Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Alvaro Quezada, Petitioner v. James Hill, Warden

No.

IN THE

ALVARO QUEZADA,

Petitioner,

v.

JAMES HILL,

Respondent.

On Petition for a Writ of

Certiorari to the United States

Court of Appeals

for the Ninth Circuit

PETITIO N FOR A WRIT OF C E RTIORA RI

CUAUHTEMOC ORTEGA

Federal Public Defender

DEVON L. HEIN*

Deputy Federal Public Defender

321 East 2nd Street

Los Angeles, California 90012-4202

Telephone: (213) 894-2936

Facsimile: (213) 894-0081

Email: Devon_Hein@fd.org

Attorneys for Petitioner

ALVARO QUEZADA

*Counsel of Record

QUESTION PRESENTED

Petitioner Alvaro Quezada is serving life without the possibility of

parole for his alleged involvement in the murder of his cousin’s

husband, Bruce Cleland, based on the testimony of Joseph Aflague,

“the only witness that linked Quezada directly to the murder . . . .”

After Aflague revealed for the first time at trial that he had worked in

the past as an informant, but swore he was expecting nothing for his

testimony in Quezada’s case, post-conviction productions of previously

undisclosed information revealed Aflague’s constant reliance on law

enforcement for funds in exchange for his cooperation, including at the

time of, and “intertwined” with, Quezada’s trial, triggering habeas

claims under Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264 (1959) and Brady v.

Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).

But when presented with this evidence, the state court failed to

perform the Napue analysis this Court required in Glossip v.

Oklahoma, 145 S. Ct. 612 (2025), and the district court overruled the

lookthrough presumption and held instead that the claim had been

silently denied on its merits without assessing the state court’s

opinion. The Ninth Circuit then summarily denied even a certificate of

appealability (“COA”), effectively deeming these decisions “not even

debatable.” Buck v. Davis, 580 U.S. 100, 116 (2017).

The question presented is thus: did the Ninth Circuit’s summary

denial of a COA here so clearly misapply Glossip’s mandate regarding

Napue and Buck’s modest standard for granting a COA as to call for

reversal and remand?

i

RELATED PROCEEDINGS

U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

Quezada v. Hill, No. 24-1797 (Mar. 7, 2025)

U.S. District Court for the Central District of California

Quezada v. Scribner, No. 2:2004-cv-07532 (Feb. 21, 2024)

California Supreme Court (on habeas)

In re Quezada, No. S257684 (Jan. 22, 2020)

California Court of Appeal (on habeas)

In re Quezada, No. B298971 (Jul. 24, 2019)

Los Angeles County Superior Court (on habeas)

In re Quezada, No. BA163991 (May 20, 2019)

U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

Quezada v. Scribner, No. 13-55750 (Mar. 26, 2015)

U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

Quezada v. Scribner, No. 08-55310 (Jul. 16, 2010)

California Supreme Court (on habeas)

In re Quezada, No. S146212 (Apr. 11, 2007)

California Court of Appeal (on habeas)

In re Quezada, No. B190651 (Aug. 21, 2006)

Los Angeles County Superior Court (on habeas)

In re Quezada, No. BA163991 (Feb. 21, 2006)

California Supreme Court (on appeal)

People v. Cleland, No. S117252 (Aug. 27, 2003)

California Court of Appeal (on appeal)

People v. Cleland, No. B143757 (May 27, 2003)

ii

CONTENTS

QUESTION PRESENTED ............................................................... I

RELATED PROCEEDINGS .......................................................... II

CONTENTS .................................................................................. III

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES .......................................................... VI

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI ...................................... 1

OPINIONS BELOW........................................................................ 1

JURISDICTION ............................................................................. 1

CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS

INVOLVED..................................................................................... 2

STATEMENT OF THE CASE ......................................................... 2

A. The Offense ......................................................................... 2

B. The Trial ............................................................................. 3

C. Direct Appeal ...................................................................... 6

D. State and Federal Habeas Proceedings .............................. 6

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT ..................................... 12

Review should be granted because the Ninth Circuit plainly

misapplied the modest standard for a grant of a certificate

of appealability. ................................................................ 12

A. The state court’s denial of Quezada’s Napue claim was

unreasonable..................................................................... 13

B. The district court’s decision not to review the state court’s

last reasoned decision for Quezada’s Napue claim is also

highly debatable. .............................................................. 14

C. Both courts’ materiality reasoning is debatable on

its face. ............................................................................. 14

CONCLUSION ............................................................................. 16

INDEX OF APPENDICES

iii

Appendix A−Order Denying Certificate of Appealability

(Mar. 07, 2025) ............................................................ Pet. App. A-1

Appendix B−Judgment Dismissing Action with Prejudice

(Feb. 21, 2024) ............................................................ Pet. App. B-2

Appendix C−Order Accepting Findings and Recommendations

(Feb. 21, 2024) .......................................................... Pet. App. C-3-4

Appendix D−Order Denying Certificate of Appealability

(Feb. 21, 2024) ..........................................................Pet. App. D-5-7

Appendix E−Report and Recommendation

(Aug. 9, 2023) ......................................................... Pet. App. E-8-91

Appendix F−Order Denying Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

(Jan. 22,2020) ............................................................ Pet. App. F-92

Appendix G− Order Denying Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

(Jul. 24, 2019) ............................................................ Pet. App. G-93

Appendix H−Order Denying Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

(May 20, 2019) ................................................... Pet. App. H-94-103

Appendix I−Order Overruling Objections to Stay and Denying

Certificate of Appealability

(May 10, 2017) ................................................... Pet. App. I-104-107

Appendix J−Order Granting Stay Following Remand

(Jan. 22, 2016) ................................................... Pet. App. J-108-118

Appendix K−Memorandum Disposition

(Mar. 26, 2015) ................................................. Pet. App. K-119-128

Appendix L−Order Amending Certificate of Appealability

(Apr. 5, 2013) .................................................... Pet. App. L-129-131

Appendix M−Order Accepting Findings and Recommendations

(Apr. 05, 2013) ........................................................ Pet. App. M-132

Appendix N−Report and Recommendation

(Feb 20, 2013) ................................................... Pet. App. N-133-158

Appendix O−Order on Motion for Review

(Oct. 13, 2011) .................................................. Pet. App. O-159-164

iv

Appendix P−Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part

Respondent’s Motion to Recall Mandate

(Aug. 19, 2011) ................................................. Pet. App. P-165-183

Appendix Q−Order Denying Motion to Recall Mandate

(Jun. 15, 2011) ......................................................... Pet. App. Q-184

Appendix R−Order Denying Petition for Rehearing

(Aug. 10, 2010) ........................................................ Pet. App. R-185

Appendix S−Order Remanding for Evidentiary Hearing

(Jul. 16, 2010) ................................................... Pet. App. S-186-191

Appendix T−Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part

Request for Certificate of Appealability

(Feb. 14, 2008) .................................................. Pet. App. T-192-195

Appendix U−Judgment Denying Petition with Prejudice

(Nov. 21, 2007) ............................................................. Pet. App.196

Appendix V−Order Accepting Findings and Recommendations

(Nov. 21, 2007) ........................................................ Pet. App. U-197

Appendix W−Report and Recommendation

(Oct. 26, 2007) .................................................. Pet. App. V-198-238

Appendix X−Order Denying Petition of Writ of Habeas Corpus

(April. 11, 2007)....................................................... Pet. App. X-239

Appendix Y−Order Denying Petition of Writ of Habeas Corpus

(Aug. 21, 2006) ........................................................ Pet. App. Y-240

Appendix Z−Order Denying Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

(Feb. 21, 2006) .................................................. Pet. App. Z-241-251

Appendix AA−Order Denying Petition for Review

(Aug. 27, 2003) ......................................................Pet. App. AA-252

Appendix BB−Opinion on Direct Appeal

(May 27, 2003) ................................................. Pet. App.BB-253-263

v

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Page(s)

Federal Cases

Brady v. Maryland,

373 U.S. 83 (1963) ........................................................................ i, 12

Buck v. Davis,

580 U.S. 100 (2017) ................................................................ i, 12, 15

Cullen v. Pinholster,

131 S. Ct. 1388 (2011) ........................................................................ 7

Glossip v. Oklahoma,

145 S. Ct. 612 (2025) ................................................... i, 12, 13, 14, 15

Harrington v. Richter,

562 U.S. 86 (2011) ............................................................................ 11

Kyles v. Whitley,

514 U.S. 419 (1995) .............................................................. 12, 13, 15

Lindh v. Murphy,

521 U.S. 320 (1997) .......................................................................... 13

Napue v. Illinois,

360 U.S. 264 (1959) ............................................................................ i

Wilson v. Sellers,

584 U.S. 122 (2018) .................................................................... 13, 14

Federal Statutes

28 U.S.C. § 1254 .................................................................................. 1, 6

28 U.S.C. § 2253 ................................................................................ 2, 12

28 U.S.C. § 2254 ...................................................................... 2, 7, 11, 13

vi

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Petitioner Alvaro Quezada (“Quezada” or “Petitioner”) petitions for a writ of

certiorari to review the judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the

Ninth Circuit, number 24-1797, entered on March 7, 2025. (Petitioner’s Appendix

(“Pet. App.”) A-1.)

OPINIONS BELOW

The Ninth Circuit’s order denying Quezada’s request for a certificate of

appealability was unreported. (Petitioner’s Appendix (“Pet. App.”) A-1.) The district

court’s final judgment (Pet. App. B-2), order adopting the magistrate judge’s report

and recommendation and denying relief (Pet. App. C-3–4), order denying a

certificate of appealability (Pet. App. D-5–7), and said report and recommendation

(Pet. App. E-8–91) are unreported. The most recent round of state habeas denials

(Pet. Apps. F-92, G-93, H-94–103), including the state courts’ last reasoned opinion

(Pet. App. H-94–103) are unreported.

The remaining opinions and orders are reproduced in the appendix as indicated

in the table of contents. Of those, the only opinion that is reported is the Ninth

Circuit’s Order remanding Quezada’s case for a determination of whether his then

newly-discovered Brady claim was exhausted or procedurally barred, dated July 16,

2010 and reported at 611 F.3d 1165. (Pet. App. S-186–91.)

JURISDICTION

The Ninth Circuit denied a certificate of appealability on March 7, 2025. (Pet.

App. A-1.) This Court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1).

1

CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY

PROVISIONS INVOLVED

The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides:

[N]or shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without

due process of law.

28 U.S.C. § 2253(c) provides:

(1) Unless a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of appealability, an

appeal may not be taken to the court of appeals from—

(A) the final order in a habeas corpus proceeding in which the

detention complained of arises out of process issued by a State court; or

(B) the final order in a proceeding under section 2255.

(2) A certificate of appealability may issue under paragraph (1) only if the

applicant has made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional

right.

28 U.S.C. § 2254 provides:

(d) An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in

custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted with

respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court

proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim—

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an

unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as

determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the

State court proceeding.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

A. The Offense

Bruce Cleland was shot to death in the early hours of July 26, 1997, while

riding home with his estranged wife Rebecca Cleland. Residents near the scene

2

reported hearing the shooting, seeing someone running away from where the shots

were heard, and hearing a car speed away, though no one was able to describe or

identify the car or its driver. Rebecca said they had been jumped while Bruce pulled

over and got out to check on a problem with the car, and that she was knocked out

and awoke to find he had been shot.

That night, Bruce and Rebecca were meeting up to have dinner to talk about

their estrangement. While Rebecca was out with Bruce, she exchanged several

phone calls with Quezada on their cell phones. After dinner, she and Bruce went to

her uncle’s–Quezada’s father’s–house, whom Rebecca treated like her own father,

and she spoke with Quezada a few more times on the landline while she, Bruce, and

her uncle had a few drinks. She and Bruce were on her way home from her uncle’s

house when the shooting took place.

B. The Trial

The prosecution’s theory of the case was that Petitioner Alvaro Quezada, who

was close with Rebecca, and his brother Jose Quezada, who needed money,

conspired with Rebecca to kill Bruce for his money, with Jose acting as the shooter

and Quezada acting as the getaway driver, but most all of the evidence in the case

was circumstantial.

At trial, several witnesses testified that Rebecca was dismissive of Bruce, spent

his money lavishly while cheating on him, had talked of plans to divorce him or

accuse him of molesting her son to extort money from him, and even asked someone

to help her find someone to kill him. There was also testimony that, at the scene of

the shooting, she behaved strangely and complained of being knocked out from a

blow to the head despite having no discernible injuries. But, as the California Court

of Appeal concluded on direct appeal, “[a]lthough this evidence surely established

3

[Rebecca’s] greed and her poor treatment of Bruce Cleland, none of it tied her

directly to the murder.” (Pet. App. BB-262.)

For Jose, the prosecution focused on the fact that he was Rebecca’s cousin, and

that, when law enforcement arrested Jose and Rebecca and put them in a police car

together in the hopes of gathering incriminating information, both parties were

silent. Indeed, this weaponizing of their silence led to new trials for both Jose and

Rebecca, but not Quezada. The prosecution also produced witnesses who said they

saw Jose running away from the scene of the shooting and could identify him from

the back, but they gave several statements that were inconsistent with one another

and with Jose’s physical condition at the time of the shooting. The California Court

of Appeal described the “eyewitness” testimony as “uncompelling.” (Pet. App. BB262.)

For Quezada, the prosecution focused on salacious and distasteful implications

that Quezada’s close relationship with his cousin was incestuous. Because Rebecca

had asked Quezada to move into her and Bruce’s house after kicking Bruce out,

they argued that Quezada had a personal stake in helping kill Bruce so he and

Rebecca could enjoy his money. In addition, the prosecution argued that the calls

between Quezada and Rebecca on the night of the shooting were them getting ready

to ambush Bruce, and that many of the calls closest in time to the shooting used a

cell tower near the site of the shooting. Quezada also testified on his own behalf,

saying that he had broken up with his girlfriend that night and was out drinking.

Though several details of the night were fuzzy, his girlfriend confirmed the breakup

was that night, as he contacted her upset about Bruce’s death the next morning.

And Rebecca likewise testified that Quezada had been calling so much because of

4

the breakup, which the Court of Appeal credited as have “blunt[ed] some of the

more damaging evidence” against Rebecca.

The lynchpin of the prosecution’s case against Jose and Quezada, though, was

the testimony of Joseph Aflague. Aflague was from the same neighborhood where

the Quezadas’ grandfather lived and knew the Quezadas growing up. He testified

that a few months before he learned the brothers had been arrested, Jose

approached him to buy drugs and to arrange the acquisition of a gun and a driver

because “he had to take care of something.” Sometime later, Jose approached

Aflague a second time, saying he was no longer in need of a driver because “him and

Al were going to take care of it.” Aflague was unclear as to the timing of these

conversations, placing them at some point in 1996 or 1997, either during the

summer or around the holidays. 1

Aflague admitted under direct examination that he used to make a living selling

illegal drugs and guns. On cross examination, Aflague admitted in passing that he

“occasionally” worked with “ATF,” “narcotics,” and “different people.” Defense

counsel was also able to establish that Aflague had been twice arrested for

shoplifting, but Aflague claimed that the crime was part of the work he was doing

“on a case” in which he was trying to get close to a criminal. Aflague insisted he got

no benefits in exchange for his testimony in the Cleland case.

Quezada, Jose and Rebecca were all convicted of murder, conspiracy to commit

murder, lying in wait, and killing for financial gain, and sentenced to life without

parole.

1 The Court of Appeal on direct appeal noted that Aflague’s timing testimony was questionable, as he

said Jose approached him about the gun and driver approximately three months before he was

arrested, but Jose was arrested seven months after Bruce was killed. (Pet. App. BB-262.)

5

C. Direct Appeal

On direct appeal, as noted above, Rebecca and Jose’s convictions were

overturned due to the prosecution’s unlawful invocation of their silence in the police

car. (Pet. App. BB.) But Quezada’s case was held to be unaffected by the invocation

and thus was affirmed. (Id.) Quezada’s petition for review to the California

Supreme Court was denied. (Pet. App. AA.)

D. State and Federal Habeas Proceedings

Quezada then learned that Aflague had testified in two other cases, regarding

defendants Padilla and Elloqui, about informant arrangements with total

compensation far more extensive than the passing reference at Quezada’s trial let

on, though Quezada had still yet to receive any discovery regarding Aflague’s

informant status from the prosecution. Quezada filed his federal habeas petition,

raising, inter alia, his Brady and Napue claims, and received a stay from the

district court to exhaust the claims that were not yet exhausted. Quezada’s first

round of state habeas petitions were all denied, with the superior court saying his

Brady and Napue claims were wholly speculative. (Pet. Apps. Z-241–51. Y-240, X239.) The district court echoed these sentiments, denying the petition but granting

a COA on claims other than the Brady and Napue claims. (Pet. Apps. W-198-238, V197, U-196, T-192–95.)

While Quezada’s case was on appeal to the Ninth Circuit, the state finally began

to produce the information on Aflague Quezada had long insisted existed, and he

argued that the court should remand his case for an evidentiary hearing. The Ninth

Circuit did so in a published order, remanding the case for the district court to hold

a hearing to determine if Quezada’s Brady and Napue claims were credible,

substantial, exhausted and/or procedurally barred. (Pet. App. S-191.) Around the

6

same time, Cullen v. Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. 1388 (2011), was decided and the State

moved for the Ninth Circuit to recall the mandate in light of Pinholster’s limitations

on the consideration of new evidence in 28 U.S.C. § 2254 cases in light of the

Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”). The Ninth Circuit

denied the motion, saying the State was free to make that argument to the district

court. (Pet. App. Q-184.)

The district court held that Pinholster did not prevent review of Quezada’s

claims, but he still needed to prove cause and prejudice to overcome any actual or

potential procedural bar. (Pet. App. P-165–83.) The court thus proceeded with an

evidentiary hearing.

The evidentiary hearing on the Aflague’s informant history took place in 2012,

and involved copious documents produced by the State and the testimony of 15

witnesses. The hearing revealed a long-standing quid pro quo relationship between

Aflague and the LAPD, with an established pattern of him being paid relocation

funds whenever he testified with only a perfunctory review of the reasons for the

requests or if he even actually relocated.

Aflague first came to the attention of the LAPD in 1995 when he was the victim

of an attempted homicide. Yet, he received money for the purposes of relocating in

1995, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2007, and 2009. Aflague testified in 2007 that he had

received $25,000 in the preceding ten-year period. The evidence reflected that

Aflague received at least $2,414 during the 1995-1998 period. During that same

period, he testified against both Padilla and Eulloqui. Even more money was

forthcoming in the 1999/2000 period in which Aflague inculpated Quezada. In late

May/early June 1999, Aflague was activated as an LAPD informant so that he could

be paid even though they were having a hard time acquiring relocation funds to give

7

him. He received $145 for this work. He also received approximately $2,590 in late

June 1999, while he was providing the LAPD with information on various homicides

and shootings. On August 11, 1999—within days of providing inculpatory

information against Quezada in the Cleland investigation—he was given $595. And

on July 13, 2000, he was given $3,200 following his testimony against Quezada. All

told, he received around $8,944 from the LAPD in the five years ending with his

testimony against Quezada.

Aflague was also defrauding the LAPD regarding his alleged relocations. In

1999, while he was providing information to the LAPD inculpating Quezada,

Aflague forged a lease document to justify receipt of $2,100 in relocation funds.

Aflague received the funds, but never paid them to his purported landlord. The

LAPD learned at that time that Aflague was not actually living at the Covina

address the LAPD believed it had relocated him to.

Lastly, Aflague admitted to lying under oath at Quezada’s trial regarding his

shoplifting charges. During Quezada’s trial, the sole impeachment evidence the

defense was able to offer against Aflague was a pair of 1999 convictions for

shoplifting. Aflague denied shoplifting, explaining that he was working

“undercover,” “working on a case” that required him to “get close” to the coperpetrator, Marcus Navarette. At the evidentiary hearing, Aflague admitted the

testimony was “not true.” Instead, his involvement in the incident was part of a

plan to make a weapons deal with Navarette’s father. Navarette was closely related

to Rene “Boxer” Enriquez, a high-ranking shot caller for the Mexican Mafia, the

source of the alleged ongoing “threat” to Aflague’s life. Indeed, it turned out that

Navarette’s mother was Ruth Navarette, Aflague’s live-in girlfriend at the time of

his 1999 relocation.

8

At the conclusion of the hearing, the district court held that Quezada had

demonstrated cause for the delay in bringing his claims because the underlying

facts had been concealed from him by the government. (Pet. App. N-147.) But on the

question of prejudice, the court held in the negative, citing Aflague’s shady history

as impeaching in and of itself, and stating that additional information that he had

lied to and/or colluded with law enforcement, as he deemed necessary, for payouts

in other cases would not have materially damaged his credibility further. (Pet. App.

N-153.) On the Napue claim, the court held that Aflague’s testimony regarding

expecting compensation for Quezada’s case was not technically untrue, as the funds

he received at the time were ostensibly for a different case, and the relocation he

received after Quezada’s case was due to new threats, but also that, even if

Aflague’s testimony was misleading, that it was not prejudicial for the reasons the

court gave in its cause and prejudice analysis. (Pet. App. N-157–58.) The Court

denied the petition again (Pet. Apps. M-132), but amended its earlier COA to

include its procedural default analysis (Pet. App. L-129–30.)

On appeal, the Ninth Circuit once again remanded for the district court to

determine whether the claims were exhausted and, if so, whether they were

procedurally barred. (Pet. App. K-119–28.) The district court ordered another stay

and required Quezada to return to state court to exhaust the evidence from the

evidentiary hearing. (Pet. Apps. J-108–18, I-104–07.) These exhaustion proceedings

led to the operative decisions at issue in this petition.

The Los Angeles County Superior Court denied Quezada’s petition on the merits

in a reasoned opinion. The superior court’s summary of the facts started with a

baffling reference to a true-crime retelling of the crime that was most certainly not

a part of the record: “[t]he sad history of this case is detailed in Honeymoon with a

9

Killer, a true-crime book by Don Lasseter (Pinnacle Books, 2009.)” (Pet. App. H-95.)

The court then spent the next several pages summarizing the evidence presented at

trial. (Pet. App. H-95–100.) With regard to the copious evidence Quezada presented

regarding Joseph Aflague, the court summarized the procedural history from the

federal case, but did not discuss any of the evidence presented regarding Aflague.

(Pet. App. H-100–01.) The court then stated, in relevant part, as follows:

On July 19. 2017, Petitioner filed the instant petition for habeas relief. He

now challenges the conclusion reached by Magistrate Judge Goldman, and

accepted by District Court Judge Lew, that the impeaching evidence about

Aflague discovered after trial would not have influenced the jury to acquit him.

He claims the impeaching evidence “decimates” Aflague’s credibility[,] that

Aflague’s trial testimony was false, and he was denied his right to a fair trial.

The Court is not persuaded. The Court accepts and concurs in the

magistrate’s conclusion that had all the previously unknown impeaching

evidence about Joseph Aflague been known to the jury it is not reasonably

probable it would have led to a different result in Petitioner’s trial. Aflague’s

trial testimony had little to do with Petitioner, but focused principally on his

contacts with Petitioner’s brother Jose. Aflague’s testimony that Jose initially

asked him to find a driver to do the “hit,” but later told him that he would be

unnecessary because Petitioner had agreed to drive was brief and unchallenged.

The Court is convinced that it was the other evidence of Petitioner’s

involvement in the murder conspiracy that led to his conviction.

(Pet. App. H-101.) The court further stated that “this Court remains convinced that

full and complete disclosure of the post-trial discovered impeaching evidence of

10

Joseph Aflague would not have altered the jury’s verdict,” and that “[w]hile helpful

to the prosecution, Joseph’s Aflague’s testimony was not essential to proof of

Petitioner’s guilt.” (Pet. App. H-102.) The California Court of Appeal and the

California Supreme Court again issued summary denials. (Pet. Apps. G-93, F-92.)

Upon Quezada’s return to federal court, the parties briefed his Brady and

Napue claims once more. The magistrate judge recommended denial of the claims in

her Report and Recommendation (the “Report”). (Pet. App. E-8–91.) In setting forth

its standard of review, the Report acknowledged that the parties disagreed about

whether 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) applied to Quezada’s Napue claim. But the court

misconstrued Quezada’s argument as one that the state court overlooked the claim,

when Quezada had in fact argued that the state court failed to apply clearly

established federal law to the claim. (Pet. App. E-26.) The court therefore held that

the state court’s denial of Quezada’s Napue claim was a silent denial on the merits,

requiring the court to seek out “any reasonable argument” for denying Quezada’s

claim per Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 105 (2011). The court then

painstakingly construed each piece of evidence proffered by Quezada against him in

a manner reminiscent of a sufficiency of the analysis review. The district court

judge adopted the Report, but also stated that it would deny Petitioner’s Napue

claim, even on de novo review, for the same reasons given by the Report in support

of denying the claim under its Richter-style AEDPA review. (Pet. App. C-3–4.) The

court also denied a COA. (Pet. App. D-5–7.)

This petition follows.

11

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT

Review should be granted because the Ninth Circuit plainly misapplied

the modest standard for a grant of a certificate of appealability.

As this Court reiterated in Glossip, Napue requires reversal of a defendant’s

conviction if “a defendant [can] show that the prosecution knowingly solicited false

testimony or knowingly allowed it ‘to go uncorrected when it appear[ed],” and if that

false testimony “in any reasonable likelihood [could] have affected the judgment of

the jury.” Glossip, 145 S. Ct. 612, 626–27 (2025) (cleaned up). And, with regard to

his Brady claim, Quezada is entitled to relief if the prosecution suppressed evidence

favorable to the defense, “irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the

prosecution,” Brady, 373 U.S. at 87, and there is “a reasonable probability that, had

the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have

been different,” Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 435 (1995).

In addition, Quezada is entitled to a certificate of appealability if he makes “a

substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right” as to either of these

claims. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). The test is whether he can show that any reasonable

jurist could “disagree with the district court’s resolution of his constitutional

claims.” Buck, 580 U.S. at 115. Is the claim, in other words, “reasonably debatable”?

Id. at 117. “A claim can be debatable even though every jurist of reason might

agree, after the COA has been granted and the case has received full consideration,

that petitioner will not prevail.” Buck, 580 U.S. at 117 (quoting Miller-El v.

Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 338 (2003)) (cleaned up).

No jurist could reasonably conclude that Quezada failed to meet this low bar

here.

12

A. The state court’s denial of Quezada’s Napue claim was unreasonable.

AEDPA (the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996) applies

because Quezada’s petition was filed after its enactment. Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S.

320, 336 (1997). He can therefore win federal habeas relief only if the state court

either (1) contravened or unreasonably applied clearly established federal law or (2)

unreasonably determined the facts on the evidence before it. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).

These standards are typically applied to the last reasoned state court decision to

decide the claim. Wilson v. Sellers, 584 U.S. 122, 125 (2018).

As noted above, the state court’s decision was unreasonable in several respects.

First, the court inexplicably referred to a true-crime book written for entertainment

purposes, Honeymoon with a Killer, as though the court had referenced it as part of

its decision making. Second, the court despite listing all of Quezada’s claims

separately, analyzed them all at once, with one prejudice standard, and that

standard was either equal to or more stringent than the Brady materiality

standard. The court does not once mention the “reasonable likelihood standard”

that is applicable to Napue claims, “which asks what a reasonable decisionmaker

would have done with the new evidence.” Glossip, 145 S. Ct. at 629. This is a failure

to apply clearly established federal law. Lastly, even for the Brady analysis, the

court stated that it was “convinced that it was the other evidence of Petitioner's

involvement in the murder conspiracy that led to his conviction.” (Pet. App. H-101.)

But this Court has also emphasized that Brady materiality “is not a sufficiency of

evidence test.” Kyles, 514 U.S. at 434. Thus, here too, the court failed to apply

clearly established federal law. At a minimum, whether the court failed to do so is

certainly debatable, which is all that is required for a COA to issue.

13

B. The district court’s decision not to review the state court’s last

reasoned decision for Quezada’s Napue claim is also highly debatable.

But rather than engage in the analysis provided above, the district court held

that the state court overlooked the Napue claim the court therefore had to search

the record for any reason the state court might have denied the claim. In light of

this Court’s lookthrough presumption, this decision was also questionable and thus

worthy of a certificate of appealability. See Sellers, 584 U.S. at 125 (“[W]hen the

last state court to decide a prisoner’s federal claim explains its decision on the

merits in a reasoned opinion . . . a federal habeas court simply reviews the specific

reasons given by the state court and defers to those reasons if they are reasonable.

We have affirmed this approach time and again.”).

C. Both courts’ materiality reasoning is debatable on its face.

Lastly, even looking at the merits of the court’s materiality findings, it is clear

that reasonable jurists could disagree. Indeed, they already have. The Ninth Circuit

held in 2010 that Aflague was “the only witness that linked Quezada directly to the

murder of Bruce Cleland,” (Pet. App. S-190), while the state court called his

testimony “helpful” but “not essential” and the district court insisted his testimony

was so specious as to be of no weight. This Court has also admonished against such

reasoning when performing a Napue analysis. See Glossip, 145 S. Ct. at 629 (noting

that this Court has “reject[ed the] argument that evidence was immaterial because

[the] witness’s credibility was ‘already impugned’”). Such an argument “is selfdefeating.” Id.

The district court also unreasonably ignored the fact that the prosecutor argued

to the jury that Aflague had “no reason to lie” and that his testimony was

“absolutely devastating “ to Quezada, instead opining that this fact could not be

weighed because Quezada did not raise a separate vouching claim. This is in direct

14

contrast to this Court’s acknowledgment that the prominence of a piece of evidence

or argument in a prosecutor’s closing shows how important or material it was to the

prosecution’s case. See id. at 628; Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 444 (1995) (“The

likely damage is best understood by taking the word of the prosecutor, who

contended during closing arguments that Smallwood and Williams were the State’s

two best witnesses.”). Indeed, as noted above, even the state court described

Aflague’s testimony as “helpful” to the prosecution’s case, though “not essential,”

demonstrating both reasonable disagreement and the state court’s erroneous

application of a sufficiency test rather than a materiality test. (Pet. App. H-102.)

Lastly, the strength of the remaining evidence has been disagreed upon by the

many courts to look at this case. Recall that, on direct appeal, the court found

Rebecca’s testimony that Quezada has suffered a breakup that day and wanted to

talk to her about it softened the damaging evidence against her, while subsequent

courts cast Quezada’s break-up and related testimony as a pure fiction and a posthoc alibi. And the court of appeal held that the eyewitness testimony against Jose

was “uncompelling.” Given that the case only made sense if the three defendants

were in it together, it was unreasonable for the courts not to recognize all of these

weaknesses when assessing the potential impact of the Brady or Napue evidence for

Quezada.

Considering all this, it is all but impossible to see how a jurist of reason could

fail to find the district court’s resolution of Quezada’s claim at least “debatable.”

Buck, 580 U.S. at 115.

///

///

///

15

CONCLUSION

For all these reasons, the Court should grant the petition, vacate the Ninth

Circuit’s order, and remand so that the court of appeals can hear Quezada’s appeal.

Respectfully submitted,

CUAUHTEMOC ORTEGA

Federal Public Defender

Dated: June 5, 2025

DEVON L. HEIN

Deputy Federal Public Defender

Attorneys for Petitioner

ALVARO QUEZADA

16

IN THE

ALVARO QUEZADA,

Petitioner,

v.

JAMES HILL,

Respondent.

On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the

United States Court of Appeals

for the Ninth Circuit

CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE WITH PAGE COUNT LIMITATIONS

I hereby certify that this Petition for a Writ of Certiorari contains approximately

5,613 words, excluding the parts of the document exempted by Supreme Court Rule

33.1(d) and that it complies with the typeface requirement of Supreme Court rule

33.1(b), being prepared in Century Schoolbook 12-point font or the text and 10-point

font for the footnotes.

///

///

///

///

1

I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the United States of

America that the foregoing is true and correct.

Dated: June 5, 2025

DEVON L. HEIN

Deputy Federal Public Defender

Attorneys for Petitioner

Alvaro Quezada

2