Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Panoche Energy Center, LLC, Petitioner v. Environmental Protection Agency, et al.

Supreme Court briefJan 3, 2025

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No. 24-___

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

————

PANOCHE ENERGY CENTER, LLC,

v.

Petitioner,

UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL

PROTECTION AGENCY ET AL.,

————

Respondents.

On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the

United States Court of Appeals

for the Ninth Circuit

————

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

————

VARU CHILAKAMARRI

Counsel of Record

ANKUR K. TOHAN

J. TIMOTHY HOBBS

SPENCER MCCANDLESS

K&L GATES LLP

1601 K Street, NW

Washington, D.C. 20006

(202) 778-9000

varu.chilakamarri@klgates.com

ankur.tohan@klgates.com

tim.hobbs@klgates.com

spencer.mccandless@klgates.com

Counsel for Petitioner

January 3, 2025

WILSON-EPES PRINTING CO., INC. – (202) 789-0096 – WASHINGTON, D.C. 20002

QUESTION PRESENTED

Petitioner Panoche Energy Center, LLC (“Panoche”)

manages a power plant that is critical to California’s

electrical grid. Panoche holds an underground injection control (“UIC”) permit from the Environmental

Protection Agency (“EPA” or the “Agency”) that

authorizes it to dispose of nonhazardous water used

for cooling its plant by injecting it thousands of feet

below the Earth’s surface. The permit is essential to

the plant’s operation. Panoche has always complied

with the permit’s terms, and its injections have never

endangered local drinking water. But when the permit

came up for renewal, EPA abruptly imposed a

condition requiring Panoche to install a new 3,500foot-deep monitoring well over a mile away at a private

commercial orchard that Panoche does not own and

has no right to access.

EPA acknowledged it was compelling Panoche to

acquire new property rights from a landowner who

had no obligation to sell them. (The landowner has

since refused to allow the well to be drilled at all, for

any price.) But EPA claimed Congress empowered

it to impose this unprecedented—and it turns out,

impossible—permit condition through a provision of

the Safe Drinking Water Act that does not even

mention permittees having to drill monitoring wells

anywhere.

The Question Presented is:

Does the Safe Drinking Water Act (42 U.S.C. § 300h5) authorize EPA to compel UIC permittees to

construct monitoring wells on third-party property

that permitees lack rights to access without

considering the feasibility and costs of such a permit

condition?

(i)

ii

PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING BELOW

AND RULE 29.6 STATEMENT

This petition seeks review of a decision by the

Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. In the Ninth Circuit

and in this Court, the Petitioner is Panoche Energy

Center, LLC. Respondents are the United States

Environmental Protection Agency; Michael Regan, in

his official capacity as Administrator of the United

States Environmental Protection Agency; and Martha

Guzman Aceves, in her official capacity as Regional

Administrator of the United States Environmental

Protection Agency, Region IX.

Pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 29.6, Petitioner

Panoche Energy Center, LLC declares that it is wholly

owned by its parent company, Ares Energy Investors

Fund V, L.P., a private investment fund managed

by affiliates of Ares Management Corporation. No

publicly held corporation owns 10% or more of

Panoche Energy Center, LLC stock.

RELATED PROCEEDINGS

This case arises from the following proceedings:

•

Panoche Energy Center, LLC v. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, No. 23-1268, 2024

WL 3043005 (9th Cir. June 18, 2024), petition

for panel rehearing denied on August 8, 2024.

•

In re Panoche Energy Ctr., LLC, 18 E.A.D. 818

(EAB 2023) (Environmental Protection Agency),

final order denying review issued on May 26,

2023.

No other proceedings in state or federal trial or

appellate courts, or in this Court, directly relate to this

case under this Court’s Rule 14.1(b)(iii).

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

QUESTION PRESENTED ..................................

i

PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING BELOW

AND RULE 29.6 STATEMENT ......................

ii

RELATED PROCEEDINGS ...............................

ii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ................................

v

OPINIONS BELOW ............................................

1

JURISDICTION ..................................................

1

STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED..........

1

STATEMENT OF THE CASE ............................

1

I. Factual and Legal Background ................

6

A. Panoche safely operates a crucial

piece of California’s energy infrastructure without endangering local

drinking water .....................................

6

B. EPA regulates underground injection

wells .....................................................

7

C. For over a decade, Panoche dutifully

complied with all EPA regulations

and permitting requirements..............

9

D. EPA arbitrarily orders Panoche to do

the legally impossible—drill a 3,500foot monitoring well on someone else’s

almond orchard ....................................

10

II. Procedural History ....................................

15

(iii)

iv

TABLE OF CONTENTS—Continued

Page

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT ..........

17

I. Because the Ninth Circuit’s Ruling

Cannot be Reconciled with this Court’s

Intervening Loper Bright Decision, this

Court Should Vacate the Judgment and

Remand for Further Proceedings .............

19

II. Alternatively, the Court Should Grant

the Petition and Review the Ninth

Circuit’s Novel Approach to EPA

Permitting .................................................

21

A. The text of the SDWA requires EPA to

consider property rights, costs, and

feasibility when imposing monitoring

requirements........................................

21

B. The structure of the SDWA confirms

EPA may not compel a permittee to

utilize property rights the permittee

does not possess ...................................

26

C. If Congress had intended to grant

EPA such an unusual, far-reaching

power, it would have been explicit—

and it would not have taken EPA

nearly forty years to notice .................

29

D. Reversal will not unduly hamper

SDWA regulation.................................

33

E. The Question Presented has significant legal and practical implications

that warrant review ............................

34

CONCLUSION ....................................................

37

APPENDIX

v

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

CASES

Page(s)

American Textile Mfrs. Inst., Inc. v.

Donovan, 452 U.S. 490 (1981) ..................

30

Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp.,

529 U.S. 120 (2000) .............................. 20, 29-31

Cent. United Life Ins. Co. v. Burwell,

827 F.3d 70 (D.C. Cir. 2016) .....................

18

Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources

Defense Council, Inc.,

467 U.S. 837 (1984) ...................................

20

City of Arlington, Tex. v. F.C.C.,

569 U.S. 290 (2013) ...................................

20

City of Carmel-By-The-Sea v. U.S. Dep’t

of Transp.,

123 F.3d 1142 (9th Cir. 1997)...................

34

City of Oberlin v. FERC,

39 F.4th 719 (D.C. Cir. 2022) ................... 27, 28

Clark v. Martinez,

543 U.S. 371 (2005) ...................................

32

Cont’l Bank v. United States,

517 F. Supp. 918 (E.D. Pa. 1981), aff’d,

688 F.2d 819 (3d Cir. 1982) ...................... 31, 32

E. Enterprises v. Apfel,

524 U.S. 498 (1998) ...................................

31

In re Panoche Energy Ctr., LLC,

18 E.A.D. 818-52 (EAB 2023) ............... 1, 23, 24

Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo,

144 S. Ct. 2244 (2024) ...................... 6, 19-21, 36

vi

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued

Page(s)

Louisiana Pub. Serv. Comm’n v. F.C.C.,

476 U.S. 355 (1986) ................................... 1, 18

Michigan v. EPA,

576 U.S. 743 (2015) ................................... 22-24

Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Dep’t of Lab.,

Occupational Safety & Health Admin.,

595 U.S. 109 (2022) ...................................

18

Nat. Res. Def. Council v. Regan,

67 F.4th 397 (D.C. Cir. 2023) ............. 18, 28, 29

Nixon v. Missouri Mun. League,

541 U.S. 125 (2004) ................................... 26, 28

Onyx Properties LLC v. Bd. of Cnty.

Commissioners of Elbert Cnty.,

838 F.3d 1039 (10th Cir. 2016) .................

31

Panoche Energy Ctr., LLC v. United States

Env’t Prot. Agency,

No. 23-1268, 2024 WL 3043005

(9th Cir. June 18, 2024) ............. 1, 16-21, 23, 26

Riverkeeper, Inc. v. U.S. E.P.A.,

475 F.3d 83 (2d Cir. 2007), rev’d

on other grounds sub nom.

Entergy Corp. v. Riverkeeper, Inc.,

556 U.S. 208 (2009) ......................... 2, 25, 29, 30

Ry. Labor Execs. Ass’n v. Nat’l Mediation Bd.,

29 F.3d 655 (D.C. Cir. 1994) .....................

29

United States v. 92 Buena Vista Ave.,

Rumson, N.J.,

507 U.S. 111 (1993) ...................................

28

vii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued

Page(s)

United States v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns,

310 U.S. 534 (1940) ...................................

26

United States v. Dalton,

960 F.2d 121 (10th Cir. 1992)...................

31

United States v. Jin Fuey Moy,

241 U.S. 394 (1916) ...................................

31

United States v. Spingola,

464 F.2d 909 (7th Cir. 1972).....................

31

United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v.

Lee, 641 F.3d 1126 (2011) .........................

18

Util. Air Regul. Grp. v. E.P.A.,

573 U.S. 302 (2014) ................................... 4, 33

W. Virginia v. Env’t Prot. Agency,

597 U.S. 697 (2022) ...................................

30

Whitman v. American Trucking Ass’ns,

531 U.S. 457 (2001) ............................... 2, 20, 30

STATUTES AND REGULATIONS

5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(c) .......................................

16

15 U.S.C. § 717f(a) ........................................ 5, 26

15 U.S.C. §§ 717f(c)-(e) .................................

27

15 U.S.C. § 717f(h) ....................................... 5, 27

16 U.S.C. § 1539(a)(2)(A)..............................

33

26 U.S.C. § 103 .............................................

31

28 U.S.C. § 1254(l) ........................................

1

42 U.S.C. § 300h(b)(1) .................................. 7, 18

viii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued

Page(s)

42 U.S.C. § 300h(d)(2) ..................................

18

42 U.S.C. § 300h-2(b)(1) ...............................

9

42 U.S.C. § 300h-2(b)(2) ...............................

9

42 U.S.C. § 300h-2(c) ....................................

9

42 U.S.C. § 300h-5 .............. 2, 4, 5, 7-9, 16, 18, 19,

....................................... 21, 22, 24-26, 28-34, 36

42 U.S.C.A. § 7412(n)(1)(A) ..........................

23

33 C.F.R. § 320.4(r)(1) ..................................

33

33 C.F.R. § 325.4(a)(3) ..................................

33

40 C.F.R. pts. 144-148 ..................................

8

§ 144.1(e) ...................................................

7

§ 144.36(a) .................................................

10

§ 144.40(a) .................................................

9

§ 144.55 .................................................. 9-11, 14

§ 146.13 .....................................................

23

§ 146.13(a) .................................................

8

§ 146.13(b) ................................................. 8, 14

§ 146.13(c) .................................................

8

§ 146.13(d) .................................... 8, 9, 14, 21-25

§ 146.5 .......................................................

8

§ 146.5(a)(2)...............................................

8

§ 147.251(a) ...............................................

7

50 C.F.R. § 22.220 ........................................

33

ix

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued

OTHER AUTHORITIES

Page(s)

53 Fed. Reg. 28118 (July 26, 1988) ..............

7, 8

EPA, UIC Permits in EPA’s Pacific

Southwest (Region 9) (Dec. 12, 2024),

https://www.epa.gov/uic/r9-uic-permits ...

35

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Petitioner Panoche Energy Center, LLC respectfully

petitions for a writ of certiorari to review the judgment

of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth

Circuit.

OPINIONS BELOW

The Ninth Circuit’s memorandum opinion is

unpublished and may be found at Panoche Energy

Ctr., LLC v. United States Env’t Prot. Agency, No. 231268, 2024 WL 3043005 (9th Cir. June 18, 2024) or in

Petitioner’s Appendix (“App.”) at App.1a-5a.

The Environmental Appeals Board (“EAB”)’s order

denying review is published at In re Panoche Energy

Ctr., LLC, 18 E.A.D. 818-52 (EAB 2023) and included

at App.8a-61a.

JURISDICTION

The Ninth Circuit issued its decision on June 18,

2024, and denied a timely petition for panel rehearing

on August 8, 2024. App.108a. Justice Kagan extended

the deadline to petition this Court for certiorari until

January 5, 2025. This Court has jurisdiction to

consider this Petition for Certiorari under 28 U.S.C.

§1254(1).

STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED

The full text of relevant statutes and regulations is

reproduced at App.109a-121a.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

“[A]n agency literally has no power to act… unless

and until Congress confers power upon it.” Louisiana

Pub. Serv. Comm’n v. F.C.C., 476 U.S. 355, 357 (1986).

Thus, when determining whether a radical new power

2

falls within an agency’s statutory authority, “[s]tudied

silence… can be as much a prohibition as an explicit

‘no.’” Entergy Corp. v. Riverkeeper, Inc., 556 U.S. 208,

239 (2009) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing Whitman v.

Am. Trucking Ass’ns, Inc., 531 U.S. 457, 467 (2001).

The Ninth Circuit neglected these maxims in holding

that a provision about groundwater monitoring in the

Safe Drinking Water Act (“SDWA” 1) unconditionally

authorizes EPA to compel permittees to undertake

major construction projects on private land they do not

own.

Panoche operates a natural gas power plant near

Firebaugh, California, that plays a critical role in the

state’s electrical infrastructure. The plant’s power

generation produces heat, so Panoche uses water to

cool its machinery. For over sixteen years, Panoche

has disposed of this nonhazardous cooling water by

injecting it into several onsite wells deep beneath the

Earth’s surface.

Under the SDWA, EPA regulates injection wells to

protect underground sources of water that are suitable

for human consumption (“potable” or “drinking”

water). EPA issued Panoche a Class I UIC permit in

2008, authorizing disposal of water used for cooling its

plant. Permit in hand, Panoche invested significant

resources to build and upgrade the facility. Panoche

injects its nonhazardous wastewater thousands of feet

below the nearest potable water supply, which is

separated from the injection zone by two impermeable

rock layers and a buffer aquifer that prevents saline

fluids in the injection zone from migrating upward into

This Petition refers to the Safe Drinking Water Act of 1974

and its amendments collectively as the SDWA, unless otherwise

indicated.

1

3

drinking water sources. Throughout the ten-year life

of Panoche’s initial UIC permit, EPA never identified

a permit violation or any cross-contamination linked

to Panoche’s wells.

When Panoche’s permit came up for renewal,

however, EPA suddenly speculated that Panoche’s

injection activities might somehow force salinated

water from the injection zone to break through the

seals of older, decommissioned oil and gas wells

located over a mile from Panoche’s facility and enter

the local drinking water supply by travelling up the

unused wellbores. No relevant conditions had changed

since EPA granted Panoche’s 2008 permit, and the

Agency did not point to any evidence that such

breakthroughs were a realistic possibility given that

the decommissioned wells had been sealed with

thousands of feet of heavy muds and cement plugs

(with approval from California regulators overseeing

the decommissionings). EPA accepted Panoche’s modeling regarding the amounts of pressure generated by

its injection activities and acknowledged that these

levels should be insufficient for fluids to penetrate

the mud and cement columns in the decommissioned

wellbores. The Agency conceded its regulations did

not require any “corrective actions” to address the

decommissioned wells.

EPA nonetheless imposed an unprecedented new

“monitoring requirement” in Panoche’s renewed permit,

ordering Panoche to drill and maintain an over halfmile-deep offsite monitoring well in the middle of an

active commercial almond orchard that Panoche does

not own and has no right to access. Panoche proposed

alternatives, pointing out that it was impossible for

it to comply with the condition without somehow

convincing the orchardist to allow Panoche to uproot a

4

portion of its almond orchard to install and operate a

monitoring well for at least ten years. But EPA refused

to consider these obstacles, stating that it had no

obligation to consider property rights or the feasibility

or cost of compliance when exercising its discretionary

authority to impose monitoring requirements.

EPA did not identify the statutory source of this

purported authority when imposing the new condition,

but it claimed for the first time on appeal that one

provision of the SDWA—42 U.S.C. § 300h-5—empowers

it to prescribe offsite monitoring requirements without

regard to whether a permittee possesses the property

rights needed to fulfill them. That provision—which

simply directs EPA to identify new groundwater

monitoring methods for early detection of leaks—

makes no mention of requiring permittees to undertake monitoring measures themselves, let alone demand

that they acquire new property rights to do so. No

court had ever cited the provision prior to the Ninth

Circuit’s opinion in this case. Nor had EPA relied on

the provision to unilaterally impose an offsite monitoring requirement the permittee lacks the property

rights to fulfill. But nearly four decades after its

enactment, EPA suddenly discovered that this seemingly innocuous provision unconditionally authorizes

it to compel a permittee to undertake multi-milliondollar construction projects on other people’s property,

and the Ninth Circuit agreed. The third-party

orchardist has since declined to sell the necessary

rights to Panoche for any price, leaving Panoche with

an impossible permit condition for a mission-critical

permit.

“When an agency claims to discover in a long-extant

statute an unheralded power to regulate,” this Court

“typically greet[s] its announcement with a measure

5

of skepticism.” Util. Air Regul. Grp. v. E.P.A., 573 U.S.

302, 324 (2014). If Congress had intended for EPA to

order permittees to drill monitoring wells on property

they do not own or control, it would have said so—or

at very least provided a mechanism by which permittees could accomplish such directives. Compare 42

U.S.C. § 300h-5 with 15 U.S.C. § 717f(a), (h) (authorizing the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission

(“FERC”) to allow natural gas companies to exercise

eminent domain, including to comply with agency

orders to construct facilities).

Congress did not include such features in the

SDWA. But the Ninth Circuit held that the statute

nevertheless confers unfettered authority to require

the use of other people’s property sub silentio simply

because it does not expressly forbid it. The ruling

expands federal administrative power in a way that

will not only lead to absurd results, but also threaten

complex infrastructure and industrial systems across

the country. The decision has already foisted upon

Panoche the dilemma of shutting down a critical piece

of California’s electrical infrastructure, compromising

the stability of an electrical grid serving nearly 40

million people, or risking severe legal penalties by

operating the facility in violation of its permit.

In upholding this novel offsite monitoring requirement, the Ninth Circuit effectively held that an agency

may compel permittees to acquire new rights to

specific real property, without regard to feasibility or

cost, as long as it furthers some broad statutory goal

and Congress has not explicitly forbidden it. No coherent limiting principle restricts this reasoning to

42 U.S.C. § 300h-5. The Ninth Circuit’s decision

bestows a power on federal agencies that is extraordinarily broad and ripe for abuse.

6

This Court should grant the petition, vacate the

Ninth Circuit’s judgment, and remand for reconsideration in light of Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo,

144 S. Ct. 2244 (2024). Alternatively, the Court should

grant certiorari to review the important question

presented by the Ninth Circuit’s decision, which has

significant implications for a broad range of federal

permittees and the scope of administrative authority

in the post-Loper-Bright legal landscape.

I. Factual and Legal Background

A. Panoche safely operates a crucial piece

of California’s energy infrastructure

without endangering local drinking

water.

Panoche operates a 417-megawatt, simple-cycle

“peaker” power generation plant located near

Firebaugh, California. 1-ER-52, 2-ER-152. 2 Panoche’s

plant is critical infrastructure for California. Because

the plant can reach full operational load in under

ten minutes, it provides on-demand energy to the

state’s electrical grid, increasing the grid’s stability

and ability to meet demand during peak hours when

solar, wind, or other energy sources become unavailable. 2-ER-155-56; 8-ER-2118-20. Panoche also plays

a significant role in supporting California’s electrical

needs as the state transitions to renewable energy

sources. 8-ER-2118.

When Panoche generates electricity, it uses water to

cool its equipment. 1-ER-41. This generates heated,

but nonhazardous, wastewater. Id. Panoche disposes

of this wastewater by injecting it into four on-site

“ER” citations refer to the Excerpts of Record filed in the

Ninth Circuit.

2

7

underground wells. Panoche injects the wastewater

at depths ranging from 7,199 to 8,897 feet beneath

the Earth’s surface—over a half mile below the

strata holding the area’s drinking water supply,

which stretch from the surface down to approximately

4,000 feet. 1-ER-41; 2-ER-354; 5-ER-1073; 5-ER-1165.

Panoche’s injection zone is also separated from underground sources of drinking water by two confining

layers of impermeable rock (one 1,148 and the other

308 feet thick), which are in turn separated by a

sandstone “buffer aquifer.” 1-ER-41; 5-ER-1171-72;

5-ER-1272-76. This buffer aquifer has the capacity to

“bleed off” any fluid movement from lower layers,

dispersing the liquid throughout the porous sandstone

before enough pressure builds to penetrate the upper

confining layer. These conditions ensure that Panoche’s

injection activities will not cause the migration of

fluids from the injection zone into underground

drinking water sources. See 53 Fed. Reg. 28118, 28133

(July 26, 1988) (“[A] ‘buffer’ aquifer/aquiclude

system… between the confining zone and the base of

the lowermost” drinking water is an “[a]dditional

[s]afeguard” to prevent fluid movement).

B. EPA regulates underground injection

wells.

Through the SDWA, Congress tasked EPA with

administering an “underground injection control program” to ensure that injection activities do not

endanger underground sources of drinking water. 3 See

42 U.S.C. § 300h(b)(1). Pursuant to this authority,

States may implement their own UIC programs with federal

approval, but EPA administers the program in states like

California that are not authorized to administer their own. See

40 C.F.R. §§ 144.1(e), 147.251(a).

3

8

EPA classified injection wells into six categories

depending on factors such as location, depth, and type

of material injected. 40 C.F.R. § 146.5. To inject fluids

underground, an entity must obtain an appropriate

UIC permit from EPA that corresponds with the

type of well it wishes to operate. See id. pts. 144-148.

Panoche’s wells are Class I injection wells—the category covering most injections occurring “beneath the

lowermost formation containing, within one quarter

mile of the well bore, an underground source of drinking water” regardless of whether the injected material

is hazardous or nonhazardous. Id. § 146.5(a)(2).

In 1986, Congress enacted 42 U.S.C. § 300h-5,

which directed EPA to modify its Class I regulations

to “identify [new] monitoring methods… including

groundwater monitoring” and then “determine the

applicability of such monitoring methods, wherever

appropriate, at locations and in such a manner as

to provide the earliest possible detection of fluid

migration into, or in the direction of, underground

sources of drinking water.” (emphasis added). Under

40 C.F.R. § 146.13(a)-(c), Class I UIC permits were

already required to include minimum operating, monitoring, and reporting requirements to ensure injection

activities do not cause fluids to migrate into underground sources of drinking water. Although 42 U.S.C.

§ 300h-5 does not mention permittees, EPA responded

by adding a new subsection (d) to § 146.13 that states

EPA “shall require the owner or operator”—i.e., the

UIC permittee—“to develop a monitoring program”

“[b]ased on a site-specific assessment of the potential

for fluid movement from the well or injection zone and

on the potential value of monitoring wells to detect

such movement.” 53 Fed. Reg. 28118, 28144 (July 26,

1988). The regulation identified one new mandatory

monitoring method that the permittee must utilize—

9

an annual shutdown of the well to review “the pressure buildup in the injection zone”—and five additional discretionary methods EPA may require the

permittee to employ. 40 C.F.R. § 146.13(d).

Finally, under 40 C.F.R. § 144.55, a Class I permit

applicant must submit a plan for “corrective action” if

the review area contains other “improperly sealed”

wells that penetrate the injection zone. The plan must

outline steps to prevent fluid from migrating through

these wells into drinking water sources, and if EPA

finds the plan adequate, it becomes a condition of the

permit. If not, EPA may require revisions, prescribe

its own corrective actions, or deny the application. Id.

The SDWA grants EPA significant enforcement

authority to punish violations of UIC permit conditions. In addition to modifying or terminating the

permit, id. § 144.40(a), the Agency can impose administrative penalties of up to $10,000 for each day of

violation (adjusted for inflation), or it can bring a civil

action with penalties up to $25,000 a day. 42 U.S.C.

§ 300h-2(b)(1), (c). For “willful” violations, the permittee can be imprisoned for up to three years. Id. § 300h2(b)(2)

C. For over a decade, Panoche dutifully

complied with all EPA regulations and

permitting requirements.

In 2008, EPA issued a Class I UIC permit to

Panoche that authorized the plant to operate up to six

onsite injection wells to dispose of its nonhazardous

wastewater (the “2008 Permit”). 1-ER-10. EPA did not

identify any improperly sealed wells in Panoche’s

review area, so the 2008 Permit did not include

any “corrective action” requirements under 40 C.F.R.

10

§ 144.55. Panoche completed construction of four

onsite injection wells in 2009. 1-ER-52.

For more than 14 years, Panoche operated these

injection wells without issue and in full compliance

with the 2008 Permit and its monitoring requirements. 1-ER-13; 1-ER-43; 1-ER-57. Throughout the

life of the 2008 Permit, EPA never detected any fluid

migration from Panoche’s injection activities, never

issued any permit violations or undertook any enforcement action, never modified or terminated the 2008

Permit, and never required Panoche to undertake

any type of corrective action. 1-ER-43; 1-ER-57; 3-ER613-14.

In late 2015, Panoche voluntarily invested millions

of dollars for a system that reduced its wastewater

volumes by up to 80%, further reducing the risk

of adverse environmental impact. 1-ER-13 at n.4;

1-ER-139; 2-ER-198; 2-ER-202-05; 3-ER-621. Panoche

has since maintained those reduced injection

volumes—and the reduced risk to the environment.

See 3-ER-621; 8-ER-2151.

D. EPA arbitrarily orders Panoche to do

the legally impossible: drill a 3,500-foot

monitoring well on someone else’s

almond orchard.

Panoche’s 2008 Permit was scheduled to expire in

2018. 40 C.F.R. § 144.36(a). In October 2017, Panoche

submitted a renewal application to EPA. 4 1-ER-41.

Over the following years, Panoche regularly communicated with EPA officials and diligently supplemented

its submissions as requested. 2-ER-259; 3-ER-610-20.

The renewal application administratively extended the term

of the 2008 Permit until EPA’s final renewal decision.

4

11

In July 2020, EPA shared an early draft of the

renewed permit. 2-ER-234. Although EPA regulations

condition the Agency’s authority to require “corrective

action” on EPA identifying improperly sealed wells in

the permit applicant’s review area, 40 C.F.R. § 144.55,

and although California regulators had certified that

each decommissioned well near Panoche had been

properly sealed, 2-ER-273-74; 2-ER-282; 8-ER-208995, EPA’s draft permit included two corrective action

requirements. 2-ER-234.

First, EPA proposed that Panoche go onto property

it does not own or control, locate an already-plugged

decommissioned well, reenter it, and install a new

cement plug deep in the wellbore. 2-ER-234-35.

Second, EPA proposed that Panoche drill and

operate two separate ambient monitoring wells—

again on property Panoche does not own and cannot

access without third-party authorization—near two

other decommissioned wells, including the Silver

Creek 18 Well at issue here. 2-ER-235-36. To be clear,

Panoche did not drill any of the decommissioned wells;

has never owned, operated, or used them; and has no

business relationship with their owners. Id.; 3-ER612; 5-ER-1211; 5-ER-1219-21. Moreover, each of the

decommissioned wells is located over a mile from

Panoche’s plant, with the Silver Creek 18 Well lying

1.25 miles away in what is now a privately-owned

commercial almond orchard. 1-ER-23; 5-ER-1220;

8-ER-2129.

EPA claimed these corrective actions were necessary because Panoche’s injection zone is “overpressurized,” though the Agency acknowledged this

had been the zone’s “native state” since before EPA

issued the 2008 Permit and was not the result of

Panoche’s activities. 3-ER-621; 5-ER-1182. The Agency

12

did not claim that Panoche’s injection activities were

endangering the region’s underground drinking water,

nor that water quality had deteriorated since Panoche

began operating its injection wells. See 1-ER-29 n.17;

3-ER-611-12. Nor did EPA identify any evidence that

decommissioned wells in the region were leaking. 5 2ER-273-74; 2-ER-282; 8-ER-2089-95.

In response to EPA’s draft permit, Panoche presented additional evidence demonstrating that its

injection activities could not endanger underground

drinking water, including academic studies, geological

evidence, and quantitative analyses showing the two

confining layers and intermediate buffer aquifer

prevented pressure from ever building to sufficient

levels for fluids to penetrate the thousands of feet of

heavy mud and cement filling the decommissioned

wells. 2-ER-290-347, 1-ER-41; 5-ER-1171-72; 5-ER1272-76. These geologic features are demonstrated in

the following diagram:

EPA would later assert it “need not provide empirical data or

direct evidence… to demonstrate that ambient monitoring is

necessary,” claiming it was enough “that the monitoring program

will provide meaningful data concerning whether there is [any]

potential for fluid movement[.]” 3-ER-611.

5

13

14

See also 1-ER-41; 4-ER-808; 5-ER-1171-72; 5-ER1272-76.

EPA published a revised draft of Panoche’s permit

for public comment in April 2021. 3-ER-634. Citing the

reduced injection volumes from Panoche’s enhanced

wastewater system, EPA nominally removed all 40

C.F.R. § 144.55 “corrective action” requirements from

the revised draft permit. See id.; 3-ER-614-16. But the

April 2021 draft re-imposed one of the very same

conditions as a “monitoring requirement,” still directing Panoche to install a monitoring well at Silver

Creek 18. EPA denied it was “recasting a corrective

action requirement as a monitoring requirement,” but

it nonetheless relied on the fact that “under 40 C.F.R.

§§ 146.13(b)&(d), EPA does not need to demonstrate

that a well is improperly plugged and abandoned as a

condition precedent to requiring additional monitoring,” as it would for corrective action under 40 C.F.R.

§ 144.55. 3-ER-613-14, 3-ER-616; 1-ER-13-14; 3-ER634; 3-ER-642-43.

EPA failed to address the buffer aquifer’s capacity

to disperse fluid pressure long before it ever reached

the drinking water supply. 2-ER-221, 3-ER-609-23.

And the Agency’s only argument for the inadequacy

of the 2008 Permit’s existing onsite monitoring

requirements—which could already detect if underground pressure increased levels sufficient to penetrate the heavy mud column filling the Silver Creek 18

Well—was that EPA did not trust the over twenty

scientific studies Panoche had provided regarding the

long-term strength of muds sealing decommissioned

wells. 3-ER-611, 3-ER-616-19. But most importantly,

the “monitoring requirement” retained the same flaw

as the “corrective actions”: it required Panoche to

install a monitoring well on property Panoche does not

15

own or have rights to access, with EPA expressly

refusing to consider the costs or feasibility. 3-ER-64243; 2-ER-354, 2-ER-318-20; 5-ER-1211.

In a last-ditch effort at compromise, Panoche responded to the revised draft by proposing at least

three alternatives to the offsite monitoring well that—

unlike EPA’s condition—Panoche could legally fulfill. 6

EPA rejected all three proposals, 8-ER-2155, and on

September 30, 2022, the Agency issued a final permit

that included the offsite monitoring condition (the

“Permit”). See 1-ER-49; 1-ER-53, 1-ER-65-71.

II. Procedural History

Panoche sought review from the EAB, arguing

among other things that EPA lacked unfettered

authority to require Panoche to install a monitoring

well on land it had no right to access. On May 26, 2023,

the EAB denied Panoche’s petition for review. 1-ER-4.

The EAB ruled that “issues of property rights and

access, as well as cost, are beyond the scope of the UIC

program,” and EPA “is not required to take ownership

of the land into account before issuing a final UIC

permit decision.” 1-ER-37-38. On June 7, 2023, EPA

issued the Notice of Final Permit Decision. 1-ER-3.

These included monitoring or reviewing data at an existing

offsite well that Panoche could legally access, 2-ER-266-67; 8-ER2109; identifying an alternative location where Panoche could

legally establish the monitoring well, 8-ER-2155; 3-ER-613;

and limiting Panoche’s injection rates even further beyond the

low levels already achieved by Panoche’s enhanced wastewater

system, 9-ER-2263.

6

16

On June 23, 2023, Panoche filed a petition for

review in the Ninth Circuit. 7 Panoche argued that the

court should vacate EPA’s permit decision under the

Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(c),

because the Agency lacked statutory authority to

impose monitoring conditions that were impossible for

Panoche to fulfill without property rights Panoche

does not possess and might not be able to obtain.

App.2a. Panoche alternatively contended that EPA

was statutorily required to consider the cost and

practicality of Panoche acquiring the necessary rights.

App.3a-4a. In response, EPA for the first time argued

that Congress had authorized it to order permittees to

utilize other people’s private property without regard

to costs or feasibility through 42 U.S.C. § 300h-5—the

1986 monitoring provision directing EPA to identify

new groundwater monitoring techniques and determine their appropriate applicability. App.2a.

On June 18, 2024, the Ninth Circuit issued a

memorandum opinion denying review. The court

ruled that the offsite monitoring requirement fell

“within EPA’s broad statutory discretion to prevent

the potential endangerment of drinking water by

underground injection.” Id. The court stated that

42 U.S.C. § 300h-5 mandates that EPA require monitoring “at locations and in such a manner as to provide

the earliest possible detection of fluid migration” and

“does not require EPA to consider property ownership

before determining where to require monitoring.” Id.

And the court ruled that, even assuming EPA was

required to consider costs, it sufficiently fulfilled that

duty by comparing the cost of monitoring to the value

The conditions were stayed during this appeal—first by

operation of EPA regulations, then by the Ninth Circuit’s order—

allowing Panoche to continue operating its power plant.

7

17

of the data that could be obtained and by requiring

offsite monitoring at one remote site rather than the

original three. Id.

On August 2, 2024, Panoche petitioned for panel

rehearing, which the Ninth Circuit denied on August

8, 2024, without requesting a response. App.108a.

On August 14, 2024, Panoche moved to stay the

Ninth Circuit’s mandate. Through briefing and supporting declarations, Panoche informed the court that

the owner of the almond orchard had refused to allow

Panoche to construct the well for any price, confirming

beyond all doubt that EPA’s condition was legally

impossible for Panoche to fulfill. Nonetheless, EPA

refused to stay the condition. On October 7, the Ninth

Circuit denied Panoche’s motion and the mandate took

effect.

Thereafter, Panoche’s UIC permit was fully effective, but Panoche could neither comply with the

permit’s offsite monitoring condition nor cease its

injection activities, which would require shutting down

its critical infrastructure powerplant. On November

21, EPA voluntarily entered a 120-day administrative

stay of the offsite monitoring condition to facilitate

settlement negotiations. But the condition will become

effective once more when the stay expires if Panoche

and the EPA are unable to reach agreement.

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT

By ratifying EPA’s unqualified power to impose

permitting conditions that are legally impossible for a

permittee to fulfill without acquiring new rights to

specific real property, the Ninth Circuit decided an

important question of federal law in a manner that

conflicts with this Court’s precedents and warrants

further review.

18

Administrative agencies are “creatures of statute,

bound to the confines of the statute that created

them.” United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Lee,

641 F.3d 1126, 1135 (2011); accord Nat’l Fed’n of

Indep. Bus. v. Dep’t of Lab., Occupational Safety &

Health Admin., 595 U.S. 109, 117 (2022). “[A]n agency

literally has no power to act… unless and until

Congress confers power upon it.” Louisiana Pub. Serv.

Comm’n v. F.C.C., 476 U.S. 355, 357 (1986). And

because “[a]gencies may act only when and how

Congress lets them,” Cent. United Life Ins. Co. v.

Burwell, 827 F.3d 70, 73 (D.C. Cir. 2016), the question

is not—as the Ninth Circuit asked below—whether

the SDWA precludes EPA from imposing the permitting requirements at issue. The question is whether

Congress intended to grant EPA the unqualified power

to compel permittees to utilize real property rights

they do not own for monitoring purposes. See Nat. Res.

Def. Council v. Regan (“NRDC”), 67 F.4th 397, 401

(D.C. Cir. 2023). (“EPA… has no inherent authority. It

has only the authority given it by the Safe Drinking

Water Act.”).

The Ninth Circuit claimed to find such a grant in

42 U.S.C. § 300h-5, 8 stating that the provision provides “broad statutory discretion to prevent the

potential endangerment of drinking water by underground injection.” App.2a. The court reasoned that the

The Ninth Circuit also cited 42 U.S.C. § 300h(b)(1) and (d)(2),

but these provisions concern only the minimum requirements

for the UIC regulations EPA enacts. They state simply that the

regulations “shall include inspection, monitoring, recordkeeping,

and reporting requirements” without specifying the substance of

the requirements or when and how they should be applied. And—

like 42 U.S.C. § 300h-5—the provisions do not mention property

rights or offsite monitoring.

8

19

statute’s text “mandates that EPA require monitoring”

“at locations and in such a manner as to provide

the earliest possible detection of fluid migration” without “requir[ing] EPA to consider property ownership

before determining where to require monitoring.” Id.

The court further stated that “nothing [else] in the

language or structure of the” SDWA limits this “broad

grant of authority to EPA.” App.3a.

The Ninth Circuit was incorrect on all counts. The

text and structure of the SDWA clearly indicates EPA

is not authorized to mandate that permittees utilize

property they lack any right to use, and multiple other

considerations would still weigh heavily against such

an interpretation even if the statute were silent on the

matter.

I. Because the Ninth Circuit’s Ruling Cannot

be Reconciled with this Court’s Intervening Loper Bright Decision, this Court

Should Vacate the Judgment and Remand

for Further Proceedings.

The Ninth Circuit’s ruling hinged on a now-defunct

approach to construing congressional delegations of

authority, wherein the court presumed from statutory

silence that Congress unconditionally authorized the

EPA to order any type of monitoring, regardless of

the practical consequences and risks. See App.3a

(“Panoche argues that because the Act does not expressly authorize offsite monitoring, the EPA must

lack the authority to require it. However, Panoche

identifies nothing in the language or structure of the

statute limiting the broad grant of authority to the

EPA.”). Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo, 144

S. Ct. 2244 (2024)—which this Court issued ten days

after the Court of Appeals’ decision—definitively

ended the blanket presumption of agency authority,

20

and with it, the basis for the Ninth Circuit’s broad

statutory holding.

Under this Court’s now-overruled Chevron precedent, 9 courts were generally obliged to defer to an

agency when the relevant statute was silent or ambiguous as to whether a matter was within the agency’s

power. City of Arlington, Tex. v. F.C.C., 569 U.S. 290,

296 (2013) (holding Chevron required deference “to an

agency’s interpretation of a statutory ambiguity that

concerns the scope of the agency’s statutory authority”

(citing Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources

Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984)). This deference was predicated on the fiction that, when a statute

is silent or ambiguous on a question, Congress intends

for the agency administering the statute to answer

that question for itself. Loper Bright, 144 S. Ct. at 2265

(citing Chevron., 467 U.S. at 843). Stated differently,

Chevron assumed that “statutory gaps” are implicit

delegations of agency authority to interpret the

statute. Id.

Loper Bright recognized that statutory silence or

“ambiguity is simply not a delegation of lawinterpreting power.” Id. (citation omitted). Such gaps

are often unintentional on Congress’s part, and “statutes, no matter how impenetrable, do—in fact, must—

have a single, best meaning” that it is the power and

duty of courts to determine, not agencies. Id. at 2266.

“That is no less true when the ambiguity is about the

Although the Ninth Circuit did not expressly invoke Chevron,

it was duty-bound to follow it, and it ruled that two cases

establishing exceptions to the now-defunct framework did not

apply, suggesting by negative implication it was applying the

precedent. See App.3a (citing FDA v. Brown & Williamson

Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 159 (2000) and Whitman, 529 U.S.

at 159).

9

21

scope of an agency’s own power—perhaps the occasion

on which abdication in favor of the agency is least

appropriate” Id. (emphasis in original).

In construing the SDWA, the Ninth Circuit was

wrong to place the onus on Panoche to “identif[y]”

limitations in the “language or structure of the

statute,” and to otherwise presume a broad grant

of agency authority as the baseline. App.3a. This

Court should therefore “GVR”—grant this petition,

vacate the Court of Appeals’ decision, and remand for

reconsideration—as it has done with several other

petitions since Loper Bright. Otherwise, the Court

should grant the petition and resolve the question

presented as argued below.

II. Alternatively, the Court Should Grant the

Petition and Review the Ninth Circuit’s

Novel Approach to EPA Permitting.

A. The text of the SDWA requires EPA to

consider property rights, costs, and

feasibility when imposing monitoring

requirements.

The Ninth Circuit held that 42 U.S.C. § 300h-5

authorized EPA to impose the offsite monitoring

condition, reasoning that nothing in the statute or

the rest of the SDWA indicates that EPA must

consider the scope of a permittee’s property rights

when deciding whether and where to require ambient

monitoring. In doing so, the court disregarded 42

U.S.C. § 300h-5’s plain language.

As discussed, Section 300h-5’s text first directed

EPA to modify its regulations for Class I injection

wells to “identify [new] monitoring methods[.]”

42 U.S.C. § 300h-5. EPA responded by promulgating

40 C.F.R. § 146.13(d), which identifies one mandatory

22

and five discretionary monitoring methods EPA may

require of a permittee “[b]ased on a site-specific assessment.” 40 C.F.R. § 146.13(d).

Section 300h-5 then provides that, “in accordance

with such regulations,” EPA

shall determine the applicability of [the

regulatorily identified] monitoring methods,

wherever appropriate, at locations and in such

a manner as to provide the earliest possible

detection of fluid migration into, or in the

direction of, underground sources of drinking

water from such wells, based on its assessment of the potential for fluid migration from

the injection zone that may be harmful to

human health or the environment.

42 U.S.C. § 300h-5 (emphasis added).

The text contains multiple indications that EPA

must consider a permittee’s property rights (and

related costs) and may not order a permittee to

conduct monitoring the permittee lacks the right to

perform. First, Congress instructed EPA to apply

the monitoring methods that EPA identified only

“wherever appropriate.” Id. “‘[A]ppropriate’ is the classic

broad and all-encompassing term that naturally and

traditionally includes consideration of all relevant

factors.” Michigan v. EPA, 576 U.S. 743, 752 (2015).

Section 300h-5 thus explicitly directs EPA to consider

all factors bearing on whether the identified monitoring methods are suitable for a given location.

When it promulgated 40 C.F.R. § 146.13(d), EPA

chose to place the onus on UIC permittees for each of

the ambient monitoring methods the Agency identified. Consequently, any costs or obstacles to the

permittee’s employing the selected monitoring method

23

are highly “relevant factors” bearing on whether the

method is “appropriate” for that “location.” Id. This

Court has already ruled as much in Michigan v. EPA,

where it considered a provision of the Clean Air Act

that “directs the Agency to regulate power plants if it

‘finds such regulation is appropriate and necessary.’”

576 U.S. at 751 (quoting 42 U.S.C.A. § 7412(n)(1)(A)).

Like here, EPA claimed it had no statutory obligation

to consider the cost of compliance when determining

whether regulation was “appropriate and necessary,”

and, like here, the Agency explicitly refused to do so.

Id. This Court rejected EPA’s construction, ruling that

the Agency had “strayed far beyond” “the bounds of

reasonable interpretation” by construing the statute

to allow it to “ignore” such a highly relevant factor;

“[r]ead naturally in the present context, the phrase

‘appropriate and necessary’ requires at least some

attention to cost.” Id. at 752 (emphasis added). The

Court further explained that the “costs” EPA was

obliged to consider include “more than the expense of

complying with regulations; any disadvantage could

be termed a cost.” Id.

The same is true here. EPA decided it was

“appropriate” for Panoche to perform monitoring on

someone else’s property while expressly refusing to

consider the cost of compliance, including the implications of the property owner’s functional monopoly on

the rights Panoche would need to fulfill the Agency’s

order. 10 App.59a. Worse still, the Agency refused to

The Ninth Circuit claimed EPA had sufficiently considered

costs by stating “monitoring is not particularly expensive when

compared to the information received.” App.4a. But EPA was not

addressing the offsite monitoring requirement. It was summarizing the 40 C.F.R. § 146.13 preamble to explain why it believed

“consideration of cost is not… a consideration in setting permit

conditions.” 3-ER-615. The court also cited EPA’s reduction of

10

24

consider whether Panoche could legally or practically

perform the ordered monitoring at all. Id. (“[I]ssues of

property rights and access, as well as cost, are beyond

the scope of the UIC program.”). As in Michigan,

EPA’s approach is not “even rational, never mind

‘appropriate.’” 11 576 U.S. at 752.

The Ninth Circuit and EPA made much of the fact

that 42 U.S.C. § 300h-5 does not expressly mention

any obligation for EPA to consider a permittee’s

property rights. But nothing in the statute’s text

required EPA to make UIC permittees responsible

for the new monitoring techniques in the first place.

EPA could have identified methods that involved

direct monitoring by the Agency, analysis of data

collected by third parties, or any number of other

monitoring techniques that did not place the burden of

monitoring on the permittee. It is thus unsurprising

that 42 U.S.C. § 300h-5 includes a general directive

that EPA consider all pertinent factors to determine

whether the identified methods are “appropriate” for

a location rather than any specific instruction to

consider a permittee’s property rights.

Second, 42 U.S.C. § 300h-5’s text also directs EPA

to “determine the applicability” of the 40 C.F.R.

§ 146.13(d) monitoring methods “at locations and in

such a manner as to provide the earliest possible

three required offsite wells to one. EPA removed the corrective

actions because there was no basis for them, not due to their cost.

3-ER-613, 616. Moreover, any cursory consideration of expense

would be woefully incomplete where EPA expressly refused “to

take ownership of land into account.” 3-ER-612.

To be clear, nothing prevents EPA from working with permittees or landowners to ensure the permittee has or can obtain

necessary rights prior to issuing a final legally binding UIC

permit that requires offsite monitoring. See infra § II.D.

11

25

detection of fluid migration.” EPA contends this

phrase authorizes it to require monitoring at any

location it chooses regardless of property rights,

guided only by its assessment of where anyone

could first detect fluid migration. But the monitoring

methods EPA identified in 40 C.F.R. § 146.13(d) do not

involve monitoring by just anyone. They require

monitoring by the permittee, so to apply them “at

locations and in such a manner as to provide the

earliest possible detection of fluid migration,” the EPA

inherently must evaluate where and how the permittee

could first detect fluid migration through the identified means. By its very nature, that assessment

requires EPA to consider the permittee’s legal rights

and practical capabilities, including whether the

permittee has the property rights necessary to carry

out the selected monitoring method at the selected

location.

Put another way, it is not “possible” for a permittee

to “detect[]… fluid migration” via any of the 40 C.F.R.

§ 146.13(d) methods at locations where the permittee

cannot employ the methods at all. A monitoring

requirement that is impossible to fulfill does not

“provide” any “possible detection of fluid migration” at

all, at any point in time; monitoring that cannot occur

cannot detect fluid migration. Cf. Riverkeeper, Inc. v.

E.P.A., 475 F.3d 83, 99 (2d Cir. 2007) (holding statute

requiring permittees use “best technology available for

minimizing adverse environmental impact” did not

mandate technologies the industry could not

reasonably afford because such technology is “not

‘available’ in any meaningful sense”), rev’d on other

grounds sub nom. Entergy Corp. v. Riverkeeper, Inc.,

556 U.S. 208, (2009).

26

In short, the Ninth Circuit and EPA’s interpretation

is incompatible with 42 U.S.C. § 300h-5’s plain text.

The court read the qualifier “where appropriate” out of

the statute and did not consider whether a monitoring

requirement can “provide the earliest possible detection of fluid migration” when a permittee lacks the

rights needed to fulfill it.

B. The structure of the SDWA confirms

EPA may not compel a permittee to

utilize property rights the permittee

does not possess.

The Ninth Circuit also claimed that “nothing in

the… structure of [the SDWA] limit[s]” EPA’s authority to impose monitoring conditions that are impossible for a permittee to fulfill without acquiring

another party’s property rights. App.3a. But the

SDWA lacks the basic features Congress includes in

regulatory statutes that involve these kinds of compelled real property transactions. Allowing EPA to

effectively order permittees to undertake such transactions in the absence of such features leads to the

type of “absurd or futile results” that courts must

avoid when construing a statute. Nixon v. Missouri

Mun. League, 541 U.S. 125, 138 (2004) (citing United

States v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 310 U.S. 534, 543

(1940)).

When Congress intends for a regulatory regime to

include the transfer of property rights between private

parties, it provides a mechanism by which the administering agency or regulated entities can accomplish

those transfers. For example, the Natural Gas Act

(“NGA”) grants FERC the authority to order natural

gas companies “to extend or improve” their interstate

pipelines to connect to local distributors when “such

action [is] necessary or desirable in the public

27

interest.” 15 U.S.C. § 717f(a). Congress anticipated

that natural gas companies would need to acquire new

property rights to fulfill such a requirement. Congress

also recognized that landowners might refuse to sell

the necessary property rights or demand an unreasonable price in light of the natural gas companies’

inflexible obligation to comply with FERC’s orders.

Congress thus authorized FERC to certify a natural

gas company to exercise eminent domain proceedings,

compelling property owners to transfer property rights

for a reasonable price when the company “cannot

acquire by contract, or is unable to agree with the

owner of property to the compensation to be paid for,

the necessary right-of-way” or “land or other property”

“to construct, operate, and maintain a pipe line.” 15

U.S.C. § 717f(h).

Recognizing the significance of the power to force

unwilling private parties to transact for property

rights, Congress set forth detailed procedural and

substantive requirements FERC must fulfill when

authorizing a natural gas company to use eminent

domain. See id. §§ 717f(c)-(e) (establishing requirements for initial certificate of public convenience and

necessity); id. § 717f(h) (authorizing certificate holders

to acquire necessary rights-of-way through exercise of

specified eminent domain procedures); City of Oberlin

v. FERC, 39 F.4th 719, 722 (D.C. Cir. 2022) (explaining FERC “evaluate[s] all the factors bearing on the

public interest,” balancing the “negative impact on…

[a] landowners’ property” and other “adverse effects

that cannot be eliminated against the public benefits”). This structure demonstrates that, when Congress grants an agency the authority to require that

one party use another’s private property, it does

so explicitly, with carefully crafted guardrails to

ensure the agency uses the power only after mindful

28

deliberation. It does not bequeath such a significant

power implicitly or incidentally by merely declining to

expressly prohibit it.

In contrast to the NGA, the SDWA does not include

any provision authorizing the use of eminent domain

to secure land for offsite monitoring wells or any other

purpose. UIC permittees thus have no mechanism to

compel landowners to transfer the necessary property

rights for a reasonable price. See Oberlin, 39 F.4th at

723 (holding the lack of any express eminent domain

authorization for import/export facilities meant the

process was unavailable). Without such processes, it is

impossible for UIC permittees to comply with EPA

orders like the one here if the landowner demands a

prohibitively high price or outright refuses to allow the

ordered monitoring (as the almond orchardist did

here). Even if the landowner is willing to part with

the necessary rights for a price the permittee can

theoretically pay, the permittee could be forced to pay

far above their fair market value by virtue of the

inherently unequal bargaining positions this type of

EPA order creates. If Congress intended that UIC

permittees be subjected to such unfair treatment, it

would have said so. See Nixon, 541 U.S. at 138 (“We

think it farfetched that Congress meant” a statute

to be interpreted to “often accomplish nothing” and

result in arbitrarily differing treatment “in the

absence of any clearer signal”); United States v. 92

Buena Vista Ave., Rumson, N.J., 507 U.S. 111, 124

(1993) (“[T]he burden of persuading us that Congress

intended such an inequitable result is especially

heavy.”).

The clear implication of Congress omitting any

mechanism for a permittee to comply with an EPA

order to utilize land it lacks rights to is that Congress

29

did not grant EPA such authority. See NRDC, 67 F.4th

at 404. While the protection of underground drinking

water is undoubtedly important, the SDWA is simply

not structured to compel permittees to acquire property rights to do so. See Brown & Williamson, 529 U.S.

at 125 (“Regardless of how serious the [purported]

problem an administrative agency seeks to address…

it may not exercise its authority ‘in a manner that is

inconsistent with the administrative structure that

Congress enacted into law.’” (citation omitted)).

C. If Congress had intended to grant EPA

such an unusual, far-reaching power, it

would have been explicit—and it would

not have taken EPA nearly forty years

to notice.

Even if the Ninth Circuit was correct that nothing

in the SDWA speaks to EPA’s obligation to consider

property rights when imposing monitoring conditions,

the omission would not support EPA’s claimed authority to require monitoring the permittee has no right to

perform. The absence of an express statutory requirement or prohibition does not necessarily mean a power

is included within an agency’s statutory authority. 12

See, e.g., Entergy, 556 U.S. at 223 (noting “the rather

unremarkable proposition that sometimes statutory

silence, when viewed in context, is best interpreted as

limiting agency discretion”); Ry. Labor Execs. Ass’n v.

Nat’l Mediation Bd., 29 F.3d 655, 671 (D.C. Cir. 1994)

(“Were courts to presume a delegation of power absent

an express withholding of such power, agencies would

Courts have rejected this type of permitted-if-not-forbidden

reasoning regarding EPA’s SDWA authority. NRDC, 67 F.4th at

404 (ruling Congress did not delegate EPA authority to do

anything it wishes so long as it does not “contravene any express

statutory command”).

12

30

enjoy virtually limitless hegemony.”). Instead, the

operative question is whether, in the broader “statutory context,” Congress’s decision not to explicitly

address the issue is “best interpreted” as permitting or

denying the agency the power in question. Entergy,

556 U.S. at 223 (citing Whitman, 531 U.S. at 457, and

American Textile Mfrs. Inst., Inc v. Donovan, 452 U.S.

490 (1981)).

Here, that context confirms that, if Congress had

intended EPA to have such a significant and unusual

power, it would have said so. This Court presumes that

Congress does not flippantly press against the legal

and customary boundaries of federal administrative

authority without commenting on its intentions, see

W. Virginia v. Env’t Prot. Agency, 597 U.S. 697, 721-22

(2022) (collecting cases), and EPA’s interpretation

strains these limits in multiple ways.

First, Congress does not hide delegations of significant powers or “alter the fundamental details of

a regulatory scheme in vague terms or ancillary

provisions—it does not, one might say, hide elephants

in mouseholes.” Whitman, 531 U.S. at 468; Brown &

Williamson, 529 U.S. at 159. Section 300h-5 is a

simple provision about developing new groundwater

monitoring techniques, so seemingly uncontroversial

that no court cited it in the 37 years proceeding this

case. Yet EPA claims this statute empowers it to

require any Class I UIC permittee to drill and operate

a monitoring well anywhere the Agency believes will

provide the earliest detection of fluid migration—

regardless of feasibility or cost, and irrespective of who

owns the land or how it is currently being used.

EPA’s new claimed authority has far-reaching

consequences. See infra § II.E. “Congress could not

have intended to delegate a [power] of such economic

31

and political significance to an agency in so cryptic a

fashion.” Brown & Williamson, 529 U.S. at 160.

Second, EPA’s interpretation raises due process

concerns. Under the longstanding canon of constitutional avoidance, “[a] statute must be construed, if

fairly possible, so as to avoid not only the conclusion

that it is unconstitutional, but also grave doubts upon

that score.” United States v. Jin Fuey Moy, 241 U.S.

394, 401 (1916). Even if it were plausible to interpret

42 U.S.C. § 300h-5 as providing EPA unfettered

authorization to impose monitoring conditions that

the permittee lacks the property rights to fulfill, such

a construction would raise serious doubts as to the

statute’s constitutionality.

The constitutional guarantee of substantive due

process protects against arbitrary government actions

that are inherently unfair, “regardless of the procedures used to reach that decision.” Onyx Properties

LLC v. Bd. of Cnty. Commissioners of Elbert Cnty., 838

F.3d 1039, 1043 (10th Cir. 2016) (citation omitted).

The Constitution thus prohibits the government from

penalizing a party for reasons that are “arbitrary and

irrational.” E. Enterprises v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498, 537

(1998). For instance, it violates fundamental fairness

to convict a criminal defendant for failing to do an act

the defendant legally or physically cannot do. See, e.g.,

United States v. Dalton, 960 F.2d 121, 124 (1992); United

States v. Spingola, 464 F.2d 909, 911 (7th Cir. 1972).

This principle is not limited to criminal law. In

Cont’l Bank v. United States, for example, Congress

had made the interest earned on certain local

government bonds tax exempt “at the election of the

issuer, made at such time and in such manner as the

[IRS] shall by regulations prescribe.” 517 F. Supp. 918,

923 (E.D. Pa. 1981) (quoting 26 U.S.C. § 103), aff’d,

32

688 F.2d 819 (3d Cir. 1982). “[A]lthough not adopted

until July 5, 1972, the regulation” that the IRS

promulgated “purport[ed] to establish a September 5,

1971 deadline for” local governments to elect the

exemption. Id. On review, the district court questioned

“whether the regulation... accords [with] due process

of law”: “Notwithstanding the deference which must

be accorded to IRS regulations, and the relatively

narrow scope of review of such regulations, the statute

obviously does not permit the Secretary to impose

procedural requirements which are impossible to

fulfill.” Id. at 923-34. The court thus ruled that, “to the

extent that the 1972 regulation imposes a 1971

deadline for filing an election statement, it is patently

invalid.” Id.

EPA orders like the monitoring condition at issue

implicate similar concerns. Because the SDWA does

not authorize the use of eminent domain to compel

landowners to transfer property rights, it is impossible

for a permittee to comply with a requirement to use

land it does not own if the current owner refuses to

cooperate. Permittees who invested millions and built

up their operations in reliance on an initial ten-year

UIC permit would be forced to shut down or face civil

and criminal liability for not taking actions they have

no power to take. Penalizing permittees for failing

to do the impossible raises serious questions about

fundamental fairness. If Congress had wished to wade

into these choppy constitutional waters, it would have

said so clearly. See Clark v. Martinez, 543 U.S. 371,

381 (2005) (explaining constitutional avoidance “rest[s]

on the reasonable presumption that Congress did

not intend the alternative which raises serious

constitutional doubts”).

33

Finally, the EPA’s interpretation is dubious given it

took the Agency nearly four decades to discover a

remarkable power hidden in an unremarkable statute.

Between the statute’s enactment in 1986 and Panoche’s

2022 final permit, EPA never imposed a monitoring

condition that a UIC permittee lacked rights to fulfill.

This Court employs particular “skepticism” when an

agency purports to suddenly discover extraordinary

power in a “long-extant statute” that it never before

utilized in such a manner, Utility Air Regulatory

Group, 573 U.S. at 324, and that is precisely what EPA

did here.

D. Reversal will not unduly hamper SDWA

regulation.

Panoche contends only that EPA cannot impose a

monitoring requirement unilaterally where the permittee lacks legal rights to comply. Yet EPA has ample

authority to carry out the SDWA.

Numerous regulatory regimes allow permits to be

conditioned on the permittee taking some type of

offsite action, frequently to mitigate or offset adverse

impacts from the permitted activity. See, e.g., 16 U.S.C.

§ 1539(a)(2)(A) (requiring mitigation for Endangered

Species Act take permits); 33 C.F.R. §§ 320.4(r)(1),

325.4(a)(3) (authorizing offsite mitigation requirements for Clean Water Act and other water-related

permits); 50 C.F.R. § 22.220 (mitigation requirement

for eagle take permits under Bald and Golden Eagle

Protection Act). But these offsite requirements are not

imposed without consideration of the permittee’s

ability to fulfill them.

Agencies work with the permit applicant to develop

offsite conditions with which the applicant can comply.

Generally, they employ a process that involves the

34

applicant submitting a proposal to address agency

concerns, the parties negotiating over modifications or

alternatives, and the agency ultimately accepting or

rejecting the proposal based on whether it satisfies

statutory and regulatory criteria. See, e.g., City of

Carmel-By-The-Sea v. U.S. Dep’t of Transp., 123 F.3d

1142, 1152 (9th Cir. 1997) (“If the objecting agencies

remain opposed to the wetlands mitigation plan each

can voice its concerns as the [Clean Water Act] permit

process evolves.”). An agency can also work with

permittees and landowners to broker a transfer of

needed rights prior to issuing a final permit, allowing

negotiations to proceed without the imbalance in

bargaining power created by the coercive force of a

binding final permit condition. If the permit applicant

and agency are unable to reach agreement regarding

a feasible measure that resolves the agency’s concerns,

the agency may deny the permit.

In other words, when the permittee has the necessary rights for offsite monitoring or can acquire

them for a reasonable price before EPA imposes the

condition—a likelier outcome when negotiations are

premised on the monitoring site being only one option

under consideration—it may be entirely “appropriate”

for EPA to require the permittee use those rights.

42 U.S.C. § 300h-5. And EPA can of course deny the

permit application if there is truly no way to operate

the well safely without utilizing property rights the

permittee does not have and cannot acquire.

E. The Question Presented has significant

legal and practical implications that

warrant review.

Finally, the Question presented is of great importance in terms of both practical ramifications and

legal precedent.

35

Panoche is not the only entity managing a critical

piece of the nation’s infrastructure who requires a

Class I UIC permit for its continued operations. There

are over a dozen Class I permit holders in EPA’s

Pacific Southwest region alone, most of them powerplants whose permits are presumably as central to

their operations as Panoche’s. 13 These and many other

industrial operators across the country rely on fair and

predictable federal permitting processes. Leaving the

Ninth Circuit’s decision in place will impose significant practical and legal costs on these entities. EPA

has already demonstrated it is willing to exercise

its purported authority in ways that imperil these

permittees’ very ability to operate, threatening to

shutter utilities and other operators who collectively

provide critical services like electricity to significant

portions of the population.

Under EPA’s reasoning, it could require permittees

to drill a well in the middle of Times Square if it

believes that is where fluid migration can earliest be

detected. Even if monitoring at more practical locations could ensure the permittees’ injection wells

operated safely, they would be forced to shut down or

face severe legal penalties if they are unable to acquire

the rights to drill there. EPA could also grant windfalls

to specific private landowners, increasing the value of

their properties by effectively mandating utilities or

other large businesses purchase monitoring rights at

whatever price they demand. EPA’s claimed authority

would have far-reaching implications across multiple

industries and have ramifications for the populations

EPA, UIC Permits in EPA’s Pacific Southwest (Region 9),

(Dec. 12, 2024), https://www.epa.gov/uic/r9-uic-permits.

13

36

who depend on UIC permittees for electricity and

other crucial services.

Moreover, nothing limits the Ninth Circuit’s reasoning to 42 U.S.C. § 300h-5. The court held that an

agency may compel a permittee to utilize other parties’

property regardless of costs or feasibility so long as

relevant statutes do not expressly prohibit it. Federal

agencies administer countless permitting regimes

regulating all manner of activities in a variety of

fields. The Ninth Circuit’s holding is precedent that

these agencies may effectively compel permittees to

purchase rights, goods, and services from specific

private parties under threat of permit revocation and

legal penalties. The sheer scope of this power is

staggering—as is the potential for abuse.

With Loper Bright, this Court ushered in a new era

of administrative law, changing the basic way federal

courts interpret congressional delegations of administrative power. The Court should grant certiorari to

correct the Ninth Circuit’s faulty methodology and

provide guidance to lower courts faced with similar

claims of agency authority derived from the absence of

express statutory limitations.

37

CONCLUSION

The petition for a writ of certiorari should be

granted.

Respectfully submitted,

VARU CHILAKAMARRI

Counsel of Record

ANKUR K. TOHAN

J. TIMOTHY HOBBS

SPENCER MCCANDLESS

K&L GATES LLP

1601 K Street, NW

Washington, D.C. 20006

(202) 778-9000

varu.chilakamarri@klgates.com

ankur.tohan@klgates.com

tim.hobbs@klgates.com

spencer.mccandless@klgates.com

Counsel for Petitioner

January 3, 2025

APPENDIX

APPENDIX TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

APPENDIX A: MEMORANDUM,

U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

(June 18, 2024) .................................................

1a

APPENDIX B: NOTICE OF PERMIT DECISION,

U.S. E.P.A., Region IX

(June 7, 2023) ...................................................

6a

APPENDIX C: ORDER DENYING REVIEW,

Environmental Appeals Board

(May 26, 2023) ..................................................

8a

APPENDIX D: FINAL PERMIT, U.S. E.P.A.

(2023) ................................................................

62a

APPENDIX E: ORDER,

U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

(August 8, 2024) ............................................... 108a

APPENDIX F: 42 U.S.C. § 300h-5. ................... 109a

APPENDIX G: 42 U.S.C. § 300h. ...................... 110a

APPENDIX H: 5 U.S.C. § 706. .......................... 116a

APPENDIX I: 40 C.F.R. § 146.13. ..................... 117a

APPENDIX J: 40 C.F.R. § 144.55. .................... 120a

1a

APPENDIX A

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

[FILED: JUN 18 2024]

————

No. 23-1268

————

PANOCHE ENERGY CENTER, LLC,

Petitioner,

v.

UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL

PROTECTION AGENCY; MICHAEL S. REGAN,

Administrator of the United States Environmental

Protection Agency; MARTHA GUZMAN ACEVES,

Regional Administrator of Region 9 of U.S.,

Respondents.

————

On Petition for Review of an Order of the

Environmental Protection Agency

————

Argued and Submitted May 22, 2024

Anchorage, Alaska

————

MEMORANDUM *

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not

precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

*

2a

Before: BYBEE, FRIEDLAND, and MILLER, Circuit

Judges.

Panoche Energy Center petitions for review of an

underground injection control permit issued by the

Environmental Protection Agency. We have jurisdiction under 42 U.S.C. § 300j-7(a)(2), and we deny the

petition.

Under the Administrative Procedure Act, we “set

aside” agency action that is “arbitrary, capricious,” “not

in accordance with law,” or “in excess of statutory

jurisdiction, authority, or limitations.” 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A),

(C). Agency action is arbitrary and capricious if “the

agency has relied on factors which Congress has not

intended it to consider, entirely failed to consider an

important aspect of the problem, offered an explanation

for its decision that runs counter to the evidence before

the agency, or is so implausible that it could not be

ascribed to a difference in view or the product of

agency expertise.” Food & Water Watch v. EPA, 20 F.4th

506, 514 (9th Cir. 2021) (quoting Motor Vehicle Mfrs.

Ass’n of U.S. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins., 463 U.S. 29,

43 (1983)).

1. Panoche argues that the EPA violated the Safe

Drinking Water Act by requiring ambient monitoring

on property Panoche does not own. But the monitoring

condition was within the EPA’s broad statutory discretion to prevent the potential endangerment of drinking

water by underground injection. The statute mandates

that the EPA require monitoring “wherever appropriate,

at locations and in such a manner as to provide the

earliest possible detection of fluid migration” that

could adversely affect human health. 42 U.S.C. § 300h5; see also 42 U.S.C. § 300h(b)(1), (d)(2). It does not

require the EPA to consider property ownership before

determining where to require monitoring.

3a

Panoche argues that because the Act does not

expressly authorize offsite monitoring, the EPA must

lack the authority to require it. However, Panoche

identifies nothing in the language or structure of the

statute limiting the broad grant of authority to the

EPA. Nor does the offsite monitoring condition implicate federalism concerns. The permit does not interfere

with state regulation of private property; it merely

requires Panoche to contract for access to the necessary

land. Whether the EPA may require offsite monitoring

is also not a “major question”: The EPA is not asserting

the power to regulate “a significant portion of the

American economy,” FDA v. Brown & Williamson

Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 159 (2000), and it is far

from “implausible” that Congress contemplated offsite

monitoring as a means of achieving its clear directive,

Whitman v. American Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457,

468 (2001).

Finally, the EPA’s reading of the statute does not

implicate the eminent domain power or otherwise

interfere with property rights. By its terms, the permit

“does not convey property rights of any sort or any

exclusive privilege” or “authorize . . . any invasion of

other private rights.” And the EPA has consistently

maintained that ensuring “access to private property

to meet the requirements of the permit conditions” is

“outside the scope of [underground injection control]

permitting authority.”

2. Panoche also argues that the EPA failed to

consider the cost of monitoring on property it does not

own, in contravention of the Safe Drinking Water Act,

the agency’s implementing regulations, and agency

precedent. Assuming without deciding that some degree

of cost consideration is appropriate, we conclude that

the EPA’s consideration of costs was adequate. The

4a

EPA determined that “monitoring is not particularly

expensive when compared to the information received,”

and it responded to Panoche’s cost concerns by reducing the number of locations and the depth at which the

permit required monitoring. The EPA explained that

the permit’s monitoring requirement “would provide

the empirical data needed about subsurface pressures,

while limiting the burden and cost” of monitoring.

Panoche also appears to have made no effort to

determine the cost of accessing the relevant land. If,

after negotiating with the neighboring landowner,

Panoche is unable to secure access to the necessary

land, the permit allows Panoche to request changes to

the monitoring condition. See 40 C.F.R. § 144.39(a)(2).

3. The EPA’s decision to require an ambient

monitoring well near abandoned well Silver Creek #18

was not arbitrary and capricious. The EPA did not

“entirely fail[] to consider an important aspect of the

problem,” State Farm, 463 U.S. at 43, by rejecting

Panoche’s concerns about its property rights. As noted

above, the EPA adequately considered the costs

associated with offsite monitoring. Nor did the EPA

treat Panoche differently from similarly situated

permittees by requiring offsite monitoring in this case.

Panoche identifies no case in which the agency

declined to require offsite monitoring when the area of

review contained several abandoned wells penetrating

the injection zone and the permittee had not yet

attempted to access the necessary property.

The EPA’s decision to require ambient monitoring

near Silver Creek #18 also evinced a rational

connection between the facts found and the choice

made. Panoche bears the burden of showing that its

injection activities pose no risk of endangerment. See

40 C.F.R. § 144.12(a). The EPA conducted a site-

5a

specific analysis—considering, for example, the fact

that the abandoned wells penetrate an over-pressurized injection zone and lack adequate long-string casing

and cement plugs—to determine that the abandoned

wells pose a risk of endangerment necessitating monitoring. The EPA reasonably refused to credit Panoche’s

argument that there is no current risk of endangerment because the mud used to plug Silver Creek #18

was legally adequate under state law in 1974.

Contrary to Panoche’s representation, the EPA’s

decision to require ambient monitoring did not depend

on an irrational assumption that Panoche would

operate at maximum capacity. Instead, the agency

reasoned that because the Panoche Formation is

already over-pressurized, any additional fluids injected

could result in pressure or water quality changes in

the underground source of drinking water, which

monitoring could help detect.

The EPA also did not irrationally fail to consider

how the region’s sandstone and natural confining

layers could reduce fluid migration from the injection

zone. The monitoring requirement was based on the

EPA’s concern regarding fluids migrating through

abandoned wells that pierce those layers.

Finally, it was not irrational for the EPA to require

ambient monitoring even though fluid migration from

the injection zone might not worsen water quality. The

EPA’s observation that the effect of fluid migration on

water quality depends on the concentration of contaminants in the fluid is consistent with its statutory and

regulatory authority to require monitoring to prevent

potential endangerment. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 300h(d)(2),

300h-5; 40 C.F.R. § 146.13(d)(1).

PETITION DENIED.

6a

APPENDIX B

UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL

PROTECTION AGENCY

REGION IX

75 Hawthorne Street

San Francisco, CA 94105-3901

OFFICE OF THE

REGIONAL ADMINISTRATOR

NOTICE OF FINAL PERMIT DECISION

UIC Permit No. R9UIC-CA1-FY17-2R

For Panoche Energy Center, LLC

In accordance with the requirements of the Code

of Federal Regulations (C.F.R.), Title 40 C.F.R.

§ 124.19(l)(2)(i), the United States Environmental

Protection Agency, Region 9 (EPA) is issuing a Notice

of Final Permit Decision for UIC Permit No. R9UICCA1-FY17-2R to Panoche Energy Center, LLC (PEC),

located at 43883 West Panoche Rd, Firebaugh, CA

93622. The final UIC Permit and copy of this Notice

are available on EPA’s web page at: https://www.epa.

gov/uic/uic-class-i-permit-no-r9uic-ca1-fy17-2r-panoch

e-energy-center-llc-firebaugh-ca.

PEC filed a petition for review (Petition) of the Final

Permit with EPA’s Environmental Appeals Board (EAB)

on October 28, 2022. In the Petition, PEC contested

certain conditions of the Final Permit. The uncontested and severable portions of the Final Permit were

placed into effect pursuant to a Notice of Stay of

Contested Conditions, dated November 7, 2022. The

contested conditions were stayed pending a decision by

the EAB on the Petition and final agency action.

On May 26, 2023, the EAB issued an order denying

the Petition in its entirety. In re Panoche Energy

7a

Center, LLC, UIC Appeal No. 22-01 (EAB May 26,

2023). Under 40 C.F.R. § 124.19(l)(2)(i), a final permit

decision must be issued by the Regional Administrator

when the EAB issues notice to the parties that a

petition for review has been denied. Accordingly, I am

hereby issuing my final permit decision.

The contested conditions shall become fully effective

and enforceable in accordance with the terms of the

Final Permit issued on September 30, 2022, with an

effective date of October 31, 2022. 1

This decision constitutes final agency action under

40 C.F.R. § 124.19(1)(2)(i). Under 40 C.F.R. § 23.7, this

Notice becomes effective for purposes of judicial review

under 42 U.S.C. § 300-j(7) and 5 U.S.C. § 704 two weeks

after this Notice is signed.

Dated:

/s/ Martha Aceves

Digitally signed by MARTHA ACEVES

Date: 2023.06.07 14:58:59 -07'00'

Martha Guzman

Regional Administrator

The Permit expiration date remains unchanged. As indicated

in Part I of the Permit, the Permit is issued for a period of ten (10)

years unless the Permit is terminated under the conditions set

forth in Section III.B.1 or administratively extended under the

conditions set forth in Section III.E.12 of the Permit.

1

8a

APPENDIX C

ENVIRONMENTAL ADMINISTRATIVE

DECISIONS

IN RE PANOCHE ENERGY CENTER, LLC

UIC Appeal No. 22-01

ORDER DENYING REVIEW

Decided May 26, 2023

Syllabus

Panoche Energy Center, LLC seeks Environmental

Appeals Board review of an Underground Injection

Control (“UIC”) Class I non-hazardous waste injection

well permit (“Final Permit”) issued by Region 9 of the

U.S. Environmental Protection Agency. The Final

Permit authorizes Panoche to continue to operate four

existing injection wells located at its Facility site and

to construct and operate up to two additional wells,

subject to certain permit conditions. One permit condition

requires ambient monitoring and directs Panoche to

install a monitoring well in the vicinity of a nearby

abandoned well, Silver Creek #18, located within the

Area of Review (“AoR”), to perform chemical analysis

and measure specific conductance and formation

pressure. Panoche challenges the inclusion of this

ambient monitoring requirement in the Final Permit.

Held: The Board finds that, based on the administrative record, Panoche has not demonstrated that the

Region clearly erred or abused its discretion in

requiring ambient monitoring in the Final Permit, or

that review is otherwise warranted. The Board denies

the petition for review in its entirety.

Panoche bears the burden of demonstrating that its

injection activities will not be conducted in a manner

that allows the movement of fluid into underground

9a

sources of drinking water (“USDW”). Panoche has not

demonstrated that the Region clearly erred or abused

its discretion by requiring ambient monitoring. Panoche

argues the Region lacks factual support for its decision

to require ambient monitoring, and the Region ignored

record evidence undercutting that decision. The administrative record supports the Region’s determination

that there is potential for fluid movement from the

injection zone into the USDW and the ambient monitoring condition in the Final Permit. The Safe Drinking

Water Act is preventative in nature, and the UIC

regulations provide the Region with the authority

and discretion to require ambient monitoring in the

Final Permit. The ambient monitoring requirement is

supported by the administrative record, including

information Panoche provided, and is consistent with

the UIC regulations and the Region’s statutory obligation to ensure USDW protection. The Region had a

rational basis for the ambient monitoring requirement

based on, among other things the: overpressured nature

of the Panoche formation, uncertainty about the

condition of wells in the AoR abandoned decades ago

that present a potential pathway for fluid migration,

and potential value of the ambient monitoring condition

to provide early warning of potential endangerment to

the USDW. The record reflects extensive technical

reviews and shows that the Region duly considered the

technical and other issues raised by Panoche in its

comments and chose an approach that is rational in

light of all the information in the record.

Before Environmental Appeals Judges Wendy L.

Blake, Mary Kay Lynch, and Kathie A. Stein.

10a

Opinion of the Board by Judge Lynch:

I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Panoche Energy Center, LLC seeks Environmental

Appeals Board review of an Underground Injection

Control (“UIC”) Class I non-hazardous waste injection

well permit (“Final Permit”) issued by Region 9 of the

U.S. Environmental Protection Agency. Panoche (“PEC”)

operates a simple cycle power generation plant in

Firebaugh, California. The Final Permit authorizes

Panoche to continue to operate four existing injection

wells located at its Facility site and to construct and

operate up to two additional wells, subject to certain

permit conditions. One permit condition requires ambient

monitoring and directs Panoche to install a monitoring

well in the vicinity of a nearby abandoned well, Silver

Creek #18, located within the Area of Review (“AoR”)

to perform chemical analysis and measure specific

conductance and formation pressure. Panoche challenges

the inclusion of this ambient monitoring requirement

in the Final Permit.

The issue before the Board is whether Panoche

demonstrated that the Region clearly erred or abused

its discretion by requiring the ambient monitoring

condition in the Final Permit. For the reasons set forth

below, the Board finds that Panoche failed to demonstrate that the Region’s decision to include the

ambient monitoring condition in the Final Permit was

clear error or an abuse of discretion. Accordingly, the

Board denies Panoche’s petition for review.

II. PRINCIPLES GOVERNING BOARD REVIEW

The Board’s review of UIC permits is governed by

Agency permitting regulations at 40 C.F.R. part 124,

which authorize parties to file petitions for review of

EPA permit decisions. 40 C.F.R. § 124.19(a)(1). EPA’s

11a

intent in promulgating these regulations was that this

“review should be only sparingly exercised.” Consolidated

Permit Regulations, 45 Fed. Reg. 33,290, 33,412 (May

19, 1980); see also In re Beeland Grp., L.L.C., 14 E.A.D.

189, 195-96 (EAB 2008).

In any appeal from a permit decision issued under

part 124, the petitioner bears the burden of demonstrating that review is warranted. “[A] petition for

review must identify the contested permit condition or

other specific challenge to the permit decision and

clearly set forth, with legal and factual support,

petitioner’s contentions for why the permit decision

should be reviewed.” 40 C.F.R. § 124.19(a)(4)(i); In re

Jordan Dev. Co., L.L.C., 18 E.A.D. 1, 4 (EAB 2019).

In considering any petition filed under 40 C.F.R.

§ 124.19(a), the Board evaluates whether the petitioner

has met threshold procedural requirements, including,

among other things, whether an issue has been preserved for Board review. See 40 C.F.R. § 124.19(a)(2)(4); see also In re Penneco Envtl. Sols., L.L.C., 17 E.A.D.

604, 617-18 (EAB 2018); In re Seneca Res. Corp., 16

E.A.D. 411, 412 (EAB 2014). For example, a petitioner

must demonstrate that any issues and arguments it

raises on appeal have been preserved for Board review

by being raised with “a reasonable degree of specificity

and clarity” during the public comment period or

public hearing. In re City of Lowell, 18 E.A.D. 115, 131

(EAB 2020) (citing In re Westborough, 10 E.A.D. 297,

304 (EAB 2002)); see 40 C.F.R. §§ 124.13, .19(a)(4)(ii);

see also In re Steel Dynamics, Inc., 9 E.A.D. 165, 230

(EAB 2000) (holding issue was not preserved when it

was not presented in comments “with sufficient clarity

to enable a meaningful response”).

Under 40 C.F.R. § 124.19, the Board has discretion

to grant or deny review of a permit decision. In re

12a

Avenal Power Ctr., L.L.C., 15 E.A.D. 384, 394 (EAB

2011); In re Archer Daniels Midland Co., 17 E.A.D. 380,

382-83 (EAB 2017). The Board ordinarily denies a

petition for review of a permit decision (and thus does

not remand it) unless the petitioner demonstrates that

the permit decision is based on a clearly erroneous

finding of fact or conclusion of law or involves an

exercise of discretion that warrants review under the

law. 40 C.F.R. § 124.19(a)(4)(i)(A)-(B); see, e.g., In re La

Paloma Energy Ctr., L.L.C., 16 E.A.D. 267, 269 (EAB

2014). To meet this standard, it is not enough for a

petitioner to simply repeat comments previously

submitted on the draft permit. A petitioner must

demonstrate why the permit issuer’s response to those

objections is clearly erroneous or otherwise warrants

review. 40 C.F.R. § 124.19(a)(4)(ii); City of Lowell, 18

E.A.D. at 131; see In re City of Taunton, 17 E.A.D. 105,

111, 180, 182-83, 189 (EAB 2016) aff’d, 895 F.3d 120

(1st Cir. 2018), cert. denied, 139 S.Ct. 1240 (2019).

When evaluating a challenged permit decision for

clear error, the Board examines the administrative

record that serves as the basis for the permit to

determine whether the permit issuer exercised “considered judgment.” City of Lowell, 18 E.A.D. at 132

(citing In re Gen. Elec. Co., 17 E.A.D. 434, 560-61 (EAB

2018); In re Ash Grove Cement Co., 7 E.A.D. 387, 41718 (EAB 1997)). The permit issuer must articulate

with reasonable clarity the reasons supporting its

conclusion and the significance of the crucial facts it

relied on when reaching its conclusion. E.g., In re Shell

Offshore, Inc., 13 E.A.D. 357, 391 (EAB 2007). As a

whole, the record must demonstrate that the permit

issuer “duly considered the issues raised in the comments”

and ultimately adopted an approach that “is rational

in light of all information in the record.” In re Gov’t of

D.C. Mun. Separate Storm Sewer Sys., 10 E.A.D. 323,

13a

342 (EAB 2002); see In re NE Hub Partners, L.P., 7 E.A.D.

561, 568 (EAB 1998), pet. for review denied sub nom.

Penn. Fuel Gas, Inc. v. EPA, 185 F.3d 862 (3rd Cir. 1999).

In reviewing an exercise of discretion by the permit

issuer, the Board applies an abuse of discretion standard.

See In re City of Palmdale, 15 E.A.D. 700, 704 (EAB

2012). The Board will uphold a permit issuer’s reasonable exercise of discretion if that decision is cogently

explained and supported in the record. See Ash Grove

Cement, 7 E.A.D. at 397 (“[A]cts of discretion must be

adequately explained and justified.”).

On matters that are fundamentally technical or

scientific in nature, including monitoring issues, the

Board typically defers to a permit issuer’s technical

expertise and experience, as long as the permit issuer

adequately explains its rationale and supports its

reasoning in the administrative record. See In re

Peabody W. Coal Co., 12 E.A.D. 22, 50-51 (EAB 2005);

Gen. Elec., 17 E.A.D. at 514-15; In re Dominion Energy

Brayton Point, L.L.C., (Formerly USGEN New England,

Inc.) Brayton Point Station, 12 E.A.D. 490, 510, 560-62,

645-47, 668, 670-74 (EAB 2006); see also, e.g., In re

Russell City Energy Ctr., L.L.C., 15 E.A.D. 1, 12, 39-42,

60-66 (EAB 2010), petition denied sub nom. ChabotLas Positas Cmty. Coll. Dist. v. EPA, 482 F. App’x 219

(9th Cir. 2012); NE Hub Partners, 7 E.A.D. at 570-71.

Clear error or abuse of discretion in a permit issuer’s

technical determination cannot be “established simply

because petitioners document a difference of opinion

or an alternative theory.” NE Hub Partners, 7 E.A.D.

at 567.

III. LEGAL FRAMEWORK

Congress established the UIC program pursuant to

the Safe Drinking Water Act (“SDWA”) and required

14a

EPA to promulgate regulations for underground injection

control programs to protect underground sources of

drinking water (“USDWs”). SDWA § 1421, 42 U.S.C.

§ 300h. Congress designed the program as a preventative program. See SDWA § 1421(b)(1), 42 U.S.C.

§ 300h(b)(1) (“Regulations * * * for State underground

injection programs shall contain minimum requirements for effective programs to prevent underground

injection which endangers drinking water sources

* * *.”). EPA has promulgated such regulations,

including minimum requirements for UIC permits.

See 40 C.F.R. pts. 144-148. EPA administers the UIC

program in states such as California that are not

authorized to administer their own UIC programs. See

40 C.F.R. §§ 144.1(e), 147.251(a).1

Central to the UIC regulations is protecting underground sources of drinking water from endangerment

associated with underground injection activities. See

SDWA § 1421(b)(1), (d), 42 U.S.C. § 300h(b)(1), (d); 40

C.F.R. § 144.1(g). The UIC program focuses on the

protection of underground water that “supplies or can

reasonably be expected to supply any public water

system” from “any contaminant” that may be present

as a result of underground injection activities. SDWA

§ 1421(d)(2), 42 U.S.C. § 300h(d)(2). The purpose of the

UIC regulations is to prevent the movement of fluids

containing contaminants into USDWs if the presence

of those contaminants may cause a violation of a primary

drinking water regulation or otherwise adversely

affect human health. See 40 C.F.R. § 144.12(a). “[A]ll

1

The UIC regulations use the term “Director” to describe the

permitting authority. 40 C.F.R. § 146.3 (defining “Director”).

Because this matter involves an EPA-administered program, the

Board will refer to the “permit issuer” or the Region, as appropriate, in places where the regulations use the term “Director.”

15a

injection activities including construction of an injection

well are prohibited until the owner or operator is

authorized by permit.” Id. § 144.31(a).

Injection wells fall into six classes. Id. §§ 144.6,

146.5. Class I wells are used to inject hazardous and,

like the wells at issue here, non-hazardous wastes.

Waste is injected into deep, confined rock formations,

and these wells are typically drilled thousands of feet

below the lowermost USDW. See id. §§ 144.6(a),

146.5(a).

Among other things, applicants for an injection well

permit must delineate an “area of review” (“AoR”) for

the permit, and that delineation must be approved by

the permitting authority. Id. § 146.6. The AoR denotes

the area surrounding injection wells in which the

pressures in the injection zone may cause migration of

the injection or geological formation fluids out of the

injection zone and into a USDW. See id. § 146.6(a)(1)(ii).

Applicable to the permit process for all classes of wells,

EPA’s regulations define the AoR as the area surrounding the proposed injection well that is determined

using either a “zone of endangering influence” calculation or the “fixed radius” method. See id. § 146.6; see

also id. § 144.3. The UIC regulations require that a

well operator identify all known wells within the AoR

that penetrate the proposed well’s injection zone and

submit a corrective action plan to address any

improperly sealed, completed, or abandoned wells in

the area of review that otherwise might allow fluid to

migrate into USDWs. See id. § 144.55(a). Further, the

regulations require the permit issuer to ensure that

the applicant takes corrective action, as necessary, to

prevent fluid migration into USDWs. Id. § 144.55(a).

Monitoring is a key component in preventing

endangerment of drinking water sources. See SDWA

16a

§ 1421(b)(1)(C), 42 U.S.C. § 300h(b)(1)(C). The UIC

regulations require that prior to authorizing injection,

the permit issuer must ensure that Class I permits

include, at a minimum, the following monitoring

requirements:

(1) The analysis of the injected fluids with

sufficient frequency to yield representative

data of their characteristics;

(2) Installation and use of continuous recording

devices to monitor injection pressure, flow

rate and volume, and the pressure on the

annulus between the tubing and the long

string of casing;

(3) A demonstration of mechanical integrity

pursuant to § 146.8 at least once every five

years during the life of the well; and

(4) The type, number, and location of wells

within the area of review to be used to

monitor any migration of fluids into and

pressure in the underground sources of drinking water, the parameters to be measured and

the frequency of monitoring.

40 C.F.R. § 146.13(b).

In addition, the regulations specifically address

ambient monitoring in a provision that EPA added in

1988, which provides as follows:

Based on a site-specific assessment of the

potential for fluid movement from the well or

injection zone and on the potential value of

monitoring wells to detect such movement,

the Director shall require the owner or

operator to develop a monitoring program.

At a minimum, the Director shall require

17a

monitoring of the pressure buildup in the

injection zone annually, including at a

minimum, a shut down of the well for a time

sufficient to conduct a valid observation of the

pressure fall-off curve.

Id. § 146.13(d)(1).

And as explained in the preamble to the 1988 rule,

EPA has “discretion in determining an acceptable

[monitoring] program.” UIC Program: Hazardous Waste

Disposal Injection Restrictions; Amendments to Technical

Requirements for Class I Hazardous Waste Injection

Wells; and Additional Monitoring Requirements Applicable to all Class I Wells, 53 Fed. Reg. 28,118, 28,141,

28,145 (July 26, 1988). Accordingly, in addition to the

minimum ambient monitoring requirements listed

above, EPA may require that an ambient monitoring

system include, among other things: “[c]ontinuous

monitoring for pressure changes in the first aquifer

overlying the confining zone,” periodic monitoring of

the ground water quality in the first aquifer overlying

the injection zone and in the lowermost USDW, and

“[a]ny additional monitoring necessary to determine

whether fluids are moving into or between USDWs.”

40 C.F.R. § 146.13(d)(2)(i), (iii)-(v).

IV. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL SUMMARY

A. Panoche Facility and Permit History

Panoche Energy Center is a 400-megawatt simplecycle power plant, consisting of four natural gas-fired

combustion turbine generators. Region 9, U.S. EPA,

Permit No. CA10600001 Fact Sheet, at 2 (2021) (A.R.

58) (“Fact Sheet”). The Facility is located in an unincorporated area of western Fresno County, California.

Id. The Region issued a permit to Panoche on April 25,

2008, which authorized Panoche to construct and

18a

operate a Class I nonhazardous waste injection well

facility with a maximum of six injection wells for a

ten-year period. Region 9, U.S. EPA, Permit No.

CA10600001, at 4 (Apr. 25, 2008) (A.R. 50) (“2008

Permit”).2 The 2008 Permit further authorized Panoche

to inject into the Panoche Formation at depths ranging

between approximately 7,199 to 8,897 feet below

ground surface. Fact Sheet at 2. In October 2017,

Panoche timely applied for renewal of the 2008 Permit

seeking authorization to inject industrial wastewater

from Panoche’s Facility into the four existing, and two

potential, non-hazardous injection UIC Class I wells,

for a ten-year period. Haley & Aldrich, Inc., 2017 UIC

Permit Application: Panoche Energy Center, 43883 W.

Panoche Road, Firebaugh, California 93622 (Oct. 20,

2017) (A.R. 3); Fact Sheet at 2. The Region deemed the

application complete, which allowed for continued

operation under an administrative extension. Fact

Sheet at 2.

B. Technical Review Leading up to Draft

Permits

Panoche and the Region engaged in a series of

technical discussions and reviews in which the Region

requested additional information to support the permit

application and site-specific assessment. See generally

Region 9, U.S. EPA, Permit Renewal Application

Technical Review (May 18, 2018) (A.R. 31) (“May 2018

Technical Review Letter”); Panoche Energy Center,

Summary of Responses and Questions to the UIC

Permit Renewal Application (July 12, 2018) (A.R. 32);

Region 9, U.S. EPA, Permit Renewal Application

Response to PEC Questions (Sept. 7, 2018) (A.R. 33).

2

Panoche operated only four wells under the 2008 Permit. Fact

Sheet at 2.

19a

As a result of these technical discussions, Panoche

submitted an updated renewal application that included

some of the technical information the Region had

requested. Haley & Aldrich, Inc., 2019 Update and Resubmittal of PEC’s 2017 UIC Permit Renewal Application

(Mar. 1, 2019) (A.R. 1) (“2019 Application”). Relevant

to this proceeding, one focus of the Region’s review was

a series of abandoned wells in the AoR/zone of

endangering influence. See, e.g., May 2018 Technical

Review Letter enclosure at 2; June 2019 Technical

Review Letter enclosure at 1; 2019 Application attach.

C (A.R. 1c). Several of the abandoned wells penetrate

the injection zone. 2019 Application attach. C at C-4C-8. The closest abandoned well to the injection zone

is Silver Creek #18, which is drilled to a depth of 8,698

feet. Id. attach. C at C-7.

Following receipt of the updated permit application

in March 2019, the Region continued its technical

review of the application. In June 2019, it commented

that the determination of the AoR in the application

(that used the Zone of Endangering Influence or “ZEI”

calculation) relied on the gel strength of the plugging

mud in the abandoned wells, but the application lacked

information about the properties of the plugging mud

in the abandoned wells in the AoR over the long term

and whether these wells could allow fluid movement

into USDWs. See, e.g., Region 9, U.S. EPA, Comments

on PEC’s March 2019 Updated Permit Application

enclosure at 1 (June 21, 2019) (A.R. 35) (“June 2019

Technical Review Letter”). The Region explained that

five wells in the AoR had been abandoned without

cement plugs between the injection zone and the base

of the USDW, four of which were abandoned 55 to 68

years ago, and it was unknown if the plugging mud

used in these abandoned wells had retained the

properties it had before the wells were abandoned, or

20a

whether the mud had become stratified or lost volume

to the surrounding formations. Id.; see also 2019

Application attach. C. The Silver Creek #18 well was

plugged in 1974. 2019 Application attach. C at C-4;

Panoche Energy Center, LLC’s Reply in Support of

Petition for Review (“Reply Br.”), attach. 4 at 45 (Jan.

31, 2023) (“Silver Creek #18 Plugging Records”). The

Region explained to Panoche that “empirical, depthspecific data would best demonstrate that the well(s)

will not permit fluid movement that could endanger

USDWs.” June 2019 Technical Review Letter enclosure

at 1. The Region also requested that Panoche provide

a sampling and testing protocol to collect test drilling

mud samples in at least two wells in the AoR to

support Panoche’s approach to identifying the ZEI and

demonstrate that the abandoned wells will not allow

fluid movement that could endanger USDWs. Id.

The Region and Panoche continued to engage in

technical discussions. See, e.g., Haley & Aldrich, Inc.,

Response to EPA Comments on PEC’s 2019 Update and

Re-submittal of the 2017 Permit Renewal Application

(Oct. 2019) (A.R. 36); Region 9, U.S. EPA, UIC Permit

Renewal Application Class I Non-Hazardous Permit

R9UIC-CA1-FY17-2R Technical Review (Dec. 3, 2019)

(A.R. 38) (“Dec. 2019 Technical Review Letter”). In the

December 2019 Technical Review Letter, the Region

informed Panoche that it did not share Panoche’s views

on the accuracy of its modeling efforts to demonstrate

that mud weight and gel strength in the abandoned

wells will prevent fluid movement into the USDW and

explained its rationale. Dec. 2019 Technical Review

Letter enclosure at 2. The Region’s assessment of some

of the studies Panoche presented during this review

was included in the December 2019 Technical Review

Letter. For example, the Region noted that a statement

in the Barker Study “supports EPA’s view that there is

21a

uncertainty regarding the gel strength for the particular wells in question.” Id., enclosure at 1; see also S.E.

Barker, Determining the Area of Review for Industrial

Effluent Disposal Wells, at 89 (Dec. 1981) (A.R. 43o)

(“Barker Study”). With respect to the Hadaway statement, the Region “concurs that the mud column

generally falls over time in an uncased wellbore.” Dec.

2019 Technical Review Letter enclosure at 2 (referencing Allen Hadaway, Wellbore Re-Entry Mud Property

Expert Opinion (Nov. 7, 2019) (A.R. 37). The Region

proposed different approaches to evaluate the condition of the mud in the abandoned wells in the AoR. Dec.

2019 Technical Review Letter enclosure at 2-3. Given

Panoche’s concerns with the Region’s proposal to reenter one of the abandoned wells to evaluate the mud

condition, the Region identified in the December 2019

Technical Review Letter an alternative approach

under which Panoche would prepare to install monitoring wells to demonstrate that the abandoned wells

are not serving as conduits for fluid movement. Id. at

3. Panoche and the Region did not reach agreement on

an approach to monitoring during the technical review

process. See id.; Panoche Energy Center, Response to

USEPA Comment No. 1d from letter dated December 3,

2019, at 6-7 (Jan.17, 2020) (A.R. 39) (“Panoche

Response to Dec. 2019 Technical Review Letter”);

Region 9, U.S. EPA, Response to Comments, at 5 (Cmt.

#4) (Sept. 30, 2022) (A.R. 48) (“Resp. to Cmts.”).

Further, Panoche did not provide the empirical data

the Region requested during this process, or at any

time thereafter. See Resp. to Cmts. at 6 (Cmt. #5).

C. Draft Permits

In late July 2020, the Region sent a pre-publication

draft permit to Panoche. Region 9, U.S. EPA,

Underground Injection Control Program Draft Permit

22a

Class I Non-hazardous Waste Injection Wells Permit

No. R9UIC-CA1-FY17-2R with comments (Jul. 27,

2020) (A.R. 9) (“2020 Pre-Publication Draft”). In addition

to other monitoring, recordkeeping, and reporting

requirements, the 2020 Pre-Publication Draft required

corrective action be undertaken prior to injection at

three abandoned wells in the AoR, which included

plugging the Souza #2 well and drilling ambient

monitoring wells (referred to as USDW Monitoring)

near the Silver Creek #18 and England #1-31 wells. Id.

at 9-10, 18.3 Panoche sent written comments to the

Region on this pre-publication draft opposing the

corrective action and ambient monitoring requirements. Letter from Ankur K. Tohan, K&L Gates, to

David Albright, Groundwater Protection Section, EPA

Region 9, at 3 (Sept. 25, 2020) (A.R. 12) (“PrePublication Comments”).

Following a December 2020 meeting to discuss the

comments and information Panoche provided, the

Region revised the 2020 Pre-Publication Draft and

published the draft permit for public comment in April

2021. Region 9, U.S. EPA Underground Injection

Control Program Draft Permit Class I Non-hazardous

Waste Injection Wells Permit No. R9UIC-CA1-FY17-2R

(Apr. 12, 2021) (A.R. 10) (“2021 Draft Permit”). The

2021 Draft Permit eliminated the corrective action

requirements, including the requirement to plug the

Souza #2 well; the USDW/ambient monitoring requirement near the England #1-31 well; and the requirement

to drill monitoring wells prior to injection.4 See 2021

3

In the Drafts and Final Permit, the ambient monitoring

provisions are referred to as “USDW Monitoring.”

4

The Region stated that it dropped the corrective action

requirements, including plugging the Souza #2 well due to “the

reduced injection volume” associated with the installation of

23a

Draft Permit pts. II.C., at 9-10; II.E.2, at 17-18. The

2021 Draft Permit required no corrective action.

Among other things, it required the drilling of one

ambient monitoring well to perform chemical analysis

and measure specific conductance and formation

pressure near Silver Creek #18, the abandoned well

closest to Panoche’s injection wells.5 Compare 2020

Pre-Publication Draft pts. II.C.1, at 9-10; II.E.2, at 18

with 2021 Draft Permit pts. II.C., at 9-10; II.E.2, at 1718. The Fact Sheet accompanying the 2021 Draft

Permit noted that the abandoned Silver Creek Well

#18 penetrates through the Panoche injection formation and does not have a cement plug between the

injection zone and the lowermost USDW. Fact Sheet at

6. The ambient monitoring requirement in the 2021

Draft Permit was in addition to other monitoring,

recordkeeping, and reporting requirements, which are

not contested in this matter.

The comment period for the 2021 Draft Permit

opened on April 11, 2021, and closed on May 11, 2021.

Region 9, U.S. EPA, Permit No. CA10600001 Public

Notice of Intent (2021) (A.R. 59); Region 9, U.S. EPA,

Notice of Final Permit Decision (Sept. 30, 2022) (A.R.

82). Panoche, the only commenter, filed comments

opposing the ambient monitoring requirement for

Silver Creek #18. Comment Letter from Ankur K.

Tohan, K&L Gates, to Michele Dermer, Groundwater

Panoche’s enhanced wastewater system “and associated

reduction of the size of the AoR.” Resp. to Cmts. at 6 (Cmt. #5).

5

The 2021 Draft Permit added trace metals to the required

chemical analysis. Compare 2021 Draft Permit pt. II.E.2.,

Monitoring Requirements subsection b, at 18 with 2020 PrePublication Draft pt. II.E.2.b, at 18.

24a

Protection Section, EPA Region 9 (May 11, 2021) (A.R.

43) (“Panoche Comments”).

D. Final Permit and Petition for Review

On September 30, 2022, the Region issued the Final

Permit for a ten-year period, along with its response to

comments document. Region 9, U.S. EPA, Permit No.

R9UICCA1-FY17-2R (Sept. 30, 2022) (A.R. 84) (“Final

Permit”); Resp. to Cmts. The Final Permit authorizes

Panoche to inject industrial wastewater into the four

existing wells and two potential wells subject to

injection pressure and injection volume limitations.

Final Permit at 4, 14; Fact Sheet at 2, 4. The Final

Permit retained the ambient monitoring requirement

from the 2021 Draft Permit, along with certain other

monitoring, recordkeeping, and reporting requirements. Final Permit at 16-23. The USDW/ambient

monitoring permit provision requires Panoche to

(1) drill a monitoring well within 100 feet to the southsouthwest of the Silver Creek #18 well; (2) equip the

monitoring well with a transducer (to monitor pressure and specific conductance within the USDW) and

water quality monitoring equipment (to allow sampling

of the USDW); and (3) sample and perform baseline

characterization of ground water chemistry. Id. pt.

II.E.2 at 17-18.

Panoche filed a petition for review on October 28,

2022, challenging the inclusion of the USDW/ambient

monitoring provision in Part II.E.2 of the Final Permit.

And following extensions of time requested by the

parties, briefing concluded on February 23, 2023, and

the Board held oral argument via videoconference on

March 30, 2023.

25a

V. ANALYSIS

According to Panoche, this case is about two things:

the lack of factual support for the Region’s decision to

require ambient monitoring, and the existence of

record evidence undercutting such decision, which the

Region ignored. The Region disagrees with both arguments. The Region maintains it had a rational basis

for the ambient monitoring requirement related to the

overpressured nature of the formation, unknown

condition of the abandoned wells in the AoR, and the

potential for fluid movement, and that it clearly

explained its rationale to Panoche and the public, all

of which is reflected in the administrative record.

What the record reveals is that the dispute in this

case is not about whether the Panoche Formation is

naturally overpressured. The record shows that it is,

and Panoche acknowledged this fact in its permit

application and during oral argument. 2019 Application

§1.2, at 3 & attach. A at A-1, attach. C at C-1 to C-8 &

tbl. C-1; Oral Argument Transcript 32 (Mar. 30, 2023)

(“Oral Arg. Tr.”). In fact, the dispute is not even about

whether there is the potential for fluid movement into

the USDW. Panoche specifically stated in its 2019

Application that with respect to Silver Creek #18, the

abandoned well closest to the injection wells, “[t]he

potential exist[s] for pressure to enter the wellbore

and move fluids into the USDW.” 2019 Application

attach. C at C-7. The dispute is about whether, based

on this administrative record, the Region can require

ambient monitoring and other actions to ensure that

there is no movement of fluid from the injection zone

into the USDW.

For the reasons explained below, the Board concludes,

after a thorough consideration of the administrative

record and the arguments raised by the parties, that

26a

Panoche has not carried its burden of demonstrating

that the Region clearly erred or abused its discretion,

or that review is otherwise warranted on any of the

grounds presented.

A. Panoche Has Not Demonstrated that the

Region Clearly Erred or Abused Its Discretion

by Requiring Ambient Monitoring in the

Permit

Following an extensive technical review and sitespecific assessment of the Panoche Formation and the

AoR, the Region explained it had two primary reasons

for requiring ambient monitoring: (1) the Panoche

Formation is naturally overpressured, such that any

additional injection poses an increased risk of fluid

migration through the old wells in the AoR that lack

long string casing and cement plugs to isolate the

injection zone from the base of the USDW;6 and

(2) Panoche’s application contained modeling and

estimates, but no empirical data directly addressing

the current conditions of the abandoned wells within

the AoR. Resp. to Cmts. at 2-3 (Cmt. #1); EPA Region

9’s Response to Petition for Review 13 (Dec. 23, 2022)

(“Resp. Br.”). This resulted in uncertainty regarding

the current condition of the abandoned wells in the

AoR and an increased risk of potential fluid movement

6

Casing is “a pipe or tubing of appropriate material, of varying

diameter and weight, lowered into a borehole during or after

drilling in order to support the sides of the hole and thus prevent

the walls from caving, to prevent loss of drilling mud into porous

ground, or to prevent water, gas, or other fluid from entering or

leaving the hole.” 40 C.F.R. § 146.3. The Region explains that long

string casing is a “type of casing which is continuous from at least

the top of the injection interval to the surface, and which is

cemented in place.” EPA Region 9’s Response to Petition for

Review 6 n.6 (Dec. 23, 2022) (“Resp. Br.”).

27a

into the USDW. Resp. to Cmts. at 2-3 (Cmt. #1); Resp.

Br. at 13.

According to the Region, the permit’s ambient monitoring requirement “will provide information about

the existence or absence of water quality or pressure

changes” that can confirm if the project is operating as

expected (i.e., no fluid movement is occurring along the

boreholes in the abandoned wells in the AoR that could

affect water quality in the USDW), or “provide early

warning of potential endangerment to USDWs before

any significant impact on water quality could occur. No

other monitoring in the Permit provides the information on pressure or water quality changes in the

USDW that is needed to provide early indication of

fluid movement that could endanger a USDW * * *.”

Resp. to Cmts. at 3 (Cmt. #1).

As explained below, the Region’s technical determination to require ambient monitoring is supported

by the administrative record, including information

Panoche provided, and is consistent with the UIC

regulations and the Region’s statutory obligation to

ensure USDW protection. On the other hand, Panoche

largely repeats comments it made previously and does

not address the Region’s response to comments

document, or it raises new arguments not previously

presented to the Region for consideration. Panoche has

not met its burden of showing clear error or abuse of

discretion for the Board to overturn the Region’s welldocumented technical determination. In fact, the

record in this case reflects extensive technical reviews

and shows that the Region duly considered the

technical and other issues raised by Panoche in its

comments and chose an approach that is rational in

light of all the information in the record. Based on this

28a

record, a denial of the petition is warranted. See NE

Hub Partners, 7 E.A.D. at 568.

1. The Administrative Record Supports the

Region’s Determination That There Is

Potential for Fluid Movement From the

Injection Zone into the USDW and the

Ambient Monitoring Condition in the

Final Permit

a. Overpressured Formation

The record shows that the Panoche Formation is

naturally overpressured, and, as noted above, Panoche

acknowledges this fact in its 2019 Application and as

recently as the oral argument. 2019 Application §1.2,

at 3 & attach. A at A-1, attach. C at C-1 to C-8 & tbl.

C-1; Oral Arg. Tr. at 32. Injection rates and volume

limits in a UIC permit provide important elements of

USDW protection. Resp. to Cmts. at 13 (Cmt. #13).

Every year, Panoche injects millions of gallons of

industrial wastewater into the Panoche Formation, see

id., and the permit authorizes Panoche to inject a

maximum of 635,229 gallons per day or 232 million

gallons per year.7 Final Permit pt. II.D.4.a, at 14; Resp.

7

The Final Permit establishes maximum daily injection rates

for each of the wells, the sum of which amounts to a total of

635,229 gallons per day and 232 million gallons per year when

multiplied by 365. Final Permit at pt. II.D.4.a, at 14; Resp. to

Cmts. at 13 (Cmt. #13). Panoche expressly requested the maximum

daily injection rates the Final Permit authorized. 2019 Application

attach. H tbl. H-1; Oral Arg. Tr. at 35-36. In its reply brief,

Panoche argues its air permit limits the amount of wastewater

Panoche can generate for injection to 84 million gallons per year

and that there is no scenario in which it would produce 232

million gallons of wastewater in a given year. Reply Br. at 6-7. We

find this argument late and inaccurate and address it in Part

V.A.2 below.

29a

to Cmts. at 13 (Cmt. #13); Oral Arg. Tr. at 35-36. The

Region explained that overpressured formations, like

the Panoche Formation, present unique risks because

subsurface pressures will continue to increase as

injection activities occur. Resp. to Cmts. at 13 (Cmt.

#13). Further, if the injection occurs when pressures

are abnormally high, this can lead to new fractures or

worsen existing ones that can serve as additional

pathways for fluid migration and potentially endanger

the USDW. Resp. Br. at 5 (citing Resp. to Cmts. at 13

(Cmt. #13) and U.S. EPA, Class I UIC Program: Study

of the Risks Associated with Class I Underground

Injection Wells, at 14 (Mar. 2001) (A.R. 49) (“Class I

Wells Study”)); Class I Wells Study at 14 (observing

that faults or fractures may form naturally, may be

created by the waste dissolving the rocks of the

confining zone, or by injecting wastewater at excessive

pressures). In other words, an overpressured formation

increases the risk of upward fluid movement that

could endanger USDWs. See Resp. to Cmts. at 13 (Cmt.

#13); Oral Arg. Tr. at 32 (noting that in an overpressured formation fluids naturally would migrate).

The Region explained that in combination with the

overpressured nature of the Panoche Formation, the

presence of abandoned wells located in the AoR

increase the risks of potential fluid movement from the

injection zone into the USDW due to the age of the

wells, their configuration and manner of plugging, and

uncertainty about their current conditions. See Resp.

to Cmts. at 5, 6-7, 8-11 (Cmts #4, 5, 9).

b. Old-Abandoned Wells in the AoR

Present a Reasonable Cause for Concern

Abandoned wells present a potential pathway for

fluid migration. Class I Wells Study at 14 (“[F]luids

could potentially be forced upward from the injection

30a

zone through transmissive faults or fractures in the

confining beds which, like abandoned wells, can act as

pathways for waste migration to USDWs”); Oral. Arg.

Tr. at 42-43. Here, Panoche identified twenty abandoned

wells within a three-mile radius of the Facility. See

2019 Application at attach. A tbl. A-1, attach. B at B-1.

The abandoned wells in the AoR here were of particular concern to the Region because several, like Silver

Creek #18, lack cement plugs between the top of the

injection zone and the base of the lowermost USDW,

penetrate the injection zone, and lack long string

casing. Resp. to Cmts. at 7, 9-10 (Cmts. #6, 9); see 2019

Application attach A. tbl. A-1, attach. C at C-1 to C-8

& tbl. C-1. The abandoned wells in the AoR were also

of concern to the Region because the condition of the

mud used as a plugging agent is unknown. See Resp.

to Cmts. at 2, 3-4, 9-10 (Cmts. #1, 2, 9-10).

The abandoned wells located within the AoR were

plugged and abandoned decades ago. See Part IV.B

above; June 2019 Technical Review Letter enclosure at

1; Reply Br. attachs. 2-5. The Region explained that

“mud conditions and columns in wells abandoned

decades ago can vary substantially, depending on well

construction, depth of casing and plugs, formation

pressures and permeabilities, and other factors.” Dec.

2019 Technical Review Letter enclosure at 2; see also

Barker Study at 89. Panoche’s application did not

provide empirical data on the condition of the mud,

and as noted, Panoche later declined to provide

empirical data in response to the Region’s request.

June 2019 Technical Review Letter enclosure at 1; Dec.

2019 Technical Review Letter enclosure at 2; Panoche

Response to Dec. 2019 Technical Review Letter at 3.

In addition, some of the abandoned wells in the AoR

lack long string casing or cement plugs between the

31a

top of the injection zone and the base of the lowermost

USDW and penetrate the injection zone. See Resp. to

Cmts. at 7, 9-10 (Cmts. #6, 9); see also 2019 Application

attach. A tbl. A-1, attach. C at C-1 to C-8 & tbl. C-1.

Silver Creek #18, the closest of the abandoned wells in

the AoR to the injection wells, was plugged and

abandoned in 1974, Silver Creek #18 Plugging Records

at 45, has no long string casing installed, no cement

plug between the injection zone and the base of the

USDW, and was abandoned with a lighter-weight mud

than the mud in the next closest well.8 Resp. to Cmts.

at 5, 12 (Cmts. #4, 11); Resp. Br. at 6-7. The Region

explained that “[t]he lack of long-string casing increases

the risk of fluids migrating laterally through the

injection zone and into the abandoned wells” and the

lack of a cement plug at the base of the USDW

amplifies that risk because if the fluid reaches Silver

Creek, or any of the abandoned wells, there would be

no effective barrier preventing upward migration into

the USDW. Resp. Br. at 6. Furthermore, lighter mud is

less resistant to pressure increases, Resp. to Cmts. at

5 (Cmt. #4), and potential fluid movement. See Oral

Arg. Tr. at 50. As noted above, Panoche itself

acknowledged the potential for pressure to enter

Silver Creek #18 and move fluids into the USDW. 2019

Application attach. C at C-7; Resp. Br.at 6.

The Region’s assessment of these multiple and

interrelated site-specific factors pointed to a risk of

8

The Region noted that the Silver Creek #18 well has a cement

plug from 1,437 to 1,700 feet, and explained that while this plug

may be protective of fresh-saltwater interfaces, no cement plugs

were placed to isolate the injection zone from the base of USDWs

to prevent fluid migration outside of the approved injection zone.

Resp. to Cmts. at 12 (Cmt. #11). The base of the USDW is located

at approximately 3,000 feet. 2019 Application attach. D at D-3.

32a

potential USDW endangerment, a concern the Region

needed to address in its permitting decision. See Resp.

to Cmts. at 2-3 (Cmt. #1). The Region found its concerns

about the uncertainty of the current condition of the

wells supported by a U.S. Geological Survey study

conducted in Utah. Id. at 10- 11 (Cmt. #9). The study

states that: “in older wells that were not plugged and

abandoned by current standards and procedures, or

where the integrity of the cement and mud used to

plug the wells has been compromised throughout time,

[] water could potentially move uphole [] into the []

aquifer.” U.S. Geological Survey, Water-Resources

Investigations Report 96-4155, at 58 (1996) (A.R. 25)

(“USGS Utah Study”); see also id. at 29-30 (similar

language).

To eliminate uncertainty as to the condition and

efficacy of the mud in the abandoned wells and to

evaluate the risk of potential fluid movement, the

Region, as noted above, requested empirical data on

the current condition of the mud and pressures in

Silver Creek #18 and the other abandoned wells in the

AoR. See, e.g., June 2019 Technical Review Letter

enclosure at 1; Dec. 2019 Technical Review Letter

enclosure at 2; Resp. to Cmts. at 5 (Cmt. #4); Resp. Br.

at 6. Panoche did not provide the requested empirical

data. Resp. to Cmts. at 6 (Cmt. #5). Instead, it

reiterated its position that the abandoned wells were

plugged consistent with procedures in place at the

time the wells were abandoned decades ago. And

Panoche estimated the mud column weight in each of

the wells in the AoR and the pressure needed to

overcome the mud weight and combination of gel

strength and mud weight. It provided some studies

that, among other things, discussed the relationship

between gel strength and time, and the effectiveness

and longevity of muds as plugging material. Panoche

33a

further claimed that its Facility operation would not

increase pressure within the injection zone because its

Enhanced Wastewater System (“EWS”) had reduced

injection rates by up to eighty percent since its

installation in 2016. See, e.g., Letter from Ankur K.

Tohan, K&L Gates, to David Albright, Groundwater

Protection Section, EPA Region 9, at 2-3, 5-6 (Jan. 25,

2021) (A.R. 43e); Panoche Comments at 9-10 & attach.

7; Resp. to Cmts. at 8-11 (Cmt. #9).

After extensive review of the information Panoche

provided, the Region found Panoche’s submissions

misplaced and unpersuasive. As noted above, it

observed that compliance with the procedures in place

at the time the wells were abandoned does not provide

information about the present condition of the mud,

decades later, and whether that mud can prevent the

potential movement of fluid into a USDW in an

already overpressured injection zone. Resp. to Cmts. at

6-7 (Cmt. #5). It also found that Panoche’s modeling

did not accurately represent the condition of the mud

within the AoR. See, e.g., id. at 9 (Cmt. #9). It explained

that Panoche did not calculate or otherwise determine

the gel strength within the AoR, but rather, Panoche

had “assigned the pressure needed at each borehole to

exceed an assumed gel strength that is based on

studies of other wells.” Id. And the estimates that

Panoche used were not based on “empirical data about

any of the wells in the AoR of the injection wells,

including Silver Creek #18 well.” Id. (noting that while

the assumed gel strength value Panoche used was on

the conservative side of the values identified in the

Barker Study upon which Panoche relied, the value is

still an estimate based on assumptions). The Region

also found the studies cited by Panoche to be of little

relevance and applicability because they addressed

mud strength at other locations, and none of them

34a

provided site-specific information that addressed all of

the characteristics of the site. Id. at 8-11 (Cmt. #9);

Resp. Br at 15. The Region’s assessment of the studies

on which Panoche relied is described in its technical

review as noted above, and at length in the response

to comments document. The Region explained that the

studies Panoche submitted to support the conservative

nature of its mud strength evaluation described wells

in other states, e.g., Panoche Comments attachs. 7.1

& 7.11(studies of wells in Texas), or non-injection

applications that do not involve pressure buildup due

to injection of fluids, e.g., Panoche Comments attach.

7.12 (study of the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant in New

Mexico).9 Resp. to Cmts. at 10 (Cmt. #9). Others, see

Panoche Comments attachs. 7.2, 7.3, 7.10, 7.14, 7.17, &

7.18, are general studies “of the characteristics and

effectiveness of clay-based muds, but are laboratory

studies, recommended practices, or general reviews,”

and the authors of some of these studies even acknowledged that the experiments cannot and were not

intended to replicate long abandoned wellbore conditions,

urging caution in applying their results to a field

setting. Resp. to Cmts. at 10 (Cmt. #9) (citing Panoche

Comments attach. 7.10); see, e.g., Barker Study at 89

(“Since the gel strength varies with the mud type and

the conditions that act on the mud it is difficult to

determine the exact gel strength of the mud in a

particular abandoned well bore.”); id. at 113 (“The 20

lb/100ft2 ultimate gel strength was arbitrarily selected

[in this study] to insure that a sufficient safety factor

is built into the proposed procedure. The selection is

the result of individual judgment prejudiced by the

above discussion [in the study]”); R.E. Collins and

9

See also attachs. 7.7, 7.8, 7.19 (other studies from wells in

Texas).

35a

D. Kortum, Drilling Mud as a Hydraulic Seal in

Abandoned Wellbores, at 8 (1989) (A.R. 43u) (“Collins

Mud Study”) (“direct application of this result to actual

wells should be used with caution”); see also Panoche

Energy Center, LLC Petition for Review attach. 11, at

136 (Oct. 28, 2022) (“Pet.”) (same study). The Region

also found that the studies Panoche submitted to

assert the maintenance of gel strength over time, e.g.,

Panoche Comments attachs. 7.10, 7.20, & 7.21, described

laboratory studies that attempted to evaluate the

effects of temperature, but did not “provide the sitespecific empirical data to address uncertainties about

the wells in the AoR at their current age, or their

ability to withstand increased pressures in the injection

zone.” Resp. to Cmts. at 10 (Cmt. #9). Other studies,

e.g., Panoche Comments attachs. 7.7, 7.8, & 7.19,

clarified that arguments about mud strength were

predicated on the conditions described in the particular

studies. Id. Studies, e.g., Panoche Comments attachs.

7.8 & 7.16, cautioned that gel strength increases with

time before leveling off and that “gel strength measured

at the surface after a short period of quiescence will

not be representative of downhole conditions in old,

abandoned wells,” and concluded that “the gel strengths

in abandoned wells are not usually known.” Id.

The Region also examined studies Panoche referenced

that provided field evidence of the longevity of mud as

a plugging material demonstrated during well reentries,

e.g., Panoche Comments attach. 7.19 (presenting field

data from a well in Texas), and concluded that the

studies cannot be cited as evidence of the proper

plugging of the Silver Creek #18 well or other wells in

the AoR. Id. With respect to the only report that

Panoche provided that addressed wells in the vicinity

of Panoche’s Facility, Panoche Comments attach. 6

(“Mud Column Characteristics and Conditions in the

36a

Cheney Ranch Field”), the Region concluded that the

three wells that Panoche selected from the Cheney

Field are not analogous to the wells in the AoR. See

Resp. to Cmts. at 10 (Cmt. #9). Specifically, the Region

noted that the mud in the Cheney Field wells was

inside long string casing in two of the wells, and that

the third well was “sidetracked” in 1973 and the mud

was in the open borehole for only a few weeks. Id. By

contrast, the Region explained that “the abandoned

wells in the AoR were drilled and abandoned decades

ago without long string casing, or adequate cement

behind the casing to isolate the USDW and with

uncertain mud conditions today.”10 Id.

Further, the Region considered and addressed

comments by Panoche that implementation of the

EWS has reduced pressures within the injection zone.

The Region observed that while the data obtained

from Panoche showed an 80% decline in injection

volumes during the EWS’s first year of operation, the

same data showed an increase in volume the following

10

The Region acknowledged that the information Panoche

provided supports the notion that drilling muds could potentially

prevent fluid migration and observed that its decision to eliminate

the corrective action requirements took this into account. Resp.

Br. at 16 (emphasis added). But the Region reiterated that the

information does not provide empirical data on the present

condition of the mud in the abandoned wells. Resp. to Cmts. at 9

(Cmt. #9); Resp. Br. at 16.

It also explained that even if the wells in the AoR meet current

California plugging requirements, that fact would not be

dispositive of USDW protection. See Resp. to Cmts. at 12 (Cmt.

#11) (explaining that California’s 2020 Onshore Well Regulations

relate to the protection of fresh-saltwater interfaces, not USDWs).

The Region also noted that it does not need to show that wells

were improperly plugged to require ambient monitoring. Id. at 8

(Cmt. #8).

37a

year, which has remained at that level. Id. at 13 (Cmt.

#13). And Panoche provided no evidence to demonstrate that injection rates and volumes will continue

to fall in the future. Id.

The uncertainty about the condition of the abandoned

wells in the AoR and their ability to prevent fluid

movement remained unresolved. The Region explained

that “[w]ithout definitive information about the current

condition of the mud, the impact of injection zone

pressure increases on potential fluid movement cannot

be ascertained to a level that ensures USDW protection.” Id. at 9 (Cmt. #9). Therefore, the Region’s technical judgment that ambient monitoring was necessary

to provide empirical data on current conditions and

potentially alert the permittee and the Region if

injection activities are endangering the USDW, was

reasonable and consistent with its obligations under

the law. See SDWA § 1421(b)(1), (d), 42 U.S.C. §-300h(b)(1),

(d); 40 C.F.R. §§ 144.1(g), .12, .55(a); id. § 146.13.

Recognizing the challenges related to mud sampling

as originally proposed by the Region, and concerns

expressed by Panoche that such sampling could

potentially disturb the mud, the Region determined

ambient monitoring to be the “best approach” to

demonstrate that there is no potential endangerment

to the USDW from Panoche’s injection activities (and

provide an early warning, as discussed below). Resp. to

Cmts. at 9 (Cmt. #9); see id. at 2-3 (Cmt. #1); see, Dec.

2019 Technical Review Letter enclosure at 2-3; Resp.

Br. at 8. The approach adopted by the Region is fully

consistent with the SDWA’s directives to prevent and

protect USDWs from endangerment associated with

underground injection activities. See SDWA § 1421(b)(1),

(d), 42 U.S.C. § 300h(b)(1), (d); 40 C.F.R. §§ 144.1(g),

.12(a). The statute focuses on the importance of

38a

prevention and avoiding failures that would result in

USDW endangerment. Thus, including permit conditions such as ambient monitoring, which are designed

to detect potential endangerment, falls squarely

within the objectives of and authority delegated under

the statute. The approach is also consistent with the

UIC regulations, which prohibit fluid movement into

the USDW, require the permit applicant to demonstrate such movement is not occurring, and authorize

the permitting authority to require monitoring to

detect any migration of fluids into and pressure in the

USDW, based on the potential for such fluid movement

to occur. 40 C.F.R. §§ 144.12, 146.13(a)(1), (b), (d).

In light of all the above, we conclude that the Region

articulated a rational basis in the record for the

inclusion of ambient monitoring in the Final Permit.

c. The Potential Value of the Ambient

Monitoring Condition

The Final Permit requires Panoche to drill a

monitoring well near Silver Creek #18, and to measure

pressure and conduct water quality sampling on an

ongoing basis. Final Permit pts. II.E.2-6, at 17-23. It

also requires Panoche to obtain baseline data of

ground water chemistry. Our review of the record

shows that the Region duly considered the potential

value of monitoring near Silver Creek #18 as required

by the ambient monitoring regulation, the usefulness

of the information that will be generated, and the role

of other monitoring conditions in the Final Permit.

The Region selected monitoring near Silver Creek

#18 because of the abandoned well’s proximity to the

injection zone (about 1.25 miles to the northeast of the

injection well), and its configuration and manner of

plugging (i.e., Silver Creek #18 has no long string

39a

casing, was abandoned with a lighter-weight mud than

the mud in the next closest abandoned well, and has

no cement plug between the top of the injection zone

and the base of the USDW). Resp. to Cmts. at 5, 12

(Cmts. #4, 11). The Region anticipates the selected

location would be the first place where an increase in

subsurface pressures may be observed. See id. at 5

(Cmt. #4); Resp. Br. at 20. And because the Silver

Creek #18 well was plugged in 1974 and there is

uncertainty about the present condition of the mud

and condition of the well, the Region considered

monitoring near this well to be appropriate. See Resp.

to Cmts. at 9 (Cmt. #9); see also id. at 11-12 (Cmt. #11)

(explaining why Silver Creek #18 remained a concern

to the Region even if it was abandoned in accordance

with California Geologic Management Division

(“CalGEM”) regulations in place when the well was

plugged in 1974).11

With respect to the potential value of the information that will be generated by monitoring near

Silver Creek #18, the record shows that the Region

expects the information will assist both the Region and

Panoche in determining whether there is hydraulic

communication between the injection zone and the

USDW. Id. at 14 (Cmt. #14). According to the Region,

this information will either confirm that the project

is operating as expected or will provide early warning

of potential endangerment to the USDW (i.e., by

detecting potential hydraulic communication between

the injection zone and the USDW). See id. at 3, 13, 14

(Cmts. #1, 13, 14); Resp. Br. at 20. The Region explained

that monitoring near Silver Creek #18 would provide

information on whether water quality or pressure

11

See also note 10.

40a

changes are occurring that could indicate an upward

movement of fluid through the abandoned well and

that information could be used to identify trends over

time. If the abandoned wells are adequately plugged,

no changes in the overlying formation should be

observed when the injected fluids reach and pass the

location of the abandoned wells. Resp. to Cmts. at 14

(Cmt. #14). By contrast, observed pressure changes

would likely indicate fluids are moving upward along

the borehole in the abandoned wells. Id. The Region

explained that water quality may or may not change

depending on the differences in the fluids in each

formation. Id.; see id. at 13 (Cmt. #13).

The Region further explained that the ongoing

pressure data and constituent monitoring results will

be compared to the baseline data and that trends over

time can provide an understanding of pressure and

water quality conditions within the USDW. See id. at

14-15 (Cmt. #14); Resp. Br. at 20. The Region also

addressed comments questioning how the pressure

and constituent monitoring data will be used to identify

issues resulting directly from Panoche’s injection activities

and not from other activities, such as other water

wells, irrigation wells, or pressure decreases due to

large-volume groundwater withdrawals in the Fresno

Irrigation District. See Resp. to Cmts. at 14 (Cmt. #14).

In its response to comments document, the Region

observed that because of the depth of the USDW (1,930

feet below the surface) “any changes would likely be

associated with a deficient wellbore” in the AoR, that

“it is unlikely that infiltration from the surface* * *

would affect water quality nearly 2,000 feet below the

surface,” and that any changes would likely be the

result of subsurface activity. Id. at 15 (Cmt. #14).

41a

Finally, the Region explained that ambient monitoring will produce data that are different from what will

be produced by the other monitoring provisions in the

Final Permit, and that together these monitoring

provisions will provide the data needed to ensure

protection of the USDW. See id. at 2-4 (Cmts. #1, 2);

Resp. Br. at 21-22 & n.14-15. In addressing Panoche’s

comments, the Region explained that while Permit

Conditions II.C.1 and II. D.2 are significant monitoring

requirements that will provide information about the

conditions at the location of the injection wells, they do

not provide data or other information about the

strength of muds in the Silver Creek #18 well or about

potential pressure changes or water quality impacts in

nearby USDWs.12 Resp. to Cmts. at 2-4 (Cmts. #1, 2);

Resp. Br. at 21- 22. The Region also observed that it

has required USDW/ambient monitoring in other

Class I permits, like it did here. Resp. to Cmts. at 8

(Cmt. #7).

The record shows that the Region addressed and

considered the arguments Panoche raised during the

comment period about the location and potential value

of the ambient monitoring condition along with the

role of the other monitoring conditions in the Final

Permit.

In sum, the Region articulated why any injection

could disrupt the already overpressured Panoche

Formation, why the estimates Panoche provided to

support its position that the mud was strong enough

to eliminate the risk of fluid migration were not

12

Permit Condition II.C.1 requires Panoche to review the zone

of endangering influence calculation on an annual basis, and

II.D.2, requires mechanical integrity testing of the injection wells.

Final Permit at 10, 11-13.

42a

persuasive, and why ambient monitoring near Silver

Creek #18 was appropriate within the meaning of the

ambient monitoring regulation. Uncertainties as to

the condition of the wells in the AoR remain. Panoche’s

disagreements are technical disagreements and a

disagreement as to how the Region exercised its

considerable discretion with respect to developing a

monitoring plan. See Peabody, 12 E.A.D. at 50-51.

These disagreements do not amount to clear error or

an abuse of discretion. NE Hub Partners, 7 E.A.D. at

570.

2. Panoche’s Petition Does Not Address the

Region’s Response to Comments Document,

the Arguments Are Without Merit, and

Some of the Arguments Are Untimely

On appeal, Panoche claims that it demonstrated

there will be no fluid movement from the injection zone

into the USDW and the Region ignored the existence

of record evidence that undercuts its decision. Pet. at

19-23; Reply Br. at 6-10; Oral Arg. Tr. at 8. We disagree.

Many of Panoche’s arguments in the petition repeat

comments raised on the 2021 Draft Permit, do not

address the Region’s response to comments document,

and are untimely. In any event, all of the arguments

fail on the merits.

Panoche states it provided the Region with the

following information that it argues demonstrates

there will be no fluid movement, namely that: the

injection zone goes deeper than 7,100 feet with two

confining layers and an intervening buffer aquifer;

every well within the AoR has sufficient mud column

weight to resist fluid entry; Silver Creek has 10.03

pound per gallon mud between the injection zone and

the lowermost USDW; the Panoche Formation pressure

would need to exceed 4,007 psi to displace the mud and

43a

4,054 psi to displace the mud and gel strength in Silver

Creek; Panoche applied a conservative approach in its

AoR and endangerment analysis; implementation of

its EWS has reduced injection volumes by approximately 70-80% and pressure in the injection formation;

and its air permit limits its ability to operate the

Facility, resulting in an estimated maximum injection

volume of 84 million gallons/year. Pet. at 19-20.

According to Panoche, these factors led the Region to

conclude that there is no potential for movement of

fluid from the injection zone into a USDW and

therefore no corrective actions are needed under the

Final Permit. Id. at 20. In addition, Panoche argues

that the ambient monitoring condition is not rational

and will not provide advance warning of fluid

movement. Id. at 26-29; Reply Br. at 18. Panoche

makes these arguments despite acknowledging that

there is the potential for fluid movement from the

Silver Creek #18 well into the USDW, and ignores the

Region’s response to comments document, and

explanation, discussed below, for why it decided to

require ambient monitoring rather than corrective

action in the Final Permit at this time.

a. The Region Considered and Addressed

Panoche’s Comments and Panoche

Failed to Address the Region’s

Responses or Otherwise Demonstrate

Clear Error or Abuse of Discretion

As discussed in Part V.A.1 above, the Region found

that neither Panoche’s modeling nor the studies,

laboratory data, and other information Panoche

provided described the current condition of the mud in

the abandoned wells in the AoR (e.g., strength of mud

column); addressed uncertainties about the conditions

of the wells in the AoR or their ability to withstand

44a

increased pressures in the injection zone; or provided

direct proof that the mud in the abandoned wells in

the AoR had retained its ability overtime to suppress

fluid movement. See Resp. to Cmts. at 6, 8-11, 13, 14

(Cmts. # 6, 9, 13, 14). Moreover, the Region found

support in some of those studies for its decision to

require site-specific empirical data. Id. at 10 (Cmt. #9)

(e.g., identifying studies that cautioned about applying

laboratory data to field settings, observed that gel

strength varies with mud type and condition of the

mud, making it difficult to determine exact gel strength,

and acknowledged that gel strengths in abandoned

wells are not usually known).13 The record also shows

that the Region considered and addressed Panoche’s

comments related to the impact of the EWS on

injection volumes and pressure in the injection

formation, and responded to questions about the

information that would be obtained from ambient

monitoring and the water quality data. See id. at 6, 13,

14 (Cmts. #6, 13, 14). Panoche’s petition does not

address the Region’s response to comments document

on these points. Instead, Panoche attempts to shift its

burden, reiterates its earlier comments on the 2021

Draft Permit, mischaracterizes the Region’s rationale

for rejecting Panoche’s modeling and eliminating

corrective action from the 2020 Pre-Publication Draft,

13

See, e.g., Collins Mud Study; Clark, P.W. Papadeaus, D.K.

Sparks, and R.R. McGowen, Gulf Coast Borehole Closure Text Well

Orangefield, Texas (Oct. 1991) (A.R. 43s); O.C. Johnson& B.K.

Knape, Pressure Effects of the Static Mud Column in Abandoned

Wells (Sept. 1986) (A.R. 43aa).

45a

and raises new arguments in its petition and reply

brief.14 We address Panoche’s arguments in turn.

14

Panoche’s argument related to the limits in its air permit was

not raised in its comments on the 2021 Draft Permit, but the

Region addressed them in its response brief.

Panoche also argues that the Region did not address “any of

the geologic features of this particular site that provide further

protection to USDWs,” and ignored “evidence in the record that

these types of rock will naturally close and seal abandoned

wellbores.” Reply Br. at 9 (emphasis in original) (citing Pet. at 8,

12-13). Contrary to Panoche’s claim, the record reflects that the

Region considered the geology of the Panoche Formation in its

decision-making. See, e.g., May 2018 Technical Review Letter at

3-4; Resp. to Cmts. at 2 (Cmt. #1); Resp. Br. at 4 (observing that it

“conducted a thorough site-specific assessment of the Facility’s

operations and injection activities, along with the geology of the

injection and confining zones”); see also Oral Arg. Tr. at 70 (articulating how artificial penetrations weaken the benefits of the confining

layer and the aquifer). In light of the overpressured condition of

the Panoche Formation, the abandoned wells and uncertainty

about their condition, the Region did not find that the confining

layers and buffer aquifer would provide the safeguards Panoche

claims. See Resp. to Cmts. at 2 (Cmt. #1); Oral Arg. Tr. at 70.

We also note that Panoche’s comment and arguments during

the comment period focused on the impact of reduced injection

volumes on pressurization of the Panoche Formation and the

strength of the mud in abandoned wells, not on the geological

features or confining layers as additional safeguards. See Panoche

Comments at 9-10. Panoche’s comment letter mentioned “confining

layers,” but it did so in the context of the pressure in the Panoche

Formation. Id. at 35 (“Given that there are 1,000s of feet of

confining layers between the USDW and the Injection zone, with

intervening pressure bleed-off zones, how will EPA account for

that decrease in pressure with the proposed monitoring condition

for the Silver Creek #18 well?”); see Oral Arg. Tr. at 83. The Region

considered and addressed the actual comment Panoche raised.

See Resp. to Cmts. at 13-14 (Cmt. #13) (interpreting comment as

focused on “how the pressure dissipation will affect pressure

monitoring and constituent monitoring results”).

46a

b. The Permittee Bears the Burden of

Demonstrating That Injection Activities

Will Not Be Conducted in a Manner

That Allows Movement of Fluid into

the USDW

In its petition, Panoche argues that the Region’s

concerns about the condition of the abandoned wells in

the AoR is based on speculation without factual

foundation, or site-specific record evidence. Pet. at 2023. It states that the Region relied on speculation,

“unsupported by any site-specific record evidence or

analysis” that older muds in properly plugged wells

may fail. Id. at 21.15 Along these lines, Panoche argues

that the Region did not provide one example of older

drilling muds failing. Reply Br. at 12; Oral Arg. Tr. at

32-33. But as shown in Part V.A.1, the administrative

record fully supports the Region’s concerns about the

condition of the abandoned wells, in particular the

condition of Silver Creek #18. See also Resp. to

Cmts. at 2-3 (Cmt. #1). To the extent that Panoche is

attempting to flip its burden of showing that its

injection activities will not endanger the USDW, we

15

Panoche also asserts that EPA’s “speculative concerns are

legally insufficient to impose costly monitoring requirements.”

Reply Br. at 10 (citing In re Stonehaven, Energy Mgmt. L.L.C., 15

E.A.D. 817, 830-31 (EAB 2013) and Amerijet Int’l, Inc. v. Pistole,

753 F.3d 1343, 1350 (D.C. Cir. 2014)); see generally Pet. at 21-23.

As discussed in Part V.B below, cost is beyond the scope of the UIC

program and Board review. And neither case cited by Panoche

provides support for its claims. Unlike in Stonehaven, the record

here provides a rational basis for the Region’s decision to require

ambient monitoring, and Stonehaven does not discuss the cost of

monitoring wells. Amerijet addresses Transportation Security

Administration denials of airline requests for alternative security

procedures and has nothing to do with cost consideration or the

UIC program. Amerijet, 753 F.3d at 1345-1346.

47a

note that this is contrary to the permit applicant’s

burden set forth in 40 C.F.R.§ 144.12(a). The burden of

showing that injection activities will not be conducted

in a manner that allows the movement of injection

fluid into USDWs, rests on the permit applicant, not

the Region. 40 C.F.R. § 144.12(a).16 Furthermore, the

Region is neither required to demonstrate that a well

is improperly plugged and abandoned, nor to provide

examples of abandoned wells that have failed, as a

precondition to, or justification for, requiring ambient

monitoring in a Class I UIC permit. Id. § 146.13(b), (d).

The Region has an obligation to prevent and protect

USDWs from endangerment associated with underground injection activities and need not wait until a

well abandoned decades ago in an overpressured

formation fails or facilitates fluid movement before

taking steps to detect or prevent endangerment. See

SDWA § 1421(b)(1), (d), 42 U.S.C. § 300h(b)(1), (d); 40

C.F.R. §§ 144.1(g), .12(a).17 Panoche has not met its

burden of showing clear error or abuse of discretion.

16

At Oral Argument, counsel for Panoche agreed that this

burden lies with Panoche. Oral Arg. Tr. at 18.

17

In its response brief, the Region cites to 40 C.F.R. § 144.12(b)

for the proposition that it has an obligation to impose permit

conditions that will ensure that USDWs remain protected, and

that in a situation where a permit applicant does not provide

evidence to conclusively redress a known risk, the Region may

require additional monitoring. Resp. Br. at 19. Panoche argues

that the Region erred in citing to section 144.12(b) for support,

because this is not a situation where there is actual movement of

fluid into the USDW. See Reply Br. at 19. We find no clear error in

the Region’s statement. The Region cites section 144.12(b) for the

proposition that it has a regulatory obligation to protect USDWs,

which the provision supports. See 40 C.F.R. § 144.12(b). The

Region is not claiming that the abandoned wells in the Panoche

48a

c. A Permittee Must Do More than

Reiterate Its Comments, It Must Address

the Region’s Response to Comments

Document and Explain Why the

Response Was Clearly Erroneous or

Otherwise Warrants Review

In addition to the arguments discussed above, the

petition repeats, without more, the comments Panoche

raised on the 2021 Draft Permit that the studies and

other information it provided show that mud retains

its properties over time and that the wells were

properly plugged when they were abandoned. Pet. at

21-22 (claiming that the results of the laboratory and

field studies it provided like the “Mud Column

Characteristics and Conditions in the Cheney Ranch

Field” apply to the abandoned wells in the AoR.); Reply

Br. at 4, 10-11 (stating that “all of [the] wells within

the AoR were properly plugged and abandoned”). As

discussed in Part V.A.1 above, the Region explained at

length why the Cheney Study and other laboratory

studies Panoche provided are not relevant. Resp. to

Cmts. at 8-11 (Cmt. #9). The Region also identified

flaws in Panoche’s modeling (e.g., it was based on

estimates and assumptions, not on empirical data

about the mud in wells in the AoR). See id. at 9, 11

(Cmts. #9, 10). And the Region explained that the

manner of plugging at the time of abandonment says

nothing about the current condition of the mud in

wells that were abandoned several decades ago, see id.

at 12 (Cmt. #12), and that the Silver Creek #18 well

was abandoned with lighter mud than the next closest

well and lacked cement plugs between the top of the

Formation are currently showing movement of contaminants into

the USDW from the injection zone.

49a

injection zone and the base of the USDW, id. at 5, 12

(Cmts. #4, 11).

Panoche does not address the Region’s responses to

these comments in its petition. Rather, it calls into

question the relevance of the USGS Utah Study to the

matter at hand, claims that all the wells within the

AoR have cement plugs and certification records from

CalGEM documenting that they were properly plugged

and abandoned, and asserts that the Region “did not

assess the additive benefits of those features.” Pet. at

23-26. But as the Region explained and the record

shows, the USGS Utah Study is not the only piece of

information the Region considered. Resp. Br. at 18 n.

13. As shown in Part V.A.1 above, and as noted by the

Region, it considered site-specific factors, including the

presence of old-abandoned wells near the Facility that

lack long string casing and cement plugs between the

top of the injection zone and base of the USDW, and

the overpressured condition of the Panoche Formation.

See also id. The USGS Utah Study supports the notion

that old wells that may have been improperly plugged

and abandoned by current standards, or where the

integrity of the mud may have been compromised over

time, provide a potential pathway for fluid migration

into a USDW. Resp. to Cmts. at 10- 11 (Cmt. #9); USGS

Utah Study at 29-30, 58; id. at 30 (providing examples

of old abandoned wells that exhibited signs of potential

fluid migration upward in plugged wells).18 Here, the

18

Panoche dismisses the examples the Region points to in the

USGS Utah Study, arguing that there is no evidence of similar

pooling at the wells within Panoche’s AoR, and that there is no

evidence that the integrity of the muds used to plug and abandon

the AoR wells has been compromised. Pet. at 25. But Panoche

continues to miss the point; the Region is not claiming that there

is fluid movement, but that the old wells in the AoR pose a risk,

50a

abandoned wells were plugged several decades ago,

and the Region reviewed the well records Panoche

provided and correctly concluded that they do not

provide data on the current condition of mud. See Resp.

to Cmts. at 2-3, 8-9 (Cmts. #1, 9). Also, the record shows

that the Silver Creek #18 cement plugs Panoche

references are not located in a position to protect the

USDW from fluid moving from the injection zone.19

The Injection Zone is between approximately 6,5008,500 feet, the base of the USDW is at approximately

3,000 feet, see Pet. at 9 fig., and the plugs in Silver

Creek #18 are no lower than 1,700 feet. See Silver

Creek #18 Plugging Records at 47; Resp. to Cmts. at 12

(Cmt. #11).

Panoche’s argument that operation of its EWS

reduced injection rates by 80 percent and has contributed to a decrease in formation pressures, Pet. at 1314, 20; Reply Br. at 6, 14, is also a reiteration of

comments the Region considered and responded to in

the response to comments document, that Panoche’s

petition does not address. See Part V.A.1 above; Resp.

to Cmts. at 13 (Cmt. #13) (explaining that the data

obtained from Panoche showed an increase in wastewater volume the year after EWS implementation and

has remained at that level and that Panoche provided

no evidence to demonstrate that injection rates and

volumes will continue to fall in the future); id. at 6

(Cmt. #5) (the Region eliminated the corrective action

requirement contemplated under the 2020 Pre-

that there is uncertainty and the potential for fluid movement,

and the risk needs to be evaluated and monitored.

19

See note 8 above.

51a

Publication Draft in light of the reduced injection

volume associated with installation the EWS).20

Likewise, Panoche’s arguments that there is no

nexus between the Region’s concerns and the water

quality data Panoche is required to obtain, and that

water quality testing would not indicate one way or

another whether a borehole plug has failed, Pet. at 26;

Reply Br. at 18-19, do not address the Region’s

explanation in the response to comments document

about the value of water quality testing. As shown in

Part V.A.1, the information obtained under the

ambient monitoring condition will assist in determining whether there is hydraulic communication

between the injection activities and the USDW. The

information will help to determine if water quality

changes are occurring that could indicate an upward

movement of fluid through the abandoned well and to

identify trends over time. The fact that the Region

observed that water quality may or may not change

depending on the differences in the fluids in each

formation, see Resp. to Cmts. at 14 (Cmt.

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Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Panoche Energy Center, LLC, Petitioner v. Environmental Protection Agency, et al. | Frix