Amicus Curiae Brief — Chevron USA Incorporated, et al., Petitioners v. Plaquemines Parish, Louisiana, et al.

No. 24-813

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

___________

CHEVRON U.S.A. I NC.; CHEVRON U.S.A. HOLDINGS,

INCORPORATED; CHEVRON PIPE LINE COMPANY; THE

TEXAS COMPANY; EXXON MOBIL CORPORATION,

Petitioners,

v.

PLAQUEMINES PARISH; PARISH OF CAMERON; STATE OF

LOUISIANA; LOUISIANA DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY

AND NATURAL RESOURCES,

Respondents.

___________

On Writ of Certiorari

to the United States Court of Appeals

for the Fifth Circuit

___________

BRIEF OF WASHINGTON LEGAL FOUNDATION

AND ATLANTIC LEGAL FOUNDATION

AS AMICI CURIAE IN SUPPORT OF PETITIONERS

___________

LAWRENCE S. EBNER

ATLANTIC LEGAL

FOUNDATION

1701 Pennsylvania Ave., NW

Washington, DC 20006

(202) 729-6337

lawrence.ebner@

atlanticlegal.org

CORY L. ANDREWS

Counsel of Record

WASHINGTON LEGAL

FOUNDATION

2009 Mass. Ave., NW

Washington, DC 20036

(202) 588-0302

candrews@wlf.org

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

(1) Does a causal-nexus or contractual-direction test align with the 2011 amendment to the federal-officer removal statute?

(2) Can federal contractors remove state-court

suits to federal court when sued over actions related

to federal contracts?

iii

TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ................................... iv

INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE ............................. 1

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT.................................. 2

ARGUMENT ............................................................ 4

I.

THE FEDERAL-OFFICER REMOVAL STAT-

UTE’S HISTORY AND PURPOSE DEMAND A

BROAD READING OF “RELATING TO” ................ 4

II.

III.

A.

The statute’s origins protect federal authority from state interference...................................................... 4

B.

Congress expanded the statute to

shield federal officers and contractors....................................................... 6

C.

The 2011 amendment imposed a

broad “relating to” test ....................... 7

THE FIFTH CIRCUIT’S CONTRACTUAL-DIRECTION TEST CONTRADICTS STATUTORY

TEXT AND PURPOSE......................................... 9

A.

“Relating to” requires a connection,

not causation ....................................... 9

B.

The Fifth Circuit’s test revives the

discarded causal-nexus test ............. 11

C.

Petitioners’ conduct satisfies the

“relating to” test ................................ 12

RESPONDENTS’ COUNTERARGUMENTS FAIL

TO OVERCOME THE “RELATING TO” TEST ...... 13

CONCLUSION ....................................................... 16

iv

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Page(s)

CASES:

Arizona v. Manypenny,

451 U.S. 232 (1981) ................................. 5, 6, 7, 15

Boyle v. United Techs. Corp.,

487 U.S. 500 (1988) ......................................... 6, 13

BP PLC v. Mayor & City Council of Balt.,

593 U.S. 230 (2021) ............................................... 1

In re Commonwealth’s Motion to Appoint Couns.,

790 F.3d 457 (3d Cir. 2015) ...................... 8, 10, 14

Jefferson Cnty. v. Acker,

527 U.S. 423 (1999) ............................................... 7

Latiolais v. Huntington Ingalls, Inc.,

951 F.3d 286 (5th Cir. 2020) ................................. 1

Maryland v. Soper,

270 U.S. 9 (1926) ................................................. 15

Mesa v. California,

489 U.S. 121 (1989) ........................... 5, 7, 8, 10, 14

Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc.,

504 U.S. 374 (1992) ............................. 8, 10, 12, 15

Patel v. Garland,

596 U.S. 328 (2022) ................................... 9, 10, 15

Sawyer v. Foster Wheeler LLC,

860 F.3d 249 (4th Cir. 2017) ..................... 8, 10, 14

St. Charles Surgical Hosp., LLC v. La. Health

Serv. & Indem. Co.,

990 F.3d 447 (5th Cir. 2021) ............................... 11

v

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

(continued)

Page(s)

Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc.,

463 U.S. 85 (1983) ............................................... 10

Tennessee v. Davis,

100 U.S. 257 (1879) ......................... 5, 7, 10, 11, 14

Watson v. Philip Morris Cos.,

551 U.S. 142 (2007) ................... 1, 5, 6, 8, 9, 14, 15

Willingham v. Morgan,

395 U.S. 402 (1969) ............. 4, 5, 6, 7, 9, 10, 11, 13

STATUTES:

28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1) ................................ 2, 4, 9, 10

Removal Clarification Act of 2011,

Pub. L. No. 112-51, 125 Stat. 545 ......................... 8

OTHER AUTHORITIES:

John F. Manning, Textualism and Legislative

Intent, 91 Va. L. Rev. 419 (2005) ........................ 10

Jack Brook, Chevron Ordered to Pay More Than

$740 Million to Restore Louisiana Coast, Associated Press (Apr. 4, 2025) .................................... 15

1

INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE *

Washington Legal Foundation (WLF) is a nonprofit, public-interest law firm and policy center with

supporters nationwide. WLF promotes free enterprise, individual rights, limited government, and the

rule of law. It often appears as an amicus in important

removal cases to insist that federal officers and their

agents enjoy the right to an Article III tribunal, as

Congress intended. See, e.g., BP PLC v. Mayor & City

Council of Balt., 593 U.S. 230 (2021); Watson v. Philip

Morris Cos., 551 U.S. 142 (2007); Latiolais v. Huntington Ingalls, Inc., 951 F.3d 286 (5th Cir. 2020) (en

banc).

Established in 1977, the Atlantic Legal Foundation (ALF) is a national, nonprofit, nonpartisan,

public interest law firm. ALF’s mission is to advance

the rule of law and civil justice by advocating for individual liberty, free enterprise, property rights, limited

and responsible government, sound science in judicial

and regulatory proceedings, and effective education,

including parental rights and school choice. With the

benefit of guidance from the distinguished legal scholars, corporate legal officers, private practitioners,

business executives, and prominent scientists who

serve on its Board of Directors and Advisory Council,

ALF pursues its mission by participating as amicus

curiae in carefully selected appeals before the Supreme Court, federal courts of appeals, and state supreme courts. See atlanticlegal.org.

* No party’s counsel authored any part of this brief. No

one, other than amici and their counsel, contributed money for

preparing or submitting this brief.

2

The federal-officer removal statute, 28 U.S.C.

§ 1442(a)(1), grants federal contractors a neutral forum for suits tied to federal projects. Many American

businesses rely on this protection to fulfill government contracts without fear of state-court bias. The

Fifth Circuit’s narrow reading of the statute chills private sector collaboration with the federal government.

Amici urge the Court to restore the statute’s proper

scope.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

Congress safeguards the implementation of

federal policy. Since 1815, the federal-officer removal

statute has shielded officers and contractors from local judges who might balk at federal directives. In

2011, Congress swapped a clunky causal-nexus test

for an express “relating to” standard so that any suit

connected to federal acts gets a federal forum. The

Fifth Circuit’s insistence on a contractual directive ignores this plain text and resurrects the old, discarded

rule. Petitioners’ wartime oil production, linked to

federal aviation gasoline (avgas) contracts, easily

meets the “relating to” test. This commonsense reading safeguards national projects, keeps the economy

humming, and respects federalism without letting

States run amok.

The statute’s history underscores its protective

aim. Congress first shielded customs agents from

state courts during the War of 1812. It expanded protection through the 1833 Force Bill, the Civil War

laws, and the 1948 codification to cover all federal officers and contractors. Most recently, Congress’s 2011

amendment replaced this Court’s narrow “causal connection” test with a broad “relating to” standard. By

3

inserting “or relating to” (as part of the change from

“capacity for” to “capacity, for or relating to”), Congress replaced the previous test—which this Court

had construed as requiring a direct causal connection

between the defendant’s actions and their official federal duties—with a broader “relating to” test that encompasses a wider range of conduct connected to acts

under color of federal office. As petitioners’ brief

shows, six circuits share this understanding.

The Fifth Circuit’s rule misreads the statute.

By demanding a contractual directive, it revives the

pre-2011 causal-nexus test and undermines Congress’s intent to broaden removal. But as this Court

has clarified in other statutory contexts, the words

“relating to” require only a connection, not causation.

Petitioners’ oil production, linked to avgas contracts

through pricing, tax exemptions, and Petroleum Administration for War (PAW) allocations, more than

satisfies this standard.

Petitioners’ reading also advances federal interests while preserving federalism. Removal protects

national defense by shielding contractors from statecourt bias. State courts often risk favoring local interests, looking askance at federal defenses like preemption, as Plaquemines Parish’s $744.6 million verdict

here confirms. Removal ensures neutrality without

stripping state authority, as federal courts still must

apply state law. This balances federal supremacy and

state sovereignty, enabling contractors to serve without fear of judicial overreach.

The Fifth Circuit got it wrong. This Court

should reverse.

4

ARGUMENT

Congress safeguards federal policy and those

who help to accomplish it. The federal-officer removal

statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1), ensures that state

courts cannot hinder contractors who answer federal

needs. The Fifth Circuit’s narrow test, requiring a

contractual directive, misreads the statute’s text and

purpose. A broad “relating to” standard protects federal interests while honoring federalism. This Court

must correct the error.

I.

THE FEDERAL-OFFICER REMOVAL STATUTE’S

HISTORY AND PURPOSE DEMAND A BROAD

READING OF “RELATING TO.”

For over two centuries, Congress has shielded

both federal officers and the private citizens working

alongside them from state interference. The removal

statute’s history shows a clear aim to prevent state

courts from obstructing anyone performing federal

duties. From 1815 to 2011, Congress expanded its protections, ensuring that contractors can access federal

courts when sued for federally related actions.

A.

The statute’s origins protect federal

authority from state interference.

In 1815, Congress passed a law to shield customs agents from state courts. Willingham v. Morgan,

395 U.S. 402, 405 (1969). The War of 1812 sparked

tension with New England, where many States opposed a federal trade embargo. Id. State courts,

swayed by local sentiment, threatened to punish

agents for enforcing federal law. Id. Congress allowed

agents to move state lawsuits to federal courts,

5

countering bias and ensuring the continued performance of federal duties. Id.

This 1815 law, though temporary, set a powerful precedent. Id. at 405–06. It addressed a core federalism concern—that state courts, swayed by local

sentiment, could obstruct federal authority by suing

or arresting officers for acts authorized by federal law.

Tennessee v. Davis, 100 U.S. 257, 263 (1879). Federal

policy depends on officers acting without fear of state

judicial overreach. Removal thus ensured a neutral

federal forum to prevent such interference. Willingham, 395 U.S. at 405.

This Court has repeatedly affirmed that purpose. As Davis explained, removal prevents States

from using judicial power to “arrest” federal functions. 100 U.S. at 263. Federal officers act within

States, but their duties serve national interests. Id.

State courts, accountable to local voters, may prioritize parochial concerns. Id. Removal thus ensures a

neutral forum where federal law governs. Mesa v.

California, 489 U.S. 121, 126-27 (1989).

The 1815 law established a lasting principle.

Willingham, 395 U.S. at 405. Federal officers and

those assisting them need protection to execute national policy. Watson, 551 U.S. at 153–54. This protection balances federal and state power, while ensuring

federal supremacy. Arizona v. Manypenny, 451 U.S.

232, 241 (1981).

6

B.

Congress expanded the statute to

shield federal officers and contractors.

Later crises yielded broader protections. In

1833, South Carolina’s nullification crisis over federal

tariffs led to the Force Bill. Willingham, 395 U.S.

at 405. This law allowed customs officers to remove

state suits to federal courts, addressing state hostility

to federal revenue collection. Id. The Force Bill reaffirmed that federal officers must be allowed to act

without state obstruction.

The Civil War brought more challenges. States

resisted federal revenue laws, suing or prosecuting

agents enforcing them. Id. at 405–406. Congress responded with removal provisions to protect these

agents. Id. These laws became a permanent statute,

focused on revenue enforcement. Id. at 406. In 1948,

Congress expanded it to cover all federal officers, ensuring comprehensive protection. Id.

Congress expanded the statute to protect federal contractors who work alongside federal officers to

achieve federal goals. Watson, 551 U.S. at 153–54;

Boyle v. United Techs. Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 507 (1988).

Removal shields these contractors from state-court

bias, ensuring that they can serve without fear of judicial overreach, a principle vital to federal supremacy. Manypenny, 451 U.S. 232, 241 (1981).

This Court has consistently upheld the statute’s broad purpose. In Willingham, it held that removal applies when suits arise from officers’ duties,

even those without immunity. 395 U.S. at 407. In

Watson, it confirmed that contractors acting under

7

federal officers qualify for removal. 551 U.S. at 153–

54. In Mesa, it emphasized that removal protects federal operations from state interference. 489 U.S.

at 126–27. And most recently in BP, 593 U.S. at 238,

the Court reaffirmed the statute’s broad protective

scope, recognizing that § 1442(a)(1) ensures federal

courts can address federal defenses, vital for contractors who, like petitioners, face state-court bias. These

rulings all underscore Congress’s aim to provide a federal forum for those accomplishing federal interests.

Davis, 100 U.S. at 263.

The statute’s evolution shows Congress’s commitment to federal supremacy in accomplishing its

policy aims. Id. State courts cannot use litigation to

thwart those helping implement federal policy. Manypenny, 451 U.S. at 241.

C.

The 2011 amendment imposed a

broad “relating to” test.

The federal-officer removal statute is not a

“narrow” or “limited” authority but a “broad” one, designed to protect federal officers from interference by

hostile state courts. Willingham, 395 U.S. at 406

(quoting Colorado v. Symes, 28 U.S. 510, 517 (1932)).

Those words, penned by Justice Thurgood Marshall in

1969, ring even truer after Congress replaced this

Court’s “causal connection” test in 2011 with a broad

“relating to” standard.

Before 2011, this Court required a nexus or

“causal connection” between the suit and federal acts.

Jefferson Cnty. v. Acker, 527 U.S. 423, 431 (1999). The

Court interpreted “for any act” narrowly, limiting removal to suits directly caused by federal duties. Id.

8

But that standard created uncertainty, as courts debated the proximate sweep of causation needed to

trigger removal. Federal officers and contractors

faced inconsistent access to federal courts. See Watson, 551 U.S. at 152 (ruling that a private company

could not invoke the federal officer removal statute

merely by complying with federal regulations).

In response to this uncertainty, Congress expanded § 1442(a)(1) in 2011. By inserting “or relating

to” (as part of the change from “capacity for” to “capacity, for or relating to”), Congress effectively ousted

or replaced the previous test—which this Court had

construed as requiring a direct causal connection between the defendant’s actions and their official federal duties—with a broader “relating to” test that encompasses a wider range of conduct connected to acts

under color of federal office. Removal Clarification Act

of 2011, Pub. L. No. 112-51, 125 Stat. 545 (2011). As

this Court recognized in Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 504 U.S. 374, 383 (1992), “relating to”

means any connection or association, not strict causation. Id. The amendment clarified judicial confusion

over causation, aligning the text with the statute’s

purpose to shield federal duties from state-court interference.

Several circuits have adopted this straightforward reading. See, e.g., In re Commonwealth’s Motion

to Appoint Couns., 790 F.3d 457, 471 (3d Cir. 2015);

Sawyer v. Foster Wheeler LLC, 860 F.3d 249, 258 (4th

Cir. 2017). They hold that “relating to” requires only

a link, not causation. Id. This ensures that federal officers and contractors can defend against state suits

in federal courts, fulfilling Congress’s intent. Mesa,

489 U.S. at 126–27. These decisions also accord with

9

this Court’s earlier holding in Watson, 551 U.S.

at 147, which held that the federal-officer removal

statute must be “liberally construed” to protect contractors assisting federal functions.

The 2011 amendment advanced Congress’s aim

to remove jurisdictional barriers. Willingham, 395

U.S. at 407. It sought to ensure that suits over conduct tied to federal duties, like petitioners’ oil production, would qualify for removal. The “relating to” update honors this intent, protecting federal interests

without overstepping structural or statutory bounds.

Patel v. Garland, 596 U.S. 328, 346 (2022).

II.

THE FIFTH CIRCUIT’S CONTRACTUAL-DIRECTION REQUIREMENT CONTRADICTS STATUTORY TEXT AND PURPOSE.

The Fifth Circuit erred. It demanded a contractual directive for removal, ignoring Congress’s “relating to” test. This misstep revives a defunct test, blocking petitioners’ access to federal courts.

A.

“Relating to” requires a connection,

not causation.

The statute permits the removal of suits “for or

relating to any act under color of [federal] office,” requiring only a connection, not causation. 28 U.S.C.

§ 1442(a)(1). This broad standard, adopted in 2011 to

replace the causal-nexus test, ensures flexibility for

complex suits tied to federal directives.

This Court has consistently interpreted “relating to” broadly. “Relating to” means “connected or associated with,” not requiring specific direction or

10

causation. Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85,

96–97 (1983); Morales, 504 U.S. at 383. That proper

reading aligns perfectly with the statute’s broad purpose. Willingham, 395 U.S. at 407. Contractors rely

on federal courts to resolve federal defenses like

preemption and immunity, ensuring fair hearings.

Mesa, 489 U.S. at 129. Requiring causation narrows

that access, risking state-court bias. Davis, 100 U.S.

at 263.

Against this clear text, respondents’ policy arguments about federal-court jurisdiction must give

way. Patel, 596 U.S. at 346 (2022) (holding that statutory text prevails over policy arguments); see also

John F. Manning, Textualism and Legislative Intent,

91 Va. L. Rev. 419, 430 (2005).

Most circuits agree. See, e.g., In re Commonwealth’s Motion, 790 F.3d at 471; Sawyer, 860 F.3d

at 258. Drawing on Morales, 504 U.S. at 383, those

circuits require only a “connection” or “association”

between the suit and federal acts. In Sawyer, the

Fourth Circuit allowed removal for a contractor’s conduct tied to federal contracts, even without a specific

directive. 860 F.3d at 258. The Third Circuit, in Commonwealth’s Motion, rejected a causation requirement, focusing solely on connection. 790 F.3d at 471.

The “relating to” standard ensures flexibility.

Suits often involve complex conduct tied to interlocking federal directives, like petitioners’ oil production.

A connection test best accommodates these realities,

fulfilling Congress’s intent to broaden removal. The

Fifth Circuit’s narrow approach eliminates this clarity, re-imposing a requirement that Congress explicitly discarded.

11

B.

The Fifth Circuit’s test revives the

discarded causal-nexus standard.

The Fifth Circuit went astray. It held that petitioners’ oil production lacked a “sufficient connection” to federal avgas contracts without a contractual

provision directing production. Pet. App. 29. But that

“contractual direction” requirement revives the very

causal-nexus test that Congress abolished. Id. at 8,

83. That can’t be right.

In Willingham, the Court interpreted the pre2011 statute to require only a minimal connection between the suit and federal duties. 395 U.S. at 409.

The 2011 amendment responded to that holding and

expanded that scope further. Yet the Fifth Circuit’s

test narrows it beyond even the pre-2011 standard.

That reading risks a return to state-court bias, as contractors will face local juries hostile to federal interests. Cf. Davis, 100 U.S. at 263.

The Fifth Circuit’s test simply pours old wine

into new bottles, undermining Congress’s intent to

broaden removal to conduct connected to federal actions. This error is particularly jarring given the appeals court’s own precedent holding that “relating to”

broadened removal to require only a “connection” between the plaintiff’s claims and acts under federal direction. St. Charles Surgical Hosp., LLC v. La. Health

Serv. & Indem. Co., 990 F.3d 447, 454 (5th Cir. 2021).

Yet here, it reverted to a stricter test, requiring a specific contractual mandate. Pet. App. 30. This extrastatutory requirement contradicts the statute’s plain

text, which permits removal for suits “relating to” federal acts, not just those directly caused by them.

12

The Fifth Circuit’s error is self-evident. It conceded that petitioners’ oil production had “some relation” to avgas contracts but required a contractual directive. Pet. App. 28–29. This defies the “relating to”

text, which requires only a relationship or connection.

C.

Petitioners’ conduct satisfies the

“relating to” test.

The record is clear. Petitioners’ World War IIera oil production directly relates to their federal

avgas contracts. Respondents challenge petitioners’

production methods in Louisiana fields, alleging violations of state law. Pet. App. 4, 16. These methods

produced crude oil that petitioners refined into avgas

to fulfill federal contracts, which explicitly tied avgas

pricing to the cost of crude production and transportation. Pet. App. 157–59 (contract adjusting avgas

price based on East Texas crude costs).

The contracts also exempted crude production

from state taxes, recognizing its role in federal wartime needs. Pet. App. 170–71. Indeed, the PAW allocated crude from these fields to petitioners’ refineries,

designating them as ‘Critical Fields Essential to the

War Program’ for avgas production. Pet. App. 23 n.64,

35. These contractual and regulatory links show that

petitioners’ production methods were integrally connected to their federal duties, satisfying the “relating

to” test. Morales, 504 U.S. at 383.

Petitioners’ actions satisfy the “relating to”

test. Respondents challenge methods tied to federal

avgas contracts, which were vital for meeting wartime needs. Respondents’ claims specifically target

petitioners’ extraction of excessive crude oil at rapid

13

rates, practices driven by the federal government’s urgent demand for avgas to fuel the war effort, as petitioners’ contracts required unprecedented production

volumes. Pet. App. 20–21, 46 (noting federal need for

44,000,000 gallons daily). Simply put, respondents’

claims bear directly on acts performed under federal

direction. This link alone satisfies the statute’s broad

scope, which covers suits aimed at federally related

acts.

Petitioners’ colorable federal preemption defense, asserting that wartime directives preempt

state-law claims, further ties their production to federal contracts, as those directives governed crude allocation and production to meet avgas needs. Pet.

App. 62; Boyle, 487 U.S. at 507. This defense, which

need not succeed to justify removal, Willingham, 395

U.S. at 407, underscores the federal interest in petitioners’ conduct.

In sum, the Fifth Circuit misapplied the statute. Petitioners’ conduct, tied to federal wartime

needs, falls safely within § 1442(a)(1). Petitioners’

reading restores a federal forum, protecting federal

interests without overstepping statutory bounds.

III.

RESPONDENTS’ COUNTERARGUMENTS FAIL TO

OVERCOME THE “RELATING TO” TEST.

None of respondents’ usual counterarguments

diminish the Fifth Circuit’s error. By imposing a contractual-direction requirement, the appeals court defied Congress’s intent and deprived petitioners of a

federal forum for conduct integrally tied to federal

wartime directives.

14

As they did below, respondents may argue that

construing the “relating to” standard broadly risks

overburdening federal courts, undermining state sovereignty, or enabling removal based on tenuous connections to federal acts. But there is no such thing as

a narrow “relating to” test. These concerns lack merit

and cannot override the clear text of 28 U.S.C.

§ 1442(a)(1).

First, the fear of flooding federal courts is unfounded. The federal-officer removal statute includes

built-in safeguards that limit its scope. Removal requires defendants to show they were “acting under” a

federal officer and assert a “colorable federal defense.”

Watson, 551 U.S. at 153–54. These requirements ensure that only cases with a meaningful federal nexus

qualify, preventing frivolous or attenuated claims

from reaching federal court. As this Court has recognized, the statute targets a narrow category of cases

involving federal duties, not a wholesale removal of

state-law claims. Mesa, 489 U.S. at 129. Nor have circuit courts applying the broad “relating to” standard,

such as the Third and Fourth Circuits, suffered an unmanageable influx of cases. See, e.g., Sawyer, 860 F.3d

at 258; In re Commonwealth’s Motion, 790 F.3d

at 471.

Second, removal under § 1442(a)(1) respects

federalism by balancing state and federal interests.

Under Erie, federal courts hearing removed cases apply state substantive law, preserving state sovereignty while ensuring that federal defenses like

preemption or immunity are fairly decided. Mesa, 489

U.S. at 129. This arrangement prevents state courts

from obstructing federal policy through local bias, as

this Court warned in Davis, 100 U.S. at 263. At the

15

same time, federal courts’ deference to state law under Erie mitigates any perceived encroachment on

state authority. Far from undermining federalism, removal upholds the supremacy of federal law while respecting state authority, a balance Congress deliberately struck. Manypenny, 451 U.S. at 241.

Third, concerns about tenuous connections

misread the statute’s text and purpose. Again, the “relating to” standard as interpreted by this Court requires a meaningful connection or association, not a

remote or speculative link. Morales, 504 U.S. at 383.

Petitioners’ oil production, tied to federal avgas contracts through pricing, tax exemptions, and wartime

allocations, exemplifies this connection. See supra

Section II.C. The statute’s other requirements help to

ensure that only conduct with a salient federal nexus

qualifies for removal. Watson, 551 U.S. at 153–54. At

all events, respondents’ policy objections cannot override the plain text of § 1442(a)(1), which Congress expanded in 2011 to broaden access to federal courts.

Patel, 596 U.S. at 346 (statutory text prevails over

policy arguments).

Petitioners produced oil under federal directives during World War II, a quintessential federal

act to meet wartime needs. Yet a Louisiana court imposed a $744.6 million verdict against them for this

conduct. Jack Brook, Chevron Ordered to Pay More

Than $740 Million to Restore Louisiana Coast, Associated Press (Apr. 4, 2025), https://tinyurl.com/

26cxpvy9. Such a result underscores the real risk that

state courts, shaped by local juries and elected judges,

might favor parochial interests over federal priorities,

exposing contractors to bias. Maryland v. Soper, 270

U.S. 9, 32 (1926). Congress has long recognized that

16

if this risk is not checked, it could deter contractors

from serving national needs, undermining national

defense and economic stability.

By exposing contractors to state-court bias, the

decision below undermines Congress’s intent to provide a federal forum for federal interests. Petitioners’

interpretation of § 1442(a)(1) restores the intended

balance, protecting contractors and ensuring that federal policies are carried out without fear of unfair

state-court judgments. We need not speculate about

the consequences of a contrary rule—Louisiana’s

$744.6 million verdict speaks for itself.

CONCLUSION

The Court should reverse.

Respectfully submitted,

September 11, 2025

CORY L. ANDREWS

Counsel of Record

WASHINGTON LEGAL FOUNDATION

2009 Massachusetts Ave., NW

Washington, DC 20036

(202) 588-0302

candrews@wlf.org

LAWRENCE S. EBNER

ATLANTIC LEGAL FOUNDATION

1701 Pennsylvania Ave., NW

Washington, DC 20006

(202) 729-6337

lawrence.ebner@atlanticlegal.org

Counsel for Amici Curiae