Respondents Brief — Enbridge Energy, LP, et al., Petitioners v. Dana Nessel, Attorney General of Michigan, on Behalf of the People of the State of Michigan

Supreme Court briefOct 14, 2025

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No. 24-783

In the Supreme Court of the United States

ENBRIDGE ENERGY, LP, ET AL., PETITIONERS

v.

DANA NESSEL, ATTORNEY GENERAL OF MICHIGAN, ON

BEHALF OF THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI

TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

BRIEF FOR RESPONDENT

DANA NESSEL

Michigan Attorney General

ANN M. SHERMAN

Michigan Solicitor General

Counsel of Record

CHRISTOPHER M. ALLEN

Assistant Solicitor General

KEITH D. UNDERKOFFLER

Assistant Attorney General,

Environment, Natural Resources & Agriculture Division

SPENCER D. SMITH

Special Assistant Attorney

General

P.O. Box 30212

Lansing, Michigan 48909

ShermanA@michigan.gov

(517) 335-7628

Attorneys for Respondent

i

QUESTION PRESENTED

Whether the 30-day removal deadline in 28 U.S.C.

§ 1446(b)(1) is subject to equitable tolling.

ii

PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDINGS

Petitioners Enbridge Energy, Limited Partnership, Enbridge Energy Company, Inc., and Enbridge

Energy Partners, L.P. (collectively, “Enbridge”) were

appellees in the court below.

Respondent Dana Nessel, Attorney General of the

State of Michigan, on behalf of the People of the State

of Michigan, was appellant in the court below.

iii

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Question Presented ...................................................... i

Parties to the Proceedings........................................... ii

Table of Contents........................................................ iii

Table of Authorities ..................................................... v

Statutory Provisions Involved..................................... 1

Introduction ................................................................. 2

Statement of the Case ................................................. 5

A. Statutory Framework ..................................... 5

B. Factual Background ....................................... 7

C. Procedural History ......................................... 9

D. Opinions Below ............................................. 15

Summary of Argument .............................................. 21

Argument ................................................................... 25

I.

No presumption of equitable tolling applies to

§ 1446(b)(1). ......................................................... 26

A. Section 1446(b)(1)’s removal deadline is

not a statute of limitations. .......................... 27

B. The context of removal underscores that

no presumption applies. ............................... 30

C. Federalism principles counsel against

expanding § 1446(b)(1)’s removal window

based on implied presumptions. .................. 32

II. Even if a presumption of equitable tolling

applied, the presumption would be rebutted. .... 33

iv

A. The text of § 1446(b)(1) creates a strict

requirement. ................................................. 34

B. The structure of the removal statute

precludes equitable tolling of § 1446(b)(1). .. 35

1. The removal statute contains six

express exceptions to § 1446(b)(1),

foreclosing additional, implied ones. ..... 36

2. Multiple exceptions account for

equitable concerns, strengthening the

structural inference that § 1446(b)(1)

is not subject to tolling. .......................... 42

C. Section 1446(b)(1)’s history and purpose

support the conclusion that Congress did

not intend equitable tolling. ......................... 44

1. The statutory history demonstrates

Congress’s deliberate decision to set a

fixed deadline for removal and to

specify any exceptions. ........................... 44

2. The purpose of § 1446(b)(1) is

furthered by enforcing it as written. ..... 48

D. This Court has long treated the removal

deadline as mandatory. ................................ 50

III. Even if § 1446(b)(1) were subject to equitable

tolling, this case would not remotely qualify. .... 53

Conclusion.................................................................. 55

Appendix — Relevant Statutory Provisions ............. 1a

v

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Page

Cases

Andrus v. Glover Constr. Co.,

446 U.S. 608 (1980) ............................................. 36

Arellano v. McDonough,

598 U.S. 1 (2023) .. 4, 27, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 40, 41,

42, 43, 49

Ayers v. Watson,

113 U.S. 594 (1885) ............................................. 51

Babbitt v. Clark,

103 U.S. 606 (1880) ............................................. 50

Balt. & Ohio R.R. Co. v. Burns,

124 U.S. 165 (1888) ............................................. 50

Bittner v. United States,

598 U.S. 85 (2023) ............................................... 39

Boechler, P.C. v. Comm’r of Internal Rev.,

596 U.S. 199 (2022) ................................. 28, 29, 42

Bowles v. Russell,

551 U.S. 205 (2007) ............................................. 31

Burt v. Titlow,

571 U.S. 12 (2013) ............................................... 29

Dean v. United States,

556 U.S. 568 (2009) ............................................. 26

Dubin v. United States,

599 U.S. 110 (2023) ............................................. 34

vi

Duncan v. Walker,

533 U.S. 167 (2001) ............................................. 43

Edrington v. Jefferson,

111 U.S. 770 (1884) ............................................. 51

Food Mktg. Inst. v. Argus Leader Media,

588 U.S. 427 (2019) ............................................. 26

Glass v. Goeckel,

703 N.W.2d 58 (Mich. 2005) ................................. 8

Gonzalez v. Thaler,

565 U.S. 134 (2012) ....................................... 25, 47

Grable & Sons Metal Products, Inc. v. Darue

Engineering & Manufacturing,

545 U.S. 308 (2005) ............................................. 13

Great N. R. Co. v. Alexander,

246 U.S. 276 (1918) ............................................. 32

Gregory v. Hartley,

113 U.S. 742 (1885) ............................................. 50

Hallstrom v. Tillamook,

493 U.S. 20 (1989) ................. 26, 27, 28, 29, 35, 54

Hamer v. Neighborhood Hous. Servs. of Chi.,

583 U.S. 17 (2017) ............................................... 25

Harrow v. Dep’t of Defense,

601 U.S. 480 (2024) ............................................. 33

Hillman v. Maretta,

569 U.S. 483 (2013) ............................................. 36

Holland v. Florida,

560 U.S. 631 (2010) ........................... 28, 29, 42, 53

vii

Hoyt v. Lane Constr. Co.,

927 F.3d 287 (5th Cir. 2019) ............................... 48

Idaho v. Coeur d’Alene Tribe of Ida.,

521 U.S. 261 (1997) ............................................... 8

Ill. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Illinois,

146 U.S. 387 (1892) ............................................... 8

Irwin v. Dep’t of Veterans Affairs,

498 U.S. 89 (1990) ......................................... 33, 43

John R. Sand & Gravel Co. v. United States,

552 U.S. 130 (2008) ....................................... 30, 33

Kan. City, Fort Scott & Memphis R.R. Co. v.

Daughtry,

138 U.S. 298 (1891) ............................................. 50

Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am.,

511 U.S. 375 (1994) ............................................. 21

Lozano v. Montoya Alvarez,

572 U.S. 1 (2014) ................................. 3, 26, 27, 28

Mackay v. Uinta Dev. Co.,

229 U.S. 173 (1913) ....................................... 31, 51

Manning v. Amy,

140 U.S. 137 (1891) ............................................. 48

Manrique v. United States,

581 U.S. 116 (2017) ............................................. 25

Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee,

14 U.S. 304 (1816) ......................................... 31, 50

Martin’s Adm’r v. Balt. & Ohio R.R. Co.,

151 U.S. 673 (1894) ............................................. 51

viii

McIntosh v. United States,

601 U.S. 330 (2024) ............................................. 25

McNeil v. United States,

508 U.S. 106 (1993) ............................................. 29

Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc. v.

Manning,

578 U.S. 374 (2016) ............................................. 32

Murphy Bros. v. Michetti Pipe Stringing, Inc.,

526 U.S. 344 (1999) ................................. 35, 46, 49

Nedtweg v. Wallace,

208 N.W. 51 (Mich. 1926)...................................... 8

Nutraceutical Corp. v. Lambert,

586 U.S. 188 (2019) ....................................... 25, 33

Oscar Mayer & Co. v. Evans,

441 U.S. 750 (1979) ............................................. 29

Phx. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Walrath,

117 U.S. 365 (1886) ............................................. 50

Powers v. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co.,

169 U.S. 92 (1898) ......................................... 51, 52

Pullman Palace Car Co. v. Speck,

113 U.S. 84 (1885) ................................... 45, 48, 51

Ross v. Blake,

578 U.S. 632 (2016) ....................................... 26, 34

Rotkiske v. Klemm,

589 U.S. 8 (2019) ................................................. 36

S. Pac. Co. v. Stewart,

245 U.S. 359 (1917) ....................................... 31, 51

ix

Sebelius v. Auburn Reg’l Med. Ctr.,

568 U.S. 145 (2013) ................................. 30, 33, 34

Shamrock Oil & Gas Corp. v. Sheets,

313 U.S. 100 (1941) ......................................... 2, 32

Snapper, Inc. v. Redan,

171 F.3d 1249 (11th Cir. 1999) ........................... 47

Syngenta Crop Prot., Inc. v. Henson,

537 U.S. 28 (2002) ............................................... 32

TRW Inc. v. Andrews,

534 U.S. 19 (2001) ......................................... 36, 43

United States v. Beggerly,

524 U.S. 38 (1998) ......................................... 42, 43

United States v. Brockamp,

519 U.S. 347 (1997) ............... 33, 35, 36, 40, 42, 49

United States v. Kubrick,

444 U.S. 111 (1979) ............................................. 29

Wilson v. Intercollegiate (Big Ten) Conference

Athletic Ass’n,

668 F.2d 962 (7th Cir. 1982) ......................... 48, 49

Young v. United States,

535 U.S. 43 (2002) ......................................... 27, 28

Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc.,

455 U.S. 385 (1982) ....................................... 28, 29

Statutes

9 U.S.C. § 205 .............................................................. 7

12 U.S.C. § 1819(b)(2)(B) ............................................. 7

28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) .................................................... 16

x

28 U.S.C. § 1441(d) ........................ 6, 23, 38, 40, 44, 49

28 U.S.C. § 1441(e) .............................................. 38, 40

28 U.S.C. § 1441(e)(1) ................................ 6, 23, 38, 44

28 U.S.C. § 1442a ............................................ 6, 23, 39

28 U.S.C. § 1446(a) ...................................................... 5

28 U.S.C. § 1446(b) .................................................... 35

28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(1) .... i, 2, 3, 4, 5, 15, 21, 23, 24, 25,

26, 28, 33, 34, 36, 37, 39, 40, 44

28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(2) ................................................ 40

28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(2)(A)–(C) .................................... 47

28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(2)(B) ....................................... 5, 37

28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(2)(C) ................................. 5, 23, 37

28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(3) .... 3, 5, 15, 17, 23, 37, 40, 43, 53

28 U.S.C. § 1446(c)(1) ...................................... 6, 38, 43

28 U.S.C. § 1446(c)(3)(B) ........................................... 38

28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) .................................................... 47

28 U.S.C. § 1453(b) ................................................ 6, 38

28 U.S.C. § 1454(b) .................................................... 40

28 U.S.C. § 1454(b)(2) .......................... 7, 23, 39, 44, 49

28 U.S.C. § 1455(b)(1) .................................... 39, 48, 49

28 U.S.C. § 2679(d)(2).................................................. 7

Act of July 27, 1886, 14 Stat. 306 ............................. 45

Act of Mar. 2, 1867, 14 Stat. 558............................... 45

Act of Mar. 3, 1875, § 3, 18 Stat. 470 ........................ 45

xi

Act of Mar. 3, 1887, § 3, 24 Stat. 552 ........................ 46

Act of Sept. 24, 1789, § 12, 1 Stat. 79 ....................... 45

Federal Courts Jurisdiction and Venue

Clarification Act of 2011, Pub. L. No. 112-63,

125 Stat. 758 (2011) ............................................ 35

Other Authorities

Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014) .................... 35

Merriam-Webster’s Dictionary and Thesaurus

(2007 ed.) ............................................................. 34

Charles Alan Wright,

Law of Federal Courts § 38 (8th ed. 2017) ......... 30

H.R. Rep. No. 10,

112th Cong., 1st Sess. (2011) .............................. 47

H.R. Rep. No. 132,

89th Cong, 1st Sess. (1965) ................................. 46

H.R. Rep. No. 1487,

94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976) ................................. 38

H.R. Rep. No. 352,

81st Cong., 1st Sess. (1949) ................................ 53

H.R. Rep. No. 889,

100th Cong., 2d Sess. (1988) ............. 39, 46, 47, 49

Rules

Mich. Ct. R. 2.116(C)(8) ............................................. 10

1

STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED

Relevant statutory provisions are reproduced in

an appendix to this brief. App., infra, 1a–12a.

2

INTRODUCTION

The Constitution reserves to States the power “to

provide for the determination of controversies in their

courts.” Shamrock Oil & Gas Corp. v. Sheets, 313 U.S.

100, 109 (1941). Because that power “may be restricted

only by the action of Congress,” federal courts must

“scrupulously confine” their exercise of power over

cases that began in state court “to the precise limits”

defined by statute. Id.

The federal removal statute provides a comprehensive scheme that governs this allocation of judicial

power. The basic rules are familiar: When state and

federal courts have concurrent jurisdiction, the plaintiff has the initial choice of forum. If the plaintiff

chooses state court, the defendant may seek removal.

But because of comity concerns raised by taking a case

from state court, the disruptive effect of changing forums midstream, and the risk of unfairness when removal is sought after substantial litigation (especially

after adverse rulings), Congress has always—since the

Judiciary Act of 1789—specified a deadline by which

removal must be sought. Over the years, this Court

has consistently held that when a defendant misses

that deadline, the removal effort fails and the case

must remain where it began.

Today, 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(1) supplies the deadline: A notice of removal “shall be filed within 30 days”

after the defendant receives the initial pleading or

summons, “whichever period is shorter.” The question

presented is whether district courts may equitably toll

that deadline. The answer is no.

3

Enbridge missed the statute’s 30-day removal

deadline by more than 850 days, seeking to remove

this case only after an adverse state-court ruling.

Enbridge attempted to excuse its tardiness by invoking a specific statutory exception, see 28 U.S.C.

§ 1446(b)(3), but the court below held that this exception did not apply—a ruling Enbridge no longer contests.

The district court seized jurisdiction over the case

anyway. It believed that, regardless of whether the removal statute’s requirements are met, a federal court

can divest a state court of jurisdiction at any time upon

a finding of “exceptional circumstances”—even though

the removal statute does not contain a single word to

that effect, and Congress alone may confer the power

to remove. The Sixth Circuit reversed, holding that

this judge-made exception cannot be squared with the

statute’s text and structure.

Now, Enbridge advances an argument it never

raised below: that a presumption of equitable tolling

applies to § 1446(b)(1)’s removal deadline and that the

presumption cannot be overcome. Enbridge’s argument fails twice over.

First, the presumption of equitable tolling applies

only to statutes of limitations, which § 1446(b)(1) is

not. The removal deadline is not triggered by the event

giving rise to a cause of action, and it does not set the

time for bringing an action or eliminate stale claims.

See Lozano v. Montoya Alvarez, 572 U.S. 1, 14 (2014).

Instead, it applies after an action has been brought,

and it serves systemic aims like judicial efficiency and

4

prompt resolution of forum issues. Further, the deadline governs the transfer of adjudicatory power from

state to federal court—a context that requires strict

construction, not atextual inquiries. Without any presumption, this case is easy: A court’s job is to apply the

statute as written, and § 1446(b)(1) sets a firm deadline in mandatory terms.

Second, even assuming a presumption applies, it

is rebutted. Text, structure, history, and purpose show

that § 1446(b)(1)’s 30-day deadline is not subject to equitable tolling. Here, statutory structure is especially

probative: The removal statute repeatedly cross-references § 1446 and provides numerous express exceptions to § 1446(b)(1)’s deadline (most of which

Enbridge ignores). Several of those exceptions account

for equitable considerations—including provisions authorizing courts to extend the deadline “for cause

shown” in specified settings—which “heightens the

structural inference” against reading an implied equitable tolling exception into the statute. Arellano v.

McDonough, 598 U.S. 1, 9 (2023).

This Court should affirm.

5

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

A. Statutory Framework

The law of removal is codified in 28 U.S.C.

§§ 1441–1455. The general authorization appears in

§ 1441(a): A defendant ordinarily may remove a civil

action from state to federal court if the federal courts

have original jurisdiction.

Section 1446 sets the procedure and default timing

for removal of a civil action. A defendant that desires

removal must file a notice “containing a short and

plain statement of the grounds for removal.” § 1446(a).

That notice “shall be filed within 30 days” after the defendant receives the initial pleading or summons,

“whichever period is shorter.” § 1446(b)(1).

In multidefendant cases, each defendant has its

own 30‑day window running from its receipt or service.

See § 1446(b)(2)(B) (cross-referencing § 1446(b)(1)).

But an earlier‑served defendant may consent to a

later‑served defendant’s timely removal “even though

that earlier-served defendant did not previously initiate or consent to removal” in time. § 1446(b)(2)(C).

Section 1446(b)(1)’s default 30-day deadline also

does not control if “the case stated by the initial pleading is not removable.” § 1446(b)(3). In that circumstance, the defendant may file a notice of removal

within 30 days after receiving “an amended pleading,

motion, order or other paper” from which removability

“may first be ascertained.” Id.

6

Congress has further specified the following timing rules to apply in particular circumstances:

•

Diversity cases. When removal rests on diversity jurisdiction and the case was not initially removable,

§ 1446(c)(1) bars removal more than one year after

the action’s commencement, subject to an express

bad-faith exception.

•

Class actions. Under the Class Action Fairness Act,

a class action “may be removed … in accordance

with section 1446,” but “the 1-year limitation under section 1446(c)(1) shall not apply.” § 1453(b).

•

Actions against foreign states. In suits removable

under § 1441(d), involving actions brought against

a foreign state, “the time limitations of section 1446(b) … may be enlarged at any time for

cause shown.” § 1441(d).

•

Multiparty, multiforum accidents. For certain

mass-accident cases, § 1441(e) provides that removal is “in accordance with section 1446,” but authorizes filing “within 30 days” after the defendant

first becomes a party to a related federal action or

“at a later time with leave of the district court.”

§ 1441(e)(1).

•

Suits involving members of the armed forces. Section 1442a permits removal “at any time before the

trial or final hearing” of covered proceedings

against members of the armed forces of the United

States. § 1442a.

7

•

Patent, plant variety protection, and copyright

cases. Section 1454(b) provides that removal shall

be “in accordance with section 1446,” but expressly

allows that “the time limitations contained in section 1446(b) may be extended at any time for cause

shown.” § 1454(b)(2).

Most of these provisions cross‑reference § 1446

and, in defined settings, either substitute a different

timing rule or authorize courts to enlarge the timing

requirements for good cause.

Outside the general removal statute, Congress has

also provided other, specific removal timelines. E.g.,

9 U.S.C. § 205 (authorizing removal of a civil action “at

any time before the trial thereof” when the action relates to an arbitration agreement or award falling under the Convention on the Recognition of Foreign Arbitral Awards); 12 U.S.C. § 1819(b)(2)(B) (authorizing

the FDIC to remove “any action, suit or proceeding”

within 90 days of becoming a party); 28 U.S.C.

§ 2679(d)(2) (authorizing removal “at any time before

trial” if the Attorney General certifies that the defendant was acting within the scope of his employment

with the United States).

B. Factual Background

The Straits of Mackinac lie at the center of the

Great Lakes. They link Lake Michigan and Lake Huron (which together hold nearly 8% of the world’s fresh

surface water) and separate Michigan’s Upper and

Lower Peninsulas. J.A. 27a–28a. The Straits are a hub

of tourism; recreation; commercial navigation; and

8

commercial, sport, and subsistence tribal fishing. J.A.

28a–29a.

When Michigan entered the Union in 1837, it acquired ownership of the lands beneath the Straits. See

Idaho v. Coeur d’Alene Tribe of Ida., 521 U.S. 261, 283

(1997); Nedtweg v. Wallace, 208 N.W. 51, 52 (Mich.

1926). Under “ancient doctrines,” these submerged

lands have “a unique status in the law” and are “infused with a public trust the State itself is bound to

respect.” Coeur d’Alene, 521 U.S. at 283–84. Michigan

must hold the bottomlands in trust for public uses

such as navigation, fishing, and recreation, and it may

not alienate them or otherwise authorize private uses

incompatible with the public’s superior rights. J.A.

29a–35a; see Glass v. Goeckel, 703 N.W.2d 58, 64–65

(Mich. 2005); Ill. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S.

387, 455–56 (1892).

Multiple shipping lanes converge in the Straits,

funneling domestic and international traffic through a

narrow corridor. J.A. 22a, 35a, 39a. Perpendicular to

that traffic, two 20-inch-diameter crude-oil pipelines—

installed by Enbridge’s predecessor in 1953 pursuant

to an easement granted by the Michigan Conservation

Commission—span roughly four miles of submerged

lands. J.A. 39a–40a. 1 Most of the pipelines are exposed, resting on the lakebed or suspended in the water column. J.A. 27a. Strong currents and erosion alter

1 These two, four-mile pipes are known as the “Straits Pipelines”;

the broader 645-mile pipeline route of which they are a part is

known as “Line 5.” J.A. 24a–27a. The Michigan Conservation

Commission is now known as the Michigan Department of Natural Resources (DNR).

9

the bottom contours, and exposed sections are vulnerable to anchor strikes and other hazards. J.A. 27a,

35a–42a.

Recent events underscore those risks. In 2010,

Enbridge’s Line 6B ruptured near Marshall, Michigan,

discharging crude oil into the Kalamazoo River watershed and causing extensive harm to state lands, waters, wildlife, and communities. It was the most expensive onshore oil spill in U.S. history, according to the

National Transportation Safety Board. J.A. 43a–44a.

And in 2018, an industrial barge inadvertently

dragged its 12,000-pound anchor across the Straits,

severing nearby electrical cables and damaging the

pipelines in three locations. J.A. 40a–41a. Although

the pipelines did not rupture, the incident heightened

concern about siting these exposed, aging lines across

a uniquely vulnerable, ecologically sensitive, and economically vital corridor.

C. Procedural History

1. Nessel v. Enbridge

On June 27, 2019, Michigan Attorney General

Dana Nessel filed this action on behalf of the People of

the State of Michigan against Enbridge in a Michigan

state court. J.A. 21a. The parties are not diverse, and

the claims arise solely under state law. J.A. 23a, 29a–

52a.

Count I alleges that the 1953 easement purporting

to authorize the Straits Pipelines to be sited on this

four-mile stretch of submerged land was void from its

10

inception and is subject to revocation under the statelaw public trust doctrine. J.A. 29a–50a. Count II alleges that the continued operation of the Straits Pipelines at their present location constitutes a public nuisance. J.A. 50a–51a. Count III alleges a violation of

Michigan’s Environmental Protection Act. J.A. 51a–

52a.

On September 16, 2019, Enbridge responded to

the complaint by filing a motion for summary disposition under Mich. Ct. R. 2.116(C)(8). J.A. 99a, 104a–

166a. It argued, among other things, that the public

trust claims were preempted by the federal Pipeline

Safety Act. J.A. 145a–155a. The Attorney General

filed a cross-motion for partial summary disposition on

one of her claims. J.A. 100a. Amicus briefs were submitted on both sides, and a three-hour hearing was

held on May 22, 2020. J.A. 85a, 170a–260a.

In advance of the hearing, the state court asked

the parties to be prepared to answer questions about

federal preemption. J.A. 167a–168a. Preemption issues, including Enbridge’s arguments under the Pipeline Safety Act and Submerged Lands Act, were a substantial focus of the oral argument, and the state court

permitted the parties to submit supplemental briefs

on those issues. J.A. 225a–236a, 244a–247a, 250a–

256a, 261a–282a.

On June 18, 2020, Enbridge disclosed that it had

to initiate an emergency shutdown because the Straits

Pipelines had been struck and damaged by an external

11

object for the second time in two years. J.A. 40a–41a. 2

The Attorney General sought a temporary restraining

order to prevent Enbridge from operating the pipelines

until the incident had been investigated, information

provided, and a restart approved by regulators. See supra note 2. Over Enbridge’s objection, the state court

granted the TRO. Id.; J.A. 67a–68a. The court closely

monitored the situation in the following weeks

through a series of hearings, status reports, and stipulations, tailoring the scope of the injunction through

multiple amended orders. See J.A. 60a–68a. The matter was fully resolved by stipulation on September 24,

2020, and pipeline operations resumed while the litigation continued. J.A. 60a.

2. Michigan v. Enbridge

On the same date the Attorney General’s lawsuit

was filed, Michigan Governor Gretchen Whitmer “directed the DNR to undertake a comprehensive review

of Enbridge’s compliance with the 1953 Easement.”

Gov. Dkt. 1-1, Ex. 2:2. 3 Following that review, the

2 See Press Release, Mich. Dep’t Att’y Gen., Judge Orders Line 5

to Cease Operations (June 25, 2020), https://www.michigan.gov/ag/news/press-releases/2020/06/25/judge-orders-line-5to-cease-operations.

3 Unless otherwise noted, “Dkt.” refers to the Sixth Circuit’s

docket in the case below, 6th Cir. No. 23-1671. “Dist. Dkt.” refers

to the district court’s docket in the case below, W.D. Mich. No.

1:21-cv-1057. And “Gov. Dkt.” refers the district court’s docket in

Michigan v. Enbridge, W.D. Mich. No. 1:20-cv-01142. Page cites

are to the document’s original page numbers, not the page numbers of the ECF header.

12

Governor 4 determined that Enbridge had committed

numerous breaches of the 1953 easement’s terms and

conditions. Id. at 11–17. She also agreed with the Attorney General’s claims that the easement should be

revoked on public-trust grounds. Id. at 2–9.

On November 13, 2020, the Governor issued a Notice of Revocation and Termination of Easement,

which informed Enbridge that the State was revoking

the easement on public-trust grounds, and, alternatively, terminating the easement for breach. Id. at 1–

20. The Governor filed a state-court lawsuit to enforce

the Notice, expecting that it would be consolidated

with the Attorney General’s action, in which the same

public-trust revocation issues were pending. Gov. Dkt.

1-1.

On November 24, 2020, however, Enbridge removed the Governor’s case to federal court. Gov.

Dkt. 1. Enbridge also filed a separate suit in federal

court asserting that the Notice of Revocation and Termination violated federal law. 5

As grounds for removing the Governor’s case,

Enbridge asserted that, although the parties were not

diverse and no element of any claim turned on federal

law, there was federal subject-matter jurisdiction under the doctrine of Grable & Sons Metal Products, Inc.

4 For consistency with the opinion below, this brief uses “the Governor” to refer collectively to the Governor and DNR Director;

“the Governor’s case” refers to Michigan v. Enbridge, W.D. Mich.

No. 1:20-cv-01142.

5 Enbridge v. Whitmer, No. 1:20-cv-01141, Dkt. 1 (W.D. Mich.

Nov. 24, 2020).

13

v. Darue Engineering & Manufacturing, 545 U.S. 308

(2005), because the complaint “necessarily raised” substantial questions regarding federal foreign affairs

powers, the 1977 U.S.-Canada Transit Pipelines

Treaty, the federal Pipeline Safety Act, and the federal

Submerged Lands Act. Gov. Dkt. 1:4–12. Enbridge

also alleged that there was federal jurisdiction under

the federal officer removal statute. Gov. Dkt. 1:5, 12–

13. Enbridge did not remove the Attorney General’s

“virtually identical lawsuit,” Pet. Br. 10, at that time.

On December 12, 2020, Enbridge filed an amended

notice of removal in the Governor’s case, adding more

grounds for federal jurisdiction, including that the

public-trust claims arose under federal common law.

Gov. Dkt. 12:3–11. Enbridge did not remove this suit

at that time either.

The Governor filed a motion to remand her case to

state court, disputing each of the jurisdictional theories Enbridge had advanced. Gov. Dkt. 41, 42. On January 15, 2021, the state court in this case convened a

status conference to address how the case should proceed given the parallel federal litigation. J.A. 59a. The

parties agreed to have this state-court case held in

abeyance pending a decision on the Governor’s motion

to remand. Id.

On November 16, 2021, the district court denied

the Governor’s motion. Gov. Dkt. 80. The district court

held that Grable jurisdiction existed because resolving

the Governor’s state-law claims would necessarily require interpreting the federal Pipeline Safety Act, the

federal Submerged Lands Act, and the 1977 Transit

14

Pipelines Treaty. Id. at 5–15. The Governor disagreed

with that ruling. But rather than challenge it or litigate overlapping claims in a different forum from the

Attorney General, the Governor voluntarily dismissed

her case on November 30, 2021, believing that doing

so would enable the Attorney General’s earlier-filed

case to resume. Gov. Dkt. 83.

The state court scheduled a status conference for

January 7, 2022, to discuss whether this case should

continue to be held in abeyance since the Governor’s

motion had been resolved. J.A. 58a. Before that status

conference could occur, Enbridge removed this case to

federal court. J.A. 1a–20a.

3. Removal of Nessel v. Enbridge and the

Attorney General’s Motion to Remand

Enbridge’s notice of removal was filed on December 15, 2021, J.A. 19a, approximately two and a half

years after Enbridge was served with the complaint,

and after the state court had received substantive

briefing on the merits, held multiple hearings, and issued a TRO over Enbridge’s objection.

Enbridge’s grounds for removal were “the same

grounds invoked when it removed the Governor’s

suit,” Pet. Br. 18, more than a year earlier: Grable, federal common law, and the federal officer removal statute, J.A. 9a–17a. As to timeliness, Enbridge asserted

that § 1446(b)(3) applied because Enbridge could not

have “ascertained” that this case was removable until

the district court denied the Governor’s motion to remand 29 days earlier. J.A. 8a–9a. Enbridge did not

15

rely on any equitable exception to the 30-day removal

deadline in § 1446(b)(1).

On January 14, 2022, the Attorney General filed a

timely motion to remand, arguing that Enbridge’s notice of removal was untimely under § 1446(b)(1), that

§ 1446(b)(3) did not apply, and that there was no federal subject-matter jurisdiction over the Attorney General’s state-law claims. Dist. Dkt. 10, 11:1–25.

Enbridge responded that the notice of removal was

timely under § 1446(b)(3) and that federal jurisdiction

existed for the same reasons set forth in the ruling in

the Governor’s case. Dist. Dkt. 20:1–25. Enbridge did

not ask the district court to excuse the 30-day deadline

on equitable grounds.

D. Opinions Below

1. The District Court’s Opinion

The district court denied the Attorney General’s

motion to remand. Pet. App. 26a–42a. The court based

its ruling on a ground that had not been briefed or argued: that § 1446(b)(1)’s 30-day removal deadline “is

overcome in exceptional circumstances, where overriding federal interests or compelling equitable considerations are evidenced.” Pet. App. 31a–32a. The district

court excused Enbridge’s noncompliance with the statutory removal deadline based on its view of several

factors. It emphasized the importance of the federal issues in the case and the desirability of having the Attorney General’s claims heard in the same forum as

Enbridge’s later-filed suit against the Governor. Pet.

App. 33a, 35a, 41a–42a. The court also described the

16

Attorney General’s act of seeking remand as “forum

manipulation,” even though the Attorney General

merely sought to return the case to the forum in which

it was brought over two years prior and had been litigated at length. Pet. App. 40a.

The district court refused to consider the subjectmatter jurisdiction issue, relying on its ruling in the

Governor’s case and holding that the Attorney General

was estopped from disputing that there was federal jurisdiction in this separate case. Pet. App. 38a–42a.

The Attorney General moved the district court to

certify its opinion for interlocutory appeal under 28

U.S.C. § 1292(b). Dist. Dkt. 24, 25:1–14. On February

17, 2023, after waiting approximately five months for

a ruling on that motion, the Attorney General petitioned the Sixth Circuit for a writ of mandamus. 6 The

next business day, the district court granted the motion and certified three issues for appeal: (1) whether

the 30-day removal period in § 1446(b)(1) is mandatory; (2) whether the district court’s order denying the

Governor’s motion for remand constituted an order

from which Enbridge could first ascertain that this

case was removable under § 1446(b)(3); and (3)

whether there is Grable jurisdiction over this case.

Pet. App. 44a. The Attorney General then filed a request for permission to appeal, which the Sixth Circuit

granted, simultaneously denying the petition for writ

of mandamus as moot. Pet. App. 46a–49a.

6 In re: Dana Nessel, 6th Cir. No. 23-1148, Dkt. 1.

17

2. The Sixth Circuit’s Opinion

The Sixth Circuit did not reach the issue of federal

subject-matter jurisdiction because it held that

Enbridge’s notice of removal was untimely under

§ 1446(b) and that the district court could not excuse

that mandatory requirement on atextual grounds. Pet.

App. 7a–8a, 24a.

The Sixth Circuit first noted that “Enbridge unquestionably did not comply with § 1446(b)(1)’s initial

30-day removal deadline,” “miss[ing] that deadline by

over two years.” Pet. App. 9a. The court of appeals

then observed that for § 1446(b)(3)’s later removal window to apply, Enbridge had to show three things: (1)

the case stated by the initial pleading was not removable; (2) something changed that “transformed this initially nonremovable case into one that was removable”; and (3) no more than 30 days before December 15,

2021—when the notice of removal was filed—

Enbridge received a document from which it could first

be ascertained that this case was removable. Pet. App.

10a. Enbridge’s attempt to invoke § 1446(b)(3), the

Sixth Circuit held, failed on the first and third elements. Pet. App. 14a.

As to the first element, Enbridge’s argument that

the case was not initially removable was belied by its

“own actions,” as Enbridge “offer[ed] no explanation

regarding how the Governor’s case could be removable

from its outset but this case was not.” Pet. App. 12a–

13a. “At oral argument, Enbridge argued (for the first

time)” that the Governor’s Notice of Revocation and

Termination had sparked a foreign-affairs controversy, making this case removable when it had not

18

been initially so. Pet. App. 13a. The problem, the Sixth

Circuit explained, was that “while this unpreserved

argument might explain how this case initially was

not removable and then later became so,” it “clashe[d]

with Enbridge’s argument about the first ‘paper’ it received that allowed it to ‘ascertain’ that this case had

become removable.” J.A. 13a (brackets omitted).

Enbridge filed its notice of removal within 30 days of

only one document: the district court’s order denying

remand in the Governor’s case. Canada’s interest in

the controversy came much earlier. 7 Thus, the Sixth

Circuit held, “Enbridge missed § 1446(b)(1)’s initial

window for removal, and to the extent § 1446(b)(3)’s

later removal window was ever open, Enbridge missed

that one too.” Pet. App. 17a.

Having found that there was no express statutory

authorization to remove this case on December 15,

2021, the Sixth Circuit turned to the district court’s

alternative rationale—that Enbridge could be allowed

to remove the case outside of the statutory timeframe

based on unwritten, equitable considerations. Pet.

App. 18a–24a. The court of appeals stated that while

§ 1446(b)’s time limits are not jurisdictional—an issue

neither party disputed—this “does not resolve the issue before us” because nonjurisdictional rules can be

mandatory and unalterable when timely raised. Pet.

App. 18a–19a. It was therefore necessary to determine

whether § 1446(b)’s “non-jurisdictional time limits are

7 Enbridge’s brief refers to a committee hearing that occurred on

March 4, 2021, a report issued in April 2021, a statement issued

on May 6, 2021, and another statement made on October 4, 2021.

Pet. Br. 11, 14–15 & nn. 6–8. All of those events occurred more

than 30 days prior to December 15, 2021.

19

mandatory and thus immune from equitable exceptions.” J.A. 20a.

To do this, the Sixth Circuit employed the “usual

tools of statutory construction … , focusing on whether

the statute as a whole allows flexibility for extra-textual exceptions.” Pet. App. 20a. The court held that it

did not, reasoning:

•

The statute’s text (“shall be filed within 30 days,”

followed by “whichever period is shorter”) suggests

“an intent for strict enforcement.” Pet. App. 20a.

•

The statute’s structure (containing a default rule

followed by “explicit exceptions—and carveouts

from those exceptions”) meant that the district

court’s approach required “adding a judicially

made exception to Congress’s detailed, express

scheme of exceptions and carveouts, an action the

Supreme Court has cautioned against.” Pet. App.

20a–22a.

•

The statutory context suggested strictness because

the removal deadline is nestled near jurisdictional

provisions and substantively “intertwined with

questions of whether and when the defendant had

grounds to argue for federal jurisdiction.” Pet. App.

22a.

•

Background principles militate against creating

extra-textual exceptions to the removal deadline,

as “[o]verwhelming authority provides that removal statutes—such as § 1446(b)—are to be

strictly construed against removal out of respect for

state sovereignty.” Pet. App. 22a.

20

•

Precedent pointed in the same direction, as courts

“have consistently rejected invitations to engraft

unwritten equitable exceptions into the removal

statute,” and the cases Enbridge cited to the contrary were distinguishable and not persuasive. Pet.

App. 24a; see also Br. in Opp. 11–15 (collecting

cases).

The Sixth Circuit concluded: “§ 1446(b)’s time limitations are mandatory. When invoked in a timely motion to remand, these limitations leave no room for equitable exceptions.” Pet. App. 24a.

Enbridge petitioned for en banc rehearing on the

issue of whether § 1446(b)(3) applied. Dkt. 55. The

Sixth Circuit denied that petition, with no judge voting

to rehear the case. Pet. App. 50a.

21

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

Federal district courts “possess only that power

authorized by Constitution and statute, which is not

to be expanded by judicial decree.” Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994) (internal citations omitted). Nothing in the Constitution

or any statute expressly authorizes district courts to

permit the removal of a state court lawsuit after the

statutory deadline has passed.

Enbridge argues that express authorization is not

necessary for removal here because this Court should

presume that district courts have implied authority to

permit untimely removals. That argument fails for

three reasons.

First, no presumption of equitable tolling applies

to § 1446(b)(1). The traditional practice of equitable

tolling applies only to statutes of limitations, which

begin to run when a plaintiff’s cause of action accrues

and prevent the plaintiff from bringing its claim after

too long has passed. Such limitations periods protect

defendants from stale claims and provide certainty

about potential liabilities. But strictly enforcing statutes of limitations can entail harsh results, preventing

claimants from seeking judicial relief solely due to the

passage of time. So, courts have historically allowed

equitable exceptions when necessary to further the interests of justice.

The removal deadline is not a statute of limitations. It does not begin to run when a plaintiff’s cause

of action accrues, does not prevent a plaintiff from

seeking judicial relief after a designated time period

22

has passed, and has nothing to do with protecting defendants from stale claims. Instead, it relates to a forum issue that arises only after a claim for relief has

been brought. Enforcing the removal deadline does not

bar a claimant from seeking judicial relief; it merely

ensures the dispute is decided in the plaintiff’s chosen

forum. Because there is no traditional practice of equitably tolling such deadlines, no presumption applies.

The context of removal further supports this conclusion. This Court has been more willing to apply a

presumption of equitable tolling in contexts that are

uniquely protective of claimants and where laypersons

rather than trained lawyers file claims. But the Court

has been less likely to indulge the presumption where,

as here, a deadline serves not to protect defendants

from stale claims but to achieve system-related goals

related to judicial efficiency and claims administration. The removal deadline arises in the context of ordinary civil litigation, and it governs the transfer of

jurisdiction from one court to another. In this setting,

strictness—not flexibility—should be presumed.

Relying on a presumption in this context also runs

counter to federalism principles. This Court has repeatedly held that removal statutes must be strictly

construed out of respect for state sovereignty. Only

Congress can authorize the removal of a case from a

state court of concurrent jurisdiction. Where Congress

has not expressly done so, federal courts cannot assert

implied authority to interfere with state proceedings.

Without the presumption on which Enbridge so

heavily relies, this is an easy case: The removal statute

23

prescribes a strict time limit using mandatory language, and its express requirement should be enforced

as written.

Second, even if the Court were to begin with a

presumption of equitable tolling, the presumption

would be rebutted. The text, structure, history, and

purpose of the removal deadline foreclose adding an

implied equitable tolling provision.

The text of § 1446(b)(1) creates a strict requirement. Congress used the mandatory word “shall” and

designated timely removal as a “requirement.” And

the statute prescribes the “shorter” of two alternative

deadlines, suggesting an intent for strict enforcement.

The structure of the removal statute further establishes that Congress did not intend to permit equitable

tolling of § 1446(b)(1). The statute contains at least six

express exceptions to § 1446(b)(1)—§§ 1446(b)(2)(C),

1446(b)(3),

1441(d),

1441(e)(1),

1442a,

and

1454(b)(2)—foreclosing additional, implied ones. In

specifying these exceptions, Congress considered equitable factors (even permitting extensions “for cause

shown” or “with leave of the district court” in particular situations) and limited the relief available, demonstrating that it did not want courts to toll the deadline

outside those parameters.

The statutory history also shows Congress’s deliberate decision to set a fixed deadline for removal and

to specify any exceptions. The current 30-day limit is

the result of trial and error over the past 235 years,

with Congress carefully balancing competing values

and interests in our dual state-federal system.

24

Through several successive acts, Congress has assumed responsibility for articulating uniform rules

that govern when late removal may be sought, rather

than delegating that task for courts to determine on a

case-by-case basis.

The purposes of § 1446(b)(1) likewise support the

conclusion that it is not subject to equitable tolling.

Congress intended for removal to be sought as early as

possible in the proceedings—certainly not two and a

half years into them—to limit forum manipulation by

defendants; minimize waste of judicial resources; and

achieve nationwide uniformity. Applying the removal

deadline as written furthers each of these objectives.

Third, even if § 1446(b)(1)’s removal deadline

were amenable to equitable tolling, this case would not

remotely qualify for it. Equitable tolling applies only

when a claimant diligently pursues its rights and an

extraordinary circumstance prevents a timely filing.

Here, nothing of the sort occurred: No extraordinary

circumstance prevented Enbridge from filing a notice

of removal when it first raised its federal preemption

arguments in September 2019 or, at a minimum, when

it removed the Governor’s “virtually identical” case in

November 2020 based on the “same grounds” it invoked here. Pet. Br. 10, 18. Thus, even if the Court

were to find that a presumption of equitable tolling applies and is not overcome by the statute’s text, structure, history, and purpose, tolling would still be unavailable and Enbridge’s removal untimely.

25

ARGUMENT

“This Court has identified three types of time limits: (1) jurisdictional deadlines; (2) mandatory claimprocessing rules; and (3) time-related directives.”

McIntosh v. United States, 601 U.S. 330, 337 (2024).

The 30-day limit contained in 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(1) is

not jurisdictional. 8 Therefore, it need not be policed by

courts sua sponte and is subject to forfeiture if not

timely raised in a motion to remand. See Hamer v.

Neighborhood Hous. Servs. of Chi., 583 U.S. 17, 19

(2017).

But “calling a rule nonjurisdictional does not mean

that it is not mandatory or that a timely objection can

be ignored.” Gonzalez v. Thaler, 565 U.S. 134, 146

(2012). Some nonjurisdictional rules are “mandatory,”

meaning “they are ‘unalterable’ if properly raised by

an opposing party.” Nutraceutical, 586 U.S. at 192

(quoting Manrique v. United States, 581 U.S. 116, 121

(2017)). When the opposing party “alerts the court to

the deadline and invokes its protection,” as the Attorney General did here, “the relevant action cannot be

taken after the deadline has passed.” McIntosh, 601

U.S. at 337.

Because the requirements for removal are statutory, “Congress sets the rules—and courts have a role

8 Enbridge argues this point, but it is not in dispute. The court of

appeals held that § 1446(b)(1) is nonjurisdictional, Pet. App. 19a,

and the Attorney General did not argue otherwise below. In any

event, “[w]hether a rule precludes equitable tolling turns not on

its jurisdictional character but rather on whether the text of the

rule leaves room for such flexibility.” Nutraceutical Corp. v. Lambert, 586 U.S. 188, 192 (2019).

26

in creating exceptions only if Congress wants them to.”

Ross v. Blake, 578 U.S. 632, 639 (2016). Courts “are

not at liberty to create an exception where Congress

has declined to do so.” Hallstrom v. Tillamook, 493

U.S. 20, 27 (1989). Whether § 1446(b)(1) is mandatory

or subject to equitable tolling is therefore “fundamentally a question of statutory intent.” Lozano, 572 U.S.

at 10.

As shown below, Congress intended the 30-day removal deadline to be mandatory and not subject to equitable tolling. Congress did not expressly authorize

equitable tolling in § 1446(b)(1). The provision thus is

not subject to equitable tolling unless a background

presumption of equitable tolling applies and is not inconsistent with the statute’s text and design. But no

such presumption applies here; and even if it did, the

presumption is overcome.

I.

No presumption of equitable tolling applies

to § 1446(b)(1).

“In statutory interpretation disputes, a court’s

proper starting point lies in a careful examination of

the ordinary meaning and structure of the law itself.”

Food Mktg. Inst. v. Argus Leader Media, 588 U.S. 427,

436 (2019) (citation omitted). When a statute’s text

and structure are clear, “judges must stop,” id., and

“resist reading words … into a statute that do not appear on its face,” Dean v. United States, 556 U.S. 568,

572 (2009) (cleaned up).

Enbridge advocates a different approach, beginning not with the statute’s text and structure, but with

27

a presumption of equitable tolling. Such a starting

point works only where “a long-established feature of

American jurisprudence” allows courts to presume

that Congress left in place a common-law adjudicatory

principle. Lozano, 572 U.S. at 10. It does not work

here.

Equitable tolling “is a traditional feature of American jurisprudence and a background principle against

which Congress drafts limitations periods.” Arellano,

598 U.S. at 6. Accordingly, this Court “presume[s] that

federal statutes of limitations are subject to equitable

tolling.” Id. But the Court has “only applied that presumption to statutes of limitations.” Lozano, 572 U.S.

at 13–14; see Hallstrom, 493 U.S. at 27 (holding that

a 60-day notice provision that did not function as a

statute of limitations was not subject to equitable tolling). Because § 1446(b)(1)’s removal deadline is not a

statute of limitations, no presumption of equitable tolling applies, and a court may not read an atextual exception into the statute. The removal context and federalism principles confirm that result.

A. Section 1446(b)(1)’s removal deadline is

not a statute of limitations.

Whether a time limit “is a statute of limitations

depends on its functional characteristics.” Lozano, 572

U.S. at 15 n.6. Statutes of limitations “establish the

period of time within which a claimant must bring an

action.” Id. at 14 (citation omitted); see Young v.

United States, 535 U.S. 43, 47–48 (2002) (citation

omitted) (explaining that limitations periods “prescribe[] a period within which certain rights … may be

28

enforced” and “define a subset of claims eligible for certain remedies”). They are triggered by the event giving

rise to the cause of action, Hallstrom, 493 U.S. at 27;

“characteristically embody a policy of repose, designed

to protect defendants”; and “foster the elimination of

stale claims, and certainty about a plaintiff’s opportunity for recovery and a defendant’s potential liabilities,” Lozano, 572 U.S. at 14 (cleaned up). This Court

applies a presumption of equitable tolling only “if the

period in question is a statute of limitations” based on

these functional traits. Id. at 11. 9

Section 1446(b)(1) possesses none of these traits.

The 30-day removal deadline does not apply to plaintiffs at all, let alone bar them from bringing a claim for

relief after a certain period. It is not triggered by the

event giving rise to the cause of action, does not protect

the defendant from stale claims, and does not define a

subset of claims eligible for judicial remedies. Instead,

removal is a forum issue that arises only after a claim

for relief has been brought.

Because § 1446(b)(1) does not function as a statute

of limitations, the concerns that call for the availability of equitable tolling are absent. Strictly applying a

9 E.g., Boechler, P.C. v. Comm’r of Internal Rev., 596 U.S. 199,

209–11 (2022) (deadline to seek judicial review of agency action);

Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 645–46 (2010) (deadline to seek

habeas relief); Young, 535 U.S. at 47 (2002) (three-year lookback

period that “serves the same ‘basic policies’ ” as a statute of limitations: “repose, elimination of stale claims, and certainty about

a plaintiff’s opportunity for recovery” (citation omitted)); Zipes v.

Trans World Airlines, Inc., 455 U.S. 385, 394 (1982) (citation

omitted) (Title VII deadline adopted to “prevent[] the pressing of

‘stale’ claims, the end served by a statute of limitations”).

29

statute of limitations can result in “the potentially

harsh consequence of barring a meritorious claim before the plaintiff has a reasonable chance to assert his

legal rights.” United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111,

126 (1979) (Stevens, J., dissenting). But strictly enforcing the removal deadline does not have this consequence. The litigation simply remains in the plaintiff’s

chosen forum—hardly the sort of severe result that

warrants judicial deviation from statutory text. Arguing otherwise would be inconsistent with “a foundational principle of our federal system: State courts are

adequate forums for the vindication of federal rights.”

Burt v. Titlow, 571 U.S. 12, 19 (2013).

Moreover, this Court has been most willing to apply a presumption of equitable tolling when a statute

of limitations appears in an “unusually protective”

statutory scheme in which “laymen, unassisted by

trained lawyers,” often “initiate the process.” Boechler,

596 U.S. at 209 (cleaned up) (tax filings); see also, e.g.,

Holland, 560 U.S. at 653 (habeas); Zipes, 455 U.S. at

397 (Title VII); Oscar Mayer & Co. v. Evans, 441 U.S.

750, 761 (1979) (ADEA). That makes sense because,

when the potentially harsh consequence of enforcing a

statute of limitations is combined with the unique equitable concerns that arise in pro se contexts, there are

strong reasons to think Congress left some flexibility

to courts. The removal deadline, by contrast, arises in

the context of ordinary civil litigation, and notices of

removal are “generally filed by trained lawyers who

are presumed to be aware of statutory requirements.”

Hallstrom, 493 U.S. at 28; see also McNeil v. United

States, 508 U.S. 106, 113 (1993) (“Our rules of procedure are based on the assumption that litigation is

30

normally conducted by lawyers.”); Sebelius v. Auburn

Reg’l Med. Ctr., 568 U.S. 145, 158–60 (2013) (rejecting

equitable tolling where a time limit was not a statute

of limitations and the statute was not remedial).

By asking this Court to presume equitable tolling

here, Enbridge invites the Court to extend the doctrine

beyond its traditional confines and to deviate from the

statute’s express requirements where the concerns

that animated the common-law doctrine do not apply.

The Court should decline that invitation.

B. The context of removal underscores that

no presumption applies.

When a time limit does not “seek primarily to protect defendants against stale or unduly delayed

claims,” but instead “seeks to achieve a broader system-related goal, such as facilitating the administration of claims … or promoting judicial efficiency,” equitable tolling is likely to be inapt. John R. Sand &

Gravel Co. v. United States, 552 U.S. 130, 133–34

(2008) (citations omitted). The removal deadline fits

comfortably in this latter category.

“The right to remove a case from state to federal

court is purely statutory, being dependent on the will

of Congress.” Charles Alan Wright, Law of Federal

Courts § 38, p. 203 (8th ed. 2017). The procedure is

“quite anomalous” and was “unknown to the common

law.” Id. Placing a time limit on the exercise of this

procedural right serves institutional interests in judicial efficiency and ensures that forum issues are

promptly decided. See infra II.C.2.

31

This Court has long analogized the transfer of jurisdiction from state to federal court to the transfer of

jurisdiction from trial to appellate court. E.g., Martin

v. Hunter’s Lessee, 14 U.S. 304, 349 (1816). And time

prescriptions governing the transfer from one Article

III court to another are jurisdictional because only

Congress “can … determine when, and under what

conditions” federal courts can hear cases. Bowles v.

Russell, 551 U.S. 205, 212–13 (2007).

The Court in past cases has strictly enforced the

removal deadline, holding that “[i]t is essential to the

removal of a cause that the petition, provided for by

the statute, be filed … within the time fixed by statute,

unless the time be in some manner waived.” S. Pac.

Co. v. Stewart, 245 U.S. 359, 363 (1917) (citation omitted), vacated on other grounds, 245 U.S. 562 (1918);

see also infra II.D. Similar to a notice of appeal and

other forms of process required to invoke a federal

court’s jurisdiction, “the litigant has the right to rely

upon the statute, and to insist that, in compliance with

its terms, the case shall be taken from the state to the

Federal court … at the proper time.” Mackay v. Uinta

Dev. Co., 229 U.S. 173, 176 (1913).

If anything, that’s the tradition Congress had in

mind when it enacted the current version of the removal statute—one of strictly enforcing the removal

deadline, not equitably tolling it.

32

C. Federalism principles counsel against

expanding § 1446(b)(1)’s removal window

based on implied presumptions.

Principles of federalism also require strict construction of the removal deadline. “Out of respect for

state courts, this Court has time and again declined to

construe federal jurisdictional statutes more expansively than their language, most fairly read, requires.”

Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc. v. Manning, 578 U.S. 374, 389 (2016). And it has “reiterated

the need to give due regard to the rightful independence of state governments—and more particularly, to

the power of the States to provide for the determination of controversies in their courts.” Id. (cleaned up).

This sovereign state power “may be restricted only

by the action of Congress in conformity to the Judiciary Articles of the Constitution.” Shamrock Oil, 313

U.S. at 108–09. So “a suit commenced in a state court

must remain there until cause is shown for its transfer

under some act of Congress.” Syngenta Crop Prot., Inc.

v. Henson, 537 U.S. 28, 32 (2002) (quoting Great N. R.

Co. v. Alexander, 246 U.S. 276, 280 (1918)). Courts

must be mindful of Congress’s role in “regulating the

jurisdiction of federal courts,” Shamrock, 313 U.S. at

108, and “statutory procedures for removal are to be

strictly construed,” Syngenta, 537 U.S. at 32.

Enbridge’s presumption-first approach to construing the removal statute is fundamentally at odds with

this principle. As the court below correctly recognized,

reading implied, equitable exceptions into the removal

statute is “incompatible with a strict construction of

§ 1446(b).” Pet. App. 23a.

33

II. Even if a presumption of equitable tolling

applied, the presumption would be rebutted.

If the Court starts with the statute’s text and

structure, rather than a presumption, this case is

straightforward: § 1446(b)(1) sets a firm deadline using mandatory language, and a court’s duty is to apply

the statute as written. But even assuming arguendo

that a presumption of equitable tolling applies, the

“presumption is rebutted if ‘there [is] good reason to

believe that Congress did not want the equitable tolling doctrine to apply.’ ” Arellano, 598 U.S. at 7 (quoting United States v. Brockamp, 519 U.S. 347, 350

(1997)). 10 Here, there is “very good reason” to so

10 Enbridge at times suggests there exists a clear statement rule

that must be met to rebut the presumption of equitable tolling.

See, e.g., Pet. Br. 45. That is incorrect. While a clear statement is

required to treat a procedural requirement as jurisdictional, see,

e.g., Harrow v. Dep’t of Defense, 601 U.S. 480, 484 (2024), the

standard to rebut the presumption of equitable tolling is the one

that this Court applied in Arellano and that the Sixth Circuit applied below: whether “there [is] good reason to believe that Congress did not want the equitable tolling doctrine to apply.” Arellano, 598 U.S. at 7 (quoting Brockamp, 519 U.S. at 350); accord

Pet. App. 20a; see also John R. Sand & Gravel Co., 552 U.S. at

137–38 (explaining that the presumption of Irwin v. Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, 498 U.S. 89 (1990) is “rebuttable,” “not conclusive,”

and that “statutory language” can “rebut the presumption by

demonstrating Congress’s intent to the contrary” (emphasis in

original)). The Court answers that question using traditional

tools of statutory construction. See Arellano, 598 U.S. at 8–12 (rejecting equitable tolling based on text and structure); Brockamp,

519 U.S. at 350–54 (rejecting equitable tolling based on text,

structure, purpose, and history); Auburn Reg’l, 568 U.S. at 159

(rejecting equitable tolling based on text, context, purpose, and

history). Although Nutraceutical spoke of “clear intent,” it used

34

believe. Id. The text, structure, history, and purpose of

the statute, as well as this Court’s precedent, demonstrate that § 1446(b)(1) is mandatory and not subject

to equitable tolling.

A. The text of § 1446(b)(1) creates a strict

requirement.

“Start with the text.” Arellano, 598 U.S. at 8. Section 1446(b)(1) provides that a notice of removal “shall

be filed within 30 days.” 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(1). “[T]he

mandatory ‘shall’ normally creates an obligation impervious to judicial discretion.” Ross, 578 U.S. at 639

(cleaned up). Although the use of “shall” does not necessarily make a time limitation jurisdictional, Auburn

Reg’l, 568 U.S. at 155, when Congress uses “that mandatory language” in a statutory requirement, as here,

a court ordinarily “may not excuse [the requirement],

even to take [special] circumstances into account,”

Ross, 578 U.S. at 639.

The surrounding textual cues reinforce that understanding. Congress located § 1446(b)(1) under the

heading “REQUIREMENTS; GENERALLY,” § 1446(b), and

this heading can inform the interpretation of the provision, see Dubin v. United States, 599 U.S. 110, 120–

21 (2023). A “requirement” means “something (as a

condition or quality) required”—that is, “something

wanted or needed: NECESSITY.” Requirement, Merriam-Webster’s Dictionary and Thesaurus 687 (2007

ed.); accord Requirement, Black’s Law Dictionary

that phrase to refer to a sufficient, not a necessary, condition. 586

U.S. at 192–93.

35

(10th ed. 2014) (“Something that must be done because

of a law or rule; something legally imposed, called for,

or demanded; an imperative command.”). 11 The operative sentence also directs courts to use the earlier of

two possible events—receipt of the initial pleading or

service of summons—“whichever period is shorter,”

§ 1446(b)(1), a phrase that suggests “an intent for

strict enforcement,” Pet. App. 20a. 12

This textual evidence indicates that Congress intended the 30-day deadline to operate as a strict requirement, or “mandatory condition[] precedent,” for

removal, which “a district court may not disregard” at

its discretion. Hallstrom, 493 U.S. at 31.

B. The structure of the removal statute

precludes

equitable

tolling

of

§ 1446(b)(1).

To determine whether the presumption of equitable tolling is overcome, this Court has paid special attention to the structure of the law crafted by Congress.

Arellano, 598 U.S. at 8–11; Brockamp, 519 U.S. at

11 The word “REQUIREMENTS” was added to 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)

by the Federal Courts Jurisdiction and Venue Clarification Act of

2011, Pub. L. No. 112-63, 125 Stat. 758 (2011).

12 Enbridge notes that Congress added this phrase to address

“atypical state commencement and complaint filing procedures.”

Murphy Bros. v. Michetti Pipe Stringing, Inc., 526 U.S. 344, 351–

53 & n.4 (1999); Pet. Br. 46. Nevertheless, as the court of appeals

and Enbridge’s amicus point out, the phrase’s language suggests

strictness, see Pet. App. 20a; Br. of Prof. Arthur R. Miller as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petrs. 6. Congress told courts to start

the clock as soon as a defendant could seek removal—not to extend it after it expires.

36

351–52. Indeed, the Court has cautioned against reading statutory language in isolation, particularly where

the statute’s provisions work together or cross-reference each other. Arellano, 598 U.S. at 12.

Here, the structure of the federal removal statute

establishes that § 1446(b)(1) is not subject to equitable

tolling. In 28 U.S.C. §§ 1441–1455, Congress repeatedly cross-referenced § 1446’s requirements and specified at least six express exceptions to § 1446(b)(1)’s default 30-day time limit (and, in places, exceptions to

those exceptions). “Atextual judicial supplementation”

is inappropriate where, as here, “Congress has shown

that it knows how to adopt the omitted language or

provision.” Rotkiske v. Klemm, 589 U.S. 8, 14 (2019).

In addition, several of these “specific exceptions” account for equitable factors, which “heightens the structural inference” that § 1446(b)(1) may not be tolled.

Arellano, 598 U.S. at 9.

1. The removal statute contains six express

exceptions to § 1446(b)(1), foreclosing

additional, implied ones.

“Where Congress explicitly enumerates certain exceptions to a general [requirement], additional exceptions are not to be implied.” TRW Inc. v. Andrews, 534

U.S. 19, 28 (2001) (quoting Andrus v. Glover Constr.

Co., 446 U.S. 608, 616–17 (1980)); accord Hillman v.

Maretta, 569 U.S. 483, 496 (2013). This Court has refused to read equitable exceptions into detailed statutes that reiterated basic time limits multiple times

and made express exceptions in specified circumstances. See Brockamp, 519 U.S. at 350–52 (declining

37

to infer equitable tolling where a statute set forth time

limits “in a highly detailed technical manner,” repeated them “several times,” and included “explicit exceptions” that omitted tolling); Arellano, 598 U.S. at 8

(rejecting tolling where a statute included express exceptions “and equitable tolling [wa]s not on the list”).

The removal statute, which reiterates § 1446(b)’s time

limits multiple times and contains a detailed scheme

of exceptions and carveouts, dictates the same result.

Section 1446(b)(1) sets the default rule for removal

of civil actions: a notice of removal “shall be filed

within 30 days” after receipt of the initial pleading or

summons. If those documents are received at different

times, the relevant deadline is “whichever period is

shorter.” § 1446(b)(1).

Two exceptions to that default rule appear in

§ 1446(b) itself. First, subsection (b)(2)(B), which expressly cross-references subsection (b)(1), explains

that the usual 30-day deadline applies to each defendant in a multidefendant case. Subsection (b)(2)(C),

however, creates an exception: “If defendants are

served at different times,” an earlier-served defendant

may consent to a later-served defendant’s removal,

“even though that earlier-served defendant did not

previously initiate or consent to removal” within its

typical 30-day window.

Second, § 1446(b)(3) creates another exception to

(b)(1): “[I]f the case stated by the initial pleading is not

removable,” the removal period extends until “thirty

days after receipt … of a copy of an amended pleading,

motion, order or other paper from which it may first be

38

ascertained that the case is one which is or has become

removable.” This exception has its own caveat, though,

contained in § 1446(c)(1): “A case may not be removed

under subsection (b)(3) on the basis of [diversity] jurisdiction … more than 1 year after commencement of the

action.” But that caveat does not apply if “the district

court finds that the plaintiff has acted in bad faith in

order to prevent a defendant from removing the action.” § 1446(c)(1); see also § 1446(c)(3)(B) (“bad faith”

includes “deliberately fail[ing] to disclose the actual

amount in controversy to prevent removal”). 13

Four more exceptions—exceptions three through

six—appear elsewhere in the removal statute:

Third, § 1441(d) provides that for civil actions

against foreign states, “the time limitations of section

1446(b) of this chapter may be enlarged at any time for

cause shown.” This exception was added due to Congress’s “preference that actions involving foreign

states be tried in federal courts.” H.R. Rep. No. 1487,

94th Cong., 2d Sess. 32 (1976).

Fourth, § 1441(e) also references § 1446, clarifying

that for civil cases arising from certain mass accidents,

removal “shall be made in accordance with section

1446 of this title, except that a notice of removal may

also be filed … within 30 days after the date on which

the defendant first becomes a party to [a covered action], or at a later time with leave of the district court.”

§ 1441(e)(1) (emphasis added). This exception

13 Yet another carveout appears in § 1453, which expressly incor-

porates § 1446 for class action removals, “except that the 1-year

limitation under section 1446(c)(1) shall not apply.” § 1453(b).

39

authorizes district courts to extend the removal deadline “because consolidated adjudication of mass tort

cases may further important systemic interests.” H.R.

Rep. No. 889, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 42 (1988).

Fifth, § 1442a permits the removal of certain civil

actions “against a member of the armed forces of the

United States” “at any time before the trial or final

hearing thereof.” § 1442a. Without this exception, a

civil suit of this kind would be subject to the default

removal deadline in § 1446(b)(1).

Sixth, § 1454(b) provides that the removal of civil

actions asserting patent, plant variety protection, or

copyright claims shall be “in accordance with section

1446, except that if the removal is based solely on this

section … the time limitations contained in section

1446(b) may be extended at any time for cause shown.”

§ 1454(b)(2) (emphasis added). Once more, a reiteration of the default rule, an express exception, and a

clear statutory authorization for a court to extend the

deadline “for cause shown.” 14

14 Although not an exception to § 1446(b)(1), which applies only

in civil cases, the procedure for criminal removal in § 1455 further demonstrates that Congress knows how to grant courts authority to extend removal deadlines when it wants: “A notice of

removal of a criminal prosecution shall be filed not later than 30

days after the arraignment in the State court, or at any time before trial, whichever is earlier, except that for good cause shown

the United States district court may enter an order granting the

defendant or defendants leave to file the notice at a later time.”

§ 1455(b)(1). Congress’s creation of a good-cause exception to this

related removal deadline evidences its intent not to provide one

in § 1446(b)(1). Bittner v. United States, 598 U.S. 85, 94 (2023)

40

This robust and “explicit listing of exceptions” indicates “that Congress did not intend courts to read

other unmentioned, open-ended, ‘equitable’ exceptions

into the statute that it wrote.” Brockamp, 519 U.S. at

352. “It would be inconsistent with this comprehensive

scheme for an adjudicator to extend [the deadline]

through the doctrine of equitable tolling.” Arellano,

598 U.S. at 7.

Enbridge contends that the statute does not contain any “exceptions” to the 30-day deadline but

merely sets different “triggers” for removal. Pet. Br.

46–47. That argument does not withstand scrutiny.

As an initial matter, Enbridge misses exceptions

three through six, which are not addressed at all in its

brief. The omission is glaring because three of those

exceptions—§ 1441(d), § 1441(e), and § 1454(b)—expressly cross-reference § 1446 and provide the exact

sort of language Enbridge claims is missing—speaking

directly to “the court’s authority to toll” the deadline.

Contra Pet. Br. 33. And § 1441(d) and § 1454(b) do not

trigger anything because they do not change when the

30-day clock begins to run.

Even for the two provisions Enbridge does

acknowledge, the “mere trigger” characterization does

not work. Section 1446(b)(1) is unqualified and, by its

terms, applies to every civil action. Subsections (b)(2)

and (b)(3) take subsets of civil actions—cases involving

(“When Congress includes particular language in one section of a

statute but omits it from a neighbor, we normally understand

that difference in language to convey a difference in meaning (expressio unius est exclusio alterius).”).

41

multiple defendants served at different times, and

those in which “the case stated by the initial pleading

is not removable”—outside of subsection (b)(1). In doing so, (b)(2) and (b)(3) make exceptions to the usual

rule that a defendant desiring to remove a case must

file a notice of removal within 30 days after receiving

the complaint or summons.

Consider this Court’s recent analysis in Arellano.

The statute there established a baseline timing rule,

then listed multiple circumstances in which a different

event (for example, the veteran’s discharge or a qualifying injury) would control the effective date of an

award of disability compensation. The Court treated

each such alternative operative dates as “exceptions”

to the baseline. See 598 U.S. at 8–11. And the reason

was straightforward: Congress’s choice to make different events the operative dates is what makes them exceptions—because those provisions displace the ordinary clock for the cases they cover. See id.

So too here. Section 1446(b)(1) sets the default 30day period based on receipt of the initial pleading or

summons; subsections (b)(2) and (b)(3) identify defined

categories in which a different event—the later removal by a co-defendant, or receipt of the first paper

showing removability—controls. Labeling those carveouts “triggers” does not change their character under

Arellano. They are exceptions to the baseline timing

rule, and their presence forecloses adding an atextual,

free-floating tolling overlay onto § 1446(b)(1).

The large number of express exceptions matters

because it shows that Congress did the tailoring itself,

42

leaving no gap for judge-made tolling. Compare

Brockamp, 519 U.S. at 351–52 (refusing to apply equitable tolling to a statutory filing deadline with six explicit exceptions), and Arellano, 598 U.S. at 8–9 (refusing to apply equitable tolling where the statute contained 16 explicit exceptions), with Boechler, 596 U.S.

at 209–10 (noting that a limitations period “admit[ted]

of a single exception,” and holding that it was subject

to equitable tolling), and Holland, 560 U.S. at 647–48

(applying equitable tolling to a deadline with a single

statutory exception).

2. Multiple

exceptions

account

for

equitable concerns, strengthening the

structural inference that § 1446(b)(1) is

not subject to tolling.

Multiple of the specific exceptions listed above—

§ 1446(b)(3)’s ascertainability rule; § 1446(c)(1)’s “bad

faith” exception; and the provisions authorizing certain late removals “for cause shown” or “with leave of

the district court”—already account for equitable considerations. This “heightens the structural inference”

that § 1441(b)(1) is not subject to equitable tolling because it “strongly suggests that [Congress] did not expect an adjudicator to add a broader range of equitable

factors to the mix.” Arellano, 598 U.S. at 9–10; see

United States v. Beggerly, 524 U.S. 38, 48–49 (1998).

Section 1446(b)(3) is the principal safety valve

Congress wrote into the removal scheme. It ensures

that a defendant who could not discover removability

from the initial pleading may remove within 30 days

after receiving “an amended pleading, motion, order or

43

other paper from which it may first be ascertained that

the case is one which is or has become removable.”

§ 1446(b)(3). Thus, “by providing that the [time limit]

will not begin to run until the [defendant] ‘knew or

should have known of’ ” removability, the statute “has

already effectively allowed for equitable tolling.”

Beggerly, 524 U.S. at 48 (quoting Irwin, 498 U.S. at

96). Indeed, whenever the requirements of § 1446(b)(3)

are met, the predicates for equitable tolling exist. If

§ 1446(b)(1) may be equitably tolled, “the express exception [in § 1446(b)(3)] would be rendered insignificant, if not wholly superfluous.” TRW Inc., 534 U.S. at

31 (quoting Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 174

(2001)).

Moreover, Congress limited § 1446(b)(3) in diversity cases by placing a one-year cap in § 1446(c)(1).

This is significant because “[w]hen Congress has already considered equitable concerns and limited the

relief available, ‘additional equitable tolling would be

unwarranted.’ ” Arellano, 598 U.S. at 10 (emphasis

added) (quoting Beggerly, 524 U.S. at 48–49). Here,

Congress included an express exception to the ordinary 30-day deadline to ensure that defendants have

an opportunity to seek removal once removability can

be ascertained. Congress then cabined that exception,

first by § 1446(b)(3)’s plain text and second by the oneyear cap in § 1446(c)(1).

Further, § 1446(c)(1)’s one-year cap has its own exception for when “the plaintiff has acted in bad faith

in order to prevent a defendant from removing the action.” That bad-faith provision is yet another example

of Congress expressly incorporating equitable

44

concerns when it wants to. And still other provisions—

extensions “for cause shown” or “with leave of the district court” in specific circumstances, §§ 1441(d),

1441(e)(1), 1454(b)(2)—can likewise account for equitable factors. In a calibrated framework that authorizes courts to extend deadlines in defined settings,

there is no warrant to read in a roving equitable power

to toll § 1446(b)(1).

C. Section 1446(b)(1)’s history and purpose

support the conclusion that Congress did

not intend equitable tolling.

The history and purpose of § 1446(b)(1) provide additional reasons to believe that Congress did not intend to delegate to courts a generalized power to extend the 30-day deadline based on case-by-case assessments of equitable factors.

1. The statutory history demonstrates

Congress’s deliberate decision to set a

fixed deadline for removal and to specify

any exceptions.

For more than two centuries, Congress has set a

definite time limit for removal. It has revisited that

limit when experience warranted and spoken expressly when it wanted flexibility. For the most part,

the removal deadline has been short by design. When

it was not, abuses occurred, and Congress swiftly responded by reverting to a shorter deadline and thereafter making slight adjustments to establish a uniform

timeframe. This history further demonstrates that

45

Congress did not leave any room for judicial alteration

of the 30-day deadline.

The removal deadline was originally quite strict.

The Judiciary Act of 1789 required that, to remove a

case, the defendant had to file a petition for removal

“at the time of entering his appearance.” Act of Sept.

24, 1789, § 12, 1 Stat. 79. The rationale for this rule

was that “the defendant, who had a right of removal,

and failed to exercise it at the earliest period possible,

should be presumed to have acquiesced in the forum

chosen by the plaintiff.” Pullman Palace Car Co. v.

Speck, 113 U.S. 84, 85 (1885).

For a brief period during the Reconstruction era,

Congress enlarged the rule, allowing removal petitions

to be filed any time before the trial or final hearing of

the case. Act of July 27, 1886, 14 Stat. 306; Act of Mar.

2, 1867, 14 Stat. 558. That did not go well. Among

other things, defendants “abuse[d]” the generous

deadline, “experiment[ing]” in state court until they

met with difficulties or came to believe they would

lose, then they would change the forum. Speck, 113

U.S. at 87 (cleaned up).

“To prevent the[se] abuses,” Congress deliberately

re-tightened the removal deadline in 1875. Id.

(cleaned up). The revised statute required a petition

for removal to be filed “before or at the term at which

[the suit] could be first tried.” Act of Mar. 3, 1875, § 3,

18 Stat. 470. The party that desired removal “[wa]s not

permitted unreasonably to delay this election during

all the period incident to the preparation of the case.”

Speck, 113 U.S. at 86.

46

Seeing fit to narrow the removal period once more,

Congress in 1887 required removal petitions to be filed

when the defendant was required by state rules to answer or plead in response to the complaint. Act of Mar.

3, 1887, § 3, 24 Stat. 552. That remained the rule until

1948, when Congress again revised the removal statute to achieve national uniformity. See Murphy Bros.

v. Michetti Pipe Stringing, Inc., 526 U.S. 344, 351

(1999). Rather than allowing the deadline to vary

based on state pleading requirements, Congress fixed

a national time limit for removal: a petition was due

20 days after the complaint was filed or served, whichever was later. Id.

Congress amended the statute in 1949 to account

for “atypical state commencement and complaint filing

procedures,” ensuring that defendants in each state

had access to the complaint for 20 days before a petition for removal was due. Id. at 351–53 & n.4. Then,

in 1965, Congress changed the deadline to 30 days after finding that 20 days was too short to permit removal in States with substituted service laws. H.R.

Rep. No. 132, 89th Cong, 1st Sess. 1 (1965).

In 1988, Congress made two important changes.

First, it added § 1446(b)(3)’s one-year cap on removal

in diversity cases to “reduc[e] the opportunity for removal after substantial progress has been made in

state court” because “[r]emoval late in the proceedings

may result in substantial delay and disruption.” H.R.

Rep. No. 889, 100th Cong. 2d Sess. 72 (1988). Second,

Congress required motions to remand based on nonjurisdictional defects to be filed within 30 days of removal to prevent plaintiffs from “hold[ing] the defect

47

in reserve as a means of forum shopping if the litigation should take an unfavorable turn.” Id.; see 28

U.S.C. § 1447(c). 15

And in 2011, Congress made three more changes

that are relevant here. First, it codified the rule of unanimity, providing that each defendant has 30 days

from his or her own date of service to seek removal,

while permitting earlier-served defendants to consent

to a later-served defendant’s removal. § 1446(b)(2)(A)–

(C); H.R. Rep. No. 10, 112th Cong., 1st Sess. 14 (2011).

Congress added the exception in § 1446(b)(2)(C) to ensure “[f]airness to later-served defendants,” but noted

that this did not “allow an indefinite period for removal.” H.R. Rep. No. 10 at 14. Second, addressing a

circuit split over whether the one-year cap in diversity

cases could be equitably tolled, Congress rejected equitable tolling and instead authorized removal beyond

15 Enbridge argues that § 1447(c)—which says a case “shall be

remanded” if the federal court lacks jurisdiction—implies that remand of a case that was untimely removed is discretionary,

thereby creating an opening for equitable tolling. Pet. Br. 39. But

§ 1447(c) merely reflects the unique status of subject-matter jurisdiction, which “can never be waived or forfeited.” Gonzalez, 565

U.S. at 141. Nothing in § 1447(c) indicates Congress intended to

change the traditional rule that while an objection to timeliness

may be waived, remand is required when a case is not timely removed and the plaintiff promptly objects. See infra II.D.

If anything, § 1447(c) supports the Attorney General here.

Before 1988, motions for remand had to be filed only “within a

reasonable time.” See Snapper, Inc. v. Redan, 171 F.3d 1249,

1257 n.18 (11th Cir. 1999). By creating the 30-day limit for motions to remand, Congress sought to encourage prompt resolution

of forum issues and to prevent litigants from using the removal

statute as a means of forum shopping by sitting on their procedural rights. H.R. Rep. No. 889 at 72.

48

one year only upon a finding that the plaintiff acted in

bad faith to prevent removal. Id. at 15; see Hoyt v.

Lane Constr. Co., 927 F.3d 287, 294 (5th Cir. 2019) (explaining that the amendment abrogated prior cases allowing equitable tolling of § 1446(c)(1)). Third, Congress relocated criminal removal provisions to a separate section and, there, expressly permitted late filings

“for good cause shown.” 28 U.S.C. § 1455(b)(1); see supra note 14. It did not confer comparable authority for

civil removals.

This history confirms that it is Congress’s role to

set and adjust the timing rules for removal, and that

courts should not superimpose an atextual tolling exception on § 1446(b)(1)’s current 30-day deadline.

2. The purpose of § 1446(b)(1) is furthered

by enforcing it as written.

Enbridge argues that equitable tolling is needed to

further the statute’s purpose. Pet. Br. 20, 40. But “[i]t

was evidently the purpose of Congress to fix an earlier

and definite time [for removal], which would not permit the litigant to experiment in the State court until

satisfied he would fail there, and then change his forum.” Speck, 113 U.S. at 87; see Manning v. Amy, 140

U.S. 137, 141 (1891); Wilson v. Intercollegiate (Big

Ten) Conference Athletic Ass’n, 668 F.2d 962, 965 (7th

Cir. 1982) (Posner, J.) (“The purpose of the 30-day limitation is … to deprive the defendant of the undeserved

tactical advantage that he would have if he could wait

and see how he was faring in state court before deciding whether to remove the case to another court system.”).

49

The time limit also serves “to prevent the delay

and waste of resources involved in starting a case over

in a second court after significant proceedings … have

taken place in the first court,” Wilson, 668 F.2d at 965,

by resolving the choice of forum early in the litigation,

see H.R. Rep. No. 889, 100th Cong. 2d Sess. 72 (1988).

And applying a fixed deadline ensures national uniformity. Murphy, 526 U.S. at 351.

Each of these purposes is well served by a clear

and mandatory rule. A system of ad hoc exceptions, by

contrast, would require case-by-case determinations of

whether removal is warranted; create delay and costs

to both courts and litigants; and allow enterprising defendants to seek removal after first receiving an adverse decision in state court, as occurred here.

In weighing these costs against the benefits of an

extended removal deadline, Congress had “the power

to choose between rules, which prioritize efficiency

and predictability, and standards, which prioritize optimal results in individual cases.” Arellano, 598 U.S.

at 11. Congress chose a rule—a notice of removal

“shall be filed within 30 days,” § 1446(b)(1)—not a

standard—such as “for cause shown,” except in limited

contexts where there is a unique interest in a federal

forum, see §§ 1441(d), 1454(b)(2), 1455(b)(1). In other

words, Congress decided for itself “whether, or just

where and when,” to extend the statute’s deadlines,

“rather than delegate to the courts a generalized

power to do so wherever a court concludes that equity

so requires.” Brockamp, 519 U.S. at 353. That choice

must be respected. See Arellano, 598 U.S. at 11–12

(“Congress opted for rules in this statutory scheme,

50

and an equitable extension … would disrupt that

choice.”).

D. This Court has long treated the removal

deadline as mandatory.

Consistent with the opinion below, this Court has

long treated the statutory removal deadline as a mandatory claims-processing rule.

From the start, the historical understanding was

that “[t]he right to remove a suit from a State court …

is statutory, and to effect a transfer of jurisdiction all

the requirements of the statute must be followed.”

Babbitt v. Clark, 103 U.S. 606, 610 (1880); see

Hunter’s Lessee, 14 U.S. at 349 (“The time, the process,

and the manner [for removal] must be subject to … absolute legislative control.”).

Accordingly, this Court repeatedly held that when

a case is removed out of time, it must be remanded to

state court, because defendants have no statutory

right to remove a case after the deadline has passed.

See, e.g., Kan. City, Fort Scott & Memphis R.R. Co. v.

Daughtry, 138 U.S. 298, 306 (1891) (affirming remand

order where application for removal “came too late”);

Balt. & Ohio R.R. Co. v. Burns, 124 U.S. 165, 166

(1888) (the defendant “lost its right to the removal” by

failing to timely remove); Phx. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v.

Walrath, 117 U.S. 365, 366 (1886) (“The right to the

removal of a suit … is lost by a failure to file a petition”

by the statutory deadline); Gregory v. Hartley, 113

U.S. 742, 746 (1885) (after the statutory deadline

passed and the state court held a hearing on a motion

51

to dismiss “it was too late … to ask for a removal”);

Speck, 113 U.S. at 88 (petition was untimely and deadline could not be extended by stipulation); Edrington

v. Jefferson, 111 U.S. 770, 775 (1884) (after the statutory deadline passed “all right of removal … was

gone”).

Moreover, the Court has historically described the

removal deadline in words that, in modern parlance,

identify a mandatory claims-processing rule—i.e., a

deadline that can be waived but must be enforced

when properly invoked. E.g., Stewart, 245 U.S. at 363

(“It is essential to the removal of a cause that the petition, provided for by the statute, be filed … within the

time fixed by statute, unless the time be in some manner waived.”); Mackay, 229 U.S. at 176 (“the litigant

has the right to rely upon the statute, and to insist

that” removal occur “in compliance with its terms”; but

noncompliance is not raised sua sponte and can be

waived); Martin’s Adm’r v. Balt. & Ohio R.R. Co., 151

U.S. 673, 687 (1894) (“As the petition for the removal

of this case … was not filed … within the time mentioned in the act of Congress, it would follow that, if a

motion to remand upon that ground had been made

promptly, and denied, the judgment of the Circuit

Court of the United States must have been reversed,

with directions to remand the case to the state court.”);

Ayers v. Watson, 113 U.S. 594, 598 (1885) (“Application in due time … [is] essential if insisted on, but …

may be waived.”).

Enbridge argues to the contrary based largely on

a single case: Powers v. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co.,

169 U.S. 92 (1898). Pet. Br. 32. In Powers, a diverse

52

defendant could not remove a case within the statutory period because the plaintiff also sued nondiverse

parties. 169 U.S. at 97–98. After the deadline passed,

the plaintiff dismissed the resident defendants, and

the action “for the first time became one in its nature

removable.” Id. at 98. The diverse defendant then “immediately filed a second petition for removal.” Id. The

Court held that, in a case that was not initially removable, a defendant could seek removal after the time

mentioned in the act of Congress had elapsed. Id. at

100–01.

Enbridge reads Powers as “clearly adopt[ing] the

principle that equitable tolling is applicable” to

§ 1446(b)(1). Pet. 17. That is inaccurate. The Court

viewed the question as “depend[ing] on the terms and

effect of the act,” not whether any traditional equitable

doctrine applied. 169 U.S. at 99. The Court had no

doubt that compliance with the statutory deadline was

required “when the case, as stated in the plaintiff’s

declaration, is a removable one.” Id. at 98. But it was

concerned that applying this rule “when the case does

not become in its nature a removable one until after

the time mentioned in the act has expired,” id. at 98–

99, “would utterly defeat all right of removal in many

cases,” id. at 100. The Court thus construed the statute to allow a defendant to file a removal petition “as

soon as the action assumes the shape of a removable

case.” Id. at 100–01.

Nothing in Powers indicates that the Court

thought the removal deadline could be more generally

tolled outside of that narrow circumstance. And at any

rate, Congress has since codified Powers in

53

§ 1446(b)(3). See H.R. Rep. No. 352, 81st Cong., 1st

Sess. 14 (1949). Now that the rule exists in a statute,

its scope is controlled by the statute’s text—which has

been further limited by § 1446(c)(1). Enbridge cannot

rely on Powers for broad equitable principles that Congress chose not to adopt, much less to establish that

“federal removal from state to federal court is an ‘area

of the law where equity finds a comfortable home.’ ”

Pet. Br. 40 (quoting Holland, 560 U.S. at 647, which

involved pro se habeas filings).

III. Even if § 1446(b)(1) were subject to equitable

tolling, this case would not remotely qualify.

Finally, even if the removal deadline were amenable to equitable tolling, tolling would be unwarranted

here. A litigant “is entitled to equitable tolling only if

he shows (1) that he has been pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary circumstance

stood in his way and prevented timely filing.” Holland,

560 U.S. at 649 (cleaned up). Enbridge cannot satisfy

either factor.

No “extraordinary circumstance” stood in

Enbridge’s way and prevented it from timely filing a

notice of removal at the outset of this case. After all,

Enbridge soon thereafter raised in state court the very

Pipeline Safety Act arguments that it later asserted

provided a basis for federal jurisdiction. J.A. 10a–11a;

145a–155a. Much less did any extraordinary circumstance prevent Enbridge from removing this case

when it removed the Governor’s “virtually identical”

one. Pet. Br. 10.

54

Instead, Enbridge stipulated to this state-court

case being held in abeyance after it removed the Governor’s case. J.A. 59a. And it only later sought removal

once the federal court “made rulings” that Enbridge

felt “reflect[ed] its view of the merits.” Pet. Br. 15. Not

only is that wait-and-see approach contrary to the very

purpose of the 30-day deadline, it cannot be described

as acting “diligently” for the reasons the court of appeals articulated in finding that no statutory exception

to the removal deadline applied. See Pet. App. 17a

(“[T]o the extent § 1446(b)(3)’s later removal window

was ever open, Enbridge missed that one too.”).

The district court did not even purport to apply the

traditional equitable-tolling framework recognized in

Irwin, Holland, and this Court’s other cases. It instead

relied on free-floating factors that were not grounded

text, precedent, or tradition. Nothing indicates Congress intended such an open-ended, atextual, and

ahistorical inquiry. As this Court has recognized, “[i]n

the long run, experience teaches that strict adherence

to the procedural requirements specified by the legislature is the best guarantee of evenhanded administration of the law.” Hallstrom, 493 U.S. at 31

(cleaned up).

55

CONCLUSION

The Sixth Circuit’s judgment should be affirmed.

Respectfully submitted,

DANA NESSEL

Michigan Attorney General

ANN M. SHERMAN

Michigan Solicitor General

Counsel of Record

CHRISTOPHER M. ALLEN

Assistant Solicitor General

KEITH D. UNDERKOFFLER

Assistant Attorney General,

Environment, Natural Resources & Agriculture Division

SPENCER D. SMITH

Special Assistant Attorney

General

P.O. Box 30212

Lansing, Michigan 48909

ShermanA@michigan.gov

(517) 335-7628

Dated: OCTOBER 2025

Attorneys for Respondent

APPENDIX

ia

BRIEF FOR RESPONDENT

APPENDIX TABLE OF CONTENTS

Relevant Statutory Provisions ......................... 1a–12a

1a

APPENDIX — RELEVANT STATUTORY

PROVISIONS

1. 28 U.S.C. § 1441 provides, in part:

Removal of civil actions

(a) GENERALLY.—Except as otherwise expressly provided by Act of Congress, any civil action brought in a

State court of which the district courts of the United

States have original jurisdiction, may be removed by

the defendant or the defendants, to the district court

of the United States for the district and division embracing the place where such action is pending.

(b) REMOVAL BASED ON DIVERSITY OF CITIZENSHIP.—(1)

In determining whether a civil action is removable on

the basis of the jurisdiction under section 1332(a) of

this title, the citizenship of defendants sued under fictitious names shall be disregarded.

(2) A civil action otherwise removable solely on the basis of the jurisdiction under section 1332(a) of this title

may not be removed if any of the parties in interest

properly joined and served as defendants is a citizen of

the State in which such action is brought.

***

(d) ACTIONS AGAINST FOREIGN STATES.—Any civil action brought in a State court against a foreign state as

defined in section 1603(a) of this title may be removed

by the foreign state to the district court of the United

States for the district and division embracing the place

where such action is pending. Upon removal the action

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shall be tried by the court without jury. Where removal is based upon this subsection, the time limitations of section 1446(b) of this chapter may be enlarged

at any time for cause shown.

(e) MULTIPARTY, MULTIFORUM JURISDICTION.—(1) Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (b) of this

section, a defendant in a civil action in a State court

may remove the action to the district court of the

United States for the district and division embracing

the place where the action is pending if—

(A) the action could have been brought in a United

States district court under section 1369 of this title; or

(B) the defendant is a party to an action which is or

could have been brought, in whole or in part, under

section 1369 in a United States district court and

arises from the same accident as the action in State

court, even if the action to be removed could not have

been brought in a district court as an original matter.

The removal of an action under this subsection shall

be made in accordance with section 1446 of this title,

except that a notice of removal may also be filed before

trial of the action in State court within 30 days after

the date on which the defendant first becomes a party

to an action under section 1369 in a United States district court that arises from the same accident as the

action in State court, or at a later time with leave of

the district court.

3a

2. 28 U.S.C. § 1442a provides:

A civil or criminal prosecution in a court of a State of

the United States against a member of the armed

forces of the United States on account of an act done

under color of his office or status, or in respect to which

he claims any right, title, or authority under a law of

the United States respecting the armed forces thereof,

or under the law of war, may at any time before the

trial or final hearing thereof be removed for trial into

the district court of the United States for the district

where it is pending in the manner prescribed by law,

and it shall thereupon be entered on the docket of the

district court, which shall proceed as if the cause had

been originally commenced therein and shall have full

power to hear and determine the cause.

3. 28 U.S.C. § 1446 provides:

Procedure for removal of civil actions

(a) GENERALLY.—A defendant or defendants desiring

to remove any civil action from a State court shall file

in the district court of the United States for the district

and division within which such action is pending a notice of removal signed pursuant to Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and containing a short

and plain statement of the grounds for removal, together with a copy of all process, pleadings, and orders

served upon such defendant or defendants in such action.

(b) REQUIREMENTS; GENERALLY.—(1) The notice of removal of a civil action or proceeding shall be filed

within 30 days after the receipt by the defendant,

4a

through service or otherwise, of a copy of the initial

pleading setting forth the claim for relief upon which

such action or proceeding is based, or within 30 days

after the service of summons upon the defendant if

such initial pleading has then been filed in court and

is not required to be served on the defendant, whichever period is shorter.

(2)(A) When a civil action is removed solely under section 1441(a), all defendants who have been properly

joined and served must join in or consent to the removal of the action.

(B) Each defendant shall have 30 days after receipt by

or service on that defendant of the initial pleading or

summons described in paragraph (1) to file the notice

of removal.

(C) If defendants are served at different times, and a

later-served defendant files a notice of removal, any

earlier-served defendant may consent to the removal

even though that earlier-served defendant did not previously initiate or consent to removal.

(3) Except as provided in subsection (c), if the case

stated by the initial pleading is not removable, a notice

of removal may be filed within thirty days after receipt

by the defendant, through service or otherwise, of a

copy of an amended pleading, motion, order or other

paper from which it may first be ascertained that the

case is one which is or has become removable.

(c) REQUIREMENTS; REMOVAL BASED ON DIVERSITY OF

CITIZENSHIP.—(1) A case may not be removed under

subsection (b)(3) on the basis of jurisdiction conferred

5a

by section 1332 more than 1 year after commencement

of the action, unless the district court finds that the

plaintiff has acted in bad faith in order to prevent a

defendant from removing the action.

(2) If removal of a civil action is sought on the basis of

the jurisdiction conferred by section 1332(a), the sum

demanded in good faith in the initial pleading shall be

deemed to be the amount in controversy, except that—

(A) the notice of removal may assert the amount in

controversy if the initial pleading seeks—

(i) nonmonetary relief; or

(ii) a money judgment, but the State practice either

does not permit demand for a specific sum or permits

recovery of damages in excess of the amount demanded; and

(B) removal of the action is proper on the basis of an

amount in controversy asserted under subparagraph

(A) if the district court finds, by the preponderance of

the evidence, that the amount in controversy exceeds

the amount specified in section 1332(a).

(3)(A) If the case stated by the initial pleading is not

removable solely because the amount in controversy

does not exceed the amount specified in section

1332(a), information relating to the amount in controversy in the record of the State proceeding, or in responses to discovery, shall be treated as an “other paper” under subsection (b)(3).

6a

(B) If the notice of removal is filed more than 1 year

after commencement of the action and the district

court finds that the plaintiff deliberately failed to disclose the actual amount in controversy to prevent removal, that finding shall be deemed bad faith under

paragraph (1).

(d) NOTICE TO ADVERSE PARTIES AND STATE COURT.—

Promptly after the filing of such notice of removal of a

civil action the defendant or defendants shall give

written notice thereof to all adverse parties and shall

file a copy of the notice with the clerk of such State

court, which shall effect the removal and the State

court shall proceed no further unless and until the

case is remanded.

(e) COUNTERCLAIM IN 337 PROCEEDING.—With respect

to any counterclaim removed to a district court pursuant to section 337(c) of the Tariff Act of 1930, the district court shall resolve such counterclaim in the same

manner as an original complaint under the Federal

Rules of Civil Procedure, except that the payment of a

filing fee shall not be required in such cases and the

counterclaim shall relate back to the date of the original complaint in the proceeding before the International Trade Commission under section 337 of that

Act.

[(f) Redesignated (e)]

(g) Where the civil action or criminal prosecution that

is removable under section 1442(a) is a proceeding in

which a judicial order for testimony or documents is

sought or issued or sought to be enforced, the 30-day

requirement of subsection (b) of this section and

7a

paragraph (1) of section 1455(b) is satisfied if the person or entity desiring to remove the proceeding files

the notice of removal not later than 30 days after receiving, through service, notice of any such proceeding.

4. 28 U.S.C. § 1447 provides:

Procedure after removal generally

(a) In any case removed from a State court, the district

court may issue all necessary orders and process to

bring before it all proper parties whether served by

process issued by the State court or otherwise.

(b) It may require the removing party to file with its

clerk copies of all records and proceedings in such

State court or may cause the same to be brought before

it by writ of certiorari issued to such State court.

(c) A motion to remand the case on the basis of any

defect other than lack of subject matter jurisdiction

must be made within 30 days after the filing of the notice of removal under section 1446(a). If at any time

before final judgment it appears that the district court

lacks subject matter jurisdiction, the case shall be remanded. An order remanding the case may require

payment of just costs and any actual expenses, including attorney fees, incurred as a result of the removal.

A certified copy of the order of remand shall be mailed

by the clerk to the clerk of the State court. The State

court may thereupon proceed with such case.

(d) An order remanding a case to the State court from

which it was removed is not reviewable on appeal or

otherwise, except that an order remanding a case to

8a

the State court from which it was removed pursuant

to section 1443 of this title shall be reviewable by appeal or otherwise.

(e) If after removal the plaintiff seeks to join additional

defendants whose joinder would destroy subject matter jurisdiction, the court may deny joinder, or permit

joinder and remand the action to the State court.

5. 28 U.S.C. § 1453 provides, in part:

Removal of class actions

***

(b) IN GENERAL.—A class action may be removed to a

district court of the United States in accordance with

section 1446 (except that the 1-year limitation under

section 1446(c)(1) shall not apply), without regard to

whether any defendant is a citizen of the State in

which the action is brought, except that such action

may be removed by any defendant without the consent

of all defendants.

(c) Review of Remand Orders.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—Section 1447 shall apply to any removal of a case under this section, except that notwithstanding section 1447(d), a court of appeals may accept

an appeal from an order of a district court granting or

denying a motion to remand a class action to the State

court from which it was removed if application is made

to the court of appeals not more than 10 days after entry of the order.

9a

(2) TIME PERIOD FOR JUDGMENT.—If the court of appeals accepts an appeal under paragraph (1), the court

shall complete all action on such appeal, including rendering judgment, not later than 60 days after the date

on which such appeal was filed, unless an extension is

granted under paragraph (3).

(3) EXTENSION OF TIME PERIOD.—The court of appeals

may grant an extension of the 60-day period described

in paragraph (2) if—

(A) all parties to the proceeding agree to such extension, for any period of time; or

(B) such extension is for good cause shown and in the

interests of justice, for a period not to exceed 10 days.

***

6. 28 U.S.C. § 1454 provides, in part:

Patent, plant variety protection, and copyright cases

(a) IN GENERAL.—A civil action in which any party asserts a claim for relief arising under any Act of Congress relating to patents, plant variety protection, or

copyrights may be removed to the district court of the

United States for the district and division embracing

the place where the action is pending.

(b) SPECIAL RULES.—The removal of an action under

this section shall be made in accordance with section

1446, except that if the removal is based solely on this

section—

(1) the action may be removed by any party; and

10a

(2) the time limitations contained in section 1446(b)

may be extended at any time for cause shown.

***

7. 28 U.S.C. § 1455 provides, in part:

Procedure for removal of criminal prosecutions

(a) NOTICE OF REMOVAL.—A defendant or defendants

desiring to remove any criminal prosecution from a

State court shall file in the district court of the United

States for the district and division within which such

prosecution is pending a notice of removal signed pursuant to Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and containing a short and plain statement of the

grounds for removal, together with a copy of all process, pleadings, and orders served upon such defendant or defendants in such action.

(b) REQUIREMENTS.—(1) A notice of removal of a criminal prosecution shall be filed not later than 30 days

after the arraignment in the State court, or at any

time before trial, whichever is earlier, except that for

good cause shown the United States district court may

enter an order granting the defendant or defendants

leave to file the notice at a later time.

***

8. 9 U.S.C. § 205 provides:

Where the subject matter of an action or proceeding

pending in a State court relates to an arbitration

agreement or award falling under the Convention, the

defendant or the defendants may, at any time before

11a

the trial thereof, remove such action or proceeding to

the district court of the United States for the district

and division embracing the place where the action or

proceeding is pending. The procedure for removal of

causes otherwise provided by law shall apply, except

that the ground for removal provided in this section

need not appear on the face of the complaint but may

be shown in the petition for removal. For the purposes

of Chapter 1 of this title any action or proceeding removed under this section shall be deemed to have been

brought in the district court to which it is removed.

9. 12 U.S.C. § 1819 provides, in part:

***

(2) Federal court jurisdiction

(A) In general

Except as provided in subparagraph (D), all suits of a

civil nature at common law or in equity to which the

Corporation, in any capacity, is a party shall be

deemed to arise under the laws of the United States.

(B) Removal

Except as provided in subparagraph (D), the Corporation may, without bond or security, remove any action,

suit, or proceeding from a State court to the appropriate United States district court before the end of the

90-day period beginning on the date the action, suit, or

proceeding is filed against the Corporation or the Corporation is substituted as a party.

***

12a

10. 28 U.S.C. § 2679 provides, in part:

***

(d)(1) Upon certification by the Attorney General that

the defendant employee was acting within the scope of

his office or employment at the time of the incident out

of which the claim arose, any civil action or proceeding

commenced upon such claim in a United States district court shall be deemed an action against the

United States under the provisions of this title and all

references thereto, and the United States shall be substituted as the party defendant.

(2) Upon certification by the Attorney General that the

defendant employee was acting within the scope of his

office or employment at the time of the incident out of

which the claim arose, any civil action or proceeding

commenced upon such claim in a State court shall be

removed without bond at any time before trial by the

Attorney General to the district court of the United

States for the district and division embracing the place

in which the action or proceeding is pending. Such action or proceeding shall be deemed to be an action or

proceeding brought against the United States under

the provisions of this title and all references thereto,

and the United States shall be substituted as the party

defendant. This certification of the Attorney General

shall conclusively establish scope of office or employment for purposes of removal.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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