Respondents Brief — Enbridge Energy, LP, et al., Petitioners v. Dana Nessel, Attorney General of Michigan, on Behalf of the People of the State of Michigan

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No. 24-783

In the Supreme Court of the United States

ENBRIDGE ENERGY, LP, ET AL., PETITIONERS

v.

DANA NESSEL, ATTORNEY GENERAL OF MICHIGAN, ON

BEHALF OF THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

BRIEF IN OPPOSITION

Dana Nessel

Michigan Attorney General

Ann M. Sherman

Solicitor General

Counsel of Record

P.O. Box 30212

Lansing, Michigan 48909

ShermanA@michigan.gov

(517) 335-7628

Daniel Bock

Keith D. Underkoffler

Assistant Attorneys General

Environment, Natural

Resources, and Agriculture

Division

Attorneys for Respondent

i

QUESTION PRESENTED

Whether the 30-day removal deadline in 28 U.S.C.

§ 1446(b)(1) is mandatory such that a timely objection

to a late notice of removal requires remand.

ii

PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING

Petitioners Enbridge Energy, Limited Partnership, Enbridge Energy Company, Inc., and Enbridge

Energy Partners, L.P. (collectively, “Enbridge”) were

appellees in the court below.

Respondent Dana Nessel, Attorney General of the

State of Michigan, on behalf of the People of the State

of Michigan, was appellant in the court below.

RELATED CASES

The petition accurately lists the directly related

cases within the meaning of Rule 14.1(b)(iii).

iii

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Question Presented...................................................... i

Parties to the Proceeding ........................................... ii

Related Cases .............................................................. ii

Table of Authorities .................................................... v

Opinions Below ........................................................... 1

Jurisdiction ................................................................. 1

Statutory Provisions Involved .................................... 1

Introduction ................................................................ 4

Statement of the Case ................................................ 5

A. Relevant facts and procedural history. ......... 5

B. The district court’s opinion. ........................... 7

C. The Sixth Circuit’s opinion. ........................... 8

Reasons for Denying the Petition............................. 11

I.

The Sixth Circuit’s decision does not

implicate a certworthy circuit split. .................. 11

A. Lower courts have overwhelmingly held

that the 30-day removal deadline is

mandatory and may not be extended by

judicial decree. ............................................. 11

B. The cases Enbridge cites are decades-old

outliers that are distinguishable and may

no longer be good law. .................................. 16

1. There is no certworthy split between

the Fifth and Sixth Circuits. ................. 16

2. There is no certworthy split between

the Sixth and Eleventh Circuits. .......... 20

iv

II. The decision below is correct and any issue

can be addressed by Congress............................ 24

Conclusion ................................................................. 26

v

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases

Abbo-Bradley v. City of Niagara Falls,

73 F.4th 143 (2d Cir. 2023) ................................ 19

Barbour v. Int’l Union,

640 F.3d 599 (4th Cir. 2011) ........................ 12, 17

BCC Apartments, Ltd. v. Browning,

994 F. Supp. 1440 (S.D. Fla. 1997) .................... 15

Bowles v. Russell,

551 U.S. 205 (2007) ............................................ 24

Cacoilo v. Sherwin-Williams Co.,

902 F. Supp. 2d 511 (D.N.J. 2012) ..................... 12

California v. Salas,

No. 24-mc-80105, 2024 WL 3757492 (N.D.

Cal. Aug. 12, 2024) ............................................. 21

Cervantez v. Bexar Cnty. Civil Serv. Comm’n,

99 F.3d 730 (5th Cir. 1996) .......................... 13, 17

Cook v. Robinson,

612 F. Supp. 187 (E.D. Va. 1985) ....................... 13

Cook v. Travelers Cos.,

904 F. Supp. 841 (N.D. Ill. 1995) ....................... 13

Dalton v. Walgreen Co.,

721 F.3d 492 (8th Cir. 2013) .............................. 14

Diaz v. Swiss Chalet,

525 F. Supp. 247 (D.P.R. 1981) .......................... 12

Doe v. Kerwood,

969 F.2d 165 (5th Cir. 1992) ........................ 16, 17

vi

Eberhart v. United States,

546 U.S. 12 (2005) ................................................ 9

Franchise Tax Bd. v. Constr. Laborers Vacation

Tr.,

463 U.S. 1 (1983) ................................................ 24

Fristoe v. Reynolds Metals Co.,

615 F.2d 1209 (9th Cir. 1980) ............................ 14

Getty Oil Corp. v. Ins. Co. of N. Am.,

841 F.2d 1254 (5th Cir. 1988) ............................ 16

Gillis v. Louisiana,

294 F.3d 755 (5th Cir. 2002) ........................ 16, 17

Glob. Satellite Comm’n Co. v. Starmill U.K. Ltd.,

378 F.3d 1269 (11th Cir. 2004) .......................... 15

Grable & Sons Metal Prod., Inc. v. Darue Eng’g

& Mfg.,

545 U.S. 308 (2005) .............................................. 7

Green v. Hill,

954 F.2d 694 (11th Cir. 1992) ............................ 23

Gruber v. Estate of Marshall,

229 F. Supp. 3d 1245 (D. Kan. 2017) ................. 14

Harris v. Edward Hyman Co.,

664 F.2d 943 (5th Cir. 1981) .............................. 20

Harris v. Kollsman, Inc.,

97 F. Supp. 2d 1148 (M.D. Fla. 2000) ................ 15

Henry v. Reynolds & Assocs., Inc.,

Case No. 1:20-cv-02321, 2020 WL 7186158

(D.D.C. Dec. 7, 2020) .......................................... 15

Hill v. Phillips, Barratt, Kaiser Eng’g Ltd.,

586 F. Supp. 944 (D. Me. 1984).......................... 12

vii

Holston v. Carolina Freight Carriers Corp.,

936 F.2d 573 (6th Cir. 1991) .............................. 11

Home Depot U.S.A., Inc. v. Jackson,

139 S. Ct. 1743 (2019) .......................................... 8

Hoyt v. Lane Constr. Co.,

927 F.3d 287 (5th Cir. 2019) .................. 18, 19, 25

Huffman v. Saul Holdings Ltd.,

194 F.3d 1072 (10th Cir. 1999) .......................... 14

In re Clark,

No. 23-7073, 2024 WL 3385251 (D.C. Cir.

July 12, 2024) ..................................................... 15

Int’l Ass’n of Entrepreneurs of Am. v. Angoff,

58 F.3d 1266 (8th Cir. 1995) .............................. 14

James v. Freedom Mort. Corp.,

No. 23-13039, 2024 WL 1509682 (11th Cir.

Apr. 8, 2024) ....................................................... 15

Johnson v. Heublein,

227 F.3d 236 (5th Cir. 2000) .............................. 19

Kuxhausen v. BMW Fin. Servs. NA LLC,

707 F.3d 1136 (9th Cir. 2013) ...................... 14, 19

Lewis v. City of Fresno,

627 F. Supp. 2d 1179 (E.D. Cal. 2008)............... 14

Lewis v. Rego Co.,

757 F.2d 66 (3d Cir. 1985) .................................. 12

Ligutom v. SunTrust Mortg.,

No. C10-05431, 2011 WL 445655 (N.D. Cal.

Feb. 4, 2011) ....................................................... 21

Loftin v. Rush,

767 F.2d 800 (11th Cir. 1985) ................ 20, 21, 22

viii

May v. Johnson Controls, Inc.,

440 F. Supp. 2d 879 (W.D. Tenn. 2006) ............. 21

McKinney v. Bd. of Tr. of Md. Cmty. Coll.,

955 F.2d 924 (4th Cir. 1992) .............................. 12

Murphy Bros., Inc. v. Michetti Pipe Stringing,

Inc.,

526 U.S. 344 (1999) ............................................ 25

N. Ill. Gas Co. v. Airco Indus. Gases,

676 F.2d 270 (7th Cir. 1982) .............................. 13

Nicola Prods. Corp. v. Showart Kitchens, Inc.,

682 F. Supp. 171 (E.D.N.Y. 1988) ...................... 12

Nutraceutical Corp. v. Lambert,

586 U.S. 188 (2019) .............................................. 9

Ogletree v. Barnes,

851 F. Supp. 184 (E.D. Pa. 1994) ....................... 12

Patsy v. Bd. of Regents,

457 U.S. 496 (1982) ............................................ 24

Pender v. Bell Asbestos Mines, Ltd.,

145 F. Supp. 2d 1107 (E.D. Mo. 2001) ............... 14

Premier Holidays Int’l, Inc. v. Actrade Cap.,

105 F. Supp. 2d 1336 (N.D. Ga. 2000) ............... 22

Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co.,

517 U.S. 706 (1996) ............................................ 20

Reese v. S. Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist.,

853 F. Supp. 413 (S.D. Fla. 1994) ...................... 23

Romulus v. CVS Pharm., Inc.,

770 F.3d 67 (1st Cir. 2014) ................................. 12

Shamrock Oil & Gas Corp. v. Sheets,

313 U.S. 100 (1941) ............................................ 24

ix

Skidmore v. Beech Aircraft Corp.,

672 F. Supp. 923 (M.D. La. 1987) ...................... 13

Snapper, Inc. v. Redan,

171 F.3d 1249 (11th Cir. 1999) .......................... 15

Somlyo v. J. Lu-Rob Enters., Inc.,

932 F.2d 1043 (2d Cir. 1991) .............................. 12

State Farm & Cas. Co. v. Valspar Corp.,

824 F. Supp. 2d 923 (D.S.D. 2010) ..................... 14

Stone Street Cap., Inc. v. McDonald’s Corp.,

300 F. Supp. 2d 345 (D. Md. 2003) .............. 13, 22

Syngenta Crop Prot., Inc. v. Henson,

537 U.S. 28 (2002) .............................................. 24

Taylor v. Medtronic, Inc.,

15 F.4th 148 (2d Cir. 2021) ................................ 18

Tedford v. Warner-Lambert Co.,

327 F.3d 423 (5th Cir. 2003) .............................. 18

Tilley v. Tisdale,

914 F. Supp. 846 (E.D. Tex. 2012) ............... 18, 25

Tucker v. Equifirst Corp.,

57 F. Supp. 3d 1347 (S.D. Ala. 2014) ........... 15, 19

United States v. Brockamp,

519 U.S. 347 (1997) .............................................. 9

Vill. Improvement Ass’n of Doylestown v. Dow

Chem. Co.,

655 F. Supp. 311 (E.D. Pa. 1987) ....................... 22

Statutes

28 U.S.C. § 1441(d) ................................................... 25

28 U.S.C. § 1446 .......................................................... 1

x

28 U.S.C. § 1446(a) ..................................................... 1

28 U.S.C. § 1446(b) ......................................... 1, 11, 14

28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(1) .................................. i, 1, 4, 5, 7

28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(2) ............................................... 18

28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(2)(A) ............................................ 2

28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(2)(B) ...................................... 2, 12

28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(2)(C) ............................................ 2

28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(2)(C)(3)(c) .................................... 3

28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(2)(C)(3)(c)(1) ............................... 3

28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(3) ....................................... 2, 7, 25

28 U.S.C. § 1446(c)(1) ............................................... 18

28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) ................................................ 3, 21

28 U.S.C. § 2679(d)(2) ............................................... 23

42 U.S.C. § 1442 ........................................................ 21

Other Authorities

Scott Dodson,

Mandatory Rules, 61 Stan. L. Rev. 1 (2008)........ 9

Rules

Fed. R. Civ. P. 5(d)(4)................................................ 12

Fed. R. Civ. P. 83(a)(2) .............................................. 12

S. Ct. R. 14.1(b)(iii) ..................................................... ii

1

OPINIONS BELOW

The Sixth Circuit’s opinion, Pet. App. 1a–25a, is

reported at 104 F.4th 958.

The district court’s opinion, Pet. App. 26a–42a, is

not published in the Federal Reporter, but it is available at 2022 WL 19005621.

JURISDICTION

The Attorney General agrees that this Court has

jurisdiction to consider the petition.

STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED

Section 1446 of Title 28 of the United States Code

provides, in part:

(a) GENERALLY.—A defendant or defendants

desiring to remove any civil action from a

State court shall file in the district court of the

United States for the district and division

within which such action is pending a notice

of removal signed pursuant to Rule 11 of the

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and containing a short and plain statement of the grounds

for removal, together with a copy of all process, pleadings, and orders served upon such

defendant or defendants in such action.

(b) REQUIREMENTS; GENERALLY.—(1) The notice of removal of a civil action or proceeding

shall be filed within 30 days after the receipt

by the defendant, through service or otherwise, of a copy of the initial pleading setting

2

forth the claim for relief upon which such action or proceeding is based, or within 30 days

after the service of summons upon the defendant if such initial pleading has then been filed

in court and is not required to be served on the

defendant, whichever period is shorter.

(2)(A) When a civil action is removed solely

under section 1441(a), all defendants who

have been properly joined and served must

join in or consent to the removal of the action.

(B) Each defendant shall have 30 days after

receipt by or service on that defendant of the

initial pleading or summons described in paragraph (1) to file the notice of removal.

(C) If defendants are served at different times,

and a later-served defendant files a notice of

removal, any earlier-served defendant may

consent to the removal even though that earlier-served defendant did not previously initiate or consent to removal.

(3) Except as provided in subsection (c), if the

case stated by the initial pleading is not removable, a notice of removal may be filed

within thirty days after receipt by the defendant, through service or otherwise, of a copy of

an amended pleading, motion, order or other

paper from which it may first be ascertained

that the case is one which is or has become removable.

3

(c) REQUIREMENTS; REMOVAL BASED ON DIVERSITY OF CITIZENSHIP.—(1) A case may not be

removed under subsection (b)(3) on the basis

of jurisdiction conferred by section 1332 more

than 1 year after commencement of the action,

unless the district court finds that the plaintiff has acted in bad faith in order to prevent

a defendant from removing the action.

Section 1447(c) of Title 28 of the United States

Code provides, in part:

A motion to remand the case on the basis of

any defect other than lack of subject matter

jurisdiction must be made within 30 days after the filing of the notice of removal under

section 1446(a). If at any time before final

judgment it appears that the district court

lacks subject matter jurisdiction, the case

shall be remanded.

4

INTRODUCTION

The Sixth Circuit correctly rejected Enbridge’s untimely removal of this action because the company

failed to comply with the removal statute’s clear commands. Congress has conditioned a defendant’s right

to remove a case from state to federal court upon compliance with certain “requirements,” including that

the defendant “shall” file a notice of removal “within

30 days” after receiving the complaint or summons,

“whichever period is shorter.” 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(1).

Because Enbridge missed that deadline by over two

years, the Michigan Attorney General timely objected,

and no statutory exception applied, the Sixth Circuit

held that Enbridge could not remove the case. Nor

could the court disregard the statute’s dictates and

take this case from state court outside of the limits

imposed by Congress.

The well-reasoned decision below follows from a

straightforward application of the clear statutory text.

It is faithful to precedent, sensitive to federalism, and

respectful of Congress’s role in establishing the

bounds of federal court adjudication. Every court of

appeals would have reached the same conclusion.

Enbridge tries to manufacture a circuit split where

there is none by citing decades-old, outlier cases that

have largely been abrogated and would not apply on

these facts. In reality, the caselaw across the circuits

is overwhelmingly uniform. Any divergence is minor

and not implicated here, so there is no cause for this

Court’s review.

5

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

A. Relevant facts and procedural history.

The Michigan Attorney General brought this action in state court on June 27, 2019, alleging that

Enbridge’s operation of the Line 5 dual pipelines in

the Straits of Mackinac violates three state laws: the

public-trust doctrine, common-law public nuisance,

and the Michigan Environmental Protection Act. Pet.

App. 3a. The summons and complaint were served on

July 12, 2019, making August 12, 2019, the deadline

to remove the case under 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(1). Pet.

App. 9a.

Rather than filing a notice of removal within the

prescribed period, Enbridge chose to litigate this case

in state court. On September 16, 2019, it filed a motion for summary disposition, arguing in part that federal law preempted the Attorney General’s claims.

Pet. App. 3a. The Attorney General filed a dispositive

motion as well. Id. The state court held an argument

in May 2020, followed by post-argument briefing on

the federal preemption arguments. Pet. App. 3a–4a.

In June 2020, while the dispositive motions were

pending for decision, the State of Michigan received a

report that Line 5’s infrastructure had been damaged

by an anchor strike or similar event. See Pet. App. 4a.

The Attorney General sought a temporary restraining

order requiring Enbridge to shut down the pipelines

until the issue was resolved. Id. The state court issued

the TRO over Enbridge’s objection. Id. Following that

adverse decision, Enbridge sought to remove the case

to a different forum.

6

In November 2020, while the parties were still

awaiting a decision on the cross-motions for summary

disposition, Governor Gretchen Whitmer issued a notice that the State was revoking and terminating the

1953 easement that authorized Line 5 to traverse the

Straits of Mackinac. Pet. App. 4a. The Governor filed

a state-court complaint seeking to enforce the notice,

which “closely paralleled” the complaint in this case.

Id. Enbridge timely removed the Governor’s case to

federal court. Id. Despite the similarity of the claims

and issues, Enbridge did not remove this case at that

time. See id.; Pet. App. 7a.

The Governor moved to remand her case to state

court, arguing the district court lacked subject-matter

jurisdiction. Pet. App. 5a. The district court denied the

motion on November 16, 2021, concluding that it had

jurisdiction under the Grable doctrine. Pet. App. 6a.

The Governor then voluntarily dismissed her case. Id.

Enbridge removed this case to federal court on December 15, 2021. Pet. App. 7a. “Although 887 days had

passed since receipt of the Attorney General’s complaint, Enbridge argued that removal was nonetheless

timely [under 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(3)] because it could

not have ascertained that there were grounds for removal until the district court denied the motion to remand in the Governor’s case.” Id. On January 14,

2022, the Attorney General filed a timely motion to

remand on two grounds: untimely removal and lack

of subject-matter jurisdiction. Id.

7

B. The district court’s opinion.

The district court denied the Attorney General’s

motion. Pet. App. 26a–42a. The court did not adopt

Enbridge’s argument that its notice of removal was

timely under § 1446(b)(3). Instead, the court set aside

the 30-day deadline on equitable grounds, including

its assessment of “the importance of a federal forum

in deciding the disputed and substantial federal issues at stake,” its decision that a federal forum was

appropriate in the Governor’s case, and the fact that—

over two years after the Attorney General filed this

action in state court—Enbridge had filed a separate

lawsuit in federal court where overlapping issues

were pending. Pet. App. 35a–38a. The district court

also held that the Attorney General was estopped

from challenging whether there was federal subjectmatter jurisdiction over this case. Pet. App. 38a–42a.

The Attorney General moved the district court to

certify its opinion for interlocutory appeal, identifying

three issues for appeal:

(1) whether the 30-day removal period set

forth in 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(1) is mandatory;

(2) whether [the] order denying remand in

[the Governor’s case] constituted an order

from which Enbridge could first ascertain that

this case is or has become removable; and

(3) whether [the] complaint necessarily raises

substantial questions of federal law that give

rise to federal court jurisdiction under Grable

& Sons Metal Prod., Inc. v. Darue Eng’g &

Mfg., 545 U.S. 308 (2005). [Pet. App. 44a.]

8

The district court granted the motion to certify

Pet. App. 43a–45a, and the Sixth Circuit granted permission to appeal, Pet. App. 46–49a.

C. The Sixth Circuit’s opinion.

The Sixth Circuit began its analysis with a simple

principle: “To remove a civil case from state to federal

court, a defendant must meet the requirements for removal detailed in § 1446.” Pet. App. 8a–9a (citing

Home Depot U.S.A., Inc. v. Jackson, 139 S. Ct. 1743,

1746 (2019)). It then held that Enbridge failed to meet

those requirements. “Enbridge missed § 1446(b)(1)’s

initial window for removal [by over two years], and to

the extent § 1446(b)(3)’s later removal window was

ever open, Enbridge missed that one too. Enbridge’s

removal was therefore untimely under § 1446(b).” Pet.

App. 17a. Enbridge does not challenge this aspect of

the court’s ruling in its petition, thereby conceding

that its removal did not comply with § 1446(b)’s time

limits.

Next, the Sixth Circuit addressed whether the district court had discretion to disregard § 1446(b)—and

assert federal jurisdiction over this case despite the

Attorney General’s timely objection to the defective

removal—on equitable grounds not set forth in the

statute. The court held that the answer was no, reasoning that Congress’s directive that a notice of removal “shall be filed within 30 days” is a mandatory

claims-processing rule. Pet. App. 18a–24a. Unlike a

jurisdictional rule, it need not be policed sua sponte

and may be forfeited. Pet. App. 19a. But when

properly raised in a timely motion to remand, it is unalterable and assures relief. Id. (citing Nutraceutical

9

Corp. v. Lambert, 586 U.S. 188, 192 (2019), Eberhart

v. United States, 546 U.S. 12, 19 (2005), and Scott

Dodson, Mandatory Rules, 61 Stan. L. Rev. 1, 5–9

(2008)).

In reaching this conclusion, the Sixth Circuit

found “ ‘good reason to believe that Congress did not

want equitable exceptions’ to apply to § 1446(b)’s time

limitations,” Pet. App. 20a (quoting United States v.

Brockamp, 519 U.S. 347, 350 (1997)), including that:

•

Congress’s use of the mandatory words “shall

be filed,” followed by “whichever period is

shorter,” suggests an intent for strict enforcement. Pet. App. 20a.

•

“Congress’s detailed, express scheme of exceptions and carveouts” to the statutory deadline

militates against “adding a judicially created

exception.” Pet. App. 20a–22a.

•

The removal deadline’s placement within Title

28, Part IV, titled “Jurisdiction and Venue,”

and the interrelation of removal and the exercise of federal jurisdiction, suggest stricter enforcement. Pet. App. 22a.

•

“Overwhelming authority provides that removal statutes—such as § 1446(b)—are to be

strictly construed against removal out of respect for state sovereignty.” Pet. App. 22a–23a

(collecting cases).

•

District courts “have consistently rejected invitations to engraft unwritten equitable exceptions into the removal statute,” Pet. App. 23a,

10

and the cases Enbridge offered in support of an

equitable exception were distinguishable and

unpersuasive, Pet. App. 24a.

The Sixth Circuit thus held that “§ 1446(b)’s time

limitations are mandatory” and “Enbridge’s failure to

comply with these mandatory rules requires remand.”

Pet. App. 24a. As a result, the court did not reach

whether there was subject-matter jurisdiction over

the Attorney General’s state-law claims. Pet. App. 8a.

11

REASONS FOR DENYING THE PETITION

I.

The Sixth Circuit’s decision does

implicate a certworthy circuit split.

not

Over 30 years ago, the Sixth Circuit observed: “It

has been uniformly held that the failure to file for removal within the thirty-day period, while waivable by

plaintiff, is a formal barrier to the exercise of federal

jurisdiction.” Holston v. Carolina Freight Carriers

Corp., 936 F.2d 573, 1991 WL 112809, at *2 (6th Cir.

1991) (unpublished table decision). That is as true

now as it was then.

Enbridge argues there is a circuit split with the

Sixth and Second Circuits on one side and the Fifth

and Eleventh Circuits on the other. Pet. 16. Not so.

The opinion below is consistent with the rule applied

in every circuit—including the Fifth and the Eleventh.

At most, Enbridge has located a single, 40-year-old

Eleventh Circuit case that excused a removal deadline

in a prior version of the statute. But that isolated case

is easily distinguishable, rarely relied on, and may no

longer be good law. It does not apply in the mine run

of cases, and it does not warrant this Court’s review.

A. Lower courts have overwhelmingly held

that the 30-day removal deadline is

mandatory and may not be extended by

judicial decree.

The Sixth Circuit’s opinion is consistent with the

removal jurisprudence in every circuit:

The First Circuit has observed that the language

in § 1446(b) is “mandatory.” Romulus v. CVS Pharm.,

12

Inc., 770 F.3d 67, 74 (1st Cir. 2014). District courts in

the First Circuit hold that the 30-day deadline cannot

be extended by court order. E.g., Hill v. Phillips, Barratt, Kaiser Eng’g Ltd., 586 F. Supp. 944, 945 (D. Me.

1984); Diaz v. Swiss Chalet, 525 F. Supp. 247, 250

(D.P.R. 1981).

The Second Circuit has stated that the “statutory

time limit is mandatory” and “rigorously enforce[d].”

Somlyo v. J. Lu-Rob Enters., Inc., 932 F.2d 1043, 1048

(2d Cir. 1991), superseded on other grounds by Fed. R.

Civ. P. 5(d)(4) & 83(a)(2). District courts in the Second

Circuit regard it as “well established that § 1446(b)’s

thirty day filing period . . . is mandatory and failure to

comply with it will defeat a defendant’s removal petition.” E.g., Nicola Prods. Corp. v. Showart Kitchens,

Inc., 682 F. Supp. 171, 172 (E.D.N.Y. 1988).

The Third Circuit has stated that “[r]emoval is a

statutory right, and the procedures to effect removal

must be followed.” Lewis v. Rego Co., 757 F.2d 66, 68

(3d Cir. 1985). District courts in the Third Circuit

have found it “well-settled . . . that the thirty-day limitation is mandatory and the court is without authority to expand it.” Ogletree v. Barnes, 851 F. Supp. 184,

190 (E.D. Pa. 1994) (cleaned up); accord Cacoilo v.

Sherwin-Williams Co., 902 F. Supp. 2d 511, 519

(D.N.J. 2012).

The Fourth Circuit’s rule is: “If you do not seek

removal within the thirty-day window, you have forfeited your right to remove.” Barbour v. Int’l Union,

640 F.3d 599, 611 (4th Cir. 2011) (en banc), abrogated

on other grounds by 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(2)(B); accord

McKinney v. Bd. of Tr. of Md. Cmty. Coll., 955 F.2d

924, 925 (4th Cir. 1992) (“If the defendant does not act

13

within thirty days, the case may not be removed.”).

District courts in the Fourth Circuit have held that

courts “do[] not have discretion to retain jurisdiction,

in the face of a timely challenge to the timeliness of

removal.” Stone Street Cap., Inc. v. McDonald’s Corp.,

300 F. Supp. 2d 345, 351 (D. Md. 2003); see also Cook

v. Robinson, 612 F. Supp. 187, 190 (E.D. Va. 1985)

(“The thirty day limitation is mandatory and cannot

be extended by the court.” (cleaned up)).

The Fifth Circuit has similarly held that “the requirement for timely filing a petition for removal is

mandatory” and non-compliance waives the defendant’s right to remove. Cervantez v. Bexar Cnty. Civil

Serv. Comm’n, 99 F.3d 730, 732, 734 (5th Cir. 1996).

District courts in the Fifth Circuit have held that federal courts “do[] not have authority to enlarge or extend this time period.” E.g., Skidmore v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 672 F. Supp. 923, 925 (M.D. La. 1987).

Courts in the Sixth Circuit have widely “rejected

equitable exceptions as incompatible with a strict construction of § 1446(b)” and refused “to engraft unwritten equitable exceptions into the removal statute.”

Pet. App. 23a (collecting cases).

The Seventh Circuit regards the removal deadline

as a “strictly applied rule of procedure,” meaning that

“untimeliness is a ground for remand so long as the

timeliness defect has not been waived.” N. Ill. Gas Co.

v. Airco Indus. Gases, 676 F.2d 270, 273 (7th Cir.

1982). District courts in the Seventh Circuit have held

that “the thirty day period in § 1446(b) is mandatory

and cannot be extended by consent of the parties or by

court order.” E.g., Cook v. Travelers Cos., 904 F. Supp.

841, 842 (N.D. Ill. 1995) (cleaned up).

14

The Eighth Circuit requires that “a defendant

must file a notice of removal within 30 days,” Dalton

v. Walgreen Co., 721 F.3d 492, 493 (8th Cir. 2013), and

limitations on removal “must be strictly construed

and enforced,” Int’l Ass’n of Entrepreneurs of Am. v.

Angoff, 58 F.3d 1266, 1270 (8th Cir. 1995). District

courts in the Eighth Circuit hold that the removal

deadline “is mandatory, therefore a timely motion to

remand for failure to observe the 30-day limit will be

granted.” E.g., Pender v. Bell Asbestos Mines, Ltd., 145

F. Supp. 2d 1107, 1110 (E.D. Mo. 2001); accord State

Farm & Cas. Co. v. Valspar Corp., 824 F. Supp. 2d

923, 938 (D.S.D. 2010).

The Ninth Circuit has held that § 1446(b)’s “time

limit is mandatory such that a timely objection to a

late petition will defeat removal.” Kuxhausen v. BMW

Fin. Servs. NA LLC, 707 F.3d 1136, 1142 n.4 (9th Cir.

2013) (cleaned up) (citing Fristoe v. Reynolds Metals

Co., 615 F.2d 1209, 1212 (9th Cir. 1980)). District

courts in the Ninth Circuit have held that courts may

not extend the statutory time limit. E.g., Lewis v. City

of Fresno, 627 F. Supp. 2d 1179, 1182 (E.D. Cal. 2008).

The Tenth Circuit has held that a defendant’s failure to comply with § 1446(b)’s requirements renders

the removal defective and justifies remand. Huffman

v. Saul Holdings Ltd., 194 F.3d 1072, 1077 (10th Cir.

1999). District courts in the Tenth Circuit treat compliance with the statutory time limit as mandatory.

E.g., Gruber v. Estate of Marshall, 229 F. Supp. 3d

1245, 1247–48 (D. Kan. 2017).

The Eleventh Circuit has stated that “[t]he failure

to comply with these express statutory requirements

for removal can fairly be said to render the removal

15

‘defective’ and justify a remand.” Snapper, Inc. v.

Redan, 171 F.3d 1249, 1253 (11th Cir. 1999); see also

Glob. Satellite Comm’n Co. v. Starmill U.K. Ltd., 378

F.3d 1269, 1271 (11th Cir. 2004) (“A defendant’s right

to remove an action against it from state to federal

court is purely statutory and therefore its scope and

the terms of its availability are entirely dependent on

the will of Congress.” (cleaned up)); James v. Freedom

Mortg. Corp., No. 23-13039, 2024 WL 1509682, *3

(11th Cir. Apr. 8, 2024) (“[B]ecause removal jurisdiction raises significant federalism concerns, the removal statute is construed strictly,” and a notice of removal that “clearly fails to meet the plain language of

the federal removal statute” is “legally without merit”

(cleaned up)). District courts in the Eleventh Circuit

regard the 30-day removal deadline as “a strictly applied rule of procedure that may not be extended by

the court.” BCC Apartments, Ltd. v. Browning, 994 F.

Supp. 1440, 1442 (S.D. Fla. 1997); accord Tucker v.

Equifirst Corp., 57 F. Supp. 3d 1347, 1353 (S.D. Ala.

2014); Harris v. Kollsman, Inc., 97 F. Supp. 2d 1148,

1151 (M.D. Fla. 2000).

The D.C. Circuit has held “[t]he 30-day time limit

to file a notice of removal is mandatory and a timely

objection to a late petition will defeat removal.” In re

Clark, No. 23-7073, 2024 WL 3385251, at *5 (D.C. Cir.

July 12, 2024) (cleaned up). District courts in the D.C.

Circuit construe the removal statute strictly and routinely remand where a removal is defective. E.g.,

Henry v. Reynolds & Assocs., Inc., Case No. 1:20-cv02321, 2020 WL 7186158, at *3 (D.D.C. Dec. 7, 2020).

16

B. The cases Enbridge cites are decades-old

outliers that are distinguishable and

may no longer be good law.

Against this robust caselaw from every circuit,

Enbridge has attempted to manufacture a circuit split

by stretching a handful of outdated decisions from the

Fifth and Eleventh Circuits. That effort fails.

1. There is no certworthy split between

the Fifth and Sixth Circuits.

Enbridge cites five Fifth Circuit cases. Pet. 19–20,

22–23. 1 The first three—Getty Oil Corp. v. Ins. Co. of

N. Am., 841 F.2d 1254 (5th Cir. 1988), Doe v. Kerwood,

969 F.2d 165 (5th Cir. 1992), and Gillis v. Louisiana,

294 F.3d 755 (5th Cir. 2002)—are inapposite, as they

are multi-defendant cases about the so-called rule of

unanimity, which requires that all defendants must

consent to a notice of removal.

In Getty Oil, the Fifth Circuit held that when the

defendants are served at different times, service on

the first defendant starts the 30-day removal clock for

all defendants—meaning later-served defendants had

less than 30 days to seek or consent to removal. 841

F.2d at 1262–63. To soften this rule, however, the

court provided that a later-served defendant may be

able to consent to removal after the 30-day period in

“exceptional circumstances.” Id. at 1263 n.12. Most

other circuits rejected the first-served defendant rule,

1 Enbridge did not cite any of these cases prior to the Sixth Cir-

cuit issuing its opinion. Enbridge cited Gillis for the first time in

its petition for en banc rehearing. (R. 55-17.) It did not cite Getty

Oil, Kerwood, Johnson, or Harris at any point below.

17

holding instead that each defendant has 30 days from

the date it is served to seek removal. See Barbour, 640

F.3d at 609 (describing the circuit split).

Kerwood and Gillis merely apply Getty Oil. In Kerwood, the court held that the Red Cross was not exempt from the rule of unanimity, and it responded to

the Red Cross’s concerns about the unfairness of the

first-served defendant rule by stating in dicta that

courts could excuse the harsh timing requirement in

exceptional circumstances. 969 F.2d at 169. In Gillis,

the court excused the 30-day consent deadline where

a defendant timely consented to a notice of removal

based on a request from board members, but the board

did not formally ratify the consent until after the 30day period due to “exceptional circumstances” that

prevented it from meeting. 294 F.3d at 758–59.

Enbridge’s reliance on these cases is misplaced for

two reasons.

First, this is not a rule-of-unanimity case. The issue here is not that a defendant failed to timely consent to a notice of removal, but that a notice of removal

was not timely filed. Enbridge has not identified any

case where the Fifth Circuit excused compliance with

§ 1446(b) on similar facts. Indeed, Enbridge overlooks

the most analogous Fifth Circuit case, Cervantez,

which holds that “the requirement for timely filing a

petition for removal is mandatory” and a defendant

that fails to file a timely petition “waive[s] its right to

remove.” 99 F.3d at 732, 734.

Second, these cases may no longer be good law.

Congress abrogated Getty Oil’s first-served defendant

rule in the Jurisdiction and Venue Clarification Act of

18

2011, amending 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(2) to codify the

last-served defendant rule instead. See, e.g., Tilley v.

Tisdale, 914 F. Supp. 846, 849 (E.D. Tex. 2012) (recognizing the abrogation). The Fifth Circuit has not addressed whether its prior caselaw survived the statutory amendments, but there is good reason to think

the answer is no. As the Second Circuit explained:

When the rule of unanimity was a judge-made

rule, courts could allow judge-made exceptions to that rule. But now we are limited to

interpreting a clear statutory command from

Congress that all defendants must consent to

removal within thirty days of service. Where,

as here, Congress provides no exceptions to

the rule, we are not at liberty to create one.

[Taylor v. Medtronic, Inc., 15 F.4th 148, 153

(2d Cir. 2021).]

The Fifth Circuit has approached other aspects of

the 2011 statutory amendments in the same manner

as the Second Circuit. Prior to the amendments, the

Fifth Circuit allowed equitable tolling of the one-year

time limit to remove diversity cases. Tedford v.

Warner-Lambert Co., 327 F.3d 423 (5th Cir. 2003).

However, the 2011 amendments provide that removal

after the one-year period is only available in cases of

“bad faith.” 28 U.S.C. § 1446(c)(1). The Fifth Circuit

has since held that the amendment abrogated its prior

caselaw and made equitable tolling of the one-year

time limit unavailable. Hoyt v. Lane Constr. Co., 927

F.3d 287, 294 (5th Cir. 2019). It reasoned: “Congress

is vested with the power to prescribe the basic procedural scheme under which claims may be heard in

19

federal courts. Once Congress has prescribed those

procedures, we cannot add to them.” Id. (cleaned up).

Given its analysis in Hoyt, it seems likely that, if

it were faced with the question, the Fifth Circuit

would follow the Second Circuit’s holding in Taylor

that equitable tolling of the time to consent to removal

is no longer available. At any rate, the issue is not presented here, since this is not a rule-of-unanimity case.

Thus, even if there were a split between the Second

and Fifth Circuits on that issue, this case would not

be an appropriate vehicle to resolve it.

Enbridge’s fourth case—Johnson v. Heublein, 227

F.3d 236 (5th Cir. 2000)—is similarly inapposite. That

case involved the so-called “revival” doctrine, under

which “a lapsed right to remove . . . is restored when

the complaint is amended so substantially as to alter

the character of the action and constitute essentially

a new lawsuit.” Id. at 241. Few courts have applied

this doctrine, and several have questioned it. See, e.g.,

Kuxhausen, 707 F.3d at 1142 n.5; Tucker, 57 F. Supp.

3d at 1350–58.

Enbridge did not raise the revival doctrine below,

and the Sixth Circuit had no occasion to consider it.

Nor does this Court. Even if the doctrine existed, it

would not apply here since the Attorney General did

not file an amended complaint, let alone one that so

substantially altered the character of the action as to

essentially create a new lawsuit. See Abbo-Bradley v.

City of Niagara Falls, 73 F.4th 143, 151 (2d Cir. 2023)

(declining to adopt or reject the revival doctrine since

it would not apply in any event). Any questions about

the revival doctrine are best left for another case

where it would at least arguably apply.

20

Enbridge’s fifth case, Harris v. Edward Hyman

Co., 664 F.2d 943 (5th Cir. 1981), is consistent with

the Sixth Circuit’s opinion below. In Harris, the Fifth

Circuit held that a plaintiff forfeited the right to object

to a defective removal petition “by failing to assert

promptly her objections to the defects in the petition

and by proceeding with discovery.” Id. at 944. The

court below did not hold to the contrary, and in fact

recognized that a plaintiff could forfeit the right to object to a defective notice of removal. Pet. App. 19a

(stating that objections to the timing of removal are

“subject to forfeiture if not raised in a timely motion

to remand”). That is not an issue here, however, since

“the Attorney General properly invoked § 1446(b)’s removal time limits in a timely motion to remand.” Pet.

App. 20a. Harris is simply irrelevant.

In sum, none of the cases Enbridge cites show a

certworthy split between the Fifth and Sixth Circuits.

And to the extent there is any divergence, this is not

a vehicle to address it because this case does not involve an untimely consent to a notice of removal, an

allegedly “revived” right to remove, or a waiver of the

right to seek remand.

2. There is no certworthy split between

the Sixth and Eleventh Circuits.

In attempting to show a split between the Sixth

and Eleventh Circuits, Enbridge cites Loftin v. Rush,

767 F.2d 800 (11th Cir. 1985), abrogated on other

grounds by Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 517 U.S.

706, 714–15 (1996). There, an employee of the U.S.

Navy failed to pay child support owed under a divorce

decree, and his ex-wife served a summons of

21

garnishment on the Navy. Id. at 801. The Navy did

not answer, and the state court entered a default judgment against it for the entire amount of child support

the employee owed, in derogation of the federal government’s sovereign immunity. Id. at 801, 806–10.

The Navy then filed an answer and removed the case

to federal court under the federal officer removal statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1442, after the 30-day period had expired. Id. at 805. On those unusual facts, the Eleventh

Circuit held that the Navy’s untimely removal did not

require remand. Id.

Enbridge seems puzzled by the Sixth Circuit’s

holding that Loftin is “distinguishable.” Pet. 21. But

there is no mystery. For one thing, Loftin involved a

prior version of the removal statute, which required

remand if a case was “removed improvidently and

without jurisdiction.” Loftin, 767 F.2d at 802 n.2

(quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c)). Some courts have read

Loftin’s statement that “[t]he timeliness of a removal

petition is not jurisdictional . . . and we therefore have

the power to review even an untimely petition,” id. at

805, as an application of that statutory language,

which was removed in 1988. Those courts have questioned whether Loftin and related cases remain good

law based on the statutory language that exists today.

See May v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 440 F. Supp. 2d

879, 883–84 (W.D. Tenn. 2006) (“The great weight of

the case law, as well as the present language of the

statute, is contrary to this discretionary approach.”). 2

2

See also California v. Salas, No. 24-mc-80105, 2024 WL

3757492, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 12, 2024) (questioning whether

Loftin remains good law); Ligutom v. SunTrust Mortg., No. C1005431, 2011 WL 445655, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 4, 2011).

22

For another thing, Enbridge is not the federal government, and litigating this action in state court

would not offend federal sovereign immunity. Several

courts have declined to follow Loftin where, as here,

the federal government was not the removing party,

and its sovereign immunity was not at issue. See, e.g.,

Stone Street Cap., 300 F. Supp. 2d at 351; Vill. Improvement Ass’n of Doylestown v. Dow Chem. Co., 655

F. Supp. 311, 315 (E.D. Pa. 1987). 3

Loftin itself states that, when a timeliness defect

is not waived, district courts are “require[d] . . . to remand the case in most instances.” 767 F.2d at 805

(emphasis added). The Loftin court did not elaborate

on when remand is not required, holding only that

“the timeliness requirement in § 1446(b) is not binding on the government under the facts here.” Id.

In the past 40 years, courts have not given Loftin

wide application. Enbridge cites only two reported

cases that relied on Loftin, Pet. 18–19, and they are

easily distinguishable. In Premier Holidays Int’l, Inc.

v. Actrade Cap., 105 F. Supp. 2d 1336, 1339–40 (N.D.

Ga. 2000), the court denied a motion to remand where

one defendant timely filed a notice of removal and another defendant did not consent, holding the non-consenting defendant “must be realigned as a plaintiff

and its consent to removal is unnecessary and

3 Courts in the Eleventh Circuit have cited Village Improvement

Association with approval. See Bray v. Loudo Trailers, Inc., No.

5:08-cv-392, 2009 WL 302164, at *1–2 (M.D. Fla. Feb. 6, 2009)

(remanding a case that was removed one day late); Dulaney v.

Halsted Fin. Servs., LLC, No. 1:16-CV-0316, 2016 WL 9558934,

at *6 (N.D. Ga. May 3, 2016) (holding that the removal deadline

is mandatory and cannot be excused).

23

irrelevant.” In Reese v. S. Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist., 853

F. Supp. 413, 415 (S.D. Fla. 1994), the court allowed

the United States to remove a case 12 days after the

deadline. No court has ever relied on Loftin to excuse

a notice of removal filed by a private entity two years

after the statutory deadline and after substantial

state-court litigation had already occurred. Indeed,

several district courts in the Eleventh Circuit regard

the statutory removal deadline as a mandatory and

strictly applied rule of procedure—exactly like the

Sixth Circuit. See supra at 14. 4

Because Loftin is a clear outlier that would not apply on these facts and has only rarely been relied on

over the past 40 years, any conflict with the opinion

below is not significant enough to warrant this Court’s

intervention. Further, as Professor Miller points out,

“a later Eleventh Circuit panel might also distinguish

[Loftin] based on . . . the persuasive value of this Sixth

Circuit opinion.” Amicus Br. 6–7. That the Eleventh

Circuit may limit Loftin and follow the Sixth Circuit’s

persuasive analysis does not weigh in favor of granting certiorari. It indicates that there is no ripe circuit

split for this Court to resolve, and further percolation

is warranted to clarify the nature and extent of any

discrepancy between the circuits.

4 Enbridge cites Green v. Hill, 954 F.2d 694, 696 n.3 (11th Cir.

1992), superseded in part on other grounds, 968 F.2d 1092 (11th

Cir. 1992), for the proposition that “Loftin remains governing law

in the Eleventh Circuit today.” Pet. 18. But Green is a 30-yearold case that only referenced Loftin in dicta. The 30-day removal

deadline did not apply in Green because the case was removed

under the Westfall Act, which authorizes removal “any time before trial.” Green, 954 F.2d at 696 n.3 (quoting 28 U.S.C.

§ 2679(d)(2)).

24

II. The decision below is correct and any issue

can be addressed by Congress.

It is no accident that courts have so uniformly held

compliance with the statutory removal deadline is

mandatory. Congress “determine[s] when, and under

what conditions, federal courts can hear [cases].”

Bowles v. Russell, 551 U.S. 205, 212–13 (2007); see

also Patsy v. Bd. of Regents, 457 U.S. 496, 501 (1982)

(“Congress is vested with the power to prescribe the

basic procedural scheme under which claims may be

heard in federal courts.”).

“Removal is entirely a creature of statute and a

suit commenced in a state court must remain there

until cause is shown for its transfer under some act of

Congress.” Syngenta Crop Prot., Inc. v. Henson, 537

U.S. 28, 32 (2002) (cleaned up). “These statutory procedures for removal are to be strictly construed,” and

defendants cannot “avoid complying with the statutory requirements for removal.” Id. at 32–33.

There are good reasons to ensure that a notice of

removal complies with Congress’s express dictates.

Removal infringes on the state court’s power, which

can only be done “by the action of Congress in conformity to the Judiciary Articles of the Constitution.”

Shamrock Oil & Gas Corp. v. Sheets, 313 U.S. 100,

108–109 (1941). Indeed, federalism concerns are at

their zenith here since this case was brought in a state

court, by the state Attorney General, on behalf of the

People of State, against a nondiverse party under

state law. See Franchise Tax Bd. v. Constr. Laborers

Vacation Tr., 463 U.S. 1, 21 n.22 (1983) (stating that

“considerations of comity make us reluctant to snatch

25

cases which a State has brought from the courts of

that State, unless some clear rule demands it”).

When Congress added a specific time period to the

removal statute in 1948, it intended the provision to

“give adequate time and operate uniformly throughout the Federal jurisdiction.” Murphy Bros., Inc. v. Michetti Pipe Stringing, Inc., 526 U.S. 344, 351 (1999)

(citation omitted). The goal of national uniformity is

not well served by allowing the removal period to

change based on case-by-case assessments of equity.

Accordingly, Congress used all the hallmarks of a

mandatory claims-processing rule: it put the requirement in a statute, used mandatory language, and nestled the provision next to jurisdictional provisions. See

supra at 8–9. Congress enacted express exceptions to

the 30-day removal period where it intended for them

to exist. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(3). And when it

intended to authorize courts to extend the time limits,

it did that expressly, too. See 28 U.S.C. § 1441(d)

(providing that in civil actions against foreign states,

“the time limitations of section 1446(b) of this chapter

may be enlarged at any time for cause shown”). All of

this supports the Sixth Circuit’s opinion below.

If an issue were to arise—for example, if a strict

application of the statute yielded inequitable results

or a genuine circuit split ever did emerge—Congress

would be well suited to step in. It has done so before,

for example, by extending the removal window from

20 to 30 days, see Murphy Bros., 526 U.S. at 352 n.3,

adopting the last-served defendant rule, Tilley, 914 F.

Supp. at 849, and enacting the bad-faith standard for

removal after the one-year limit in diversity cases,

Hoyt, 927 F.3d at 293–94.

26

But given the clear statutory language and the

overwhelming consistency of the caselaw across the

circuits—the development of which will be advanced

by the Sixth Circuit’s opinion—there is no need for

this Court to intervene. This is especially true based

on these facts, where the complaint was not amended,

where Enbridge missed the statutory deadline by over

two years, and where every circuit would reach the

same result.

CONCLUSION

The petition for writ of certiorari should be denied.

Respectfully submitted,

Dana Nessel

Michigan Attorney General

Ann M. Sherman

Solicitor General

Counsel of Record

P.O. Box 30212

Lansing, Michigan 48909

ShermanA@michigan.gov

(517) 335-7628

Daniel P. Bock

Keith D. Underkoffler

Assistant Attorneys

General

Environment, Natural

Resources, and Agriculture

Division

Dated: APRIL 2025

Attorneys for Respondent

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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Respondents Brief — Enbridge Energy, LP, et al., Petitioners v. Dana Nessel, Attorney General of Michigan, on Behalf of the People of the State of Michigan | Frix