Reply Brief — Enbridge Energy, LP, et al., Petitioners v. Dana Nessel, Attorney General of Michigan, on Behalf of the People of the State of Michigan

No. 24-783

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

————

ENBRIDGE ENERGY, LIMITED PARTNERSHIP, et al.,

Petitioners,

v.

DANA NESSEL, ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE STATE

OF MICHIGAN, ON BEHALF OF THE

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,

Respondent.

————

On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the

United States Court of Appeals

for the Sixth Circuit

————

REPLY BRIEF FOR PETITIONERS

————

PHILLIP J. DEROSIER

DICKINSON WRIGHT PLLC

500 Woodward Ave.

Suite 4000

Detroit, MI 48226

ALICE E. LOUGHRAN

Counsel of Record

STEPTOE LLP

1330 Connecticut Ave., N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20036

(202) 429-6202

aloughran@steptoe.com

JEFFERY V. STUCKEY

DICKINSON WRIGHT PLLC

123 W. Allegan St., Suite 900 JOHN J. BURSCH

BURSCH LAW PLLC

Lansing, MI 48933

9339 Cherry Valley Ave. SE

Suite 78

Caledonia, MI 49316

Counsel for Petitioners

May 12, 2025

WILSON-EPES PRINTING CO., INC. – (202) 789-0096 – WASHINGTON, D.C. 20002

i

PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING AND

RULE 29.6 STATEMENT

The statement of the parties to the proceeding

and the corporate disclosure statement contained in

the petition for a writ of certiorari remain accurate.

ii

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING AND

RULE 29.6 STATEMENT ............................... i

REPLY BRIEF FOR PETITIONER ..........................1

I.

The Decision Below Deepens an Existing

Conflict .............................................................2

A.

Eleventh Circuit ....................................2

B.

Fifth Circuit ..........................................5

C.

Second and Sixth Circuits ....................8

D.

Other Circuits .......................................9

II.

Respondent’s Faulty Merits Arguments

Confirm that Review is Warranted...............10

III.

This Is an Ideal Vehicle To Resolve the

Conflict ...........................................................12

CONCLUSION .........................................................13

iii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Page(s)

CASES

Back Doctors Ltd v. Metro. Prop. & Cas.

Ins. Co.,

637 F.3d 827 (7th Cir. 2011) ................................ 10

Breuer v. Jim’s Concrete of Brevard,

Inc.,

538 U.S. 691 (2003) .............................................. 11

Brown v. Demco,

792 F.2d 478 (5th Cir. 1986) .............................. 5, 6

Caterpillar Inc. v. Lewis,

519 U.S. 61 (1996) ................................................ 12

Cervantez v. Bexar County Civil Service

Com’n,

99 F.3d 730 (5th Cir. 1996) ................................ 6, 7

Doe v. Kerwood,

969 F.2d 165 (5th Cir. 1992) .................................. 6

Farm & City Ins. Co. v. Johnson,

190 F. Supp. 2d 1232 (D. Kan. 2002) ................ 3, 8

Gillis v. Louisiana,

294 F.3d 755 (5th Cir. 2002) .............................. 5, 6

iv

Glob. Satellite Comm’n v. Starmill U.K.

Ltd.,

378 F.3d 1269 (11th Cir. 2004) .............................. 5

Harris v. U.S. Dep’t of Transp.,

122 F.4th 418 (D.C. Cir. 2024) ........................ 4, 11

Harrow v. Dep’t of Def.,

601 U.S. 480 (2024) ................................................ 9

Hoyt v. Lane Constr. Corp.,

927 F.3d 287 (5th Cir. 2019) .............................. 7, 8

James v. Freedom Mortg. Corp.,

No. 23-13039, 2024 WL 1509682

(11th Cir. Apr. 8, 2024) .......................................... 5

Johnson v. Heublein Inc.,

227 F.3d 236 (5th Cir. 2000) ...................... 5, 6, 7, 8

Kingdomware Techs. v. United States,

579 U.S. 162 (2016) ................................................ 9

Kuxhausen v. BMW Fin. Servs. NA

LLC,

707 F.3d 1136 (9th Cir. 2013) ................................ 9

Loftin v. Rush,

767 F.2d 800 (11th Cir. 1985) .................... 2, 3, 4, 5

Miami Herald Media Co. v. Fla. Dep’t of

Transp.,

345 F. Supp. 3d 1349 (N.D. Fla.

2018) ....................................................................... 3

v

N. Illinois Gas Co. v. Airco Indus.

Gases,

676 F.2d 270 (7th Cir. 1982) .................................. 9

Romulus v. CVS Pharmacy, Inc.,

770 F.3d 67 (1st Cir. 2014) .................................... 9

Rothner v. City of Chicago,

879 F.2d 1402 (7th Cir. 1989) ................................ 4

Shamrock Oil & Gas Corp. v. Sheets,

313 U.S. 100 (1941) ........................................ 10, 11

Snapper, Inc. v. Redan,

171 F.3d 1249 (11th Cir. 1999) .............................. 5

State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. U.S ex

rel. Rigsby,

580 U.S. 26 (2016) .................................................. 4

Stone Street Cap. v. McDonald’s Corp.,

300 F. Supp. 2d 345 (D. Md. 2003) ........................ 3

Tedford v. Warner-Lambert Co.,

327 F.3d 423 (5th Cir. 2003) .................................. 7

Vill. Improvement Ass’n of Doylestown

v. Dow Chem. Co.,

655 F. Supp. 311 (E.D. Pa. 1987) .......................... 3

STATUTES

28 U.S.C. § 1446(b) ........................ 1, 2, 4, 6, 7, 8, 9, 11

28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(1) ........................................... 1, 11

vi

28 U.S.C. § 1447 .......................................................... 4

28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) ................................................ 4, 11

28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) (1982) ........................................... 4

28 U.S.C. § 1447(d) .................................................... 12

PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS

Executive Order 14260, Protecting

American Energy from State

Overreach (Apr. 8, 2025)...................................... 13

Executive Order 14156, Declaring a

National Energy Emergency (Jan.

20, 2025) ............................................................... 13

MISCELLANEOUS

14B Wright & Miller, Fed. Prac. & Proc.

Juris., § 3731 (Rev. 4th ed.) ............................... 2, 3

FEDERALIST No. 80 (A. Hamilton) (Garry

Wills ed., 1982) ..................................................... 11

H.R. Rep. No. 100-889, 1988

U.S.C.C.A.N 5982 (Aug. 26, 1988)......................... 4

S. CT. Rule 10(a) .......................................................... 2

REPLY BRIEF FOR PETITIONER

Petitioners asked this Court to resolve an

important circuit split: whether the district courts

have equitable power to toll the 30-day removal

window in 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(1) in exceptional

circumstances. The circuit split is real. In one

corner stand the Sixth and Second Circuits, which

hold that there are no equitable exceptions to the 30day window. In the other corner stand the Eleventh

and Fifth Circuits, holding that the district courts

have equitable power to excuse the 30-day window.

Enbridge’s removal petition thus would have

turned out differently in the Eleventh and Fifth

Circuits than it did in the Sixth Circuit. The district

court here found that exceptional circumstances

warranted excusing the 30-day window and also

concluded that it had original jurisdiction to hear the

case. (App. 34a-39a.) Yet Enbridge was denied

access to the federal courts because the Sixth Circuit

ruled the 30-window is immune from exceptions.

(App. 2a, 18a-24a.)

Respondent spends several pages trying to

explain away the circuit split. In certain instances,

she seizes on inconsequential fact differences in the

cases; in others, she embraces stray statements but

ignores the holdings. As Professor Arthur Miller

explains, there is “a circuit split,” and “it is critical to

achieve uniformity for something as basic as a time

limitation.” Amicus Brief of Professor Arthur R.

Miller at 1-2, 6. This issue often evades review due

to limitations on appellate jurisdiction in the

removal context.

See id. at 8-9.

That’s why

2

Professor Miller “urge[s] this Court to resolve a

circuit split and provide for national uniformity on a

significant question of civil procedure.” Id. at 1.

I.

The Decision Below Deepens an Existing

Conflict

As explained below, Respondent does not dispute

the legal holdings of the federal circuit decisions

cited in Enbridge’s petition. Thus, all parties seem

to agree that the ordinary criteria for this Court’s

review are present in this case. Rule 10(a).

A.

Eleventh Circuit

In Loftin v. Rush, 767 F.2d 800, 805 (11th Cir.

1985), the defendant removed the case several

months “beyond the 30-day time limit established by

28 U.S.C. § 1446(b).”

Id. at 805.

Despite

“disapproving” of defendant’s “tardiness,” the

Eleventh Circuit refused to remand the case: “The

timeliness of a removal petition is not jurisdictional,

and we therefore have the power to review even an

untimely petition.” Id.

Respondent characterizes Loftin as an “outlier”

and expressing a minority view. (Opp. 4, 23.) But

lower courts continue to cite Loftin with approval,

including in circuits that have yet to address this

question. Pet. 18-19 & n.7 (collecting cases); App.

35a-36a; 14B Wright & Miller, Fed. Prac. & Proc.

Juris., § 3731 nn.31-32 and accompanying text (Rev.

3

4th ed.)1 That is hardly the mark of an isolated

decision or stale split. Respondent is also wrong to

suggest that the Eleventh Circuit, rather than the

Sixth or Second Circuits, is the outlier. (Pet. 18-20.)

At any rate, Respondent’s portrayal of the Eleventh

Circuit as an “outlier” only confirms a circuit conflict

on the question presented.

Respondent tries to distinguish Loftin on the

basis that the federal government was the removing

party there. (Opp. 22.) But the identity of the

removing party had no bearing on the Eleventh

Circuit’s resolution of the legal issue. See Loftin, 767

F.2d at 802, 805 (“We are unwilling to allow a modal

defect to pretermit our substantive inquiry.”). At

most, the Eleventh Circuit cited the federal

government’s sovereign immunity status as grounds

for finding the presence of exceptional circumstances.

See id. at 805-10 (state court entered a judgment

greater than allowed by federal statutes).2

1 See also Miami Herald Media Co. v. Fla. Dep’t of

Transp., 345 F. Supp. 3d 1349, 1368 (N.D. Fla. 2018); Farm &

City Ins. v. Johnson, 190 F. Supp. 2d 1232, 1237 (D. Kan. 2002).

2 In the two cases cited by Respondent (Opp. 22), the

district courts declined to follow Loftin—not based on any

factual distinction—but because any tolling of the removal

deadlines was discouraged in those districts. Vill. Improvement

Ass’n of Doylestown v. Dow Chem. Co., 655 F. Supp. 311, 315

(E.D. Pa. 1987); Stone Street Cap. v. McDonald’s Corp., 300 F.

Supp. 2d 345, 351 (D. Md. 2003).

4

Respondent argues that Loftin was decided before

the 1988 amendments to 28 U.S.C. § 1447. (Opp.

21.) But the 30-day time window for removal is

found in Section 1446(b)—not Section 1447(c).

Regardless, the 1988 amendments to Section 1447(c)

support Enbridge’s position. Prior to 1988, Section

1447(c) required a remand when the case “was

removed improvidently and without jurisdiction ….”

28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) (1982). In 1988, Congress

amended Section 1447(c) to require a remand when

the “district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction

….” Rothner v. City of Chicago, 879 F.2d 1402, 1411

& n.7 (7th Cir. 1989).

In explaining the

amendment’s purpose, the House Report states: “So

long as the defect in removal” is not jurisdictional,

“there is no reason why” the courts or parties “should

be subject to the burdens of shuttling a case between

two courts that each have subject matter

jurisdiction.” 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N 5982, 6033. Section

1447(c) today distinguishes between procedural and

jurisdictional defects in removal. See Harris v. U.S.

Dep’t of Transp., 122 F.4th 418, 425 (D.C. Cir. 2024).

It directs remand when the district court lacks

subject matter jurisdiction but is silent on procedural

defects in the removal petition.

See id. That

Congress expressly required remand in some cases

but not others suggests that district courts have

equitable authority in the latter context. See State

Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. U.S ex rel. Rigsby, 580 U.S.

26, 34 (2016) (where a statute has “provisions that do

require, in express terms, the dismissal” of an action,

then “[i]t is proper to infer that, had Congress

intended to require dismissal for a violation of [a

different] requirement, it would have said so”).

5

Respondent also cites three post-Loftin decisions

in the Eleventh Circuit but none are on point. (Opp.

22.) In two of them, the defendants timely removed

to federal court but the plaintiff argued that removal

was waived in the contract’s forum-selection clause.

See Snapper, Inc. v. Redan, 171 F.3d 1249, 1251,

1252-60 (11th Cir. 1999); Glob. Satellite Comm’n v.

Starmill U.K. Ltd., 378 F.3d 1269, 1271 (11th Cir.

2004). In the third, the plaintiff removed his own

action after losing in state court. The Eleventh

Circuit rejected removal for two reasons: only a

defendant can remove a civil action, and the state

action must be pending at the time of removal.

James v. Freedom Mortg. Corp., 2024 WL 1509682,

at *1 (11th Cir. Apr. 8, 2024). These decisions do not

cast shade on Loftin or suggest it is no longer law of

the circuit.

B.

Fifth Circuit

The Fifth Circuit has recognized repeatedly that

the 30-day window is subject to equitable exceptions.

(Pet. 19-20.)

Respondent points to immaterial

factual distinctions but does not dispute the legal

principle established by those cases. See Brown v.

Demco, 792 F.2d 478, 482 (5th Cir. 1986) (there is

“no inexorable time limit” for removing and it is

within the court’s equitable power to consider

“[e]xceptional circumstances”); Gillis v. Louisiana,

294 F.3d 755, 759 (5th Cir. 2002) (applying

“equitable exception” to permit removal even though

“defendant fail[ed] to comply fully with § 1446 within

the thirty-day removal period”); Johnson v. Heublein,

227 F.3d 236, 241 (5th Cir. 2000) (permitting

6

removal even though defendants “did not file a notice

of removal within thirty days”); Doe v. Kerwood, 969

F.2d 165, 169 & n.15 (5th Cir. 1992) (recognizing

court’s equitable power to consider exceptions to the

30-day window for removal).3

Respondent emphasizes that two of the cited

Fifth Circuit decisions concerned removal by

multiple defendants.

(Opp. 17.)

This factual

distinction proves Enbridge’s point. For a notice of

removal to be timely in the Fifth Circuit, “all served

defendants must join . . . prior to the expiration of

the removal period” in Section 1446(b). Gillis, 294

F.3d at 759; Getty Oil, 841 F.2d at 1263. In Gillis

and Getty Oil, all defendants had not within the 30day period and thus the removal was untimely. The

Fifth Circuit held, in line with its prior precedents,

that the district courts have equitable power to toll

Section 1446(b)’s 30-day removal window. Getty Oil,

841 F.2d at 1263-64; Gillis, 294 F.3d at 759 & n.6.

Respondent accuses Enbridge of “overlook[ing]

the most analogous Fifth Circuit case.” Opp. 17,

citing Cervantez v. Bexar County Civil Service Com’n,

99 F.3d 730 (5th Cir. 1996). But Cervantez is

inapposite.

There, the defendant constructively

waived removal by litigating the case in state court

3 In briefing below, Enbridge relied on the Fifth

Circuit’s lead decision on this issue—Brown v. Demco. See

Answering Br. 25 (ECF No. 38); contra Opp. 16 n.1 (suggesting

Enbridge never cited Fifth Circuit precedent to the panel before

its decision).

7

through discovery and summary judgment motions.

Id. at 732. The defendant tried to avoid this result

by arguing that removal did not become apparent

until plaintiff filed his summary judgment

opposition. The Fifth Circuit disagreed, holding that

plaintiff’s first amended complaint had stated a

federal question. Id. at 772 n.4 & 773.4 Equitable

tolling was not raised or addressed in Cervantez.

Following Cervantez, the Fifth Circuit twice

reaffirmed a district court’s equitable power to toll

30-day window in the removal statute. See Tedford

v. Warner-Lambert Co., 327 F.3d 423, 426 & nn.5-8

(5th Cir. 2003); Johnson v. Heublein Inc., 227 F.3d

236, 241-44 (5th Cir. 2000). At issue in Tedford was

the one-year bar in 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b) for removing

in diversity of citizenship cases. Id. The Fifth

Circuit recognized that its precedent allowed

equitable tolling of the 30-day window in Section

1446(b). Tedford, 327 F.3d at 426 n.8. The court

saw “no reason to depart” from this precedent for

purposes of the one-year bar in Section 1446. See id.;

accord App. 33a-38a (as in Tedford, the district court

here cited plaintiff’s conduct in finding exceptional

circumstances).

Respondent emphasizes that

Congress subsequently amended Section 1446,

moved the one-year bar to paragraph (c), and created

a bad faith exception to it. Opp. 18-19, citing Hoyt v.

Lane Constr. Corp., 927 F.3d 287 (5th Cir. 2019).

4 There was no finding of constructive waiver in this

case, nor could there be. Even to this day, Enbridge has not

filed an answer in state court and no discovery has taken place.

8

This statutory amendment is irrelevant here. No

court has ever held that the statutory amendments

to the one-year bar in Section 1446(c) presage the

legislative overruling of precedent allowing an

equitable exception to a different deadline that

Congress did not alter.

In Johnson, the Fifth Circuit permitted tolling of

the 30-day window under the revival doctrine. Opp.

19, citing Johnson, 227 F.3d at 241-44. The revivaldoctrine is a judicially-created exception that allows

a defendant to remove after the expiration of Section

1446(b)’s 30-day window. Id. This happens if the

plaintiff changes his case by amending the

complaint, thereby reviving the defendant’s right to

remove. See id. Respondent emphasizes that she

never amended her complaint and thus this case did

not present the revival doctrine. (Opp. 19.) This

misses the point. Here, the district court cited both

the revival doctrine and Johnson in its order denying

remand because the revival doctrine is an

application of the general rule that Section 1446(b) is

subject to equitable exceptions. (App. 38a.)

C.

Second and Sixth Circuits

In contrast to the Eleventh and Fifth Circuits, the

Second and Sixth Circuits hold that the 30-day

window for removing is immune from exceptions.

Pet. 20. Only this Court’s intervention can resolve

that conflict, restore uniformity to the removal

statute, and provide much-needed guidance to the

lower courts on their power to consider equitable

exceptions to non-jurisdictional time-limits.

9

D. Other Circuits

Respondent tries to avoid the circuit conflict by

reframing the issue presented, stating that the issue

is whether the 30-day window is mandatory. (Opp.

i.) She then walks through decisions in every circuit

containing some stray statement that the removal

time limits are mandatory or strictly construed.

(Opp. 11-15.) Of course a statute stating that a

notice “shall be filed within 30 days” imposes a

mandatory deadline. Kingdomware Techs. v. United

States, 579 U.S. 162, 171 (2016). But as this Court

recently explained: “The procedural requirements

that Congress enacts to govern the litigation process

are only occasionally as strict as they seem. Most of

those rules read as categorical commands …. But

Congress legislates against the backdrop of judicial

doctrines creating exceptions, and typically expects

those doctrines to apply.” Harrow v. Dep’t of Def.,

601 U.S. 480, 483-84 (2024).

The real question is not whether the

Section 1446(b)(3)’s deadline is “mandatory” but

whether it is subject to equitable exceptions. (Pet. i,

3-4.) None of the circuit cases cited in Respondent’s

five-page litany address that issue. E.g., Romulus v.

CVS Pharmacy, 770 F.3d 67, 74-80 (1st Cir. 2014)

(concluding removal was timely); Kuxhausen v. BMW

Fin. Servs. NA LLC, 707 F.3d 1136, 1142 (9th Cir.

2013) (same); N. Illinois Gas Co. v. Airco Indus.

Gases, 676 F.2d 270, 274 (7th Cir. 1982) (allowing

amendment to notice of removal to cure a pleading

defect). Respondent is wrong to claim a “consensus”

of federal circuit decisions on the issue raised here.

10

II.

Respondent’s Faulty Merits Arguments

Confirm that Review is Warranted

Respondent argues that “the decision below is

correct” but, tellingly, she fails to defend that

decision on its own terms. (Opp. 24-25.) The Sixth

Circuit recognized that the 30-day removal window

is not jurisdictional but emphasized that the statute

is to be “strictly construed against removal ….” App.

22a-23a, citing Shamrock Oil & Gas Corp. v. Sheets,

313 U.S. 100, 108-09 (1941). Conspicuously absent

from the opposition brief is any meaningful defense

of this reasoning.

As the petition explained, the Sixth Circuit’s

presumption against removability is an invention of

the lower courts that has no applicability here. See

Pet. 22. This Court has never announced such a

presumption. See Back Doctors Ltd v. Metro. Prop. &

Cas. Ins., 637 F.3d 827, 830 (7th Cir. 2011)

(Easterbrook, J.) (“There is no presumption against

federal jurisdiction in general, or removal in

particular.”). While some courts have invoked the

presumption on jurisdictional questions arising in

the removal context, everyone agrees that the 30-day

removal window is not jurisdictional. (App. 19a.)

This Court’s decision in Shamrock—cited in the

decision below—does not say otherwise. There, a

plaintiff removed his own case to federal court after

the defendant filed a counterclaim. 313 U.S. at 100.

While the removal statute previously permitted

“removal by either party,” Congress amended the

statute by the time Shamrock was decided to permit

removal only by “defendant or defendants.” Id. at

11

107.

The Court held that “the policy of the

successive acts of Congress regulating the

jurisdiction of federal courts [was] one calling for the

strict construction of such legislation.” Id. at 108. In

using the words “strict construction,” the Shamrock

Court was referring to a particular congressional

policy at the time, not some overriding constitutional

prerogative to interpret the removal statute

narrowly. See Breuer v. Jim’s Concrete of Brevard,

538 U.S. 691 (2003) (rejecting that Shamrock

required strict construction of ambiguous removal

provision).

Respondent asserts that the decision below

promotes “federalism.” (Opp. 4, 24.) To the contrary,

the Framers contemplated that removal jurisdiction

would play a vital role in our federal system of

government. See THE FEDERALIST No. 80 at 403

(Alexander Hamilton) (federal courts were “likely to

be impartial …owing [their] official existence to the

Union”). It is no more an affront to state courts to

allow equitable tolling of the initial 30-day window in

Section 1446(b)(1) than it is to allow removal under

the second 30-day window in Section 1446(b)(1)(2).

Respondent says that Congress used “all the

hallmarks of [] mandating” a strict 30-day removal

period. (Opp. 25.) But Respondent overlooks that

Section 1447(c) directs a remand only when there are

jurisdictional defects. See Harris, 122 F.4th at 425.

Respondent’s barren merits argument highlights

the need for this Court’s review. But right or wrong,

the 2–2 circuit split calls for resolution.

12

III. This Is an Ideal Vehicle to Resolve the

Conflict

This case is the ideal vehicle to resolve the circuit

conflict.

First, the factual predicate is clear and

undisputed: the district court found this case to

present exceptional circumstances warranting tolling

of the 30-day removal window. App. 33a-38a, 41a

(citing plaintiff’s conduct and importance of federal

issues); Opp. 7.

Second, the legal predicate is clear. The Sixth

Circuit ruled that Section 1446(b) is immune to any

equitable exceptions. (App. 2a, 18a-24a.)

Third, the question presented often evades

appellate review. (Pet. 25-26.) If the district court

finds the removal untimely and remands to state

court, appellate review is barred in most cases. See

28 U.S.C. § 1447(d). If the district court tolls the 30day window and proceeds to entry of judgment,

appellate review of procedural defects in the removal

process is barred. See Caterpillar Inc. v. Lewis, 519

U.S. 61 (1996). In contrast here, the district court

certified the tolling issue for interlocutory review.

Since “[a] comparable case might not come up again

for a long time,” the “Court should seize this

opportunity ….” Amicus Brief of Professor Miller at

9.

Finally, the importance of the underlying issues

is reinforced by recent events.

The President

recently declared a national energy emergency and

13

directed the U.S. Attorney General to take all

appropriate action to stop the continuation of civil

actions by state officials that unreasonably burden

domestic energy development. See Executive Order

14260, Protecting American Energy from State

Overreach; Executive Order 14156, Declaring a

National Energy Emergency; United States v.

Michigan, No. 25-cv-496 (W.D. Mich. filed Apr. 30,

2025). Here, Respondent seeks an unprovoked shut

down of critical energy infrastructure on which

millions of North Americans depend. See Pet. 6-7;

Amicus Brief of North Americas Building Trades

Unions, U.S. Steel Workers at 11-17.

CONCLUSION

This Court

certiorari.

should

grant

the

petition

for

Respectfully submitted,

Alice E. Loughran

Phillip J. DeRosier

Counsel of Record

DICKINSON WRIGHT PLLC

STEPTOE LLP

500 Woodward Ave.

1330 Connecticut Ave, N.W.

Suite 4000

Washington, D.C. 20036

Detroit, MI 48226

(202) 429-6202

aloughran@steptoe.com

Jeffery V. Stuckey

DICKINSON WRIGHT PLLC

John Bursch

123 W. Allegan St.

BURSCH LAW PLLC

Suite 900

9339 Cherry Valley Ave. SE

Lansing, MI 48933

Suite 78

Caledonia, MI 49316

May 2025