Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Anthony J. Woods, Petitioner v. N'Gai Smith

XII.

APPENDICES

SEE ATTACHMENTS

1. The Mandate of the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals.

2. The judgment of the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals.

3. The judgment of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana.

20

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United States Court ofAppeals

FIFTH CIRCUIT

OFFICE OF THE CLERK

TEL. 504-310-7700

600 S. MAESTRI PLACE,

Suite 115

NEW ORLEANS, LA 70130

LYLE VV. CAYCE

CLERK

January 07, 2025

Ms. Carol L. Michel

U.S. District Court, Eastern District of Louisiana

500 Poydras Street

Room C-151

New Orleans, LA 70130

No. 23-30918

Woods v. Smith

USDC No. 2:20-CV-482

Dear Ms. Michel,

Enclosed is a copy of the judgment issued as the mandate and a

copy of the court's opinion.

Sincerely,

LYLE W. CAYCE, Clerk

By: ________ ___________________

Roeshawn Johnson, Deputy Clerk

504-310-7998

cc:

Mr. Max Victor Camp

Mr. Anthony J. Woods

Case: 23-30918

Document: 51-1

Page: 1

Date Filed: 12/30/2024

States Court of Appeal#

for tlje Jfiftlj Circuit

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

December 30, 2024

No. 23-30918

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

Anthony J. Woods,

Plaintiff— Appellant,

versus

N ’ G a i Smith, officially and individually,

Defendant— Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Louisiana

USDC No. 2:20-CV-482

ON PETITION FOR REHEARING EN BANC

Before Elrod, ChiefJudge3 and Dennis and Higginson, Circuit Judges.

Per Curiam:

Treating the petition for rehearing en banc as a petition for panel

rehearing /5th Cir. R.40 I.O.P.), the petition for panel rehearing is

DENIED. Because no member of the panel or judge in regular active

service requested that the court be polled on rehearing en banc (Fed. R.

App. P.40 and 5th Cir. R.40), the petition for rehearing en banc is

DENIED.

.*•. *

Case(23^:c^30m28LM^iOl(aMienDdK2iaienP^:l1

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QEmteiJ States Court of SUppeate

for tjje Jftftf) Circuit

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

November 4, 2024

No. 23-30918

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

Anthony J. Woods,

Plaintiff—Appellant,

versus

N’Gai Smith, officially and individually,

Defendant—Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Louisiana

USDC No. 2:20-CV-482

Before Elrod, Chief Judge, and Dennis and Higginson, Circuit

Judges.

Per Curiam:*

Appellant Anthony J. Woods alleges that his former supervisor,

Appellee N’Gai Smith, created a hostile work environment by calling him a

racial epithet in front of other employees. The district court granted Smith’s

motion for summary judgment, concluding that Woods’s Title VII claim was

time-barred. Because Woods filed his EEOC charge more than 300 days after

‘ This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.

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No. 23-30918

the date of the alleged incident without grounds supporting equitable tolling,

we AFFIRM.

I

A

Woods worked at French Market Corporation in New Orleans,

Louisiana, as a painter with Smith as his immediate supervisor. Woods

alleges that French Market leadership racially discriminated against him.

Specifically, Woods alleges that on June 22, 2018, Smith called him a racial

epithet. This alleged use of a slur is the only instance of a hostile work

environment supported by record evidence.1 Woods filed a grievance in June

2018 requesting authorization to file a lawsuit, compensation, and

termination of Smith. After Smith received a suspension and was enrolled in

a supervisor course, Woods requested review of the determination, but later

recanted his grievance and stated that he was “satisfied with the

disciplinary” action in September 2018. Woods continued working for

French Market Corporation until his termination on August 23, 2019.

Woods later filed his Equal Employment Opportunity Commission charge on

October 21, 2019, and received notice of a right to sue shortly after.2

B

Woods originally filed this lawsuit in the Eastern District of Louisiana

in 2020, naming the mayor and City of New Orleans and several French

1 Woods identifies that this incident happened on June 22, 2018, in his grievance

form and deposition testimony. Smith does not dispute making the alleged statement in

the motion for summary judgment or response brief.

2 As we have previously held, “Title VII’s administrative exhaustion requirement

is not a jurisdictional bar to suit but rather a prudential prerequisite under our binding

precedentDavis v. Fort Bend County, 893 F.3d 300, 308 (5th Cir. 2018), aff’d, Fort

Bend County v. Davis, 587 U.S. 541, 552 (2019).

2

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Market management-level employees as defendants. Woods’s complaint

alleged several claims, including race discrimination and a hostile work

environment under Title VII and various other violations of civil rights

statutes. The defendants moved to dismiss all claims, contending that

Woods failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. The district

court granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss, and Woods first appealed

to this court in 2021.

On appeal, we agreed with the district court on all but the hostilework-environment claim and remanded for further consideration. Woods v.

Cantrell, 29 F.4th 284, 285-86 (5th Cir. 2022).

On remand, Smith moved for summary judgment, insisting that

Woods’s hostile-work-environment claim was time-barred. Specifically,

Smith asserted that Woods did not file his EEOC charge within 300 days after

the alleged racial epithet. In support of his motion, Smith set forth summary

judgment evidence that showed Woods testified in a deposition that Smith

uttered the alleged racial slur on June 22, 2018, but that he did not file his

EEOC charge until October 21, 2019—486 days later. The district court

granted Smith ’ s motion on the basis that Woods ’ s claim was time-barred and

found no grounds for equitable tolling. Woods v. Cantrell, No. 20-CV-482,

2023 WL 8716587, at *3 (E.D. La. Dec. 18, 2023). The district court

determined that, even though Woods asserted that the “alleged misconduct

occurred between January 1,2018 and August 23, 2019,” there was only one

discrete incident of discrimination on record and each discriminatory act has

its own limitations period which begins at the time of the conduct. Id.

II

Woods now appeals the district court’s grant of summary judgment.

“We review the district court’s ruling on a motion for summary judgment de

novo, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving

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party.” Ramirez v. Killian, 113 F.4th 415, 421 (5th Cir. 2024). “Summary

judgment is appropriate ‘if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute

as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of

law.’” Id. (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a)). A genuine dispute of material fact

exists if “the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for

the nonmoving party.” Sweetin v. City of Texas City, 48 F.4th 387, 391 (5th

Cir. 2022) (quoting McCarty v. HillstoneRest. Grp.j Inc., 864 F.3d 354, 35758 (5th Cir. 2017)).

“This Circuit has long required plaintiffs to exhaust their

administrative remedies before bringing suit under Title VII.” Price v.

Choctaw Glove & Safety Co., Inc., 459 F.3d 595, 598 (5th Cir. 2006) (citing

Wheeler v. Am. Home Prod., Corp., 582 F.2d 891, 897 (5th Cir. 1977)). “In

order to file suit under Title VII, a plaintiff first must file a charge with the

EEOC within 180 [or 300] days of the alleged discriminatory act.” Id.

(footnote omitted). 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(l) extends the limitations period

to 300 days for individuals who file with a “State or local agency.” Louisiana

has declared itself a “deferral state” which extends the period to file to 300

days. La. Rev. Stat. § 51:2231(A).3

In addition, “[e]ach discrete discriminatory act starts a new clock for

filing charges alleging that act. The charge, therefore, must be filed within

the 180- or 300-day time period after the discrete discriminatory act

occurred.” Nat’lR.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101,113 (2002).

A party may file past the 300-day period if there are grounds for equitable

3 See Lavigne v. Cajun Deep Founds., L.L. C., 654 F. App ’x 640,643 (5th Cir. 2016)

(“To effectively exhaust administrative remedies, ‘ [a] Title VII plaintiff must file a charge

of discrimination with the EEOC no more than 180 days—300 days in a deferral state such

as Louisiana—after the alleged discriminatory employment action occurred.’”) (quoting

Carter v. Target Corp., 541F. App’x 413, 419 (5th Cir. 2013)).

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tolling. Id. We have recognized at least three bases for equitable tolling: “(1)

the pendency of a suit between the same parties in the wrong forum; (2)

plaintiff’s unawareness of the facts giving rise to the claim because of the

defendant’s intentional concealment of them; and (3) the EEOC’s

misleading the plaintiff about the nature of [his] rights. ” Granger v. Aaron %

Inc., 636 F.3d 708, 712 (5th Cir. 2011) (quoting Wilson v. Sec’y} Dep’t of

Veterans Affs., 65 F.3d 402,404 (5th Cir. 1995)).

Ill

We now turn to the parties’ arguments.4 Woods asserts that his

hostile-work-environment claim is not time-barred under Title VII. He

contends that his claim is within the Title VII limitations period to file his

EEOC charge because Louisiana Revised Statute § 23:301 etseq.5 provides an

additional six months to “file.”

Woods also asserts the hostile work

environment lasted until his last day of employment.

Smith, by contrast, maintains that the hostile-work-environment

claim is time-barred because Woods failed to file the EEOC charge within

300 days of the alleged misconduct.

Smith cites Woods’s deposition

4 Woods ’ s original and reply briefs will be construed liberally because he submitted

both as a pro se litigant. Brown v. Sudduth, 675 F.3d 472, 477 (5th Cir. 2012) (“We giwe pro

se briefs a liberal construction. ”) (citing Mayfield v. Tex. Dep’t ofCrim. Just., 529 F.3d 599,

604 (5th Cir. 2008)). “While we ‘liberally construe briefs ofpro se litigants and apply less

stringent standards to parties proceeding pro se than to parties represented by counsel, pro

se parties must still brief the issues and reasonably comply with the standards of Rule 28. ’ ”

Rui Yang v. Holder, 664 F.3d 580, 589 (5th Cir. 2011) (quoting Grant v. Cuellar, 59 F.3d

523,524 (5th Cir. 1995)).

5 Construing Woods’s reply brief liberally as he is a pro se litigant, we understand

his reference to an additional six months to “file” as referring to Louisiana Revised Statute

§ 23:303(D) because § 23:303(D) provides a suspension period of no longer than six months

while a Louisiana Employment Discrimination Law claim is investigated by EEOC.

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testimony and grievance form, which both show the date of the alleged

incident as June 22, 2018.

Though Woods makes several of the same arguments that he raised in

the district court, the only issue before us is the timeliness of the hostilework-environment claim under Title VII.

We agree with the district court that Woods’s Title VII claim is timebarred because he filed his EEOC charge more than 300 days after the alleged

misconduct.

A

First, Woods asserts that his EEOC charge was timely because the

alleged race-based harassment that contributed to the hostile work

environment continued until the day he was terminated, August 23, 2019.

However, the only discriminatory act that is supported by the summary

judgment record is Smith’s alleged utterance of the racial epithet in 2018.

Woods testified in his deposition and submitted in his grievance form that

Smith made the alleged statement on June 22,2018. Although Woods insists

that he endured a hostile work environment until his last day of employment,

Woods puts forth no summary judgment evidence of any sort that could

support this assertion, and we have already determined that the only basis for

the hostile-work-environment claim is the June 2018 slur. Woods, 29 F.4th at

285.

His EEOC charge, therefore, was required to be filed within 300 days

after June 22, 2018—-or at least by April 18, 2019. Here, Woods, filed his

EEOC charge on October 21, 2019, more than a year after the date of the

alleged incident, and more than 186 days past his April 2019 deadline.

Accordingly, Smith is correct that Woods’s hostile-work-environment claim

is time-barred.

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B

Although Woods filed after the 300-day period, failure to timely file

an EEOC charge may be acceptable when there are grounds for equitable

tolling.6 While Woods has not asserted grounds for equitable tolling, even

interpreting his briefs liberally, we see no evidence that justifies tolling the

limitations period in this case. This suit has never been pending in the wrong

forum, Woods has always been fully apprised of the facts giving rise to his

claim, and the EEOC did not mislead Woods about the nature of his rights.

See Aaron3s} Inc., 636 F.3d at 712. Therefore, there is no summary judgment

evidence supporting the tolling of the 300-day limitations period.

C

Last, Woods contends that Louisiana Revised Statute § 23:303(D)

provides an additional six months to file, which would place his EEOC

complaint within the Title VII limitations period. While Woods is correct

that § 23:303(D) suspends certain limitations periods, the statute’s tolling

period only applies to claims arising under Louisiana state law, not Title VII.

La. Rev. Stat. § 23:303(D) (specifying that § 23:303 applies to “[a]ny cause

of action provided in this Chapter” (emphasis added)); see Menson v. City of

Baton Rouge, 539 F. App’x 433, 434 (5th Cir. 2013) (applying federal

limitations periods to claims arising under federal law and applying § 23:303

to state-law claims). Therefore, this argument cannot salvage his hostilework-environment claim brought under Title VII.

6 Here, Woods’s only basis for his hostile-work-environment claim is the alleged

racial epithet on June 22, 2018, and he filed his EEOC charge more than 300 days after the

occurrence. Thus, he may proceed only if equitable tolling applies.

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IV

In sum, we see nothing in the record that shows a genuine dispute of

any material fact. The parties agree on the date of the alleged slur and the

date that Woods filed his EEOC charge. None of Woods’s authorities

supports his contention that his EEOC charge was nonetheless timely filed.

Nor does Woods set forth any competent summary judgment evidence that

would create a genuine fact dispute as to his claim being time-barred, such as

reasonable grounds for equitable tolling or another specific instance of

sufficiently severe discrimination within the 300 days before October 21,

2019. Accordingly, we agree with the district court that summary judgment

was proper because Woods’s Title VII claim is time-barred. Because we

agree with Smith that summary judgment was proper, we do not reach

Woods’s remaining arguments pertaining to remand.

The district court’s grant of summary judgment is AFFIRMED.

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

CIVIL ACTION

ANTHONY WOODS

VERSUS

No. 20-482

LATOYA CANTRELL ET AL.

SECTION I

ORDER & REASONS

Before the Court is defendant N’Gai Smith’s (“defendant”) motion for summary

judgment.1 Pro se plaintiff Anthony Woods (“plaintiff’) opposes the motion.2 For the

reasons that follow, the Court grants defendant’s motion for summary judgment.

I.

BACKGROUND

This case arises from plaintiffs employment with the French Market

Corporation (“French Market”) and his subsequent termination. The Court

previously set forth the procedural history of this case and need not repeat it in full.3

The facts relevant to the determination of the instant motion for summary judgment,

as stated in plaintiffs complaint, are as follows. Plaintiff alleges that he was

terminated from his position at French Market on August 23, 2019.4 On August 26,

2019, plaintiff appealed his termination to the Civil Service Commission (“the

Commission”) for the City of New Orleans.5

1 R. Doc. No. 112.

2 R. Doc. No. 139.

3 R. Doc. No. 74.

4 R. Doc. No. 1, at 5.

5 Id.

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The case was terminated after an attorney for the City of New Orleans, a

dismissed defendant in this matter, allegedly fraudulently represented that an

agreement had been reached with plaintiff.6 Plaintiff was subsequently assigned a

new appeal.7 On November 21, 2019, the Commission held a hearing on his appeal. 8

Plaintiffs complaint asserts that he exhausted his administrative remedies by

filing a complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”)

and receiving a notice of right to sue letter.9 Plaintiff filed his complaint with the

EEOC on October 21, 2019.10 The EEOC mailed plaintiff a notice of his right to sue

on November 13, 2019.11 The notice from the EEOC states “that the EEOC is unable

to conclude that the information obtained establishes violations of the statute. This

does not certify that [plaintiff] is in compliance with the statutes.”12 Plaintiff filed his

complaint in this Court on February 11, 2020.13

This Court previously issued an order dismissing all of plaintiffs federal

claims, finding that plaintiffs allegations did not constitute cognizable, triable

claims.14 Plaintiff appealed this Court’s judgment to the U.S. Fifth Circuit Court of

6 Id. at 6.

7 Id. at 7.

8 Id. As noted by the parties and the Court in its previous order, the Commission had

not ruled on this appeal at the time of this Court’s previous order. R. Doc. No. 74, at

10 n.68. The Court has not been made aware of any ruling by the Commission that

would be relevant to this matter.

9 R. Doc. No. 1, at 12.

10 R. Doc. No. 139-1, at 11.

11 Id. at 10.

12 Id.

13 R. Doc. No. 1.

14 R. Doc. No. 74.

2

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Appeals. The Court of Appeals affirmed on all counts except one. Specifically, the

Fifth Circuit found that plaintiff had stated an actionable claim of hostile work

environment by pleading that his supervisor, defendant, “called him a ‘Lazy Monkey

A_N___ ’ in front of his fellow employees. Woods v. Cantrell, 29 F.4th 284, 285 (5th

Cir. 2022). Accordingly, this claim against defendant is the only claim remaining in

this action.

Defendant filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that plaintiff did not

timely file his complaint with the EEOC and that plaintiff cannot establish a hostile

work environment claim.15 In response, plaintiff argues that his EEOC complaint was

timely filed and that his allegations are factually sufficient to support a hostile work

environment claim.16

II.

STANDARDS OF LAW

Summary judgment is proper when, after reviewing the materials in the

record, a court determines that there is no genuine dispute of material fact and the

movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). “[A] party

seeking summary judgment always bears the initial responsibility of informing the

district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of [the record]

which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.” Celotex

Corp. v. Catrett, All U.S. 317, 323 (1986). The party seeking summary judgment need

not produce evidence negating the existence of a material fact; it need only point out

15 See generally R. Doc. No. 112-1.

16 See generally R. Doc. No. 139-1.

3

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the absence of evidence supporting the other party’s case. Id.; see also Fontenot v.

Upjohn Co., 780 F.2d 1190, 1195—96 (5th Cir. 1986) (“There is no sound reason why

conclusory allegations should suffice to require a trial when there is no evidence to

support them even if the movant lacks contrary evidence.”).

Once the party seeking summary judgment carries that burden, the

nonmoving party must come forward with specific facts showing that there is a

genuine dispute of material fact for trial. See Matsushita Elec. Indus, v. Zenith Radio

Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). The showing of a genuine issue is not satisfied by

creating ‘“some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts,’ by ‘conclusory

allegations,’ by ‘unsubstantiated assertions,’ or by only a ‘scintilla’ of evidence.” Little

v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir. 1994) (citations omitted). Rather, a

genuine issue of material fact exists when the “evidence is such that a reasonable

jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,

477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). If the nonmovant fails to meet their burden of showing a

genuine issue for trial that could support a judgment in favor of the nonmovant,

summary judgment must be granted. See Little, 37 F.3d at 1075—76.

The party responding to the motion for summary judgment may not rest upon

the pleadings but must identify specific facts that establish a genuine issue. See

Anderson, All U.S. at 248. The nonmoving party’s evidence, however, “is to be

believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in [the nonmoving party’s]

favor.” Id. at 255.

4

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III.

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ANALYSIS

As mentioned, the only claim that remains in this action is the hostile work

environment claim against defendant in which plaintiff alleges that defendant called

him a “Lazy Monkey A_N

” in front of his fellow employees. Defendants argue

that this claim is time barred.

“When an employment discrimination claim is brought in a deferral state, an

aggrieved employee must file a claim with the designated state agency [responsible

for the administration of complaints of employment discrimination] or the EEOC

within 300 days of the alleged unlawful employment action. ” Kirkland v. Big Lots

Store, Inc., 547 F. App'x 570, 572 (5th Cir. 2013). Louisiana is a “deferral state.”

Conner v. La. Dep't of Health & Hosps., 247 F. App'x 480, 481 (5th Cir. 2007).

“Discrete discriminatory acts are not actionable if time barred, even when they

are related to acts alleged in timely filed charges.” Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp. v.

Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 113 (2002). “Each discrete discriminatory act starts a new

clock for filing charges alleging that act. The charge, therefore, must be filed within

the . . . 300-day time period after the discrete discriminatory act occurred.” Id. “[A]

suit based upon the untimely charge should be dismissed.” Kirkland, 547 F. App'x at

572 (citing Barrow v. New Orleans S.S. Ass'n, 932 F.2d 473, 476-77 (5th Cir.1991)).

“[The Fifth Circuit has] recognized at least three circumstances where failure

to timely file may be excused under the equitable tolling doctrine: (1) a suit is pending

between the parties in the incorrect forum; (2) the claimant is unaware of facts

supporting [his] claim because the defendant intentionally concealed them; and (3)

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the claimant is misled by the EEOC or designated state agency about [his] rights.”

Id. “The party who invokes equitable tolling bears the burden of demonstrating that

it applies in his case.” Manning v. Chevron Chem. Co., LLC, 332 F.3d 874, 880 (5th

Cir. 2003) (citing Ramirez v. City of San Antonio, 312 F.3d 178, 183 (5th Cir. 2002)).

The Court notes that plaintiff in this matter is proceeding pro se. “Federal

courts, [the Fifth Circuit] included, have a ‘traditional disposition of leniency toward

pro se litigants.’” Davis v. Fernandez, 798 F.3d 290, 293 (5th Cir. 2015). “Of course,

this is not to say that pro se plaintiffs don't have to submit competent evidence to

avoid summary judgment, because they do.” Id. (citing Gordon v. Watson, 622 F.2d

120, 123 (5th Cir. 1980)).

In this action, plaintiff testified at his deposition that defendant’s comment,

which serves as the basis for his only remaining claim, was made on June 22, 2018,17

and he submitted an internal grievance form on June 29, 2018.18 Plaintiff did not file

a claim with the EEOC until October 21, 2019. At that point, the 300-day filing period

had expired.

Plaintiff argues that his complaint was timely filed with the EEOC because

the alleged misconduct occurred between January 1, 2018 and August 23, 2019.19

However, as mentioned, “[e]ach discrete discriminatory act starts a new clock for

filing charges alleging that act.” See Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp., 536 U.S. at 113.

Because only one claim remains before this Court, the timing of the other alleged acts

17 R. Doc No. 112-2, at 18.

18 R. Doc No. 112-3, at 1.

19 R. Doc. No. 139-1, at 5.

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is not relevant to this motion. Accordingly, plaintiffs hostile work environment claim

against defendant is time-barred.

Additionally, while plaintiff has not asserted equitable tolling applies, nothing

in the record indicates that the failure to timely file was excused by equitable tolling.

Plaintiffs lawsuit was not filed in the incorrect forum. There is no evidence that

defendant intentionally concealed facts supporting plaintiffs claims. The record does

not indicate that the EEOC mislead plaintiff about his rights.20 Even extending the

traditional leniency toward plaintiff, see Davis, 798 F.3d at 293, plaintiff has not

identified specific facts that establish a genuine issue. See Little, 37 F.3d at 1075—76.

IV.

CONCLUSION

Accordingly,

IT IS ORDERED that defendant’s motion for summary judgment is

GRANTED. Plaintiffs claim is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

New Orleans, Louisiana, December 18, 20

LANCE M. AFRICK

UNITED STAGES DISTRICT JUDGE

20 Because the claim is time-barred, the Court need not address whether plaintiff has

sufficient evidentiary support for his claim.

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

ANTHONY WOODS

CIVIL ACTION

VERSUS

NO:

THE CITY OF NEW ORLEANS, ET AL.

SECTION: “I” (4)

20-482

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Before the Court is a Motion to Enforce Settlement (R. Doc. 99) filed by the Defendants, the

City of New Orleans (the “City”), Mayor Latoya Cantrell, French Market Corporation, Rhonda Sidney,

N’Gai Smith, Robert Matthews, and Deputy City Attorney Elizabeth Robins (collectively “Defendants”).

Defendants seek a Court Order to enforce the settlement confected between Plaintiff, Anthony Woods

(“Woods” or “Plaintiff’), and Defendants. The motion is opposed. R. Doc. 100. This matter was referred

to the undersigned under 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(B) and (C).

I.

Background

A.

Introduction

This case arises from Woods’ employment with the French Market and his subsequent termination.

R. Doc. 1. Woods alleged that he was the subject of a racial slur by his supervisor, N’Gai Smith. Id. Further,

Woods alleged that he was the subject of on-going harassment by his supervisor and others at his workplace.

Id. The record reflects that the City of New Orleans terminated Woods on August 23,2019. Id. Woods then

filed his EEOC complaint on October 21, 2019 as a result of his alleged harassment by Defendants. Id.

Woods asserted several claims including: 1) Title VII race discrimination based on Plaintiffs

termination, French Market’s alleged failure to promote him, and hostile work environment claim; 2) Race

discrimination in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981 based on his termination; 3) Religious discrimination and

retaliation under Title VII; 4) Violations of the First Amendment related to his termination brought under

42 U.S.C. 1983, with the individual defendants sued in both their individual and official capacities; 5)

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Violations of the Fourteenth Amendment related to his termination, brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983; and

6) A conspiracy in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1985. Id.

The record shows that Defendants filed a Rule 12 motion to dismiss which was granted and reversed

only on a limited basis by the Fifth Circuit. See R. Doc. 82. The remaining claim was a single count hostile

work environment claim.

While the remaining claim was pending, a settlement conference was held before the undersigned

on January 10, 2023. See R. Doc. 94-95. Plaintiff and his counsel as well as counsel for Defendants were

present at this conference. A settlement was ultimately reached between the parties before the undersigned

and was memorialized on the record. See R. Doc. 98. Specifically, Plaintiff agreed to accept $7,500.00 and

in return, Plaintiff agreed to sign a settlement release and voluntarily dismiss his case. See id. The terms of

the agreement were stated on the record and transcribed by a court reporter. Id.

B.

Instant Motion

Defendants filed the instant motion on February 16, 2023. R Doc. 99. In the motion, Defendants

allege that Plaintiffs counsel expressed that Plaintiff no longer intends to settle the case and refused to sign

the circulated settlement agreement. Id. Defendants contend they gave Plaintiff a few weeks to reconsider

his decision. Id. However, as of this date, Defendants allege that Plaintiffs counsel indicated that Plaintiff

continues to refuse to sign the release, and no longer agrees to the terms of settlement reached on January

10, 2023, before the undersigned. Defendants now move to enforce the settlement. Id.

Plaintiff filed a response to Defendants’ instant motion on February 28,2022. R. Doc. 100. Plaintiff

asserts and does not dispute that Plaintiff, his counsel, and Defendant’s counsel achieved a settlement

agreement in a settlement conference before the undersigned on January 10, 2023. Id. However, at the

settlement conference Plaintiff alleges that the undersigned emphasized that all previous defendants sued

by Plaintiff had previously been dismissed by the Fifth Circuit and were now “gone.” Id. Yet, Plaintiff

alleges that when he reviewed the Confidential Settlement and Release Agreement tendered by the

defendants, all previous defendants’ names (including current defendant, N’Gai Smith) were apart of the

settlement and release. Id.

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Plaintiff contends that this inclusion of previous defendants was contrary to the assurances on the

record that these defendants had already been dismissed. Id. Based on these events, Plaintiff avers that he

could not in good faith sign the Settlement Agreement.

II.

Standard of Review

Federal law determines whether a settlement agreement is valid “where the substantive rights and

liabilities of the parties derive from federal law.” Mid-South Towing Co. v. Har-Win, Inc., 733 F.2d 386,

389 (5th Cir. 1984). Under federal law, settlement agreements are contracts. Guidry v. Halliburton

Geographical Services, Inc., 976 F.2d 938, 940 (5th Cir. 1992). A binding settlement agreement exists

where there is a manifestation of mutual assent, usually in the form of an offer and an acceptance. See

Courtney v. Andersen, 264 F. App’x 426,430 (5th Cir. 2008); Lopez v. Kempthome, No. H-07-1534,2010

WL 4639046, at *4 (S.D. Tex. Nov. 5, 2010) (citing Triche v. Louisiana Ins. Guaranty Assoc., No. 083931, 2010 WL 891000, at *5 (E.D. La. Mar. 5, 2010); Turner Marine Fleeting, Inc. v. Quality Fab and

Mechanical, Inc., No. Civ.A.02-0091, 2002 WL 31819199, at *4 (E.D. La. Dec.13,2002)). “If a party to a

[federal] suit who has previously authorized a settlement changes his mind when presented with the

settlement documents, that party remains bound by the terms of the agreement.” Fulgence v. J. Ray

McDermott & Co., 662 F.2d 1207, 1209 (5th Cir. 1981).

III.

Analysis

Here, the Plaintiff does not dispute that a settlement was reached on January 10, 2023. However,

Plaintiff takes issue with the fact that defendants that were previously dismissed by the Fifth Circuit (the

City of New Orleans, Mayor Latoya Cantrell, French Market Corporation, Rhonda Sidney, Robert

Matthews, and Deputy City Attorney Elizabeth Robins) were named in the settlement agreement on January

10, 2023.

The Fifth Circuit has held that “a motion to enforce a settlement agreement cannot be granted to

enforce a term that is not included in the settlement at issue.” Sunshine Kids Found, v. Sunshine Kids

Juvenile Prods., LLC, 540 F. App'x 402, 403 (5th Cir. 2013). The record reflects that the Fifth Circuit

upheld the District Judge’s ruling, with the exception of the hostile work environment claim. Therefore, the

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hostile work environment claim against N’Gai Smith was the only claim at issue during settlement

negotiations, as the other claims against the other defendants had been dismissed. As such, the previously

dismissed defendants were not apart of the settlement terms, yet were named in the settlement agreement.

The Court finds that enforcing a settlement agreement to include defendants that had been

previously dismissed would be done in error. Thus, the Court recommends that the parties should be

instructed to modify the settlement agreement to name the correct defendant: N’Gai Smith, as the hostile

work environment claim was the only claim at issue during the settlement.

TV.

Recommendation

Accordingly,

IT IS RECOMMENDED that the Defendants' Motion to Enforce Settlement (R. Doc. 99) be

DENIED.

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that the Defendants be ordered to remove the previously

dismissed parties from the proposed release agreement, namely: Mayor Latoya Cantrell, City of New

Orleans, French Market Corporation, Kathleen Turner, Rhonda Sidney, Robert Matthews, and Elizabeth

Robins.

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that the parties should be instructed to modify the

settlement agreement no later than fourteen (14) days from the issue of this Court’s order to name the

correct defendant: N’Gai Smith.

A party’s failure to file written objections to the proposed findings, conclusions, and

recommendation in a magistrate judge’s report and recommendation within fourteen (14) days after being

served with a copy shall bar that party, except upon grounds of plain error, from attacking on appeal the

unobjected-to proposed factual findings and legal conclusions accepted by the district court, provided that

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the party has been served with notice that such consequences will result from a failure to object. Douglass

v. UnitedServs. Auto. Ass’n, 79 F.3d 1415, 1430 (5th Cir. 1996). i

New Orleans, Louisiana, this 26rd day of June 2023.

KAREN WELLS ROBY

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

1Douglass referenced the previously applicable ten-day period for the filing of objections. Effective

December 1,2009,28 U.S.C. D 636(b)(1) was amended to extend the period to fourteen days.

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

ANTHONY WOODS

CIVIL ACTION

VERSUS

NO:

LATOYA CANTRELL, ET AL

SECTION: “I” (4)

20-482

ORDER

The Court, having considered the record, applicable law, the Report and Recommendation

of the United States Magistrate Judge, and the failure of the plaintiff to file an objection to the

Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation, hereby approves the Report and

Recommendation of the United States Magistrate Judge and adopts it as its opinion in this matter.

Therefore,

IT IS ORDERED that the defendants’ motion to enforce settlement1 is DENIED.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the defendants are ordered to remove the previously dismissed

parties from the proposed release agreement, namely: Mayor Latoya Cantrell, City of New Orleans, French

Market Corporation, Kathleen Turner, Rhonda Sidney, Robert Matthews, and Elizabeth Robins.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the parties are instructed to modify the settlement agreement,

no later than JULY 25, 2023, to name the only remaining defendant, N’Gai Smith. The parties shall then

sign the settlement agreement.

New Orleans, Louisiana, this 11th day of July, 2023.

EANCE M. AFRICK

UNITED&TATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Rec. Doc. No. 99