Respondents Brief — The GEO Group, Inc., Petitioner v. Alejandro Menocal, et al.
Supreme Court briefApr 21, 2025
Ask Donna
What actually matters in this document.
Text
No. 24-758
In the Supreme Court of the United States
THE GEO GROUP, INC.,
Petitioner,
v.
ALEJANDRO MENOCAL, ET AL.,
Respondents.
On Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the
United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
RESPONDENTS’ BRIEF IN OPPOSITION
ROBERT D. FRIEDMAN
GUPTA WESSLER LLP
2001 K STREET NW
SUITE 850 NORTH
WASHINGTON, DC 20006
(202) 888-1741
JENNIFER D. BENNETT
Counsel of Record
GUPTA WESSLER LLP
505 MONTGOMERY STREET
SUITE 625
SAN FRANCISCO, CA 94111
(415) 573-0336
jennifer@guptawessler.com
(Additional counsel listed on inside cover)
April 21, 2025
JUNO TURNER
DAVID SELIGMAN
ALEXANDER HOOD
RACHEL DEMPSEY
TOWARDS JUSTICE
PO Box 371680
Denver, CO 80237
(720) 248-8426
HANS MEYER
MEYER LAW
OFFICE
901 West 10th Ave
Suite 2A
Denver, CO 80204
(303) 831-0817
BRANDT MILSTEIN
ANDREW HESS
TURNER
MILSTEIN TURNER
1490 Lafayette
Street
Suite 304
Denver, CO 80218
(303) 440-8780
MICHAEL SCIMONE
OUTTEN & GOLDEN LLP
685 Third Avenue
25th Floor
New York, NY 10017
(212) 658-0137
ADAM KOSHKIN
OUTTEN & GOLDEN LLP
One California Street
12th Floor
San Francisco, CA 94111
(415) 727-2237
-iQUESTION PRESENTED
Under this Court’s decision in Yearsley v. W.A. Ross
Construction Co., contractors have a defense to liability
for damages caused by “lawfully” carrying out work that
is “authorized and directed” by the government. 309 U.S.
18, 20, 22 (1940).
The question presented is: Are interlocutory orders
holding that a contractor does not meet the requirements
for a defense under Yearsley immediately appealable
under the collateral order doctrine?
- ii TABLE OF CONTENTS
Question presented ................................................................ i
Table of contents ...................................................................ii
Table of authorities ..............................................................iii
Introduction ........................................................................... 1
Statement ............................................................................... 4
A. Legal Background ..................................................... 4
B. Factual background .................................................. 9
C. Procedural history................................................... 11
Reasons for denying the petition....................................... 14
I. There is no circuit split ........................................... 14
II. The question presented is unimportant, and
this case is a poor vehicle to decide it ................... 18
III.The decision below is correct ................................. 20
Conclusion ............................................................................ 28
- iii TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases
ACT, Inc. v. Worldwide Interactive
Network, Inc.,
46 F.4th 489 (6th Cir. 2022) ............................................17
Al Shimari v. CACI Premier Technology, Inc.,
775 F. App’x 758 (4th Cir. 2019) ....................................14
Bell & Son v. Kidd & Roberts,
63 S.E. 607 (Ga. Ct. App. 1909) ........................................6
Budrow v. Ames,
1998 WL 328423 (Conn. Super. June 10, 1998) ..............7
Campbell-Ewald Co. v. Gomez,
577 U.S. 153 (2016) ..............................................4, 6, 7, 26
Childs v. San Diego Family Housing LLC,
22 F.4th 1092 (9th Cir. 2022) ....................................14, 15
Cobbledick v. United States,
309 U.S. 323 (1940) ............................................................7
Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay,
437 U.S. 463 (1978) ........................................................8, 9
Correctional Services Corp. v. Malesko,
534 U.S. 61 (2001) ..............................................................6
Cunningham v. Hamilton County,
527 U.S. 198 (1999) ....................................................21, 22
Daegling v. Gilmore,
49 Ill. 248 (1868) .................................................................6
- iv Del Campo v. Kennedy,
517 F.3d 1070 (9th Cir. 2008) .........................................17
Digital Equiptment Corp. v. Desktop Direct,
511 U.S. 863 (1994) ........................................1, 8, 9, 19, 25
Evans v. Mayer Tree Service, Inc.,
162 N.E.3d 70 (Mass. App. Ct. 2020) ..............................7
Filarsky v. Delia,
566 U.S. 377 (2012) ..........................................................26
Geo Group, Inc. v. Newsom,
50 F.4th 745 (9th Cir. 2022) ............................................19
Gulfstream Aerospace Corp. v.
Mayacamas Corp.,
485 U.S. 271 (1988) ..........................................................28
Hatch v. Trail King Industries,
656 F.3d 59 (1st Cir. 2011) ................................................6
In re World Trade Center Disaster Site Litigation,
521 F.3d 169 (2d Cir. 2008) .............................................15
Johnson v. Jones,
515 U.S. 304 (1995) ........................................24, 25, 27, 28
Johnson-Howard v. AECOM Special Missions
Services, Inc.,
2023 WL 6216604 (D. Md. Sept. 25, 2023) ......................7
Keifer & Keifer v. Reconstruction Financial Corp.,
306 U.S. 381 (1939) ............................................................4
Lutz v. Secretary of the Air Force,
944 F.2d 1477 (9th Cir. 1991) .........................................17
-vMartin v. Halliburton,
618 F.3d 476 (5th Cir. 2010) ...........................................14
McMahon v. Presidential Airways, Inc.,
502 F.3d 1331 (2007) ..................................................16, 17
Menocal v. GEO Group, Inc.,
882 F.3d 905 (10th Cir. 2018) .........................................11
Midland Asphalt Corp. v. United States,
489 U.S. 794 (1989) ............................................................8
Mitchell v. Forsyth,
472 U.S. 511 (1985) ..........................................................23
Newton v. Lee,
677 F.3d 1017 (10th Cir. 2012) .......................................17
Posada v. Cultural Care, Inc.,
66 F.4th 348 (1st Cir. 2023) ............................................18
Pullman Construction Industries, Inc. v.
United States,
23 F.3d 1166 (7th Cir. 1994) ...........................................14
Richardson v. McKnight,
521 U.S. 399 (1997) ..........................................................26
Sloan Shipyards Corp. v. U.S. Shipping Board
Emergency Fleet Corp.,
258 U.S. 549 (1922) ......................................................4, 26
Swint v. Chambers County Commission,
514 U.S. 35 (1995) ............................................................25
Van Cauwenberghe v. Biard,
486 U.S. 517 (1988) ..........................................................21
- vi Will v. Hallock,
546 U.S. 345 (2006) ....................7, 8, 12, 14, 21, 23, 27, 28
Yearsley v. W.A. Ross Construction Co.,
309 U.S. 18 (1940) ....................................................1, 5, 25
Statutes
28 U.S.C. § 1291 .................................................................1, 8
Other authorities
Restatement (Second) of Agency § 217
(Am. L. Inst. 1958).............................................................4
Restatement (Second) Torts § 404
(Am. L. Inst. 1965).............................................................6
-1INTRODUCTION
GEO asks this Court to review an unpublished decision
holding what every published opinion to have considered
the question has held: There is no exception to the finaljudgment rule for private contractors asserting a defense
under Yearsley v. W.A. Ross Construction Co., 309 U.S.
18 (1940). This Court should decline GEO’s request.
Yearsley shields government contractors from liability
for actions that were authorized and directed by the
government. Determining whether the defense applies
typically requires a fact-intensive inquiry into what the
contractor did and whether the government directed it to
do so. Take this case: To determine whether summary
judgment was warranted on GEO’s Yearsley defense, the
district court reviewed hundreds of pages of documents,
numerous deposition transcripts and declarations, and
dozens of discovery responses.
In an unpublished order, the Tenth Circuit dismissed
GEO’s appeal of the district court’s summary judgment
decision for lack of appellate jurisdiction. This conclusion
is a straightforward application of the final-judgment rule.
Courts of appeals may only review “final decisions of the
district courts.” 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (emphasis added).
Denials of summary judgment ordinarily don’t count.
The collateral order doctrine provides a “narrow
exception” to this rule. Digit. Equip. Corp. v. Desktop
Direct, 511 U.S. 863, 868 (1994). But that narrow exception
applies only to orders that meet three stringent
requirements: They must be conclusive; they must resolve
important questions completely separate from the merits;
and they must render such important questions effectively
unreviewable on appeal from final judgment in the
underlying action.
-2Yearsley orders, the Tenth Circuit held, fail the second
requirement. As this case demonstrates, reviewing a
district court’s Yearsley order will almost inevitably
require a fact-intensive inquiry that cannot be completely
separated from the merits. After all, it is hard to imagine
a case where what the contractor did and whether the
government told it do so have no bearing on the merits of
the claims. Yearsley orders, therefore, do not fall within
the narrow category of interlocutory decisions that may
be collaterally appealed.
GEO cannot identify a single circuit that has a
different rule. So instead it lumps together cases about the
Yearsley defense with cases about other defenses under
the general label “derivative sovereign immunity.” But
there is no conflict between the lower court’s decision that
Yearsley orders are not collaterally appealable and
decisions holding that different defenses are.
And GEO’s complaint that Yearsley entitles
contractors to share in the government’s immunity from
suit is both wrong and irrelevant. The law has been clear
for over a century that the government’s sovereign
immunity does not extend to those it hires to do its work.
But more importantly, for purposes of the question
presented, it doesn’t matter. Whatever the nature of the
Yearsley defense, it cannot be collaterally appealed unless
it is completely separate from the merits. And as the
Tenth Circuit held, it is not.
This Court ordinarily does not review unpublished
decisions that faithfully apply its precedent and do not
split with the rule in any other circuit. GEO offers no
credible reason to do so here. GEO claims that unless
Yearsley orders are immediately appealable, good
companies will be deterred from contracting with the
-3government. But the government itself doesn’t believe
that. And it’s hard to imagine that any company would
base its contracting decisions on whether the Yearsley
defense is subject to the collateral order doctrine.
So GEO opens and closes its petition with another
pitch: This Court should grant review to prevent
“activists” from “frustrat[ing] federal immigration
enforcement.” Pet. 34; see id. at 1. This case is not about
immigration enforcement; it’s about a private company
using forced labor and paying its workers almost nothing.
But, in any event, the question presented is not about
whether the plaintiffs should succeed on their claims. It’s
not even about whether GEO should succeed on its
Yearsley defense. It is about whether Yearsley orders—
all Yearsley orders—are collaterally appealable.
The same rule that applies to GEO applies in the slipand-fall case against a janitorial company that leaves a wet
floor in a government building; or the trespass case
against a tree-cutting company hired by the government;
or the personal injury case against the architect of a jury
box, when a juror falls down the stairs—all real cases in
which Yearsley was invoked. It’s no wonder that the
courts of appeals agree that Yearsley orders do not
warrant automatic interlocutory appeal.
If GEO truly believed that some important federal
interest justified interlocutory appeal in this case, it could
have asked for permission to file one under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1292 or it could have sought mandamus. This Court
should not grant certiorari simply because GEO chose not
to do so.
-4STATEMENT
A. Legal Background
1.
The Yearsley defense
This Court has long held that the United States’
sovereign “immunity does not extend to those that act[] in
its name.” Sloan Shipyards Corp. v. U.S. Shipping Bd.
Emergency Fleet Corp., 258 U.S. 549, 567-68 (1922); see,
e.g., Keifer & Keifer v. Reconstruction Fin. Corp.,
306 U.S. 381, 388 (1939) (“[T]he government does not
become the conduit of its immunity in suits against its
agents or instrumentalities merely because they do its
work.”); Campbell-Ewald Co. v. Gomez, 577 U.S. 153, 166
(2016). An agent of the government “does not cease to be
answerable for his acts,” simply because he works for the
government. Sloan Shipyards, 258 U.S. at 566-67.1
This accords with basic agency law: Like any other
principal, the government may delegate to its agents its
“privilege” to take actions that would be unlawful if
committed by others. See, e.g., Restatement (Second) of
Agency § 217 cmt. a (Am. L. Inst. 1958). Here, for
example, the government has authorized GEO to detain
people awaiting immigration proceedings. Cf. id. But a
principal cannot delegate its immunity. See id. § 217 cmt.
b. The government is no different. See Campbell-Ewald,
577 U.S. at 166 (explaining that there is “no authority for
the notion that private persons performing Government
work acquire the Government’s embracive immunity”).
While this Court has therefore repeatedly rejected the
claim that contractors share the government’s sovereign
1
Unless otherwise specified, all internal quotation marks,
citations, alterations, and emphases have been omitted from
quotations through this brief.
-5immunity, they are not defenseless if they are sued for
doing what the government told them to do. As in many
other principal-agent relationships, a contractor that is
sued for damages caused by simply executing a lawful
order from the government may defend against liability
by arguing that the government (the principal) and not the
contractor (the agent) is responsible. See Yearsley v. W.A.
Ross Constr. Co., 309 U.S. 18, 21 (1940).
This Court first recognized this defense almost a
century ago in Yearsley. Id. In that case, a construction
company had been hired by the government to build dikes
on the Missouri River, washing away some of the
plaintiffs’ land in the process. Id. at 19. The contractor’s
work was “all authorized and directed” by the
government, and the authority granted to perform that
work was “validly conferred” by Congress. Id. at 20; see
also United States Br., Yearsley, 1939 WL 48388, at *6
(1939) (“The construction work was in accordance with
detailed specifications in the contracts with the
Government, and was done under the direct and constant
supervision and direction of Government inspectors.”).
The erosion of the plaintiffs’ land was an unfortunate but
“inevitable” consequence of the work the government had
directed. Yearsley, 309 U.S. at 20; United States Br.,
Yearsley, 1939 WL 48388, at *6 (“[I]t was intended to be
washed away as a necessary part of the federal project for
the stabilization of the river.”).
This Court held that, under those circumstances, the
contractor had “no liability” for simply “executing [the
government’s] will.” Yearsley, 309 U.S. at 21. Yearsley did
not afford the contractor sovereign immunity, derivative
or otherwise. See id. In fact, the Court held that the
government’s authorization to the contractor to wash
-6away the plaintiffs’ land was only valid because the
government itself would pay the damages—that is,
because the government was not immune. Id. at 22. There
was thus no sovereign immunity to derive.
The Court did hold, however, that the contractor had a
defense to “liability.” Id. at 20-21 (emphasis added).
Government contractors are not liable for damages if:
(1) the government “validly” authorized the contractor’s
work; and (2) the government “directed” the challenged
conduct. Id.; accord Campbell-Ewald, 577 U.S. at 153; see
also Corr. Servs. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 74 n.6
(2001) (“Where the government has directed a contractor
to do the very thing that is the subject of the claim, we
have recognized this as a special circumstance where the
contractor may assert a defense.”).
While Yearsley was the first case from this Court to
recognize this defense in the government-contractor
context, courts have long provided agents a defense to
liability when it is, in fact, the principal that is truly at
fault—that is, when the principal directed the challenged
conduct. See, e.g., Hatch v. Trail King Indus., 656 F.3d 59,
68 (1st Cir. 2011) (collecting cases); Bell & Son v. Kidd &
Roberts, 63 S.E. 607, 608 (Ga. Ct. App. 1909); Daegling v.
Gilmore, 49 Ill. 248, 249 (1868); Restatement (Second)
Torts § 404 cmts. a-b (Am. L. Inst. 1965) (contractor who
follows another’s specifications is not liable unless defect
in specifications is obvious).
As with other principal-agent cases, therefore, the
Yearsley defense typically turns on the answer to two
factual questions: (1) What did the contractor do to cause
the plaintiff’s injury?; and (2) Did the government dictate
that conduct? See, e.g., Campbell-Ewald, 577 U.S. at 168.
-7In the decades since Yearsley, the defense has been
most commonly invoked in run-of-the mill cases, where
the defendant happens to be a government contractor.
See, e.g., Campbell-Ewald, 577 U.S. at 166 (Telephone
Consumer Protection Act case against contractor for
sending unwanted text messages); Evans v. Mayer Tree
Serv., Inc., 162 N.E.3d 70 (Mass. App. Ct. 2020) (trespass
action against tree-removal company); Johnson-Howard
v. AECOM Spec. Missions Servs., Inc., 2023 WL 6216604
(D. Md. Sept. 25, 2023) (slip-and-fall case against janitorial
company); Budrow v. Ames, 1998 WL 328423 (Conn.
Super. June 10, 1998) (personal injury case against
architect).
2.
The collateral order doctrine
The question presented here is not about the Yearsley
defense itself. The question is whether, when a district
court concludes that a contractor has not satisfied
Yearsley’s requirements, that contractor may take an
interlocutory appeal. And that question turns on the
collateral order doctrine.
a. The collateral order doctrine allows immediate
appeal of a “narrow class of decisions that do not
terminate the litigation, but are sufficiently important and
collateral to the merits that they should nonetheless be
treated as final.” Will v. Hallock, 546 U.S. 345, 345 (2006).
“Finality as a condition of review is an historic
characteristic of federal appellate procedure.” Cobbledick
v. United States, 309 U.S. 323, 324 (1940). Since the
Judiciary Act of 1789, Congress has “forbidd[en]
piecemeal disposition on appeal of what for practical
purposes is a single controversy.” Id. at 324-25. Instead,
the jurisdiction of the courts of appeals is limited to
“appeals from ... final decisions of the district courts.”
-828 U.S.C. § 1291. Ordinarily, then, a party is “entitled to a
single appeal,” “deferred until final judgment,” where
“claims of district court error at any stage of the litigation
may be ventilated.” Digit. Equip., 511 U.S. at 868.
This final-judgment rule “evinces a legislative
judgment that [r]estricting appellate review to final
decisions prevents the debilitating effect on judicial
administration” caused by multiple, successive,
interlocutory appeals. Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay,
437 U.S. 463, 471 (1978).
b. Ordinarily, a final decision is “deemed not to have
occurred” unless it “ends the litigation on the merits and
leaves nothing for the court to do but execute the
judgment.” Midland Asphalt Corp. v. United States,
489 U.S. 794, 798 (1989). But this Court has recognized “a
narrow class of decisions that do not terminate the
litigation, but are sufficiently important and collateral to
the merits that they should nonetheless be treated as
final” for purposes of allowing an immediate appeal. Will,
546 U.S. at 347. This “narrow exception”—the collateral
order doctrine—applies only to orders “[1] that are
conclusive, [2] that resolve important questions
completely separate from the merits, and [3] that would
render such important questions effectively unreviewable
on appeal from final judgment in the underlying action.”
Digit. Equip., 511 U.S. at 867-868.
This Court has warned that these requirements “are
stringent” and must be “kept so.” Will, 546 U.S. at 349-50.
Otherwise, what is meant to be a “narrow exception” will
undermine the important interests served by the final
judgment rule: judicial efficiency and preventing parties
from “saddling” their opponents with the “cost and delay”
of multiple appeals. Digit. Equip., 511 U.S. at 873.
-9Whether an order falls within the collateral-order
doctrine is a determination made on a categorical basis, id.
at 868, not after an “individualized jurisdictional inquiry”
specific to the facts of a case, Coopers, 437 U.S. at 473. So,
for an interlocutory order to be immediately appealable,
“the entire category to which a claim belongs, without
regard to the chance that the litigation at hand might be
speeded, or a particular injustic[e] averted.” Digit.
Equip., 511 U.S. at 868 (emphasis added).
B. Factual background
GEO is a publicly traded, for-profit company that
makes billions of dollars a year operating private
detention facilities. One of these facilities is the Aurora
Immigration Processing Center, which houses people
awaiting resolution of their immigration proceedings. Pet.
App. 4a.
Managing a detention facility requires work:
preparing meals for hundreds of people, doing their
laundry, sanitation and janitorial work, building
maintenance. App. 34. The government pays GEO millions
of dollars a year to perform that work. Supp. App. Vol. 3
at 105. But GEO didn’t perform the work itself: It
required those detained in its facility to do it.2
The company forced every person detained at the
Aurora Center to perform unpaid janitorial work,
threatening that if they refuse, they will be sent to “the
hole”—solitary confinement. Supp. App. Vol. 1 at 165-66;
see also Supp. App. Vol. 2 at 22-23 (“[T]hey were taken
away, and they were put in isolation.”); id. at 85
2
References to App. and Supp. App. are to the appendices filed
in the Tenth Circuit. References to Pet. App. are to the appendix filed
with the petition for certiorari.
- 10 (recounting that an officer would “scream[]” at detainees
“about going to segregation” for “not cleaning”); id. at
138-44 (stating that he was sent to solitary confinement
“four times” for refusing to perform janitorial work).
People came back from solitary “skinny,” “afraid,” and
“antisocial”—unable to “talk to other people.” Supp. App.
Vol. 2 at 74, 184.
GEO’s forced sanitation program was, in the words of
ICE’s contracting officer, a “GEO policy, created by
GEO” and not “a requirement of the contract” with ICE.
Supp. App. Vol. 1 at 73. The contract with ICE—and
ICE’s national detention standards—prohibited GEO
from forcing those detained at Aurora to do anything
other than “personal housekeeping.” App. Vol. 1 at 144;
Supp. App. Vol. 1 at 121 (Department of Homeland
Security’s Office of Inspector General warning that
requiring those detained in the facility to perform the
facility’s janitorial work “is in violation of ICE
standards”).
In addition to its forced janitorial work, GEO fulfilled
its other staffing needs through a “voluntary work
program.” Although technically voluntary, many people
detained at the Center had little choice but to participate.
Working for GEO was the only way they could earn money
to buy food and toiletries from the commissary or make
phone calls while detained. These were not luxuries: The
“inadequate” meals GEO served left those in its care
“chronically hungry”—unable to get enough to eat
without “voluntar[ily]” working for GEO. Supp. App. Vol.
2 at 90, 183, 185. Initially, the company paid these workers
“$1.00 per day ... and a bottle of soda once a week.” Supp.
App. Vol. 3 at 134. GEO later reduced that to just $1 a day.
- 11 Id. at 140. That, too, was GEO’s choice. ICE did not
require GEO to pay so little.3
Between its forced sanitation program and its
voluntary work program, those detained in GEO’s facility
performed virtually all non-security-related work needed
to operate the facility. Detained workers were responsible
for the janitorial work (including cleaning the bathrooms,
and mopping, stripping, and waxing the floors), building
maintenance, laundry for the entire facility, food
preparation, running the library, and running a
barbershop. App. Vol. 1 at 13-14, 34, 233. Their
compensation was not being sent to solitary and—for
some—$1 a day.
C. Procedural history
This lawsuit was filed over a decade ago. Alejandro
Menocal, who had been detained in GEO’s facility, sued
GEO for violating the Trafficking Victims Protection Act’s
prohibition on forced labor and Colorado’s prohibition on
unjust enrichment. Pet. App. 6a. GEO has repeatedly
sought to delay the case. It has sought multiple stays and
multiple interlocutory appeals. See Supp. App. Vol. 1 at 139. For example, GEO appealed the district court’s classcertification order, which the court of appeals then
affirmed, and this Court denied certiorari. See Menocal v.
GEO Grp., Inc., 882 F.3d 905, 910 (10th Cir. 2018). That
ultimately meritless appeal took over a year.
3
For most of the class period, ICE’s national detention
standards stated that “compensation is at least $1.00 (USD) per day.”
App. Vol. 1 at 147 (emphasis added). They did not set any cap. See id.
Before February 27, 2012, the standards stated that “compensation is
$1.00.” Id. at 222. But this, too, set a floor, not a ceiling. As GEO
admitted in its summary judgment briefing, there was no “prohibition
on paying more.” App. Vol. 3 at 692.
- 12 Following affirmance of the class-certification
decision, and after the close of discovery, the parties crossmoved for summary judgment on whether GEO was
entitled to the Yearsley defense. Pet. App. 7a. In a nearly
100-page order, the district court held that GEO was not
entitled to the defense. Pet. App. 32a. After carefully
reviewing hundreds of pages of GEO’s internal
documents, numerous declarations, and hours of
deposition testimony, the court concluded that ICE had
not directed GEO to force those detained in its facility to
conduct its janitorial work, nor had it required GEO to pay
detained workers only $1 a day. Pet. App. 32a-84a.4
GEO tried to take yet another interlocutory appeal.
This time, in an unpublished order, the Tenth Circuit
dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. Pet. App. 3a.
“[A]n order denying Yearsley’s applicability,” the court
held, “does not satisfy the collateral order doctrine.” Pet.
App. 10a.
In so holding, the court relied on the second prong of
the collateral-order test: that an order must “resolve an
important issue completely separate from the merits.” Id.
at 18a (quoting Will, 546 U.S. at 349). Yearsley orders, the
Court concluded, do not. The court explained that the
same “factual questions concerning what the government
did and did not specifically direct” that are “at the heart of
the Yearsley inquiry” are often “also at the heart of the
merits inquiry.” Pet. App. 21a. And so Yearsley orders are
“enmeshed in the merits,” not separate. Pet. App. 19a, 21a.
This case, the court observed, “highlights the
soundness of [that] conclusion.” Pet. App. 21a-23a. To
review the district court’s Yearsley order, the Tenth
4
The court also ruled on other issues, which are not relevant here.
- 13 Circuit would have had to resolve factual disputes about
GEO’s conduct and what the government did (or did not)
specifically direct. Pet. App. 22a-25a. Those factual
disputes also go to the “heart of the merits.” Pet. App. 21a.
For example, GEO’s Yearsley defense depends on
whether ICE “specifically directed” GEO to punish those
who refused to do its janitorial work with solitary
confinement. Pet. App. 22a. But so too does its defense on
the merits. See Pet. App. 22a, 25a; see also App. Vol 2 at
497 (arguing that its solitary-confinement threat doesn’t
constitute a “threat of serious harm” under the
Trafficking Victims Protection Act because it was merely
a “warning of legitimate consequences” directed by ICE).
Similarly, whether Yearsley shields GEO from the
plaintiffs’ unjust enrichment claim depends on whether
ICE directed GEO to pay detained workers only $1 a day.
And again, so too, does its defense on the merits—that
paying its workers so little was not unjust because ICE
told it to. Pet. App. 23a, 25a.
Although this case exemplifies the factbound nature of
the Yearsley defense, the Tenth Circuit explained, it is not
unique. Pet. App. 26a. “[A]ll appeals challenging orders
that reject ... Yearsley’s protection” are likely to hinge on
factual questions that go not only to the Yearsley defense,
but to the merits of the plaintiff’s claims. Id.
For that reason, the panel rejected GEO’s comparison
to qualified immunity appeals. Id. Unlike qualified
immunity appeals, where the “court is concerned with
resolving abstract issues of law,” in Yearsley appeals, “the
actual facts” play a “significant role.” Id.
And because Yearsley orders cannot be completely
separated from the merits, the court held that they cannot
- 14 be collaterally appealed. Pet. App. 29a. The court
therefore did not need to consider the collateral order
doctrine’s other requirements. Pet. App. 30a.
REASONS FOR DENYING THE PETITION
I. There Is No Circuit Split.
Yearsley has been on the books for eighty-five years.
Yet, in nearly a century, only two circuits have issued
published decisions on whether an order rejecting a
contractor’s Yearsley defense is immediately appealable.
And they agree on the answer: No. See Childs v. San
Diego Fam. Hous. LLC, 22 F.4th 1092, 1098 (9th Cir.
2022); Martin v. Halliburton, 618 F.3d 476, 485 (5th Cir.
2010); see also Al Shimari v. CACI Premier Tech., Inc.,
775 F. App’x 758, 759 (4th Cir. 2019) (unpublished decision
with the same result). The unpublished decision below
came to the same conclusion. Pet. App. 3a.5
GEO does not cite a single circuit whose rule is that the
collateral order doctrine applies to an order denying the
Yearsley defense. This consensus is unsurprising. As the
Tenth Circuit explained, the collateral order doctrine
requires that orders be “completely separate from the
merits.” Pet. App. 29a (quoting Will, 546 U.S. at 549). But
Yearsley orders often require a detailed examination of
the same facts that underlie the contractor’s defense on
the merits. Id. And, as the Ninth Circuit explained, the
interest served by the Yearsley defense—providing
contractors a defense to the payment of damages—can
5
To inflate the number of courts that have weighed in, GEO also
cites Pullman Construction Industries, Inc. v. United States, 23 F.3d
1166 (7th Cir. 1994). But the defendant in Pullman was not a
contractor; it was the government. Pullman therefore did not address
the Yearsley defense. It addressed whether the United States could
collaterally appeal a denial of sovereign immunity. Id. at 1167-70.
- 15 easily be vindicated on appeal from a final judgment. See
Childs, 22 F.4th at 1098. If the contractor wins on appeal,
it doesn’t have to pay.
1. GEO attempts to manufacture a circuit split by
grouping Yearsley cases together with cases about other
defenses under the label “derivative sovereign immunity.”
Pet. 12. But each defense stems from a different source
and has different elements. There is no conflict between
cases holding that the Yearsley defense is not immediately
appealable and those holding that some other defense is.
Second Circuit. In In re World Trade Center Disaster
Site Litigation, the Second Circuit held that claims to
immunity under the Stafford Act may be immediately
appealed. 521 F.3d 169, 188 (2d Cir. 2008). Congress
enacted the Stafford Act to shield the federal government
from lawsuits challenging discretionary decisions made in
the course of providing disaster relief. See id. citing 42
U.S.C. § 5148). The Second Circuit explained that the Act
thus represents a “specific congressional” award of true
“immunity from suit.” Id. at 192-93. That immunity
implicates “a substantial public interest” because it
concerns the ability to engage in “disaster relief efforts
without fear of judicial second-guessing” during a
“declared national emergency.” Id. And an order denying
Stafford Act immunity can be reviewed “completely
separate from the merits of the action.” Id.
None of this is true of the Yearsley defense. No statute
underlies Yearsley. There is, therefore, no “specific
congressional recognition” of immunity from suit. Id. And
while claims to Stafford Act immunity can only arise from
a declared national emergency—by definition, a
“substantial public interest”—the Yearsley defense
applies to all manner of mundane activities: from food
- 16 service to landscaping to telemarketing. See supra page 7.
In addition, as the Tenth Circuit explained, to determine
whether Yearsley applies, a court will often have to wade
into the same facts that underlie the merits of the case.
There is thus no conflict between the Second Circuit’s
conclusion that Stafford Act immunity is subject to the
collateral order doctrine and the Tenth Circuit’s
conclusion that the Yearsley defense is not.
Eleventh Circuit. In McMahon v. Presidential
Airways, Inc., the Eleventh Circuit held that the
collateral order doctrine applies to orders denying “Feres
immunity,” which provides the government “immun[ity]
from claims brought by soldiers for their service-related
injuries.” 502 F.3d 1331, 1339-41 (2007). Feres immunity
hinges on “whether [a] suit is service-related,” a question
that is ordinarily “completely separate from the merits of
the action.” Id. at 1340.
And its denial cannot be vindicated after final
judgment. Id. at 1339-40. That’s because Feres immunity
is “an immunity that not only insulates the party from
liability, but also prevents the party from being exposed
to discovery and/or trial.” Id. at 1339. In cases related to
military service, the litigation process itself—complete
with “the prospect of compelled depositions and trial
testimony by military officers concerning the details of
their military commands”—“would disrupt the military
regime.” Id. at 1340. If orders denying Feres immunity
could only be appealed after final judgment, it would be
too late: The harm would have already occurred. Id.
Again, none of this applies to the Yearsley defense.
Indeed, both the Ninth and Tenth Circuits, which have
held that the Yearsley defense is not immediately
appealable, have also held that Feres immunity is. See
- 17 Newton v. Lee, 677 F.3d 1017, 1023 (10th Cir. 2012) (citing
McMahon); Lutz v. Sec’y of the Air Force, 944 F.2d 1477,
1484 (9th Cir. 1991). Furthermore, Feres immunity
doesn’t apply to contractors at all. McMahon, 502 F.3d at
1355-56.
There’s no conflict between the decision below, holding
that the Yearsley defense—which applies only to
contractors—cannot be immediately appealed and the
Eleventh Circuit’s decision, holding that the Feres
doctrine—which applies only to the government—can.
Sixth Circuit. The decision below also does not
conflict with the Sixth Circuit’s determination in ACT, Inc.
v. Worldwide Interactive Network, Inc., that a claim to
state sovereign immunity fits within the collateral order
doctrine. 46 F.4th 489, 506-09 (6th Cir. 2022). The court’s
conclusion rested on its determination that state
sovereign immunity presented an “immunity from suit
itself.” Id. at 498.
Yet again, that is not true of the defense here—which
is founded on basic principles of agency, not sovereign
immunity. See supra pages 4-7. And yet again, courts that
hold that the Yearsley defense is not immediately
appealable nevertheless hold that denials of state
sovereign immunity are. See, e.g., Del Campo v. Kennedy,
517 F.3d 1070, 1074 (9th Cir. 2008).
3. Contrary to GEO’s contention (at 16), the
government has recognized that there is not a “square
split” in the courts of appeals: The cases GEO cites came
out differently because they involved different defenses.
See United States Br., CACI Premier Tech., Inc. v.
Abdulla Al Shimari, 2020 WL 5094136, at *18 (S. Ct. Aug.
26, 2020). Although the government has suggested that
there is confusion about the nature of these different
- 18 defenses, id. at *16, this case does not present an
opportunity to resolve any such confusion. The question
presented here is not the nature of the Yearsley defense
(or any other defense a contractor might invoke). It’s
whether orders denying the Yearsley defense are
immediately appealable. And, as the decision below held,
that question is easily resolved without delving into the
nature of Yearsley. Whatever the nature or scope of the
Yearsley defense, it cannot be resolved completely
separate from the merits. No circuit has held otherwise.6
II. The question presented is unimportant, and this
case is a poor vehicle to decide it.
1. GEO insists (at 30-31) that this Court must grant
certiorari now because absent an immediate appeal of the
Yearsley defense, private companies like GEO will be less
willing to work for the government—and less competent
when they do. Presumably if that were true, the
government itself would have advocated for Yearsley
orders to be immediately appealable. But under both
President Trump and Biden, the government has
consistently taken the opposite position. United States
Br., CACI Premier Tech., Inc., 2020 WL 5094136, at *6
(Aug. 26, 2020); United States Br., Childs v. San Diego
Fam. Hous. LLC, 2021 WL 1897312, at *13 (9th Cir., May.
6
Unable to identify a genuine split, GEO touts a footnote in a
case that did not decide the issue, which asserted that “[t]here is no
consensus ... as to whether Yearsley confers an immunity from suit,
the denial of which is appealable under the collateral order doctrine.”
Posada v. Cultural Care, Inc., 66 F.4th 348, 355 n.5 (1st Cir. 2023).
But most of the cases that footnote cited didn’t even involve the
collateral order doctrine. And the only other cases it cited are
McMahon and World Trade Center—the same cases that GEO
mistakenly relies on here.
- 19 3, 2022); United States Br., Posada v. Cultural Care, Inc.,
2022 WL 17413928, at *10 (1st Cir., Nov. 28, 2022).
And with good reason. It defies common sense that a
company’s decision about whether to contract with the
government would depend not on whether the Yearsley
defense is available, but on when it can appeal. GEO itself
proves the point. Although the Ninth Circuit has held that
orders denying the Yearsley defense are not immediately
appealable, GEO has continued to sell its detention
services to the federal government there—and, indeed,
sued for the right to do so. See Geo Grp., Inc. v. Newsom,
50 F.4th 745 (9th Cir. 2022) (en banc). GEO has identified
no example of any contractor that has ever based its
contracting decisions on whether Yearsley orders are
subject to the collateral order doctrine.
Unable to demonstrate any practical impact of the
actual question presented, GEO repeatedly resorts to
arguments about the importance of qualified immunity—
an entirely different defense. But the purposes of qualified
immunity continue to be served by qualified immunity.
Whether the Yearsley defense can be immediately
appealed makes no difference.
2. Falling back, GEO argues (at 31-32) that “immunity
for those who carry out immigration laws is a value of high
order” rooted in the separation of powers. But, again, this
case is not about whether contractors should be shielded
from liability; it’s about when they can appeal.
More importantly, the collateral order doctrine is a
categorical inquiry. Digit. Equip., 511 U.S. at 873.
Government contractors include everyone from janitorial
companies that clean government buildings to foodservice companies that run government cafeterias to
telemarketing firms hired by the government. The
- 20 question presented isn’t whether immigration detention
contractors can collaterally appeal; it’s whether every
company that happens to be working on a government
contract can do so.
And the lack of a collateral order appeal does not
foreclose immediate appeals in cases that are important.
In those cases, contractors may seek interlocutory appeal
under 28 U.S.C. § 1292 or mandamus. They simply can’t
do so under the collateral order doctrine. That’s how the
final-judgment rule has always operated. GEO identifies
no reason this Court must intervene.
3. Even if this Court were inclined to weigh in, this case
is a poor vehicle for doing so. The decision below is
unpublished, and it arises in an unusual context. The first
sentence in GEO’s petition—and its main pitch to this
Court—is that this case is about immigration policy. But
the question presented is not about immigration. It’s not
even about the application of Yearsley. It’s about the
collateral order doctrine. If the Court would like to weigh
in on the scope of the Yearsley defense, it should review a
case that raises that question.
And if, despite the lower courts’ unanimity, this Court
would like to consider whether Yearsley orders are
subject to the collateral order doctrine, it should at least
do so in the context in which they usually arise: ordinary,
run-of-the mill cases where the defendant just happens to
be a government contractor.
III.The decision below is correct.
Over and over again, this Court has “emphasiz[ed]”
the narrow scope of the collateral order doctrine. Will,
546 U.S. at 350. To satisfy the doctrine, a class of orders
must meet all three conditions: It must “[1] conclusively
- 21 determine the disputed question, [2] resolve an important
issue completely separate from the merits of the action,
and [3] be effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final
judgment.” Id. at 349. These “conditions are stringent.”
Id. And the Yearsley defense does not satisfy any of them.
1. As the Tenth Circuit correctly held, the inquiry can
begin and end with the separateness requirement. To be
immediately appealable, an order must be “completely
separate from the merits.” Van Cauwenberghe v. Biard,
486 U.S. 517, 527 (1988) (emphasis added). This
requirement is strictly construed. Thus, this Court has
held that the denial of a forum non conveniens motion is
too enmeshed with the merits because to evaluate “the
relative ease of access to sources of proof, and the
availability of witnesses,” the court must “evaluate what
proof [will be] required.” Id. at 527-28. It has held that
discovery-sanctions orders are not sufficiently collateral
to the merits because determining the appropriateness of
sanctions may “require the reviewing court to inquire into
the importance of the information sought or the adequacy
or truthfulness of a response.” Cunningham v. Hamilton
Cnty., 527 U.S. 198, 205 (1999).
Reviewing a court’s denial of a contractor’s Yearsley
defense will ordinarily be far more enmeshed with the
merits than determining whether a lawsuit has been
brought in an inconvenient forum or a party committed
sanctionable discovery misconduct. Yearsley requires a
comparison of the contractor’s conduct with the actions
the government directed the contractor to take. As the
Tenth Circuit explained, those issues will almost always
be core to the merits: A plaintiff cannot prove their claim
without proving what the contractor actually did. And in
most cases, the contractor’s defense on the merits—its
- 22 argument that its conduct was lawful—will rely on its
contention that the government commanded it.
This case is the paradigmatic example. GEO asserts
that Yearsley absolves it from liability for forced labor
because ICE directed it to force those in detention to
perform janitorial work, on pain of solitary confinement.
But that is also its defense on the merits: that its threats
of solitary confinement were not an unlawful attempt to
coerce labor, but instead a lawful attempt to comply with
its contract with ICE. See App. Vol 2 at 521. GEO also
disputes what exactly its sanitation program entails. See,
e.g., id. at 505-06, 514-17. That dispute goes both to the
merits of the case—did GEO force those in its care to
labor?—and to Yearsley—is what GEO did the same as
what the government authorized and directed?
As the Tenth Circuit explained, this enmeshment is
inherent in the elements of the Yearsley defense. Pet.
App. 26a. “Perhaps not every” Yearsley order “will be
inextricably intertwined with the merits,” but it will be a
rare case that what a defendant actually did and whether
the government directed it to do so is “completely”
irrelevant to the merits. Cunningham, 527 U.S. at 206.
And this Court has “consistently eschewed a case-by-case
approach to deciding whether an order is sufficiently
collateral.” Id.
GEO argues that the Tenth Circuit applied the wrong
standard in evaluating the separateness prong, but the
standard it applied comes straight from this Court’s case
law. See, e.g., Pet. App. 19a (quoting Will, 546 U.S. at 349);
cf. Van Cauwenberghe, 486 U.S. at 529 (looking to
“substantial[ ] overlap [with the] factual and legal issues
of the underlying dispute”). GEO’s confusion stems from
a misunderstanding of this Court’s decision in Mitchell v.
- 23 Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511 (1985). Mitchell held that orders
denying qualified immunity are immediately appealable
because they turn on a “purely legal” issue: “whether the
facts alleged ... support a claim of violation of clearly
established law.” Id. at 528 & n.9.
The Court recognized that, technically, this inquiry
“involves some factual overlap” with the merits in that, to
answer the abstract legal question of whether the law was
clearly established, the court assumes that the allegations
of the plaintiff’s complaint are true. Id. at 529 & n.10. But
that abstract exercise is “completely separate from the
merits” in every meaningful sense: It does not depend on
the “correctness of the plaintiff’s” facts; it can be resolved
“in isolation from the remaining issues of the case”; and it
“does not entail a determination” of whether the
“defendant’s actions were in fact unlawful.” Id.
By contrast, the Yearsley defense does not turn on an
abstract question of law that can be answered with
assumed facts. It turns on “the actual factual
circumstances”: What did the contractor actually do and
what did the government actually direct? Pet. App. 29a.
And those “actual facts” not only go to the heart of the
Yearsley defense; they go to the heart of the merits. Pet.
App. 26a.
Because the application of Yearsley is so factbound, it
will often—as here—“require reading a vast pretrial
record, with numerous conflicting affidavits, depositions,
and other discovery materials.” Johnson v. Jones, 515
U.S. 304, 316 (1995). “Institutionally speaking,” that is
ordinarily the work of trial judges. Id. And it means that
Yearsley appeals are likely to “consume inordinate
amounts of appellate time.” Id. If contractors are
permitted to take interlocutory appeals of the Yearsley
- 24 defense, that means that appeals courts will have to
conduct this time-consuming task up to three times in the
same case—once on a motion to dismiss, once at summary
judgment, and once after trial. Id. Each time, the court is
likely to be faced with “approximately” the same issue, but
on a record just different enough that the court must
“canvass the record” “once again.” Id. And because the
defense is so factbound, “interlocutory appeals are less
likely to bring important error-correcting benefits.” Id.
It is these “considerations of delay, comparative
expertise of trial and appellate courts, and wise use of
appellate resources” that underlie the requirement that a
collateral order be “completely separate from the merits.”
Id. at 317. Yearsley orders do not satisfy that
requirement.
GEO suggests (at 25) that the separateness prong is
necessarily satisfied if the Yearsley defense is an
immunity from suit. As explained above, Yearsley isn’t an
immunity from suit. But either way, this Court has held
that even orders denying immunity from suit cannot be
collaterally appealed if they are enmeshed with the merits.
See Johnson, 515 U.S. at 315, 317-18 (rejecting collateralorder argument because despite an “interest in avoiding
trial, we can find no separability”).
Nothing more is needed to conclude that the decision
below is correct.
2. Because interlocutory orders are not immediately
appealable if they fail even one of the collateral order
requirements, the lower court had no need to determine
whether Yearsley orders satisfy the other two. And this
Court need not answer that question to deny certiorari.
- 25 But, to be clear, Yearsley orders do not meet the other
requirements either. Collateral orders must resolve an
“important question” that is “effectively unreviewable
upon final judgment.” Digit. Equip., 511 U.S. at 869. And
an order rejecting a defense to liability is the
quintessential example of a decision that can be reviewed
effectively after judgment. See, e.g., Swint v. Chambers
Cnty. Comm’n, 514 U.S. 35, 43 (1995). If the district court
gets it wrong, the court of appeals can simply reverse; the
defendant’s right to avoid liability remains intact. See id.
GEO asserts (at 19) that the Yearsley defense is not a
defense to liability, but rather an immunity from suit akin
to presidential immunity or the right not to be tried twice
for the same crime. According to GEO, Yearsley provides
government contractors the right not to stand trial at all,
which can’t be vindicated after final judgment. This
argument fails twice over.
First, although the Yearsley defense is sometimes
called an immunity, Yearsley makes plain that it is a
defense to liability, not an immunity from suit: “[T]here is
no liability on the part of the contractor for executing [the
government’s] will.” 309 U.S. at 21 (emphasis added).
Nowhere does Yearsley afford government contractors a
right not to stand trial. Indeed, Yearsley itself was decided
on appeal from a jury verdict. Cf. Digit. Equip., 511 U.S.
at 873 (warning that “claims of a right not to be tried”
should be viewed “with skepticism, if not a jaundiced
eye”).
GEO argues (at 21-22) that contractors share in the
federal government’s immunity from suit, unless they
“lose[]” that immunity by violating “the government’s
instructions.” But this Court has repeatedly held
otherwise: There is “no authority for the notion” that
- 26 contractors ever “acquire the Government’s embracive
immunity.” Campbell-Ewald, 577 U.S. at 166. A
company’s “contract with the” government does not allow
it to “acquire[] the sovereign’s immunity from suit.” Id. at
168-69; see also Sloan Shipyards, 258 U.S. at 567-68 (“In
general the United States cannot be sued for a tort, but its
immunity does not extend to those that acted in its
name.”).7
GEO invokes Filarsky v. Delia, which held that a
lawyer temporarily retained by the government was
entitled to seek qualified immunity. 566 U.S. 377, 393-94
(2012). But, again, qualified immunity is an entirely
different defense that doesn’t even apply to private
corporations like GEO. See Richardson v. McKnight,
521 U.S. 399 (1997). And this Court has already rejected
the argument that Filarsky supports the contention that
government contractors share in the United States’
immunity from suit. See Campbell-Ewald, 577 U.S. at 167.
Second, even if the Yearsley defense were a right not
to stand trial, not all “orders denying an asserted right to
avoid the burdens of trial qualify” for the collateral order
doctrine. Will, 546 U.S. at 352. “[I]t is not mere avoidance
of a trial, but avoidance of a trial that would imperil a
substantial public interest, that counts when asking
whether an order is effectively unreviewable if review is to
7
Campbell-Ewald did state that contractors “obtain certain
immunity in connection with [their] work” for the government. 577
U.S. at 166. But it rejects the notion that a company’s “status as a
federal contractor renders it immune from suit.” Id. Some who work
for the government are entitled to qualified immunity (a defense that
is not at issue here). Id. at 167. And, under Yearsley, contractors have
a defense to “liability” for acts performed at the government’s
direction. Id. (emphasis added). But neither doctrine, the Court held,
supports a claim to “derivative sovereign immunity.” Id. at 166-67.
- 27 be left until later.” Id. at 353 (emphasis added); see also
Johnson, 515 U.S. at 318 (denying collateral-order appeal,
despite right at issue being immunity from suit).
The cases that satisfy this high burden are few and far
between and involve the weightiest of public interests,
such as “honoring the separation of powers” (presidential
immunity) or “respecting a State’s dignitary interests”
(state sovereign immunity). Will, 546 U.S. at 352-53.
Orders that do not implicate such important interests do
not satisfy the collateral order doctrine. Id. Thus, for
example, this Court held that the collateral order doctrine
does not apply to orders denying government employees’
attempts to avoid trial under a statute that explicitly
provides “a complete bar to any action.” Id. (quoting 28
U.S.C. § 2676). “[S]imply abbreviating litigation
troublesome” to the government or its employees, the
Court explained, is not “important enough” to warrant
collateral order appeal; there must be some other
“compelling public” interest at stake. Id.
GEO identifies no such compelling public interest.
GEO claims (at 31) that requiring government contractors
to face litigation like any other company will “harm the
government.” But the government itself has said
otherwise. See, e.g., United States Br., CACI Premier
Tech., 2020 WL 5094136, at *13.
And in any event, the primary interest that GEO
asserts is the exact interest this Court already rejected:
the desire for the government and those that perform its
work to avoid the burdens of litigation. See, e.g., Pet. 31.
Avoiding the “burdens of trial,” this Court has
emphasized, is not sufficient—even for the government
itself, let alone a contractor. Will, 546 U.S. at 351-53.
- 28 Thus, not only does the Yearsley defense require the
kind of factbound inquiry that this Court has held is
inappropriate for collateral appeals, but there is also no
compelling interest that will be lost if the defense is
reviewed after final judgment.
3. Finally, interlocutory orders denying assertions of
the Yearsley defense often will not “conclusively resolve”
the issue. Gulfstream Aerospace Corp. v. Mayacamas
Corp., 485 U.S. 271, 278 (1988). Although in some cases,
district courts will be able to conclusively resolve the
Yearsley defense at summary judgment, in many cases,
they will not. “A district court that denies a [Yearsley]
motion does not necessarily contemplate that the decision
will close the matter for all time.” Id. at 278. The denial of
the Yearsley defense at the motion for summary judgment
stage, for example, may be revisited on the trial record. A
category of orders that will commonly include these kinds
of “inherently tentative” decisions is not suitable for
interlocutory appeal. Id.; see Johnson, 515 U.S. at 316.
*
*
*
Although this Court “has been asked many times to
expand the small class of collaterally appealable orders, [it
has] instead kept it narrow and selective in its
membership.” Will, 546 U.S. at 350. The courts of appeal
agree: The Yearsley defense does not fit within that
selective membership. This Court need not grant
certiorari just to reaffirm that consensus.
CONCLUSION
This Court should deny the petition.
- 29 April 21, 2025
Respectfully submitted,
JENNIFER D. BENNETT
Counsel of Record
GUPTA WESSLER LLP
505 MONTGOMERY STREET
SUITE 625
SAN FRANCISCO, CA 94111
(415) 573-0336
jennifer@guptawessler.com
ROBERT D. FRIEDMAN
GUPTA WESSLER LLP
2001 K Street NW
Suite 850 North
Washington, DC 20006
(202) 888-1741
JUNO TURNER
DAVID SELIGMAN
ALEXANDER HOOD
RACHEL DEMPSEY
TOWARDS JUSTICE
PO Box 371680
Denver, CO 80237
(720) 248-8426
MICHAEL SCIMONE
OUTTEN & GOLDEN LLP
685 Third Avenue
25th Floor
New York, NY 10017
(212) 658-0137
- 30 ADAM KOSHKIN
OUTTEN & GOLDEN LLP
One California Street
12th Floor
San Francisco, CA 94111
(415) 727-2237
HANS MEYER
MEYER LAW OFFICE
901 West 10th Ave
Suite 2A
Denver, CO 80204
(303) 831-0817
BRANDT MILSTEIN
ANDREW HESS TURNER
MILSTEIN TURNER
1490 Lafayette Street
Suite 304
Denver, CO 80218
(303) 440-8780
Counsel for Respondents
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.