Amicus Curiae Brief — La Dell Grizzell, on Behalf of Her Minor Children, Petitioner v. San Elijo Elementary School, et al.

Supreme Court briefMar 3, 2025

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No. 24-812

In the

Supreme Court of the United States

LA DELL GRIZZELL, ON

BEHALF OF HER MINOR CHILDREN,

Petitioner,

SAN ELIJO ELEMENTARY SCHOOL, et al.,

Respondents.

On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the

United States Court of A ppeals for the Ninth Circuit

AMICUS CURIAE BRIEF OF THE

RELIGIOUS FREEDOM INSTITUTE

IN SUPPORT OF PETITIONER

Brian T. Goldman

Counsel of Record

Holwell Shuster &

Goldberg LLP

425 Lexington Avenue

New York, NY 10017

(646) 837-5151

bgoldman@hsgllp.com

Counsel for Amicus Curiae

TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES....................................... ii

INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE ........................... 1

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT ........................... 2

ARGUMENT .............................................................. 2

The Counsel Mandate

Tramples Fundamental Rights ........................... 2

A. Parental Rights Are Fundamental............... 2

B. Proceeding Pro Se

Is A Parenting Choice ................................... 5

II. Pro Se Parent Representation

Is a Matter of Religious Liberty .......................... 7

III. Even A Legitimate

Governmental Interest Does

Not Outweigh This Fundamental Right ........... 10

CONCLUSION ......................................................... 12

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases

Page(s)

Cheung v. Youth Orchestra Found. of Buffalo, Inc.,

906 F.2d 59 (2d Cir. 1990) .......................................6

Meyer v. Nebraska,

262 U.S. 390 (1923).............................................. 2, 3

Parham v. J.R.,

442 U.S. 584 (1979).................................................. 7

Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters,

268 U.S. 510 (1925).............................................. 3, 7

Prince v. Massachusetts,

321 U.S. 158 (1944)............................................ 4, 10

Troxel v. Granville,

530 U.S. 57 (2000).......................................... 5, 6, 11

Wisconsin v. Yoder,

406 U.S. 205 (1972).................................... 4, 6, 7, 11

Other Authorities

1 Corinthians 1:10 .......................................................9

1 Timothy 5:8 ............................................................. 10

Deuteronomy 6:6–7 ................................................... 10

Ephesians 6:4 ............................................................ 10

Isaiah 1:17 ................................................................... 8

Jeremiah 22:3 .............................................................. 8

Matthew 18:1–5 ...........................................................9

Micah 6:8 .....................................................................8

iii

Philippians 2:15–16 .....................................................9

Proverbs 22:6 ............................................................... 8

Psalm 133:1 .................................................................9

Surah An-Nahl, 16:72 ................................................. 9

Surah Al-Isra, 17:24 .................................................... 9

Surah Al-Ahqaf, 46:15 ................................................. 8

Surah Al-Ma'idah, 5:8 .................................................8

Rules

Sup. Ct. R. 37.2 ............................................................1

Model Rules of Pro. Conduct 1.14 ............................... 6

Model Rules of Pro. Conduct 1.6 .................................7

INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE 1

The Religious Freedom Institute (RFI) is

committed to achieving broad acceptance of religious

liberty as a fundamental human right, a source of

individual and social flourishing, the cornerstone of a

successful society, and a driver of national and

international security. Among its core activities, RFI

equips students, parents, policymakers, professionals,

faith-based organization members, scholars, and

religious leaders through programs and resources

that communicate the true meaning and value of

religious freedom, and apply that understanding to

contemporary challenges and opportunities.

RFI envisions a world that respects religion as an

indispensable societal good and which promises

religious believers the freedom to live out their beliefs

fully and openly. RFI submits this brief because this

Petition raises fundamental questions concerning the

rights of parents to make child-rearing decisions in

accordance with their religious beliefs—including the

decision to litigate pro se on their children’s behalf.

1 Pursuant to Sup. Ct. R. 37.2, counsel of record for all parties

received timely notice of this filing. Amicus certifies that no party

or party’s counsel authored this brief in whole or in part and that

no party or party’s counsel made a monetary contribution

intended to fund the preparation or submission of this brief. No

person other than amicus or their counsel made a monetary

contribution to its preparation or submission.

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

Many parents feel compelled to represent a child’s

legal interests in court due to deeply held religious

beliefs. But the courts have disregarded this fact in

fashioning the “counsel mandate,” which broadly bans

non-attorney parents from representing their children

in legal proceedings. This Court should grant

certiorari and reaffirm that the Constitution protects

parents’ fundamental right to guide their children’s

upbringing, including how their children are

represented in legal matters.

ARGUMENT

I. The Counsel Mandate

Tramples Fundamental Rights

A. Parental Rights Are Fundamental

In a line of decisions beginning with Meyer v.

Nebraska, this Court has consistently underscored

that parental rights are among the core rights

enshrined in the federal Constitution, and that

parental rights are particularly durable when they

intersect with free-exercise claims.

1. In Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923),

this Court acknowledged that parents possess a

fundamental constitutional right to direct the

education and upbringing of their children. Meyer

established that “the liberty guaranteed . . . by the

Fourteenth Amendment . . . denotes . . . the right

of the individual . . . [to] bring up children, [and] to

worship God according to the dictates of his own

conscience.” Id. at 399. Additionally, Meyer made

clear that “this liberty may not be interfered with,

under the guise of protecting the public interest,

by legislative action which is arbitrary or without

reasonable relation to some purpose within the

competency of the State to effect.” Id. at 399–400.

Further, Meyer recognized that, “[c]orresponding

to the right of control, it is the natural duty of the

parent to give his children education suitable to

their station in life,” and that “the right of parents

to engage [educators] so to instruct their

children . . . [is] within the liberty of the

[Fourteenth] Amendment.” Id. at 400 (emphasis

added).

2. Likewise, in Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268

U.S. 510 (1925), this Court expressly held that the

Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment

protects “the liberty of parents and guardians to

direct the upbringing and education of children

under their control.” Id. at 534. In so holding that

“the education of children” is “a part of the[]

liberty” of “parents and guardians,” ibid., the

Pierce Court explained that the government’s

interest in ensuring that children are educated

does not grant the government the power to

eliminate all alternatives to public education, see

id. at 534–35.

Indeed, Pierce underscored parents’ decisional

autonomy when it noted that “[t]he child is not the

mere creature of the State; those who nurture him

and direct his destiny have the right, coupled with

the high duty, to recognize and prepare him for

additional obligations.” Id. at 535.

3. This Court consistently upheld these bedrock

principles in subsequent cases.

For example, in Prince v. Massachusetts, 321

U.S. 158 (1944), this Court announced the rigorous

standard that must be satisfied in order for the

government to intrude upon parents’ right to raise

their children in accordance with their religious

beliefs. Namely, “when state action impinges upon

a claimed religious freedom, it must fall unless

shown to be necessary for or conducive to the

child’s protection against some clear and present

danger.” Id. at 166.

Although Prince recognized some limits on

parental authority, importantly, it reaffirmed

“that the custody, care and nurture of the child

reside first in the parents, whose primary function

and freedom include preparation for obligations

the state can neither supply nor hinder.” Id. at 166.

Later, in Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205

(1972), this Court explained that parental

authority over children—particularly in the

context of religious exercise—generally trumps

competing government interests. In addition to

explicating the “fundamental interest of parents,

as contrasted with that of the State, to guide the

religious future and education of their children,”

Yoder stressed that parents, especially when

motivated by faith, enjoy the unrestricted

authority to make choices for their children, even

when those choices clash with compelling

government interests. See id. at 233 (“[W]hen the

interests of parenthood are combined with a free

exercise claim . . . , more than merely a reasonable

relation to some purpose within the competency of

the State is required to sustain the validity of the

State’s requirement under the First Amendment.”

(internal quotation marks omitted)).

Lastly, in Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57

(2000), this Court clarified that “the Due Process

Clause does not permit a State to infringe on the

fundamental right of parents to make child rearing

decisions simply because a . . . judge believes a

‘better’ decision could be made.” Id. at 72–73. This

is the case, Troxel noted, because “[t]he liberty

interest at issue . . . of parents in the care, custody,

and control of their children . . . is perhaps the

oldest of the fundamental liberty interests

recognized by this Court.” Id. at 65.

Hence, “[i]n light of this extensive precedent, it

cannot now be doubted that the Due Process

Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects the

fundamental right of parents to make decisions

concerning the care, custody, and control of their

children.” See id. at 66.

B. Proceeding Pro Se Is A Parenting Choice

A parent’s decision to represent his child in court

is not merely a hiring decision. Rather, it is an

extension of the constitutionally-protected parental

role.

Representing one’s child in legal proceedings is an

exercise of a parent’s right to ensure that his child’s

interests are properly protected; it directly involves

safeguarding a child’s rights and future opportunities.

It is thus a critical decision similar in kind to dictating

the contours of a child’s education, choosing medical

care for a child, and seeking custody of a child. Hence,

pro se representation by a parent of a child is part and

parcel of an “enduring American tradition,” Yoder,

406 U.S. at 232, namely, parents directing “the care,

custody, and control of their children,” Troxel, 530

U.S. at 65.

This Court affirmed in Troxel its recognition of the

principle—rooted in the common law—that parents

presumptively act in their child’s best interest when

making critical decisions, including medical decisions.

Similarly, a parent’s decision to advocate personally

on behalf of his child in court should receive the same

deference.

Unfortunately, that basic syllogism has not been

accepted by lower courts. See, e.g., Cheung v. Youth

Orchestra Foundation of Buffalo, Inc., 906 F.2d 59 (2d

Cir. 1990) (“There is nothing in the guardian-minor

relationship that suggests that the minor’s interests

would be furthered by representation by the nonattorney guardian.”). This, despite the fact a child’s

parents often best understand his unique needs and

circumstances, and are therefore best positioned to

advance his interests.2

2 It bears noting that parents may feel they have no choice but

to represent a child pro se because they do not trust an attorney

faithfully to represent the child’s best interests given attorneys’

ethical obligation to keep confidential (i.e., to exclude parents

from) case information and related communications with minor

clients. See Model Rules of Pro. Conduct 1.14(a) (“When a client’s

capacity to make adequately considered decisions in connection

As such, pro se representation by a parent of his

child is an act of direct involvement in the child’s

welfare and an exercise of the parent’s “high

duty . . . to recognize and prepare [his child] for

additional obligations.” See Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S.

584, 602 (1972) (quoting Pierce, 268 U.S. at 535).

Indeed, in Yoder, this Court explained that its prior

pronouncement of this “high duty” “must be read to

include the inculcation of moral standards, religious

beliefs, and elements of good citizenship.” 406 U.S. at

233. And a parent who guides a child through a legal

dispute stands as an example for that child of what it

means to advocate for another’s interests and pursue

justice, fairness, and equity on another’s behalf.

II. Pro Se Parent Representation

Is A Matter Of Religious Liberty

As noted above, Yoder confirmed that parents have

the right to make decisions regarding their children’s

upbringing based on deeply-held beliefs—particularly

religious convictions. Motivations for parents to

represent their children in court may stem from

beliefs about family, morality, and responsibility,

beliefs that themselves emanate from deeply-held

religious views. Amicus identifies below teachings

with

representation

diminished . . . because

minority, . . . the lawyer shall, as far as reasonably possible,

maintain a normal client-lawyer relationship with the client.”);

Model Rules of Pro. Conduct 1.6 (“A fundamental principle in the

client-lawyer relationship is that, in the absence of the client’s

informed consent, the lawyer must not reveal information

relating to the representation.”).

from different faiths that touch on such common

principles.

To begin, many faiths designate parents as their

children’s divinely-appointed guardians.3 In other

words, parents of faith are regarded as stewards

responsible for protecting their children’s wellbeing—including their children’s legal welfare.

Additionally, a ubiquitous element within

religious teachings is the pursuit of justice and

fairness.4 Parents of faith may believe they are

3 See, e.g., Proverbs 22:6 (“Train up a child in the way he should

go, and when he is old he will not depart from it.”); Surah AlAhqaf 46:15, Sahih International, https://quran.com/46/15 (“And

We have enjoined upon man, to his parents, good treatment. His

mother carried him with hardship and gave birth to him with

hardship, and his gestation and weaning [period] is thirty

months. [He grows] until, when he reaches maturity and reaches

[the age of] forty years, he says, ‘My Lord, enable me to be

grateful for Your favor which You have bestowed upon me and

upon my parents[.]’”).

4 See, e.g., Isaiah 1:17 (“Learn to do good; seek justice, correct

oppression; bring justice to the fatherless, plead the widow’s

case.”); Jeremiah 22:3 (“Thus says the Lord: Do justice and

righteousness, and deliver from the hand of the oppressor him

who has been robbed. And do no wrong or violence to the resident

alien, the fatherless, and the widow, nor shed innocent blood in

this place.”); Micah 6:8 (“He has shown you, O mortal, what is

good. And what does the Lord require of you? To act justly and to

love mercy and to walk humbly with your God.”); Surah AlMa’idah 5:8, Sahih International, https://quran.com/5/8 (“Do not

let the hatred of a people lead you to injustice. Be just! That is

closer to righteousness[.]”).

obligated to advocate for their children in court,

especially if they believe their children were wronged.

Relatedly, protecting children’s innocence is a core

tenet in many religions.5 Parents of faith may seek to

represent their children in court in order to shield

their children from environments or decisions they

view as harmful to their development. Indeed, here,

Petitioner La Dell Grizzell sought to represent her

children because she sought to shield them from an

educational environment she regarded as detrimental

to their development.

Finally, faiths frequently emphasize family unity

and communal responsibility.6 Many faiths encourage

parents to teach their children the distinction

5 See, e.g., Philippians 2:15–16 (“[S]o that you may become

blameless and pure, children of God without fault in a warped

and crooked generation.”) (internal quotation marks omitted);

Matthew 18:1–5 (“At that time the disciples came to Jesus and

asked, ‘Who, then, is the greatest in the kingdom of heaven?’ He

called a little child to him, and placed the child among them. And

he said: ‘Truly I tell you, unless you change and become like little

children, you will never enter the kingdom of heaven..”); Surah

Al-Isra 17:24, Sahih International, https://quran.com/17/24

(“And be humble with them out of mercy, and pray, ‘My Lord! Be

merciful to them as they raised me when I was young.’”).

6 See, e.g., Psalm 133:1 (“Behold, how good and pleasant it is

when brothers dwell in unity!”); 1 Corinthians 1:10 (“I appeal to

you, brothers and sisters, in the name of our Lord Jesus Christ,

that all of you agree with one another in what you say and that

there be no divisions among you, but that you be perfectly united

in mind and thought.”); Surah An-Nahl 16:72, Sahih

International, https://quran.com/16/72 (“And Allah has made for

you spouses of your own kind, and given you through your

spouses children and grandchildren[.]”).

between right and wrong.7 And in many faiths,

parents are regarded as the representatives of their

family in the broader community.8

III. Even A Legitimate

Governmental Interest Does

Not Outweigh This Fundamental Right

Even if the government has a legitimate interest in

ensuring competent representation, such an interest

does not outweigh parents’ fundamental right to

decide how their children’s interests are represented.

As noted above, in Prince, this Court explained that

if the government seeks to interfere with a faith-based

parental right consistent with the Constitution, it

must first demonstrate that its actions are narrowly

tailored to ensure “the child’s protection against some

clear and present danger.” 321 U.S. at 167.

But the government cannot proffer any “clear and

present danger” sufficient to justify a blanket

prohibition on pro se parent representation. Indeed, a

parent’s decision to represent his child in court poses

no threat of “jeopardiz[ing] the health or safety of the

child,” or of “materially detract[ing] from the welfare

of society.” Yoder, 406 U.S. at 234. And to the extent a

7 See, e.g., Deuteronomy 6:6–7 (“These commandments that I

give you today are to be on your hearts. Impress them on your

children[.]”); Ephesians 6:4 (“Fathers, do not exasperate your

children; instead, bring them up in the training and instruction

of the Lord.”).

8 See, e.g., 1 Timothy 5:8 (“Anyone who does not provide for their

relatives, and especially for their own household, has denied the

faith and is worse than an unbeliever.”).

parent turns out to lack the faculty to represent

competently his child in court, the court can mitigate

such concerns when they arise. There is no need for a

prophylactic bar.

Finally, because Yoder made clear that faith-based

parental

decision-making

receives

additional

insulation from governmental interference, parents

seeking to represent their children in court for faithbased reasons enjoy enhanced protections. Any

attempt to justify the judge-made ban on pro se parent

representation deserves heightened scrutiny in light

of Troxel’s skepticism toward judicial infringement

upon child-rearing decisions. 530 U.S. at 72–73.

CONCLUSION

The Court should grant the petition for a writ of

certiorari.

Respectfully submitted,