Respondents Brief — Enbridge Energy, LP, et al., Petitioners v. Dana Nessel, Attorney General of Michigan, on Behalf of the People of the State of Michigan
Supreme Court briefOct 14, 2025
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No. 24-783
In the Supreme Court of the United States
ENBRIDGE ENERGY, LP, ET AL., PETITIONERS
v.
DANA NESSEL, ATTORNEY GENERAL OF MICHIGAN, ON
BEHALF OF THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
BRIEF FOR RESPONDENT
DANA NESSEL
Michigan Attorney General
ANN M. SHERMAN
Michigan Solicitor General
Counsel of Record
CHRISTOPHER M. ALLEN
Assistant Solicitor General
KEITH D. UNDERKOFFLER
Assistant Attorney General,
Environment, Natural Resources & Agriculture Division
SPENCER D. SMITH
Special Assistant Attorney
General
P.O. Box 30212
Lansing, Michigan 48909
ShermanA@michigan.gov
(517) 335-7628
Attorneys for Respondent
i
QUESTION PRESENTED
Whether the 30-day removal deadline in 28 U.S.C.
§ 1446(b)(1) is subject to equitable tolling.
ii
PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDINGS
Petitioners Enbridge Energy, Limited Partnership, Enbridge Energy Company, Inc., and Enbridge
Energy Partners, L.P. (collectively, “Enbridge”) were
appellees in the court below.
Respondent Dana Nessel, Attorney General of the
State of Michigan, on behalf of the People of the State
of Michigan, was appellant in the court below.
iii
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Question Presented ...................................................... i
Parties to the Proceedings........................................... ii
Table of Contents........................................................ iii
Table of Authorities ..................................................... v
Statutory Provisions Involved..................................... 1
Introduction ................................................................. 2
Statement of the Case ................................................. 5
A. Statutory Framework ..................................... 5
B. Factual Background ....................................... 7
C. Procedural History ......................................... 9
D. Opinions Below ............................................. 15
Summary of Argument .............................................. 21
Argument ................................................................... 25
I.
No presumption of equitable tolling applies to
§ 1446(b)(1). ......................................................... 26
A. Section 1446(b)(1)’s removal deadline is
not a statute of limitations. .......................... 27
B. The context of removal underscores that
no presumption applies. ............................... 30
C. Federalism principles counsel against
expanding § 1446(b)(1)’s removal window
based on implied presumptions. .................. 32
II. Even if a presumption of equitable tolling
applied, the presumption would be rebutted. .... 33
iv
A. The text of § 1446(b)(1) creates a strict
requirement. ................................................. 34
B. The structure of the removal statute
precludes equitable tolling of § 1446(b)(1). .. 35
1. The removal statute contains six
express exceptions to § 1446(b)(1),
foreclosing additional, implied ones. ..... 36
2. Multiple exceptions account for
equitable concerns, strengthening the
structural inference that § 1446(b)(1)
is not subject to tolling. .......................... 42
C. Section 1446(b)(1)’s history and purpose
support the conclusion that Congress did
not intend equitable tolling. ......................... 44
1. The statutory history demonstrates
Congress’s deliberate decision to set a
fixed deadline for removal and to
specify any exceptions. ........................... 44
2. The purpose of § 1446(b)(1) is
furthered by enforcing it as written. ..... 48
D. This Court has long treated the removal
deadline as mandatory. ................................ 50
III. Even if § 1446(b)(1) were subject to equitable
tolling, this case would not remotely qualify. .... 53
Conclusion.................................................................. 55
Appendix — Relevant Statutory Provisions ............. 1a
v
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Page
Cases
Andrus v. Glover Constr. Co.,
446 U.S. 608 (1980) ............................................. 36
Arellano v. McDonough,
598 U.S. 1 (2023) .. 4, 27, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 40, 41,
42, 43, 49
Ayers v. Watson,
113 U.S. 594 (1885) ............................................. 51
Babbitt v. Clark,
103 U.S. 606 (1880) ............................................. 50
Balt. & Ohio R.R. Co. v. Burns,
124 U.S. 165 (1888) ............................................. 50
Bittner v. United States,
598 U.S. 85 (2023) ............................................... 39
Boechler, P.C. v. Comm’r of Internal Rev.,
596 U.S. 199 (2022) ................................. 28, 29, 42
Bowles v. Russell,
551 U.S. 205 (2007) ............................................. 31
Burt v. Titlow,
571 U.S. 12 (2013) ............................................... 29
Dean v. United States,
556 U.S. 568 (2009) ............................................. 26
Dubin v. United States,
599 U.S. 110 (2023) ............................................. 34
vi
Duncan v. Walker,
533 U.S. 167 (2001) ............................................. 43
Edrington v. Jefferson,
111 U.S. 770 (1884) ............................................. 51
Food Mktg. Inst. v. Argus Leader Media,
588 U.S. 427 (2019) ............................................. 26
Glass v. Goeckel,
703 N.W.2d 58 (Mich. 2005) ................................. 8
Gonzalez v. Thaler,
565 U.S. 134 (2012) ....................................... 25, 47
Grable & Sons Metal Products, Inc. v. Darue
Engineering & Manufacturing,
545 U.S. 308 (2005) ............................................. 13
Great N. R. Co. v. Alexander,
246 U.S. 276 (1918) ............................................. 32
Gregory v. Hartley,
113 U.S. 742 (1885) ............................................. 50
Hallstrom v. Tillamook,
493 U.S. 20 (1989) ................. 26, 27, 28, 29, 35, 54
Hamer v. Neighborhood Hous. Servs. of Chi.,
583 U.S. 17 (2017) ............................................... 25
Harrow v. Dep’t of Defense,
601 U.S. 480 (2024) ............................................. 33
Hillman v. Maretta,
569 U.S. 483 (2013) ............................................. 36
Holland v. Florida,
560 U.S. 631 (2010) ........................... 28, 29, 42, 53
vii
Hoyt v. Lane Constr. Co.,
927 F.3d 287 (5th Cir. 2019) ............................... 48
Idaho v. Coeur d’Alene Tribe of Ida.,
521 U.S. 261 (1997) ............................................... 8
Ill. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Illinois,
146 U.S. 387 (1892) ............................................... 8
Irwin v. Dep’t of Veterans Affairs,
498 U.S. 89 (1990) ......................................... 33, 43
John R. Sand & Gravel Co. v. United States,
552 U.S. 130 (2008) ....................................... 30, 33
Kan. City, Fort Scott & Memphis R.R. Co. v.
Daughtry,
138 U.S. 298 (1891) ............................................. 50
Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am.,
511 U.S. 375 (1994) ............................................. 21
Lozano v. Montoya Alvarez,
572 U.S. 1 (2014) ................................. 3, 26, 27, 28
Mackay v. Uinta Dev. Co.,
229 U.S. 173 (1913) ....................................... 31, 51
Manning v. Amy,
140 U.S. 137 (1891) ............................................. 48
Manrique v. United States,
581 U.S. 116 (2017) ............................................. 25
Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee,
14 U.S. 304 (1816) ......................................... 31, 50
Martin’s Adm’r v. Balt. & Ohio R.R. Co.,
151 U.S. 673 (1894) ............................................. 51
viii
McIntosh v. United States,
601 U.S. 330 (2024) ............................................. 25
McNeil v. United States,
508 U.S. 106 (1993) ............................................. 29
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc. v.
Manning,
578 U.S. 374 (2016) ............................................. 32
Murphy Bros. v. Michetti Pipe Stringing, Inc.,
526 U.S. 344 (1999) ................................. 35, 46, 49
Nedtweg v. Wallace,
208 N.W. 51 (Mich. 1926)...................................... 8
Nutraceutical Corp. v. Lambert,
586 U.S. 188 (2019) ....................................... 25, 33
Oscar Mayer & Co. v. Evans,
441 U.S. 750 (1979) ............................................. 29
Phx. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Walrath,
117 U.S. 365 (1886) ............................................. 50
Powers v. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co.,
169 U.S. 92 (1898) ......................................... 51, 52
Pullman Palace Car Co. v. Speck,
113 U.S. 84 (1885) ................................... 45, 48, 51
Ross v. Blake,
578 U.S. 632 (2016) ....................................... 26, 34
Rotkiske v. Klemm,
589 U.S. 8 (2019) ................................................. 36
S. Pac. Co. v. Stewart,
245 U.S. 359 (1917) ....................................... 31, 51
ix
Sebelius v. Auburn Reg’l Med. Ctr.,
568 U.S. 145 (2013) ................................. 30, 33, 34
Shamrock Oil & Gas Corp. v. Sheets,
313 U.S. 100 (1941) ......................................... 2, 32
Snapper, Inc. v. Redan,
171 F.3d 1249 (11th Cir. 1999) ........................... 47
Syngenta Crop Prot., Inc. v. Henson,
537 U.S. 28 (2002) ............................................... 32
TRW Inc. v. Andrews,
534 U.S. 19 (2001) ......................................... 36, 43
United States v. Beggerly,
524 U.S. 38 (1998) ......................................... 42, 43
United States v. Brockamp,
519 U.S. 347 (1997) ............... 33, 35, 36, 40, 42, 49
United States v. Kubrick,
444 U.S. 111 (1979) ............................................. 29
Wilson v. Intercollegiate (Big Ten) Conference
Athletic Ass’n,
668 F.2d 962 (7th Cir. 1982) ......................... 48, 49
Young v. United States,
535 U.S. 43 (2002) ......................................... 27, 28
Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc.,
455 U.S. 385 (1982) ....................................... 28, 29
Statutes
9 U.S.C. § 205 .............................................................. 7
12 U.S.C. § 1819(b)(2)(B) ............................................. 7
28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) .................................................... 16
x
28 U.S.C. § 1441(d) ........................ 6, 23, 38, 40, 44, 49
28 U.S.C. § 1441(e) .............................................. 38, 40
28 U.S.C. § 1441(e)(1) ................................ 6, 23, 38, 44
28 U.S.C. § 1442a ............................................ 6, 23, 39
28 U.S.C. § 1446(a) ...................................................... 5
28 U.S.C. § 1446(b) .................................................... 35
28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(1) .... i, 2, 3, 4, 5, 15, 21, 23, 24, 25,
26, 28, 33, 34, 36, 37, 39, 40, 44
28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(2) ................................................ 40
28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(2)(A)–(C) .................................... 47
28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(2)(B) ....................................... 5, 37
28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(2)(C) ................................. 5, 23, 37
28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(3) .... 3, 5, 15, 17, 23, 37, 40, 43, 53
28 U.S.C. § 1446(c)(1) ...................................... 6, 38, 43
28 U.S.C. § 1446(c)(3)(B) ........................................... 38
28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) .................................................... 47
28 U.S.C. § 1453(b) ................................................ 6, 38
28 U.S.C. § 1454(b) .................................................... 40
28 U.S.C. § 1454(b)(2) .......................... 7, 23, 39, 44, 49
28 U.S.C. § 1455(b)(1) .................................... 39, 48, 49
28 U.S.C. § 2679(d)(2).................................................. 7
Act of July 27, 1886, 14 Stat. 306 ............................. 45
Act of Mar. 2, 1867, 14 Stat. 558............................... 45
Act of Mar. 3, 1875, § 3, 18 Stat. 470 ........................ 45
xi
Act of Mar. 3, 1887, § 3, 24 Stat. 552 ........................ 46
Act of Sept. 24, 1789, § 12, 1 Stat. 79 ....................... 45
Federal Courts Jurisdiction and Venue
Clarification Act of 2011, Pub. L. No. 112-63,
125 Stat. 758 (2011) ............................................ 35
Other Authorities
Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014) .................... 35
Merriam-Webster’s Dictionary and Thesaurus
(2007 ed.) ............................................................. 34
Charles Alan Wright,
Law of Federal Courts § 38 (8th ed. 2017) ......... 30
H.R. Rep. No. 10,
112th Cong., 1st Sess. (2011) .............................. 47
H.R. Rep. No. 132,
89th Cong, 1st Sess. (1965) ................................. 46
H.R. Rep. No. 1487,
94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976) ................................. 38
H.R. Rep. No. 352,
81st Cong., 1st Sess. (1949) ................................ 53
H.R. Rep. No. 889,
100th Cong., 2d Sess. (1988) ............. 39, 46, 47, 49
Rules
Mich. Ct. R. 2.116(C)(8) ............................................. 10
1
STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED
Relevant statutory provisions are reproduced in
an appendix to this brief. App., infra, 1a–12a.
2
INTRODUCTION
The Constitution reserves to States the power “to
provide for the determination of controversies in their
courts.” Shamrock Oil & Gas Corp. v. Sheets, 313 U.S.
100, 109 (1941). Because that power “may be restricted
only by the action of Congress,” federal courts must
“scrupulously confine” their exercise of power over
cases that began in state court “to the precise limits”
defined by statute. Id.
The federal removal statute provides a comprehensive scheme that governs this allocation of judicial
power. The basic rules are familiar: When state and
federal courts have concurrent jurisdiction, the plaintiff has the initial choice of forum. If the plaintiff
chooses state court, the defendant may seek removal.
But because of comity concerns raised by taking a case
from state court, the disruptive effect of changing forums midstream, and the risk of unfairness when removal is sought after substantial litigation (especially
after adverse rulings), Congress has always—since the
Judiciary Act of 1789—specified a deadline by which
removal must be sought. Over the years, this Court
has consistently held that when a defendant misses
that deadline, the removal effort fails and the case
must remain where it began.
Today, 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(1) supplies the deadline: A notice of removal “shall be filed within 30 days”
after the defendant receives the initial pleading or
summons, “whichever period is shorter.” The question
presented is whether district courts may equitably toll
that deadline. The answer is no.
3
Enbridge missed the statute’s 30-day removal
deadline by more than 850 days, seeking to remove
this case only after an adverse state-court ruling.
Enbridge attempted to excuse its tardiness by invoking a specific statutory exception, see 28 U.S.C.
§ 1446(b)(3), but the court below held that this exception did not apply—a ruling Enbridge no longer contests.
The district court seized jurisdiction over the case
anyway. It believed that, regardless of whether the removal statute’s requirements are met, a federal court
can divest a state court of jurisdiction at any time upon
a finding of “exceptional circumstances”—even though
the removal statute does not contain a single word to
that effect, and Congress alone may confer the power
to remove. The Sixth Circuit reversed, holding that
this judge-made exception cannot be squared with the
statute’s text and structure.
Now, Enbridge advances an argument it never
raised below: that a presumption of equitable tolling
applies to § 1446(b)(1)’s removal deadline and that the
presumption cannot be overcome. Enbridge’s argument fails twice over.
First, the presumption of equitable tolling applies
only to statutes of limitations, which § 1446(b)(1) is
not. The removal deadline is not triggered by the event
giving rise to a cause of action, and it does not set the
time for bringing an action or eliminate stale claims.
See Lozano v. Montoya Alvarez, 572 U.S. 1, 14 (2014).
Instead, it applies after an action has been brought,
and it serves systemic aims like judicial efficiency and
4
prompt resolution of forum issues. Further, the deadline governs the transfer of adjudicatory power from
state to federal court—a context that requires strict
construction, not atextual inquiries. Without any presumption, this case is easy: A court’s job is to apply the
statute as written, and § 1446(b)(1) sets a firm deadline in mandatory terms.
Second, even assuming a presumption applies, it
is rebutted. Text, structure, history, and purpose show
that § 1446(b)(1)’s 30-day deadline is not subject to equitable tolling. Here, statutory structure is especially
probative: The removal statute repeatedly cross-references § 1446 and provides numerous express exceptions to § 1446(b)(1)’s deadline (most of which
Enbridge ignores). Several of those exceptions account
for equitable considerations—including provisions authorizing courts to extend the deadline “for cause
shown” in specified settings—which “heightens the
structural inference” against reading an implied equitable tolling exception into the statute. Arellano v.
McDonough, 598 U.S. 1, 9 (2023).
This Court should affirm.
5
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. Statutory Framework
The law of removal is codified in 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1441–1455. The general authorization appears in
§ 1441(a): A defendant ordinarily may remove a civil
action from state to federal court if the federal courts
have original jurisdiction.
Section 1446 sets the procedure and default timing
for removal of a civil action. A defendant that desires
removal must file a notice “containing a short and
plain statement of the grounds for removal.” § 1446(a).
That notice “shall be filed within 30 days” after the defendant receives the initial pleading or summons,
“whichever period is shorter.” § 1446(b)(1).
In multidefendant cases, each defendant has its
own 30‑day window running from its receipt or service.
See § 1446(b)(2)(B) (cross-referencing § 1446(b)(1)).
But an earlier‑served defendant may consent to a
later‑served defendant’s timely removal “even though
that earlier-served defendant did not previously initiate or consent to removal” in time. § 1446(b)(2)(C).
Section 1446(b)(1)’s default 30-day deadline also
does not control if “the case stated by the initial pleading is not removable.” § 1446(b)(3). In that circumstance, the defendant may file a notice of removal
within 30 days after receiving “an amended pleading,
motion, order or other paper” from which removability
“may first be ascertained.” Id.
6
Congress has further specified the following timing rules to apply in particular circumstances:
•
Diversity cases. When removal rests on diversity jurisdiction and the case was not initially removable,
§ 1446(c)(1) bars removal more than one year after
the action’s commencement, subject to an express
bad-faith exception.
•
Class actions. Under the Class Action Fairness Act,
a class action “may be removed … in accordance
with section 1446,” but “the 1-year limitation under section 1446(c)(1) shall not apply.” § 1453(b).
•
Actions against foreign states. In suits removable
under § 1441(d), involving actions brought against
a foreign state, “the time limitations of section 1446(b) … may be enlarged at any time for
cause shown.” § 1441(d).
•
Multiparty, multiforum accidents. For certain
mass-accident cases, § 1441(e) provides that removal is “in accordance with section 1446,” but authorizes filing “within 30 days” after the defendant
first becomes a party to a related federal action or
“at a later time with leave of the district court.”
§ 1441(e)(1).
•
Suits involving members of the armed forces. Section 1442a permits removal “at any time before the
trial or final hearing” of covered proceedings
against members of the armed forces of the United
States. § 1442a.
7
•
Patent, plant variety protection, and copyright
cases. Section 1454(b) provides that removal shall
be “in accordance with section 1446,” but expressly
allows that “the time limitations contained in section 1446(b) may be extended at any time for cause
shown.” § 1454(b)(2).
Most of these provisions cross‑reference § 1446
and, in defined settings, either substitute a different
timing rule or authorize courts to enlarge the timing
requirements for good cause.
Outside the general removal statute, Congress has
also provided other, specific removal timelines. E.g.,
9 U.S.C. § 205 (authorizing removal of a civil action “at
any time before the trial thereof” when the action relates to an arbitration agreement or award falling under the Convention on the Recognition of Foreign Arbitral Awards); 12 U.S.C. § 1819(b)(2)(B) (authorizing
the FDIC to remove “any action, suit or proceeding”
within 90 days of becoming a party); 28 U.S.C.
§ 2679(d)(2) (authorizing removal “at any time before
trial” if the Attorney General certifies that the defendant was acting within the scope of his employment
with the United States).
B. Factual Background
The Straits of Mackinac lie at the center of the
Great Lakes. They link Lake Michigan and Lake Huron (which together hold nearly 8% of the world’s fresh
surface water) and separate Michigan’s Upper and
Lower Peninsulas. J.A. 27a–28a. The Straits are a hub
of tourism; recreation; commercial navigation; and
8
commercial, sport, and subsistence tribal fishing. J.A.
28a–29a.
When Michigan entered the Union in 1837, it acquired ownership of the lands beneath the Straits. See
Idaho v. Coeur d’Alene Tribe of Ida., 521 U.S. 261, 283
(1997); Nedtweg v. Wallace, 208 N.W. 51, 52 (Mich.
1926). Under “ancient doctrines,” these submerged
lands have “a unique status in the law” and are “infused with a public trust the State itself is bound to
respect.” Coeur d’Alene, 521 U.S. at 283–84. Michigan
must hold the bottomlands in trust for public uses
such as navigation, fishing, and recreation, and it may
not alienate them or otherwise authorize private uses
incompatible with the public’s superior rights. J.A.
29a–35a; see Glass v. Goeckel, 703 N.W.2d 58, 64–65
(Mich. 2005); Ill. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S.
387, 455–56 (1892).
Multiple shipping lanes converge in the Straits,
funneling domestic and international traffic through a
narrow corridor. J.A. 22a, 35a, 39a. Perpendicular to
that traffic, two 20-inch-diameter crude-oil pipelines—
installed by Enbridge’s predecessor in 1953 pursuant
to an easement granted by the Michigan Conservation
Commission—span roughly four miles of submerged
lands. J.A. 39a–40a. 1 Most of the pipelines are exposed, resting on the lakebed or suspended in the water column. J.A. 27a. Strong currents and erosion alter
1 These two, four-mile pipes are known as the “Straits Pipelines”;
the broader 645-mile pipeline route of which they are a part is
known as “Line 5.” J.A. 24a–27a. The Michigan Conservation
Commission is now known as the Michigan Department of Natural Resources (DNR).
9
the bottom contours, and exposed sections are vulnerable to anchor strikes and other hazards. J.A. 27a,
35a–42a.
Recent events underscore those risks. In 2010,
Enbridge’s Line 6B ruptured near Marshall, Michigan,
discharging crude oil into the Kalamazoo River watershed and causing extensive harm to state lands, waters, wildlife, and communities. It was the most expensive onshore oil spill in U.S. history, according to the
National Transportation Safety Board. J.A. 43a–44a.
And in 2018, an industrial barge inadvertently
dragged its 12,000-pound anchor across the Straits,
severing nearby electrical cables and damaging the
pipelines in three locations. J.A. 40a–41a. Although
the pipelines did not rupture, the incident heightened
concern about siting these exposed, aging lines across
a uniquely vulnerable, ecologically sensitive, and economically vital corridor.
C. Procedural History
1. Nessel v. Enbridge
On June 27, 2019, Michigan Attorney General
Dana Nessel filed this action on behalf of the People of
the State of Michigan against Enbridge in a Michigan
state court. J.A. 21a. The parties are not diverse, and
the claims arise solely under state law. J.A. 23a, 29a–
52a.
Count I alleges that the 1953 easement purporting
to authorize the Straits Pipelines to be sited on this
four-mile stretch of submerged land was void from its
10
inception and is subject to revocation under the statelaw public trust doctrine. J.A. 29a–50a. Count II alleges that the continued operation of the Straits Pipelines at their present location constitutes a public nuisance. J.A. 50a–51a. Count III alleges a violation of
Michigan’s Environmental Protection Act. J.A. 51a–
52a.
On September 16, 2019, Enbridge responded to
the complaint by filing a motion for summary disposition under Mich. Ct. R. 2.116(C)(8). J.A. 99a, 104a–
166a. It argued, among other things, that the public
trust claims were preempted by the federal Pipeline
Safety Act. J.A. 145a–155a. The Attorney General
filed a cross-motion for partial summary disposition on
one of her claims. J.A. 100a. Amicus briefs were submitted on both sides, and a three-hour hearing was
held on May 22, 2020. J.A. 85a, 170a–260a.
In advance of the hearing, the state court asked
the parties to be prepared to answer questions about
federal preemption. J.A. 167a–168a. Preemption issues, including Enbridge’s arguments under the Pipeline Safety Act and Submerged Lands Act, were a substantial focus of the oral argument, and the state court
permitted the parties to submit supplemental briefs
on those issues. J.A. 225a–236a, 244a–247a, 250a–
256a, 261a–282a.
On June 18, 2020, Enbridge disclosed that it had
to initiate an emergency shutdown because the Straits
Pipelines had been struck and damaged by an external
11
object for the second time in two years. J.A. 40a–41a. 2
The Attorney General sought a temporary restraining
order to prevent Enbridge from operating the pipelines
until the incident had been investigated, information
provided, and a restart approved by regulators. See supra note 2. Over Enbridge’s objection, the state court
granted the TRO. Id.; J.A. 67a–68a. The court closely
monitored the situation in the following weeks
through a series of hearings, status reports, and stipulations, tailoring the scope of the injunction through
multiple amended orders. See J.A. 60a–68a. The matter was fully resolved by stipulation on September 24,
2020, and pipeline operations resumed while the litigation continued. J.A. 60a.
2. Michigan v. Enbridge
On the same date the Attorney General’s lawsuit
was filed, Michigan Governor Gretchen Whitmer “directed the DNR to undertake a comprehensive review
of Enbridge’s compliance with the 1953 Easement.”
Gov. Dkt. 1-1, Ex. 2:2. 3 Following that review, the
2 See Press Release, Mich. Dep’t Att’y Gen., Judge Orders Line 5
to Cease Operations (June 25, 2020), https://www.michigan.gov/ag/news/press-releases/2020/06/25/judge-orders-line-5to-cease-operations.
3 Unless otherwise noted, “Dkt.” refers to the Sixth Circuit’s
docket in the case below, 6th Cir. No. 23-1671. “Dist. Dkt.” refers
to the district court’s docket in the case below, W.D. Mich. No.
1:21-cv-1057. And “Gov. Dkt.” refers the district court’s docket in
Michigan v. Enbridge, W.D. Mich. No. 1:20-cv-01142. Page cites
are to the document’s original page numbers, not the page numbers of the ECF header.
12
Governor 4 determined that Enbridge had committed
numerous breaches of the 1953 easement’s terms and
conditions. Id. at 11–17. She also agreed with the Attorney General’s claims that the easement should be
revoked on public-trust grounds. Id. at 2–9.
On November 13, 2020, the Governor issued a Notice of Revocation and Termination of Easement,
which informed Enbridge that the State was revoking
the easement on public-trust grounds, and, alternatively, terminating the easement for breach. Id. at 1–
20. The Governor filed a state-court lawsuit to enforce
the Notice, expecting that it would be consolidated
with the Attorney General’s action, in which the same
public-trust revocation issues were pending. Gov. Dkt.
1-1.
On November 24, 2020, however, Enbridge removed the Governor’s case to federal court. Gov.
Dkt. 1. Enbridge also filed a separate suit in federal
court asserting that the Notice of Revocation and Termination violated federal law. 5
As grounds for removing the Governor’s case,
Enbridge asserted that, although the parties were not
diverse and no element of any claim turned on federal
law, there was federal subject-matter jurisdiction under the doctrine of Grable & Sons Metal Products, Inc.
4 For consistency with the opinion below, this brief uses “the Governor” to refer collectively to the Governor and DNR Director;
“the Governor’s case” refers to Michigan v. Enbridge, W.D. Mich.
No. 1:20-cv-01142.
5 Enbridge v. Whitmer, No. 1:20-cv-01141, Dkt. 1 (W.D. Mich.
Nov. 24, 2020).
13
v. Darue Engineering & Manufacturing, 545 U.S. 308
(2005), because the complaint “necessarily raised” substantial questions regarding federal foreign affairs
powers, the 1977 U.S.-Canada Transit Pipelines
Treaty, the federal Pipeline Safety Act, and the federal
Submerged Lands Act. Gov. Dkt. 1:4–12. Enbridge
also alleged that there was federal jurisdiction under
the federal officer removal statute. Gov. Dkt. 1:5, 12–
13. Enbridge did not remove the Attorney General’s
“virtually identical lawsuit,” Pet. Br. 10, at that time.
On December 12, 2020, Enbridge filed an amended
notice of removal in the Governor’s case, adding more
grounds for federal jurisdiction, including that the
public-trust claims arose under federal common law.
Gov. Dkt. 12:3–11. Enbridge did not remove this suit
at that time either.
The Governor filed a motion to remand her case to
state court, disputing each of the jurisdictional theories Enbridge had advanced. Gov. Dkt. 41, 42. On January 15, 2021, the state court in this case convened a
status conference to address how the case should proceed given the parallel federal litigation. J.A. 59a. The
parties agreed to have this state-court case held in
abeyance pending a decision on the Governor’s motion
to remand. Id.
On November 16, 2021, the district court denied
the Governor’s motion. Gov. Dkt. 80. The district court
held that Grable jurisdiction existed because resolving
the Governor’s state-law claims would necessarily require interpreting the federal Pipeline Safety Act, the
federal Submerged Lands Act, and the 1977 Transit
14
Pipelines Treaty. Id. at 5–15. The Governor disagreed
with that ruling. But rather than challenge it or litigate overlapping claims in a different forum from the
Attorney General, the Governor voluntarily dismissed
her case on November 30, 2021, believing that doing
so would enable the Attorney General’s earlier-filed
case to resume. Gov. Dkt. 83.
The state court scheduled a status conference for
January 7, 2022, to discuss whether this case should
continue to be held in abeyance since the Governor’s
motion had been resolved. J.A. 58a. Before that status
conference could occur, Enbridge removed this case to
federal court. J.A. 1a–20a.
3. Removal of Nessel v. Enbridge and the
Attorney General’s Motion to Remand
Enbridge’s notice of removal was filed on December 15, 2021, J.A. 19a, approximately two and a half
years after Enbridge was served with the complaint,
and after the state court had received substantive
briefing on the merits, held multiple hearings, and issued a TRO over Enbridge’s objection.
Enbridge’s grounds for removal were “the same
grounds invoked when it removed the Governor’s
suit,” Pet. Br. 18, more than a year earlier: Grable, federal common law, and the federal officer removal statute, J.A. 9a–17a. As to timeliness, Enbridge asserted
that § 1446(b)(3) applied because Enbridge could not
have “ascertained” that this case was removable until
the district court denied the Governor’s motion to remand 29 days earlier. J.A. 8a–9a. Enbridge did not
15
rely on any equitable exception to the 30-day removal
deadline in § 1446(b)(1).
On January 14, 2022, the Attorney General filed a
timely motion to remand, arguing that Enbridge’s notice of removal was untimely under § 1446(b)(1), that
§ 1446(b)(3) did not apply, and that there was no federal subject-matter jurisdiction over the Attorney General’s state-law claims. Dist. Dkt. 10, 11:1–25.
Enbridge responded that the notice of removal was
timely under § 1446(b)(3) and that federal jurisdiction
existed for the same reasons set forth in the ruling in
the Governor’s case. Dist. Dkt. 20:1–25. Enbridge did
not ask the district court to excuse the 30-day deadline
on equitable grounds.
D. Opinions Below
1. The District Court’s Opinion
The district court denied the Attorney General’s
motion to remand. Pet. App. 26a–42a. The court based
its ruling on a ground that had not been briefed or argued: that § 1446(b)(1)’s 30-day removal deadline “is
overcome in exceptional circumstances, where overriding federal interests or compelling equitable considerations are evidenced.” Pet. App. 31a–32a. The district
court excused Enbridge’s noncompliance with the statutory removal deadline based on its view of several
factors. It emphasized the importance of the federal issues in the case and the desirability of having the Attorney General’s claims heard in the same forum as
Enbridge’s later-filed suit against the Governor. Pet.
App. 33a, 35a, 41a–42a. The court also described the
16
Attorney General’s act of seeking remand as “forum
manipulation,” even though the Attorney General
merely sought to return the case to the forum in which
it was brought over two years prior and had been litigated at length. Pet. App. 40a.
The district court refused to consider the subjectmatter jurisdiction issue, relying on its ruling in the
Governor’s case and holding that the Attorney General
was estopped from disputing that there was federal jurisdiction in this separate case. Pet. App. 38a–42a.
The Attorney General moved the district court to
certify its opinion for interlocutory appeal under 28
U.S.C. § 1292(b). Dist. Dkt. 24, 25:1–14. On February
17, 2023, after waiting approximately five months for
a ruling on that motion, the Attorney General petitioned the Sixth Circuit for a writ of mandamus. 6 The
next business day, the district court granted the motion and certified three issues for appeal: (1) whether
the 30-day removal period in § 1446(b)(1) is mandatory; (2) whether the district court’s order denying the
Governor’s motion for remand constituted an order
from which Enbridge could first ascertain that this
case was removable under § 1446(b)(3); and (3)
whether there is Grable jurisdiction over this case.
Pet. App. 44a. The Attorney General then filed a request for permission to appeal, which the Sixth Circuit
granted, simultaneously denying the petition for writ
of mandamus as moot. Pet. App. 46a–49a.
6 In re: Dana Nessel, 6th Cir. No. 23-1148, Dkt. 1.
17
2. The Sixth Circuit’s Opinion
The Sixth Circuit did not reach the issue of federal
subject-matter jurisdiction because it held that
Enbridge’s notice of removal was untimely under
§ 1446(b) and that the district court could not excuse
that mandatory requirement on atextual grounds. Pet.
App. 7a–8a, 24a.
The Sixth Circuit first noted that “Enbridge unquestionably did not comply with § 1446(b)(1)’s initial
30-day removal deadline,” “miss[ing] that deadline by
over two years.” Pet. App. 9a. The court of appeals
then observed that for § 1446(b)(3)’s later removal window to apply, Enbridge had to show three things: (1)
the case stated by the initial pleading was not removable; (2) something changed that “transformed this initially nonremovable case into one that was removable”; and (3) no more than 30 days before December 15,
2021—when the notice of removal was filed—
Enbridge received a document from which it could first
be ascertained that this case was removable. Pet. App.
10a. Enbridge’s attempt to invoke § 1446(b)(3), the
Sixth Circuit held, failed on the first and third elements. Pet. App. 14a.
As to the first element, Enbridge’s argument that
the case was not initially removable was belied by its
“own actions,” as Enbridge “offer[ed] no explanation
regarding how the Governor’s case could be removable
from its outset but this case was not.” Pet. App. 12a–
13a. “At oral argument, Enbridge argued (for the first
time)” that the Governor’s Notice of Revocation and
Termination had sparked a foreign-affairs controversy, making this case removable when it had not
18
been initially so. Pet. App. 13a. The problem, the Sixth
Circuit explained, was that “while this unpreserved
argument might explain how this case initially was
not removable and then later became so,” it “clashe[d]
with Enbridge’s argument about the first ‘paper’ it received that allowed it to ‘ascertain’ that this case had
become removable.” J.A. 13a (brackets omitted).
Enbridge filed its notice of removal within 30 days of
only one document: the district court’s order denying
remand in the Governor’s case. Canada’s interest in
the controversy came much earlier. 7 Thus, the Sixth
Circuit held, “Enbridge missed § 1446(b)(1)’s initial
window for removal, and to the extent § 1446(b)(3)’s
later removal window was ever open, Enbridge missed
that one too.” Pet. App. 17a.
Having found that there was no express statutory
authorization to remove this case on December 15,
2021, the Sixth Circuit turned to the district court’s
alternative rationale—that Enbridge could be allowed
to remove the case outside of the statutory timeframe
based on unwritten, equitable considerations. Pet.
App. 18a–24a. The court of appeals stated that while
§ 1446(b)’s time limits are not jurisdictional—an issue
neither party disputed—this “does not resolve the issue before us” because nonjurisdictional rules can be
mandatory and unalterable when timely raised. Pet.
App. 18a–19a. It was therefore necessary to determine
whether § 1446(b)’s “non-jurisdictional time limits are
7 Enbridge’s brief refers to a committee hearing that occurred on
March 4, 2021, a report issued in April 2021, a statement issued
on May 6, 2021, and another statement made on October 4, 2021.
Pet. Br. 11, 14–15 & nn. 6–8. All of those events occurred more
than 30 days prior to December 15, 2021.
19
mandatory and thus immune from equitable exceptions.” J.A. 20a.
To do this, the Sixth Circuit employed the “usual
tools of statutory construction … , focusing on whether
the statute as a whole allows flexibility for extra-textual exceptions.” Pet. App. 20a. The court held that it
did not, reasoning:
•
The statute’s text (“shall be filed within 30 days,”
followed by “whichever period is shorter”) suggests
“an intent for strict enforcement.” Pet. App. 20a.
•
The statute’s structure (containing a default rule
followed by “explicit exceptions—and carveouts
from those exceptions”) meant that the district
court’s approach required “adding a judicially
made exception to Congress’s detailed, express
scheme of exceptions and carveouts, an action the
Supreme Court has cautioned against.” Pet. App.
20a–22a.
•
The statutory context suggested strictness because
the removal deadline is nestled near jurisdictional
provisions and substantively “intertwined with
questions of whether and when the defendant had
grounds to argue for federal jurisdiction.” Pet. App.
22a.
•
Background principles militate against creating
extra-textual exceptions to the removal deadline,
as “[o]verwhelming authority provides that removal statutes—such as § 1446(b)—are to be
strictly construed against removal out of respect for
state sovereignty.” Pet. App. 22a.
20
•
Precedent pointed in the same direction, as courts
“have consistently rejected invitations to engraft
unwritten equitable exceptions into the removal
statute,” and the cases Enbridge cited to the contrary were distinguishable and not persuasive. Pet.
App. 24a; see also Br. in Opp. 11–15 (collecting
cases).
The Sixth Circuit concluded: “§ 1446(b)’s time limitations are mandatory. When invoked in a timely motion to remand, these limitations leave no room for equitable exceptions.” Pet. App. 24a.
Enbridge petitioned for en banc rehearing on the
issue of whether § 1446(b)(3) applied. Dkt. 55. The
Sixth Circuit denied that petition, with no judge voting
to rehear the case. Pet. App. 50a.
21
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Federal district courts “possess only that power
authorized by Constitution and statute, which is not
to be expanded by judicial decree.” Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994) (internal citations omitted). Nothing in the Constitution
or any statute expressly authorizes district courts to
permit the removal of a state court lawsuit after the
statutory deadline has passed.
Enbridge argues that express authorization is not
necessary for removal here because this Court should
presume that district courts have implied authority to
permit untimely removals. That argument fails for
three reasons.
First, no presumption of equitable tolling applies
to § 1446(b)(1). The traditional practice of equitable
tolling applies only to statutes of limitations, which
begin to run when a plaintiff’s cause of action accrues
and prevent the plaintiff from bringing its claim after
too long has passed. Such limitations periods protect
defendants from stale claims and provide certainty
about potential liabilities. But strictly enforcing statutes of limitations can entail harsh results, preventing
claimants from seeking judicial relief solely due to the
passage of time. So, courts have historically allowed
equitable exceptions when necessary to further the interests of justice.
The removal deadline is not a statute of limitations. It does not begin to run when a plaintiff’s cause
of action accrues, does not prevent a plaintiff from
seeking judicial relief after a designated time period
22
has passed, and has nothing to do with protecting defendants from stale claims. Instead, it relates to a forum issue that arises only after a claim for relief has
been brought. Enforcing the removal deadline does not
bar a claimant from seeking judicial relief; it merely
ensures the dispute is decided in the plaintiff’s chosen
forum. Because there is no traditional practice of equitably tolling such deadlines, no presumption applies.
The context of removal further supports this conclusion. This Court has been more willing to apply a
presumption of equitable tolling in contexts that are
uniquely protective of claimants and where laypersons
rather than trained lawyers file claims. But the Court
has been less likely to indulge the presumption where,
as here, a deadline serves not to protect defendants
from stale claims but to achieve system-related goals
related to judicial efficiency and claims administration. The removal deadline arises in the context of ordinary civil litigation, and it governs the transfer of
jurisdiction from one court to another. In this setting,
strictness—not flexibility—should be presumed.
Relying on a presumption in this context also runs
counter to federalism principles. This Court has repeatedly held that removal statutes must be strictly
construed out of respect for state sovereignty. Only
Congress can authorize the removal of a case from a
state court of concurrent jurisdiction. Where Congress
has not expressly done so, federal courts cannot assert
implied authority to interfere with state proceedings.
Without the presumption on which Enbridge so
heavily relies, this is an easy case: The removal statute
23
prescribes a strict time limit using mandatory language, and its express requirement should be enforced
as written.
Second, even if the Court were to begin with a
presumption of equitable tolling, the presumption
would be rebutted. The text, structure, history, and
purpose of the removal deadline foreclose adding an
implied equitable tolling provision.
The text of § 1446(b)(1) creates a strict requirement. Congress used the mandatory word “shall” and
designated timely removal as a “requirement.” And
the statute prescribes the “shorter” of two alternative
deadlines, suggesting an intent for strict enforcement.
The structure of the removal statute further establishes that Congress did not intend to permit equitable
tolling of § 1446(b)(1). The statute contains at least six
express exceptions to § 1446(b)(1)—§§ 1446(b)(2)(C),
1446(b)(3),
1441(d),
1441(e)(1),
1442a,
and
1454(b)(2)—foreclosing additional, implied ones. In
specifying these exceptions, Congress considered equitable factors (even permitting extensions “for cause
shown” or “with leave of the district court” in particular situations) and limited the relief available, demonstrating that it did not want courts to toll the deadline
outside those parameters.
The statutory history also shows Congress’s deliberate decision to set a fixed deadline for removal and
to specify any exceptions. The current 30-day limit is
the result of trial and error over the past 235 years,
with Congress carefully balancing competing values
and interests in our dual state-federal system.
24
Through several successive acts, Congress has assumed responsibility for articulating uniform rules
that govern when late removal may be sought, rather
than delegating that task for courts to determine on a
case-by-case basis.
The purposes of § 1446(b)(1) likewise support the
conclusion that it is not subject to equitable tolling.
Congress intended for removal to be sought as early as
possible in the proceedings—certainly not two and a
half years into them—to limit forum manipulation by
defendants; minimize waste of judicial resources; and
achieve nationwide uniformity. Applying the removal
deadline as written furthers each of these objectives.
Third, even if § 1446(b)(1)’s removal deadline
were amenable to equitable tolling, this case would not
remotely qualify for it. Equitable tolling applies only
when a claimant diligently pursues its rights and an
extraordinary circumstance prevents a timely filing.
Here, nothing of the sort occurred: No extraordinary
circumstance prevented Enbridge from filing a notice
of removal when it first raised its federal preemption
arguments in September 2019 or, at a minimum, when
it removed the Governor’s “virtually identical” case in
November 2020 based on the “same grounds” it invoked here. Pet. Br. 10, 18. Thus, even if the Court
were to find that a presumption of equitable tolling applies and is not overcome by the statute’s text, structure, history, and purpose, tolling would still be unavailable and Enbridge’s removal untimely.
25
ARGUMENT
“This Court has identified three types of time limits: (1) jurisdictional deadlines; (2) mandatory claimprocessing rules; and (3) time-related directives.”
McIntosh v. United States, 601 U.S. 330, 337 (2024).
The 30-day limit contained in 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(1) is
not jurisdictional. 8 Therefore, it need not be policed by
courts sua sponte and is subject to forfeiture if not
timely raised in a motion to remand. See Hamer v.
Neighborhood Hous. Servs. of Chi., 583 U.S. 17, 19
(2017).
But “calling a rule nonjurisdictional does not mean
that it is not mandatory or that a timely objection can
be ignored.” Gonzalez v. Thaler, 565 U.S. 134, 146
(2012). Some nonjurisdictional rules are “mandatory,”
meaning “they are ‘unalterable’ if properly raised by
an opposing party.” Nutraceutical, 586 U.S. at 192
(quoting Manrique v. United States, 581 U.S. 116, 121
(2017)). When the opposing party “alerts the court to
the deadline and invokes its protection,” as the Attorney General did here, “the relevant action cannot be
taken after the deadline has passed.” McIntosh, 601
U.S. at 337.
Because the requirements for removal are statutory, “Congress sets the rules—and courts have a role
8 Enbridge argues this point, but it is not in dispute. The court of
appeals held that § 1446(b)(1) is nonjurisdictional, Pet. App. 19a,
and the Attorney General did not argue otherwise below. In any
event, “[w]hether a rule precludes equitable tolling turns not on
its jurisdictional character but rather on whether the text of the
rule leaves room for such flexibility.” Nutraceutical Corp. v. Lambert, 586 U.S. 188, 192 (2019).
26
in creating exceptions only if Congress wants them to.”
Ross v. Blake, 578 U.S. 632, 639 (2016). Courts “are
not at liberty to create an exception where Congress
has declined to do so.” Hallstrom v. Tillamook, 493
U.S. 20, 27 (1989). Whether § 1446(b)(1) is mandatory
or subject to equitable tolling is therefore “fundamentally a question of statutory intent.” Lozano, 572 U.S.
at 10.
As shown below, Congress intended the 30-day removal deadline to be mandatory and not subject to equitable tolling. Congress did not expressly authorize
equitable tolling in § 1446(b)(1). The provision thus is
not subject to equitable tolling unless a background
presumption of equitable tolling applies and is not inconsistent with the statute’s text and design. But no
such presumption applies here; and even if it did, the
presumption is overcome.
I.
No presumption of equitable tolling applies
to § 1446(b)(1).
“In statutory interpretation disputes, a court’s
proper starting point lies in a careful examination of
the ordinary meaning and structure of the law itself.”
Food Mktg. Inst. v. Argus Leader Media, 588 U.S. 427,
436 (2019) (citation omitted). When a statute’s text
and structure are clear, “judges must stop,” id., and
“resist reading words … into a statute that do not appear on its face,” Dean v. United States, 556 U.S. 568,
572 (2009) (cleaned up).
Enbridge advocates a different approach, beginning not with the statute’s text and structure, but with
27
a presumption of equitable tolling. Such a starting
point works only where “a long-established feature of
American jurisprudence” allows courts to presume
that Congress left in place a common-law adjudicatory
principle. Lozano, 572 U.S. at 10. It does not work
here.
Equitable tolling “is a traditional feature of American jurisprudence and a background principle against
which Congress drafts limitations periods.” Arellano,
598 U.S. at 6. Accordingly, this Court “presume[s] that
federal statutes of limitations are subject to equitable
tolling.” Id. But the Court has “only applied that presumption to statutes of limitations.” Lozano, 572 U.S.
at 13–14; see Hallstrom, 493 U.S. at 27 (holding that
a 60-day notice provision that did not function as a
statute of limitations was not subject to equitable tolling). Because § 1446(b)(1)’s removal deadline is not a
statute of limitations, no presumption of equitable tolling applies, and a court may not read an atextual exception into the statute. The removal context and federalism principles confirm that result.
A. Section 1446(b)(1)’s removal deadline is
not a statute of limitations.
Whether a time limit “is a statute of limitations
depends on its functional characteristics.” Lozano, 572
U.S. at 15 n.6. Statutes of limitations “establish the
period of time within which a claimant must bring an
action.” Id. at 14 (citation omitted); see Young v.
United States, 535 U.S. 43, 47–48 (2002) (citation
omitted) (explaining that limitations periods “prescribe[] a period within which certain rights … may be
28
enforced” and “define a subset of claims eligible for certain remedies”). They are triggered by the event giving
rise to the cause of action, Hallstrom, 493 U.S. at 27;
“characteristically embody a policy of repose, designed
to protect defendants”; and “foster the elimination of
stale claims, and certainty about a plaintiff’s opportunity for recovery and a defendant’s potential liabilities,” Lozano, 572 U.S. at 14 (cleaned up). This Court
applies a presumption of equitable tolling only “if the
period in question is a statute of limitations” based on
these functional traits. Id. at 11. 9
Section 1446(b)(1) possesses none of these traits.
The 30-day removal deadline does not apply to plaintiffs at all, let alone bar them from bringing a claim for
relief after a certain period. It is not triggered by the
event giving rise to the cause of action, does not protect
the defendant from stale claims, and does not define a
subset of claims eligible for judicial remedies. Instead,
removal is a forum issue that arises only after a claim
for relief has been brought.
Because § 1446(b)(1) does not function as a statute
of limitations, the concerns that call for the availability of equitable tolling are absent. Strictly applying a
9 E.g., Boechler, P.C. v. Comm’r of Internal Rev., 596 U.S. 199,
209–11 (2022) (deadline to seek judicial review of agency action);
Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 645–46 (2010) (deadline to seek
habeas relief); Young, 535 U.S. at 47 (2002) (three-year lookback
period that “serves the same ‘basic policies’ ” as a statute of limitations: “repose, elimination of stale claims, and certainty about
a plaintiff’s opportunity for recovery” (citation omitted)); Zipes v.
Trans World Airlines, Inc., 455 U.S. 385, 394 (1982) (citation
omitted) (Title VII deadline adopted to “prevent[] the pressing of
‘stale’ claims, the end served by a statute of limitations”).
29
statute of limitations can result in “the potentially
harsh consequence of barring a meritorious claim before the plaintiff has a reasonable chance to assert his
legal rights.” United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111,
126 (1979) (Stevens, J., dissenting). But strictly enforcing the removal deadline does not have this consequence. The litigation simply remains in the plaintiff’s
chosen forum—hardly the sort of severe result that
warrants judicial deviation from statutory text. Arguing otherwise would be inconsistent with “a foundational principle of our federal system: State courts are
adequate forums for the vindication of federal rights.”
Burt v. Titlow, 571 U.S. 12, 19 (2013).
Moreover, this Court has been most willing to apply a presumption of equitable tolling when a statute
of limitations appears in an “unusually protective”
statutory scheme in which “laymen, unassisted by
trained lawyers,” often “initiate the process.” Boechler,
596 U.S. at 209 (cleaned up) (tax filings); see also, e.g.,
Holland, 560 U.S. at 653 (habeas); Zipes, 455 U.S. at
397 (Title VII); Oscar Mayer & Co. v. Evans, 441 U.S.
750, 761 (1979) (ADEA). That makes sense because,
when the potentially harsh consequence of enforcing a
statute of limitations is combined with the unique equitable concerns that arise in pro se contexts, there are
strong reasons to think Congress left some flexibility
to courts. The removal deadline, by contrast, arises in
the context of ordinary civil litigation, and notices of
removal are “generally filed by trained lawyers who
are presumed to be aware of statutory requirements.”
Hallstrom, 493 U.S. at 28; see also McNeil v. United
States, 508 U.S. 106, 113 (1993) (“Our rules of procedure are based on the assumption that litigation is
30
normally conducted by lawyers.”); Sebelius v. Auburn
Reg’l Med. Ctr., 568 U.S. 145, 158–60 (2013) (rejecting
equitable tolling where a time limit was not a statute
of limitations and the statute was not remedial).
By asking this Court to presume equitable tolling
here, Enbridge invites the Court to extend the doctrine
beyond its traditional confines and to deviate from the
statute’s express requirements where the concerns
that animated the common-law doctrine do not apply.
The Court should decline that invitation.
B. The context of removal underscores that
no presumption applies.
When a time limit does not “seek primarily to protect defendants against stale or unduly delayed
claims,” but instead “seeks to achieve a broader system-related goal, such as facilitating the administration of claims … or promoting judicial efficiency,” equitable tolling is likely to be inapt. John R. Sand &
Gravel Co. v. United States, 552 U.S. 130, 133–34
(2008) (citations omitted). The removal deadline fits
comfortably in this latter category.
“The right to remove a case from state to federal
court is purely statutory, being dependent on the will
of Congress.” Charles Alan Wright, Law of Federal
Courts § 38, p. 203 (8th ed. 2017). The procedure is
“quite anomalous” and was “unknown to the common
law.” Id. Placing a time limit on the exercise of this
procedural right serves institutional interests in judicial efficiency and ensures that forum issues are
promptly decided. See infra II.C.2.
31
This Court has long analogized the transfer of jurisdiction from state to federal court to the transfer of
jurisdiction from trial to appellate court. E.g., Martin
v. Hunter’s Lessee, 14 U.S. 304, 349 (1816). And time
prescriptions governing the transfer from one Article
III court to another are jurisdictional because only
Congress “can … determine when, and under what
conditions” federal courts can hear cases. Bowles v.
Russell, 551 U.S. 205, 212–13 (2007).
The Court in past cases has strictly enforced the
removal deadline, holding that “[i]t is essential to the
removal of a cause that the petition, provided for by
the statute, be filed … within the time fixed by statute,
unless the time be in some manner waived.” S. Pac.
Co. v. Stewart, 245 U.S. 359, 363 (1917) (citation omitted), vacated on other grounds, 245 U.S. 562 (1918);
see also infra II.D. Similar to a notice of appeal and
other forms of process required to invoke a federal
court’s jurisdiction, “the litigant has the right to rely
upon the statute, and to insist that, in compliance with
its terms, the case shall be taken from the state to the
Federal court … at the proper time.” Mackay v. Uinta
Dev. Co., 229 U.S. 173, 176 (1913).
If anything, that’s the tradition Congress had in
mind when it enacted the current version of the removal statute—one of strictly enforcing the removal
deadline, not equitably tolling it.
32
C. Federalism principles counsel against
expanding § 1446(b)(1)’s removal window
based on implied presumptions.
Principles of federalism also require strict construction of the removal deadline. “Out of respect for
state courts, this Court has time and again declined to
construe federal jurisdictional statutes more expansively than their language, most fairly read, requires.”
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc. v. Manning, 578 U.S. 374, 389 (2016). And it has “reiterated
the need to give due regard to the rightful independence of state governments—and more particularly, to
the power of the States to provide for the determination of controversies in their courts.” Id. (cleaned up).
This sovereign state power “may be restricted only
by the action of Congress in conformity to the Judiciary Articles of the Constitution.” Shamrock Oil, 313
U.S. at 108–09. So “a suit commenced in a state court
must remain there until cause is shown for its transfer
under some act of Congress.” Syngenta Crop Prot., Inc.
v. Henson, 537 U.S. 28, 32 (2002) (quoting Great N. R.
Co. v. Alexander, 246 U.S. 276, 280 (1918)). Courts
must be mindful of Congress’s role in “regulating the
jurisdiction of federal courts,” Shamrock, 313 U.S. at
108, and “statutory procedures for removal are to be
strictly construed,” Syngenta, 537 U.S. at 32.
Enbridge’s presumption-first approach to construing the removal statute is fundamentally at odds with
this principle. As the court below correctly recognized,
reading implied, equitable exceptions into the removal
statute is “incompatible with a strict construction of
§ 1446(b).” Pet. App. 23a.
33
II. Even if a presumption of equitable tolling
applied, the presumption would be rebutted.
If the Court starts with the statute’s text and
structure, rather than a presumption, this case is
straightforward: § 1446(b)(1) sets a firm deadline using mandatory language, and a court’s duty is to apply
the statute as written. But even assuming arguendo
that a presumption of equitable tolling applies, the
“presumption is rebutted if ‘there [is] good reason to
believe that Congress did not want the equitable tolling doctrine to apply.’ ” Arellano, 598 U.S. at 7 (quoting United States v. Brockamp, 519 U.S. 347, 350
(1997)). 10 Here, there is “very good reason” to so
10 Enbridge at times suggests there exists a clear statement rule
that must be met to rebut the presumption of equitable tolling.
See, e.g., Pet. Br. 45. That is incorrect. While a clear statement is
required to treat a procedural requirement as jurisdictional, see,
e.g., Harrow v. Dep’t of Defense, 601 U.S. 480, 484 (2024), the
standard to rebut the presumption of equitable tolling is the one
that this Court applied in Arellano and that the Sixth Circuit applied below: whether “there [is] good reason to believe that Congress did not want the equitable tolling doctrine to apply.” Arellano, 598 U.S. at 7 (quoting Brockamp, 519 U.S. at 350); accord
Pet. App. 20a; see also John R. Sand & Gravel Co., 552 U.S. at
137–38 (explaining that the presumption of Irwin v. Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, 498 U.S. 89 (1990) is “rebuttable,” “not conclusive,”
and that “statutory language” can “rebut the presumption by
demonstrating Congress’s intent to the contrary” (emphasis in
original)). The Court answers that question using traditional
tools of statutory construction. See Arellano, 598 U.S. at 8–12 (rejecting equitable tolling based on text and structure); Brockamp,
519 U.S. at 350–54 (rejecting equitable tolling based on text,
structure, purpose, and history); Auburn Reg’l, 568 U.S. at 159
(rejecting equitable tolling based on text, context, purpose, and
history). Although Nutraceutical spoke of “clear intent,” it used
34
believe. Id. The text, structure, history, and purpose of
the statute, as well as this Court’s precedent, demonstrate that § 1446(b)(1) is mandatory and not subject
to equitable tolling.
A. The text of § 1446(b)(1) creates a strict
requirement.
“Start with the text.” Arellano, 598 U.S. at 8. Section 1446(b)(1) provides that a notice of removal “shall
be filed within 30 days.” 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(1). “[T]he
mandatory ‘shall’ normally creates an obligation impervious to judicial discretion.” Ross, 578 U.S. at 639
(cleaned up). Although the use of “shall” does not necessarily make a time limitation jurisdictional, Auburn
Reg’l, 568 U.S. at 155, when Congress uses “that mandatory language” in a statutory requirement, as here,
a court ordinarily “may not excuse [the requirement],
even to take [special] circumstances into account,”
Ross, 578 U.S. at 639.
The surrounding textual cues reinforce that understanding. Congress located § 1446(b)(1) under the
heading “REQUIREMENTS; GENERALLY,” § 1446(b), and
this heading can inform the interpretation of the provision, see Dubin v. United States, 599 U.S. 110, 120–
21 (2023). A “requirement” means “something (as a
condition or quality) required”—that is, “something
wanted or needed: NECESSITY.” Requirement, Merriam-Webster’s Dictionary and Thesaurus 687 (2007
ed.); accord Requirement, Black’s Law Dictionary
that phrase to refer to a sufficient, not a necessary, condition. 586
U.S. at 192–93.
35
(10th ed. 2014) (“Something that must be done because
of a law or rule; something legally imposed, called for,
or demanded; an imperative command.”). 11 The operative sentence also directs courts to use the earlier of
two possible events—receipt of the initial pleading or
service of summons—“whichever period is shorter,”
§ 1446(b)(1), a phrase that suggests “an intent for
strict enforcement,” Pet. App. 20a. 12
This textual evidence indicates that Congress intended the 30-day deadline to operate as a strict requirement, or “mandatory condition[] precedent,” for
removal, which “a district court may not disregard” at
its discretion. Hallstrom, 493 U.S. at 31.
B. The structure of the removal statute
precludes
equitable
tolling
of
§ 1446(b)(1).
To determine whether the presumption of equitable tolling is overcome, this Court has paid special attention to the structure of the law crafted by Congress.
Arellano, 598 U.S. at 8–11; Brockamp, 519 U.S. at
11 The word “REQUIREMENTS” was added to 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)
by the Federal Courts Jurisdiction and Venue Clarification Act of
2011, Pub. L. No. 112-63, 125 Stat. 758 (2011).
12 Enbridge notes that Congress added this phrase to address
“atypical state commencement and complaint filing procedures.”
Murphy Bros. v. Michetti Pipe Stringing, Inc., 526 U.S. 344, 351–
53 & n.4 (1999); Pet. Br. 46. Nevertheless, as the court of appeals
and Enbridge’s amicus point out, the phrase’s language suggests
strictness, see Pet. App. 20a; Br. of Prof. Arthur R. Miller as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petrs. 6. Congress told courts to start
the clock as soon as a defendant could seek removal—not to extend it after it expires.
36
351–52. Indeed, the Court has cautioned against reading statutory language in isolation, particularly where
the statute’s provisions work together or cross-reference each other. Arellano, 598 U.S. at 12.
Here, the structure of the federal removal statute
establishes that § 1446(b)(1) is not subject to equitable
tolling. In 28 U.S.C. §§ 1441–1455, Congress repeatedly cross-referenced § 1446’s requirements and specified at least six express exceptions to § 1446(b)(1)’s default 30-day time limit (and, in places, exceptions to
those exceptions). “Atextual judicial supplementation”
is inappropriate where, as here, “Congress has shown
that it knows how to adopt the omitted language or
provision.” Rotkiske v. Klemm, 589 U.S. 8, 14 (2019).
In addition, several of these “specific exceptions” account for equitable factors, which “heightens the structural inference” that § 1446(b)(1) may not be tolled.
Arellano, 598 U.S. at 9.
1. The removal statute contains six express
exceptions to § 1446(b)(1), foreclosing
additional, implied ones.
“Where Congress explicitly enumerates certain exceptions to a general [requirement], additional exceptions are not to be implied.” TRW Inc. v. Andrews, 534
U.S. 19, 28 (2001) (quoting Andrus v. Glover Constr.
Co., 446 U.S. 608, 616–17 (1980)); accord Hillman v.
Maretta, 569 U.S. 483, 496 (2013). This Court has refused to read equitable exceptions into detailed statutes that reiterated basic time limits multiple times
and made express exceptions in specified circumstances. See Brockamp, 519 U.S. at 350–52 (declining
37
to infer equitable tolling where a statute set forth time
limits “in a highly detailed technical manner,” repeated them “several times,” and included “explicit exceptions” that omitted tolling); Arellano, 598 U.S. at 8
(rejecting tolling where a statute included express exceptions “and equitable tolling [wa]s not on the list”).
The removal statute, which reiterates § 1446(b)’s time
limits multiple times and contains a detailed scheme
of exceptions and carveouts, dictates the same result.
Section 1446(b)(1) sets the default rule for removal
of civil actions: a notice of removal “shall be filed
within 30 days” after receipt of the initial pleading or
summons. If those documents are received at different
times, the relevant deadline is “whichever period is
shorter.” § 1446(b)(1).
Two exceptions to that default rule appear in
§ 1446(b) itself. First, subsection (b)(2)(B), which expressly cross-references subsection (b)(1), explains
that the usual 30-day deadline applies to each defendant in a multidefendant case. Subsection (b)(2)(C),
however, creates an exception: “If defendants are
served at different times,” an earlier-served defendant
may consent to a later-served defendant’s removal,
“even though that earlier-served defendant did not
previously initiate or consent to removal” within its
typical 30-day window.
Second, § 1446(b)(3) creates another exception to
(b)(1): “[I]f the case stated by the initial pleading is not
removable,” the removal period extends until “thirty
days after receipt … of a copy of an amended pleading,
motion, order or other paper from which it may first be
38
ascertained that the case is one which is or has become
removable.” This exception has its own caveat, though,
contained in § 1446(c)(1): “A case may not be removed
under subsection (b)(3) on the basis of [diversity] jurisdiction … more than 1 year after commencement of the
action.” But that caveat does not apply if “the district
court finds that the plaintiff has acted in bad faith in
order to prevent a defendant from removing the action.” § 1446(c)(1); see also § 1446(c)(3)(B) (“bad faith”
includes “deliberately fail[ing] to disclose the actual
amount in controversy to prevent removal”). 13
Four more exceptions—exceptions three through
six—appear elsewhere in the removal statute:
Third, § 1441(d) provides that for civil actions
against foreign states, “the time limitations of section
1446(b) of this chapter may be enlarged at any time for
cause shown.” This exception was added due to Congress’s “preference that actions involving foreign
states be tried in federal courts.” H.R. Rep. No. 1487,
94th Cong., 2d Sess. 32 (1976).
Fourth, § 1441(e) also references § 1446, clarifying
that for civil cases arising from certain mass accidents,
removal “shall be made in accordance with section
1446 of this title, except that a notice of removal may
also be filed … within 30 days after the date on which
the defendant first becomes a party to [a covered action], or at a later time with leave of the district court.”
§ 1441(e)(1) (emphasis added). This exception
13 Yet another carveout appears in § 1453, which expressly incor-
porates § 1446 for class action removals, “except that the 1-year
limitation under section 1446(c)(1) shall not apply.” § 1453(b).
39
authorizes district courts to extend the removal deadline “because consolidated adjudication of mass tort
cases may further important systemic interests.” H.R.
Rep. No. 889, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 42 (1988).
Fifth, § 1442a permits the removal of certain civil
actions “against a member of the armed forces of the
United States” “at any time before the trial or final
hearing thereof.” § 1442a. Without this exception, a
civil suit of this kind would be subject to the default
removal deadline in § 1446(b)(1).
Sixth, § 1454(b) provides that the removal of civil
actions asserting patent, plant variety protection, or
copyright claims shall be “in accordance with section
1446, except that if the removal is based solely on this
section … the time limitations contained in section
1446(b) may be extended at any time for cause shown.”
§ 1454(b)(2) (emphasis added). Once more, a reiteration of the default rule, an express exception, and a
clear statutory authorization for a court to extend the
deadline “for cause shown.” 14
14 Although not an exception to § 1446(b)(1), which applies only
in civil cases, the procedure for criminal removal in § 1455 further demonstrates that Congress knows how to grant courts authority to extend removal deadlines when it wants: “A notice of
removal of a criminal prosecution shall be filed not later than 30
days after the arraignment in the State court, or at any time before trial, whichever is earlier, except that for good cause shown
the United States district court may enter an order granting the
defendant or defendants leave to file the notice at a later time.”
§ 1455(b)(1). Congress’s creation of a good-cause exception to this
related removal deadline evidences its intent not to provide one
in § 1446(b)(1). Bittner v. United States, 598 U.S. 85, 94 (2023)
40
This robust and “explicit listing of exceptions” indicates “that Congress did not intend courts to read
other unmentioned, open-ended, ‘equitable’ exceptions
into the statute that it wrote.” Brockamp, 519 U.S. at
352. “It would be inconsistent with this comprehensive
scheme for an adjudicator to extend [the deadline]
through the doctrine of equitable tolling.” Arellano,
598 U.S. at 7.
Enbridge contends that the statute does not contain any “exceptions” to the 30-day deadline but
merely sets different “triggers” for removal. Pet. Br.
46–47. That argument does not withstand scrutiny.
As an initial matter, Enbridge misses exceptions
three through six, which are not addressed at all in its
brief. The omission is glaring because three of those
exceptions—§ 1441(d), § 1441(e), and § 1454(b)—expressly cross-reference § 1446 and provide the exact
sort of language Enbridge claims is missing—speaking
directly to “the court’s authority to toll” the deadline.
Contra Pet. Br. 33. And § 1441(d) and § 1454(b) do not
trigger anything because they do not change when the
30-day clock begins to run.
Even for the two provisions Enbridge does
acknowledge, the “mere trigger” characterization does
not work. Section 1446(b)(1) is unqualified and, by its
terms, applies to every civil action. Subsections (b)(2)
and (b)(3) take subsets of civil actions—cases involving
(“When Congress includes particular language in one section of a
statute but omits it from a neighbor, we normally understand
that difference in language to convey a difference in meaning (expressio unius est exclusio alterius).”).
41
multiple defendants served at different times, and
those in which “the case stated by the initial pleading
is not removable”—outside of subsection (b)(1). In doing so, (b)(2) and (b)(3) make exceptions to the usual
rule that a defendant desiring to remove a case must
file a notice of removal within 30 days after receiving
the complaint or summons.
Consider this Court’s recent analysis in Arellano.
The statute there established a baseline timing rule,
then listed multiple circumstances in which a different
event (for example, the veteran’s discharge or a qualifying injury) would control the effective date of an
award of disability compensation. The Court treated
each such alternative operative dates as “exceptions”
to the baseline. See 598 U.S. at 8–11. And the reason
was straightforward: Congress’s choice to make different events the operative dates is what makes them exceptions—because those provisions displace the ordinary clock for the cases they cover. See id.
So too here. Section 1446(b)(1) sets the default 30day period based on receipt of the initial pleading or
summons; subsections (b)(2) and (b)(3) identify defined
categories in which a different event—the later removal by a co-defendant, or receipt of the first paper
showing removability—controls. Labeling those carveouts “triggers” does not change their character under
Arellano. They are exceptions to the baseline timing
rule, and their presence forecloses adding an atextual,
free-floating tolling overlay onto § 1446(b)(1).
The large number of express exceptions matters
because it shows that Congress did the tailoring itself,
42
leaving no gap for judge-made tolling. Compare
Brockamp, 519 U.S. at 351–52 (refusing to apply equitable tolling to a statutory filing deadline with six explicit exceptions), and Arellano, 598 U.S. at 8–9 (refusing to apply equitable tolling where the statute contained 16 explicit exceptions), with Boechler, 596 U.S.
at 209–10 (noting that a limitations period “admit[ted]
of a single exception,” and holding that it was subject
to equitable tolling), and Holland, 560 U.S. at 647–48
(applying equitable tolling to a deadline with a single
statutory exception).
2. Multiple
exceptions
account
for
equitable concerns, strengthening the
structural inference that § 1446(b)(1) is
not subject to tolling.
Multiple of the specific exceptions listed above—
§ 1446(b)(3)’s ascertainability rule; § 1446(c)(1)’s “bad
faith” exception; and the provisions authorizing certain late removals “for cause shown” or “with leave of
the district court”—already account for equitable considerations. This “heightens the structural inference”
that § 1441(b)(1) is not subject to equitable tolling because it “strongly suggests that [Congress] did not expect an adjudicator to add a broader range of equitable
factors to the mix.” Arellano, 598 U.S. at 9–10; see
United States v. Beggerly, 524 U.S. 38, 48–49 (1998).
Section 1446(b)(3) is the principal safety valve
Congress wrote into the removal scheme. It ensures
that a defendant who could not discover removability
from the initial pleading may remove within 30 days
after receiving “an amended pleading, motion, order or
43
other paper from which it may first be ascertained that
the case is one which is or has become removable.”
§ 1446(b)(3). Thus, “by providing that the [time limit]
will not begin to run until the [defendant] ‘knew or
should have known of’ ” removability, the statute “has
already effectively allowed for equitable tolling.”
Beggerly, 524 U.S. at 48 (quoting Irwin, 498 U.S. at
96). Indeed, whenever the requirements of § 1446(b)(3)
are met, the predicates for equitable tolling exist. If
§ 1446(b)(1) may be equitably tolled, “the express exception [in § 1446(b)(3)] would be rendered insignificant, if not wholly superfluous.” TRW Inc., 534 U.S. at
31 (quoting Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 174
(2001)).
Moreover, Congress limited § 1446(b)(3) in diversity cases by placing a one-year cap in § 1446(c)(1).
This is significant because “[w]hen Congress has already considered equitable concerns and limited the
relief available, ‘additional equitable tolling would be
unwarranted.’ ” Arellano, 598 U.S. at 10 (emphasis
added) (quoting Beggerly, 524 U.S. at 48–49). Here,
Congress included an express exception to the ordinary 30-day deadline to ensure that defendants have
an opportunity to seek removal once removability can
be ascertained. Congress then cabined that exception,
first by § 1446(b)(3)’s plain text and second by the oneyear cap in § 1446(c)(1).
Further, § 1446(c)(1)’s one-year cap has its own exception for when “the plaintiff has acted in bad faith
in order to prevent a defendant from removing the action.” That bad-faith provision is yet another example
of Congress expressly incorporating equitable
44
concerns when it wants to. And still other provisions—
extensions “for cause shown” or “with leave of the district court” in specific circumstances, §§ 1441(d),
1441(e)(1), 1454(b)(2)—can likewise account for equitable factors. In a calibrated framework that authorizes courts to extend deadlines in defined settings,
there is no warrant to read in a roving equitable power
to toll § 1446(b)(1).
C. Section 1446(b)(1)’s history and purpose
support the conclusion that Congress did
not intend equitable tolling.
The history and purpose of § 1446(b)(1) provide additional reasons to believe that Congress did not intend to delegate to courts a generalized power to extend the 30-day deadline based on case-by-case assessments of equitable factors.
1. The statutory history demonstrates
Congress’s deliberate decision to set a
fixed deadline for removal and to specify
any exceptions.
For more than two centuries, Congress has set a
definite time limit for removal. It has revisited that
limit when experience warranted and spoken expressly when it wanted flexibility. For the most part,
the removal deadline has been short by design. When
it was not, abuses occurred, and Congress swiftly responded by reverting to a shorter deadline and thereafter making slight adjustments to establish a uniform
timeframe. This history further demonstrates that
45
Congress did not leave any room for judicial alteration
of the 30-day deadline.
The removal deadline was originally quite strict.
The Judiciary Act of 1789 required that, to remove a
case, the defendant had to file a petition for removal
“at the time of entering his appearance.” Act of Sept.
24, 1789, § 12, 1 Stat. 79. The rationale for this rule
was that “the defendant, who had a right of removal,
and failed to exercise it at the earliest period possible,
should be presumed to have acquiesced in the forum
chosen by the plaintiff.” Pullman Palace Car Co. v.
Speck, 113 U.S. 84, 85 (1885).
For a brief period during the Reconstruction era,
Congress enlarged the rule, allowing removal petitions
to be filed any time before the trial or final hearing of
the case. Act of July 27, 1886, 14 Stat. 306; Act of Mar.
2, 1867, 14 Stat. 558. That did not go well. Among
other things, defendants “abuse[d]” the generous
deadline, “experiment[ing]” in state court until they
met with difficulties or came to believe they would
lose, then they would change the forum. Speck, 113
U.S. at 87 (cleaned up).
“To prevent the[se] abuses,” Congress deliberately
re-tightened the removal deadline in 1875. Id.
(cleaned up). The revised statute required a petition
for removal to be filed “before or at the term at which
[the suit] could be first tried.” Act of Mar. 3, 1875, § 3,
18 Stat. 470. The party that desired removal “[wa]s not
permitted unreasonably to delay this election during
all the period incident to the preparation of the case.”
Speck, 113 U.S. at 86.
46
Seeing fit to narrow the removal period once more,
Congress in 1887 required removal petitions to be filed
when the defendant was required by state rules to answer or plead in response to the complaint. Act of Mar.
3, 1887, § 3, 24 Stat. 552. That remained the rule until
1948, when Congress again revised the removal statute to achieve national uniformity. See Murphy Bros.
v. Michetti Pipe Stringing, Inc., 526 U.S. 344, 351
(1999). Rather than allowing the deadline to vary
based on state pleading requirements, Congress fixed
a national time limit for removal: a petition was due
20 days after the complaint was filed or served, whichever was later. Id.
Congress amended the statute in 1949 to account
for “atypical state commencement and complaint filing
procedures,” ensuring that defendants in each state
had access to the complaint for 20 days before a petition for removal was due. Id. at 351–53 & n.4. Then,
in 1965, Congress changed the deadline to 30 days after finding that 20 days was too short to permit removal in States with substituted service laws. H.R.
Rep. No. 132, 89th Cong, 1st Sess. 1 (1965).
In 1988, Congress made two important changes.
First, it added § 1446(b)(3)’s one-year cap on removal
in diversity cases to “reduc[e] the opportunity for removal after substantial progress has been made in
state court” because “[r]emoval late in the proceedings
may result in substantial delay and disruption.” H.R.
Rep. No. 889, 100th Cong. 2d Sess. 72 (1988). Second,
Congress required motions to remand based on nonjurisdictional defects to be filed within 30 days of removal to prevent plaintiffs from “hold[ing] the defect
47
in reserve as a means of forum shopping if the litigation should take an unfavorable turn.” Id.; see 28
U.S.C. § 1447(c). 15
And in 2011, Congress made three more changes
that are relevant here. First, it codified the rule of unanimity, providing that each defendant has 30 days
from his or her own date of service to seek removal,
while permitting earlier-served defendants to consent
to a later-served defendant’s removal. § 1446(b)(2)(A)–
(C); H.R. Rep. No. 10, 112th Cong., 1st Sess. 14 (2011).
Congress added the exception in § 1446(b)(2)(C) to ensure “[f]airness to later-served defendants,” but noted
that this did not “allow an indefinite period for removal.” H.R. Rep. No. 10 at 14. Second, addressing a
circuit split over whether the one-year cap in diversity
cases could be equitably tolled, Congress rejected equitable tolling and instead authorized removal beyond
15 Enbridge argues that § 1447(c)—which says a case “shall be
remanded” if the federal court lacks jurisdiction—implies that remand of a case that was untimely removed is discretionary,
thereby creating an opening for equitable tolling. Pet. Br. 39. But
§ 1447(c) merely reflects the unique status of subject-matter jurisdiction, which “can never be waived or forfeited.” Gonzalez, 565
U.S. at 141. Nothing in § 1447(c) indicates Congress intended to
change the traditional rule that while an objection to timeliness
may be waived, remand is required when a case is not timely removed and the plaintiff promptly objects. See infra II.D.
If anything, § 1447(c) supports the Attorney General here.
Before 1988, motions for remand had to be filed only “within a
reasonable time.” See Snapper, Inc. v. Redan, 171 F.3d 1249,
1257 n.18 (11th Cir. 1999). By creating the 30-day limit for motions to remand, Congress sought to encourage prompt resolution
of forum issues and to prevent litigants from using the removal
statute as a means of forum shopping by sitting on their procedural rights. H.R. Rep. No. 889 at 72.
48
one year only upon a finding that the plaintiff acted in
bad faith to prevent removal. Id. at 15; see Hoyt v.
Lane Constr. Co., 927 F.3d 287, 294 (5th Cir. 2019) (explaining that the amendment abrogated prior cases allowing equitable tolling of § 1446(c)(1)). Third, Congress relocated criminal removal provisions to a separate section and, there, expressly permitted late filings
“for good cause shown.” 28 U.S.C. § 1455(b)(1); see supra note 14. It did not confer comparable authority for
civil removals.
This history confirms that it is Congress’s role to
set and adjust the timing rules for removal, and that
courts should not superimpose an atextual tolling exception on § 1446(b)(1)’s current 30-day deadline.
2. The purpose of § 1446(b)(1) is furthered
by enforcing it as written.
Enbridge argues that equitable tolling is needed to
further the statute’s purpose. Pet. Br. 20, 40. But “[i]t
was evidently the purpose of Congress to fix an earlier
and definite time [for removal], which would not permit the litigant to experiment in the State court until
satisfied he would fail there, and then change his forum.” Speck, 113 U.S. at 87; see Manning v. Amy, 140
U.S. 137, 141 (1891); Wilson v. Intercollegiate (Big
Ten) Conference Athletic Ass’n, 668 F.2d 962, 965 (7th
Cir. 1982) (Posner, J.) (“The purpose of the 30-day limitation is … to deprive the defendant of the undeserved
tactical advantage that he would have if he could wait
and see how he was faring in state court before deciding whether to remove the case to another court system.”).
49
The time limit also serves “to prevent the delay
and waste of resources involved in starting a case over
in a second court after significant proceedings … have
taken place in the first court,” Wilson, 668 F.2d at 965,
by resolving the choice of forum early in the litigation,
see H.R. Rep. No. 889, 100th Cong. 2d Sess. 72 (1988).
And applying a fixed deadline ensures national uniformity. Murphy, 526 U.S. at 351.
Each of these purposes is well served by a clear
and mandatory rule. A system of ad hoc exceptions, by
contrast, would require case-by-case determinations of
whether removal is warranted; create delay and costs
to both courts and litigants; and allow enterprising defendants to seek removal after first receiving an adverse decision in state court, as occurred here.
In weighing these costs against the benefits of an
extended removal deadline, Congress had “the power
to choose between rules, which prioritize efficiency
and predictability, and standards, which prioritize optimal results in individual cases.” Arellano, 598 U.S.
at 11. Congress chose a rule—a notice of removal
“shall be filed within 30 days,” § 1446(b)(1)—not a
standard—such as “for cause shown,” except in limited
contexts where there is a unique interest in a federal
forum, see §§ 1441(d), 1454(b)(2), 1455(b)(1). In other
words, Congress decided for itself “whether, or just
where and when,” to extend the statute’s deadlines,
“rather than delegate to the courts a generalized
power to do so wherever a court concludes that equity
so requires.” Brockamp, 519 U.S. at 353. That choice
must be respected. See Arellano, 598 U.S. at 11–12
(“Congress opted for rules in this statutory scheme,
50
and an equitable extension … would disrupt that
choice.”).
D. This Court has long treated the removal
deadline as mandatory.
Consistent with the opinion below, this Court has
long treated the statutory removal deadline as a mandatory claims-processing rule.
From the start, the historical understanding was
that “[t]he right to remove a suit from a State court …
is statutory, and to effect a transfer of jurisdiction all
the requirements of the statute must be followed.”
Babbitt v. Clark, 103 U.S. 606, 610 (1880); see
Hunter’s Lessee, 14 U.S. at 349 (“The time, the process,
and the manner [for removal] must be subject to … absolute legislative control.”).
Accordingly, this Court repeatedly held that when
a case is removed out of time, it must be remanded to
state court, because defendants have no statutory
right to remove a case after the deadline has passed.
See, e.g., Kan. City, Fort Scott & Memphis R.R. Co. v.
Daughtry, 138 U.S. 298, 306 (1891) (affirming remand
order where application for removal “came too late”);
Balt. & Ohio R.R. Co. v. Burns, 124 U.S. 165, 166
(1888) (the defendant “lost its right to the removal” by
failing to timely remove); Phx. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v.
Walrath, 117 U.S. 365, 366 (1886) (“The right to the
removal of a suit … is lost by a failure to file a petition”
by the statutory deadline); Gregory v. Hartley, 113
U.S. 742, 746 (1885) (after the statutory deadline
passed and the state court held a hearing on a motion
51
to dismiss “it was too late … to ask for a removal”);
Speck, 113 U.S. at 88 (petition was untimely and deadline could not be extended by stipulation); Edrington
v. Jefferson, 111 U.S. 770, 775 (1884) (after the statutory deadline passed “all right of removal … was
gone”).
Moreover, the Court has historically described the
removal deadline in words that, in modern parlance,
identify a mandatory claims-processing rule—i.e., a
deadline that can be waived but must be enforced
when properly invoked. E.g., Stewart, 245 U.S. at 363
(“It is essential to the removal of a cause that the petition, provided for by the statute, be filed … within the
time fixed by statute, unless the time be in some manner waived.”); Mackay, 229 U.S. at 176 (“the litigant
has the right to rely upon the statute, and to insist
that” removal occur “in compliance with its terms”; but
noncompliance is not raised sua sponte and can be
waived); Martin’s Adm’r v. Balt. & Ohio R.R. Co., 151
U.S. 673, 687 (1894) (“As the petition for the removal
of this case … was not filed … within the time mentioned in the act of Congress, it would follow that, if a
motion to remand upon that ground had been made
promptly, and denied, the judgment of the Circuit
Court of the United States must have been reversed,
with directions to remand the case to the state court.”);
Ayers v. Watson, 113 U.S. 594, 598 (1885) (“Application in due time … [is] essential if insisted on, but …
may be waived.”).
Enbridge argues to the contrary based largely on
a single case: Powers v. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co.,
169 U.S. 92 (1898). Pet. Br. 32. In Powers, a diverse
52
defendant could not remove a case within the statutory period because the plaintiff also sued nondiverse
parties. 169 U.S. at 97–98. After the deadline passed,
the plaintiff dismissed the resident defendants, and
the action “for the first time became one in its nature
removable.” Id. at 98. The diverse defendant then “immediately filed a second petition for removal.” Id. The
Court held that, in a case that was not initially removable, a defendant could seek removal after the time
mentioned in the act of Congress had elapsed. Id. at
100–01.
Enbridge reads Powers as “clearly adopt[ing] the
principle that equitable tolling is applicable” to
§ 1446(b)(1). Pet. 17. That is inaccurate. The Court
viewed the question as “depend[ing] on the terms and
effect of the act,” not whether any traditional equitable
doctrine applied. 169 U.S. at 99. The Court had no
doubt that compliance with the statutory deadline was
required “when the case, as stated in the plaintiff’s
declaration, is a removable one.” Id. at 98. But it was
concerned that applying this rule “when the case does
not become in its nature a removable one until after
the time mentioned in the act has expired,” id. at 98–
99, “would utterly defeat all right of removal in many
cases,” id. at 100. The Court thus construed the statute to allow a defendant to file a removal petition “as
soon as the action assumes the shape of a removable
case.” Id. at 100–01.
Nothing in Powers indicates that the Court
thought the removal deadline could be more generally
tolled outside of that narrow circumstance. And at any
rate, Congress has since codified Powers in
53
§ 1446(b)(3). See H.R. Rep. No. 352, 81st Cong., 1st
Sess. 14 (1949). Now that the rule exists in a statute,
its scope is controlled by the statute’s text—which has
been further limited by § 1446(c)(1). Enbridge cannot
rely on Powers for broad equitable principles that Congress chose not to adopt, much less to establish that
“federal removal from state to federal court is an ‘area
of the law where equity finds a comfortable home.’ ”
Pet. Br. 40 (quoting Holland, 560 U.S. at 647, which
involved pro se habeas filings).
III. Even if § 1446(b)(1) were subject to equitable
tolling, this case would not remotely qualify.
Finally, even if the removal deadline were amenable to equitable tolling, tolling would be unwarranted
here. A litigant “is entitled to equitable tolling only if
he shows (1) that he has been pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary circumstance
stood in his way and prevented timely filing.” Holland,
560 U.S. at 649 (cleaned up). Enbridge cannot satisfy
either factor.
No “extraordinary circumstance” stood in
Enbridge’s way and prevented it from timely filing a
notice of removal at the outset of this case. After all,
Enbridge soon thereafter raised in state court the very
Pipeline Safety Act arguments that it later asserted
provided a basis for federal jurisdiction. J.A. 10a–11a;
145a–155a. Much less did any extraordinary circumstance prevent Enbridge from removing this case
when it removed the Governor’s “virtually identical”
one. Pet. Br. 10.
54
Instead, Enbridge stipulated to this state-court
case being held in abeyance after it removed the Governor’s case. J.A. 59a. And it only later sought removal
once the federal court “made rulings” that Enbridge
felt “reflect[ed] its view of the merits.” Pet. Br. 15. Not
only is that wait-and-see approach contrary to the very
purpose of the 30-day deadline, it cannot be described
as acting “diligently” for the reasons the court of appeals articulated in finding that no statutory exception
to the removal deadline applied. See Pet. App. 17a
(“[T]o the extent § 1446(b)(3)’s later removal window
was ever open, Enbridge missed that one too.”).
The district court did not even purport to apply the
traditional equitable-tolling framework recognized in
Irwin, Holland, and this Court’s other cases. It instead
relied on free-floating factors that were not grounded
text, precedent, or tradition. Nothing indicates Congress intended such an open-ended, atextual, and
ahistorical inquiry. As this Court has recognized, “[i]n
the long run, experience teaches that strict adherence
to the procedural requirements specified by the legislature is the best guarantee of evenhanded administration of the law.” Hallstrom, 493 U.S. at 31
(cleaned up).
55
CONCLUSION
The Sixth Circuit’s judgment should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
DANA NESSEL
Michigan Attorney General
ANN M. SHERMAN
Michigan Solicitor General
Counsel of Record
CHRISTOPHER M. ALLEN
Assistant Solicitor General
KEITH D. UNDERKOFFLER
Assistant Attorney General,
Environment, Natural Resources & Agriculture Division
SPENCER D. SMITH
Special Assistant Attorney
General
P.O. Box 30212
Lansing, Michigan 48909
ShermanA@michigan.gov
(517) 335-7628
Dated: OCTOBER 2025
Attorneys for Respondent
APPENDIX
ia
BRIEF FOR RESPONDENT
APPENDIX TABLE OF CONTENTS
Relevant Statutory Provisions ......................... 1a–12a
1a
APPENDIX — RELEVANT STATUTORY
PROVISIONS
1. 28 U.S.C. § 1441 provides, in part:
Removal of civil actions
(a) GENERALLY.—Except as otherwise expressly provided by Act of Congress, any civil action brought in a
State court of which the district courts of the United
States have original jurisdiction, may be removed by
the defendant or the defendants, to the district court
of the United States for the district and division embracing the place where such action is pending.
(b) REMOVAL BASED ON DIVERSITY OF CITIZENSHIP.—(1)
In determining whether a civil action is removable on
the basis of the jurisdiction under section 1332(a) of
this title, the citizenship of defendants sued under fictitious names shall be disregarded.
(2) A civil action otherwise removable solely on the basis of the jurisdiction under section 1332(a) of this title
may not be removed if any of the parties in interest
properly joined and served as defendants is a citizen of
the State in which such action is brought.
***
(d) ACTIONS AGAINST FOREIGN STATES.—Any civil action brought in a State court against a foreign state as
defined in section 1603(a) of this title may be removed
by the foreign state to the district court of the United
States for the district and division embracing the place
where such action is pending. Upon removal the action
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shall be tried by the court without jury. Where removal is based upon this subsection, the time limitations of section 1446(b) of this chapter may be enlarged
at any time for cause shown.
(e) MULTIPARTY, MULTIFORUM JURISDICTION.—(1) Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (b) of this
section, a defendant in a civil action in a State court
may remove the action to the district court of the
United States for the district and division embracing
the place where the action is pending if—
(A) the action could have been brought in a United
States district court under section 1369 of this title; or
(B) the defendant is a party to an action which is or
could have been brought, in whole or in part, under
section 1369 in a United States district court and
arises from the same accident as the action in State
court, even if the action to be removed could not have
been brought in a district court as an original matter.
The removal of an action under this subsection shall
be made in accordance with section 1446 of this title,
except that a notice of removal may also be filed before
trial of the action in State court within 30 days after
the date on which the defendant first becomes a party
to an action under section 1369 in a United States district court that arises from the same accident as the
action in State court, or at a later time with leave of
the district court.
3a
2. 28 U.S.C. § 1442a provides:
A civil or criminal prosecution in a court of a State of
the United States against a member of the armed
forces of the United States on account of an act done
under color of his office or status, or in respect to which
he claims any right, title, or authority under a law of
the United States respecting the armed forces thereof,
or under the law of war, may at any time before the
trial or final hearing thereof be removed for trial into
the district court of the United States for the district
where it is pending in the manner prescribed by law,
and it shall thereupon be entered on the docket of the
district court, which shall proceed as if the cause had
been originally commenced therein and shall have full
power to hear and determine the cause.
3. 28 U.S.C. § 1446 provides:
Procedure for removal of civil actions
(a) GENERALLY.—A defendant or defendants desiring
to remove any civil action from a State court shall file
in the district court of the United States for the district
and division within which such action is pending a notice of removal signed pursuant to Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and containing a short
and plain statement of the grounds for removal, together with a copy of all process, pleadings, and orders
served upon such defendant or defendants in such action.
(b) REQUIREMENTS; GENERALLY.—(1) The notice of removal of a civil action or proceeding shall be filed
within 30 days after the receipt by the defendant,
4a
through service or otherwise, of a copy of the initial
pleading setting forth the claim for relief upon which
such action or proceeding is based, or within 30 days
after the service of summons upon the defendant if
such initial pleading has then been filed in court and
is not required to be served on the defendant, whichever period is shorter.
(2)(A) When a civil action is removed solely under section 1441(a), all defendants who have been properly
joined and served must join in or consent to the removal of the action.
(B) Each defendant shall have 30 days after receipt by
or service on that defendant of the initial pleading or
summons described in paragraph (1) to file the notice
of removal.
(C) If defendants are served at different times, and a
later-served defendant files a notice of removal, any
earlier-served defendant may consent to the removal
even though that earlier-served defendant did not previously initiate or consent to removal.
(3) Except as provided in subsection (c), if the case
stated by the initial pleading is not removable, a notice
of removal may be filed within thirty days after receipt
by the defendant, through service or otherwise, of a
copy of an amended pleading, motion, order or other
paper from which it may first be ascertained that the
case is one which is or has become removable.
(c) REQUIREMENTS; REMOVAL BASED ON DIVERSITY OF
CITIZENSHIP.—(1) A case may not be removed under
subsection (b)(3) on the basis of jurisdiction conferred
5a
by section 1332 more than 1 year after commencement
of the action, unless the district court finds that the
plaintiff has acted in bad faith in order to prevent a
defendant from removing the action.
(2) If removal of a civil action is sought on the basis of
the jurisdiction conferred by section 1332(a), the sum
demanded in good faith in the initial pleading shall be
deemed to be the amount in controversy, except that—
(A) the notice of removal may assert the amount in
controversy if the initial pleading seeks—
(i) nonmonetary relief; or
(ii) a money judgment, but the State practice either
does not permit demand for a specific sum or permits
recovery of damages in excess of the amount demanded; and
(B) removal of the action is proper on the basis of an
amount in controversy asserted under subparagraph
(A) if the district court finds, by the preponderance of
the evidence, that the amount in controversy exceeds
the amount specified in section 1332(a).
(3)(A) If the case stated by the initial pleading is not
removable solely because the amount in controversy
does not exceed the amount specified in section
1332(a), information relating to the amount in controversy in the record of the State proceeding, or in responses to discovery, shall be treated as an “other paper” under subsection (b)(3).
6a
(B) If the notice of removal is filed more than 1 year
after commencement of the action and the district
court finds that the plaintiff deliberately failed to disclose the actual amount in controversy to prevent removal, that finding shall be deemed bad faith under
paragraph (1).
(d) NOTICE TO ADVERSE PARTIES AND STATE COURT.—
Promptly after the filing of such notice of removal of a
civil action the defendant or defendants shall give
written notice thereof to all adverse parties and shall
file a copy of the notice with the clerk of such State
court, which shall effect the removal and the State
court shall proceed no further unless and until the
case is remanded.
(e) COUNTERCLAIM IN 337 PROCEEDING.—With respect
to any counterclaim removed to a district court pursuant to section 337(c) of the Tariff Act of 1930, the district court shall resolve such counterclaim in the same
manner as an original complaint under the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, except that the payment of a
filing fee shall not be required in such cases and the
counterclaim shall relate back to the date of the original complaint in the proceeding before the International Trade Commission under section 337 of that
Act.
[(f) Redesignated (e)]
(g) Where the civil action or criminal prosecution that
is removable under section 1442(a) is a proceeding in
which a judicial order for testimony or documents is
sought or issued or sought to be enforced, the 30-day
requirement of subsection (b) of this section and
7a
paragraph (1) of section 1455(b) is satisfied if the person or entity desiring to remove the proceeding files
the notice of removal not later than 30 days after receiving, through service, notice of any such proceeding.
4. 28 U.S.C. § 1447 provides:
Procedure after removal generally
(a) In any case removed from a State court, the district
court may issue all necessary orders and process to
bring before it all proper parties whether served by
process issued by the State court or otherwise.
(b) It may require the removing party to file with its
clerk copies of all records and proceedings in such
State court or may cause the same to be brought before
it by writ of certiorari issued to such State court.
(c) A motion to remand the case on the basis of any
defect other than lack of subject matter jurisdiction
must be made within 30 days after the filing of the notice of removal under section 1446(a). If at any time
before final judgment it appears that the district court
lacks subject matter jurisdiction, the case shall be remanded. An order remanding the case may require
payment of just costs and any actual expenses, including attorney fees, incurred as a result of the removal.
A certified copy of the order of remand shall be mailed
by the clerk to the clerk of the State court. The State
court may thereupon proceed with such case.
(d) An order remanding a case to the State court from
which it was removed is not reviewable on appeal or
otherwise, except that an order remanding a case to
8a
the State court from which it was removed pursuant
to section 1443 of this title shall be reviewable by appeal or otherwise.
(e) If after removal the plaintiff seeks to join additional
defendants whose joinder would destroy subject matter jurisdiction, the court may deny joinder, or permit
joinder and remand the action to the State court.
5. 28 U.S.C. § 1453 provides, in part:
Removal of class actions
***
(b) IN GENERAL.—A class action may be removed to a
district court of the United States in accordance with
section 1446 (except that the 1-year limitation under
section 1446(c)(1) shall not apply), without regard to
whether any defendant is a citizen of the State in
which the action is brought, except that such action
may be removed by any defendant without the consent
of all defendants.
(c) Review of Remand Orders.—
(1) IN GENERAL.—Section 1447 shall apply to any removal of a case under this section, except that notwithstanding section 1447(d), a court of appeals may accept
an appeal from an order of a district court granting or
denying a motion to remand a class action to the State
court from which it was removed if application is made
to the court of appeals not more than 10 days after entry of the order.
9a
(2) TIME PERIOD FOR JUDGMENT.—If the court of appeals accepts an appeal under paragraph (1), the court
shall complete all action on such appeal, including rendering judgment, not later than 60 days after the date
on which such appeal was filed, unless an extension is
granted under paragraph (3).
(3) EXTENSION OF TIME PERIOD.—The court of appeals
may grant an extension of the 60-day period described
in paragraph (2) if—
(A) all parties to the proceeding agree to such extension, for any period of time; or
(B) such extension is for good cause shown and in the
interests of justice, for a period not to exceed 10 days.
***
6. 28 U.S.C. § 1454 provides, in part:
Patent, plant variety protection, and copyright cases
(a) IN GENERAL.—A civil action in which any party asserts a claim for relief arising under any Act of Congress relating to patents, plant variety protection, or
copyrights may be removed to the district court of the
United States for the district and division embracing
the place where the action is pending.
(b) SPECIAL RULES.—The removal of an action under
this section shall be made in accordance with section
1446, except that if the removal is based solely on this
section—
(1) the action may be removed by any party; and
10a
(2) the time limitations contained in section 1446(b)
may be extended at any time for cause shown.
***
7. 28 U.S.C. § 1455 provides, in part:
Procedure for removal of criminal prosecutions
(a) NOTICE OF REMOVAL.—A defendant or defendants
desiring to remove any criminal prosecution from a
State court shall file in the district court of the United
States for the district and division within which such
prosecution is pending a notice of removal signed pursuant to Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and containing a short and plain statement of the
grounds for removal, together with a copy of all process, pleadings, and orders served upon such defendant or defendants in such action.
(b) REQUIREMENTS.—(1) A notice of removal of a criminal prosecution shall be filed not later than 30 days
after the arraignment in the State court, or at any
time before trial, whichever is earlier, except that for
good cause shown the United States district court may
enter an order granting the defendant or defendants
leave to file the notice at a later time.
***
8. 9 U.S.C. § 205 provides:
Where the subject matter of an action or proceeding
pending in a State court relates to an arbitration
agreement or award falling under the Convention, the
defendant or the defendants may, at any time before
11a
the trial thereof, remove such action or proceeding to
the district court of the United States for the district
and division embracing the place where the action or
proceeding is pending. The procedure for removal of
causes otherwise provided by law shall apply, except
that the ground for removal provided in this section
need not appear on the face of the complaint but may
be shown in the petition for removal. For the purposes
of Chapter 1 of this title any action or proceeding removed under this section shall be deemed to have been
brought in the district court to which it is removed.
9. 12 U.S.C. § 1819 provides, in part:
***
(2) Federal court jurisdiction
(A) In general
Except as provided in subparagraph (D), all suits of a
civil nature at common law or in equity to which the
Corporation, in any capacity, is a party shall be
deemed to arise under the laws of the United States.
(B) Removal
Except as provided in subparagraph (D), the Corporation may, without bond or security, remove any action,
suit, or proceeding from a State court to the appropriate United States district court before the end of the
90-day period beginning on the date the action, suit, or
proceeding is filed against the Corporation or the Corporation is substituted as a party.
***
12a
10. 28 U.S.C. § 2679 provides, in part:
***
(d)(1) Upon certification by the Attorney General that
the defendant employee was acting within the scope of
his office or employment at the time of the incident out
of which the claim arose, any civil action or proceeding
commenced upon such claim in a United States district court shall be deemed an action against the
United States under the provisions of this title and all
references thereto, and the United States shall be substituted as the party defendant.
(2) Upon certification by the Attorney General that the
defendant employee was acting within the scope of his
office or employment at the time of the incident out of
which the claim arose, any civil action or proceeding
commenced upon such claim in a State court shall be
removed without bond at any time before trial by the
Attorney General to the district court of the United
States for the district and division embracing the place
in which the action or proceeding is pending. Such action or proceeding shall be deemed to be an action or
proceeding brought against the United States under
the provisions of this title and all references thereto,
and the United States shall be substituted as the party
defendant. This certification of the Attorney General
shall conclusively establish scope of office or employment for purposes of removal.
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.