests by

trapping federal officers and contractors in potentially

biased state

initiatives.

forums—hindering

critical

federal

A. The decision below disregards Congress’s

intentional expansion of the statute.

The Fifth Circuit’s decision below and similar

decisions that gloss over the 2011 amended language

frustrate congressional intent, duly expressed

through statutory language passed in accordance with

bicameralism and presentment to the President. See

U.S. Const. art. I, § 7, cl. 2. The purpose of the

statute’s expansion was to enable federal removal in

cases like this. So, Congress should not need to act

again to express its broad understanding of federal

officer removal: that broad understanding is already

the law. Courts should not fight statutory language.

Under ordinary interpretive principles, “[a]

statute should be construed so that effect is given to

all its provisions, so that no part will be inoperative or

superfluous, void or insignificant.” Hibbs v. Winn, 542

U.S. 88, 101 (2004). “When the words of a statute are

unambiguous,” “judicial inquiry is complete.”

Connecticut Nat’l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 253

(1992). Interpretation of the words of a statute

“always depends on context,” “context always includes

evident purpose,” and “evident purpose always

includes effectiveness.” A. Scalia & B. Garner,

Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts 63

(2012). Interpretation should thus “further[], not

hinder[]” the text’s “manifest purpose.” Ibid.; see

Colorado v. Symes, 286 U.S. 510, 517 (1932) (noting

that statutes enacted “to maintain the supremacy of

the laws of the United States by safeguarding officers

and others acting under federal authority [from

abusive litigation in hostile forums] . . . . are to be

liberally construed to give full effect to the purposes

for which they were enacted”).

Even before the 2011 amendment, this Court

recognized that Congress’s policy favoring a broad

federal officer removal “should not be frustrated by a

narrow, grudging interpretation of 28 U.S.C.

§ 1442(a)(1).” Willingham, 395 U.S. at 407. Based on

the textually evident purposes of § 1442, this Court

has reiterated that the statute “must be ‘liberally

construed.’” Watson, 551 U.S. at 147.

That is even more true after the 2011 amendment.

As discussed, Congress amended the statute

specifically to “broaden the universe of” removal

rights under § 1442(a)(1). H.R. Rep. No. 112-17(I), at

6. Hence the Act’s title: the “Removal Clarification

Act.” See Dubin v. United States, 599 U.S. 110, 121

(2023) (noting that a statute’s title can “shed light on

its text”). And the phrase that Congress added—

“relating to”—carries an exceptionally broad

meaning. “A law ‘relates to’ an [activity], in the

normal sense of the phrase, if it has a connection with

or a reference to” that activity. Shaw v. Delta Air

Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 96–97 (1995); see also Morales

v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 504 U.S. 374, 383 (1992)

(“The ordinary meaning of the words ‘relating to’ is a

broad one—‘to stand in some relation; to have bearing

or concern; to pertain; refer; to bring into association

with or connection with.’” (cleaned up) (quoting

Black’s Law Dictionary 1158 (5th ed. 1979)); cf. Ford

Motor Co. v. Montana Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 592 U.S.

351, 362 (2021) (the term “relate to” “contemplates

that some relationships will support jurisdiction

without a causal showing”).

Even before 2011, this Court had rejected a rigid

causation standard between the legal claim and the

federal acts, holding that “[i]t is enough that [the]

acts . . . constitute the basis . . . of the state [lawsuit].”

Maryland v. Soper, 270 U.S. 9, 33 (1926). Congress’s

addition of “or relating to” built on this flexible

framework by further loosening the nexus

requirement. The current standard should “sweep[] as

broadly as its language suggests.” Ali v. Fed. Bureau

of Prisons, 552 U.S. 214, 226 (2008). The 2011

amendment contains more expansive language for

broadened removal. This standard should be satisfied

anytime the federal acts are connected or associated

with the legal claim. See Baker v. Atl. Richfield Co.,

962 F.3d 937, 944 (CA7 2020); see also Pet. 44a

(Oldham, J., dissenting). The interpretive principle of

fully effectuating Congress’s amendment of

preexisting statutory text is especially important in

the context of the type of “dialogue between Congress

and the [courts]” that the evolution of the removal

statute suggests. Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723,

738 (2008). “If Congress amends, its intent must be

respected” by courts. Ibid. “This allows both of [these]

branches to adhere to [their] respected, and

respective, constitutional roles.” Lamie v. U.S. Tr.,

540 U.S. 526, 542 (2004).

But below, the Fifth Circuit did the opposite,

practically ignoring the added language. Just as it had

done before the amendment, the court required direct

causation, holding that without explicit mention of oil

production in the federal oil refinement contracts,

there was no connection between those contracts and

claims implicating oil production—and thus no

removal. Pet. 33a–34a. But “relating to” also means

an “association with.” Morales, 504 U.S. at 383. So

even though the majority acknowledged (with some

understatement) that crude oil production was

“tangentially related [to the] federal directive” to

refine oil, Pet. 34a, it practically applied a causal

nexus test by limiting removable actions “to the bare

words of a federal contract,” Pet. 49a–50a (Oldham, J.,

dissenting). Yet even the Petitioners’ federal contracts

anticipated crude oil production by providing tax

exemptions for oil produced under their refining

agreements. See Pet. 170a (contracts providing that if

the Petitioners were “required by [a] municipal” or

“state” law to pay “any new or additional taxes” or

other fees “by reason of the production” of crude

petroleum, they were “entitled to [an] exemption”).

Ultimately, the panel majority’s fixation on

contractual language glosses over the broader

operational reality. As the panel recognized, the

Petitioners’ predecessors “were vertically integrated

oil companies that produced . . . and used [the] crude

at their refineries to comply with their World War IIera contracts with the government.” Pet. 9a. The

production of crude oil was more than just “related to”

the federal contracts; it was a prerequisite for

fulfilling the contracts. Even though Petitioners’

“federal contracts clearly pertain to their refinement

of avgas and other petroleum products,” “these

refinery activities do . . . have some relation to oil

production.” Pet. 28a. That relationship should easily

suffice under the operative statutory text, which

extends beyond such vertically-integrated companies

to encompass any actions “relating to” government

contracts or directions. 1

The restrictive approach below ignores not only

the meaning of the amendment’s language, but also

the reality of operations essential to fulfilling federal

contracts. That interpretation risks eviscerating the

purpose of federal officer removal.

B. The unduly narrow reading below would

harm important federal interests.

The consequences of flouting Congress’s clear

directive to broaden federal officer removal would be

significant. Narrow construction of federal officer

removal threatens important federal interests and

programs that Congress specifically sought to protect,

as well as the government’s relationship with private

contractors.

Removal ensures that federal officers and agents

may enter a venue where all defenses are at their

See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 9276, Establishing the Petroleum

Administration for War, 7 Fed. Reg. 10091, 10092 (Dec. 2, 1942)

(granting the Chairman of the War Production Board the power

to direct “the petroleum industry as the Administrator may deem

necessary, in order to . . . provide adequate supplies” and “[e]ffect

proper distribution” “of petroleum for military, or other essential

uses”); see also Exxon Mobil Corp. v. United States, 2020 WL

5573048, at *10 (S.D. Tex. Sept. 16, 2020) (During WWII, the

government “control[led] the allocation, exchange, license,

pooling, loan, sale, or lease of crude oil, base stocks, blending

agents, processes and patents, and production, transportation

and refining facilities . . . whenever and to whatever extent may

be necessary to facilitate the maximum production of all grades

of aviation gasoline or to reduce the time required to produce

such gasoline.”).

disposal. Without federal removal, States “may

deprive federal officials of a federal forum in which to

assert federal immunity defenses.” Watson, 551 U.S.

at 150. “[O]ne of the most important reasons for

removal is to have the validity of the defense of official

immunity tried in a federal court.” Willingham, 395

U.S. at 407 (emphasis added); see also Jefferson Cnty.

v. Acker, 527 U.S. 423, 447 (1999) (Scalia, J.,

concurring in part and dissenting in part) (stating

that the “main point” of federal officer removal “is to

give officers a federal forum in which to litigate the

merits of immunity defenses”). Of course, immunity is

not the only point, and Congress intended to provide

the venue itself regardless of the claims. See H.R. Rep.

No. 112-17(I), at 6.

Depriving federal officials and agents of a federal

forum forces them into state courts, where local biases

could potentially obstruct federal operations. This

Court has long recognized that the overarching

purpose of the removal statute is “to prevent paralysis

of operations of the federal government.” Gay v. Ruff,

292 U.S. 25, 32 (1934); see also Watson, 551 U.S. at

149; Davis, 100 U.S. at 263. The removal statute

“protect[s] the Federal Government from the

interference with its operations that would ensue” if a

State brought officers and agents of the federal

government to trial in state court for alleged offenses

against state law while acting within the scope of their

authority. Watson, 551 U.S. at 150 (cleaned up).

Again, state court “proceedings may reflect ‘local

prejudice’ against unpopular federal laws or federal

officials.” Ibid. (quoting Soper, 270 U.S. at 32). As

Congress emphasized in amending § 1442, it sought

to shield the federal government from “political

harassment” by the States. H.R. Rep. No. 112-17(I), at

3. Without protection, “local interests or prejudice’

[will] color outcomes.” Ibid. Thus, without an

appropriate ability for federal officers and agents to

remove, the same scenario that faced the customs

officers in New England and the federal agents in

South Carolina could result: a paralysis of federal

initiatives.

Many precedents show the connection between

federal officer removal and important federal

interests. For instance, in Baker v. Atlantic Richfield

Co., 962 F.3d 937, 940 (CA7 2020), residents sued

companies for polluting the soil with lead and arsenic.

During World War II, the federal government

contracted with several companies. Id. at 939. It

directed one to produce zinc oxide, white lead

carbonate, and lead for military and essential civilian

goods. Id. at 940. It directed the other to build and

operate a facility producing Freon-12 (a refrigerant

used for preserving food, medicine, and other

perishable supplies) solely for government use. Id. at

940–41. The plaintiffs alleged that the companies’

operations violated state pollution laws. Id. at 939.

The Seventh Circuit held that, under the 2011

amendment to § 1442, the companies did not need to

show that every act of pollution was directly ordered

by the government. Id. at 944–45. Instead, it was

sufficient that the companies were acting under

federal authority. Ibid.

Likewise, in Latiolais v. Avondale, 951 F.3d 286,

289 (CA5 2020), a Navy machinist sued Avondale for

asbestos exposure during the refurbishment of the

USS Tappahannock. The Navy had contracted with

Avondale in the 1960s and 1970s to build and

refurbish naval vessels, directing the company to

install asbestos for thermal insulation and

supervising the process to ensure compliance. Ibid.

The plaintiff alleged under state law that Avondale

negligently failed to warn him of asbestos hazards and

provide adequate safety equipment. Id. at 290. But

under the 2011 amendment to § 1442(a)(1), the en

banc Fifth Circuit held that removability does not

require a direct causal nexus; it is enough for the civil

action to be connected or associated with acts

performed under color of federal office. Id. at 296.

Because Avondale installed asbestos under Navy

directions, the case was removable. Ibid.

As these precedents show, often federal officer

removal is needed to protect federal contractors—

private parties working under the government’s

direction to advance significant federal initiatives.

Section 1442 protects “any person acting under” a

federal officer’s direction. 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1). The

federal government relies on these contractors for

many reasons, including cost efficiencies, taking

advantage of private sector expertise, and avoiding

federal bureaucracy bloat.

Reading federal officer removal narrowly

threatens this relationship between the federal

government and vital contractors. In many cases,

contractors’ work may implicate areas of intense

political disagreement, threatening them with the

same type of local biases and pressures that motivated

federal officer removal in the first place.

For instance, the Trump Administration has

sought greater enforcement of our immigration laws,

after years of nonenforcement created severe public

safety and economic problems. See, e.g., Exec. Order

No. 14159, Protecting the American People Against

Invasion, 90 Fed. Reg. 8443 (Jan. 20, 2025); Exec.

Order No. 14165, Securing Our Borders, 90 Fed. Reg.

8467 (Jan. 20, 2025); Proclamation No. 10888,

Guaranteeing the States Protection Against Invasion,

90 Fed. Reg. 8333 (Jan. 20, 2025).

The U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement

(ICE) relies on contractors to carry out these

important goals. 2 ICE uses private contractors for

transportation, security, detention facilities, IT

The federal government’s contracting authority in this area

stems from several statutory sources. The Homeland Security

Acquisition Regulation outlines procedures for all Department of

Homeland Security acquisition activities. See 48 C.F.R.

§ 3001.103 et seq.; e.g., id. §§ 3037.104-70 (service contracting),

3035.017 (research and development contracting). More broadly,

the Federal Property and Administrative Services Act of 1949

gives the President power to dictate federal contracting terms to

ensure efficiency and economy. 40 U.S.C. § 101 et seq.; see also

id. § 121 (“The President may prescribe policies and directives

that the President considers necessary to carry out this

subtitle.”). All this authority operates through the Federal

Acquisition Regulation, 48 C.F.R. § 1.101 et seq., under which

agency heads can delegate contracting authority to contracting

officers, id. §§ 1.601, 1.602-1(a) (“Contracting officers have

authority to enter into, administer, or terminate contracts and

make related determinations and findings.”). Taken together,

these authorities vest ICE with expansive discretion to contract

with a wide range of private entities.

services, supplies, and deliveries. 3 These contractors

play vital roles in immigration enforcement. But it is

no secret that contractors’ fulfillment of this

important work is not without controversy. Cell phone

applications have been designed solely to expose ICE

agents. 4 Without a federal forum to assert federal

defenses, there is significant danger that ICE agents

and contractors could face legal actions colored by

“local interests or prejudice.” H.R. Rep. No. 112-17(I),

at 3.

Another example occurred in Connecticut. New

Haven is banning its employees from flying Avelo

Airlines because it is an ICE subcontractor. 5 At one

protest, Senator Richard Blumenthal said: “To the

president of Avelo: You really stepped in it. . . . You

made a bad mistake.” 6 Connecticut’s Attorney

General, William Tong, dashed off a threatening

letter, declaring that because Avelo “chose[]” to help

the federal government enforce its laws, “[t]he State

of Connecticut has an obligation now to review this

business decision and to consider the viability of our

3 See, e.g., L. MacLellan, These are the Fortune 500 Companies

that have Active Contracts with ICE, Fortune (June 26, 2025),

https://perma.cc/5P2F-CMA6.

4 C. Duffy, ‘I wanted to do something to fight back’: This iPhone

App Alerts Users to Nearby ICE Sightings, CNN (June 30, 2025),

https://perma.cc/8HRZ-BKJK.

5 J. Rose, Budget Airline Avelo Faces Backlash for Signing Up to

Fly Deportation Flights for ICE, NPR (Apr. 30, 2025),

https://perma.cc/P8VM-FB26.

6 Ibid.

choice to support Avelo.” 7 In his letter, Tong

demanded that Avelo provide a copy of its contract

with the Department of Homeland Security (or

related parties) and answer detailed questions about

its deportation flights, including confirmation Avelo

will not operate deportation flights from Connecticut

airports. 8

Connecticut could try to prosecute Avelo in state

court under any number of theories, including

perhaps state nondiscrimination laws. See, e.g., Conn.

Gen. Stat. §§ 46a-71(b), 46a-58(a). Many States let

their Attorneys General issue intrusive subpoenas

and other demands. See, e.g., N.J. Stat. Ann. § 56:8-3;

Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 93A, § 6(1); N.Y. Gen. Bus.

Law §§ 343, 352. An unduly narrow reading of § 1442

could threaten contractors like Avelo that make many

decisions related to the fulfillment of their federal

obligations—including what operations it may

undertake in a particular State—without express

contractual provisions about those decisions. There is

ample reason to think that ICE contractors like Avelo

could not get a fair shake in state courts like

Connecticut’s.

ICE’s detention facilities are also facing mounting

pressure. “The use of private detention contractors is

a vital piece of the national detention system enabling

ICE to successfully execute its mission with less than

7 W. Tong, Avelo Airlines Contract to Operate Flights for U.S.

Department of Homeland Security, Off. Att’y Gen. Conn. (Apr. 8,

2025), https://perma.cc/5DFQ-RLGP.

8 Ibid.

4% of facilities being ICE owned and operated.” 9 But

ICE detention contractors are unpopular in some

quarters. For instance, one contractor that operates a

detention facility on ICE’s behalf in Colorado has

become a target for local malcontents following a

FOIA lawsuit brought by the ACLU. 10 This scrutiny

comes on top of existing legal challenges at the same

facility, where the contractor was already embroiled

in litigation over alleged violations of Colorado’s

minimum wage law while acting “ pursuant to a

contract with [ICE].” Menocal v. The GEO Group, Inc.,

635 F. Supp. 3d 1151, 1157 (D. Colo. 2022); see 113 F.

Supp. 3d 1125, 1129 (D. Colo. 2015) (dismissing the

minimum wage claim).

Colorado’s hostility toward federal immigration

policies extends beyond ICE facilities. Recently,

Colorado Attorney General Phil Weiser sued a Mesa

County sheriff’s deputy for allegedly violating a

Colorado law that purports to prohibit assisting

federal immigration enforcement. 11 Again, it is not a

stretch that contractors in venues like this will face

an unacceptable risk of local bias, and their actions

that are related to—even if not expressly required

Readout of U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement

Meeting with Private Detention Contractor (Apr. 5, 2024),

https://perma.cc/4RBL-A4EJ.

10 S. Wilson, Three New ICE Detention Centers Reportedly

Planned in Colorado, Colo. Newsline (Aug. 15, 2025),

https://perma.cc/AJ7W-K8SR.

11 R. Fish, Mesa County Sheriff: AG Lawsuit Over Alleged

Immigration Enforcement Violation is About Politics, Not

Fairness, Denver7 ABC (Jul. 31, 2025), https://perma.cc/XVF8M2U2.

by—a federal directive should be protected by the

availability of a federal forum.

This availability of a neutral forum is especially

important because private contractors have freedom

to choose their work. The prospect of prolonged

litigation in hostile forums may cause many

contractors to choose not to bid on government

contracts. Or contractors may refuse to participate in

certain jurisdictions. Or some potential contractors

may never get off the ground, as hostile litigation

could serve as a significant barrier to entry. All this

undermines the ability of the federal government to

achieve its objectives, threatening the delivery of

federal services—or potentially leading to a

patchwork of federal services that depends on local

political sentiment rather than national need.

These policy considerations were addressed

precisely where they ought to be: in Congress, by the

People’s elected representatives. Congress amended

the statutory language to avoid these outcomes. This

Court should give the clear statutory text its full

sweep and thereby vindicate Congress’s intentional

effort to broadly shield federal officers and

contractors—doing important federal work—from

abusive litigation in hostile forums.

CONCLUSION

For these reasons, the Court should reverse.

Respectfully submitted,