Amicus Curiae Brief — The Gym 24/7 Fitness, LLC, Petitioner v. Michigan
Supreme Court briefFeb 13, 2025
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Nos. 24-754, 24-757
In the
Supreme Court of the United States
MOUNT CLEMENS RECREATIONAL BOWL, INC., et al.,
Petitioners,
v.
ELIZABETH HERTEL, DIRECTOR,
MICHIGAN DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH
AND HUMAN SERVICES, et al.,
Respondents.
THE GYM 24/7 FITNESS, LLC,
Petitioner,
v.
MICHIGAN,
Respondent.
On Petitions for Writs of Certiorari to the
Court of A ppeals of Michigan
RENTAL HOUSING ASSOCIATION OF
WASHINGTON AMICUS BRIEF
IN SUPPORT OF PETITIONERS
Philip A. Talmadge
Counsel of Record
Talmadge/Fitzpatrick
2775 Harbor Avenue, SW
Third Floor, Suite C
Seattle, WA 98126
(206) 574-6661
phil@tal-fitzlaw.com
Attorneys for Amicus Curiae
Rental Housing Association
of Washington
335970
i
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
TABLE OF CONTENTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . i
TABLE OF CITED AUTHORITIES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ii
A. INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE . . . . . . . . . . 1
B. INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF
ARGUMENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
C. ARGUMENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
(1) Michigan’s Covid Proclamations Take
the Petitioners Property under the
Fifth/Fourteenth Amendments . . . . . . . . . . 5
(2) Application of Regulatory Takings
Analysis in the Ninth Circuit . . . . . . . . . . . 10
(3) Washington State’s Eviction Moratoria
Resulted in Devastating Real World
Consequences for RHA Landlord
Members and Landlords Generally . . . . . . 13
D. CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
ii
TABLE OF CITED AUTHORITIES
Page
Cases
Alabama Ass’n of Realtors v. Dep’t of Health &
Human Servs.,
594 U.S. 758 (2021) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Almota Farmers Elevator & Warehouse Co. v.
United States,
409 U.S. 470 (1973) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Arkansas Game & Fish Comm’n v. United States,
568 U.S. 23 (2012) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8, 10
Armstrong v. United States,
364 U.S. 40 (1960) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5, 8, 9
Bridge Aina Le’a LLC v. Hawaii Land Use
Comm’n,
950 F.3d 610 (9th Cir. 2020), cert. denied,
141 S. Ct. 731 (2021) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Bridge Aina Le’a, LLC v. Hawaii Land Use
Comm’n,
141 S. Ct. 731 (2021) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Cary v. Mason Cnty.,
173 Wn.2d 697 P.3d 194 (2012) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Cedar Point Nursery v. Hassid,
594 U.S. 139 (2021) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
iii
Cited Authorities
Page
Cedar Point Nursery v. Shiroma,
923 F.3d 524 (9th Cir. 2019) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Cienega Gardens v. United States,
331 F.3d 1319 (Fed. Cir. 2003) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
City of Pasco v. Shaw,
161 Wn.2d 450, 166 P.3d 1157 (2007) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Duncan v. Bonta,
19 F.4th 1087 (9th Cir. 2021),
142 S. Ct. 2895 (2022) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
El Papel, LLC v. City of Seattle,
2023 WL 7040314 (9th Cir. 2023), cert. denied,
144 S. Ct. 827 (2024) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Faciszewski v. Brown,
187 Wn.2d 308, 386 P.3d 711 (2016) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of
Glendale v. Los Angeles County, Cal.,
482 U.S. 304 (1987) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8, 10
Gonzalez v. Inlsee,
2 Wn.3d 280, 535 P.3d 864 (2023), cert. denied,
144 S. Ct. 2685 (2024) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Guggenheim v. City of Goleta,
638 F.3d 1111 (9th Cir. 2010), cert. denied,
563 U.S. 988 (2011) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
iv
Cited Authorities
Page
Jevons v. Inslee,
2023 WL 5031498 (9th Cir. 2023), cert. denied,
144 S. Ct. 500 (2023) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Laurel Park Community LLC v. City of Tumwater,
698 F.3d 1180 (9th Cir. 2012) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Lingle v. Chevron USA., Inc.,
544 U.S. 528 (2005) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5, 6, 9, 10, 11, 13
Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp.,
458 U.S. 419 (1982) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council,
505 U.S. 1003 (1992) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
MHC Financing Ltd. P’ship v. City of San Rafael,
714 F.3d 1118 (9th Cir. 2013), cert. denied,
571 U.S. 1125 (2014) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11, 12
Penn Central Transp. Co. v. City of New York,
438 U.S. 104 (1978) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4, 6, 7, 10, 11, 13
Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon,
260 U.S. 393 (1922) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
R. J. Widen Co. v. U.S.,
357 F.2d 988 (Ct. Cl. 1966) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Rancho de Calistoga v. City of Calistoga,
800 F.3d 1083 (9th Cir. 2015) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
v
Cited Authorities
Page
Roman Catholic Diocese of Brooklyn v. Cuomo,
592 U.S. 14 (2020) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Rose Acre Farms, Inc. v. United States,
373 F.3d 1177 (Fed. Cir. 2004), cert. denied,
559 U.S. 935 (2010) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co.,
467 U.S. 986 (1984) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Segura v. Cabrera,
184 Wn.2d 587, 362 P.3d 1278 (2015) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council v. Regional
Planning Agency,
535 U.S. 302 (2002) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6, 10, 11, 13
The Gym 24/7 Fitness v. Michigan,
10 N.W.3d 443 (Mich. 2024) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
United States v. General Motors Corp.,
323 U.S. 373 (1945) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Yim v. City of Seattle,
63 F.4th 783 (9th Cir. 2023) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Yim v. City of Seattle,
194 Wn.2d 651, 451 P.3d 675 (2019) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
vi
Cited Authorities
Page
Constitutional Provisions
U.S. Const. amend. V . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3, 5, 6, 10, 15
U.S. Const. amend. XIV . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3, 5, 10, 15
Statutes, Rules and Other Authorities
Sup. Ct. R. 37 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Sup. Ct. R. 37.2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Jevons v. Inslee, No. 23-490, Br. of Amicus
Curiae GRE Downtowner LLC in Support
of Petitioners, https://www.supremecourt.
gov/DocketPDF/23/23-490/292269/202312050
93516355_23-490%20GRE%20Amicus%20
Brief%20Final.pdf . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .13, 15
Scott Lincicome, The CDC Eviction Moratorium:
An Epic Case Study in Very Bad Policy,
CATO Institute (Sept. 18, 2020) https://
w w w.cato.org /commentar y/cdc- ev ictionmoratorium-epic-case-study-very-bad-policy . . . . . 14
1
A. INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE1
Amicus curiae Rental Housing Association of
Washington (“RHA”) is a 5,000 plus member non-profit
organization of rental housing owners (single family
homes to multi-family communities) in Washington
State. Its objectives are to oversee the general welfare
of Washington’s rental housing industry, lead advocacy
efforts, provide continuous development of skills and
knowledge for its members, and assist members to provide
appropriate services to the renting public.
RHA represents the interests of rental housing
owners to state and local legislative bodies, news media,
and the general public. RHA is actively involved in
the Washington Legislature and local governments on
any legislation affecting landlords. Its staff studies the
regular meeting agendas of the local governments, meets
with city and county council members, and reports to its
board about any issues which affect the local community.
It is also involved in educating and encouraging member
involvement on issues affecting the rental housing industry.
RHA offers educational programs which enhance rental
property owners’ knowledge and provides different fora
for knowledge sharing and social interaction. RHA also
offers products and services that rental property owners
need to be successful, while encouraging the highest
standards of ethics and integrity for its members. RHA
1. Pursuant to Rule 37, counsel for amicus affirm that no
counsel for any party authored this brief in whole or part, and no
person or entity, other than amicus, their members, or counsel,
made any monetary contribution to its preparation or submission.
Notice was given to the parties as required by SCR 37.2 on
February 5, 2025
2
promotes the value of the rental housing industry to the
community and educates renters about the process of
becoming a tenant and being a good tenant.
RHA, or its predecessor, has also appeared as an
amicus curiae in numerous federal and Washington
cases. 2
RHA’s members were directly impacted by the State
of Washington’s (“State”) eviction moratoria discussed in
Jevons v. Inslee, 2023 WL 5031498 (9th Cir. 2023), cert.
denied, 144 S. Ct. 500 (2023); El Papel, LLC v. City of
Seattle, 2023 WL 7040314 (9th Cir. 2023), cert. denied, 144
S. Ct. 827 (2024), and Gonzalez v. Inlsee, 2 Wn.3d 280, 535
P.3d 864 (2023), cert. denied, 144 S. Ct. 2685 (2024), just as
were the petitioners by the Michigan Covid-19 (“Covid”)
proclamation. The Washington eviction moratoria
deprived landlords like RHA’s members of any viable
means of evicting tenants who failed to pay rent or held
over in violation of the terms of a tenancy. Tenants simply
stopped paying rent. By government fiat, Washington
landlords were required to bear the brunt of the public
policy for the Covid pandemic’s effect on housing. Those
landlords were not fully compensated by local, state, and
federal public programs for their attendant losses.
2. See, e.g., Gonzalez v. Inslee, (Supreme Ct. No. 23-935); El
Papel, LLC v. City of Seattle (Supreme Ct. No. 23-807); Yim v. City
of Seattle, 63 F.4th 783 (9th Cir. 2023); Yim v. City of Seattle, 194
Wn.2d 651, 451 P.3d 675 (2019); Faciszewski v. Brown, 187 Wn.2d
308, 386 P.3d 711 (2016); Segura v. Cabrera, 184 Wn.2d 587, 362
P.3d 1278 (2015); Cary v. Mason Cnty., 173 Wn.2d 697, 272 P.3d 194
(2012); City of Pasco v. Shaw, 161 Wn.2d 450, 166 P.3d 1157 (2007).
3
Whether a regulatory taking of business owners’
property occurred in Michigan is relevant to RHA’s
members now and in connection with possible future
situations governments deem to be crises. This Court’s
regulatory takings principles do not provide clear
guideposts for their understanding by parties affected
by governmental actions or for their application by the
bench and the bar. This case merits review by this Court.
B. I N T R O D U C T I O N A N D S U M M A RY O F
ARGUMENT
RHA concurs with petitioners that this Court’s
regulatory takings precedents are seemingly at odds and
provide a confusing standard that is difficult to apply in
the real world.
Covid-related proclamations like Michigan’s, 3 though
temporary in duration, may still effect a regulatory taking
of property under the Fifth/Fourteenth Amendment.
RHA’s members and landlords across Washington,
for example, as will be noted infra, were precluded by
gubernatorial proclamation from evicting tenants or from
taking usual steps to address failure to pay rent such as
late fees or using deposits to cover unpaid rent even when
a tenant chose to leave the tenancy.
3. That the Covid pandemic was an emergency does not
alter the standard of the Fifth/Fourteenth Amendments’ takings
jurisprudence. United States v. General Motors Corp., 323 U.S.
373, 382 (1945) (temporary taking during to assist with war effort
constituted a compensable taking); Roman Catholic Diocese of
Brooklyn v. Cuomo, 592 U.S. 14, 19 (2020) (per curium) (“[E]ven in
a pandemic, the Constitution cannot be put away and forgotten.”).
4
But the petition filed in this case has implications
beyond Covid. Governments take actions in situations
that they deem to be a crises that impact private property
rights. The principles for analyzing regulation takings
should be clear for governments proposing to take
such actions, as well as property owners. Moreover, the
principles for such regulatory takings must be clear and
specific in order for the courts to apply them.
Amicus RHA agrees with and adopts the arguments
presented by petitioners in this matter, but it further
highlights the real world impact this Court’s regulatory
takings precedents have for private property owners,
including RHA’s members. Review is warranted.
C. ARGUMENT
The petitioners’ petition for writ of certiorari
articulates why this case meets the criteria for review in
Rule 10. In particular, the Michigan courts’ decision in
this case is at odds with this Court’s regulatory takings
jurisprudence. The eloquent plea of the Michigan Supreme
Court justices who dissented from that court’s decision
to deny review in The Gym 24/7 Fitness v. Michigan, 10
N.W.3d 443 (Mich. 2024), is particularly apt in noting that
courts struggle as they attempt to apply Penn Central
Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978),
particularly in light of the lack of guidance from this Court
on the proper application of the Penn Central factors. Id.
at 447-52.
By denying the petitioners just compensation for
bearing the burden of Michigan’s social policy relating
to the Covid pandemic, the Michigan courts’ decisions
5
conflicted squarely with this Court’s determination
that “the Fifth Amendment’s guarantee that private
property shall not be taken for a public use without just
compensation was designed to bar Government from
forcing some people alone to bear public burdens which,
in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public
as a whole.” Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49
(1960). Lingle v. Chevron USA., Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 537
(2005) (“Government [cannot force] some people alone
to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice,
should be borne by the public as a whole” without just
compensation).
RHA will not repeat all of the legal arguments
advanced by petitioners, but will discuss how Circuit
Courts like the Ninth Circuit have struggled to apply this
Court’s regulatory taking jurisprudence consistently, and
it will discuss the real world impacts of the regulatory
taking here.
(1) Michiga n’s Cov id Proclamations Ta ke
the Petitioners Property under the Fifth/
Fourteenth Amendments
The Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment of
the United States Constitution, applicable to the states
through the Fourteenth Amendment, provides that
private property shall not “be taken for public use, without
just compensation.” U.S. Const. Amend. V.4 The clause
4. “Just compensation” requires that the property owner
be put in the same position monetarily that he or she would have
occupied had the property not been taken. See, e.g., Almota
Farmers Elevator & Warehouse Co. v. United States, 409 U.S.
470, 473-74 (1973).
6
prohibits “Government from forcing some people alone
to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice,
should be borne by the public as a whole.” Penn. Central,
438 U.S. at 123.
Classically, a Fifth Amendment taking occurs: (1)
where the government requires the owner to suffer a
permanent physical invasion, Loretto v. Teleprompter
Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982); or (2)
where a regulation completely deprives an owner of all
economically beneficial use of the property, Lucas v. South
Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1016 (1992). But
where an onerous regulation “goes too far,” a taking is
present because it is the functional equivalent of a direct
appropriation. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S.
393 (1922).
After Penn Central, Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council v.
Regional Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302 (2002), and
Lingle, an ordinance goes “too far” where the economic
impact of the regulation on the property owner is
onerous, the regulation has interfered with the property
owner’s distinct investment-backed expectations, and
the character of the governmental action is such that
it is tantamount to a physical invasion of the owner’s
property. A more frequently applied iteration of this last
factor considers whether the challenged regulation places
a high burden on a few private property owners that
should more fairly be apportioned more broadly among
taxpayers or property owners generally. But these tenets
of a regulatory taking are difficult to apply in practice, as
petitioners document.
7
Under the economic impact factor of the Penn Central
test, petitioners need only demonstrate a loss of value that
may be less than 100 percent, but high enough to have
“go[ne] too far.” Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124. They need
not assign a specific dollar amount to their constitutional
deprivations at this stage of the case because they are not
proving their damages, only the constitutional harm. But
that standard is amorphous, to say the least.
Under the second Penn Central factor, the reasonable
investor-backed expectations, the petitioners’ expectations
must be “reasonable . . . [and] must be more than a
unilateral expectation or an abstract need.” Ruckelshaus
v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1005-06 (1984) (quotation
omitted). This factor limits takings claims to those who
can “demonstrate that they bought their property in
reliance on a state of affairs that did not include the
challenged regulatory regime.” Rose Acre Farms, Inc. v.
United States, 373 F.3d 1177, 1190 (Fed. Cir. 2004), cert.
denied, 559 U.S. 935 (2010) (quotation omitted).
While the existence of some regulation may be
understood by an investor, a jurisdiction’s enactment of
wildly more onerous regulatory restrictions on the use
of property can hardly be predicted by such investors.
Some regulation is simply unlike regulations that are the
functional equivalent of a physical taking.
Finally, under the third Penn Central factor relating
to the character of the government action, this Court must
assess what Michigan did and how it affected property
rights: a government cannot impose the burdens of a
societal policy upon a select few. This standard seems
to invite courts to weigh the degree of the need, or
8
the emergency, that prompted the government to act,
in derogation of the property owners’ rights. Almost
invariably, the apparent need for government action will
outweigh the countervailing rights of the property owner.
Even if temporary in duration, this Court has
repeatedly held that a taking can occur. This Court has
“confirm[ed] that takings temporary in duration can
be compensable.” Arkansas Game & Fish Comm’n v.
United States, 568 U.S. 23, 32 (2012) (citing cases); see
also, e.g., R. J. Widen Co. v. U.S., 357 F.2d 988, 996 (Ct.
Cl. 1966) (“Temporary takings are recognized in the
law of federal eminent domain” and require payment of
just compensation during time the government effected
a taking temporarily) (past taking occurred for which
compensation must be paid when federal engineers
temporarily entered plaintiffs land to construct flood
control measures). Such takings “are not different in
kind from permanent takings, for which the Constitution
clearly requires compensation,” because the loss imposed
on a property owner by a temporary taking “may be great
indeed.” First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of
Glendale v. Los Angeles County, Cal., 482 U.S. 304, 319
(1987).
Here, Michigan, like Washington, as will be discussed
infra, placed the economic burden of Covid solely on
the shoulders of the petitioners. Michigan singled out
businesses to address Covid. This runs afoul of one of the
primary policy concerns animating takings jurisprudence,
namely the notion that the Takings Clause “bar[s]
Government from forcing some people alone to bear
public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should
be borne by the public as a whole.” Armstrong, 364 U.S.
9
at 49; Lingle, 544 U.S. at 537. Singling out a small class to
bear a societal burden “is the kind of expense-shifting to
a few persons that amounts to a taking.” Cienega Gardens
v. United States, 331 F.3d 1319, 1338-39 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
In Cienega Gardens, two federal statutes abrogated
property developers’ contractual rights to prepay their
forty-year mortgage loans after twenty years. The
developers were effectively prevented from exiting the
low-rent housing programs in which they were required
to participate while carrying the loans. The statutes led
to a 96 percent loss of return on equity for the developers.
The Federal Circuit found that the government’s action
placed the expense of low-income housing on a few
private property owners, instead of distributing the
expense among all taxpayers in the form of incentives
for developers to construct more low-rent apartments.
Id. at 1338-39. Like the government in Cienega Gardens,
Michigan improperly singled out the petitioners to bear
the societal burden of addressing the pandemic’s burden
on society.
Michigan’s proclamations required that the State’s
Covid policy falls on the shoulders of businesses. If the
policy was as beneficial for the public as Michigan claims,
then it should fall on all citizens alike. Only businesses
bear obligations similar to those imposed on the petitioner
owners here. Nor does Michigan tax its citizens to bear the
true cost of its social policy addressing Covid’s impacts.
Whatever the rationale for Michigan’s proclamations, it
is clear businesses are being asked to shoulder more than
their share of the societal burden of providing affordable
housing.
10
Weighing all of the Penn Central/Lingle factors
together, Michigan’s Covid proclamations caused
substantial economic hardship to the petitioners and
interfered with their investment-backed expectations.
The ordinances singled them out and forced them to
bear a burden that should fairly be borne by society as a
whole. The proclamations went “too far” and amounted
to a regulatory taking under the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments.
Notwithstanding the foregoing, if, as the Michigan
courts concluded, the fact that the regulatory taking was
of a short duration (as the Tahoe-Sierra court apparently
condoned, despite this Court’s decisions in Cedar Point
Nursery v. Hassid, 594 U.S. 139, 153 (2021), Arkansas
Game & Fish Comm’n, supra, and First English
Evangelical Lutheran Church, supra, as to temporary
takings), almost any situation that a government deems
to be a crisis is temporally limited so that a regulatory
taking will never occur.
For the reasons the petitioners have articulated, this
Court needs to provide practical, coherent guidelines for
the existence of a regulatory taking. See Bridge Aina
Le’a, LLC v. Hawaii Land Use Comm’n, 141 S. Ct. 731,
732 (2021) (Thomas, J. dissent from denial of certiorari)
(rejecting “know it when you see it” standard for
regulatory takings).
(2) Application of Regulatory Takings Analysis
in the Ninth Circuit
To illustrate the confusing standards for regulatory
takings and how they play out in the courts, this Court
11
need look no further than to the regulatory takings
jurisprudence of the Ninth Circuit, the Circuit with which
RHA and its members are most familiar. That Circuit has
rarely, if ever, found a regulatory taking in its decisions
over the last decade or so.
But more pointedly apt for this Court’s review
decision, the Ninth Circuit has not produced a clear
delineation of what constitutes a regulatory taking in
light of Penn Central/Tahoe-Sierra/Lingle. This results
in a lack of coherent standards for district courts as
well. Consequently, what may be legitimate regulatory
takings cases go unlitigated, and property rights are left
unprotected.
Beginning with Guggenheim v. City of Goleta, 638
F.3d 1111 (9th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 563 U.S. 988 (2011)
a split en banc decision, the court rejected a regulatory
taking applying the Penn Central protocol5 in a case
involving a municipality’s severe restrictions on mobile
home park rents. This case was followed by a series of
mobile home park cases in which regulatory takings were
rejected. See Laurel Park Community LLC v. City of
Tumwater, 698 F.3d 1180 (9th Cir. 2012) (no regulatory
taking under Penn Central where a municipality enacted
ordinances that effectively barred property owners from
using their property for anything but mobile home parks);
MHC Financing Ltd. P’ship v. City of San Rafael, 714
5. The Guggenheim court recognized that Lingle made the
three Penn Central elements factors in the taking analysis, rather
than a set formula. 638 F.3d at 1120. This analysis only make the
test for a regulatory taking ever the more “mushy.” The en banc
court did not even assess all three Penn Central factors, limiting
its analysis to the element of investment-backed expectations.
12
F.3d 1118 (9th Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 571 U.S. 1125 (2014)
(no regulatory taking where the city enacted rent controls
on mobile home parks that severely limited rents). Rancho
de Calistoga v. City of Calistoga, 800 F.3d 1083 (9th Cir.
2015) (no regulatory taking despite diminution in park
value from mobile home rent control ordinance).
The Ninth Circuit has rejected regulatory takings
outside the mobile home park rent control setting as well.
In Cedar Point Nursery v. Shiroma, 923 F.3d 524 (9th
Cir. 2019), later reversed by this Court, the Ninth Circuit
declined to find a regulatory taking where a California
regulation allowed union organizers access to worksites
of agricultural employers because the issue was not
preserved for review, id. at 534, but the court noted the
temporary duration of any access was not the equivalent
of a permanent physical taking.
In Bridge Aina Le’a LLC v. Hawaii Land Use
Comm’n, 950 F.3d 610 (9th Cir. 2020), cert. denied, 141
S. Ct. 731 (2021), the court rejected a regulatory taking
where the commission altered land use for 1060 acres on
the island of Hawaii from conditional urban agriculture.
In Duncan v. Bonta, 19 F.4th 1087 (9th Cir. 2021), a case
this Court later vacated, 142 S. Ct. 2895 (2022), the court
rejected a regulatory taking in a case where a California
statute prohibited gun owners’ possession of largecapacity ammunition magazines.
From this short recitation of the regulatory takings
precedents of a single Circuit Court of Appeals, it is
readily apparent that in applying this Court’s protocol
for regulatory takings, there are no clearly lineated
principles for a regulatory taking to guide lower courts;
13
it is virtually impossible to establish a case, even when the
government’s regulations are pervasive and result in the
functional equivalent of physical taking. This Court did
not envision such a stringent standard in Penn Central/
Tahoe-Sierra/Lingle. The very imprecision of the three
Penn Central elements forestalls a regulatory taking.
(3) Washing ton State’s Eviction Moratoria
R e s u lt e d i n D e v a s t at i n g R e a l Wo rld
Consequences for RHA Landlord Members
and Landlords Generally
Another example of just how broadly governmental
proclamations can sweep may be seen in Washington
State’s eviction moratoria proclamations that were issued
in response to the Covid pandemic. Those proclamations
intruded upon RHA members’ property rights. It is
difficult to envision a regulatory action by government that
had more profound impacts on property rights. The real
world effect of Washington State’s eviction moratoria was
that tenants refused to pay rent and often held over on the
premises long past the legal termination of the tenancies.
Government programs, local, state and federal did not
fully compensate landlords for their massive financial
losses. This includes enormous financial strain on those
that provide housing for low-income tenants. See Jevons v.
Inslee, No. 23-490, Br. of Amicus Curiae GRE Downtowner
LLC in Support of Petitioners, https://www.supremecourt.
gov/DocketPDF/23/23-490/292269/20231205093516355_
23- 490%20GRE%20A micus%20Brief%20Final.pdf,
(Seattle housing provider documenting $1,270,757 in
unpaid rent in 2022, up more than tenfold from recent
years and paling in comparison to the rental assistance
received from the State in the same year). Reimbursement
14
programs did not make property owners, like RHA’s
members, whole.
This financial strain was borne not just by large,
sophisticated housing providers. It is well-documented
that “about 20 million of the country’s 48 million rental
units are owned and managed by individual” property
owners, not corporations. Scott Lincicome, The CDC
Eviction Moratorium: An Epic Case Study in Very Bad
Policy, CATO Institute (Sept. 18, 2020) https://www.cato.
org/commentary/cdc-eviction-moratorium-epic-casestudy-very-bad-policy.
RHA member landlords were forced to suffer tenants
occupying their land despite material breaches of their
leases. More critically, landowners were forced to “assume
the financial distress” of their renters, without adequate
compensation from the government. Lincicome, supra.
While this may be a legitimate social policy during a
time of crisis, that policy fell squarely on the backs of
only one segment of Washington society – not taxpayers
generally, not property owners generally, not tenants,
only landlords.
In striking down the CDC’s federal eviction moratorium
as an unconstitutional exercise of federal power, this Court
explained the inequitable burden such moratoria place on
one subset of citizens – residential lessors:
The moratorium has put the applicants, along
with millions of landlords across the country,
at risk of irreparable harm by depriving them
of rent payments with no guarantee of eventual
recovery. Despite the CDC’s determination that
15
landlords should bear a significant financial cost
of the pandemic, many landlords have modest
means. And preventing them from evicting
tenants who breach their leases intrudes
on one of the most fundamental elements of
property ownership – the right to exclude
. . . It is indisputable that the public has a
strong interest in combating the spread of the
COVID-19 Delta variant. But our system does
not permit agencies to act unlawfully even in
pursuit of desirable ends.
Alabama Ass’n of Realtors v. Dep’t of Health & Human
Servs., 594 U.S. 758, 765-766 (2021). A social policy to
prevent homelessness due to a situation like a pandemic
may be necessary, but appropriating private property for
that public purpose, without providing just compensation
as required by the Fifth Amendment, is “unlawful[].” Id.
at 766.
The courts’ response to the challenges to Washington’s
eviction-related actions was to find the challenge mooted
by the end of the crisis. See Jevons, supra. Here, again
the temporal duration of the taking resulted in denial of
any protection under the Fifth/Fourteenth Amendments
to private property rights. Washington State, in effect,
commandeered residential landlords, by executive action,
to provide housing to its citizens.
D. CONCLUSION
The freewheeling use of governmental authority in
times of what are deemed to be crises that adversely
impact private property rights is not going away, even
16
as the public fears about Covid ebb. A myriad of other
crises from public health to storms or fires, just to name
a few, will confront governments in the years ahead. This
Court’s protocol for regulatory takings needs to be clear
when governments promulgate regulations that impact
private property rights. It is not. This Court’s review is
appropriate in this case.
For the reasons set forth by petitioners and fully
supported herein by RHA, this Court should grant review.
DATED this 13th day of February 2025.
Respectfully submitted,
Philip A. Talmadge
Counsel of Record
Talmadge/Fitzpatrick
2775 Harbor Avenue, SW
Third Floor, Suite C
Seattle, WA 98126
(206) 574-6661
phil@tal-fitzlaw.com
Attorneys for Amicus Curiae
Rental Housing Association
of Washington
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