Respondents Brief — The GEO Group, Inc., Petitioner v. Alejandro Menocal, et al.

Supreme Court briefApr 21, 2025

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No. 24-758

In the Supreme Court of the United States

THE GEO GROUP, INC.,

Petitioner,

v.

ALEJANDRO MENOCAL, ET AL.,

Respondents.

On Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the

United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit

RESPONDENTS’ BRIEF IN OPPOSITION

ROBERT D. FRIEDMAN

GUPTA WESSLER LLP

2001 K STREET NW

SUITE 850 NORTH

WASHINGTON, DC 20006

(202) 888-1741

JENNIFER D. BENNETT

Counsel of Record

GUPTA WESSLER LLP

505 MONTGOMERY STREET

SUITE 625

SAN FRANCISCO, CA 94111

(415) 573-0336

jennifer@guptawessler.com

(Additional counsel listed on inside cover)

April 21, 2025

JUNO TURNER

DAVID SELIGMAN

ALEXANDER HOOD

RACHEL DEMPSEY

TOWARDS JUSTICE

PO Box 371680

Denver, CO 80237

(720) 248-8426

HANS MEYER

MEYER LAW

OFFICE

901 West 10th Ave

Suite 2A

Denver, CO 80204

(303) 831-0817

BRANDT MILSTEIN

ANDREW HESS

TURNER

MILSTEIN TURNER

1490 Lafayette

Street

Suite 304

Denver, CO 80218

(303) 440-8780

MICHAEL SCIMONE

OUTTEN & GOLDEN LLP

685 Third Avenue

25th Floor

New York, NY 10017

(212) 658-0137

ADAM KOSHKIN

OUTTEN & GOLDEN LLP

One California Street

12th Floor

San Francisco, CA 94111

(415) 727-2237

-iQUESTION PRESENTED

Under this Court’s decision in Yearsley v. W.A. Ross

Construction Co., contractors have a defense to liability

for damages caused by “lawfully” carrying out work that

is “authorized and directed” by the government. 309 U.S.

18, 20, 22 (1940).

The question presented is: Are interlocutory orders

holding that a contractor does not meet the requirements

for a defense under Yearsley immediately appealable

under the collateral order doctrine?

- ii TABLE OF CONTENTS

Question presented ................................................................ i

Table of contents ...................................................................ii

Table of authorities ..............................................................iii

Introduction ........................................................................... 1

Statement ............................................................................... 4

A. Legal Background ..................................................... 4

B. Factual background .................................................. 9

C. Procedural history................................................... 11

Reasons for denying the petition....................................... 14

I. There is no circuit split ........................................... 14

II. The question presented is unimportant, and

this case is a poor vehicle to decide it ................... 18

III.The decision below is correct ................................. 20

Conclusion ............................................................................ 28

- iii TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases

ACT, Inc. v. Worldwide Interactive

Network, Inc.,

46 F.4th 489 (6th Cir. 2022) ............................................17

Al Shimari v. CACI Premier Technology, Inc.,

775 F. App’x 758 (4th Cir. 2019) ....................................14

Bell & Son v. Kidd & Roberts,

63 S.E. 607 (Ga. Ct. App. 1909) ........................................6

Budrow v. Ames,

1998 WL 328423 (Conn. Super. June 10, 1998) ..............7

Campbell-Ewald Co. v. Gomez,

577 U.S. 153 (2016) ..............................................4, 6, 7, 26

Childs v. San Diego Family Housing LLC,

22 F.4th 1092 (9th Cir. 2022) ....................................14, 15

Cobbledick v. United States,

309 U.S. 323 (1940) ............................................................7

Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay,

437 U.S. 463 (1978) ........................................................8, 9

Correctional Services Corp. v. Malesko,

534 U.S. 61 (2001) ..............................................................6

Cunningham v. Hamilton County,

527 U.S. 198 (1999) ....................................................21, 22

Daegling v. Gilmore,

49 Ill. 248 (1868) .................................................................6

- iv Del Campo v. Kennedy,

517 F.3d 1070 (9th Cir. 2008) .........................................17

Digital Equiptment Corp. v. Desktop Direct,

511 U.S. 863 (1994) ........................................1, 8, 9, 19, 25

Evans v. Mayer Tree Service, Inc.,

162 N.E.3d 70 (Mass. App. Ct. 2020) ..............................7

Filarsky v. Delia,

566 U.S. 377 (2012) ..........................................................26

Geo Group, Inc. v. Newsom,

50 F.4th 745 (9th Cir. 2022) ............................................19

Gulfstream Aerospace Corp. v.

Mayacamas Corp.,

485 U.S. 271 (1988) ..........................................................28

Hatch v. Trail King Industries,

656 F.3d 59 (1st Cir. 2011) ................................................6

In re World Trade Center Disaster Site Litigation,

521 F.3d 169 (2d Cir. 2008) .............................................15

Johnson v. Jones,

515 U.S. 304 (1995) ........................................24, 25, 27, 28

Johnson-Howard v. AECOM Special Missions

Services, Inc.,

2023 WL 6216604 (D. Md. Sept. 25, 2023) ......................7

Keifer & Keifer v. Reconstruction Financial Corp.,

306 U.S. 381 (1939) ............................................................4

Lutz v. Secretary of the Air Force,

944 F.2d 1477 (9th Cir. 1991) .........................................17

-vMartin v. Halliburton,

618 F.3d 476 (5th Cir. 2010) ...........................................14

McMahon v. Presidential Airways, Inc.,

502 F.3d 1331 (2007) ..................................................16, 17

Menocal v. GEO Group, Inc.,

882 F.3d 905 (10th Cir. 2018) .........................................11

Midland Asphalt Corp. v. United States,

489 U.S. 794 (1989) ............................................................8

Mitchell v. Forsyth,

472 U.S. 511 (1985) ..........................................................23

Newton v. Lee,

677 F.3d 1017 (10th Cir. 2012) .......................................17

Posada v. Cultural Care, Inc.,

66 F.4th 348 (1st Cir. 2023) ............................................18

Pullman Construction Industries, Inc. v.

United States,

23 F.3d 1166 (7th Cir. 1994) ...........................................14

Richardson v. McKnight,

521 U.S. 399 (1997) ..........................................................26

Sloan Shipyards Corp. v. U.S. Shipping Board

Emergency Fleet Corp.,

258 U.S. 549 (1922) ......................................................4, 26

Swint v. Chambers County Commission,

514 U.S. 35 (1995) ............................................................25

Van Cauwenberghe v. Biard,

486 U.S. 517 (1988) ..........................................................21

- vi Will v. Hallock,

546 U.S. 345 (2006) ....................7, 8, 12, 14, 21, 23, 27, 28

Yearsley v. W.A. Ross Construction Co.,

309 U.S. 18 (1940) ....................................................1, 5, 25

Statutes

28 U.S.C. § 1291 .................................................................1, 8

Other authorities

Restatement (Second) of Agency § 217

(Am. L. Inst. 1958).............................................................4

Restatement (Second) Torts § 404

(Am. L. Inst. 1965).............................................................6

-1INTRODUCTION

GEO asks this Court to review an unpublished decision

holding what every published opinion to have considered

the question has held: There is no exception to the finaljudgment rule for private contractors asserting a defense

under Yearsley v. W.A. Ross Construction Co., 309 U.S.

18 (1940). This Court should decline GEO’s request.

Yearsley shields government contractors from liability

for actions that were authorized and directed by the

government. Determining whether the defense applies

typically requires a fact-intensive inquiry into what the

contractor did and whether the government directed it to

do so. Take this case: To determine whether summary

judgment was warranted on GEO’s Yearsley defense, the

district court reviewed hundreds of pages of documents,

numerous deposition transcripts and declarations, and

dozens of discovery responses.

In an unpublished order, the Tenth Circuit dismissed

GEO’s appeal of the district court’s summary judgment

decision for lack of appellate jurisdiction. This conclusion

is a straightforward application of the final-judgment rule.

Courts of appeals may only review “final decisions of the

district courts.” 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (emphasis added).

Denials of summary judgment ordinarily don’t count.

The collateral order doctrine provides a “narrow

exception” to this rule. Digit. Equip. Corp. v. Desktop

Direct, 511 U.S. 863, 868 (1994). But that narrow exception

applies only to orders that meet three stringent

requirements: They must be conclusive; they must resolve

important questions completely separate from the merits;

and they must render such important questions effectively

unreviewable on appeal from final judgment in the

underlying action.

-2Yearsley orders, the Tenth Circuit held, fail the second

requirement. As this case demonstrates, reviewing a

district court’s Yearsley order will almost inevitably

require a fact-intensive inquiry that cannot be completely

separated from the merits. After all, it is hard to imagine

a case where what the contractor did and whether the

government told it do so have no bearing on the merits of

the claims. Yearsley orders, therefore, do not fall within

the narrow category of interlocutory decisions that may

be collaterally appealed.

GEO cannot identify a single circuit that has a

different rule. So instead it lumps together cases about the

Yearsley defense with cases about other defenses under

the general label “derivative sovereign immunity.” But

there is no conflict between the lower court’s decision that

Yearsley orders are not collaterally appealable and

decisions holding that different defenses are.

And GEO’s complaint that Yearsley entitles

contractors to share in the government’s immunity from

suit is both wrong and irrelevant. The law has been clear

for over a century that the government’s sovereign

immunity does not extend to those it hires to do its work.

But more importantly, for purposes of the question

presented, it doesn’t matter. Whatever the nature of the

Yearsley defense, it cannot be collaterally appealed unless

it is completely separate from the merits. And as the

Tenth Circuit held, it is not.

This Court ordinarily does not review unpublished

decisions that faithfully apply its precedent and do not

split with the rule in any other circuit. GEO offers no

credible reason to do so here. GEO claims that unless

Yearsley orders are immediately appealable, good

companies will be deterred from contracting with the

-3government. But the government itself doesn’t believe

that. And it’s hard to imagine that any company would

base its contracting decisions on whether the Yearsley

defense is subject to the collateral order doctrine.

So GEO opens and closes its petition with another

pitch: This Court should grant review to prevent

“activists” from “frustrat[ing] federal immigration

enforcement.” Pet. 34; see id. at 1. This case is not about

immigration enforcement; it’s about a private company

using forced labor and paying its workers almost nothing.

But, in any event, the question presented is not about

whether the plaintiffs should succeed on their claims. It’s

not even about whether GEO should succeed on its

Yearsley defense. It is about whether Yearsley orders—

all Yearsley orders—are collaterally appealable.

The same rule that applies to GEO applies in the slipand-fall case against a janitorial company that leaves a wet

floor in a government building; or the trespass case

against a tree-cutting company hired by the government;

or the personal injury case against the architect of a jury

box, when a juror falls down the stairs—all real cases in

which Yearsley was invoked. It’s no wonder that the

courts of appeals agree that Yearsley orders do not

warrant automatic interlocutory appeal.

If GEO truly believed that some important federal

interest justified interlocutory appeal in this case, it could

have asked for permission to file one under 28 U.S.C.

§ 1292 or it could have sought mandamus. This Court

should not grant certiorari simply because GEO chose not

to do so.

-4STATEMENT

A. Legal Background

1.

The Yearsley defense

This Court has long held that the United States’

sovereign “immunity does not extend to those that act[] in

its name.” Sloan Shipyards Corp. v. U.S. Shipping Bd.

Emergency Fleet Corp., 258 U.S. 549, 567-68 (1922); see,

e.g., Keifer & Keifer v. Reconstruction Fin. Corp.,

306 U.S. 381, 388 (1939) (“[T]he government does not

become the conduit of its immunity in suits against its

agents or instrumentalities merely because they do its

work.”); Campbell-Ewald Co. v. Gomez, 577 U.S. 153, 166

(2016). An agent of the government “does not cease to be

answerable for his acts,” simply because he works for the

government. Sloan Shipyards, 258 U.S. at 566-67.1

This accords with basic agency law: Like any other

principal, the government may delegate to its agents its

“privilege” to take actions that would be unlawful if

committed by others. See, e.g., Restatement (Second) of

Agency § 217 cmt. a (Am. L. Inst. 1958). Here, for

example, the government has authorized GEO to detain

people awaiting immigration proceedings. Cf. id. But a

principal cannot delegate its immunity. See id. § 217 cmt.

b. The government is no different. See Campbell-Ewald,

577 U.S. at 166 (explaining that there is “no authority for

the notion that private persons performing Government

work acquire the Government’s embracive immunity”).

While this Court has therefore repeatedly rejected the

claim that contractors share the government’s sovereign

1

Unless otherwise specified, all internal quotation marks,

citations, alterations, and emphases have been omitted from

quotations through this brief.

-5immunity, they are not defenseless if they are sued for

doing what the government told them to do. As in many

other principal-agent relationships, a contractor that is

sued for damages caused by simply executing a lawful

order from the government may defend against liability

by arguing that the government (the principal) and not the

contractor (the agent) is responsible. See Yearsley v. W.A.

Ross Constr. Co., 309 U.S. 18, 21 (1940).

This Court first recognized this defense almost a

century ago in Yearsley. Id. In that case, a construction

company had been hired by the government to build dikes

on the Missouri River, washing away some of the

plaintiffs’ land in the process. Id. at 19. The contractor’s

work was “all authorized and directed” by the

government, and the authority granted to perform that

work was “validly conferred” by Congress. Id. at 20; see

also United States Br., Yearsley, 1939 WL 48388, at *6

(1939) (“The construction work was in accordance with

detailed specifications in the contracts with the

Government, and was done under the direct and constant

supervision and direction of Government inspectors.”).

The erosion of the plaintiffs’ land was an unfortunate but

“inevitable” consequence of the work the government had

directed. Yearsley, 309 U.S. at 20; United States Br.,

Yearsley, 1939 WL 48388, at *6 (“[I]t was intended to be

washed away as a necessary part of the federal project for

the stabilization of the river.”).

This Court held that, under those circumstances, the

contractor had “no liability” for simply “executing [the

government’s] will.” Yearsley, 309 U.S. at 21. Yearsley did

not afford the contractor sovereign immunity, derivative

or otherwise. See id. In fact, the Court held that the

government’s authorization to the contractor to wash

-6away the plaintiffs’ land was only valid because the

government itself would pay the damages—that is,

because the government was not immune. Id. at 22. There

was thus no sovereign immunity to derive.

The Court did hold, however, that the contractor had a

defense to “liability.” Id. at 20-21 (emphasis added).

Government contractors are not liable for damages if:

(1) the government “validly” authorized the contractor’s

work; and (2) the government “directed” the challenged

conduct. Id.; accord Campbell-Ewald, 577 U.S. at 153; see

also Corr. Servs. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 74 n.6

(2001) (“Where the government has directed a contractor

to do the very thing that is the subject of the claim, we

have recognized this as a special circumstance where the

contractor may assert a defense.”).

While Yearsley was the first case from this Court to

recognize this defense in the government-contractor

context, courts have long provided agents a defense to

liability when it is, in fact, the principal that is truly at

fault—that is, when the principal directed the challenged

conduct. See, e.g., Hatch v. Trail King Indus., 656 F.3d 59,

68 (1st Cir. 2011) (collecting cases); Bell & Son v. Kidd &

Roberts, 63 S.E. 607, 608 (Ga. Ct. App. 1909); Daegling v.

Gilmore, 49 Ill. 248, 249 (1868); Restatement (Second)

Torts § 404 cmts. a-b (Am. L. Inst. 1965) (contractor who

follows another’s specifications is not liable unless defect

in specifications is obvious).

As with other principal-agent cases, therefore, the

Yearsley defense typically turns on the answer to two

factual questions: (1) What did the contractor do to cause

the plaintiff’s injury?; and (2) Did the government dictate

that conduct? See, e.g., Campbell-Ewald, 577 U.S. at 168.

-7In the decades since Yearsley, the defense has been

most commonly invoked in run-of-the mill cases, where

the defendant happens to be a government contractor.

See, e.g., Campbell-Ewald, 577 U.S. at 166 (Telephone

Consumer Protection Act case against contractor for

sending unwanted text messages); Evans v. Mayer Tree

Serv., Inc., 162 N.E.3d 70 (Mass. App. Ct. 2020) (trespass

action against tree-removal company); Johnson-Howard

v. AECOM Spec. Missions Servs., Inc., 2023 WL 6216604

(D. Md. Sept. 25, 2023) (slip-and-fall case against janitorial

company); Budrow v. Ames, 1998 WL 328423 (Conn.

Super. June 10, 1998) (personal injury case against

architect).

2.

The collateral order doctrine

The question presented here is not about the Yearsley

defense itself. The question is whether, when a district

court concludes that a contractor has not satisfied

Yearsley’s requirements, that contractor may take an

interlocutory appeal. And that question turns on the

collateral order doctrine.

a. The collateral order doctrine allows immediate

appeal of a “narrow class of decisions that do not

terminate the litigation, but are sufficiently important and

collateral to the merits that they should nonetheless be

treated as final.” Will v. Hallock, 546 U.S. 345, 345 (2006).

“Finality as a condition of review is an historic

characteristic of federal appellate procedure.” Cobbledick

v. United States, 309 U.S. 323, 324 (1940). Since the

Judiciary Act of 1789, Congress has “forbidd[en]

piecemeal disposition on appeal of what for practical

purposes is a single controversy.” Id. at 324-25. Instead,

the jurisdiction of the courts of appeals is limited to

“appeals from ... final decisions of the district courts.”

-828 U.S.C. § 1291. Ordinarily, then, a party is “entitled to a

single appeal,” “deferred until final judgment,” where

“claims of district court error at any stage of the litigation

may be ventilated.” Digit. Equip., 511 U.S. at 868.

This final-judgment rule “evinces a legislative

judgment that [r]estricting appellate review to final

decisions prevents the debilitating effect on judicial

administration” caused by multiple, successive,

interlocutory appeals. Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay,

437 U.S. 463, 471 (1978).

b. Ordinarily, a final decision is “deemed not to have

occurred” unless it “ends the litigation on the merits and

leaves nothing for the court to do but execute the

judgment.” Midland Asphalt Corp. v. United States,

489 U.S. 794, 798 (1989). But this Court has recognized “a

narrow class of decisions that do not terminate the

litigation, but are sufficiently important and collateral to

the merits that they should nonetheless be treated as

final” for purposes of allowing an immediate appeal. Will,

546 U.S. at 347. This “narrow exception”—the collateral

order doctrine—applies only to orders “[1] that are

conclusive, [2] that resolve important questions

completely separate from the merits, and [3] that would

render such important questions effectively unreviewable

on appeal from final judgment in the underlying action.”

Digit. Equip., 511 U.S. at 867-868.

This Court has warned that these requirements “are

stringent” and must be “kept so.” Will, 546 U.S. at 349-50.

Otherwise, what is meant to be a “narrow exception” will

undermine the important interests served by the final

judgment rule: judicial efficiency and preventing parties

from “saddling” their opponents with the “cost and delay”

of multiple appeals. Digit. Equip., 511 U.S. at 873.

-9Whether an order falls within the collateral-order

doctrine is a determination made on a categorical basis, id.

at 868, not after an “individualized jurisdictional inquiry”

specific to the facts of a case, Coopers, 437 U.S. at 473. So,

for an interlocutory order to be immediately appealable,

“the entire category to which a claim belongs, without

regard to the chance that the litigation at hand might be

speeded, or a particular injustic[e] averted.” Digit.

Equip., 511 U.S. at 868 (emphasis added).

B. Factual background

GEO is a publicly traded, for-profit company that

makes billions of dollars a year operating private

detention facilities. One of these facilities is the Aurora

Immigration Processing Center, which houses people

awaiting resolution of their immigration proceedings. Pet.

App. 4a.

Managing a detention facility requires work:

preparing meals for hundreds of people, doing their

laundry, sanitation and janitorial work, building

maintenance. App. 34. The government pays GEO millions

of dollars a year to perform that work. Supp. App. Vol. 3

at 105. But GEO didn’t perform the work itself: It

required those detained in its facility to do it.2

The company forced every person detained at the

Aurora Center to perform unpaid janitorial work,

threatening that if they refuse, they will be sent to “the

hole”—solitary confinement. Supp. App. Vol. 1 at 165-66;

see also Supp. App. Vol. 2 at 22-23 (“[T]hey were taken

away, and they were put in isolation.”); id. at 85

2

References to App. and Supp. App. are to the appendices filed

in the Tenth Circuit. References to Pet. App. are to the appendix filed

with the petition for certiorari.

- 10 (recounting that an officer would “scream[]” at detainees

“about going to segregation” for “not cleaning”); id. at

138-44 (stating that he was sent to solitary confinement

“four times” for refusing to perform janitorial work).

People came back from solitary “skinny,” “afraid,” and

“antisocial”—unable to “talk to other people.” Supp. App.

Vol. 2 at 74, 184.

GEO’s forced sanitation program was, in the words of

ICE’s contracting officer, a “GEO policy, created by

GEO” and not “a requirement of the contract” with ICE.

Supp. App. Vol. 1 at 73. The contract with ICE—and

ICE’s national detention standards—prohibited GEO

from forcing those detained at Aurora to do anything

other than “personal housekeeping.” App. Vol. 1 at 144;

Supp. App. Vol. 1 at 121 (Department of Homeland

Security’s Office of Inspector General warning that

requiring those detained in the facility to perform the

facility’s janitorial work “is in violation of ICE

standards”).

In addition to its forced janitorial work, GEO fulfilled

its other staffing needs through a “voluntary work

program.” Although technically voluntary, many people

detained at the Center had little choice but to participate.

Working for GEO was the only way they could earn money

to buy food and toiletries from the commissary or make

phone calls while detained. These were not luxuries: The

“inadequate” meals GEO served left those in its care

“chronically hungry”—unable to get enough to eat

without “voluntar[ily]” working for GEO. Supp. App. Vol.

2 at 90, 183, 185. Initially, the company paid these workers

“$1.00 per day ... and a bottle of soda once a week.” Supp.

App. Vol. 3 at 134. GEO later reduced that to just $1 a day.

- 11 Id. at 140. That, too, was GEO’s choice. ICE did not

require GEO to pay so little.3

Between its forced sanitation program and its

voluntary work program, those detained in GEO’s facility

performed virtually all non-security-related work needed

to operate the facility. Detained workers were responsible

for the janitorial work (including cleaning the bathrooms,

and mopping, stripping, and waxing the floors), building

maintenance, laundry for the entire facility, food

preparation, running the library, and running a

barbershop. App. Vol. 1 at 13-14, 34, 233. Their

compensation was not being sent to solitary and—for

some—$1 a day.

C. Procedural history

This lawsuit was filed over a decade ago. Alejandro

Menocal, who had been detained in GEO’s facility, sued

GEO for violating the Trafficking Victims Protection Act’s

prohibition on forced labor and Colorado’s prohibition on

unjust enrichment. Pet. App. 6a. GEO has repeatedly

sought to delay the case. It has sought multiple stays and

multiple interlocutory appeals. See Supp. App. Vol. 1 at 139. For example, GEO appealed the district court’s classcertification order, which the court of appeals then

affirmed, and this Court denied certiorari. See Menocal v.

GEO Grp., Inc., 882 F.3d 905, 910 (10th Cir. 2018). That

ultimately meritless appeal took over a year.

3

For most of the class period, ICE’s national detention

standards stated that “compensation is at least $1.00 (USD) per day.”

App. Vol. 1 at 147 (emphasis added). They did not set any cap. See id.

Before February 27, 2012, the standards stated that “compensation is

$1.00.” Id. at 222. But this, too, set a floor, not a ceiling. As GEO

admitted in its summary judgment briefing, there was no “prohibition

on paying more.” App. Vol. 3 at 692.

- 12 Following affirmance of the class-certification

decision, and after the close of discovery, the parties crossmoved for summary judgment on whether GEO was

entitled to the Yearsley defense. Pet. App. 7a. In a nearly

100-page order, the district court held that GEO was not

entitled to the defense. Pet. App. 32a. After carefully

reviewing hundreds of pages of GEO’s internal

documents, numerous declarations, and hours of

deposition testimony, the court concluded that ICE had

not directed GEO to force those detained in its facility to

conduct its janitorial work, nor had it required GEO to pay

detained workers only $1 a day. Pet. App. 32a-84a.4

GEO tried to take yet another interlocutory appeal.

This time, in an unpublished order, the Tenth Circuit

dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. Pet. App. 3a.

“[A]n order denying Yearsley’s applicability,” the court

held, “does not satisfy the collateral order doctrine.” Pet.

App. 10a.

In so holding, the court relied on the second prong of

the collateral-order test: that an order must “resolve an

important issue completely separate from the merits.” Id.

at 18a (quoting Will, 546 U.S. at 349). Yearsley orders, the

Court concluded, do not. The court explained that the

same “factual questions concerning what the government

did and did not specifically direct” that are “at the heart of

the Yearsley inquiry” are often “also at the heart of the

merits inquiry.” Pet. App. 21a. And so Yearsley orders are

“enmeshed in the merits,” not separate. Pet. App. 19a, 21a.

This case, the court observed, “highlights the

soundness of [that] conclusion.” Pet. App. 21a-23a. To

review the district court’s Yearsley order, the Tenth

4

The court also ruled on other issues, which are not relevant here.

- 13 Circuit would have had to resolve factual disputes about

GEO’s conduct and what the government did (or did not)

specifically direct. Pet. App. 22a-25a. Those factual

disputes also go to the “heart of the merits.” Pet. App. 21a.

For example, GEO’s Yearsley defense depends on

whether ICE “specifically directed” GEO to punish those

who refused to do its janitorial work with solitary

confinement. Pet. App. 22a. But so too does its defense on

the merits. See Pet. App. 22a, 25a; see also App. Vol 2 at

497 (arguing that its solitary-confinement threat doesn’t

constitute a “threat of serious harm” under the

Trafficking Victims Protection Act because it was merely

a “warning of legitimate consequences” directed by ICE).

Similarly, whether Yearsley shields GEO from the

plaintiffs’ unjust enrichment claim depends on whether

ICE directed GEO to pay detained workers only $1 a day.

And again, so too, does its defense on the merits—that

paying its workers so little was not unjust because ICE

told it to. Pet. App. 23a, 25a.

Although this case exemplifies the factbound nature of

the Yearsley defense, the Tenth Circuit explained, it is not

unique. Pet. App. 26a. “[A]ll appeals challenging orders

that reject ... Yearsley’s protection” are likely to hinge on

factual questions that go not only to the Yearsley defense,

but to the merits of the plaintiff’s claims. Id.

For that reason, the panel rejected GEO’s comparison

to qualified immunity appeals. Id. Unlike qualified

immunity appeals, where the “court is concerned with

resolving abstract issues of law,” in Yearsley appeals, “the

actual facts” play a “significant role.” Id.

And because Yearsley orders cannot be completely

separated from the merits, the court held that they cannot

- 14 be collaterally appealed. Pet. App. 29a. The court

therefore did not need to consider the collateral order

doctrine’s other requirements. Pet. App. 30a.

REASONS FOR DENYING THE PETITION

I. There Is No Circuit Split.

Yearsley has been on the books for eighty-five years.

Yet, in nearly a century, only two circuits have issued

published decisions on whether an order rejecting a

contractor’s Yearsley defense is immediately appealable.

And they agree on the answer: No. See Childs v. San

Diego Fam. Hous. LLC, 22 F.4th 1092, 1098 (9th Cir.

2022); Martin v. Halliburton, 618 F.3d 476, 485 (5th Cir.

2010); see also Al Shimari v. CACI Premier Tech., Inc.,

775 F. App’x 758, 759 (4th Cir. 2019) (unpublished decision

with the same result). The unpublished decision below

came to the same conclusion. Pet. App. 3a.5

GEO does not cite a single circuit whose rule is that the

collateral order doctrine applies to an order denying the

Yearsley defense. This consensus is unsurprising. As the

Tenth Circuit explained, the collateral order doctrine

requires that orders be “completely separate from the

merits.” Pet. App. 29a (quoting Will, 546 U.S. at 549). But

Yearsley orders often require a detailed examination of

the same facts that underlie the contractor’s defense on

the merits. Id. And, as the Ninth Circuit explained, the

interest served by the Yearsley defense—providing

contractors a defense to the payment of damages—can

5

To inflate the number of courts that have weighed in, GEO also

cites Pullman Construction Industries, Inc. v. United States, 23 F.3d

1166 (7th Cir. 1994). But the defendant in Pullman was not a

contractor; it was the government. Pullman therefore did not address

the Yearsley defense. It addressed whether the United States could

collaterally appeal a denial of sovereign immunity. Id. at 1167-70.

- 15 easily be vindicated on appeal from a final judgment. See

Childs, 22 F.4th at 1098. If the contractor wins on appeal,

it doesn’t have to pay.

1. GEO attempts to manufacture a circuit split by

grouping Yearsley cases together with cases about other

defenses under the label “derivative sovereign immunity.”

Pet. 12. But each defense stems from a different source

and has different elements. There is no conflict between

cases holding that the Yearsley defense is not immediately

appealable and those holding that some other defense is.

Second Circuit. In In re World Trade Center Disaster

Site Litigation, the Second Circuit held that claims to

immunity under the Stafford Act may be immediately

appealed. 521 F.3d 169, 188 (2d Cir. 2008). Congress

enacted the Stafford Act to shield the federal government

from lawsuits challenging discretionary decisions made in

the course of providing disaster relief. See id. citing 42

U.S.C. § 5148). The Second Circuit explained that the Act

thus represents a “specific congressional” award of true

“immunity from suit.” Id. at 192-93. That immunity

implicates “a substantial public interest” because it

concerns the ability to engage in “disaster relief efforts

without fear of judicial second-guessing” during a

“declared national emergency.” Id. And an order denying

Stafford Act immunity can be reviewed “completely

separate from the merits of the action.” Id.

None of this is true of the Yearsley defense. No statute

underlies Yearsley. There is, therefore, no “specific

congressional recognition” of immunity from suit. Id. And

while claims to Stafford Act immunity can only arise from

a declared national emergency—by definition, a

“substantial public interest”—the Yearsley defense

applies to all manner of mundane activities: from food

- 16 service to landscaping to telemarketing. See supra page 7.

In addition, as the Tenth Circuit explained, to determine

whether Yearsley applies, a court will often have to wade

into the same facts that underlie the merits of the case.

There is thus no conflict between the Second Circuit’s

conclusion that Stafford Act immunity is subject to the

collateral order doctrine and the Tenth Circuit’s

conclusion that the Yearsley defense is not.

Eleventh Circuit. In McMahon v. Presidential

Airways, Inc., the Eleventh Circuit held that the

collateral order doctrine applies to orders denying “Feres

immunity,” which provides the government “immun[ity]

from claims brought by soldiers for their service-related

injuries.” 502 F.3d 1331, 1339-41 (2007). Feres immunity

hinges on “whether [a] suit is service-related,” a question

that is ordinarily “completely separate from the merits of

the action.” Id. at 1340.

And its denial cannot be vindicated after final

judgment. Id. at 1339-40. That’s because Feres immunity

is “an immunity that not only insulates the party from

liability, but also prevents the party from being exposed

to discovery and/or trial.” Id. at 1339. In cases related to

military service, the litigation process itself—complete

with “the prospect of compelled depositions and trial

testimony by military officers concerning the details of

their military commands”—“would disrupt the military

regime.” Id. at 1340. If orders denying Feres immunity

could only be appealed after final judgment, it would be

too late: The harm would have already occurred. Id.

Again, none of this applies to the Yearsley defense.

Indeed, both the Ninth and Tenth Circuits, which have

held that the Yearsley defense is not immediately

appealable, have also held that Feres immunity is. See

- 17 Newton v. Lee, 677 F.3d 1017, 1023 (10th Cir. 2012) (citing

McMahon); Lutz v. Sec’y of the Air Force, 944 F.2d 1477,

1484 (9th Cir. 1991). Furthermore, Feres immunity

doesn’t apply to contractors at all. McMahon, 502 F.3d at

1355-56.

There’s no conflict between the decision below, holding

that the Yearsley defense—which applies only to

contractors—cannot be immediately appealed and the

Eleventh Circuit’s decision, holding that the Feres

doctrine—which applies only to the government—can.

Sixth Circuit. The decision below also does not

conflict with the Sixth Circuit’s determination in ACT, Inc.

v. Worldwide Interactive Network, Inc., that a claim to

state sovereign immunity fits within the collateral order

doctrine. 46 F.4th 489, 506-09 (6th Cir. 2022). The court’s

conclusion rested on its determination that state

sovereign immunity presented an “immunity from suit

itself.” Id. at 498.

Yet again, that is not true of the defense here—which

is founded on basic principles of agency, not sovereign

immunity. See supra pages 4-7. And yet again, courts that

hold that the Yearsley defense is not immediately

appealable nevertheless hold that denials of state

sovereign immunity are. See, e.g., Del Campo v. Kennedy,

517 F.3d 1070, 1074 (9th Cir. 2008).

3. Contrary to GEO’s contention (at 16), the

government has recognized that there is not a “square

split” in the courts of appeals: The cases GEO cites came

out differently because they involved different defenses.

See United States Br., CACI Premier Tech., Inc. v.

Abdulla Al Shimari, 2020 WL 5094136, at *18 (S. Ct. Aug.

26, 2020). Although the government has suggested that

there is confusion about the nature of these different

- 18 defenses, id. at *16, this case does not present an

opportunity to resolve any such confusion. The question

presented here is not the nature of the Yearsley defense

(or any other defense a contractor might invoke). It’s

whether orders denying the Yearsley defense are

immediately appealable. And, as the decision below held,

that question is easily resolved without delving into the

nature of Yearsley. Whatever the nature or scope of the

Yearsley defense, it cannot be resolved completely

separate from the merits. No circuit has held otherwise.6

II. The question presented is unimportant, and this

case is a poor vehicle to decide it.

1. GEO insists (at 30-31) that this Court must grant

certiorari now because absent an immediate appeal of the

Yearsley defense, private companies like GEO will be less

willing to work for the government—and less competent

when they do. Presumably if that were true, the

government itself would have advocated for Yearsley

orders to be immediately appealable. But under both

President Trump and Biden, the government has

consistently taken the opposite position. United States

Br., CACI Premier Tech., Inc., 2020 WL 5094136, at *6

(Aug. 26, 2020); United States Br., Childs v. San Diego

Fam. Hous. LLC, 2021 WL 1897312, at *13 (9th Cir., May.

6

Unable to identify a genuine split, GEO touts a footnote in a

case that did not decide the issue, which asserted that “[t]here is no

consensus ... as to whether Yearsley confers an immunity from suit,

the denial of which is appealable under the collateral order doctrine.”

Posada v. Cultural Care, Inc., 66 F.4th 348, 355 n.5 (1st Cir. 2023).

But most of the cases that footnote cited didn’t even involve the

collateral order doctrine. And the only other cases it cited are

McMahon and World Trade Center—the same cases that GEO

mistakenly relies on here.

- 19 3, 2022); United States Br., Posada v. Cultural Care, Inc.,

2022 WL 17413928, at *10 (1st Cir., Nov. 28, 2022).

And with good reason. It defies common sense that a

company’s decision about whether to contract with the

government would depend not on whether the Yearsley

defense is available, but on when it can appeal. GEO itself

proves the point. Although the Ninth Circuit has held that

orders denying the Yearsley defense are not immediately

appealable, GEO has continued to sell its detention

services to the federal government there—and, indeed,

sued for the right to do so. See Geo Grp., Inc. v. Newsom,

50 F.4th 745 (9th Cir. 2022) (en banc). GEO has identified

no example of any contractor that has ever based its

contracting decisions on whether Yearsley orders are

subject to the collateral order doctrine.

Unable to demonstrate any practical impact of the

actual question presented, GEO repeatedly resorts to

arguments about the importance of qualified immunity—

an entirely different defense. But the purposes of qualified

immunity continue to be served by qualified immunity.

Whether the Yearsley defense can be immediately

appealed makes no difference.

2. Falling back, GEO argues (at 31-32) that “immunity

for those who carry out immigration laws is a value of high

order” rooted in the separation of powers. But, again, this

case is not about whether contractors should be shielded

from liability; it’s about when they can appeal.

More importantly, the collateral order doctrine is a

categorical inquiry. Digit. Equip., 511 U.S. at 873.

Government contractors include everyone from janitorial

companies that clean government buildings to foodservice companies that run government cafeterias to

telemarketing firms hired by the government. The

- 20 question presented isn’t whether immigration detention

contractors can collaterally appeal; it’s whether every

company that happens to be working on a government

contract can do so.

And the lack of a collateral order appeal does not

foreclose immediate appeals in cases that are important.

In those cases, contractors may seek interlocutory appeal

under 28 U.S.C. § 1292 or mandamus. They simply can’t

do so under the collateral order doctrine. That’s how the

final-judgment rule has always operated. GEO identifies

no reason this Court must intervene.

3. Even if this Court were inclined to weigh in, this case

is a poor vehicle for doing so. The decision below is

unpublished, and it arises in an unusual context. The first

sentence in GEO’s petition—and its main pitch to this

Court—is that this case is about immigration policy. But

the question presented is not about immigration. It’s not

even about the application of Yearsley. It’s about the

collateral order doctrine. If the Court would like to weigh

in on the scope of the Yearsley defense, it should review a

case that raises that question.

And if, despite the lower courts’ unanimity, this Court

would like to consider whether Yearsley orders are

subject to the collateral order doctrine, it should at least

do so in the context in which they usually arise: ordinary,

run-of-the mill cases where the defendant just happens to

be a government contractor.

III.The decision below is correct.

Over and over again, this Court has “emphasiz[ed]”

the narrow scope of the collateral order doctrine. Will,

546 U.S. at 350. To satisfy the doctrine, a class of orders

must meet all three conditions: It must “[1] conclusively

- 21 determine the disputed question, [2] resolve an important

issue completely separate from the merits of the action,

and [3] be effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final

judgment.” Id. at 349. These “conditions are stringent.”

Id. And the Yearsley defense does not satisfy any of them.

1. As the Tenth Circuit correctly held, the inquiry can

begin and end with the separateness requirement. To be

immediately appealable, an order must be “completely

separate from the merits.” Van Cauwenberghe v. Biard,

486 U.S. 517, 527 (1988) (emphasis added). This

requirement is strictly construed. Thus, this Court has

held that the denial of a forum non conveniens motion is

too enmeshed with the merits because to evaluate “the

relative ease of access to sources of proof, and the

availability of witnesses,” the court must “evaluate what

proof [will be] required.” Id. at 527-28. It has held that

discovery-sanctions orders are not sufficiently collateral

to the merits because determining the appropriateness of

sanctions may “require the reviewing court to inquire into

the importance of the information sought or the adequacy

or truthfulness of a response.” Cunningham v. Hamilton

Cnty., 527 U.S. 198, 205 (1999).

Reviewing a court’s denial of a contractor’s Yearsley

defense will ordinarily be far more enmeshed with the

merits than determining whether a lawsuit has been

brought in an inconvenient forum or a party committed

sanctionable discovery misconduct. Yearsley requires a

comparison of the contractor’s conduct with the actions

the government directed the contractor to take. As the

Tenth Circuit explained, those issues will almost always

be core to the merits: A plaintiff cannot prove their claim

without proving what the contractor actually did. And in

most cases, the contractor’s defense on the merits—its

- 22 argument that its conduct was lawful—will rely on its

contention that the government commanded it.

This case is the paradigmatic example. GEO asserts

that Yearsley absolves it from liability for forced labor

because ICE directed it to force those in detention to

perform janitorial work, on pain of solitary confinement.

But that is also its defense on the merits: that its threats

of solitary confinement were not an unlawful attempt to

coerce labor, but instead a lawful attempt to comply with

its contract with ICE. See App. Vol 2 at 521. GEO also

disputes what exactly its sanitation program entails. See,

e.g., id. at 505-06, 514-17. That dispute goes both to the

merits of the case—did GEO force those in its care to

labor?—and to Yearsley—is what GEO did the same as

what the government authorized and directed?

As the Tenth Circuit explained, this enmeshment is

inherent in the elements of the Yearsley defense. Pet.

App. 26a. “Perhaps not every” Yearsley order “will be

inextricably intertwined with the merits,” but it will be a

rare case that what a defendant actually did and whether

the government directed it to do so is “completely”

irrelevant to the merits. Cunningham, 527 U.S. at 206.

And this Court has “consistently eschewed a case-by-case

approach to deciding whether an order is sufficiently

collateral.” Id.

GEO argues that the Tenth Circuit applied the wrong

standard in evaluating the separateness prong, but the

standard it applied comes straight from this Court’s case

law. See, e.g., Pet. App. 19a (quoting Will, 546 U.S. at 349);

cf. Van Cauwenberghe, 486 U.S. at 529 (looking to

“substantial[ ] overlap [with the] factual and legal issues

of the underlying dispute”). GEO’s confusion stems from

a misunderstanding of this Court’s decision in Mitchell v.

- 23 Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511 (1985). Mitchell held that orders

denying qualified immunity are immediately appealable

because they turn on a “purely legal” issue: “whether the

facts alleged ... support a claim of violation of clearly

established law.” Id. at 528 & n.9.

The Court recognized that, technically, this inquiry

“involves some factual overlap” with the merits in that, to

answer the abstract legal question of whether the law was

clearly established, the court assumes that the allegations

of the plaintiff’s complaint are true. Id. at 529 & n.10. But

that abstract exercise is “completely separate from the

merits” in every meaningful sense: It does not depend on

the “correctness of the plaintiff’s” facts; it can be resolved

“in isolation from the remaining issues of the case”; and it

“does not entail a determination” of whether the

“defendant’s actions were in fact unlawful.” Id.

By contrast, the Yearsley defense does not turn on an

abstract question of law that can be answered with

assumed facts. It turns on “the actual factual

circumstances”: What did the contractor actually do and

what did the government actually direct? Pet. App. 29a.

And those “actual facts” not only go to the heart of the

Yearsley defense; they go to the heart of the merits. Pet.

App. 26a.

Because the application of Yearsley is so factbound, it

will often—as here—“require reading a vast pretrial

record, with numerous conflicting affidavits, depositions,

and other discovery materials.” Johnson v. Jones, 515

U.S. 304, 316 (1995). “Institutionally speaking,” that is

ordinarily the work of trial judges. Id. And it means that

Yearsley appeals are likely to “consume inordinate

amounts of appellate time.” Id. If contractors are

permitted to take interlocutory appeals of the Yearsley

- 24 defense, that means that appeals courts will have to

conduct this time-consuming task up to three times in the

same case—once on a motion to dismiss, once at summary

judgment, and once after trial. Id. Each time, the court is

likely to be faced with “approximately” the same issue, but

on a record just different enough that the court must

“canvass the record” “once again.” Id. And because the

defense is so factbound, “interlocutory appeals are less

likely to bring important error-correcting benefits.” Id.

It is these “considerations of delay, comparative

expertise of trial and appellate courts, and wise use of

appellate resources” that underlie the requirement that a

collateral order be “completely separate from the merits.”

Id. at 317. Yearsley orders do not satisfy that

requirement.

GEO suggests (at 25) that the separateness prong is

necessarily satisfied if the Yearsley defense is an

immunity from suit. As explained above, Yearsley isn’t an

immunity from suit. But either way, this Court has held

that even orders denying immunity from suit cannot be

collaterally appealed if they are enmeshed with the merits.

See Johnson, 515 U.S. at 315, 317-18 (rejecting collateralorder argument because despite an “interest in avoiding

trial, we can find no separability”).

Nothing more is needed to conclude that the decision

below is correct.

2. Because interlocutory orders are not immediately

appealable if they fail even one of the collateral order

requirements, the lower court had no need to determine

whether Yearsley orders satisfy the other two. And this

Court need not answer that question to deny certiorari.

- 25 But, to be clear, Yearsley orders do not meet the other

requirements either. Collateral orders must resolve an

“important question” that is “effectively unreviewable

upon final judgment.” Digit. Equip., 511 U.S. at 869. And

an order rejecting a defense to liability is the

quintessential example of a decision that can be reviewed

effectively after judgment. See, e.g., Swint v. Chambers

Cnty. Comm’n, 514 U.S. 35, 43 (1995). If the district court

gets it wrong, the court of appeals can simply reverse; the

defendant’s right to avoid liability remains intact. See id.

GEO asserts (at 19) that the Yearsley defense is not a

defense to liability, but rather an immunity from suit akin

to presidential immunity or the right not to be tried twice

for the same crime. According to GEO, Yearsley provides

government contractors the right not to stand trial at all,

which can’t be vindicated after final judgment. This

argument fails twice over.

First, although the Yearsley defense is sometimes

called an immunity, Yearsley makes plain that it is a

defense to liability, not an immunity from suit: “[T]here is

no liability on the part of the contractor for executing [the

government’s] will.” 309 U.S. at 21 (emphasis added).

Nowhere does Yearsley afford government contractors a

right not to stand trial. Indeed, Yearsley itself was decided

on appeal from a jury verdict. Cf. Digit. Equip., 511 U.S.

at 873 (warning that “claims of a right not to be tried”

should be viewed “with skepticism, if not a jaundiced

eye”).

GEO argues (at 21-22) that contractors share in the

federal government’s immunity from suit, unless they

“lose[]” that immunity by violating “the government’s

instructions.” But this Court has repeatedly held

otherwise: There is “no authority for the notion” that

- 26 contractors ever “acquire the Government’s embracive

immunity.” Campbell-Ewald, 577 U.S. at 166. A

company’s “contract with the” government does not allow

it to “acquire[] the sovereign’s immunity from suit.” Id. at

168-69; see also Sloan Shipyards, 258 U.S. at 567-68 (“In

general the United States cannot be sued for a tort, but its

immunity does not extend to those that acted in its

name.”).7

GEO invokes Filarsky v. Delia, which held that a

lawyer temporarily retained by the government was

entitled to seek qualified immunity. 566 U.S. 377, 393-94

(2012). But, again, qualified immunity is an entirely

different defense that doesn’t even apply to private

corporations like GEO. See Richardson v. McKnight,

521 U.S. 399 (1997). And this Court has already rejected

the argument that Filarsky supports the contention that

government contractors share in the United States’

immunity from suit. See Campbell-Ewald, 577 U.S. at 167.

Second, even if the Yearsley defense were a right not

to stand trial, not all “orders denying an asserted right to

avoid the burdens of trial qualify” for the collateral order

doctrine. Will, 546 U.S. at 352. “[I]t is not mere avoidance

of a trial, but avoidance of a trial that would imperil a

substantial public interest, that counts when asking

whether an order is effectively unreviewable if review is to

7

Campbell-Ewald did state that contractors “obtain certain

immunity in connection with [their] work” for the government. 577

U.S. at 166. But it rejects the notion that a company’s “status as a

federal contractor renders it immune from suit.” Id. Some who work

for the government are entitled to qualified immunity (a defense that

is not at issue here). Id. at 167. And, under Yearsley, contractors have

a defense to “liability” for acts performed at the government’s

direction. Id. (emphasis added). But neither doctrine, the Court held,

supports a claim to “derivative sovereign immunity.” Id. at 166-67.

- 27 be left until later.” Id. at 353 (emphasis added); see also

Johnson, 515 U.S. at 318 (denying collateral-order appeal,

despite right at issue being immunity from suit).

The cases that satisfy this high burden are few and far

between and involve the weightiest of public interests,

such as “honoring the separation of powers” (presidential

immunity) or “respecting a State’s dignitary interests”

(state sovereign immunity). Will, 546 U.S. at 352-53.

Orders that do not implicate such important interests do

not satisfy the collateral order doctrine. Id. Thus, for

example, this Court held that the collateral order doctrine

does not apply to orders denying government employees’

attempts to avoid trial under a statute that explicitly

provides “a complete bar to any action.” Id. (quoting 28

U.S.C. § 2676). “[S]imply abbreviating litigation

troublesome” to the government or its employees, the

Court explained, is not “important enough” to warrant

collateral order appeal; there must be some other

“compelling public” interest at stake. Id.

GEO identifies no such compelling public interest.

GEO claims (at 31) that requiring government contractors

to face litigation like any other company will “harm the

government.” But the government itself has said

otherwise. See, e.g., United States Br., CACI Premier

Tech., 2020 WL 5094136, at *13.

And in any event, the primary interest that GEO

asserts is the exact interest this Court already rejected:

the desire for the government and those that perform its

work to avoid the burdens of litigation. See, e.g., Pet. 31.

Avoiding the “burdens of trial,” this Court has

emphasized, is not sufficient—even for the government

itself, let alone a contractor. Will, 546 U.S. at 351-53.

- 28 Thus, not only does the Yearsley defense require the

kind of factbound inquiry that this Court has held is

inappropriate for collateral appeals, but there is also no

compelling interest that will be lost if the defense is

reviewed after final judgment.

3. Finally, interlocutory orders denying assertions of

the Yearsley defense often will not “conclusively resolve”

the issue. Gulfstream Aerospace Corp. v. Mayacamas

Corp., 485 U.S. 271, 278 (1988). Although in some cases,

district courts will be able to conclusively resolve the

Yearsley defense at summary judgment, in many cases,

they will not. “A district court that denies a [Yearsley]

motion does not necessarily contemplate that the decision

will close the matter for all time.” Id. at 278. The denial of

the Yearsley defense at the motion for summary judgment

stage, for example, may be revisited on the trial record. A

category of orders that will commonly include these kinds

of “inherently tentative” decisions is not suitable for

interlocutory appeal. Id.; see Johnson, 515 U.S. at 316.

*

*

*

Although this Court “has been asked many times to

expand the small class of collaterally appealable orders, [it

has] instead kept it narrow and selective in its

membership.” Will, 546 U.S. at 350. The courts of appeal

agree: The Yearsley defense does not fit within that

selective membership. This Court need not grant

certiorari just to reaffirm that consensus.

CONCLUSION

This Court should deny the petition.

- 29 April 21, 2025

Respectfully submitted,

JENNIFER D. BENNETT

Counsel of Record

GUPTA WESSLER LLP

505 MONTGOMERY STREET

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(415) 573-0336

jennifer@guptawessler.com

ROBERT D. FRIEDMAN

GUPTA WESSLER LLP

2001 K Street NW

Suite 850 North

Washington, DC 20006

(202) 888-1741

JUNO TURNER

DAVID SELIGMAN

ALEXANDER HOOD

RACHEL DEMPSEY

TOWARDS JUSTICE

PO Box 371680

Denver, CO 80237

(720) 248-8426

MICHAEL SCIMONE

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Counsel for Respondents

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Respondents Brief — The GEO Group, Inc., Petitioner v. Alejandro Menocal, et al. | Frix