Respondents Brief — Enbridge Energy, LP, et al., Petitioners v. Dana Nessel, Attorney General of Michigan, on Behalf of the People of the State of Michigan
Supreme Court briefApr 29, 2025
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No. 24-783
In the Supreme Court of the United States
ENBRIDGE ENERGY, LP, ET AL., PETITIONERS
v.
DANA NESSEL, ATTORNEY GENERAL OF MICHIGAN, ON
BEHALF OF THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN
ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
BRIEF IN OPPOSITION
Dana Nessel
Michigan Attorney General
Ann M. Sherman
Solicitor General
Counsel of Record
P.O. Box 30212
Lansing, Michigan 48909
ShermanA@michigan.gov
(517) 335-7628
Daniel Bock
Keith D. Underkoffler
Assistant Attorneys General
Environment, Natural
Resources, and Agriculture
Division
Attorneys for Respondent
i
QUESTION PRESENTED
Whether the 30-day removal deadline in 28 U.S.C.
§ 1446(b)(1) is mandatory such that a timely objection
to a late notice of removal requires remand.
ii
PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING
Petitioners Enbridge Energy, Limited Partnership, Enbridge Energy Company, Inc., and Enbridge
Energy Partners, L.P. (collectively, “Enbridge”) were
appellees in the court below.
Respondent Dana Nessel, Attorney General of the
State of Michigan, on behalf of the People of the State
of Michigan, was appellant in the court below.
RELATED CASES
The petition accurately lists the directly related
cases within the meaning of Rule 14.1(b)(iii).
iii
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Question Presented...................................................... i
Parties to the Proceeding ........................................... ii
Related Cases .............................................................. ii
Table of Authorities .................................................... v
Opinions Below ........................................................... 1
Jurisdiction ................................................................. 1
Statutory Provisions Involved .................................... 1
Introduction ................................................................ 4
Statement of the Case ................................................ 5
A. Relevant facts and procedural history. ......... 5
B. The district court’s opinion. ........................... 7
C. The Sixth Circuit’s opinion. ........................... 8
Reasons for Denying the Petition............................. 11
I.
The Sixth Circuit’s decision does not
implicate a certworthy circuit split. .................. 11
A. Lower courts have overwhelmingly held
that the 30-day removal deadline is
mandatory and may not be extended by
judicial decree. ............................................. 11
B. The cases Enbridge cites are decades-old
outliers that are distinguishable and may
no longer be good law. .................................. 16
1. There is no certworthy split between
the Fifth and Sixth Circuits. ................. 16
2. There is no certworthy split between
the Sixth and Eleventh Circuits. .......... 20
iv
II. The decision below is correct and any issue
can be addressed by Congress............................ 24
Conclusion ................................................................. 26
v
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases
Abbo-Bradley v. City of Niagara Falls,
73 F.4th 143 (2d Cir. 2023) ................................ 19
Barbour v. Int’l Union,
640 F.3d 599 (4th Cir. 2011) ........................ 12, 17
BCC Apartments, Ltd. v. Browning,
994 F. Supp. 1440 (S.D. Fla. 1997) .................... 15
Bowles v. Russell,
551 U.S. 205 (2007) ............................................ 24
Cacoilo v. Sherwin-Williams Co.,
902 F. Supp. 2d 511 (D.N.J. 2012) ..................... 12
California v. Salas,
No. 24-mc-80105, 2024 WL 3757492 (N.D.
Cal. Aug. 12, 2024) ............................................. 21
Cervantez v. Bexar Cnty. Civil Serv. Comm’n,
99 F.3d 730 (5th Cir. 1996) .......................... 13, 17
Cook v. Robinson,
612 F. Supp. 187 (E.D. Va. 1985) ....................... 13
Cook v. Travelers Cos.,
904 F. Supp. 841 (N.D. Ill. 1995) ....................... 13
Dalton v. Walgreen Co.,
721 F.3d 492 (8th Cir. 2013) .............................. 14
Diaz v. Swiss Chalet,
525 F. Supp. 247 (D.P.R. 1981) .......................... 12
Doe v. Kerwood,
969 F.2d 165 (5th Cir. 1992) ........................ 16, 17
vi
Eberhart v. United States,
546 U.S. 12 (2005) ................................................ 9
Franchise Tax Bd. v. Constr. Laborers Vacation
Tr.,
463 U.S. 1 (1983) ................................................ 24
Fristoe v. Reynolds Metals Co.,
615 F.2d 1209 (9th Cir. 1980) ............................ 14
Getty Oil Corp. v. Ins. Co. of N. Am.,
841 F.2d 1254 (5th Cir. 1988) ............................ 16
Gillis v. Louisiana,
294 F.3d 755 (5th Cir. 2002) ........................ 16, 17
Glob. Satellite Comm’n Co. v. Starmill U.K. Ltd.,
378 F.3d 1269 (11th Cir. 2004) .......................... 15
Grable & Sons Metal Prod., Inc. v. Darue Eng’g
& Mfg.,
545 U.S. 308 (2005) .............................................. 7
Green v. Hill,
954 F.2d 694 (11th Cir. 1992) ............................ 23
Gruber v. Estate of Marshall,
229 F. Supp. 3d 1245 (D. Kan. 2017) ................. 14
Harris v. Edward Hyman Co.,
664 F.2d 943 (5th Cir. 1981) .............................. 20
Harris v. Kollsman, Inc.,
97 F. Supp. 2d 1148 (M.D. Fla. 2000) ................ 15
Henry v. Reynolds & Assocs., Inc.,
Case No. 1:20-cv-02321, 2020 WL 7186158
(D.D.C. Dec. 7, 2020) .......................................... 15
Hill v. Phillips, Barratt, Kaiser Eng’g Ltd.,
586 F. Supp. 944 (D. Me. 1984).......................... 12
vii
Holston v. Carolina Freight Carriers Corp.,
936 F.2d 573 (6th Cir. 1991) .............................. 11
Home Depot U.S.A., Inc. v. Jackson,
139 S. Ct. 1743 (2019) .......................................... 8
Hoyt v. Lane Constr. Co.,
927 F.3d 287 (5th Cir. 2019) .................. 18, 19, 25
Huffman v. Saul Holdings Ltd.,
194 F.3d 1072 (10th Cir. 1999) .......................... 14
In re Clark,
No. 23-7073, 2024 WL 3385251 (D.C. Cir.
July 12, 2024) ..................................................... 15
Int’l Ass’n of Entrepreneurs of Am. v. Angoff,
58 F.3d 1266 (8th Cir. 1995) .............................. 14
James v. Freedom Mort. Corp.,
No. 23-13039, 2024 WL 1509682 (11th Cir.
Apr. 8, 2024) ....................................................... 15
Johnson v. Heublein,
227 F.3d 236 (5th Cir. 2000) .............................. 19
Kuxhausen v. BMW Fin. Servs. NA LLC,
707 F.3d 1136 (9th Cir. 2013) ...................... 14, 19
Lewis v. City of Fresno,
627 F. Supp. 2d 1179 (E.D. Cal. 2008)............... 14
Lewis v. Rego Co.,
757 F.2d 66 (3d Cir. 1985) .................................. 12
Ligutom v. SunTrust Mortg.,
No. C10-05431, 2011 WL 445655 (N.D. Cal.
Feb. 4, 2011) ....................................................... 21
Loftin v. Rush,
767 F.2d 800 (11th Cir. 1985) ................ 20, 21, 22
viii
May v. Johnson Controls, Inc.,
440 F. Supp. 2d 879 (W.D. Tenn. 2006) ............. 21
McKinney v. Bd. of Tr. of Md. Cmty. Coll.,
955 F.2d 924 (4th Cir. 1992) .............................. 12
Murphy Bros., Inc. v. Michetti Pipe Stringing,
Inc.,
526 U.S. 344 (1999) ............................................ 25
N. Ill. Gas Co. v. Airco Indus. Gases,
676 F.2d 270 (7th Cir. 1982) .............................. 13
Nicola Prods. Corp. v. Showart Kitchens, Inc.,
682 F. Supp. 171 (E.D.N.Y. 1988) ...................... 12
Nutraceutical Corp. v. Lambert,
586 U.S. 188 (2019) .............................................. 9
Ogletree v. Barnes,
851 F. Supp. 184 (E.D. Pa. 1994) ....................... 12
Patsy v. Bd. of Regents,
457 U.S. 496 (1982) ............................................ 24
Pender v. Bell Asbestos Mines, Ltd.,
145 F. Supp. 2d 1107 (E.D. Mo. 2001) ............... 14
Premier Holidays Int’l, Inc. v. Actrade Cap.,
105 F. Supp. 2d 1336 (N.D. Ga. 2000) ............... 22
Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co.,
517 U.S. 706 (1996) ............................................ 20
Reese v. S. Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist.,
853 F. Supp. 413 (S.D. Fla. 1994) ...................... 23
Romulus v. CVS Pharm., Inc.,
770 F.3d 67 (1st Cir. 2014) ................................. 12
Shamrock Oil & Gas Corp. v. Sheets,
313 U.S. 100 (1941) ............................................ 24
ix
Skidmore v. Beech Aircraft Corp.,
672 F. Supp. 923 (M.D. La. 1987) ...................... 13
Snapper, Inc. v. Redan,
171 F.3d 1249 (11th Cir. 1999) .......................... 15
Somlyo v. J. Lu-Rob Enters., Inc.,
932 F.2d 1043 (2d Cir. 1991) .............................. 12
State Farm & Cas. Co. v. Valspar Corp.,
824 F. Supp. 2d 923 (D.S.D. 2010) ..................... 14
Stone Street Cap., Inc. v. McDonald’s Corp.,
300 F. Supp. 2d 345 (D. Md. 2003) .............. 13, 22
Syngenta Crop Prot., Inc. v. Henson,
537 U.S. 28 (2002) .............................................. 24
Taylor v. Medtronic, Inc.,
15 F.4th 148 (2d Cir. 2021) ................................ 18
Tedford v. Warner-Lambert Co.,
327 F.3d 423 (5th Cir. 2003) .............................. 18
Tilley v. Tisdale,
914 F. Supp. 846 (E.D. Tex. 2012) ............... 18, 25
Tucker v. Equifirst Corp.,
57 F. Supp. 3d 1347 (S.D. Ala. 2014) ........... 15, 19
United States v. Brockamp,
519 U.S. 347 (1997) .............................................. 9
Vill. Improvement Ass’n of Doylestown v. Dow
Chem. Co.,
655 F. Supp. 311 (E.D. Pa. 1987) ....................... 22
Statutes
28 U.S.C. § 1441(d) ................................................... 25
28 U.S.C. § 1446 .......................................................... 1
x
28 U.S.C. § 1446(a) ..................................................... 1
28 U.S.C. § 1446(b) ......................................... 1, 11, 14
28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(1) .................................. i, 1, 4, 5, 7
28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(2) ............................................... 18
28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(2)(A) ............................................ 2
28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(2)(B) ...................................... 2, 12
28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(2)(C) ............................................ 2
28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(2)(C)(3)(c) .................................... 3
28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(2)(C)(3)(c)(1) ............................... 3
28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(3) ....................................... 2, 7, 25
28 U.S.C. § 1446(c)(1) ............................................... 18
28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) ................................................ 3, 21
28 U.S.C. § 2679(d)(2) ............................................... 23
42 U.S.C. § 1442 ........................................................ 21
Other Authorities
Scott Dodson,
Mandatory Rules, 61 Stan. L. Rev. 1 (2008)........ 9
Rules
Fed. R. Civ. P. 5(d)(4)................................................ 12
Fed. R. Civ. P. 83(a)(2) .............................................. 12
S. Ct. R. 14.1(b)(iii) ..................................................... ii
1
OPINIONS BELOW
The Sixth Circuit’s opinion, Pet. App. 1a–25a, is
reported at 104 F.4th 958.
The district court’s opinion, Pet. App. 26a–42a, is
not published in the Federal Reporter, but it is available at 2022 WL 19005621.
JURISDICTION
The Attorney General agrees that this Court has
jurisdiction to consider the petition.
STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED
Section 1446 of Title 28 of the United States Code
provides, in part:
(a) GENERALLY.—A defendant or defendants
desiring to remove any civil action from a
State court shall file in the district court of the
United States for the district and division
within which such action is pending a notice
of removal signed pursuant to Rule 11 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and containing a short and plain statement of the grounds
for removal, together with a copy of all process, pleadings, and orders served upon such
defendant or defendants in such action.
(b) REQUIREMENTS; GENERALLY.—(1) The notice of removal of a civil action or proceeding
shall be filed within 30 days after the receipt
by the defendant, through service or otherwise, of a copy of the initial pleading setting
2
forth the claim for relief upon which such action or proceeding is based, or within 30 days
after the service of summons upon the defendant if such initial pleading has then been filed
in court and is not required to be served on the
defendant, whichever period is shorter.
(2)(A) When a civil action is removed solely
under section 1441(a), all defendants who
have been properly joined and served must
join in or consent to the removal of the action.
(B) Each defendant shall have 30 days after
receipt by or service on that defendant of the
initial pleading or summons described in paragraph (1) to file the notice of removal.
(C) If defendants are served at different times,
and a later-served defendant files a notice of
removal, any earlier-served defendant may
consent to the removal even though that earlier-served defendant did not previously initiate or consent to removal.
(3) Except as provided in subsection (c), if the
case stated by the initial pleading is not removable, a notice of removal may be filed
within thirty days after receipt by the defendant, through service or otherwise, of a copy of
an amended pleading, motion, order or other
paper from which it may first be ascertained
that the case is one which is or has become removable.
3
(c) REQUIREMENTS; REMOVAL BASED ON DIVERSITY OF CITIZENSHIP.—(1) A case may not be
removed under subsection (b)(3) on the basis
of jurisdiction conferred by section 1332 more
than 1 year after commencement of the action,
unless the district court finds that the plaintiff has acted in bad faith in order to prevent
a defendant from removing the action.
Section 1447(c) of Title 28 of the United States
Code provides, in part:
A motion to remand the case on the basis of
any defect other than lack of subject matter
jurisdiction must be made within 30 days after the filing of the notice of removal under
section 1446(a). If at any time before final
judgment it appears that the district court
lacks subject matter jurisdiction, the case
shall be remanded.
4
INTRODUCTION
The Sixth Circuit correctly rejected Enbridge’s untimely removal of this action because the company
failed to comply with the removal statute’s clear commands. Congress has conditioned a defendant’s right
to remove a case from state to federal court upon compliance with certain “requirements,” including that
the defendant “shall” file a notice of removal “within
30 days” after receiving the complaint or summons,
“whichever period is shorter.” 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(1).
Because Enbridge missed that deadline by over two
years, the Michigan Attorney General timely objected,
and no statutory exception applied, the Sixth Circuit
held that Enbridge could not remove the case. Nor
could the court disregard the statute’s dictates and
take this case from state court outside of the limits
imposed by Congress.
The well-reasoned decision below follows from a
straightforward application of the clear statutory text.
It is faithful to precedent, sensitive to federalism, and
respectful of Congress’s role in establishing the
bounds of federal court adjudication. Every court of
appeals would have reached the same conclusion.
Enbridge tries to manufacture a circuit split where
there is none by citing decades-old, outlier cases that
have largely been abrogated and would not apply on
these facts. In reality, the caselaw across the circuits
is overwhelmingly uniform. Any divergence is minor
and not implicated here, so there is no cause for this
Court’s review.
5
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. Relevant facts and procedural history.
The Michigan Attorney General brought this action in state court on June 27, 2019, alleging that
Enbridge’s operation of the Line 5 dual pipelines in
the Straits of Mackinac violates three state laws: the
public-trust doctrine, common-law public nuisance,
and the Michigan Environmental Protection Act. Pet.
App. 3a. The summons and complaint were served on
July 12, 2019, making August 12, 2019, the deadline
to remove the case under 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(1). Pet.
App. 9a.
Rather than filing a notice of removal within the
prescribed period, Enbridge chose to litigate this case
in state court. On September 16, 2019, it filed a motion for summary disposition, arguing in part that federal law preempted the Attorney General’s claims.
Pet. App. 3a. The Attorney General filed a dispositive
motion as well. Id. The state court held an argument
in May 2020, followed by post-argument briefing on
the federal preemption arguments. Pet. App. 3a–4a.
In June 2020, while the dispositive motions were
pending for decision, the State of Michigan received a
report that Line 5’s infrastructure had been damaged
by an anchor strike or similar event. See Pet. App. 4a.
The Attorney General sought a temporary restraining
order requiring Enbridge to shut down the pipelines
until the issue was resolved. Id. The state court issued
the TRO over Enbridge’s objection. Id. Following that
adverse decision, Enbridge sought to remove the case
to a different forum.
6
In November 2020, while the parties were still
awaiting a decision on the cross-motions for summary
disposition, Governor Gretchen Whitmer issued a notice that the State was revoking and terminating the
1953 easement that authorized Line 5 to traverse the
Straits of Mackinac. Pet. App. 4a. The Governor filed
a state-court complaint seeking to enforce the notice,
which “closely paralleled” the complaint in this case.
Id. Enbridge timely removed the Governor’s case to
federal court. Id. Despite the similarity of the claims
and issues, Enbridge did not remove this case at that
time. See id.; Pet. App. 7a.
The Governor moved to remand her case to state
court, arguing the district court lacked subject-matter
jurisdiction. Pet. App. 5a. The district court denied the
motion on November 16, 2021, concluding that it had
jurisdiction under the Grable doctrine. Pet. App. 6a.
The Governor then voluntarily dismissed her case. Id.
Enbridge removed this case to federal court on December 15, 2021. Pet. App. 7a. “Although 887 days had
passed since receipt of the Attorney General’s complaint, Enbridge argued that removal was nonetheless
timely [under 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(3)] because it could
not have ascertained that there were grounds for removal until the district court denied the motion to remand in the Governor’s case.” Id. On January 14,
2022, the Attorney General filed a timely motion to
remand on two grounds: untimely removal and lack
of subject-matter jurisdiction. Id.
7
B. The district court’s opinion.
The district court denied the Attorney General’s
motion. Pet. App. 26a–42a. The court did not adopt
Enbridge’s argument that its notice of removal was
timely under § 1446(b)(3). Instead, the court set aside
the 30-day deadline on equitable grounds, including
its assessment of “the importance of a federal forum
in deciding the disputed and substantial federal issues at stake,” its decision that a federal forum was
appropriate in the Governor’s case, and the fact that—
over two years after the Attorney General filed this
action in state court—Enbridge had filed a separate
lawsuit in federal court where overlapping issues
were pending. Pet. App. 35a–38a. The district court
also held that the Attorney General was estopped
from challenging whether there was federal subjectmatter jurisdiction over this case. Pet. App. 38a–42a.
The Attorney General moved the district court to
certify its opinion for interlocutory appeal, identifying
three issues for appeal:
(1) whether the 30-day removal period set
forth in 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(1) is mandatory;
(2) whether [the] order denying remand in
[the Governor’s case] constituted an order
from which Enbridge could first ascertain that
this case is or has become removable; and
(3) whether [the] complaint necessarily raises
substantial questions of federal law that give
rise to federal court jurisdiction under Grable
& Sons Metal Prod., Inc. v. Darue Eng’g &
Mfg., 545 U.S. 308 (2005). [Pet. App. 44a.]
8
The district court granted the motion to certify
Pet. App. 43a–45a, and the Sixth Circuit granted permission to appeal, Pet. App. 46–49a.
C. The Sixth Circuit’s opinion.
The Sixth Circuit began its analysis with a simple
principle: “To remove a civil case from state to federal
court, a defendant must meet the requirements for removal detailed in § 1446.” Pet. App. 8a–9a (citing
Home Depot U.S.A., Inc. v. Jackson, 139 S. Ct. 1743,
1746 (2019)). It then held that Enbridge failed to meet
those requirements. “Enbridge missed § 1446(b)(1)’s
initial window for removal [by over two years], and to
the extent § 1446(b)(3)’s later removal window was
ever open, Enbridge missed that one too. Enbridge’s
removal was therefore untimely under § 1446(b).” Pet.
App. 17a. Enbridge does not challenge this aspect of
the court’s ruling in its petition, thereby conceding
that its removal did not comply with § 1446(b)’s time
limits.
Next, the Sixth Circuit addressed whether the district court had discretion to disregard § 1446(b)—and
assert federal jurisdiction over this case despite the
Attorney General’s timely objection to the defective
removal—on equitable grounds not set forth in the
statute. The court held that the answer was no, reasoning that Congress’s directive that a notice of removal “shall be filed within 30 days” is a mandatory
claims-processing rule. Pet. App. 18a–24a. Unlike a
jurisdictional rule, it need not be policed sua sponte
and may be forfeited. Pet. App. 19a. But when
properly raised in a timely motion to remand, it is unalterable and assures relief. Id. (citing Nutraceutical
9
Corp. v. Lambert, 586 U.S. 188, 192 (2019), Eberhart
v. United States, 546 U.S. 12, 19 (2005), and Scott
Dodson, Mandatory Rules, 61 Stan. L. Rev. 1, 5–9
(2008)).
In reaching this conclusion, the Sixth Circuit
found “ ‘good reason to believe that Congress did not
want equitable exceptions’ to apply to § 1446(b)’s time
limitations,” Pet. App. 20a (quoting United States v.
Brockamp, 519 U.S. 347, 350 (1997)), including that:
•
Congress’s use of the mandatory words “shall
be filed,” followed by “whichever period is
shorter,” suggests an intent for strict enforcement. Pet. App. 20a.
•
“Congress’s detailed, express scheme of exceptions and carveouts” to the statutory deadline
militates against “adding a judicially created
exception.” Pet. App. 20a–22a.
•
The removal deadline’s placement within Title
28, Part IV, titled “Jurisdiction and Venue,”
and the interrelation of removal and the exercise of federal jurisdiction, suggest stricter enforcement. Pet. App. 22a.
•
“Overwhelming authority provides that removal statutes—such as § 1446(b)—are to be
strictly construed against removal out of respect for state sovereignty.” Pet. App. 22a–23a
(collecting cases).
•
District courts “have consistently rejected invitations to engraft unwritten equitable exceptions into the removal statute,” Pet. App. 23a,
10
and the cases Enbridge offered in support of an
equitable exception were distinguishable and
unpersuasive, Pet. App. 24a.
The Sixth Circuit thus held that “§ 1446(b)’s time
limitations are mandatory” and “Enbridge’s failure to
comply with these mandatory rules requires remand.”
Pet. App. 24a. As a result, the court did not reach
whether there was subject-matter jurisdiction over
the Attorney General’s state-law claims. Pet. App. 8a.
11
REASONS FOR DENYING THE PETITION
I.
The Sixth Circuit’s decision does
implicate a certworthy circuit split.
not
Over 30 years ago, the Sixth Circuit observed: “It
has been uniformly held that the failure to file for removal within the thirty-day period, while waivable by
plaintiff, is a formal barrier to the exercise of federal
jurisdiction.” Holston v. Carolina Freight Carriers
Corp., 936 F.2d 573, 1991 WL 112809, at *2 (6th Cir.
1991) (unpublished table decision). That is as true
now as it was then.
Enbridge argues there is a circuit split with the
Sixth and Second Circuits on one side and the Fifth
and Eleventh Circuits on the other. Pet. 16. Not so.
The opinion below is consistent with the rule applied
in every circuit—including the Fifth and the Eleventh.
At most, Enbridge has located a single, 40-year-old
Eleventh Circuit case that excused a removal deadline
in a prior version of the statute. But that isolated case
is easily distinguishable, rarely relied on, and may no
longer be good law. It does not apply in the mine run
of cases, and it does not warrant this Court’s review.
A. Lower courts have overwhelmingly held
that the 30-day removal deadline is
mandatory and may not be extended by
judicial decree.
The Sixth Circuit’s opinion is consistent with the
removal jurisprudence in every circuit:
The First Circuit has observed that the language
in § 1446(b) is “mandatory.” Romulus v. CVS Pharm.,
12
Inc., 770 F.3d 67, 74 (1st Cir. 2014). District courts in
the First Circuit hold that the 30-day deadline cannot
be extended by court order. E.g., Hill v. Phillips, Barratt, Kaiser Eng’g Ltd., 586 F. Supp. 944, 945 (D. Me.
1984); Diaz v. Swiss Chalet, 525 F. Supp. 247, 250
(D.P.R. 1981).
The Second Circuit has stated that the “statutory
time limit is mandatory” and “rigorously enforce[d].”
Somlyo v. J. Lu-Rob Enters., Inc., 932 F.2d 1043, 1048
(2d Cir. 1991), superseded on other grounds by Fed. R.
Civ. P. 5(d)(4) & 83(a)(2). District courts in the Second
Circuit regard it as “well established that § 1446(b)’s
thirty day filing period . . . is mandatory and failure to
comply with it will defeat a defendant’s removal petition.” E.g., Nicola Prods. Corp. v. Showart Kitchens,
Inc., 682 F. Supp. 171, 172 (E.D.N.Y. 1988).
The Third Circuit has stated that “[r]emoval is a
statutory right, and the procedures to effect removal
must be followed.” Lewis v. Rego Co., 757 F.2d 66, 68
(3d Cir. 1985). District courts in the Third Circuit
have found it “well-settled . . . that the thirty-day limitation is mandatory and the court is without authority to expand it.” Ogletree v. Barnes, 851 F. Supp. 184,
190 (E.D. Pa. 1994) (cleaned up); accord Cacoilo v.
Sherwin-Williams Co., 902 F. Supp. 2d 511, 519
(D.N.J. 2012).
The Fourth Circuit’s rule is: “If you do not seek
removal within the thirty-day window, you have forfeited your right to remove.” Barbour v. Int’l Union,
640 F.3d 599, 611 (4th Cir. 2011) (en banc), abrogated
on other grounds by 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(2)(B); accord
McKinney v. Bd. of Tr. of Md. Cmty. Coll., 955 F.2d
924, 925 (4th Cir. 1992) (“If the defendant does not act
13
within thirty days, the case may not be removed.”).
District courts in the Fourth Circuit have held that
courts “do[] not have discretion to retain jurisdiction,
in the face of a timely challenge to the timeliness of
removal.” Stone Street Cap., Inc. v. McDonald’s Corp.,
300 F. Supp. 2d 345, 351 (D. Md. 2003); see also Cook
v. Robinson, 612 F. Supp. 187, 190 (E.D. Va. 1985)
(“The thirty day limitation is mandatory and cannot
be extended by the court.” (cleaned up)).
The Fifth Circuit has similarly held that “the requirement for timely filing a petition for removal is
mandatory” and non-compliance waives the defendant’s right to remove. Cervantez v. Bexar Cnty. Civil
Serv. Comm’n, 99 F.3d 730, 732, 734 (5th Cir. 1996).
District courts in the Fifth Circuit have held that federal courts “do[] not have authority to enlarge or extend this time period.” E.g., Skidmore v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 672 F. Supp. 923, 925 (M.D. La. 1987).
Courts in the Sixth Circuit have widely “rejected
equitable exceptions as incompatible with a strict construction of § 1446(b)” and refused “to engraft unwritten equitable exceptions into the removal statute.”
Pet. App. 23a (collecting cases).
The Seventh Circuit regards the removal deadline
as a “strictly applied rule of procedure,” meaning that
“untimeliness is a ground for remand so long as the
timeliness defect has not been waived.” N. Ill. Gas Co.
v. Airco Indus. Gases, 676 F.2d 270, 273 (7th Cir.
1982). District courts in the Seventh Circuit have held
that “the thirty day period in § 1446(b) is mandatory
and cannot be extended by consent of the parties or by
court order.” E.g., Cook v. Travelers Cos., 904 F. Supp.
841, 842 (N.D. Ill. 1995) (cleaned up).
14
The Eighth Circuit requires that “a defendant
must file a notice of removal within 30 days,” Dalton
v. Walgreen Co., 721 F.3d 492, 493 (8th Cir. 2013), and
limitations on removal “must be strictly construed
and enforced,” Int’l Ass’n of Entrepreneurs of Am. v.
Angoff, 58 F.3d 1266, 1270 (8th Cir. 1995). District
courts in the Eighth Circuit hold that the removal
deadline “is mandatory, therefore a timely motion to
remand for failure to observe the 30-day limit will be
granted.” E.g., Pender v. Bell Asbestos Mines, Ltd., 145
F. Supp. 2d 1107, 1110 (E.D. Mo. 2001); accord State
Farm & Cas. Co. v. Valspar Corp., 824 F. Supp. 2d
923, 938 (D.S.D. 2010).
The Ninth Circuit has held that § 1446(b)’s “time
limit is mandatory such that a timely objection to a
late petition will defeat removal.” Kuxhausen v. BMW
Fin. Servs. NA LLC, 707 F.3d 1136, 1142 n.4 (9th Cir.
2013) (cleaned up) (citing Fristoe v. Reynolds Metals
Co., 615 F.2d 1209, 1212 (9th Cir. 1980)). District
courts in the Ninth Circuit have held that courts may
not extend the statutory time limit. E.g., Lewis v. City
of Fresno, 627 F. Supp. 2d 1179, 1182 (E.D. Cal. 2008).
The Tenth Circuit has held that a defendant’s failure to comply with § 1446(b)’s requirements renders
the removal defective and justifies remand. Huffman
v. Saul Holdings Ltd., 194 F.3d 1072, 1077 (10th Cir.
1999). District courts in the Tenth Circuit treat compliance with the statutory time limit as mandatory.
E.g., Gruber v. Estate of Marshall, 229 F. Supp. 3d
1245, 1247–48 (D. Kan. 2017).
The Eleventh Circuit has stated that “[t]he failure
to comply with these express statutory requirements
for removal can fairly be said to render the removal
15
‘defective’ and justify a remand.” Snapper, Inc. v.
Redan, 171 F.3d 1249, 1253 (11th Cir. 1999); see also
Glob. Satellite Comm’n Co. v. Starmill U.K. Ltd., 378
F.3d 1269, 1271 (11th Cir. 2004) (“A defendant’s right
to remove an action against it from state to federal
court is purely statutory and therefore its scope and
the terms of its availability are entirely dependent on
the will of Congress.” (cleaned up)); James v. Freedom
Mortg. Corp., No. 23-13039, 2024 WL 1509682, *3
(11th Cir. Apr. 8, 2024) (“[B]ecause removal jurisdiction raises significant federalism concerns, the removal statute is construed strictly,” and a notice of removal that “clearly fails to meet the plain language of
the federal removal statute” is “legally without merit”
(cleaned up)). District courts in the Eleventh Circuit
regard the 30-day removal deadline as “a strictly applied rule of procedure that may not be extended by
the court.” BCC Apartments, Ltd. v. Browning, 994 F.
Supp. 1440, 1442 (S.D. Fla. 1997); accord Tucker v.
Equifirst Corp., 57 F. Supp. 3d 1347, 1353 (S.D. Ala.
2014); Harris v. Kollsman, Inc., 97 F. Supp. 2d 1148,
1151 (M.D. Fla. 2000).
The D.C. Circuit has held “[t]he 30-day time limit
to file a notice of removal is mandatory and a timely
objection to a late petition will defeat removal.” In re
Clark, No. 23-7073, 2024 WL 3385251, at *5 (D.C. Cir.
July 12, 2024) (cleaned up). District courts in the D.C.
Circuit construe the removal statute strictly and routinely remand where a removal is defective. E.g.,
Henry v. Reynolds & Assocs., Inc., Case No. 1:20-cv02321, 2020 WL 7186158, at *3 (D.D.C. Dec. 7, 2020).
16
B. The cases Enbridge cites are decades-old
outliers that are distinguishable and
may no longer be good law.
Against this robust caselaw from every circuit,
Enbridge has attempted to manufacture a circuit split
by stretching a handful of outdated decisions from the
Fifth and Eleventh Circuits. That effort fails.
1. There is no certworthy split between
the Fifth and Sixth Circuits.
Enbridge cites five Fifth Circuit cases. Pet. 19–20,
22–23. 1 The first three—Getty Oil Corp. v. Ins. Co. of
N. Am., 841 F.2d 1254 (5th Cir. 1988), Doe v. Kerwood,
969 F.2d 165 (5th Cir. 1992), and Gillis v. Louisiana,
294 F.3d 755 (5th Cir. 2002)—are inapposite, as they
are multi-defendant cases about the so-called rule of
unanimity, which requires that all defendants must
consent to a notice of removal.
In Getty Oil, the Fifth Circuit held that when the
defendants are served at different times, service on
the first defendant starts the 30-day removal clock for
all defendants—meaning later-served defendants had
less than 30 days to seek or consent to removal. 841
F.2d at 1262–63. To soften this rule, however, the
court provided that a later-served defendant may be
able to consent to removal after the 30-day period in
“exceptional circumstances.” Id. at 1263 n.12. Most
other circuits rejected the first-served defendant rule,
1 Enbridge did not cite any of these cases prior to the Sixth Cir-
cuit issuing its opinion. Enbridge cited Gillis for the first time in
its petition for en banc rehearing. (R. 55-17.) It did not cite Getty
Oil, Kerwood, Johnson, or Harris at any point below.
17
holding instead that each defendant has 30 days from
the date it is served to seek removal. See Barbour, 640
F.3d at 609 (describing the circuit split).
Kerwood and Gillis merely apply Getty Oil. In Kerwood, the court held that the Red Cross was not exempt from the rule of unanimity, and it responded to
the Red Cross’s concerns about the unfairness of the
first-served defendant rule by stating in dicta that
courts could excuse the harsh timing requirement in
exceptional circumstances. 969 F.2d at 169. In Gillis,
the court excused the 30-day consent deadline where
a defendant timely consented to a notice of removal
based on a request from board members, but the board
did not formally ratify the consent until after the 30day period due to “exceptional circumstances” that
prevented it from meeting. 294 F.3d at 758–59.
Enbridge’s reliance on these cases is misplaced for
two reasons.
First, this is not a rule-of-unanimity case. The issue here is not that a defendant failed to timely consent to a notice of removal, but that a notice of removal
was not timely filed. Enbridge has not identified any
case where the Fifth Circuit excused compliance with
§ 1446(b) on similar facts. Indeed, Enbridge overlooks
the most analogous Fifth Circuit case, Cervantez,
which holds that “the requirement for timely filing a
petition for removal is mandatory” and a defendant
that fails to file a timely petition “waive[s] its right to
remove.” 99 F.3d at 732, 734.
Second, these cases may no longer be good law.
Congress abrogated Getty Oil’s first-served defendant
rule in the Jurisdiction and Venue Clarification Act of
18
2011, amending 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(2) to codify the
last-served defendant rule instead. See, e.g., Tilley v.
Tisdale, 914 F. Supp. 846, 849 (E.D. Tex. 2012) (recognizing the abrogation). The Fifth Circuit has not addressed whether its prior caselaw survived the statutory amendments, but there is good reason to think
the answer is no. As the Second Circuit explained:
When the rule of unanimity was a judge-made
rule, courts could allow judge-made exceptions to that rule. But now we are limited to
interpreting a clear statutory command from
Congress that all defendants must consent to
removal within thirty days of service. Where,
as here, Congress provides no exceptions to
the rule, we are not at liberty to create one.
[Taylor v. Medtronic, Inc., 15 F.4th 148, 153
(2d Cir. 2021).]
The Fifth Circuit has approached other aspects of
the 2011 statutory amendments in the same manner
as the Second Circuit. Prior to the amendments, the
Fifth Circuit allowed equitable tolling of the one-year
time limit to remove diversity cases. Tedford v.
Warner-Lambert Co., 327 F.3d 423 (5th Cir. 2003).
However, the 2011 amendments provide that removal
after the one-year period is only available in cases of
“bad faith.” 28 U.S.C. § 1446(c)(1). The Fifth Circuit
has since held that the amendment abrogated its prior
caselaw and made equitable tolling of the one-year
time limit unavailable. Hoyt v. Lane Constr. Co., 927
F.3d 287, 294 (5th Cir. 2019). It reasoned: “Congress
is vested with the power to prescribe the basic procedural scheme under which claims may be heard in
19
federal courts. Once Congress has prescribed those
procedures, we cannot add to them.” Id. (cleaned up).
Given its analysis in Hoyt, it seems likely that, if
it were faced with the question, the Fifth Circuit
would follow the Second Circuit’s holding in Taylor
that equitable tolling of the time to consent to removal
is no longer available. At any rate, the issue is not presented here, since this is not a rule-of-unanimity case.
Thus, even if there were a split between the Second
and Fifth Circuits on that issue, this case would not
be an appropriate vehicle to resolve it.
Enbridge’s fourth case—Johnson v. Heublein, 227
F.3d 236 (5th Cir. 2000)—is similarly inapposite. That
case involved the so-called “revival” doctrine, under
which “a lapsed right to remove . . . is restored when
the complaint is amended so substantially as to alter
the character of the action and constitute essentially
a new lawsuit.” Id. at 241. Few courts have applied
this doctrine, and several have questioned it. See, e.g.,
Kuxhausen, 707 F.3d at 1142 n.5; Tucker, 57 F. Supp.
3d at 1350–58.
Enbridge did not raise the revival doctrine below,
and the Sixth Circuit had no occasion to consider it.
Nor does this Court. Even if the doctrine existed, it
would not apply here since the Attorney General did
not file an amended complaint, let alone one that so
substantially altered the character of the action as to
essentially create a new lawsuit. See Abbo-Bradley v.
City of Niagara Falls, 73 F.4th 143, 151 (2d Cir. 2023)
(declining to adopt or reject the revival doctrine since
it would not apply in any event). Any questions about
the revival doctrine are best left for another case
where it would at least arguably apply.
20
Enbridge’s fifth case, Harris v. Edward Hyman
Co., 664 F.2d 943 (5th Cir. 1981), is consistent with
the Sixth Circuit’s opinion below. In Harris, the Fifth
Circuit held that a plaintiff forfeited the right to object
to a defective removal petition “by failing to assert
promptly her objections to the defects in the petition
and by proceeding with discovery.” Id. at 944. The
court below did not hold to the contrary, and in fact
recognized that a plaintiff could forfeit the right to object to a defective notice of removal. Pet. App. 19a
(stating that objections to the timing of removal are
“subject to forfeiture if not raised in a timely motion
to remand”). That is not an issue here, however, since
“the Attorney General properly invoked § 1446(b)’s removal time limits in a timely motion to remand.” Pet.
App. 20a. Harris is simply irrelevant.
In sum, none of the cases Enbridge cites show a
certworthy split between the Fifth and Sixth Circuits.
And to the extent there is any divergence, this is not
a vehicle to address it because this case does not involve an untimely consent to a notice of removal, an
allegedly “revived” right to remove, or a waiver of the
right to seek remand.
2. There is no certworthy split between
the Sixth and Eleventh Circuits.
In attempting to show a split between the Sixth
and Eleventh Circuits, Enbridge cites Loftin v. Rush,
767 F.2d 800 (11th Cir. 1985), abrogated on other
grounds by Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 517 U.S.
706, 714–15 (1996). There, an employee of the U.S.
Navy failed to pay child support owed under a divorce
decree, and his ex-wife served a summons of
21
garnishment on the Navy. Id. at 801. The Navy did
not answer, and the state court entered a default judgment against it for the entire amount of child support
the employee owed, in derogation of the federal government’s sovereign immunity. Id. at 801, 806–10.
The Navy then filed an answer and removed the case
to federal court under the federal officer removal statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1442, after the 30-day period had expired. Id. at 805. On those unusual facts, the Eleventh
Circuit held that the Navy’s untimely removal did not
require remand. Id.
Enbridge seems puzzled by the Sixth Circuit’s
holding that Loftin is “distinguishable.” Pet. 21. But
there is no mystery. For one thing, Loftin involved a
prior version of the removal statute, which required
remand if a case was “removed improvidently and
without jurisdiction.” Loftin, 767 F.2d at 802 n.2
(quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c)). Some courts have read
Loftin’s statement that “[t]he timeliness of a removal
petition is not jurisdictional . . . and we therefore have
the power to review even an untimely petition,” id. at
805, as an application of that statutory language,
which was removed in 1988. Those courts have questioned whether Loftin and related cases remain good
law based on the statutory language that exists today.
See May v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 440 F. Supp. 2d
879, 883–84 (W.D. Tenn. 2006) (“The great weight of
the case law, as well as the present language of the
statute, is contrary to this discretionary approach.”). 2
2
See also California v. Salas, No. 24-mc-80105, 2024 WL
3757492, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 12, 2024) (questioning whether
Loftin remains good law); Ligutom v. SunTrust Mortg., No. C1005431, 2011 WL 445655, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 4, 2011).
22
For another thing, Enbridge is not the federal government, and litigating this action in state court
would not offend federal sovereign immunity. Several
courts have declined to follow Loftin where, as here,
the federal government was not the removing party,
and its sovereign immunity was not at issue. See, e.g.,
Stone Street Cap., 300 F. Supp. 2d at 351; Vill. Improvement Ass’n of Doylestown v. Dow Chem. Co., 655
F. Supp. 311, 315 (E.D. Pa. 1987). 3
Loftin itself states that, when a timeliness defect
is not waived, district courts are “require[d] . . . to remand the case in most instances.” 767 F.2d at 805
(emphasis added). The Loftin court did not elaborate
on when remand is not required, holding only that
“the timeliness requirement in § 1446(b) is not binding on the government under the facts here.” Id.
In the past 40 years, courts have not given Loftin
wide application. Enbridge cites only two reported
cases that relied on Loftin, Pet. 18–19, and they are
easily distinguishable. In Premier Holidays Int’l, Inc.
v. Actrade Cap., 105 F. Supp. 2d 1336, 1339–40 (N.D.
Ga. 2000), the court denied a motion to remand where
one defendant timely filed a notice of removal and another defendant did not consent, holding the non-consenting defendant “must be realigned as a plaintiff
and its consent to removal is unnecessary and
3 Courts in the Eleventh Circuit have cited Village Improvement
Association with approval. See Bray v. Loudo Trailers, Inc., No.
5:08-cv-392, 2009 WL 302164, at *1–2 (M.D. Fla. Feb. 6, 2009)
(remanding a case that was removed one day late); Dulaney v.
Halsted Fin. Servs., LLC, No. 1:16-CV-0316, 2016 WL 9558934,
at *6 (N.D. Ga. May 3, 2016) (holding that the removal deadline
is mandatory and cannot be excused).
23
irrelevant.” In Reese v. S. Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist., 853
F. Supp. 413, 415 (S.D. Fla. 1994), the court allowed
the United States to remove a case 12 days after the
deadline. No court has ever relied on Loftin to excuse
a notice of removal filed by a private entity two years
after the statutory deadline and after substantial
state-court litigation had already occurred. Indeed,
several district courts in the Eleventh Circuit regard
the statutory removal deadline as a mandatory and
strictly applied rule of procedure—exactly like the
Sixth Circuit. See supra at 14. 4
Because Loftin is a clear outlier that would not apply on these facts and has only rarely been relied on
over the past 40 years, any conflict with the opinion
below is not significant enough to warrant this Court’s
intervention. Further, as Professor Miller points out,
“a later Eleventh Circuit panel might also distinguish
[Loftin] based on . . . the persuasive value of this Sixth
Circuit opinion.” Amicus Br. 6–7. That the Eleventh
Circuit may limit Loftin and follow the Sixth Circuit’s
persuasive analysis does not weigh in favor of granting certiorari. It indicates that there is no ripe circuit
split for this Court to resolve, and further percolation
is warranted to clarify the nature and extent of any
discrepancy between the circuits.
4 Enbridge cites Green v. Hill, 954 F.2d 694, 696 n.3 (11th Cir.
1992), superseded in part on other grounds, 968 F.2d 1092 (11th
Cir. 1992), for the proposition that “Loftin remains governing law
in the Eleventh Circuit today.” Pet. 18. But Green is a 30-yearold case that only referenced Loftin in dicta. The 30-day removal
deadline did not apply in Green because the case was removed
under the Westfall Act, which authorizes removal “any time before trial.” Green, 954 F.2d at 696 n.3 (quoting 28 U.S.C.
§ 2679(d)(2)).
24
II. The decision below is correct and any issue
can be addressed by Congress.
It is no accident that courts have so uniformly held
compliance with the statutory removal deadline is
mandatory. Congress “determine[s] when, and under
what conditions, federal courts can hear [cases].”
Bowles v. Russell, 551 U.S. 205, 212–13 (2007); see
also Patsy v. Bd. of Regents, 457 U.S. 496, 501 (1982)
(“Congress is vested with the power to prescribe the
basic procedural scheme under which claims may be
heard in federal courts.”).
“Removal is entirely a creature of statute and a
suit commenced in a state court must remain there
until cause is shown for its transfer under some act of
Congress.” Syngenta Crop Prot., Inc. v. Henson, 537
U.S. 28, 32 (2002) (cleaned up). “These statutory procedures for removal are to be strictly construed,” and
defendants cannot “avoid complying with the statutory requirements for removal.” Id. at 32–33.
There are good reasons to ensure that a notice of
removal complies with Congress’s express dictates.
Removal infringes on the state court’s power, which
can only be done “by the action of Congress in conformity to the Judiciary Articles of the Constitution.”
Shamrock Oil & Gas Corp. v. Sheets, 313 U.S. 100,
108–109 (1941). Indeed, federalism concerns are at
their zenith here since this case was brought in a state
court, by the state Attorney General, on behalf of the
People of State, against a nondiverse party under
state law. See Franchise Tax Bd. v. Constr. Laborers
Vacation Tr., 463 U.S. 1, 21 n.22 (1983) (stating that
“considerations of comity make us reluctant to snatch
25
cases which a State has brought from the courts of
that State, unless some clear rule demands it”).
When Congress added a specific time period to the
removal statute in 1948, it intended the provision to
“give adequate time and operate uniformly throughout the Federal jurisdiction.” Murphy Bros., Inc. v. Michetti Pipe Stringing, Inc., 526 U.S. 344, 351 (1999)
(citation omitted). The goal of national uniformity is
not well served by allowing the removal period to
change based on case-by-case assessments of equity.
Accordingly, Congress used all the hallmarks of a
mandatory claims-processing rule: it put the requirement in a statute, used mandatory language, and nestled the provision next to jurisdictional provisions. See
supra at 8–9. Congress enacted express exceptions to
the 30-day removal period where it intended for them
to exist. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(3). And when it
intended to authorize courts to extend the time limits,
it did that expressly, too. See 28 U.S.C. § 1441(d)
(providing that in civil actions against foreign states,
“the time limitations of section 1446(b) of this chapter
may be enlarged at any time for cause shown”). All of
this supports the Sixth Circuit’s opinion below.
If an issue were to arise—for example, if a strict
application of the statute yielded inequitable results
or a genuine circuit split ever did emerge—Congress
would be well suited to step in. It has done so before,
for example, by extending the removal window from
20 to 30 days, see Murphy Bros., 526 U.S. at 352 n.3,
adopting the last-served defendant rule, Tilley, 914 F.
Supp. at 849, and enacting the bad-faith standard for
removal after the one-year limit in diversity cases,
Hoyt, 927 F.3d at 293–94.
26
But given the clear statutory language and the
overwhelming consistency of the caselaw across the
circuits—the development of which will be advanced
by the Sixth Circuit’s opinion—there is no need for
this Court to intervene. This is especially true based
on these facts, where the complaint was not amended,
where Enbridge missed the statutory deadline by over
two years, and where every circuit would reach the
same result.
CONCLUSION
The petition for writ of certiorari should be denied.
Respectfully submitted,
Dana Nessel
Michigan Attorney General
Ann M. Sherman
Solicitor General
Counsel of Record
P.O. Box 30212
Lansing, Michigan 48909
ShermanA@michigan.gov
(517) 335-7628
Daniel P. Bock
Keith D. Underkoffler
Assistant Attorneys
General
Environment, Natural
Resources, and Agriculture
Division
Dated: APRIL 2025
Attorneys for Respondent
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.