Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Donald Evans, Petitioner v. Jasen Bohinski, Superintendent, State Correctional Institution at Dallas, et al.

No. 24-1158

IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

FILED

JAN 0 3 2025

OFFICE OF THE CLERK

SUPREME COURT, U.S

DONALD EVANS

petitioner

vs.

SUPERINTENDENT DALLAS SCI ET. AL.

Respondent(s)

ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEAL FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Donald Aldrigo Evans KU1113

Sci Dallas

1000 Follies Road

Dallas Pennsylvania 18612

received

JUN 1 1 2825

RECEIVED

MAY 1 3 2025

OFFICE OF THE CLERK

SUPREME COURT, U.S^

NO.24-M58

QUESTION(S) PRESENTED

1) DID THE COURT VIOLATE PETITIONER'S 6TH AND 14TH AMENDMENT

CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS VIA REFUSING TO GRANT PETITIONER'S REQUEST

FOR A CONTINUANCE TO WHERE ATTORNEY BOGGS INFORMED PETITIONER,

ON THE DAY TRIAL WAS TO BEGIN, THAT HE HAD A CONFLICT OF

INTEREST ?..........

3

2) WAS THE PETITIONER DENIED HIS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO

SELF REPRESENTATION ?......

...6

3) DID ATTORNEY BOGGS CONCEDE GUILT IN HIS OPENING STATEMENTS

TO THE JURY AND DEPRIVE PETITIONER OF HIS 6TH AND 1 4TH AMENDMENT

CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS ?........ ....... ....... ....8

4) DID THE TRIAL COURT COMMIT STRUCTURAL ERROR AND VIOLATE

PETITIONER’S CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO A PUBLIC TRIAL UNDER THE

6TH AMENDMENT OF THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION.... 9

5) DID THE PROSECUTION EXERCISE EGREGIOUS MISCONDUCT VIA

WITHHOLDING FAVORABLE EXCULPATORY EVIDENCE AT TRIAL OF WHICH

VIOLATED DUE PROCESS UNDER THE 14TH AMENDMENT OF THE UNITED

STATES CONSTITUTION ?..... ........ . ............ ..10

6) DID THE COMMONWEALTH PURPOSELY EXCLUDE MEMBERS OF ()

PETITIONER’S RACE FROM SERVICE ON THE PETITE JURY AND (ON) THE

VENTRE, (WHERE) PETITIONER’S RACE WAS SUBSTANTIALLY UNDER

REPRESENTED ?....................

14

7) DID ATTORNEY BOGGS RENDER INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL

AT TRIAL AND VIOLATE THE 6TH AMENDMENT OF THE UNITED STATES

CONSTITUTION ?............

17

8) WAS TRIAL COUNSEL INEFFECTIVE AND ALL SUBSEQUENT COUNSEL

INEFFECTIVE IN FAILING TO RAISE RECORD-BASED CLAIMS OBVIOUS

FROM THE FACE OF THE RECORD, IN VIOLATION OF THE 6TH AMENDMENT

OF THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION ?......... .....20

9) IS PETITIONER'S SENTENCE FOR THE CHARGE OF PWID UNDER THE

STATUTE PA.C.S.A. 7508 UNCONSTITUTIONAL AND UNENFORCABLE ?...23

10) DID THE TRIAL COURT VIOLATE THE 14TH AMENDMENT OF THE UNITED

STATES CONSTITUTION WHEN IT INVOKED AND FAILED TO ADHERE TO

THE DICTATES OF 42 PA.C.S.A. 9714 ?........... .....24

11 )

(i)

No. 24-1158

QUESTION(S) PRESENTED

11) IS PETITIONER’S SENTENCE ILLEGAL, WHERE IT IMPOSED

CONSECUTIVE SENTENCES FOR AGGRAVATED ASSAULT ATTEMPT TO CAUSE

BODILY INJURY 18 PA.C.S.A. 2702(A)(1) AND AGGRAVATED ASSAULT

BY PHYSICAL MENACE 2702(A)(6), WHERE BOTH OFFENSES AROSE OUT

OF THE SAME CRIMINAL ACT AND ARE ALTERNATIVE PLEADINGS OF THE

SAME STATUTE, WHICH CANNOT SERVE AS THE BASIS FOR SEPARATE

PUNISHMENTS FOR A SINGLE OFFENSE..... ............ 26

12) IS PETITIONER’S SENTENCE ILLEGAL, WHERE PETITIONER WAS

SENTENCED TO SEVENTY EIGHT(78)MONTHS TO TWO HUNDRED FORTY(240)

MONTHS FOR PWID OF WHICH EXCEEDS THE STATUTORY MAXIMUM OF

ONE HUNDRED EIGHTY(180)MONTHS ?.........

26

13) DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR VIA PROVIDING IMPROPER REASONABLE

DOUBT () JURY INSTRUCTIONS TO THE JURY ?....

..27

14) DID THE COMMONWEALTH LACK SUBJECT-MATTER JURISDICTION TO

PROSECUTE PETITIONER ?. . . ...........

.29

15) IS PETITIONER FACTUALLY AND ACTUALLY INNOCENT ?..33

16) DID THE COMMONWEALTH VIOLATE THE EX POST FACTO CLAUSE ?...35

LIST OF PARTIES

( J All parties appear in the caption of the case on the

cover page.

1) DELAWARE COUNTY DISTRICT ATTORNEYS’ OFFICE

DELAWARE COUNTY COURTHOUSE

201 WEST FRONT STREET

MEDIA PENNSYLVANIA 19063

2) OFFICE OF ATTORNEY GENERAL

4) SUPERINTENDENT DALLAS SCI

SUITE 310

1000 FOLLIES ROAD

1000 MADDISON AVENUE

DALLAS PENNSYLVANIA 18612

NORRISTOWN PENNSYLVANIA 19403

3) OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

OF PENNSYLVANIA

1600 ARCH STREET

SUITE 300

PHILADELPHIA PENNSYLVANIA 19103

(ii)

No. 24-1158

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES CITED

CASES

PAGE NUMBER

ALLEYNE V. UNITED STATES U.S. 133 S.Ct. 2152 186 ' rL.ED.2d 314 (2013)........... 23

"A

ARIZONA V. YOUNGBLOOD 488 U.S. 1051 102 L.Ed.2d

1007 109 S.Ct. 885 (1988).

...6 & 14

BASSO V. MILLER 40 N.Y.2d 223 241 352 N.R.2d

868 872 386 N.Y.2d 564 568 (1986)

16

BATSON V. KENTUCKY ,476 U.S. 45 79 90 L.Ed.2d

69 (19$6)..

..... 1.5

BRACY V. SUPERINTENDENT 986 F.3d 274 (3d Cir.2021)..14

BRADY V. MARYLAND 373 U.S. 87 10 L.Ed.2d 215 83

S.Ct. 1194 (1963). ......

.4,6,11,13,26,32-33

BRANCH V. SWEENY 758 F.3d 266 232 (3d Cir.2011)...30

CHAPMAN V. CALIFORNIA 386 U.S. 18 23 n.8

87 S.Ct. 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967)

..9

CULVER V. SULLIVAN 466 U.S. 335 349-50 (1980)....

DAVIS V. ANDREWS Tex Civ App. 361 A.W.2d 419 423...13 & 32

FARETTA V. CALIFORNIA 422 U.S. 806 819 n.5 (1975)...7 & 20

FULMINANTE 499 U.S. at 310....9

GIGLIO V. UNITED STATES 405 U.S. 150 153 92

S.Ct. 763 31 L.Ed.2d 104 (1972)

6 & 19

GILLISPIE V. TIMMERMAN-COOPER 2013 U.S. DIST.

Lexis 17998 (S.D.Ohio 2013)....12

GRIFFIN V. ILLINOIS 315 U.S. 12 (1956)...16

HASKELL V. SUPERINTENDENT GREENE SCI 866 F.3d

139 149 (3d Cir.2017)

19,23,29 & 33

HONOMICHL V. STATE 333 N.W.2d 797 (S.D.1983)....29 & 32

JOHNSON V. CALIFORNIA 545 U.S. 162 168 170 125

S.Ct. 2410 162 L.Ed.2d 129 (2005)

16

LANGARF V. USI FILM PRODS 511 U.S. 244 265 (1994)...35

(iii)

No. 24-1158

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

CASES

■

*

PAGE NUMBER

LYNCE V. MATHIS 519 U.S. 433 (1997)...35

MCCOY Pp-(La.2O16) 218 So.3d 3d 535 reversed & remanded..8

MCQUIGGINS V. PERKINS 569 U.S. 383 392 113

S.Ct. 1924 185 L.Ed.2d 1019 (2013)....34

MIKE V. RYAN 2013 U.S. APP Lexis 5102 (9th Cir.2013)....1

MILLER V. FLORIDA 482 U.S. 429 (1987)....35

MURRAY V. CARRIER 477 U.S. 478 495-96 106

S.Ct. 2639 91 L.Ed.2d 397 (1986)....34

NAPUE V. ILLINOIS 360 U.S. 264 271 79 S.Ct.

1 173 3 L.Ed.2d 1217 (1959).. . . 11 119-20,22,29 & 33

PEOPLE EX REL BENEFIT ASS’N OF RAILWAY EMPLOYEE

V. MINER 387 ILL. 393 56 N.E.2d 353 356....16

PRECKLE V. BYRNE 243 N.W. 823 826 62 N.D.

356 (1932)....28

PURKETT V. ELEM 514 U.S. 765 767-68 115 S.Ct.

1769 131 L.Ed.2d 834 (1995)....15

ROSE V. CLARK 478 U.S. 570 577 106 S.Ct. 3101

92 L.Ed.2d 460 (1986)....9

ROZZELLE V. SEC* FLA DEP'T OF CORR.,672

F.3d 1000 1011 (11th Cir.2012)...

STATE V. GILLISPIE 2026 Ohio 7688.... 12

STATE V. HELMER 211 N.W. 3 169 Min 221 (1926)....2

STRICKLAND V. WASHINGTON 466 U.S. 668 104 S.Ct.

2052 80 L.Ed.2d (1984)....8,17-18, 20

STRICKLER V. GREENE 527 U.S. 263 280 119 S.Ct.

1936 144 L.Ed.2d 286 (1999)....10

STOIA V. UNITED STATES 109 F.3d 392 395

(7th Cir.1997)....4

(iv)

‘No. .24-1158

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

PAGE NUMBER

CASES

STRIDIRON V. STRIDIRON 698 F.2d 204 207 19 V.I.

642 (3d Cir.,1 983)... .32

TOMKINS V. MOORE 193 F.3d 1327 1339 (1 1th Cir.1999).... 1 8

UNITED STATES V. AICHELE 941 F.2d 761 764 (9th Cir.1991)....10

UNITED STATES V. ALZATE 47 F.3d 1103 110

(11th Cir.1995)....19

UNITED STATES V. AUGURS 427 U.S. 103-104 (1976)... 19,23,30

UNITED STATES V. BAGLEY 473 U.S. 667 105 S.Ct.

3375 87 L.Ed.2d 461 (1985)....23

UNITED STATES V. BRUCE 984 F.3d 884 (9th Cir.2021)....10

UNITED STATES V. GOLDBERG 67 F.3d 1092 (3d Cir.1995)....5,1 0

UNITED STATES V. GORDON 844 F.2d 1397 1403

(9th Cir.1988)....10

WAYNE R. LAFAVE SUBSTANTIAL CRIMINAL LAW

1.2(d) at 17 (2003)....25

WEAVER V. GRAHAM 450 U.S. 24 30 (1991)....35

WEAVER V. MASSACHUSETTES 137 S.Ct. 1899 1907 198

L.Ed.2d 420 (2017)....9,17,28-29

WILSON V. BEARD 589 F.3d 651 664 (3d Cir.2 09)....4,11

STATE CASES

Commonwealth v. Aaron Bradley appellant Supreme

Court of PA 2021 Pa. Lexis 3819 No.37 EAP 2020...

3

Commonwealth v. El 602 Pa. 126 977 A.2d

1158 1162-63 (PA.2009)....4,7

Commonwealth v. Fennel 105 A.3d 13 (PA.2014)....24,27

Commonwealth v. Greene 2009 Pa. Super. Lexis

4990 (PA.Super.Ct.2009)....24

Commonwealth v. Houtz 2004 Super. 0

856 A.2d 119 122 (PA.Super.Ct.2004)....7

(v)

No. 24 — 11 58. .

......

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

CASES

PAGE NUMBER

Commonwealth v. McGill 574 832 1014 (2003)....20

Commonwealth v. Motley Superior Court of PA

2018 Pa. Super. 8;A.3d 960;2018....25

Commonwealth v. Owens 649 A.2d Super. (1994)....26 & 27

Coimmonwealth v. Rhoads 431 Pa. Super. 437 (1994)....26

Commonwealth v. Watson 945 A.2d 174 178-79

(Pa.Super.2008)....24

STATUTES

42 PA.C.S. 9541-9546

Pennsylvania Constitution Article I, Section 9

United States Constitution, Amendment VI

United States Constitution, Amendment VIII

United States Constitution, Amendment VIV

RULES

PA R. CRIM P. 573

(vi)

No. 24-1 1 58

IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Petitioner respectfully prays that a writ of certiorari issue to review.the judgment below.

OPINIONS BELOW

For cases from federal courts:

The opinion of the United States court of appeals appears at Appendix £

the petition and is

reported at 0. A’ Mo • II

;; or

[ ] has been designated for publication but is not yet reported; or,

[ ] is unpublished.

The opinion of the United States district court appears at Appendix JZ) to

the petition and is

[^f reported at 2. »

- C.\Z-; or

[ ] has been designated for publication but is not yet reported; or,

[ ] is unpublished.

[vf For cases from state courts:

z>

Superior (aid PA

202.)

[vf reported at S-G EGA 7,02,0

CP-2.3-0^-6772^2; or

[ ] has been designated for pubheation but is not yet reported; or,

[ ] is unpublished.

o? Common. ) /<sdS

[ reported at 56 £DA 2,020 CP-2.3 -<2^-679- ZO/2 ; or

[ ] has been designated for publication but is not yet reported; or,

[ ] is unpublished.

Vi i

to

'No.. 24-1 1 58

JURISDICTION

[vf^For cases from federal courts:

The date On which the United States Court of Appeals decided my case

was

O cfohpc Ll f 20 2 H_______

[ ] No petition for rehearing was timely filed in my case.

[

A timely petition for rehearing was denied by the United States Court of

Appeals on the following date: 7~\gce/T) Aer

2.o2A{ , and a copy of the

Order denying rehearing appears at Appendix

F

[■xf An extension of time to file the petition for a writ of certiorari was granted

to and including Ajo >

Q-OZS (date) on AfacA I'S} ZCAS

(date)

in Application No.

The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1).

HFor cases from state courts:

The date on which the highest state court decided my case was

A copy of that decision appears at Appendix

VA .

[ ] A timely petition for rehearing was thereafter denied on the following date:

______ //A

and a copy of the order denying rehearing

appears at Appendix , X/A .

, [ ] An extension of time to file the petition for a writ of certiorari was granted

to and including

Aa.

(date) on

a//A(date) in

Application No. Wa A X/A- .

The jurisdiction of the Court is invoked under 28 U.S.C. § 1257(a).

(viii)

CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISION INVOLVED

18 PA.C.S. 2702(A)(1)(F)(1)

18 PA.C.S. 2702(A)(1)(F)(1)

18 PA.C.S. 2702(A)(3)(F2)

18 PA.C.S. 2702(A)(6)(F2)

75 PAiC.S. 3733(A)(F3)

■ -A/

35 'PAiC.S. 780-113(A)(30)(F)

'18 PA.C.S. 5104 (M@)

18 PA.C.S. 2705(A)(3)(M2)

75 PA.C.S. 3743 (M2)

18 PA.C.S. 7508

42 PA.C.S. 9714

(ix)

No. 24-1158

TABLE OF CONTENTS

QUESTIONS PRESENTED.(i)(ii)

LIST OF PARTIES....(ii)

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES..;.(iii)-(vi)

STATUTES AND RULES....(vi)

OPINIONS BELOW....(vii)

JURISDICTION....(viii)

CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED.. .(ix)

STATEMENT OF THE CASE....1

REASONS FOR GRANTING"WRIT....3

CONCLUSION....35

INDEX TO APPENDICIES

Concise Statement of Matters Complained of on Appeal..Appendix"A"

Superior Court 56 EDA 2020 Opinion....Appendix "B"

Superior Court 56 EDA 2020 Request for Discovery..Appendix "C"

Civil Action No. 21-5474 Order...

pendix "D"

3rd Circuit Court of Appeals Order....Appendix "E"

3rd Circuit Court of Appeals Sur petition Re Hearing..Appendix"F"

(x)

No. 24-1J 58

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

On 10/25/2011 at (12:03 PM))) an ANONYMOUS call was placed

to Prospect Park PD*

Subsequently Chief Engel received a radio

call and responded to the 600 block of Pennsylvania avenue.

Engel pulled his vehicle alongside Petitioner’s driver's side

car door. Officer Boseman pulled his vehicle in front of

Petitioner's front bumper and Officer Hoover, accompanied by

several officers, positioned their vehicles behind one another.

Petitioner turned his vehicle off and attempted to hand Chief

Engel vehicle documents/insurance and valid drivers license,

however, Engel did not accept them. From Petitioner's peripheral

view, he observed officers' arming themselves of which caused

Petitioner to panick. Petitioner turned the ignition back on

and attempted to drive away from officers in reverse. Boseman

is to have conducted a controlled vehicle interruption causing

Petitioner's'vehicle to strike the curb and spin out of control

striking vehicles near an auto body shop. When Petitioner's

vehicle stalled, a projectile struck Petitioner's driver's side

window and exit through the passenger window. Petitioner exit

his vehicle, ran into the hood of his car falling to the ground.

Two Garen Employees pursued Petitioner as he ran across Chester

Pike highway and on to the CVS parking lot. Engel drove to

Petitioner's vehicle to check on the passenger for possible

injuries, of which was the end of his involvement.

Officer

Rafter of Norwood PD jumped the curb near Summit avenue and

jammed on the brakes nearly running Petitioner over with his

■1

No.24-1158

vehicle. Petitioner surrendered via kneeling down and lay. flat

across a grass area. Garen Employees watched Petitioner until

police arrived. Petitioner was handcuffed, shot in the back

of the head with a taser, and subsequently assaulted by police

and Garen Employees. Incident to arrest, Hoover conducted a

search and seized $1,264.00 from Petitioner. Boseman is to have

found a green leather jacket, took it to the police station,

searched the pockets and found drugs. Petitioner and passenger/

VanVladricken was transported to the police station and placed

in holding cells. EMS personnel from Taylor hospital located

Petitioner and VanVladricken at the police station to check

for possible injuries. One of EMS personnel followed a blood

trail to Petitioner's cell, and found Petitioner laying on the

floor in a pool of blood. EMS demanded that Petitioner be

transported to the hospital to be treated for injuries.

Subsequently, Petitioner was placed on a stretcher and taken

to Taylor hospital. Magisterial Judge Lippart traveled to

Taylor hospital and arraigned Petitioner while he was handcuffed

to a bedrail. Petitioner was charged with the following:

Manufacture Delivery or Possession with Intent to Manufacture

or Deliver(PWID), Intentional Possession of Controlled Substance

(K&I), Aggravated Assault, Recklessly Endangering Another Person

(8 counts), Fleeing or Attempting to allude an Officer, Simple

Assault (2 counts) Resisting Arrest, Accidents.Involving Damage

Attended Vehicle/Property (2 counts), Reckless Driving,

Accident Damage to Unattended Vehicle or Property (2 counts),

-2-

No.24-1158

Attempted-Criminal Homicide, Aggravated Assault(A)(1), Aggravated

Assault(A)(2), Aggravated Assault(A)(3) and Aggravated Assault

(A)(6) (1 count each) relating to Chief Engel.

October 4, 2012,

Petitioner was found guilty of (PWID), 4 Counts of Aggravated

Assault, Recklessly Endangering Another Person, Fleeing or

Attempting to Elude an Officer, Resisting Arrest, Accident

Involvin Damage Attended Vehicle/Property, Reckless Driving,

and Accident Damage Unattended Vehicle/Property.

November 7,

2012, Petitioner was sentenced to an aggravated term of

imprisonment of/from 24 1/2 years to 62 years as follows:

CHARGE

SENTENCE

18 PA.C.S. 2702(A)(1)(F)(1)

:

120-240 months

18 PA.C.S. 2702(A)(2)(Fl)

:

Merged

18 PA.C.S. 2702(A)(3)(F2)

:

Merged

18 PA.C.S. 2702(A)(6)(F2)

:

39-120 months

75 PA.C.S. 780-113(A)(30)(F)

:

78-240 months

18 PA.C.S. 5104(M2)

:

9-24 months

18 PA.C.S. 2705(A)(3)(M2)

:

12-24 months

75 PA.C.S. 3743(M2)

:

6-12 months

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION

I. THE TRIAL COURT VIOLATED PETITIONER’S 6TH AND 14TH

AMENDMENT CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS VIA REFUSING TO GRANT

PETITIONER'S REQUEST FOR A CONTINUANCE, TO WHERE

ATTORNEY BOGGS INFORMED PETITIONER, ON THE TRIAL WAS

TO BEGIN, THAT HE HAD A CONFLICT OF INTEREST

-3-

No.24-1158

Trial counsel explained to the court that he and Petitioner

have always disagreed on how to proceed. (NT.10/03/2012 pp.4)

October 2, 2012, Petitioner submitted a handwritten petition

seeking to have Boggs disqualified. Petitioner explained to

Bogs that he did not possess any drugs October 25, 201 1, nor

attempt to harm any officer. Boggs was informed about police

misconduct, corruption, and various witnesses, however, Boggs

deemed such criteria as hearsay. (NT. 10/2/2012 pp.18-19 EXH'"D")

Petitioner retained Attorney Johnson October 2, 2012, prior

to the start of trial, and had also explained that Boggs was

preparing a trial strategy against him and in favor of the

prosecution. Boggs denied any conflict, and subsequently, his

representation was (forced))) upon Petitioner.

The very next

day, just minutes before the jury was sworn in, ADA Mann

explained to Bogs, that its key witness, VanVladricken, was

found in possession of cocaine at the time of the vehicle stop.

Chief Engel cited her for Disorderly Conduct. The R&R suggest

that Boggs seemed prepared to cross-examine VanVladricken

regarding the Guilty Plea and Citation generally, suggesting

that counsel was aware of its contents Id at 110-11, however,

she nor Chief Engel explained the basis for the Disorderly

Conduct charge or testified as to whether the citation

included other charges. Wilson v. Beard 589 F.3d 651 664

(3d Cir.2009)

Citation-(P9110911-5) was not disclosed at trial.

Brady v. Maryland 373 U.S. 83 87 10 L.Ed.2d 215 83 S.Ct.

1194 (1963)

Detective Lythgoe of the Del. Co. Special

-4-

No.24-1158

Investiations recently discovered the Citation (13 years later)))

in 2024.

It was Boggs affirmative duty to inform the court

of the informations relayed to him by ADA Mann, however, Boggs

invoked his duty of loyalty to VanVladricken. (NT.10/3/12 pp.107)

Adjoining Circuits have opined that the duty of loyalty belongs

to the client. Stoia v. United States 109 F.3d 392 395 (7th

Cir.1997)

On October 3, 2012, Boggs entered a two-fold conflict

asking to be withdrawn, and to allow Attorney Johnson to entere

his appearance. (NT.10/3/2012 pp.3-7)

The court denied Boggs

request, and once more, (forced))) the representation of Boggs

upon Petitioner. The sixth amendment right to counsel is a

fundamental right as it's essential to fair adjudication.

U.S. Goldberg 67 F.3d 1092 (3d Cir.1995)

The only evidence

of the case was a green leather jacket alleged to have contained

3.6 grams of cocaine. (NT.05/15/2012 pp.8 EXHIBIT "B")

After

the Suppression hearing concluded, Petitioner retained Nasurat

Rasheed esquire. Subsequently, Petitioner was summoned to

appear for Civil matter MJ-3244-cv-00001 56-2012.

The civil ■

matter arose from the 10/25/11 incident, and Insurance agents

opined that the Prospect Park police were soley responsible

for what occurred.

Judge Coll scheduled the criminal trial-

for September 24, 2012 9:00 AM.

Judge Lippart scheduled the

civil matter for September 24, 2012 1:00 PM.

Attorney Boggs

and Rasheed were informed of the scheduling conflicts.

Request for a continuance was made, but neither court would

grant Petitioner's request. Petitioner obtained medical

-5-

records

No.24-1158

from Taylor hospital in efforts to (prove))) and prepare a

defense surrounding police misconduct/corruption.

Boggs gave

ADA Mann Petitioner's medical records, whom in turn provided

fraudulent expert testimony, and subsequently lost/misplaced

and/or possibly destroyed the records. Arizona v. Youngblood

488 U.S. 51 109 S.Ct. 33 102 L.Ed.2d 281;also see Giglio v.

United States 405 U.S. 150 153 92 S.Ct. 763 31 L.Ed.2d 104

(1972).

The Prospect Park PD Insurance claim was withheld at

trial. (NT.11/7/2012 pp.63) Brady v. MAryland 373 U.S. 83 87

10 L.Ed.2d 215 83 S.Ct. 1194 (1963).

ADA MAnn opt to introduce

and place into evidence, for the very first time, the Prospect

Park PD Insurance claim, at Petitioner's November 7, 2012

sentencing.

The defense was not provided a copy of the claim

in order to xerox/photoraph and/or inspect.

An actual conflict

did exist between trial counsel and Petitioner.

The standard

for analyzing claims of attorney conflict of interest derives

from the United States Supreme Court's opinion in Culver v.

Sullivan 466 U.S. 335 349-50 (1980). The Commonwealth violate

Petitioner's 6th and 14th amendment rights U.S.C. via refusing

to grant a continuance premised upon the surrounding

circumstances.

II. PETITIONER WAS DENIED HIS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO

SELF REPRESENTATION

When Judge Coll refused to allow Johnson to enter his

appearance, Petitioner placed on-the-record, that he

-6-

No?24-1 1 58

"did not want Attorney Boggs representing him." (NT.10/3/12

pp.12 EXHIBIT "Q") Faretta v. California 422 U.S. 806 819 n.15

(1975)

Supreme Court has reasoned that because the right to

self-representation serves to affirm a defendant’s personal

autonomy an indeed, is "a right when exercised usually increases

the likelihood of a trial outcome unfavorable to the defendant,

its denial is not amenable to harmless error analysis. The

right is either respected or denied; it’s deprivation cannot

(ever) be harmless.

Likewise, the rule that defendant is not

required to have counsel (forced))) upon his is true on appeal

an leads to the recognition that all defendants have the basic

right to address the court with pro se brief.

The Sixth

Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and Article I, Section Nine

of the Pennsylvania Constitution (guarantee))) the right to

self■‘representation when a (sic) Appellant makes a knowingly

and intelligent waiver to assistance of counsel. See Pa. Const,

amend VI; Commonwealth v. Houtz, 2004 Pa. Super 300 856 A.2d

119 122 (Pa.Super. Ct.2004).

In fact, "where a defendant

knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently seeks to waive his

right to counsel, the court...must allow the individual to

proceed pro se." Commonwealth v. El, 602 Pa. 126 977 A. 2d H58

1162-63 (Pa.2009) In this case, appellant insisted upon his

constitutional right to self-representation, an he was properly

(colloquied))) by the court with the (2018 U.S. Dist. Lexis

16) Court's standard colloquy.

The Court did not inquire

-7-

No.24-1158

into appellant's mental health in the colloquy because no

*

/

mental illness was apparent and none was raised by a party..'

Therefore, the Court maintains that its colloquy was clear and

sufficient under the circumstances. Judge Coll did not affbrd

Petitioner any colloquy thereof. (NT.10/3/2012 pp.12 EXH'"Q")

The Commonwealth infringed upon Petitioner's 6th and Mth

amendmenty constitutional rights.

III. ATTORNEY BOGGS CONCEDED GUILT WITHIN HIS OPENING

STATEMENTS, TO THE JURY, OF WHICH DEPRIVED PETITIONER

OF HIS 6TH AND 1 4TH AMENDMENT CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS

Petitioner explained to the court that Attorney Boggs was

preparing a trial strategy against him and in favor of the

prosecution. After Boggs learned of VanVladricken possessing

cocaine at the time of the 10/25/2011 vehicle stop, there was

a derelict of duty on his behalf, whereas, as an officer of

the court, he was obligated to inform Judge Coll and declare

a mistrial. Boggs representation was fundamentally incompetent.

Strickland v. Washington 466 U.S. 668 104 S.Ct. 2052 80 L.Ed.2d

(1984).,

In his opening statements Boggs (agreed))) with ADA

Mann, in that justice will end up being a conviction for

Petitioner. (NT.10/3/2012 pp.26-27)

The McCoy court explained

that there must be accorded a new trial without any need to

first show prejudice. Pp

-(La.2016) 218 So.3d 3d 535, reversed

and remanded. The sixth amendment guarantees a defendant the

right to choose the objective of his defense and insist that

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No.24-1158

counsel refrain from admitting guilt. The error was structural

in kind of which affected the framework on how a trial proceeds

rather simply an error in the trial process itself. Weaver v.

Massachusettes 137 S.Ct. 1899 1907 198 L.Ed.2d

IV. THE TRIAL COURT COMMITED STRUCTURAL ERROR AND VIOLATED

PETITIONER'S CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO A PUBLIC TRIAL

UNDER THE 6TH AMENDMENT U.S.C.

Just minutes before the jury was about to retire, ADA Mann

added charges to the verdict slip. (NT.10/4/2012 pp.130-133)

Weaver v. Massachusettes 137 S.Ct. 1899 1907 198 L.Ed.2d 420

(2017).

The jury did not return a verdict for 75 Pa.Cosnt.

Stat. 3743, and Petitioner was released from any culpability

of (Accident involving damage to attended vehicle or property)))

and (leaving the scene of an accident))) thereto.

However,

from the bench, Judge Coll found Petitioner guilty of the

chare. (NT.10/4/2012 pp.144)

Weaver v. Massachusettes 137 S.Ct.

1899 1907 198 L.Ed.2d 420 (2017).

The structural error

doctrine "recognizes that some constitutional errors (require

reversal))) without regard to the evidence in the particular

case." Rose v. Clark 478 U.S. 570 577 106 S.Ct. 3101 92 L.Ed.2d

460 (1986)(citing Chapman v. California 386 U.S. 18 23 n.8 87

S.Ct. S.Ct. 824 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967) "(T)he defining features

of structural error is that it affects the frame work on how

a trial proceeds rather simply an error in the trial process

itself." Weaver v. Massachusettes 137 S.Ct. 1899 1907 198 L.Ed.2d

420 (2017)(quoting Fulminante 499 U.S. at 310)

-9 —

No.24-1158

5

V. THE PROSECUTION EXERCISED EGREGIOUS MISCONDUCT VIA

WITHHOLDING FAVORABLE EXCULPATORY EVIDENCE AT TRIAL

OF WHICH VIOLATED DUE PROCESS UNDER THE 14TH AMENDMENT

OF THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION

Under Brady, "the suppression by the prosecution of evidence

favorable to an accused...violates due process where the evidence

is material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of

good faith or bad faith of the prosecution." 373 at 87. Brady

requires the disclosure of "impeachment evidence as well as

exculpatory evidence." Strickler v. Greene 527 U.S. 263 280

119 S.Ct. 1936 144 L.Ed.2d 286 (1999)

Even inadvertent failure

to disclose may violate this duty, which does not require a

criminal defendant's request, see United States v. Bruce 984

F.3d 884 (9th Cir.2021) Disclosures "must be made at the time

when (the) disclosure would be (2023 U.S. App. lexis 7) of

value to the accused." United States v. Aichele 941 F.2d 761

764 (9th Cir.1991)(quoting United States v. Gordon 844 F.2d

1397 1403 (9th Cir.1988)

The 911/radio calls is in concert

with Computer automated draft reports, of which provides

(precise))) time the (Anonymous phone call))) was made October

25, 2011 at (12:03 PM))).

The (time))) the call was made is

significant, because at (12:03 PM))) October 25, 2011,

VanVladricken, a key prosecution witness, was issued Citation

(P9110911-5))) by Officer Chief Enel. SuppIfementdlxA^g^^dix "a1")

Boggs Attorney Boggs learned of the Citation just minutes before

the jury was sworn in, whereas, ADA Mann explained that drugs

was found in possession of VanVladricken at the time of the

No.24-1158

10/25/11 vehicle stop.

The (R&R) indicated that Attorney Boggs

seemed prepared to cross-examine VanVladricken regarding the

Guilty Plea and Citation.generally, suggesting Boggs was

aware of its contents, Id at 110-11, however, VanVladricken

nor Engel explained the basis for the Disorderly Conduct charge,

citing Wilson v. Beard 589 F.3d 651 664 (3d Cir.2009) A defendant

has the right to face his accuser, likewise, VanVladricken’s

(criminal record))) must be disclosed to the defense. 911/radio

calls, C.A.D. reports and Citation (P9110911-5) was intentionally

withheld by the prosecution at trial. Brady v. Maryland 373

U.S. 83 87 10 L.Ed.2d 215 83 S.Ct. 1194 (1963)

Citation

(P9110911-5) was Newly-Discovered 13 years after Petitioner

was arrested.

The (contents))) of Citation (P9110911-5)

indicate that it was issued 10/25/11 at (12:03 PM))). " It also

refers to Newly-Discovered (Incident Report 20111025M3504).

The Report provides that the Prospect Park PD (did not))) arrive

on the 600 block of Pennsylvania avenue until (12:05 PM)))

October 25, 2011.

see (EXHIBIT "J")

Plainly put, VanVLadricken

was arrested/detained at (12:03 PM))) 10/25/2011 by Chief Engel.

VanVladricken was not inside Petitioner's vehicle (when))) the

anonymous phone call was placed to the police. (NT.10/3/2012

pp. 7'8);Supplement'arlnAppfendfcx/l^a ’’"Jointly an in concert with

eachother, ADA Mann and Prospect Park PD exercised a known

deception to deceive a court.

Napue v. Illinois 360 U.S. 264

79 S.Ct. 1173 3L.Ed.2d 1217 (1959).

The prosecution presented

evidence and testimony it knows to be false.

_ 11

The Haskell

No.24-1158

court made it clear with respect to false evidence and testimony.

In Gillispie v. Timmerman-Cooper 2013 U.S Dist. Lexis 17998

(SD.Ohio 2013), the district court granted habeas corpus based

on a failure to disclose Brady material in the form of

supplemental police reports. When the case came back to the

trial court, the prosecutors claimed they did not have the

supplemental police reports. In State v. Gillispie, 2016 Ohio

7688, the court granted immediate release based on the

conclusion that the district court's findings of fact were

conclusive. These are the same set of circumstances here. The

Commonwealth indicated that they do not have any of the requested

materials in its possession. (NT.0/27/18 pp.18-19)

The

Magistrate Judge found : " Assuming that all the items existed

at one time and would have been discoverable and favorable to

Petitioner — in other words, the first two prongs of Brady

were satisfied — Petitioner cannot show prejudice in light

of the other evidence adduced at trial, particularly the

testimony of VanVladricken that she was purchasing drugs from

Petitioner, Chief Enel who narrowly avoided injury when

Petitioner's car suddenly sped towards him in reverse, and the

police officers' who pursued Petitioner by car and on foot,

arrested him, and recovered cash and drugs on or near his person.

The Incident Report was not published to the jury, and was

discovered 13 years after Petitioner was arrested.

The Report

directly contradicts the testimony of VanVladricken and Engel,

whereas, it does not contain any informations about the sale

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t /

No. 24-1 1 58

and purchase of drugs, see (EXHIBIT "J") citing Davis v. Andrews

Tex Civ. App. 361 S*W.2d 419 423.

The report explains that

Petitioner drove pass Engel in reverse, in that he (leaned)))

up against his vehicle.

The Incident report did not contain

any informations of VanVladricken 's handwritten statement

alleged to have been written while seated in the passenger's

seat.

Detective Lythgoe of Del. Co. Special Investigations

recovered both, Citation (P9110911-5) and (Report 20111025M3504)

and could not explain why the Citation and Report was not

turned in to be processed.

Petitioner was prejudiced, and had

such favorable exculpatory evidence been introduced at trial,

the outcome of the proceeding would have been different.

Del. Co. District Attorneys' office failed to disclose EMS

medical reports, Tire Impression Expert reports, Petitioner's

street files, incluing, albeit not limited to, Prospect Park

PD Insurance Claim.

ADA Mann opt to introduce, and place

into evidence, for the very first time, at Petitioner's

November 7, 2012 sentencing. (NT.11/7/2012 pp.63) Brady v.

Maryland 373 U.S. 83 87 10 L.Ed.2d 215 83 S.Ct. 1194 (1963)

Mann did not provide the defense with a copy of the Insurance

Claim in order to xerox/copy/photograph and/or inspect. The

jury did not have the Insurance Claim before it, and the

informations contained therein would have explained that the

Prospect Park PD were soley responsible for the collisions

that occurre October 25, 2011.

After Insurance agents found

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No.24-1158

police liable for the accidents, the police filed civil action

MJ-3244-cv-O156-2012.

As with the findings of the (R&R),

Petitioner satisfied the first two prongs of Brady. But it is

the contention of the Commonwealth that they do not have any

of the requested Brady materials in their possession.

(NT.09/27/2018 pp.18-19) Such comports with a Youngblood

violation. Arizona v. Youngblood 488 U.S. 1051 102 L.Ed.2d 1007

109 S.Ct. 885 (1988)

In Bracy v. Superintendent 986 F.3d 274

(3d Cir.2021), the court held that prosecutors have an

absolute duty to disclose Brady material. It held that the

defense has no obliation to scavenge for it even if the

material can be found in public records. The defense has the

right to expect that the prosecution has complied with its

obligation to disclose exculpatory evidence and impeachment

material.

VI. THE COMMONWEALTH PURPOSELY EXCLUDED ,MEMBERS OF ()

PETITIONER'S RACE FROM SERVICE ON THE PETITE JURY

AND ON THE VENIRE, (WHERE) PETITIONER'S RACE WAS

SUBSTANTIALLY UNDER REPRESENTED

Petitioner lodged an objection to the Batson violation, and

was threatened by ADA Mann with contempt of court.

The very

next day, Attorney Bogs reiterated the Batson Claim,

(NT.10/3/2012 pp.90 EXHIBIT "R"), and instead of re picking

the jury, the court deemed Petitioner's Batson Claim as a

delay tactic. There were no African American jurors on the

main panel of the jury and members of Petitioner's race was

4-

No.24-1158

purposely excluded on account of race. (NT.10/2/2012 pp.77)

Batson v. Kentucky 476 U.S. 45 79 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986) In

Batson the Supreme Court held that a defendant who is a member

of a cognizable racial group should show facts that "raises

an inference that the prosecutor used that practice to exclude

veniremen from the petite jury on account of their race (.)

Batson 476 U.S. at 96. A judge determining whether the defenant

made a prima facie showing "should consider all relevant

circumstances." Id (Internal citations omitted). Once a

defendant has made a prima facie case, the burden shifts to

the prosecutor to "come forward with a neutral explanation for

challenging black jurors." Id at 97. The prosecutor may not rebut

the prima facie case "merely denying that he had a discriminatory

motive or affirm(ing) (his) good (2018 U.S. Dist. Lexis 17)

faith in makinc.) individual selections."’ Id at 98 (alteration

in original). The prosecutor...must articulate a neutral

explanation related to the particular case to be tried." Id

The Supreme Court has clarified that. The second step of this

process does not demand an explanation that is persuasive, or

even plausible. At this (second) step of the inquiry, the

issue is the facial validity of the prosecutor’s explanation.

Unless a discriminatory intent is inherent in the prosecutor’s

explanation, the reason offered will be deemed race neutral.

Purkett v. Elem 514 U.S. 765 767-68 115 S.Ct. 1769 131 L.Ed.2d

834 (1995)

If the prosecutor provides a race neutral explanation

-15

No.24-1158

the burden shifts back to the defendant, and the trial court

is left with the "duty to determine if the defendant has

established purposeful discrimination." Batson 476 U.S* at 98*

The Supreme Court has affirmed that Batson's procedural steps

were central to it's holding, see Johnson v. California 545

U.S. 162 168 170 125 S.Ct. 2410 162 L.Ed.2d 129 (2005)

On

appeal, Molineux explained that he was unwilling to raise

Petitioner’s Batson claim. (NT. 9/27/18 pp.32 EXHIBIT "S")

Molineux lost Petitioner’s file, and Petitioner purchased

his transcripts, whereas the prosecution withheld in excess

of 300 pages that prevented Attorney Lattanzi from raising

the claim. BAsso v. Miller 40 N.Y.2d 223 241 352 N.E.2d 868

872 386 N.Y.2d 564 568 (1986); see also People ex rel. Benefit

Ass'n of Railway Employees v. Miner 387 Ill. 393 56 N.E.2d

e

353 356.

Petitioner is entitled to transcript(s) on appeal.

Griffin v. Illinois 315 U.S. 12 (1956). The Evidentiary hearing

was scheduled for 10/2/2019, however, the Del. Co. District

Attorneys' office did not provide the (missing))) portions of

transcript until February 24, 2020. see (EXHIBIT "T")

The state

court determination of facts is unreliable if the fact-finding

process itself is defective. This occurs when the prosecution

suppresses evidence favorable to the defense forcing the judge

to make a decision on an incomplete record.

In such cases,

the Mike v. Ryan 2013 U.S. App. Lexis 5102 (9th Cir.2013) court ■

explained, that there is no AEDPA deference. Petitioner is

-16-

No.24-1158

a member of a protected class of citizens within the United

States. The Batson v. Kentucky court made it clear as to putting

an end to purposely excluding member's of Petitioner’s race

on the petite jury and venire. Weaver v. MAssachusettes 137

S.Ct. 1899 1907 198 L.Ed.2d 420 (2017)

VII. ATTORNEY BOGGS RENDERED INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF

COUNSEL AT TRIAL OF WHICH VIOLATES THE 6TH AMENDMENT

OF THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION

Petitioner and Attorney Boggs have always disagreed on how

to proceed. (NT.10/3/12 pp.4) Boggs was informed about police

misconduct and witnesse(s), and instead of preparing Petitioner's

chosen stategy, Boggs formed a fixed bias and deemed Petitioner's

claims as hearsay. (NT.10/2/12 pp.18-19 EXHIBIT "D") Strickland

v. washinton 488 U.S. 668 104 S.Ct. 2052 80 L.Ed.2d (1984)

Boggs did not call any of Petitioner's witnesses. Superior Court

opined that Rothwell's Affidavit demonstrated that the potential

witness existed, was available, and willing to testify at trial,

and that his testimony could have provided material evidence.

Boggs knew the existence of this potential witness prior to

the start of trial. (NT. 10/2/12 at 18) Furthermore, the

Affidavit of Rothwell suggest proof that counsel's omission

(caused prejudice) Id Doc 33 at 34. Superior Court denied relief

and deemed Petitioner's claim(s) waived. Superior Court pointed

out that the PCRA court made the wrong inquiry as to Mr.Rothwell

unwilling to testify at the 10/2/2019 Evidentiary hearing.

-17-

No.24-1158

At the October 2, 2012 proceeding, Boggs placed his (reasons)))

on-the-record, indicating that he deemed petitioner's claims

of misconduct and witnesse(s) as hearsay. Premised upon Boggs

fixed bias, he failed to investigate any and all criteria

relevant thereto. Strickland v. Washington 466 U.S. 668 104

S.Ct. 2052 80 L.Ed.2d (1984) Boggs stipulated to (all))) chain

of custody of all evidence and forged a defense in favor of

the prosecution. Boseman testified that he found the drugs

inside one of the pockets of the green leather jacket (at

the police station))). (NT.05/15/12 pp.53-54)

At the preliminary

hearing Officer Hoover denied seizing $1,264.00 from Petitioner.

The Affidavit of Probable Cause provides that Engel leaned

up aainst his vehicle as Petitioner (drove pass him))) in

reverse. The only evidence of the case was a green leather

jacket alleged to have contained 3.6 grams of cocaine.

(NT.5/15/12 pp.8)

At trial, ADA Mann explained that the police

fourd VanVladricken in possession of cocaine during the vehicle

stop, to where she was issued a Citation.

Bogs was obligated

to inform Judge Coll of the informations. Attorney Boggs made

errors so serious that he was not functioning as counsel

guaranteed by the sixth amendment. Strickland v. Washington

466 U.S. 668 104 S.Ct. 2052 80 L.Ed.2d (1984)

Having another

bite at the apple, Officer Boseman explained to the court that

he (did not))) find the drugs at the police station, in that

another officer found the drugs near the CVS store.

(NT.10/2/12 pp.156 EXHIBIT "G") Tomkins v. Moore 193 F.3d

-1 8-

No.24-1158

1327 1339 (11th Cir.1999)(quoting United States v. Alzate 47

F.3d 1103 110 (11th Cir.1995)

Chief Engel (approved))) Incident

Report 20111025M3504, however, he testified that he was

standing behind the Black Nissan when Petitioner turned on the

Ignition. At trial, Officer Hoover testified that he did seize

$1,264.00 during the 10/25/11 vehicle stop, but failed to mention

it in the report.-(NT.10/3/12 pp.176 EXHIBIT "I") Hoover is

to have polaced the $1,264.00 into evidence time-stamped at

(12:03 PM))) 10/25/2011.

Newly-Discovered Evidence

20111025M3504 indicates that $1,264.00 was seized 10/25/2011.

The Incident Report and Citation (P9710911—5) was withheld at

trial. A different and more defense friendly standard of

materiality applies when the prosecutor knowingly uses false

testimony, or fails to correct false testimony. Where (2018

{

U.S. Dist. Lexis 17) either of those events has happened, the

falsehood is deemed to be material ”if there is a reasonable

likelihood that the false testimony could have affected the

judgment of the jury." Haskell 866 F.3d

at 149 (quoting Augurs 427 U.S. at 103); see Giglio v. United

States 405 U.S. 150 154 92 S.Ct. 763 31 L.Ed.2d 104 (1972);

Napue v. Illinois 360 U.S. 264 271 79 S.Ct. 1173 3 L.Ed.2d 1217

Boggs conceded guilt in his opening statements, (NT.10/3/12

pp.26-27), and at the November 7, 2012 (Sentencing proceeding))),

he remained silent as ADA Mann introduced the Prospect Park

PD Insurance claim for the first time. (NT.11/7/2012 pp.63)

-1 9-

No.24-1158

Napue v. Illinois 360 U.S. 264 271 79 S.Ct. 1173 3 L.Ed.2d 1217

(1959)

The sixth amendment does not surrender control entirely

to counsel. Faretta v. California 422 U.S. 806 819-20 95 S.Ct.

2525 45 L.Ed.2 562. The lawyer’s province is trial management,

but some decisions are reserve for the client-including whether

to plead guilty, waive the right to a jury tria-1, -testi-fy on

one's own behalf, and forego appeal. Autonomy to decide that

the objective of the defense is to assert innocence belongs

(2018 U.S. Lexis 3) in this reserves-for the client category.

Adjoining circuits agree that conceding guilt violates the

sixth amendment. The process of (Discovery))) was never

exercised despite mandatory dictates of Pa.Crim.R.P. 573.

Petitioner did not receive a fair trial, and Attorney Boggs

failed to put the Commonwealth's case to adversal testing.

VIII. LAYERED CLAIM OF INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL

IN VIOLATION OF THE 6TH AMENDMENT U.S.C.

Trial counsel was ineffective, and all subsequent counsel was

ineffective in failing to raise record-based claims obvious

from the face of the record. Commonwealth v. McGill 574 832

A.2d 1014 (2003); Strickland v. Washington 466 U.S. 668 104

S.Ct. 2052 80 L.Ed.2d (1984) Attorney Johnson's ineffectiveness

bottomed from trial counsel's ineffectiveness. Likewise,

Attorney Walsh, Molineux and Lattanzi's ineffectiveness bottomed

from trial counsel's ineffectiveness.

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There were record-based

No.24-1158

claims/.such as the Batson and Brady claims that were over­

looked. Discovery was never handed over to the defense prior

to, nor at trial. The Del. Co. District Attorneys office

refuses to comply with the mandatory dictates of Pa.Crim.R.P.

573. Petitioner has developed a record at the 9/27/2018 Grazier

hearing, in that he wanted all of his claims raised and

litigated so that he could preserve claims for a 2254 Federal

Habeas Corpus. When Molineux refused to raise Petitioner's

claims,

(NT. 9/27/18 pp.32 EXHIBIT "S"), the PCRA court

attempted to appoint Dugan esquire. Before the court could do

so, Petitioner retained Attorney Lantanzi, and expressed the

importance of raising and preserving his claims.

Lattanzi

indicated that she would raise Petitioner's claims, specifically

Batson and Brady violations, see (EXHIBIT "T") Lattanzi

explained that she would provide a copy of Petitioner's notes

of testimony once transferred to Delaware County Prison. LAttanzi

soujit verification from Petitioner but was unable to complete

the process due to new mailing policy within the Pennsylvania

Dept.' of Corrections. When Petitioner arrived at Del. Co. Prison

Lattanzi indicated that she would provide a copy of notes

of testimony at the October 2, 2019 Evidentiary hearing. Lattanzi

condensed Petitioner's claims because she did not see the

informations/claims in the record. At the Evidentiary hearing,

Petitioner reiterated his concerns about the notes of testimony

and wanted to show Lattanzi where the claims could be found.

-21-

No.24-1158

Lattanzi attempted to review transcripts and noticed that

several portions of transcript were missing and/or distorted.

Lattanzi attempted to raise prior counsel ineffectiveness but

Judge Cappelli did not consider the issue, see (APPENDIX "B")

The PCRA court denied relief and Petitioner was transported

back to Sci Dallas.

Lattanzi forward Petitioner's Trial and

Sentencing notes of testimony of which was missing in excess

of 300 pages. Petitioner spoke with Lattanzi and she indicated

that she would contact the District Attorneys office in efforts

to ascertain the missing portions of transcript.

On FEbruary

24, 2020, Lattanzi Emailed Petitioner and informed him that

the missing portions of transcript would be available to be

picked up at her office by Petitioner's father.

All the while,

it was the Commonwealth's intent to deceive the court. As it

turned out, Petitioner's Batson and Brady claims, inter alia,

were contained therein and obvious from the face of the record.

Federal Magistrate Judge found Brady violations, in that

Petitioner satisfied two of the prongs. However, Del. Co.

District Attorneys office explained that it does not have any

of the requested Brady materials in its possession.

(NT.9/27/18 pp.18-19)

Newly-Discovered evidence (P9110911-5)

and (Incident Report 20111025M3504) was ascertained via

Detective Lythgoe of the Spectial Investigations Unit.

citing Napuev. Illinois 360 U.S. 264 271 79 S.Ct. 1173 3 L.Ed.2d

1217 (1959)

Petitioner was handicap toward preparing an

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No.24-1158

adequate defense and prejudiced without the favorable

exculpatory evidence.

Citation (P9110911-5) reveals that

VanVlaricken was detained and/or arrested 10/25/2011 at

(12:03 PM))), and was not inside Petitioner's vehicle when the

anonymous phone call was made. Incident report (20111025M3504)

explains that the Prospect Park Police did not arrive on the

600 block of Pennsylvania avenue until (12:05 PM))).

if

is clear and convincing that the Prosecution presented testimony

and evidence it knows to be false. Haskell v. Superintendent

Greene Sci 866 F.3d 139 149 (3d Cir.2017)(Citing Augurs 427

U.S. 97 96 S.Ct. 2392 49 L.Ed.2d 342 (1976), holding modified

by United States v. Bagley 473 U.S. 667 105 S.Ct. 3375 87 L.Ed.2d

481

(1985).

Petitioner raised the Batson and Brady claims ,

inter alia on PCRA appeal.

Petitioner's appeal was pending

when Commonwealth v. Aaron Bradley appellant Supreme Court of

PA Lexis 3819 No. 37 EAP 2020, was announced .

Superior Court

of Pennsylvania denied relief July 2021, whereas Bradley was

decided October 2021.

The new rule in Bradley (allows)))

defendants to raise ineffectyive assistance assistance of PCRA

counsel at the first instance, even on appeal. Superior Court

noted that "it would remand" otherwise.

IX. MANDATORY MINIMUM SENTENCES ARE UNCONSTITUTIONAL UNDER

ALLEYNE V. UNITED STATES U.S. 133 S.Ct. 2152 186

L.Ed.2d 314 (2013)

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No.24-1158

For the charge of 18 PA.C.S.A. 7508 PWID, Petitioner was

sentenced to 6 1/2 years to 20 years. The statute is

unconstitutional and unenforcable. Commonwealth v. Fennel 105

A.3d 13 (Pa.Super.2014)(holding mandatory minimum sentencing

scheme under 18 PA.C.S.A. 7508...unconstitutional). If no statute

exist the sentence must be vacated. Commonwealth v. WAtson 945

A.2d 174 178-79 (Pa.Super.2008) The maximum term of confinement

for 780-113(A) is 15 years. ADA Mann invoked 18 PA.C.S.A. 7508

and fashioned a sentence in concert with 42 PA.C.S.A. 9714.

Petitioner received twice the term of the (former))) applicable

range of 3 years. The maximum term of 20 years exceeds that

statutory maximum of 15 years. The sentence is illegal. The

Commonwealth violated Due Process under the 14th amendment U.S.C.

X. THE TRIAL COURT FAILED TO ADHERE TO THE DICTATES OF

42 PA.C.S.A. 9714 OF WHICH VIOLATED DUE PROCESS UNDER

THE 14TH AMENDMENT U.S.C. AND SERVES AS CRUEL AND

UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT UNDER .THE 8TH AMENDMENT U.S.C.

ADA Mann misrepresented Petitioner's prior conviction(s).

Philadelphia docket CP-51-CR-0414231-1994 provides, that the

charge of Aggravated Assault was an (Ungraded Felony))).

Petitioner was found (Not Guilty))). ^Siipp^emeujt^al6 ^ppendi^ "a3’")

9714(g) Petitioner's current offense under CP-23-CRr-00006792012, a thwarted attempt to commit an empty threat of force

("a bluff") is categorically not a crime of violence.

In

Commonwealth v. Greene 2009 PA. Super. Lexis 4990 (Pa.Super.

2009), this court explained that there could have been crimes

where the victim only ^suffered or was put in fea-r of only

•

i

■

I

■<’

■

,

■

’

-24-

:

No.24-1158

/

.

bodily injury, but under 9714(g) would not. qualify as a crime

of violence. Petitioner positions, that absent the trier of

fact, but by leislative fiat, for a new categorical offense

based on status, as a prior convicted felon that was not defined

in Title 18 2702, but under the categorical element of Title

42 9714, an ambiguous, new aggravated offense, that was not

pled to the jury, prior to, or during trial, was fashioned.

Chief Engel did not suffer any injury, and Petitioner’s 1991

prior conviction under transcript 5882 provides that the charge

is an (Ungraded Felony))), which does not qualify as a crime

of violence under 9714(g). ADA Mann invoked 18 Pa.C.S.A. 7508

subjecting Petitioner to a 3 year mandatory sentence. Mann had

also invoked 42 Pa.C.S.A. 97U, of which (doubled))) the

punishment under 18 Pa.C.S.A. 7508 for the charge of PWID.

18 Pa.C.S.A. 7508 has been ruled unconstitutional, and ADA Mann

did not furnish a copy of Petitioner's priors at sentencing

so that he could contest the accuracy of informations.

Commonwealth v. Motley Superior Court of Pa. 2018 Pa. Super.

8;A.3d 960;2018. The Commonwealth violated due process. The

sentence is illegal and serves as cruel and unusual punishment

under the 8th amendment U.S.C.

Petitioner is a member of a

protected class of citizens and avers that he was singled out

by the prosecution. Wayne R. Lafave Substantive Criminal Law

1.2(d), at 17 (2003) announced a crime is made of two parts,

forbidden conduct and prescribed penalty. The former without

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No.24-1158

the later is no crime. 18 Pa.C.S.A. 7508 and 42 Pa.C.S.A. 9714

were not contained in the Bill of Particulars, and despite

invokirG the statutes (after))) Petitioner's trial concluded,

the Commonwealth's withholding of the informations it had in

its possession serves as a Brady violation. >Brady v. Maryland

r>

373 U.S. 87 10 L.Ed.2d 215 83 S.Ct. 1194 (1963)

XI. THE COMMONWEALTH IMPOSED AN ILLEGAL SENTENCE WHERE IT

IMPOSED CONSECUTIVE SENTENCES FOR AGGRAVATED ASSAULT,

ATTEMPT TO CAUSE BODILY INJURY 18 PA.C.S.A. 2702(A)(1)

AND AGGRAVATED ASSAULT BY PHYSICAL MENACE 2702(A)(6)

WHERE BOTH OFFENSES AROSE OUT OF THE SAME CRIMINAL ACT

AND ARE ALTERNATIVE PLEADINGS OF THE SAME STATUTE,

WHICH CANNOT SERVE THE BASIS FOR SEPARATE PUNISHMENTS

FOR A SINGLE OFFENSE, WHICH VIOLATES DUE PROCESS

The legislature intended for each (subsection))) of Aggravated

Assault to establish culpability rather than each representing

the commission of a separate crime. Subsection (A)(1) and (A)(6)

of 18 Pa.C.S.A. 2702 merge fcr sentencing purposes. Commonwealth

v. Rhoads 431 Pa. Super. 437 (1994);Commonwealth v. Shannon

530 Pa. 279 1020 (1992). Petitioner was subjected to double

jeopardy. Commonwealth v. Owens 649 A.2d Super. 437 (1994),

and the Commonwealth infringed upon Petitioner's constitutional

right to Due Process.

XII. THE TRIAL COURT IMPOSED AN ILLEGAL SENTENCE WHERE IT

SENTENCED PETITIONER TO A TERM OF SEVENTY EIGHT(78)

MONTHS TO TWO HUNDRED FORTY(240)MONTHS FOR PWID OF

WHICH EXCEEDS THE STATUTORY MAXIMUM OF ONE HUNDRED

EIGHTY(180)MONTHS, OF WHICH VIOLATES DUE PROCESS

UNDER THE 14TH AMENDMENT U.S.C.

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No. 24-1 1 58

*,

7

...

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The maximum term of confinement for 780-113(a) is 15 years.

Judge Coll sentenced Petitioner to 6 1/2 years to (twenty(20)))

years for the charge of PWID. 18 Pa.C.S.A. 7508 has been

ruled unconstitutional and (unenforcable))). Commonwealth v.

Fennel 105 A.3 13 (Pa.Super.2014)

sentence for the charge#

The standard range of

(without))) 18 Pa.C.S.A. 7508 would

have been 15 to 18 months of confinement. Once ADA Mann

invoked 18 Pa.C.S.A. 7508# and 42 Pa.C.S.A. 9714, Petitioner

was subjected to a 3 year mandatoryi??ii?f.imumunder 18 Pa.C.S.A.

7508, of which was (doubled))) under 42 Pa.C.S.A. 9714# to

a 6 1/2 year (minimum))) and 20 year (maximum))).

Plainly

put# Petitioner has been subjected to double jeopardy in

violation of the 5th amendment# Commonwealth v. Owens 649 A.2d

Super. 1994# and the Commonwealth violated Due Process.

XIII. THE TRIAL COURT VIOLATED DUE PROCESS (VIA PROVIDING)

IMPROPER REASONABLE DOUBT () JURY INSTRUCTIONS, TO THE

JURY, AS SUCH INFORMATIONS CHARGED THEREIN WERE UNLAWFUL

AND HIGHLY PREJUDICIAL

.Judge Coll read excerpts from the Affidavit of Probable Cause

(NT. Voire Dire 10/2/12 pp.31 In.1-9 & 12-22). The anonymous

caller was never identified in order to (authenticate))) the

accuracy of the informations;

Petitioner was deprived of the

opportunity to face the anonymous caller at trial in violation

of the 5th amendment.^ The record reveals there was (never)))

any elicit activity. (NT.5/15/12 pp.68)

Petitioner and

VanVladricken were talking Inside the vehicle when she had

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No.24-1158

asked him if-she could buy a couple bags of drugs, also see

(NT.10/3/12 pp.92-117 EXHIBIT "E")

ADA Mann indicated that

the Affidavit of Probable Cause lacks foundation.

(NT.5/15/12 pp.32 EXHIBIT "M") The extraneous informations

presented to the jury by Judge Coll was prejudicial and abridged

Petitioner's constitutional rights to a fair trial. Weaver v.

Massachusettes 137 S.Ct. 1899 1907 198 L.Ed.2d 420 (2017)

Furthermore, Judge Coll improperly charged the jury that there

were (four))) types of aggravated assault "that hinge on and

(idea))) rather than causing injury." see (NT.10/4/12)

There

is no enactin clause for an (idea))) of aggravated assault.

73 Am Jur.2d "Statutes" 93 p.319 320;Preckle v. Byrne 243 N.W.

823 826 62 N.D. 356 (1932)

(T)he purpose of the constitutional

provision quoted is * * * to prevent misleading or deceiving

the public as to the (nature))) of an (act))) by the title

given it. State v. Heimer 211 N.W. 3, 169 Min. 221

(1926).

Judge Coll improperly charged the jury in that Petitioner had

a (motive))) to harm Chief Engel. (NT.10/4/12 pp.123)

The error

is structural in kind. Weaver v. Massachusettes 137 S.Ct. 1899

1907 198 L.Ed.2d 420 (2017).

Judge Coll charged the jury,

in that "although the presumption of innocence stays with the

defendant," Judge Coll conceded guilt, stating,

/

THE HONORABLE MICHAEL F.X. COLL

"And maybe it still ekist at this point."

(NT.10/4/12 pp.85)

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No.24-1158

The. extraneous informations was purposefully charged in efforts

to mislead the jury, of which affected the framework on how

a trial proceeds rather simply an error in the trial process

itself./ Weaver v. Massachusettes 137 S.Ct. 1899 1907 198 L.Ed.2d

420 (2017). The Commonwealth violated Due Process.

XIV. THE COMMONWEALTH LACKED SUBJECT-MATTER JURISDICTION

TO PROSECUTE PETITIONER

Honomichle v. State 333 N.W.2d 797 (S.D. 1983) explains,

(holding, without a formal and sufficient indictment or

information, a court does not acquire jurisdiction and thus,

an accused may not be punished for a crime.

ADA Mann explained

to Judge Coll that the Affidavit of Probable Cause lacked

foundation, see (NT.5/15/12 pp.31-32 EXHIBIT "M")

Mann

continued to prosecute Petitioner premised upon false testimony

and evidence she knew to be false. Haskell v. Superintendent

Greene Sci,866 F.3d 139 149 (3d Cir.20',7)

Newly-Discovered

Evidence (2011125MJ504) explains that Chief Enel (approved)))

the Incident Report written by Officer Hoover.

Jointly and

in concert with each, other, they exercised a known deception

to deceive a court.

Napue v. Illinois 360 U.S. 264 27d 79

S.Ct. 1173 3 L.Ed.2d 1217 C 959). see CS^WI’dnfenta'l Appendix "a2")

Theojibnly)) evidence of the case was a green leather jacket alleged

to have contained 3.6 grams' of cocaine. (NT.5/15/12 pp.8

EXHIBIT "B")

Officer Boseman testified that he found the

jacket, took it to the police station and found drugs (inside)))

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No.24-1158

one of the pockets. (NT.5/15/12 pp.53-54 EXHIBIT ’’F")

Having

another bite at the apple, at trial, he testified that he

(did not) discover the drugs, in that another officer found

the drugs and gave them to him. (NT.10/3/12 pp.156 EXHIBIT "G")

The court is required to determine de novo, whether such

conduct violated Petitioner’s right to Due Process. Branch v.

Sweeny 758 F.3d 266 232 (3d.Cir.2011)

Especially, it is to

assess whether there was "any likelihood that the false

testimony of the Commonwealth witnesses could have affected

the verdict,” which is distinct from the "reasonable

probability standard used by the District Court.

v. Augurs 427 U.S. 103-104 (1976)

United States

The Commonwealth avered

that VanVladricken provided a (handwritten statement))) to

Chief Engel while sitting in the passenger’s seat of Petitioner's

vehicle.

The handwritten statement is (not))) contained in

the Affidavit of Probable Cause, nor Incident Report

(20111025M3504).

VanVladricken did not testify at the

January 30, 2012 and May 15, 2012 proceedings.

Officer Hoover

denied seizing $1,264.00 during the October 25, 2011 arrest.

Having another bite at the apple, at trial, Hoover testified

that he (did seize))) $1,264.00, but forgot to mention it in

the Affidavit of Probable Cause. (NT.10/3/12 pp.176 EXHIBIT

"I")

Hoover indicated that’he placed the $1,264.00 into

evidence (time-stampedz)')) at (12:03 PM))).

Newly Discovered

Evidence (20111025M3504) explains that the police did not

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No.24-1158

arrive on the 600 block of Pennsylvania avenue until (12:05

PM) October 25, 2011. see (EXHIBIT "j")

The anonymous phone

call was placed to the police at (12:03 PM))) October 25, 2011

and logged via Del. Com.

Chief EingeJ-t was first to arrive on

the scene. (NT.10/3/12 pp.40-41 EXHIBIT "H").

What is

illuminating, is that VanVladricken was issued, Newly Discovered

Evidence (P9110911-5) at (12:03 PM))) on October 25, 2011.

Petitioner demonstrates, that he was neither approached,nor

arrested at (12:03 PM))) October 25, 2011, because police had

not arrived until (12:05 PM))). Ihe U.S. currency was not seized

until (after 12:10 PM))), whereas police exercised a controlled

vehicle interruption causing Petitioner's vehicle to strike

the curb and spin out of control.

When Petitioner’s vehicle

stalled, a projectile struck Petitioner's driver's window

and exit through the passenger window. Petitioner exit his

vehicle and ran across Chester Pike highway and onto the CVS

parking lot. He was pursued by two Garen Employees and police.

Petitioner surrendered, via laying flat across a grass area.

Garen Employees stood watch until police arrived. Once placed

in handcuffs, Petitioner was shot in the back cf the head with

a taser and subsequently assaulted by police and Garen Employees.

It was only (after))) the sequence of events that Officer

Hoover (seized))) the $1,264.efo from Petitioner.

The

Commonwealth violated the four-corners rule, of which explains

, relevant in part:

;

'

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No.24-1158

FOUR CORNERS RULE

'

7

I

'

"Intentions of parties, especially that-'of grantor,

is to be gathered from instruments as a whole and

not from isolated parts thereof." Davis v. Andrews

Tex Civ. App. 361 S.W.2d 419 423

Premised considered, Petitioner was improperly indicted. Stump

v. Sparkman 435 U.S. 349 98 S.Ct. 1099 (1997).

The detention

and subsequent 10/25/11 arrest of Petitioner was sta^lr.

VanVlaricken was not inside Petitioner's vehicle when the

anonymous phone call was made to police. Newly-Discovered

evidence (P9110911 -.5) provides that she was detained by Officer

Chief Engel at (12:03 PM))) October 25, 2011. i.e. (the same

time the anonymous phone call was made to police and logged

via Del. Com.))).

The Commonwealth did not have the legal

authority to prosecute without a formal and sufficient

indictment or informations. Honomichl v. State 333 N.2d 797

7798 (S.D.1983); also see Stridiron v. Stridiron 698 F.2d 204

207 19 V.I. 642 (3d Cir-^OBS)

Petitioner abscond prior to the

conclusion of trial, and was apprehended in Camden New Jersey.

It was the contention of Petitioner to contest the accuracy

of informations and/or indictment, however, Petitioner was

deprived of an extradition hearing. (All Discovery))), with

the exception of 3.6 grams and $1 ,264.00 U.S. Currency, was

(withheld))) at trial.

Brady v. Maryland 373 U.S. 87 10 L.Ed.2d

215 83 S.Ct. 1194 (1963).

The Commonwealth cannot claim that

its default was "excusable." Pa.R.Crim.P. 11013 must be judged

on what was done by authorities, not cn what was done.

-32-

No.24-1158.

After Petitioner's trial concluded, ADA Mann opt to introduce,

and place into evidence, for the very first time, the Prospect

Park Police Department Insurance Claim. (NT.11/7/2012 pp.63)

Brady v. Maryland 373 U.S. 87 10 L.Ed.2d 215 83 S.Ct. 1194 (1963)

As it turned out, Prospect Park PD were responsible for the

collisions that occurred October 25, 2011.

The police filed

civil action MJ-3244-cv-0000156-2012 against Petitioner prior

to the start of trial.

Chief Engel was never standing

directly behind Petitioner's vehicle when he turned the

ignition on. see (EXHIBIT "J") citing Haskell v. Superintendent

Greene Sci 866 F.3d 139 149 (3d Cir.2007)

The Commonwealth

exercised a known deception to deceive a court, Napue v.

Illinois 360 U.S. 264 79 S.Ct. 1173 3L.Ed.2d 1217 (1959),

whereas the prosecution lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to

prosecute.

XV. ACTUAL INNOCENCE AND MISCARRIAGE OF JUSTICE

The AEDPA rules governing procedural defaulted claims do not

apply to a free standing claim of actual innocence. Jointly

and in concert with each other, Judge Coll, ADA Mann, and

Prospect Park Police colluded in calculated schemes to deceive

a court. Napue v. Illinois 360 U.S. 264 79 S.Ct. 1173 3L.Ed.2d

1217 (1959)

A fundamental miscarriage of justice has occurred

where a constitutional violation has probably resulted in the

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No. 24-1158

■

*

”

'■

I»

!

'

conviction of one whp is actually innocent. McQuiggins

Perkins 569 U.S.383'392

133S.Ct. 1924

v.

185 L.Ed.2d1019 (2013)

(citing Murray v. Carrier 477 U.S. 478 495-96 106 S.Ct. 2639

91 L.Ed.2d -397 (1986)

New reliable evidence/facts was not

presented at tfial. see (Supplemental Appendix (al)(a2)&(a3)

It is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have

found Petitioner guilty beyond a reasonable doubt* in light

of the new evidence. Rozzelle v. Sec’y Fla. Dep’t of Corr.,

672 F.3d 1000 1011 (11th Cir.2012).

The Police were responsible

for the collisions that occurred October 25, 2011, (NT.11/7/12

pp.63), and prior to trial, the police had filed civil action

MJ-3244-CV-0000156-2012.

ADA Mann vouched that there was no

contraband for VanVladricken to be charged.

However, Citation

(P9110911-5) clearly explains that VanVladricken was charged,

see (NT.10/03/12 pp.114);also see (Supplemental Appendix "a1")

At the time of (12:03 PM))) October 25, 2011, VanVladricken

was detained/arrested by Chief Engel. The anonymous phone call

was placed and logged via Del. Com., at the precise time of

(12:03 PM) on the date of October 25, 2011.

Furthermore,

Incident Report (20111025M3504) explains that the police did

not arrive until (12:05 PM), thus two(2)minutes after the

anonymous call was made. And although ADA Mann explained that

the Affidavit of Probable Cause lacks foundation, (NT.05/15/12

pp.31-32), she continued to prosecute the case based on false

informations and evidence, see (EXHIBIT "M")

factually innocent of the charge.

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Petitioner is

No.24-1158

XVI. THE COMMONWEALTH VIOLATED THE EX POST FACTO CLAUSE

The ex post facto clause is a "deep rooted" protection against

the retrospective application of new laws. Lynce v. Mathis 519

U.S. 433 (1997)(quoting Landgarf v. USI Film Prods 511 U.S.

244 265 (1994). The two central concerns of the ex post facto

clause are "lack of fair notice and government restraint when

the legislature increases a punishment beyond what was prescribed

when the crime was consumated." Lynce 519 U.S. at 441

Weaver v. Graham 450 U.S. 24 30 (1991)

(quoting

Every law that changes

the punishment annexed to the crime, (when consumated): violates

the ex post facto clause. Miller v. Florida 482 U.S. 423 429

(1987). The prosecution misrepresented Petitioner's prior

conviction(s) and applied mandatory minimum sentencing scheme(s)

18 PA.C.S.A. 7508 and 42 PA.C.S.A. 9714, of which was misapplied,

see (EXHIBIT "L") Petitioner's prior convictions do not qualify

as a crime of violence under 42 PA.C.S.A. 9714(g). The

sentencing scheme(s) inflicted a greater punishment than the

crime warrants.

Petitioner's sentencing is illegal and exceeds

the statutory maximum for the crimes charged.

CONCLUSION

The petition for writ of certiorari should be granted.

Respectfully Submitt

Sci Dallas

1000 Follies Road

Dallas Pennsylvania 18612

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