Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Panoche Energy Center, LLC, Petitioner v. Environmental Protection Agency, et al.
Supreme Court briefJan 3, 2025
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No. 24-___
IN THE
Supreme Court of the United States
————
PANOCHE ENERGY CENTER, LLC,
v.
Petitioner,
UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL
PROTECTION AGENCY ET AL.,
————
Respondents.
On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the
United States Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit
————
PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
————
VARU CHILAKAMARRI
Counsel of Record
ANKUR K. TOHAN
J. TIMOTHY HOBBS
SPENCER MCCANDLESS
K&L GATES LLP
1601 K Street, NW
Washington, D.C. 20006
(202) 778-9000
varu.chilakamarri@klgates.com
ankur.tohan@klgates.com
tim.hobbs@klgates.com
spencer.mccandless@klgates.com
Counsel for Petitioner
January 3, 2025
WILSON-EPES PRINTING CO., INC. – (202) 789-0096 – WASHINGTON, D.C. 20002
QUESTION PRESENTED
Petitioner Panoche Energy Center, LLC (“Panoche”)
manages a power plant that is critical to California’s
electrical grid. Panoche holds an underground injection control (“UIC”) permit from the Environmental
Protection Agency (“EPA” or the “Agency”) that
authorizes it to dispose of nonhazardous water used
for cooling its plant by injecting it thousands of feet
below the Earth’s surface. The permit is essential to
the plant’s operation. Panoche has always complied
with the permit’s terms, and its injections have never
endangered local drinking water. But when the permit
came up for renewal, EPA abruptly imposed a
condition requiring Panoche to install a new 3,500foot-deep monitoring well over a mile away at a private
commercial orchard that Panoche does not own and
has no right to access.
EPA acknowledged it was compelling Panoche to
acquire new property rights from a landowner who
had no obligation to sell them. (The landowner has
since refused to allow the well to be drilled at all, for
any price.) But EPA claimed Congress empowered
it to impose this unprecedented—and it turns out,
impossible—permit condition through a provision of
the Safe Drinking Water Act that does not even
mention permittees having to drill monitoring wells
anywhere.
The Question Presented is:
Does the Safe Drinking Water Act (42 U.S.C. § 300h5) authorize EPA to compel UIC permittees to
construct monitoring wells on third-party property
that permitees lack rights to access without
considering the feasibility and costs of such a permit
condition?
(i)
ii
PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING BELOW
AND RULE 29.6 STATEMENT
This petition seeks review of a decision by the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. In the Ninth Circuit
and in this Court, the Petitioner is Panoche Energy
Center, LLC. Respondents are the United States
Environmental Protection Agency; Michael Regan, in
his official capacity as Administrator of the United
States Environmental Protection Agency; and Martha
Guzman Aceves, in her official capacity as Regional
Administrator of the United States Environmental
Protection Agency, Region IX.
Pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 29.6, Petitioner
Panoche Energy Center, LLC declares that it is wholly
owned by its parent company, Ares Energy Investors
Fund V, L.P., a private investment fund managed
by affiliates of Ares Management Corporation. No
publicly held corporation owns 10% or more of
Panoche Energy Center, LLC stock.
RELATED PROCEEDINGS
This case arises from the following proceedings:
•
Panoche Energy Center, LLC v. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, No. 23-1268, 2024
WL 3043005 (9th Cir. June 18, 2024), petition
for panel rehearing denied on August 8, 2024.
•
In re Panoche Energy Ctr., LLC, 18 E.A.D. 818
(EAB 2023) (Environmental Protection Agency),
final order denying review issued on May 26,
2023.
No other proceedings in state or federal trial or
appellate courts, or in this Court, directly relate to this
case under this Court’s Rule 14.1(b)(iii).
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
QUESTION PRESENTED ..................................
i
PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING BELOW
AND RULE 29.6 STATEMENT ......................
ii
RELATED PROCEEDINGS ...............................
ii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ................................
v
OPINIONS BELOW ............................................
1
JURISDICTION ..................................................
1
STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED..........
1
STATEMENT OF THE CASE ............................
1
I. Factual and Legal Background ................
6
A. Panoche safely operates a crucial
piece of California’s energy infrastructure without endangering local
drinking water .....................................
6
B. EPA regulates underground injection
wells .....................................................
7
C. For over a decade, Panoche dutifully
complied with all EPA regulations
and permitting requirements..............
9
D. EPA arbitrarily orders Panoche to do
the legally impossible—drill a 3,500foot monitoring well on someone else’s
almond orchard ....................................
10
II. Procedural History ....................................
15
(iii)
iv
TABLE OF CONTENTS—Continued
Page
REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT ..........
17
I. Because the Ninth Circuit’s Ruling
Cannot be Reconciled with this Court’s
Intervening Loper Bright Decision, this
Court Should Vacate the Judgment and
Remand for Further Proceedings .............
19
II. Alternatively, the Court Should Grant
the Petition and Review the Ninth
Circuit’s Novel Approach to EPA
Permitting .................................................
21
A. The text of the SDWA requires EPA to
consider property rights, costs, and
feasibility when imposing monitoring
requirements........................................
21
B. The structure of the SDWA confirms
EPA may not compel a permittee to
utilize property rights the permittee
does not possess ...................................
26
C. If Congress had intended to grant
EPA such an unusual, far-reaching
power, it would have been explicit—
and it would not have taken EPA
nearly forty years to notice .................
29
D. Reversal will not unduly hamper
SDWA regulation.................................
33
E. The Question Presented has significant legal and practical implications
that warrant review ............................
34
CONCLUSION ....................................................
37
APPENDIX
v
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
CASES
Page(s)
American Textile Mfrs. Inst., Inc. v.
Donovan, 452 U.S. 490 (1981) ..................
30
Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp.,
529 U.S. 120 (2000) .............................. 20, 29-31
Cent. United Life Ins. Co. v. Burwell,
827 F.3d 70 (D.C. Cir. 2016) .....................
18
Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources
Defense Council, Inc.,
467 U.S. 837 (1984) ...................................
20
City of Arlington, Tex. v. F.C.C.,
569 U.S. 290 (2013) ...................................
20
City of Carmel-By-The-Sea v. U.S. Dep’t
of Transp.,
123 F.3d 1142 (9th Cir. 1997)...................
34
City of Oberlin v. FERC,
39 F.4th 719 (D.C. Cir. 2022) ................... 27, 28
Clark v. Martinez,
543 U.S. 371 (2005) ...................................
32
Cont’l Bank v. United States,
517 F. Supp. 918 (E.D. Pa. 1981), aff’d,
688 F.2d 819 (3d Cir. 1982) ...................... 31, 32
E. Enterprises v. Apfel,
524 U.S. 498 (1998) ...................................
31
In re Panoche Energy Ctr., LLC,
18 E.A.D. 818-52 (EAB 2023) ............... 1, 23, 24
Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo,
144 S. Ct. 2244 (2024) ...................... 6, 19-21, 36
vi
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued
Page(s)
Louisiana Pub. Serv. Comm’n v. F.C.C.,
476 U.S. 355 (1986) ................................... 1, 18
Michigan v. EPA,
576 U.S. 743 (2015) ................................... 22-24
Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Dep’t of Lab.,
Occupational Safety & Health Admin.,
595 U.S. 109 (2022) ...................................
18
Nat. Res. Def. Council v. Regan,
67 F.4th 397 (D.C. Cir. 2023) ............. 18, 28, 29
Nixon v. Missouri Mun. League,
541 U.S. 125 (2004) ................................... 26, 28
Onyx Properties LLC v. Bd. of Cnty.
Commissioners of Elbert Cnty.,
838 F.3d 1039 (10th Cir. 2016) .................
31
Panoche Energy Ctr., LLC v. United States
Env’t Prot. Agency,
No. 23-1268, 2024 WL 3043005
(9th Cir. June 18, 2024) ............. 1, 16-21, 23, 26
Riverkeeper, Inc. v. U.S. E.P.A.,
475 F.3d 83 (2d Cir. 2007), rev’d
on other grounds sub nom.
Entergy Corp. v. Riverkeeper, Inc.,
556 U.S. 208 (2009) ......................... 2, 25, 29, 30
Ry. Labor Execs. Ass’n v. Nat’l Mediation Bd.,
29 F.3d 655 (D.C. Cir. 1994) .....................
29
United States v. 92 Buena Vista Ave.,
Rumson, N.J.,
507 U.S. 111 (1993) ...................................
28
vii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued
Page(s)
United States v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns,
310 U.S. 534 (1940) ...................................
26
United States v. Dalton,
960 F.2d 121 (10th Cir. 1992)...................
31
United States v. Jin Fuey Moy,
241 U.S. 394 (1916) ...................................
31
United States v. Spingola,
464 F.2d 909 (7th Cir. 1972).....................
31
United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v.
Lee, 641 F.3d 1126 (2011) .........................
18
Util. Air Regul. Grp. v. E.P.A.,
573 U.S. 302 (2014) ................................... 4, 33
W. Virginia v. Env’t Prot. Agency,
597 U.S. 697 (2022) ...................................
30
Whitman v. American Trucking Ass’ns,
531 U.S. 457 (2001) ............................... 2, 20, 30
STATUTES AND REGULATIONS
5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(c) .......................................
16
15 U.S.C. § 717f(a) ........................................ 5, 26
15 U.S.C. §§ 717f(c)-(e) .................................
27
15 U.S.C. § 717f(h) ....................................... 5, 27
16 U.S.C. § 1539(a)(2)(A)..............................
33
26 U.S.C. § 103 .............................................
31
28 U.S.C. § 1254(l) ........................................
1
42 U.S.C. § 300h(b)(1) .................................. 7, 18
viii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued
Page(s)
42 U.S.C. § 300h(d)(2) ..................................
18
42 U.S.C. § 300h-2(b)(1) ...............................
9
42 U.S.C. § 300h-2(b)(2) ...............................
9
42 U.S.C. § 300h-2(c) ....................................
9
42 U.S.C. § 300h-5 .............. 2, 4, 5, 7-9, 16, 18, 19,
....................................... 21, 22, 24-26, 28-34, 36
42 U.S.C.A. § 7412(n)(1)(A) ..........................
23
33 C.F.R. § 320.4(r)(1) ..................................
33
33 C.F.R. § 325.4(a)(3) ..................................
33
40 C.F.R. pts. 144-148 ..................................
8
§ 144.1(e) ...................................................
7
§ 144.36(a) .................................................
10
§ 144.40(a) .................................................
9
§ 144.55 .................................................. 9-11, 14
§ 146.13 .....................................................
23
§ 146.13(a) .................................................
8
§ 146.13(b) ................................................. 8, 14
§ 146.13(c) .................................................
8
§ 146.13(d) .................................... 8, 9, 14, 21-25
§ 146.5 .......................................................
8
§ 146.5(a)(2)...............................................
8
§ 147.251(a) ...............................................
7
50 C.F.R. § 22.220 ........................................
33
ix
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued
OTHER AUTHORITIES
Page(s)
53 Fed. Reg. 28118 (July 26, 1988) ..............
7, 8
EPA, UIC Permits in EPA’s Pacific
Southwest (Region 9) (Dec. 12, 2024),
https://www.epa.gov/uic/r9-uic-permits ...
35
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
Petitioner Panoche Energy Center, LLC respectfully
petitions for a writ of certiorari to review the judgment
of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit.
OPINIONS BELOW
The Ninth Circuit’s memorandum opinion is
unpublished and may be found at Panoche Energy
Ctr., LLC v. United States Env’t Prot. Agency, No. 231268, 2024 WL 3043005 (9th Cir. June 18, 2024) or in
Petitioner’s Appendix (“App.”) at App.1a-5a.
The Environmental Appeals Board (“EAB”)’s order
denying review is published at In re Panoche Energy
Ctr., LLC, 18 E.A.D. 818-52 (EAB 2023) and included
at App.8a-61a.
JURISDICTION
The Ninth Circuit issued its decision on June 18,
2024, and denied a timely petition for panel rehearing
on August 8, 2024. App.108a. Justice Kagan extended
the deadline to petition this Court for certiorari until
January 5, 2025. This Court has jurisdiction to
consider this Petition for Certiorari under 28 U.S.C.
§1254(1).
STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED
The full text of relevant statutes and regulations is
reproduced at App.109a-121a.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
“[A]n agency literally has no power to act… unless
and until Congress confers power upon it.” Louisiana
Pub. Serv. Comm’n v. F.C.C., 476 U.S. 355, 357 (1986).
Thus, when determining whether a radical new power
2
falls within an agency’s statutory authority, “[s]tudied
silence… can be as much a prohibition as an explicit
‘no.’” Entergy Corp. v. Riverkeeper, Inc., 556 U.S. 208,
239 (2009) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing Whitman v.
Am. Trucking Ass’ns, Inc., 531 U.S. 457, 467 (2001).
The Ninth Circuit neglected these maxims in holding
that a provision about groundwater monitoring in the
Safe Drinking Water Act (“SDWA” 1) unconditionally
authorizes EPA to compel permittees to undertake
major construction projects on private land they do not
own.
Panoche operates a natural gas power plant near
Firebaugh, California, that plays a critical role in the
state’s electrical infrastructure. The plant’s power
generation produces heat, so Panoche uses water to
cool its machinery. For over sixteen years, Panoche
has disposed of this nonhazardous cooling water by
injecting it into several onsite wells deep beneath the
Earth’s surface.
Under the SDWA, EPA regulates injection wells to
protect underground sources of water that are suitable
for human consumption (“potable” or “drinking”
water). EPA issued Panoche a Class I UIC permit in
2008, authorizing disposal of water used for cooling its
plant. Permit in hand, Panoche invested significant
resources to build and upgrade the facility. Panoche
injects its nonhazardous wastewater thousands of feet
below the nearest potable water supply, which is
separated from the injection zone by two impermeable
rock layers and a buffer aquifer that prevents saline
fluids in the injection zone from migrating upward into
This Petition refers to the Safe Drinking Water Act of 1974
and its amendments collectively as the SDWA, unless otherwise
indicated.
1
3
drinking water sources. Throughout the ten-year life
of Panoche’s initial UIC permit, EPA never identified
a permit violation or any cross-contamination linked
to Panoche’s wells.
When Panoche’s permit came up for renewal,
however, EPA suddenly speculated that Panoche’s
injection activities might somehow force salinated
water from the injection zone to break through the
seals of older, decommissioned oil and gas wells
located over a mile from Panoche’s facility and enter
the local drinking water supply by travelling up the
unused wellbores. No relevant conditions had changed
since EPA granted Panoche’s 2008 permit, and the
Agency did not point to any evidence that such
breakthroughs were a realistic possibility given that
the decommissioned wells had been sealed with
thousands of feet of heavy muds and cement plugs
(with approval from California regulators overseeing
the decommissionings). EPA accepted Panoche’s modeling regarding the amounts of pressure generated by
its injection activities and acknowledged that these
levels should be insufficient for fluids to penetrate
the mud and cement columns in the decommissioned
wellbores. The Agency conceded its regulations did
not require any “corrective actions” to address the
decommissioned wells.
EPA nonetheless imposed an unprecedented new
“monitoring requirement” in Panoche’s renewed permit,
ordering Panoche to drill and maintain an over halfmile-deep offsite monitoring well in the middle of an
active commercial almond orchard that Panoche does
not own and has no right to access. Panoche proposed
alternatives, pointing out that it was impossible for
it to comply with the condition without somehow
convincing the orchardist to allow Panoche to uproot a
4
portion of its almond orchard to install and operate a
monitoring well for at least ten years. But EPA refused
to consider these obstacles, stating that it had no
obligation to consider property rights or the feasibility
or cost of compliance when exercising its discretionary
authority to impose monitoring requirements.
EPA did not identify the statutory source of this
purported authority when imposing the new condition,
but it claimed for the first time on appeal that one
provision of the SDWA—42 U.S.C. § 300h-5—empowers
it to prescribe offsite monitoring requirements without
regard to whether a permittee possesses the property
rights needed to fulfill them. That provision—which
simply directs EPA to identify new groundwater
monitoring methods for early detection of leaks—
makes no mention of requiring permittees to undertake monitoring measures themselves, let alone demand
that they acquire new property rights to do so. No
court had ever cited the provision prior to the Ninth
Circuit’s opinion in this case. Nor had EPA relied on
the provision to unilaterally impose an offsite monitoring requirement the permittee lacks the property
rights to fulfill. But nearly four decades after its
enactment, EPA suddenly discovered that this seemingly innocuous provision unconditionally authorizes
it to compel a permittee to undertake multi-milliondollar construction projects on other people’s property,
and the Ninth Circuit agreed. The third-party
orchardist has since declined to sell the necessary
rights to Panoche for any price, leaving Panoche with
an impossible permit condition for a mission-critical
permit.
“When an agency claims to discover in a long-extant
statute an unheralded power to regulate,” this Court
“typically greet[s] its announcement with a measure
5
of skepticism.” Util. Air Regul. Grp. v. E.P.A., 573 U.S.
302, 324 (2014). If Congress had intended for EPA to
order permittees to drill monitoring wells on property
they do not own or control, it would have said so—or
at very least provided a mechanism by which permittees could accomplish such directives. Compare 42
U.S.C. § 300h-5 with 15 U.S.C. § 717f(a), (h) (authorizing the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
(“FERC”) to allow natural gas companies to exercise
eminent domain, including to comply with agency
orders to construct facilities).
Congress did not include such features in the
SDWA. But the Ninth Circuit held that the statute
nevertheless confers unfettered authority to require
the use of other people’s property sub silentio simply
because it does not expressly forbid it. The ruling
expands federal administrative power in a way that
will not only lead to absurd results, but also threaten
complex infrastructure and industrial systems across
the country. The decision has already foisted upon
Panoche the dilemma of shutting down a critical piece
of California’s electrical infrastructure, compromising
the stability of an electrical grid serving nearly 40
million people, or risking severe legal penalties by
operating the facility in violation of its permit.
In upholding this novel offsite monitoring requirement, the Ninth Circuit effectively held that an agency
may compel permittees to acquire new rights to
specific real property, without regard to feasibility or
cost, as long as it furthers some broad statutory goal
and Congress has not explicitly forbidden it. No coherent limiting principle restricts this reasoning to
42 U.S.C. § 300h-5. The Ninth Circuit’s decision
bestows a power on federal agencies that is extraordinarily broad and ripe for abuse.
6
This Court should grant the petition, vacate the
Ninth Circuit’s judgment, and remand for reconsideration in light of Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo,
144 S. Ct. 2244 (2024). Alternatively, the Court should
grant certiorari to review the important question
presented by the Ninth Circuit’s decision, which has
significant implications for a broad range of federal
permittees and the scope of administrative authority
in the post-Loper-Bright legal landscape.
I. Factual and Legal Background
A. Panoche safely operates a crucial piece
of California’s energy infrastructure
without endangering local drinking
water.
Panoche operates a 417-megawatt, simple-cycle
“peaker” power generation plant located near
Firebaugh, California. 1-ER-52, 2-ER-152. 2 Panoche’s
plant is critical infrastructure for California. Because
the plant can reach full operational load in under
ten minutes, it provides on-demand energy to the
state’s electrical grid, increasing the grid’s stability
and ability to meet demand during peak hours when
solar, wind, or other energy sources become unavailable. 2-ER-155-56; 8-ER-2118-20. Panoche also plays
a significant role in supporting California’s electrical
needs as the state transitions to renewable energy
sources. 8-ER-2118.
When Panoche generates electricity, it uses water to
cool its equipment. 1-ER-41. This generates heated,
but nonhazardous, wastewater. Id. Panoche disposes
of this wastewater by injecting it into four on-site
“ER” citations refer to the Excerpts of Record filed in the
Ninth Circuit.
2
7
underground wells. Panoche injects the wastewater
at depths ranging from 7,199 to 8,897 feet beneath
the Earth’s surface—over a half mile below the
strata holding the area’s drinking water supply,
which stretch from the surface down to approximately
4,000 feet. 1-ER-41; 2-ER-354; 5-ER-1073; 5-ER-1165.
Panoche’s injection zone is also separated from underground sources of drinking water by two confining
layers of impermeable rock (one 1,148 and the other
308 feet thick), which are in turn separated by a
sandstone “buffer aquifer.” 1-ER-41; 5-ER-1171-72;
5-ER-1272-76. This buffer aquifer has the capacity to
“bleed off” any fluid movement from lower layers,
dispersing the liquid throughout the porous sandstone
before enough pressure builds to penetrate the upper
confining layer. These conditions ensure that Panoche’s
injection activities will not cause the migration of
fluids from the injection zone into underground
drinking water sources. See 53 Fed. Reg. 28118, 28133
(July 26, 1988) (“[A] ‘buffer’ aquifer/aquiclude
system… between the confining zone and the base of
the lowermost” drinking water is an “[a]dditional
[s]afeguard” to prevent fluid movement).
B. EPA regulates underground injection
wells.
Through the SDWA, Congress tasked EPA with
administering an “underground injection control program” to ensure that injection activities do not
endanger underground sources of drinking water. 3 See
42 U.S.C. § 300h(b)(1). Pursuant to this authority,
States may implement their own UIC programs with federal
approval, but EPA administers the program in states like
California that are not authorized to administer their own. See
40 C.F.R. §§ 144.1(e), 147.251(a).
3
8
EPA classified injection wells into six categories
depending on factors such as location, depth, and type
of material injected. 40 C.F.R. § 146.5. To inject fluids
underground, an entity must obtain an appropriate
UIC permit from EPA that corresponds with the
type of well it wishes to operate. See id. pts. 144-148.
Panoche’s wells are Class I injection wells—the category covering most injections occurring “beneath the
lowermost formation containing, within one quarter
mile of the well bore, an underground source of drinking water” regardless of whether the injected material
is hazardous or nonhazardous. Id. § 146.5(a)(2).
In 1986, Congress enacted 42 U.S.C. § 300h-5,
which directed EPA to modify its Class I regulations
to “identify [new] monitoring methods… including
groundwater monitoring” and then “determine the
applicability of such monitoring methods, wherever
appropriate, at locations and in such a manner as
to provide the earliest possible detection of fluid
migration into, or in the direction of, underground
sources of drinking water.” (emphasis added). Under
40 C.F.R. § 146.13(a)-(c), Class I UIC permits were
already required to include minimum operating, monitoring, and reporting requirements to ensure injection
activities do not cause fluids to migrate into underground sources of drinking water. Although 42 U.S.C.
§ 300h-5 does not mention permittees, EPA responded
by adding a new subsection (d) to § 146.13 that states
EPA “shall require the owner or operator”—i.e., the
UIC permittee—“to develop a monitoring program”
“[b]ased on a site-specific assessment of the potential
for fluid movement from the well or injection zone and
on the potential value of monitoring wells to detect
such movement.” 53 Fed. Reg. 28118, 28144 (July 26,
1988). The regulation identified one new mandatory
monitoring method that the permittee must utilize—
9
an annual shutdown of the well to review “the pressure buildup in the injection zone”—and five additional discretionary methods EPA may require the
permittee to employ. 40 C.F.R. § 146.13(d).
Finally, under 40 C.F.R. § 144.55, a Class I permit
applicant must submit a plan for “corrective action” if
the review area contains other “improperly sealed”
wells that penetrate the injection zone. The plan must
outline steps to prevent fluid from migrating through
these wells into drinking water sources, and if EPA
finds the plan adequate, it becomes a condition of the
permit. If not, EPA may require revisions, prescribe
its own corrective actions, or deny the application. Id.
The SDWA grants EPA significant enforcement
authority to punish violations of UIC permit conditions. In addition to modifying or terminating the
permit, id. § 144.40(a), the Agency can impose administrative penalties of up to $10,000 for each day of
violation (adjusted for inflation), or it can bring a civil
action with penalties up to $25,000 a day. 42 U.S.C.
§ 300h-2(b)(1), (c). For “willful” violations, the permittee can be imprisoned for up to three years. Id. § 300h2(b)(2)
C. For over a decade, Panoche dutifully
complied with all EPA regulations and
permitting requirements.
In 2008, EPA issued a Class I UIC permit to
Panoche that authorized the plant to operate up to six
onsite injection wells to dispose of its nonhazardous
wastewater (the “2008 Permit”). 1-ER-10. EPA did not
identify any improperly sealed wells in Panoche’s
review area, so the 2008 Permit did not include
any “corrective action” requirements under 40 C.F.R.
10
§ 144.55. Panoche completed construction of four
onsite injection wells in 2009. 1-ER-52.
For more than 14 years, Panoche operated these
injection wells without issue and in full compliance
with the 2008 Permit and its monitoring requirements. 1-ER-13; 1-ER-43; 1-ER-57. Throughout the
life of the 2008 Permit, EPA never detected any fluid
migration from Panoche’s injection activities, never
issued any permit violations or undertook any enforcement action, never modified or terminated the 2008
Permit, and never required Panoche to undertake
any type of corrective action. 1-ER-43; 1-ER-57; 3-ER613-14.
In late 2015, Panoche voluntarily invested millions
of dollars for a system that reduced its wastewater
volumes by up to 80%, further reducing the risk
of adverse environmental impact. 1-ER-13 at n.4;
1-ER-139; 2-ER-198; 2-ER-202-05; 3-ER-621. Panoche
has since maintained those reduced injection
volumes—and the reduced risk to the environment.
See 3-ER-621; 8-ER-2151.
D. EPA arbitrarily orders Panoche to do
the legally impossible: drill a 3,500-foot
monitoring well on someone else’s
almond orchard.
Panoche’s 2008 Permit was scheduled to expire in
2018. 40 C.F.R. § 144.36(a). In October 2017, Panoche
submitted a renewal application to EPA. 4 1-ER-41.
Over the following years, Panoche regularly communicated with EPA officials and diligently supplemented
its submissions as requested. 2-ER-259; 3-ER-610-20.
The renewal application administratively extended the term
of the 2008 Permit until EPA’s final renewal decision.
4
11
In July 2020, EPA shared an early draft of the
renewed permit. 2-ER-234. Although EPA regulations
condition the Agency’s authority to require “corrective
action” on EPA identifying improperly sealed wells in
the permit applicant’s review area, 40 C.F.R. § 144.55,
and although California regulators had certified that
each decommissioned well near Panoche had been
properly sealed, 2-ER-273-74; 2-ER-282; 8-ER-208995, EPA’s draft permit included two corrective action
requirements. 2-ER-234.
First, EPA proposed that Panoche go onto property
it does not own or control, locate an already-plugged
decommissioned well, reenter it, and install a new
cement plug deep in the wellbore. 2-ER-234-35.
Second, EPA proposed that Panoche drill and
operate two separate ambient monitoring wells—
again on property Panoche does not own and cannot
access without third-party authorization—near two
other decommissioned wells, including the Silver
Creek 18 Well at issue here. 2-ER-235-36. To be clear,
Panoche did not drill any of the decommissioned wells;
has never owned, operated, or used them; and has no
business relationship with their owners. Id.; 3-ER612; 5-ER-1211; 5-ER-1219-21. Moreover, each of the
decommissioned wells is located over a mile from
Panoche’s plant, with the Silver Creek 18 Well lying
1.25 miles away in what is now a privately-owned
commercial almond orchard. 1-ER-23; 5-ER-1220;
8-ER-2129.
EPA claimed these corrective actions were necessary because Panoche’s injection zone is “overpressurized,” though the Agency acknowledged this
had been the zone’s “native state” since before EPA
issued the 2008 Permit and was not the result of
Panoche’s activities. 3-ER-621; 5-ER-1182. The Agency
12
did not claim that Panoche’s injection activities were
endangering the region’s underground drinking water,
nor that water quality had deteriorated since Panoche
began operating its injection wells. See 1-ER-29 n.17;
3-ER-611-12. Nor did EPA identify any evidence that
decommissioned wells in the region were leaking. 5 2ER-273-74; 2-ER-282; 8-ER-2089-95.
In response to EPA’s draft permit, Panoche presented additional evidence demonstrating that its
injection activities could not endanger underground
drinking water, including academic studies, geological
evidence, and quantitative analyses showing the two
confining layers and intermediate buffer aquifer
prevented pressure from ever building to sufficient
levels for fluids to penetrate the thousands of feet of
heavy mud and cement filling the decommissioned
wells. 2-ER-290-347, 1-ER-41; 5-ER-1171-72; 5-ER1272-76. These geologic features are demonstrated in
the following diagram:
EPA would later assert it “need not provide empirical data or
direct evidence… to demonstrate that ambient monitoring is
necessary,” claiming it was enough “that the monitoring program
will provide meaningful data concerning whether there is [any]
potential for fluid movement[.]” 3-ER-611.
5
13
14
See also 1-ER-41; 4-ER-808; 5-ER-1171-72; 5-ER1272-76.
EPA published a revised draft of Panoche’s permit
for public comment in April 2021. 3-ER-634. Citing the
reduced injection volumes from Panoche’s enhanced
wastewater system, EPA nominally removed all 40
C.F.R. § 144.55 “corrective action” requirements from
the revised draft permit. See id.; 3-ER-614-16. But the
April 2021 draft re-imposed one of the very same
conditions as a “monitoring requirement,” still directing Panoche to install a monitoring well at Silver
Creek 18. EPA denied it was “recasting a corrective
action requirement as a monitoring requirement,” but
it nonetheless relied on the fact that “under 40 C.F.R.
§§ 146.13(b)&(d), EPA does not need to demonstrate
that a well is improperly plugged and abandoned as a
condition precedent to requiring additional monitoring,” as it would for corrective action under 40 C.F.R.
§ 144.55. 3-ER-613-14, 3-ER-616; 1-ER-13-14; 3-ER634; 3-ER-642-43.
EPA failed to address the buffer aquifer’s capacity
to disperse fluid pressure long before it ever reached
the drinking water supply. 2-ER-221, 3-ER-609-23.
And the Agency’s only argument for the inadequacy
of the 2008 Permit’s existing onsite monitoring
requirements—which could already detect if underground pressure increased levels sufficient to penetrate the heavy mud column filling the Silver Creek 18
Well—was that EPA did not trust the over twenty
scientific studies Panoche had provided regarding the
long-term strength of muds sealing decommissioned
wells. 3-ER-611, 3-ER-616-19. But most importantly,
the “monitoring requirement” retained the same flaw
as the “corrective actions”: it required Panoche to
install a monitoring well on property Panoche does not
15
own or have rights to access, with EPA expressly
refusing to consider the costs or feasibility. 3-ER-64243; 2-ER-354, 2-ER-318-20; 5-ER-1211.
In a last-ditch effort at compromise, Panoche responded to the revised draft by proposing at least
three alternatives to the offsite monitoring well that—
unlike EPA’s condition—Panoche could legally fulfill. 6
EPA rejected all three proposals, 8-ER-2155, and on
September 30, 2022, the Agency issued a final permit
that included the offsite monitoring condition (the
“Permit”). See 1-ER-49; 1-ER-53, 1-ER-65-71.
II. Procedural History
Panoche sought review from the EAB, arguing
among other things that EPA lacked unfettered
authority to require Panoche to install a monitoring
well on land it had no right to access. On May 26, 2023,
the EAB denied Panoche’s petition for review. 1-ER-4.
The EAB ruled that “issues of property rights and
access, as well as cost, are beyond the scope of the UIC
program,” and EPA “is not required to take ownership
of the land into account before issuing a final UIC
permit decision.” 1-ER-37-38. On June 7, 2023, EPA
issued the Notice of Final Permit Decision. 1-ER-3.
These included monitoring or reviewing data at an existing
offsite well that Panoche could legally access, 2-ER-266-67; 8-ER2109; identifying an alternative location where Panoche could
legally establish the monitoring well, 8-ER-2155; 3-ER-613;
and limiting Panoche’s injection rates even further beyond the
low levels already achieved by Panoche’s enhanced wastewater
system, 9-ER-2263.
6
16
On June 23, 2023, Panoche filed a petition for
review in the Ninth Circuit. 7 Panoche argued that the
court should vacate EPA’s permit decision under the
Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(c),
because the Agency lacked statutory authority to
impose monitoring conditions that were impossible for
Panoche to fulfill without property rights Panoche
does not possess and might not be able to obtain.
App.2a. Panoche alternatively contended that EPA
was statutorily required to consider the cost and
practicality of Panoche acquiring the necessary rights.
App.3a-4a. In response, EPA for the first time argued
that Congress had authorized it to order permittees to
utilize other people’s private property without regard
to costs or feasibility through 42 U.S.C. § 300h-5—the
1986 monitoring provision directing EPA to identify
new groundwater monitoring techniques and determine their appropriate applicability. App.2a.
On June 18, 2024, the Ninth Circuit issued a
memorandum opinion denying review. The court
ruled that the offsite monitoring requirement fell
“within EPA’s broad statutory discretion to prevent
the potential endangerment of drinking water by
underground injection.” Id. The court stated that
42 U.S.C. § 300h-5 mandates that EPA require monitoring “at locations and in such a manner as to provide
the earliest possible detection of fluid migration” and
“does not require EPA to consider property ownership
before determining where to require monitoring.” Id.
And the court ruled that, even assuming EPA was
required to consider costs, it sufficiently fulfilled that
duty by comparing the cost of monitoring to the value
The conditions were stayed during this appeal—first by
operation of EPA regulations, then by the Ninth Circuit’s order—
allowing Panoche to continue operating its power plant.
7
17
of the data that could be obtained and by requiring
offsite monitoring at one remote site rather than the
original three. Id.
On August 2, 2024, Panoche petitioned for panel
rehearing, which the Ninth Circuit denied on August
8, 2024, without requesting a response. App.108a.
On August 14, 2024, Panoche moved to stay the
Ninth Circuit’s mandate. Through briefing and supporting declarations, Panoche informed the court that
the owner of the almond orchard had refused to allow
Panoche to construct the well for any price, confirming
beyond all doubt that EPA’s condition was legally
impossible for Panoche to fulfill. Nonetheless, EPA
refused to stay the condition. On October 7, the Ninth
Circuit denied Panoche’s motion and the mandate took
effect.
Thereafter, Panoche’s UIC permit was fully effective, but Panoche could neither comply with the
permit’s offsite monitoring condition nor cease its
injection activities, which would require shutting down
its critical infrastructure powerplant. On November
21, EPA voluntarily entered a 120-day administrative
stay of the offsite monitoring condition to facilitate
settlement negotiations. But the condition will become
effective once more when the stay expires if Panoche
and the EPA are unable to reach agreement.
REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT
By ratifying EPA’s unqualified power to impose
permitting conditions that are legally impossible for a
permittee to fulfill without acquiring new rights to
specific real property, the Ninth Circuit decided an
important question of federal law in a manner that
conflicts with this Court’s precedents and warrants
further review.
18
Administrative agencies are “creatures of statute,
bound to the confines of the statute that created
them.” United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Lee,
641 F.3d 1126, 1135 (2011); accord Nat’l Fed’n of
Indep. Bus. v. Dep’t of Lab., Occupational Safety &
Health Admin., 595 U.S. 109, 117 (2022). “[A]n agency
literally has no power to act… unless and until
Congress confers power upon it.” Louisiana Pub. Serv.
Comm’n v. F.C.C., 476 U.S. 355, 357 (1986). And
because “[a]gencies may act only when and how
Congress lets them,” Cent. United Life Ins. Co. v.
Burwell, 827 F.3d 70, 73 (D.C. Cir. 2016), the question
is not—as the Ninth Circuit asked below—whether
the SDWA precludes EPA from imposing the permitting requirements at issue. The question is whether
Congress intended to grant EPA the unqualified power
to compel permittees to utilize real property rights
they do not own for monitoring purposes. See Nat. Res.
Def. Council v. Regan (“NRDC”), 67 F.4th 397, 401
(D.C. Cir. 2023). (“EPA… has no inherent authority. It
has only the authority given it by the Safe Drinking
Water Act.”).
The Ninth Circuit claimed to find such a grant in
42 U.S.C. § 300h-5, 8 stating that the provision provides “broad statutory discretion to prevent the
potential endangerment of drinking water by underground injection.” App.2a. The court reasoned that the
The Ninth Circuit also cited 42 U.S.C. § 300h(b)(1) and (d)(2),
but these provisions concern only the minimum requirements
for the UIC regulations EPA enacts. They state simply that the
regulations “shall include inspection, monitoring, recordkeeping,
and reporting requirements” without specifying the substance of
the requirements or when and how they should be applied. And—
like 42 U.S.C. § 300h-5—the provisions do not mention property
rights or offsite monitoring.
8
19
statute’s text “mandates that EPA require monitoring”
“at locations and in such a manner as to provide
the earliest possible detection of fluid migration” without “requir[ing] EPA to consider property ownership
before determining where to require monitoring.” Id.
The court further stated that “nothing [else] in the
language or structure of the” SDWA limits this “broad
grant of authority to EPA.” App.3a.
The Ninth Circuit was incorrect on all counts. The
text and structure of the SDWA clearly indicates EPA
is not authorized to mandate that permittees utilize
property they lack any right to use, and multiple other
considerations would still weigh heavily against such
an interpretation even if the statute were silent on the
matter.
I. Because the Ninth Circuit’s Ruling Cannot
be Reconciled with this Court’s Intervening Loper Bright Decision, this Court
Should Vacate the Judgment and Remand
for Further Proceedings.
The Ninth Circuit’s ruling hinged on a now-defunct
approach to construing congressional delegations of
authority, wherein the court presumed from statutory
silence that Congress unconditionally authorized the
EPA to order any type of monitoring, regardless of
the practical consequences and risks. See App.3a
(“Panoche argues that because the Act does not expressly authorize offsite monitoring, the EPA must
lack the authority to require it. However, Panoche
identifies nothing in the language or structure of the
statute limiting the broad grant of authority to the
EPA.”). Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo, 144
S. Ct. 2244 (2024)—which this Court issued ten days
after the Court of Appeals’ decision—definitively
ended the blanket presumption of agency authority,
20
and with it, the basis for the Ninth Circuit’s broad
statutory holding.
Under this Court’s now-overruled Chevron precedent, 9 courts were generally obliged to defer to an
agency when the relevant statute was silent or ambiguous as to whether a matter was within the agency’s
power. City of Arlington, Tex. v. F.C.C., 569 U.S. 290,
296 (2013) (holding Chevron required deference “to an
agency’s interpretation of a statutory ambiguity that
concerns the scope of the agency’s statutory authority”
(citing Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources
Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984)). This deference was predicated on the fiction that, when a statute
is silent or ambiguous on a question, Congress intends
for the agency administering the statute to answer
that question for itself. Loper Bright, 144 S. Ct. at 2265
(citing Chevron., 467 U.S. at 843). Stated differently,
Chevron assumed that “statutory gaps” are implicit
delegations of agency authority to interpret the
statute. Id.
Loper Bright recognized that statutory silence or
“ambiguity is simply not a delegation of lawinterpreting power.” Id. (citation omitted). Such gaps
are often unintentional on Congress’s part, and “statutes, no matter how impenetrable, do—in fact, must—
have a single, best meaning” that it is the power and
duty of courts to determine, not agencies. Id. at 2266.
“That is no less true when the ambiguity is about the
Although the Ninth Circuit did not expressly invoke Chevron,
it was duty-bound to follow it, and it ruled that two cases
establishing exceptions to the now-defunct framework did not
apply, suggesting by negative implication it was applying the
precedent. See App.3a (citing FDA v. Brown & Williamson
Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 159 (2000) and Whitman, 529 U.S.
at 159).
9
21
scope of an agency’s own power—perhaps the occasion
on which abdication in favor of the agency is least
appropriate” Id. (emphasis in original).
In construing the SDWA, the Ninth Circuit was
wrong to place the onus on Panoche to “identif[y]”
limitations in the “language or structure of the
statute,” and to otherwise presume a broad grant
of agency authority as the baseline. App.3a. This
Court should therefore “GVR”—grant this petition,
vacate the Court of Appeals’ decision, and remand for
reconsideration—as it has done with several other
petitions since Loper Bright. Otherwise, the Court
should grant the petition and resolve the question
presented as argued below.
II. Alternatively, the Court Should Grant the
Petition and Review the Ninth Circuit’s
Novel Approach to EPA Permitting.
A. The text of the SDWA requires EPA to
consider property rights, costs, and
feasibility when imposing monitoring
requirements.
The Ninth Circuit held that 42 U.S.C. § 300h-5
authorized EPA to impose the offsite monitoring
condition, reasoning that nothing in the statute or
the rest of the SDWA indicates that EPA must
consider the scope of a permittee’s property rights
when deciding whether and where to require ambient
monitoring. In doing so, the court disregarded 42
U.S.C. § 300h-5’s plain language.
As discussed, Section 300h-5’s text first directed
EPA to modify its regulations for Class I injection
wells to “identify [new] monitoring methods[.]”
42 U.S.C. § 300h-5. EPA responded by promulgating
40 C.F.R. § 146.13(d), which identifies one mandatory
22
and five discretionary monitoring methods EPA may
require of a permittee “[b]ased on a site-specific assessment.” 40 C.F.R. § 146.13(d).
Section 300h-5 then provides that, “in accordance
with such regulations,” EPA
shall determine the applicability of [the
regulatorily identified] monitoring methods,
wherever appropriate, at locations and in such
a manner as to provide the earliest possible
detection of fluid migration into, or in the
direction of, underground sources of drinking
water from such wells, based on its assessment of the potential for fluid migration from
the injection zone that may be harmful to
human health or the environment.
42 U.S.C. § 300h-5 (emphasis added).
The text contains multiple indications that EPA
must consider a permittee’s property rights (and
related costs) and may not order a permittee to
conduct monitoring the permittee lacks the right to
perform. First, Congress instructed EPA to apply
the monitoring methods that EPA identified only
“wherever appropriate.” Id. “‘[A]ppropriate’ is the classic
broad and all-encompassing term that naturally and
traditionally includes consideration of all relevant
factors.” Michigan v. EPA, 576 U.S. 743, 752 (2015).
Section 300h-5 thus explicitly directs EPA to consider
all factors bearing on whether the identified monitoring methods are suitable for a given location.
When it promulgated 40 C.F.R. § 146.13(d), EPA
chose to place the onus on UIC permittees for each of
the ambient monitoring methods the Agency identified. Consequently, any costs or obstacles to the
permittee’s employing the selected monitoring method
23
are highly “relevant factors” bearing on whether the
method is “appropriate” for that “location.” Id. This
Court has already ruled as much in Michigan v. EPA,
where it considered a provision of the Clean Air Act
that “directs the Agency to regulate power plants if it
‘finds such regulation is appropriate and necessary.’”
576 U.S. at 751 (quoting 42 U.S.C.A. § 7412(n)(1)(A)).
Like here, EPA claimed it had no statutory obligation
to consider the cost of compliance when determining
whether regulation was “appropriate and necessary,”
and, like here, the Agency explicitly refused to do so.
Id. This Court rejected EPA’s construction, ruling that
the Agency had “strayed far beyond” “the bounds of
reasonable interpretation” by construing the statute
to allow it to “ignore” such a highly relevant factor;
“[r]ead naturally in the present context, the phrase
‘appropriate and necessary’ requires at least some
attention to cost.” Id. at 752 (emphasis added). The
Court further explained that the “costs” EPA was
obliged to consider include “more than the expense of
complying with regulations; any disadvantage could
be termed a cost.” Id.
The same is true here. EPA decided it was
“appropriate” for Panoche to perform monitoring on
someone else’s property while expressly refusing to
consider the cost of compliance, including the implications of the property owner’s functional monopoly on
the rights Panoche would need to fulfill the Agency’s
order. 10 App.59a. Worse still, the Agency refused to
The Ninth Circuit claimed EPA had sufficiently considered
costs by stating “monitoring is not particularly expensive when
compared to the information received.” App.4a. But EPA was not
addressing the offsite monitoring requirement. It was summarizing the 40 C.F.R. § 146.13 preamble to explain why it believed
“consideration of cost is not… a consideration in setting permit
conditions.” 3-ER-615. The court also cited EPA’s reduction of
10
24
consider whether Panoche could legally or practically
perform the ordered monitoring at all. Id. (“[I]ssues of
property rights and access, as well as cost, are beyond
the scope of the UIC program.”). As in Michigan,
EPA’s approach is not “even rational, never mind
‘appropriate.’” 11 576 U.S. at 752.
The Ninth Circuit and EPA made much of the fact
that 42 U.S.C. § 300h-5 does not expressly mention
any obligation for EPA to consider a permittee’s
property rights. But nothing in the statute’s text
required EPA to make UIC permittees responsible
for the new monitoring techniques in the first place.
EPA could have identified methods that involved
direct monitoring by the Agency, analysis of data
collected by third parties, or any number of other
monitoring techniques that did not place the burden of
monitoring on the permittee. It is thus unsurprising
that 42 U.S.C. § 300h-5 includes a general directive
that EPA consider all pertinent factors to determine
whether the identified methods are “appropriate” for
a location rather than any specific instruction to
consider a permittee’s property rights.
Second, 42 U.S.C. § 300h-5’s text also directs EPA
to “determine the applicability” of the 40 C.F.R.
§ 146.13(d) monitoring methods “at locations and in
such a manner as to provide the earliest possible
three required offsite wells to one. EPA removed the corrective
actions because there was no basis for them, not due to their cost.
3-ER-613, 616. Moreover, any cursory consideration of expense
would be woefully incomplete where EPA expressly refused “to
take ownership of land into account.” 3-ER-612.
To be clear, nothing prevents EPA from working with permittees or landowners to ensure the permittee has or can obtain
necessary rights prior to issuing a final legally binding UIC
permit that requires offsite monitoring. See infra § II.D.
11
25
detection of fluid migration.” EPA contends this
phrase authorizes it to require monitoring at any
location it chooses regardless of property rights,
guided only by its assessment of where anyone
could first detect fluid migration. But the monitoring
methods EPA identified in 40 C.F.R. § 146.13(d) do not
involve monitoring by just anyone. They require
monitoring by the permittee, so to apply them “at
locations and in such a manner as to provide the
earliest possible detection of fluid migration,” the EPA
inherently must evaluate where and how the permittee
could first detect fluid migration through the identified means. By its very nature, that assessment
requires EPA to consider the permittee’s legal rights
and practical capabilities, including whether the
permittee has the property rights necessary to carry
out the selected monitoring method at the selected
location.
Put another way, it is not “possible” for a permittee
to “detect[]… fluid migration” via any of the 40 C.F.R.
§ 146.13(d) methods at locations where the permittee
cannot employ the methods at all. A monitoring
requirement that is impossible to fulfill does not
“provide” any “possible detection of fluid migration” at
all, at any point in time; monitoring that cannot occur
cannot detect fluid migration. Cf. Riverkeeper, Inc. v.
E.P.A., 475 F.3d 83, 99 (2d Cir. 2007) (holding statute
requiring permittees use “best technology available for
minimizing adverse environmental impact” did not
mandate technologies the industry could not
reasonably afford because such technology is “not
‘available’ in any meaningful sense”), rev’d on other
grounds sub nom. Entergy Corp. v. Riverkeeper, Inc.,
556 U.S. 208, (2009).
26
In short, the Ninth Circuit and EPA’s interpretation
is incompatible with 42 U.S.C. § 300h-5’s plain text.
The court read the qualifier “where appropriate” out of
the statute and did not consider whether a monitoring
requirement can “provide the earliest possible detection of fluid migration” when a permittee lacks the
rights needed to fulfill it.
B. The structure of the SDWA confirms
EPA may not compel a permittee to
utilize property rights the permittee
does not possess.
The Ninth Circuit also claimed that “nothing in
the… structure of [the SDWA] limit[s]” EPA’s authority to impose monitoring conditions that are impossible for a permittee to fulfill without acquiring
another party’s property rights. App.3a. But the
SDWA lacks the basic features Congress includes in
regulatory statutes that involve these kinds of compelled real property transactions. Allowing EPA to
effectively order permittees to undertake such transactions in the absence of such features leads to the
type of “absurd or futile results” that courts must
avoid when construing a statute. Nixon v. Missouri
Mun. League, 541 U.S. 125, 138 (2004) (citing United
States v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 310 U.S. 534, 543
(1940)).
When Congress intends for a regulatory regime to
include the transfer of property rights between private
parties, it provides a mechanism by which the administering agency or regulated entities can accomplish
those transfers. For example, the Natural Gas Act
(“NGA”) grants FERC the authority to order natural
gas companies “to extend or improve” their interstate
pipelines to connect to local distributors when “such
action [is] necessary or desirable in the public
27
interest.” 15 U.S.C. § 717f(a). Congress anticipated
that natural gas companies would need to acquire new
property rights to fulfill such a requirement. Congress
also recognized that landowners might refuse to sell
the necessary property rights or demand an unreasonable price in light of the natural gas companies’
inflexible obligation to comply with FERC’s orders.
Congress thus authorized FERC to certify a natural
gas company to exercise eminent domain proceedings,
compelling property owners to transfer property rights
for a reasonable price when the company “cannot
acquire by contract, or is unable to agree with the
owner of property to the compensation to be paid for,
the necessary right-of-way” or “land or other property”
“to construct, operate, and maintain a pipe line.” 15
U.S.C. § 717f(h).
Recognizing the significance of the power to force
unwilling private parties to transact for property
rights, Congress set forth detailed procedural and
substantive requirements FERC must fulfill when
authorizing a natural gas company to use eminent
domain. See id. §§ 717f(c)-(e) (establishing requirements for initial certificate of public convenience and
necessity); id. § 717f(h) (authorizing certificate holders
to acquire necessary rights-of-way through exercise of
specified eminent domain procedures); City of Oberlin
v. FERC, 39 F.4th 719, 722 (D.C. Cir. 2022) (explaining FERC “evaluate[s] all the factors bearing on the
public interest,” balancing the “negative impact on…
[a] landowners’ property” and other “adverse effects
that cannot be eliminated against the public benefits”). This structure demonstrates that, when Congress grants an agency the authority to require that
one party use another’s private property, it does
so explicitly, with carefully crafted guardrails to
ensure the agency uses the power only after mindful
28
deliberation. It does not bequeath such a significant
power implicitly or incidentally by merely declining to
expressly prohibit it.
In contrast to the NGA, the SDWA does not include
any provision authorizing the use of eminent domain
to secure land for offsite monitoring wells or any other
purpose. UIC permittees thus have no mechanism to
compel landowners to transfer the necessary property
rights for a reasonable price. See Oberlin, 39 F.4th at
723 (holding the lack of any express eminent domain
authorization for import/export facilities meant the
process was unavailable). Without such processes, it is
impossible for UIC permittees to comply with EPA
orders like the one here if the landowner demands a
prohibitively high price or outright refuses to allow the
ordered monitoring (as the almond orchardist did
here). Even if the landowner is willing to part with
the necessary rights for a price the permittee can
theoretically pay, the permittee could be forced to pay
far above their fair market value by virtue of the
inherently unequal bargaining positions this type of
EPA order creates. If Congress intended that UIC
permittees be subjected to such unfair treatment, it
would have said so. See Nixon, 541 U.S. at 138 (“We
think it farfetched that Congress meant” a statute
to be interpreted to “often accomplish nothing” and
result in arbitrarily differing treatment “in the
absence of any clearer signal”); United States v. 92
Buena Vista Ave., Rumson, N.J., 507 U.S. 111, 124
(1993) (“[T]he burden of persuading us that Congress
intended such an inequitable result is especially
heavy.”).
The clear implication of Congress omitting any
mechanism for a permittee to comply with an EPA
order to utilize land it lacks rights to is that Congress
29
did not grant EPA such authority. See NRDC, 67 F.4th
at 404. While the protection of underground drinking
water is undoubtedly important, the SDWA is simply
not structured to compel permittees to acquire property rights to do so. See Brown & Williamson, 529 U.S.
at 125 (“Regardless of how serious the [purported]
problem an administrative agency seeks to address…
it may not exercise its authority ‘in a manner that is
inconsistent with the administrative structure that
Congress enacted into law.’” (citation omitted)).
C. If Congress had intended to grant EPA
such an unusual, far-reaching power, it
would have been explicit—and it would
not have taken EPA nearly forty years
to notice.
Even if the Ninth Circuit was correct that nothing
in the SDWA speaks to EPA’s obligation to consider
property rights when imposing monitoring conditions,
the omission would not support EPA’s claimed authority to require monitoring the permittee has no right to
perform. The absence of an express statutory requirement or prohibition does not necessarily mean a power
is included within an agency’s statutory authority. 12
See, e.g., Entergy, 556 U.S. at 223 (noting “the rather
unremarkable proposition that sometimes statutory
silence, when viewed in context, is best interpreted as
limiting agency discretion”); Ry. Labor Execs. Ass’n v.
Nat’l Mediation Bd., 29 F.3d 655, 671 (D.C. Cir. 1994)
(“Were courts to presume a delegation of power absent
an express withholding of such power, agencies would
Courts have rejected this type of permitted-if-not-forbidden
reasoning regarding EPA’s SDWA authority. NRDC, 67 F.4th at
404 (ruling Congress did not delegate EPA authority to do
anything it wishes so long as it does not “contravene any express
statutory command”).
12
30
enjoy virtually limitless hegemony.”). Instead, the
operative question is whether, in the broader “statutory context,” Congress’s decision not to explicitly
address the issue is “best interpreted” as permitting or
denying the agency the power in question. Entergy,
556 U.S. at 223 (citing Whitman, 531 U.S. at 457, and
American Textile Mfrs. Inst., Inc v. Donovan, 452 U.S.
490 (1981)).
Here, that context confirms that, if Congress had
intended EPA to have such a significant and unusual
power, it would have said so. This Court presumes that
Congress does not flippantly press against the legal
and customary boundaries of federal administrative
authority without commenting on its intentions, see
W. Virginia v. Env’t Prot. Agency, 597 U.S. 697, 721-22
(2022) (collecting cases), and EPA’s interpretation
strains these limits in multiple ways.
First, Congress does not hide delegations of significant powers or “alter the fundamental details of
a regulatory scheme in vague terms or ancillary
provisions—it does not, one might say, hide elephants
in mouseholes.” Whitman, 531 U.S. at 468; Brown &
Williamson, 529 U.S. at 159. Section 300h-5 is a
simple provision about developing new groundwater
monitoring techniques, so seemingly uncontroversial
that no court cited it in the 37 years proceeding this
case. Yet EPA claims this statute empowers it to
require any Class I UIC permittee to drill and operate
a monitoring well anywhere the Agency believes will
provide the earliest detection of fluid migration—
regardless of feasibility or cost, and irrespective of who
owns the land or how it is currently being used.
EPA’s new claimed authority has far-reaching
consequences. See infra § II.E. “Congress could not
have intended to delegate a [power] of such economic
31
and political significance to an agency in so cryptic a
fashion.” Brown & Williamson, 529 U.S. at 160.
Second, EPA’s interpretation raises due process
concerns. Under the longstanding canon of constitutional avoidance, “[a] statute must be construed, if
fairly possible, so as to avoid not only the conclusion
that it is unconstitutional, but also grave doubts upon
that score.” United States v. Jin Fuey Moy, 241 U.S.
394, 401 (1916). Even if it were plausible to interpret
42 U.S.C. § 300h-5 as providing EPA unfettered
authorization to impose monitoring conditions that
the permittee lacks the property rights to fulfill, such
a construction would raise serious doubts as to the
statute’s constitutionality.
The constitutional guarantee of substantive due
process protects against arbitrary government actions
that are inherently unfair, “regardless of the procedures used to reach that decision.” Onyx Properties
LLC v. Bd. of Cnty. Commissioners of Elbert Cnty., 838
F.3d 1039, 1043 (10th Cir. 2016) (citation omitted).
The Constitution thus prohibits the government from
penalizing a party for reasons that are “arbitrary and
irrational.” E. Enterprises v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498, 537
(1998). For instance, it violates fundamental fairness
to convict a criminal defendant for failing to do an act
the defendant legally or physically cannot do. See, e.g.,
United States v. Dalton, 960 F.2d 121, 124 (1992); United
States v. Spingola, 464 F.2d 909, 911 (7th Cir. 1972).
This principle is not limited to criminal law. In
Cont’l Bank v. United States, for example, Congress
had made the interest earned on certain local
government bonds tax exempt “at the election of the
issuer, made at such time and in such manner as the
[IRS] shall by regulations prescribe.” 517 F. Supp. 918,
923 (E.D. Pa. 1981) (quoting 26 U.S.C. § 103), aff’d,
32
688 F.2d 819 (3d Cir. 1982). “[A]lthough not adopted
until July 5, 1972, the regulation” that the IRS
promulgated “purport[ed] to establish a September 5,
1971 deadline for” local governments to elect the
exemption. Id. On review, the district court questioned
“whether the regulation... accords [with] due process
of law”: “Notwithstanding the deference which must
be accorded to IRS regulations, and the relatively
narrow scope of review of such regulations, the statute
obviously does not permit the Secretary to impose
procedural requirements which are impossible to
fulfill.” Id. at 923-34. The court thus ruled that, “to the
extent that the 1972 regulation imposes a 1971
deadline for filing an election statement, it is patently
invalid.” Id.
EPA orders like the monitoring condition at issue
implicate similar concerns. Because the SDWA does
not authorize the use of eminent domain to compel
landowners to transfer property rights, it is impossible
for a permittee to comply with a requirement to use
land it does not own if the current owner refuses to
cooperate. Permittees who invested millions and built
up their operations in reliance on an initial ten-year
UIC permit would be forced to shut down or face civil
and criminal liability for not taking actions they have
no power to take. Penalizing permittees for failing
to do the impossible raises serious questions about
fundamental fairness. If Congress had wished to wade
into these choppy constitutional waters, it would have
said so clearly. See Clark v. Martinez, 543 U.S. 371,
381 (2005) (explaining constitutional avoidance “rest[s]
on the reasonable presumption that Congress did
not intend the alternative which raises serious
constitutional doubts”).
33
Finally, the EPA’s interpretation is dubious given it
took the Agency nearly four decades to discover a
remarkable power hidden in an unremarkable statute.
Between the statute’s enactment in 1986 and Panoche’s
2022 final permit, EPA never imposed a monitoring
condition that a UIC permittee lacked rights to fulfill.
This Court employs particular “skepticism” when an
agency purports to suddenly discover extraordinary
power in a “long-extant statute” that it never before
utilized in such a manner, Utility Air Regulatory
Group, 573 U.S. at 324, and that is precisely what EPA
did here.
D. Reversal will not unduly hamper SDWA
regulation.
Panoche contends only that EPA cannot impose a
monitoring requirement unilaterally where the permittee lacks legal rights to comply. Yet EPA has ample
authority to carry out the SDWA.
Numerous regulatory regimes allow permits to be
conditioned on the permittee taking some type of
offsite action, frequently to mitigate or offset adverse
impacts from the permitted activity. See, e.g., 16 U.S.C.
§ 1539(a)(2)(A) (requiring mitigation for Endangered
Species Act take permits); 33 C.F.R. §§ 320.4(r)(1),
325.4(a)(3) (authorizing offsite mitigation requirements for Clean Water Act and other water-related
permits); 50 C.F.R. § 22.220 (mitigation requirement
for eagle take permits under Bald and Golden Eagle
Protection Act). But these offsite requirements are not
imposed without consideration of the permittee’s
ability to fulfill them.
Agencies work with the permit applicant to develop
offsite conditions with which the applicant can comply.
Generally, they employ a process that involves the
34
applicant submitting a proposal to address agency
concerns, the parties negotiating over modifications or
alternatives, and the agency ultimately accepting or
rejecting the proposal based on whether it satisfies
statutory and regulatory criteria. See, e.g., City of
Carmel-By-The-Sea v. U.S. Dep’t of Transp., 123 F.3d
1142, 1152 (9th Cir. 1997) (“If the objecting agencies
remain opposed to the wetlands mitigation plan each
can voice its concerns as the [Clean Water Act] permit
process evolves.”). An agency can also work with
permittees and landowners to broker a transfer of
needed rights prior to issuing a final permit, allowing
negotiations to proceed without the imbalance in
bargaining power created by the coercive force of a
binding final permit condition. If the permit applicant
and agency are unable to reach agreement regarding
a feasible measure that resolves the agency’s concerns,
the agency may deny the permit.
In other words, when the permittee has the necessary rights for offsite monitoring or can acquire
them for a reasonable price before EPA imposes the
condition—a likelier outcome when negotiations are
premised on the monitoring site being only one option
under consideration—it may be entirely “appropriate”
for EPA to require the permittee use those rights.
42 U.S.C. § 300h-5. And EPA can of course deny the
permit application if there is truly no way to operate
the well safely without utilizing property rights the
permittee does not have and cannot acquire.
E. The Question Presented has significant
legal and practical implications that
warrant review.
Finally, the Question presented is of great importance in terms of both practical ramifications and
legal precedent.
35
Panoche is not the only entity managing a critical
piece of the nation’s infrastructure who requires a
Class I UIC permit for its continued operations. There
are over a dozen Class I permit holders in EPA’s
Pacific Southwest region alone, most of them powerplants whose permits are presumably as central to
their operations as Panoche’s. 13 These and many other
industrial operators across the country rely on fair and
predictable federal permitting processes. Leaving the
Ninth Circuit’s decision in place will impose significant practical and legal costs on these entities. EPA
has already demonstrated it is willing to exercise
its purported authority in ways that imperil these
permittees’ very ability to operate, threatening to
shutter utilities and other operators who collectively
provide critical services like electricity to significant
portions of the population.
Under EPA’s reasoning, it could require permittees
to drill a well in the middle of Times Square if it
believes that is where fluid migration can earliest be
detected. Even if monitoring at more practical locations could ensure the permittees’ injection wells
operated safely, they would be forced to shut down or
face severe legal penalties if they are unable to acquire
the rights to drill there. EPA could also grant windfalls
to specific private landowners, increasing the value of
their properties by effectively mandating utilities or
other large businesses purchase monitoring rights at
whatever price they demand. EPA’s claimed authority
would have far-reaching implications across multiple
industries and have ramifications for the populations
EPA, UIC Permits in EPA’s Pacific Southwest (Region 9),
(Dec. 12, 2024), https://www.epa.gov/uic/r9-uic-permits.
13
36
who depend on UIC permittees for electricity and
other crucial services.
Moreover, nothing limits the Ninth Circuit’s reasoning to 42 U.S.C. § 300h-5. The court held that an
agency may compel a permittee to utilize other parties’
property regardless of costs or feasibility so long as
relevant statutes do not expressly prohibit it. Federal
agencies administer countless permitting regimes
regulating all manner of activities in a variety of
fields. The Ninth Circuit’s holding is precedent that
these agencies may effectively compel permittees to
purchase rights, goods, and services from specific
private parties under threat of permit revocation and
legal penalties. The sheer scope of this power is
staggering—as is the potential for abuse.
With Loper Bright, this Court ushered in a new era
of administrative law, changing the basic way federal
courts interpret congressional delegations of administrative power. The Court should grant certiorari to
correct the Ninth Circuit’s faulty methodology and
provide guidance to lower courts faced with similar
claims of agency authority derived from the absence of
express statutory limitations.
37
CONCLUSION
The petition for a writ of certiorari should be
granted.
Respectfully submitted,
VARU CHILAKAMARRI
Counsel of Record
ANKUR K. TOHAN
J. TIMOTHY HOBBS
SPENCER MCCANDLESS
K&L GATES LLP
1601 K Street, NW
Washington, D.C. 20006
(202) 778-9000
varu.chilakamarri@klgates.com
ankur.tohan@klgates.com
tim.hobbs@klgates.com
spencer.mccandless@klgates.com
Counsel for Petitioner
January 3, 2025
APPENDIX
APPENDIX TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
APPENDIX A: MEMORANDUM,
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
(June 18, 2024) .................................................
1a
APPENDIX B: NOTICE OF PERMIT DECISION,
U.S. E.P.A., Region IX
(June 7, 2023) ...................................................
6a
APPENDIX C: ORDER DENYING REVIEW,
Environmental Appeals Board
(May 26, 2023) ..................................................
8a
APPENDIX D: FINAL PERMIT, U.S. E.P.A.
(2023) ................................................................
62a
APPENDIX E: ORDER,
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
(August 8, 2024) ............................................... 108a
APPENDIX F: 42 U.S.C. § 300h-5. ................... 109a
APPENDIX G: 42 U.S.C. § 300h. ...................... 110a
APPENDIX H: 5 U.S.C. § 706. .......................... 116a
APPENDIX I: 40 C.F.R. § 146.13. ..................... 117a
APPENDIX J: 40 C.F.R. § 144.55. .................... 120a
1a
APPENDIX A
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
[FILED: JUN 18 2024]
————
No. 23-1268
————
PANOCHE ENERGY CENTER, LLC,
Petitioner,
v.
UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL
PROTECTION AGENCY; MICHAEL S. REGAN,
Administrator of the United States Environmental
Protection Agency; MARTHA GUZMAN ACEVES,
Regional Administrator of Region 9 of U.S.,
Respondents.
————
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Environmental Protection Agency
————
Argued and Submitted May 22, 2024
Anchorage, Alaska
————
MEMORANDUM *
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not
precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
*
2a
Before: BYBEE, FRIEDLAND, and MILLER, Circuit
Judges.
Panoche Energy Center petitions for review of an
underground injection control permit issued by the
Environmental Protection Agency. We have jurisdiction under 42 U.S.C. § 300j-7(a)(2), and we deny the
petition.
Under the Administrative Procedure Act, we “set
aside” agency action that is “arbitrary, capricious,” “not
in accordance with law,” or “in excess of statutory
jurisdiction, authority, or limitations.” 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A),
(C). Agency action is arbitrary and capricious if “the
agency has relied on factors which Congress has not
intended it to consider, entirely failed to consider an
important aspect of the problem, offered an explanation
for its decision that runs counter to the evidence before
the agency, or is so implausible that it could not be
ascribed to a difference in view or the product of
agency expertise.” Food & Water Watch v. EPA, 20 F.4th
506, 514 (9th Cir. 2021) (quoting Motor Vehicle Mfrs.
Ass’n of U.S. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins., 463 U.S. 29,
43 (1983)).
1. Panoche argues that the EPA violated the Safe
Drinking Water Act by requiring ambient monitoring
on property Panoche does not own. But the monitoring
condition was within the EPA’s broad statutory discretion to prevent the potential endangerment of drinking
water by underground injection. The statute mandates
that the EPA require monitoring “wherever appropriate,
at locations and in such a manner as to provide the
earliest possible detection of fluid migration” that
could adversely affect human health. 42 U.S.C. § 300h5; see also 42 U.S.C. § 300h(b)(1), (d)(2). It does not
require the EPA to consider property ownership before
determining where to require monitoring.
3a
Panoche argues that because the Act does not
expressly authorize offsite monitoring, the EPA must
lack the authority to require it. However, Panoche
identifies nothing in the language or structure of the
statute limiting the broad grant of authority to the
EPA. Nor does the offsite monitoring condition implicate federalism concerns. The permit does not interfere
with state regulation of private property; it merely
requires Panoche to contract for access to the necessary
land. Whether the EPA may require offsite monitoring
is also not a “major question”: The EPA is not asserting
the power to regulate “a significant portion of the
American economy,” FDA v. Brown & Williamson
Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 159 (2000), and it is far
from “implausible” that Congress contemplated offsite
monitoring as a means of achieving its clear directive,
Whitman v. American Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457,
468 (2001).
Finally, the EPA’s reading of the statute does not
implicate the eminent domain power or otherwise
interfere with property rights. By its terms, the permit
“does not convey property rights of any sort or any
exclusive privilege” or “authorize . . . any invasion of
other private rights.” And the EPA has consistently
maintained that ensuring “access to private property
to meet the requirements of the permit conditions” is
“outside the scope of [underground injection control]
permitting authority.”
2. Panoche also argues that the EPA failed to
consider the cost of monitoring on property it does not
own, in contravention of the Safe Drinking Water Act,
the agency’s implementing regulations, and agency
precedent. Assuming without deciding that some degree
of cost consideration is appropriate, we conclude that
the EPA’s consideration of costs was adequate. The
4a
EPA determined that “monitoring is not particularly
expensive when compared to the information received,”
and it responded to Panoche’s cost concerns by reducing the number of locations and the depth at which the
permit required monitoring. The EPA explained that
the permit’s monitoring requirement “would provide
the empirical data needed about subsurface pressures,
while limiting the burden and cost” of monitoring.
Panoche also appears to have made no effort to
determine the cost of accessing the relevant land. If,
after negotiating with the neighboring landowner,
Panoche is unable to secure access to the necessary
land, the permit allows Panoche to request changes to
the monitoring condition. See 40 C.F.R. § 144.39(a)(2).
3. The EPA’s decision to require an ambient
monitoring well near abandoned well Silver Creek #18
was not arbitrary and capricious. The EPA did not
“entirely fail[] to consider an important aspect of the
problem,” State Farm, 463 U.S. at 43, by rejecting
Panoche’s concerns about its property rights. As noted
above, the EPA adequately considered the costs
associated with offsite monitoring. Nor did the EPA
treat Panoche differently from similarly situated
permittees by requiring offsite monitoring in this case.
Panoche identifies no case in which the agency
declined to require offsite monitoring when the area of
review contained several abandoned wells penetrating
the injection zone and the permittee had not yet
attempted to access the necessary property.
The EPA’s decision to require ambient monitoring
near Silver Creek #18 also evinced a rational
connection between the facts found and the choice
made. Panoche bears the burden of showing that its
injection activities pose no risk of endangerment. See
40 C.F.R. § 144.12(a). The EPA conducted a site-
5a
specific analysis—considering, for example, the fact
that the abandoned wells penetrate an over-pressurized injection zone and lack adequate long-string casing
and cement plugs—to determine that the abandoned
wells pose a risk of endangerment necessitating monitoring. The EPA reasonably refused to credit Panoche’s
argument that there is no current risk of endangerment because the mud used to plug Silver Creek #18
was legally adequate under state law in 1974.
Contrary to Panoche’s representation, the EPA’s
decision to require ambient monitoring did not depend
on an irrational assumption that Panoche would
operate at maximum capacity. Instead, the agency
reasoned that because the Panoche Formation is
already over-pressurized, any additional fluids injected
could result in pressure or water quality changes in
the underground source of drinking water, which
monitoring could help detect.
The EPA also did not irrationally fail to consider
how the region’s sandstone and natural confining
layers could reduce fluid migration from the injection
zone. The monitoring requirement was based on the
EPA’s concern regarding fluids migrating through
abandoned wells that pierce those layers.
Finally, it was not irrational for the EPA to require
ambient monitoring even though fluid migration from
the injection zone might not worsen water quality. The
EPA’s observation that the effect of fluid migration on
water quality depends on the concentration of contaminants in the fluid is consistent with its statutory and
regulatory authority to require monitoring to prevent
potential endangerment. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 300h(d)(2),
300h-5; 40 C.F.R. § 146.13(d)(1).
PETITION DENIED.
6a
APPENDIX B
UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL
PROTECTION AGENCY
REGION IX
75 Hawthorne Street
San Francisco, CA 94105-3901
OFFICE OF THE
REGIONAL ADMINISTRATOR
NOTICE OF FINAL PERMIT DECISION
UIC Permit No. R9UIC-CA1-FY17-2R
For Panoche Energy Center, LLC
In accordance with the requirements of the Code
of Federal Regulations (C.F.R.), Title 40 C.F.R.
§ 124.19(l)(2)(i), the United States Environmental
Protection Agency, Region 9 (EPA) is issuing a Notice
of Final Permit Decision for UIC Permit No. R9UICCA1-FY17-2R to Panoche Energy Center, LLC (PEC),
located at 43883 West Panoche Rd, Firebaugh, CA
93622. The final UIC Permit and copy of this Notice
are available on EPA’s web page at: https://www.epa.
gov/uic/uic-class-i-permit-no-r9uic-ca1-fy17-2r-panoch
e-energy-center-llc-firebaugh-ca.
PEC filed a petition for review (Petition) of the Final
Permit with EPA’s Environmental Appeals Board (EAB)
on October 28, 2022. In the Petition, PEC contested
certain conditions of the Final Permit. The uncontested and severable portions of the Final Permit were
placed into effect pursuant to a Notice of Stay of
Contested Conditions, dated November 7, 2022. The
contested conditions were stayed pending a decision by
the EAB on the Petition and final agency action.
On May 26, 2023, the EAB issued an order denying
the Petition in its entirety. In re Panoche Energy
7a
Center, LLC, UIC Appeal No. 22-01 (EAB May 26,
2023). Under 40 C.F.R. § 124.19(l)(2)(i), a final permit
decision must be issued by the Regional Administrator
when the EAB issues notice to the parties that a
petition for review has been denied. Accordingly, I am
hereby issuing my final permit decision.
The contested conditions shall become fully effective
and enforceable in accordance with the terms of the
Final Permit issued on September 30, 2022, with an
effective date of October 31, 2022. 1
This decision constitutes final agency action under
40 C.F.R. § 124.19(1)(2)(i). Under 40 C.F.R. § 23.7, this
Notice becomes effective for purposes of judicial review
under 42 U.S.C. § 300-j(7) and 5 U.S.C. § 704 two weeks
after this Notice is signed.
Dated:
/s/ Martha Aceves
Digitally signed by MARTHA ACEVES
Date: 2023.06.07 14:58:59 -07'00'
Martha Guzman
Regional Administrator
The Permit expiration date remains unchanged. As indicated
in Part I of the Permit, the Permit is issued for a period of ten (10)
years unless the Permit is terminated under the conditions set
forth in Section III.B.1 or administratively extended under the
conditions set forth in Section III.E.12 of the Permit.
1
8a
APPENDIX C
ENVIRONMENTAL ADMINISTRATIVE
DECISIONS
IN RE PANOCHE ENERGY CENTER, LLC
UIC Appeal No. 22-01
ORDER DENYING REVIEW
Decided May 26, 2023
Syllabus
Panoche Energy Center, LLC seeks Environmental
Appeals Board review of an Underground Injection
Control (“UIC”) Class I non-hazardous waste injection
well permit (“Final Permit”) issued by Region 9 of the
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency. The Final
Permit authorizes Panoche to continue to operate four
existing injection wells located at its Facility site and
to construct and operate up to two additional wells,
subject to certain permit conditions. One permit condition
requires ambient monitoring and directs Panoche to
install a monitoring well in the vicinity of a nearby
abandoned well, Silver Creek #18, located within the
Area of Review (“AoR”), to perform chemical analysis
and measure specific conductance and formation
pressure. Panoche challenges the inclusion of this
ambient monitoring requirement in the Final Permit.
Held: The Board finds that, based on the administrative record, Panoche has not demonstrated that the
Region clearly erred or abused its discretion in
requiring ambient monitoring in the Final Permit, or
that review is otherwise warranted. The Board denies
the petition for review in its entirety.
Panoche bears the burden of demonstrating that its
injection activities will not be conducted in a manner
that allows the movement of fluid into underground
9a
sources of drinking water (“USDW”). Panoche has not
demonstrated that the Region clearly erred or abused
its discretion by requiring ambient monitoring. Panoche
argues the Region lacks factual support for its decision
to require ambient monitoring, and the Region ignored
record evidence undercutting that decision. The administrative record supports the Region’s determination
that there is potential for fluid movement from the
injection zone into the USDW and the ambient monitoring condition in the Final Permit. The Safe Drinking
Water Act is preventative in nature, and the UIC
regulations provide the Region with the authority
and discretion to require ambient monitoring in the
Final Permit. The ambient monitoring requirement is
supported by the administrative record, including
information Panoche provided, and is consistent with
the UIC regulations and the Region’s statutory obligation to ensure USDW protection. The Region had a
rational basis for the ambient monitoring requirement
based on, among other things the: overpressured nature
of the Panoche formation, uncertainty about the
condition of wells in the AoR abandoned decades ago
that present a potential pathway for fluid migration,
and potential value of the ambient monitoring condition
to provide early warning of potential endangerment to
the USDW. The record reflects extensive technical
reviews and shows that the Region duly considered the
technical and other issues raised by Panoche in its
comments and chose an approach that is rational in
light of all the information in the record.
Before Environmental Appeals Judges Wendy L.
Blake, Mary Kay Lynch, and Kathie A. Stein.
10a
Opinion of the Board by Judge Lynch:
I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Panoche Energy Center, LLC seeks Environmental
Appeals Board review of an Underground Injection
Control (“UIC”) Class I non-hazardous waste injection
well permit (“Final Permit”) issued by Region 9 of the
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency. Panoche (“PEC”)
operates a simple cycle power generation plant in
Firebaugh, California. The Final Permit authorizes
Panoche to continue to operate four existing injection
wells located at its Facility site and to construct and
operate up to two additional wells, subject to certain
permit conditions. One permit condition requires ambient
monitoring and directs Panoche to install a monitoring
well in the vicinity of a nearby abandoned well, Silver
Creek #18, located within the Area of Review (“AoR”)
to perform chemical analysis and measure specific
conductance and formation pressure. Panoche challenges
the inclusion of this ambient monitoring requirement
in the Final Permit.
The issue before the Board is whether Panoche
demonstrated that the Region clearly erred or abused
its discretion by requiring the ambient monitoring
condition in the Final Permit. For the reasons set forth
below, the Board finds that Panoche failed to demonstrate that the Region’s decision to include the
ambient monitoring condition in the Final Permit was
clear error or an abuse of discretion. Accordingly, the
Board denies Panoche’s petition for review.
II. PRINCIPLES GOVERNING BOARD REVIEW
The Board’s review of UIC permits is governed by
Agency permitting regulations at 40 C.F.R. part 124,
which authorize parties to file petitions for review of
EPA permit decisions. 40 C.F.R. § 124.19(a)(1). EPA’s
11a
intent in promulgating these regulations was that this
“review should be only sparingly exercised.” Consolidated
Permit Regulations, 45 Fed. Reg. 33,290, 33,412 (May
19, 1980); see also In re Beeland Grp., L.L.C., 14 E.A.D.
189, 195-96 (EAB 2008).
In any appeal from a permit decision issued under
part 124, the petitioner bears the burden of demonstrating that review is warranted. “[A] petition for
review must identify the contested permit condition or
other specific challenge to the permit decision and
clearly set forth, with legal and factual support,
petitioner’s contentions for why the permit decision
should be reviewed.” 40 C.F.R. § 124.19(a)(4)(i); In re
Jordan Dev. Co., L.L.C., 18 E.A.D. 1, 4 (EAB 2019).
In considering any petition filed under 40 C.F.R.
§ 124.19(a), the Board evaluates whether the petitioner
has met threshold procedural requirements, including,
among other things, whether an issue has been preserved for Board review. See 40 C.F.R. § 124.19(a)(2)(4); see also In re Penneco Envtl. Sols., L.L.C., 17 E.A.D.
604, 617-18 (EAB 2018); In re Seneca Res. Corp., 16
E.A.D. 411, 412 (EAB 2014). For example, a petitioner
must demonstrate that any issues and arguments it
raises on appeal have been preserved for Board review
by being raised with “a reasonable degree of specificity
and clarity” during the public comment period or
public hearing. In re City of Lowell, 18 E.A.D. 115, 131
(EAB 2020) (citing In re Westborough, 10 E.A.D. 297,
304 (EAB 2002)); see 40 C.F.R. §§ 124.13, .19(a)(4)(ii);
see also In re Steel Dynamics, Inc., 9 E.A.D. 165, 230
(EAB 2000) (holding issue was not preserved when it
was not presented in comments “with sufficient clarity
to enable a meaningful response”).
Under 40 C.F.R. § 124.19, the Board has discretion
to grant or deny review of a permit decision. In re
12a
Avenal Power Ctr., L.L.C., 15 E.A.D. 384, 394 (EAB
2011); In re Archer Daniels Midland Co., 17 E.A.D. 380,
382-83 (EAB 2017). The Board ordinarily denies a
petition for review of a permit decision (and thus does
not remand it) unless the petitioner demonstrates that
the permit decision is based on a clearly erroneous
finding of fact or conclusion of law or involves an
exercise of discretion that warrants review under the
law. 40 C.F.R. § 124.19(a)(4)(i)(A)-(B); see, e.g., In re La
Paloma Energy Ctr., L.L.C., 16 E.A.D. 267, 269 (EAB
2014). To meet this standard, it is not enough for a
petitioner to simply repeat comments previously
submitted on the draft permit. A petitioner must
demonstrate why the permit issuer’s response to those
objections is clearly erroneous or otherwise warrants
review. 40 C.F.R. § 124.19(a)(4)(ii); City of Lowell, 18
E.A.D. at 131; see In re City of Taunton, 17 E.A.D. 105,
111, 180, 182-83, 189 (EAB 2016) aff’d, 895 F.3d 120
(1st Cir. 2018), cert. denied, 139 S.Ct. 1240 (2019).
When evaluating a challenged permit decision for
clear error, the Board examines the administrative
record that serves as the basis for the permit to
determine whether the permit issuer exercised “considered judgment.” City of Lowell, 18 E.A.D. at 132
(citing In re Gen. Elec. Co., 17 E.A.D. 434, 560-61 (EAB
2018); In re Ash Grove Cement Co., 7 E.A.D. 387, 41718 (EAB 1997)). The permit issuer must articulate
with reasonable clarity the reasons supporting its
conclusion and the significance of the crucial facts it
relied on when reaching its conclusion. E.g., In re Shell
Offshore, Inc., 13 E.A.D. 357, 391 (EAB 2007). As a
whole, the record must demonstrate that the permit
issuer “duly considered the issues raised in the comments”
and ultimately adopted an approach that “is rational
in light of all information in the record.” In re Gov’t of
D.C. Mun. Separate Storm Sewer Sys., 10 E.A.D. 323,
13a
342 (EAB 2002); see In re NE Hub Partners, L.P., 7 E.A.D.
561, 568 (EAB 1998), pet. for review denied sub nom.
Penn. Fuel Gas, Inc. v. EPA, 185 F.3d 862 (3rd Cir. 1999).
In reviewing an exercise of discretion by the permit
issuer, the Board applies an abuse of discretion standard.
See In re City of Palmdale, 15 E.A.D. 700, 704 (EAB
2012). The Board will uphold a permit issuer’s reasonable exercise of discretion if that decision is cogently
explained and supported in the record. See Ash Grove
Cement, 7 E.A.D. at 397 (“[A]cts of discretion must be
adequately explained and justified.”).
On matters that are fundamentally technical or
scientific in nature, including monitoring issues, the
Board typically defers to a permit issuer’s technical
expertise and experience, as long as the permit issuer
adequately explains its rationale and supports its
reasoning in the administrative record. See In re
Peabody W. Coal Co., 12 E.A.D. 22, 50-51 (EAB 2005);
Gen. Elec., 17 E.A.D. at 514-15; In re Dominion Energy
Brayton Point, L.L.C., (Formerly USGEN New England,
Inc.) Brayton Point Station, 12 E.A.D. 490, 510, 560-62,
645-47, 668, 670-74 (EAB 2006); see also, e.g., In re
Russell City Energy Ctr., L.L.C., 15 E.A.D. 1, 12, 39-42,
60-66 (EAB 2010), petition denied sub nom. ChabotLas Positas Cmty. Coll. Dist. v. EPA, 482 F. App’x 219
(9th Cir. 2012); NE Hub Partners, 7 E.A.D. at 570-71.
Clear error or abuse of discretion in a permit issuer’s
technical determination cannot be “established simply
because petitioners document a difference of opinion
or an alternative theory.” NE Hub Partners, 7 E.A.D.
at 567.
III. LEGAL FRAMEWORK
Congress established the UIC program pursuant to
the Safe Drinking Water Act (“SDWA”) and required
14a
EPA to promulgate regulations for underground injection
control programs to protect underground sources of
drinking water (“USDWs”). SDWA § 1421, 42 U.S.C.
§ 300h. Congress designed the program as a preventative program. See SDWA § 1421(b)(1), 42 U.S.C.
§ 300h(b)(1) (“Regulations * * * for State underground
injection programs shall contain minimum requirements for effective programs to prevent underground
injection which endangers drinking water sources
* * *.”). EPA has promulgated such regulations,
including minimum requirements for UIC permits.
See 40 C.F.R. pts. 144-148. EPA administers the UIC
program in states such as California that are not
authorized to administer their own UIC programs. See
40 C.F.R. §§ 144.1(e), 147.251(a).1
Central to the UIC regulations is protecting underground sources of drinking water from endangerment
associated with underground injection activities. See
SDWA § 1421(b)(1), (d), 42 U.S.C. § 300h(b)(1), (d); 40
C.F.R. § 144.1(g). The UIC program focuses on the
protection of underground water that “supplies or can
reasonably be expected to supply any public water
system” from “any contaminant” that may be present
as a result of underground injection activities. SDWA
§ 1421(d)(2), 42 U.S.C. § 300h(d)(2). The purpose of the
UIC regulations is to prevent the movement of fluids
containing contaminants into USDWs if the presence
of those contaminants may cause a violation of a primary
drinking water regulation or otherwise adversely
affect human health. See 40 C.F.R. § 144.12(a). “[A]ll
1
The UIC regulations use the term “Director” to describe the
permitting authority. 40 C.F.R. § 146.3 (defining “Director”).
Because this matter involves an EPA-administered program, the
Board will refer to the “permit issuer” or the Region, as appropriate, in places where the regulations use the term “Director.”
15a
injection activities including construction of an injection
well are prohibited until the owner or operator is
authorized by permit.” Id. § 144.31(a).
Injection wells fall into six classes. Id. §§ 144.6,
146.5. Class I wells are used to inject hazardous and,
like the wells at issue here, non-hazardous wastes.
Waste is injected into deep, confined rock formations,
and these wells are typically drilled thousands of feet
below the lowermost USDW. See id. §§ 144.6(a),
146.5(a).
Among other things, applicants for an injection well
permit must delineate an “area of review” (“AoR”) for
the permit, and that delineation must be approved by
the permitting authority. Id. § 146.6. The AoR denotes
the area surrounding injection wells in which the
pressures in the injection zone may cause migration of
the injection or geological formation fluids out of the
injection zone and into a USDW. See id. § 146.6(a)(1)(ii).
Applicable to the permit process for all classes of wells,
EPA’s regulations define the AoR as the area surrounding the proposed injection well that is determined
using either a “zone of endangering influence” calculation or the “fixed radius” method. See id. § 146.6; see
also id. § 144.3. The UIC regulations require that a
well operator identify all known wells within the AoR
that penetrate the proposed well’s injection zone and
submit a corrective action plan to address any
improperly sealed, completed, or abandoned wells in
the area of review that otherwise might allow fluid to
migrate into USDWs. See id. § 144.55(a). Further, the
regulations require the permit issuer to ensure that
the applicant takes corrective action, as necessary, to
prevent fluid migration into USDWs. Id. § 144.55(a).
Monitoring is a key component in preventing
endangerment of drinking water sources. See SDWA
16a
§ 1421(b)(1)(C), 42 U.S.C. § 300h(b)(1)(C). The UIC
regulations require that prior to authorizing injection,
the permit issuer must ensure that Class I permits
include, at a minimum, the following monitoring
requirements:
(1) The analysis of the injected fluids with
sufficient frequency to yield representative
data of their characteristics;
(2) Installation and use of continuous recording
devices to monitor injection pressure, flow
rate and volume, and the pressure on the
annulus between the tubing and the long
string of casing;
(3) A demonstration of mechanical integrity
pursuant to § 146.8 at least once every five
years during the life of the well; and
(4) The type, number, and location of wells
within the area of review to be used to
monitor any migration of fluids into and
pressure in the underground sources of drinking water, the parameters to be measured and
the frequency of monitoring.
40 C.F.R. § 146.13(b).
In addition, the regulations specifically address
ambient monitoring in a provision that EPA added in
1988, which provides as follows:
Based on a site-specific assessment of the
potential for fluid movement from the well or
injection zone and on the potential value of
monitoring wells to detect such movement,
the Director shall require the owner or
operator to develop a monitoring program.
At a minimum, the Director shall require
17a
monitoring of the pressure buildup in the
injection zone annually, including at a
minimum, a shut down of the well for a time
sufficient to conduct a valid observation of the
pressure fall-off curve.
Id. § 146.13(d)(1).
And as explained in the preamble to the 1988 rule,
EPA has “discretion in determining an acceptable
[monitoring] program.” UIC Program: Hazardous Waste
Disposal Injection Restrictions; Amendments to Technical
Requirements for Class I Hazardous Waste Injection
Wells; and Additional Monitoring Requirements Applicable to all Class I Wells, 53 Fed. Reg. 28,118, 28,141,
28,145 (July 26, 1988). Accordingly, in addition to the
minimum ambient monitoring requirements listed
above, EPA may require that an ambient monitoring
system include, among other things: “[c]ontinuous
monitoring for pressure changes in the first aquifer
overlying the confining zone,” periodic monitoring of
the ground water quality in the first aquifer overlying
the injection zone and in the lowermost USDW, and
“[a]ny additional monitoring necessary to determine
whether fluids are moving into or between USDWs.”
40 C.F.R. § 146.13(d)(2)(i), (iii)-(v).
IV. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL SUMMARY
A. Panoche Facility and Permit History
Panoche Energy Center is a 400-megawatt simplecycle power plant, consisting of four natural gas-fired
combustion turbine generators. Region 9, U.S. EPA,
Permit No. CA10600001 Fact Sheet, at 2 (2021) (A.R.
58) (“Fact Sheet”). The Facility is located in an unincorporated area of western Fresno County, California.
Id. The Region issued a permit to Panoche on April 25,
2008, which authorized Panoche to construct and
18a
operate a Class I nonhazardous waste injection well
facility with a maximum of six injection wells for a
ten-year period. Region 9, U.S. EPA, Permit No.
CA10600001, at 4 (Apr. 25, 2008) (A.R. 50) (“2008
Permit”).2 The 2008 Permit further authorized Panoche
to inject into the Panoche Formation at depths ranging
between approximately 7,199 to 8,897 feet below
ground surface. Fact Sheet at 2. In October 2017,
Panoche timely applied for renewal of the 2008 Permit
seeking authorization to inject industrial wastewater
from Panoche’s Facility into the four existing, and two
potential, non-hazardous injection UIC Class I wells,
for a ten-year period. Haley & Aldrich, Inc., 2017 UIC
Permit Application: Panoche Energy Center, 43883 W.
Panoche Road, Firebaugh, California 93622 (Oct. 20,
2017) (A.R. 3); Fact Sheet at 2. The Region deemed the
application complete, which allowed for continued
operation under an administrative extension. Fact
Sheet at 2.
B. Technical Review Leading up to Draft
Permits
Panoche and the Region engaged in a series of
technical discussions and reviews in which the Region
requested additional information to support the permit
application and site-specific assessment. See generally
Region 9, U.S. EPA, Permit Renewal Application
Technical Review (May 18, 2018) (A.R. 31) (“May 2018
Technical Review Letter”); Panoche Energy Center,
Summary of Responses and Questions to the UIC
Permit Renewal Application (July 12, 2018) (A.R. 32);
Region 9, U.S. EPA, Permit Renewal Application
Response to PEC Questions (Sept. 7, 2018) (A.R. 33).
2
Panoche operated only four wells under the 2008 Permit. Fact
Sheet at 2.
19a
As a result of these technical discussions, Panoche
submitted an updated renewal application that included
some of the technical information the Region had
requested. Haley & Aldrich, Inc., 2019 Update and Resubmittal of PEC’s 2017 UIC Permit Renewal Application
(Mar. 1, 2019) (A.R. 1) (“2019 Application”). Relevant
to this proceeding, one focus of the Region’s review was
a series of abandoned wells in the AoR/zone of
endangering influence. See, e.g., May 2018 Technical
Review Letter enclosure at 2; June 2019 Technical
Review Letter enclosure at 1; 2019 Application attach.
C (A.R. 1c). Several of the abandoned wells penetrate
the injection zone. 2019 Application attach. C at C-4C-8. The closest abandoned well to the injection zone
is Silver Creek #18, which is drilled to a depth of 8,698
feet. Id. attach. C at C-7.
Following receipt of the updated permit application
in March 2019, the Region continued its technical
review of the application. In June 2019, it commented
that the determination of the AoR in the application
(that used the Zone of Endangering Influence or “ZEI”
calculation) relied on the gel strength of the plugging
mud in the abandoned wells, but the application lacked
information about the properties of the plugging mud
in the abandoned wells in the AoR over the long term
and whether these wells could allow fluid movement
into USDWs. See, e.g., Region 9, U.S. EPA, Comments
on PEC’s March 2019 Updated Permit Application
enclosure at 1 (June 21, 2019) (A.R. 35) (“June 2019
Technical Review Letter”). The Region explained that
five wells in the AoR had been abandoned without
cement plugs between the injection zone and the base
of the USDW, four of which were abandoned 55 to 68
years ago, and it was unknown if the plugging mud
used in these abandoned wells had retained the
properties it had before the wells were abandoned, or
20a
whether the mud had become stratified or lost volume
to the surrounding formations. Id.; see also 2019
Application attach. C. The Silver Creek #18 well was
plugged in 1974. 2019 Application attach. C at C-4;
Panoche Energy Center, LLC’s Reply in Support of
Petition for Review (“Reply Br.”), attach. 4 at 45 (Jan.
31, 2023) (“Silver Creek #18 Plugging Records”). The
Region explained to Panoche that “empirical, depthspecific data would best demonstrate that the well(s)
will not permit fluid movement that could endanger
USDWs.” June 2019 Technical Review Letter enclosure
at 1. The Region also requested that Panoche provide
a sampling and testing protocol to collect test drilling
mud samples in at least two wells in the AoR to
support Panoche’s approach to identifying the ZEI and
demonstrate that the abandoned wells will not allow
fluid movement that could endanger USDWs. Id.
The Region and Panoche continued to engage in
technical discussions. See, e.g., Haley & Aldrich, Inc.,
Response to EPA Comments on PEC’s 2019 Update and
Re-submittal of the 2017 Permit Renewal Application
(Oct. 2019) (A.R. 36); Region 9, U.S. EPA, UIC Permit
Renewal Application Class I Non-Hazardous Permit
R9UIC-CA1-FY17-2R Technical Review (Dec. 3, 2019)
(A.R. 38) (“Dec. 2019 Technical Review Letter”). In the
December 2019 Technical Review Letter, the Region
informed Panoche that it did not share Panoche’s views
on the accuracy of its modeling efforts to demonstrate
that mud weight and gel strength in the abandoned
wells will prevent fluid movement into the USDW and
explained its rationale. Dec. 2019 Technical Review
Letter enclosure at 2. The Region’s assessment of some
of the studies Panoche presented during this review
was included in the December 2019 Technical Review
Letter. For example, the Region noted that a statement
in the Barker Study “supports EPA’s view that there is
21a
uncertainty regarding the gel strength for the particular wells in question.” Id., enclosure at 1; see also S.E.
Barker, Determining the Area of Review for Industrial
Effluent Disposal Wells, at 89 (Dec. 1981) (A.R. 43o)
(“Barker Study”). With respect to the Hadaway statement, the Region “concurs that the mud column
generally falls over time in an uncased wellbore.” Dec.
2019 Technical Review Letter enclosure at 2 (referencing Allen Hadaway, Wellbore Re-Entry Mud Property
Expert Opinion (Nov. 7, 2019) (A.R. 37). The Region
proposed different approaches to evaluate the condition of the mud in the abandoned wells in the AoR. Dec.
2019 Technical Review Letter enclosure at 2-3. Given
Panoche’s concerns with the Region’s proposal to reenter one of the abandoned wells to evaluate the mud
condition, the Region identified in the December 2019
Technical Review Letter an alternative approach
under which Panoche would prepare to install monitoring wells to demonstrate that the abandoned wells
are not serving as conduits for fluid movement. Id. at
3. Panoche and the Region did not reach agreement on
an approach to monitoring during the technical review
process. See id.; Panoche Energy Center, Response to
USEPA Comment No. 1d from letter dated December 3,
2019, at 6-7 (Jan.17, 2020) (A.R. 39) (“Panoche
Response to Dec. 2019 Technical Review Letter”);
Region 9, U.S. EPA, Response to Comments, at 5 (Cmt.
#4) (Sept. 30, 2022) (A.R. 48) (“Resp. to Cmts.”).
Further, Panoche did not provide the empirical data
the Region requested during this process, or at any
time thereafter. See Resp. to Cmts. at 6 (Cmt. #5).
C. Draft Permits
In late July 2020, the Region sent a pre-publication
draft permit to Panoche. Region 9, U.S. EPA,
Underground Injection Control Program Draft Permit
22a
Class I Non-hazardous Waste Injection Wells Permit
No. R9UIC-CA1-FY17-2R with comments (Jul. 27,
2020) (A.R. 9) (“2020 Pre-Publication Draft”). In addition
to other monitoring, recordkeeping, and reporting
requirements, the 2020 Pre-Publication Draft required
corrective action be undertaken prior to injection at
three abandoned wells in the AoR, which included
plugging the Souza #2 well and drilling ambient
monitoring wells (referred to as USDW Monitoring)
near the Silver Creek #18 and England #1-31 wells. Id.
at 9-10, 18.3 Panoche sent written comments to the
Region on this pre-publication draft opposing the
corrective action and ambient monitoring requirements. Letter from Ankur K. Tohan, K&L Gates, to
David Albright, Groundwater Protection Section, EPA
Region 9, at 3 (Sept. 25, 2020) (A.R. 12) (“PrePublication Comments”).
Following a December 2020 meeting to discuss the
comments and information Panoche provided, the
Region revised the 2020 Pre-Publication Draft and
published the draft permit for public comment in April
2021. Region 9, U.S. EPA Underground Injection
Control Program Draft Permit Class I Non-hazardous
Waste Injection Wells Permit No. R9UIC-CA1-FY17-2R
(Apr. 12, 2021) (A.R. 10) (“2021 Draft Permit”). The
2021 Draft Permit eliminated the corrective action
requirements, including the requirement to plug the
Souza #2 well; the USDW/ambient monitoring requirement near the England #1-31 well; and the requirement
to drill monitoring wells prior to injection.4 See 2021
3
In the Drafts and Final Permit, the ambient monitoring
provisions are referred to as “USDW Monitoring.”
4
The Region stated that it dropped the corrective action
requirements, including plugging the Souza #2 well due to “the
reduced injection volume” associated with the installation of
23a
Draft Permit pts. II.C., at 9-10; II.E.2, at 17-18. The
2021 Draft Permit required no corrective action.
Among other things, it required the drilling of one
ambient monitoring well to perform chemical analysis
and measure specific conductance and formation
pressure near Silver Creek #18, the abandoned well
closest to Panoche’s injection wells.5 Compare 2020
Pre-Publication Draft pts. II.C.1, at 9-10; II.E.2, at 18
with 2021 Draft Permit pts. II.C., at 9-10; II.E.2, at 1718. The Fact Sheet accompanying the 2021 Draft
Permit noted that the abandoned Silver Creek Well
#18 penetrates through the Panoche injection formation and does not have a cement plug between the
injection zone and the lowermost USDW. Fact Sheet at
6. The ambient monitoring requirement in the 2021
Draft Permit was in addition to other monitoring,
recordkeeping, and reporting requirements, which are
not contested in this matter.
The comment period for the 2021 Draft Permit
opened on April 11, 2021, and closed on May 11, 2021.
Region 9, U.S. EPA, Permit No. CA10600001 Public
Notice of Intent (2021) (A.R. 59); Region 9, U.S. EPA,
Notice of Final Permit Decision (Sept. 30, 2022) (A.R.
82). Panoche, the only commenter, filed comments
opposing the ambient monitoring requirement for
Silver Creek #18. Comment Letter from Ankur K.
Tohan, K&L Gates, to Michele Dermer, Groundwater
Panoche’s enhanced wastewater system “and associated
reduction of the size of the AoR.” Resp. to Cmts. at 6 (Cmt. #5).
5
The 2021 Draft Permit added trace metals to the required
chemical analysis. Compare 2021 Draft Permit pt. II.E.2.,
Monitoring Requirements subsection b, at 18 with 2020 PrePublication Draft pt. II.E.2.b, at 18.
24a
Protection Section, EPA Region 9 (May 11, 2021) (A.R.
43) (“Panoche Comments”).
D. Final Permit and Petition for Review
On September 30, 2022, the Region issued the Final
Permit for a ten-year period, along with its response to
comments document. Region 9, U.S. EPA, Permit No.
R9UICCA1-FY17-2R (Sept. 30, 2022) (A.R. 84) (“Final
Permit”); Resp. to Cmts. The Final Permit authorizes
Panoche to inject industrial wastewater into the four
existing wells and two potential wells subject to
injection pressure and injection volume limitations.
Final Permit at 4, 14; Fact Sheet at 2, 4. The Final
Permit retained the ambient monitoring requirement
from the 2021 Draft Permit, along with certain other
monitoring, recordkeeping, and reporting requirements. Final Permit at 16-23. The USDW/ambient
monitoring permit provision requires Panoche to
(1) drill a monitoring well within 100 feet to the southsouthwest of the Silver Creek #18 well; (2) equip the
monitoring well with a transducer (to monitor pressure and specific conductance within the USDW) and
water quality monitoring equipment (to allow sampling
of the USDW); and (3) sample and perform baseline
characterization of ground water chemistry. Id. pt.
II.E.2 at 17-18.
Panoche filed a petition for review on October 28,
2022, challenging the inclusion of the USDW/ambient
monitoring provision in Part II.E.2 of the Final Permit.
And following extensions of time requested by the
parties, briefing concluded on February 23, 2023, and
the Board held oral argument via videoconference on
March 30, 2023.
25a
V. ANALYSIS
According to Panoche, this case is about two things:
the lack of factual support for the Region’s decision to
require ambient monitoring, and the existence of
record evidence undercutting such decision, which the
Region ignored. The Region disagrees with both arguments. The Region maintains it had a rational basis
for the ambient monitoring requirement related to the
overpressured nature of the formation, unknown
condition of the abandoned wells in the AoR, and the
potential for fluid movement, and that it clearly
explained its rationale to Panoche and the public, all
of which is reflected in the administrative record.
What the record reveals is that the dispute in this
case is not about whether the Panoche Formation is
naturally overpressured. The record shows that it is,
and Panoche acknowledged this fact in its permit
application and during oral argument. 2019 Application
§1.2, at 3 & attach. A at A-1, attach. C at C-1 to C-8 &
tbl. C-1; Oral Argument Transcript 32 (Mar. 30, 2023)
(“Oral Arg. Tr.”). In fact, the dispute is not even about
whether there is the potential for fluid movement into
the USDW. Panoche specifically stated in its 2019
Application that with respect to Silver Creek #18, the
abandoned well closest to the injection wells, “[t]he
potential exist[s] for pressure to enter the wellbore
and move fluids into the USDW.” 2019 Application
attach. C at C-7. The dispute is about whether, based
on this administrative record, the Region can require
ambient monitoring and other actions to ensure that
there is no movement of fluid from the injection zone
into the USDW.
For the reasons explained below, the Board concludes,
after a thorough consideration of the administrative
record and the arguments raised by the parties, that
26a
Panoche has not carried its burden of demonstrating
that the Region clearly erred or abused its discretion,
or that review is otherwise warranted on any of the
grounds presented.
A. Panoche Has Not Demonstrated that the
Region Clearly Erred or Abused Its Discretion
by Requiring Ambient Monitoring in the
Permit
Following an extensive technical review and sitespecific assessment of the Panoche Formation and the
AoR, the Region explained it had two primary reasons
for requiring ambient monitoring: (1) the Panoche
Formation is naturally overpressured, such that any
additional injection poses an increased risk of fluid
migration through the old wells in the AoR that lack
long string casing and cement plugs to isolate the
injection zone from the base of the USDW;6 and
(2) Panoche’s application contained modeling and
estimates, but no empirical data directly addressing
the current conditions of the abandoned wells within
the AoR. Resp. to Cmts. at 2-3 (Cmt. #1); EPA Region
9’s Response to Petition for Review 13 (Dec. 23, 2022)
(“Resp. Br.”). This resulted in uncertainty regarding
the current condition of the abandoned wells in the
AoR and an increased risk of potential fluid movement
6
Casing is “a pipe or tubing of appropriate material, of varying
diameter and weight, lowered into a borehole during or after
drilling in order to support the sides of the hole and thus prevent
the walls from caving, to prevent loss of drilling mud into porous
ground, or to prevent water, gas, or other fluid from entering or
leaving the hole.” 40 C.F.R. § 146.3. The Region explains that long
string casing is a “type of casing which is continuous from at least
the top of the injection interval to the surface, and which is
cemented in place.” EPA Region 9’s Response to Petition for
Review 6 n.6 (Dec. 23, 2022) (“Resp. Br.”).
27a
into the USDW. Resp. to Cmts. at 2-3 (Cmt. #1); Resp.
Br. at 13.
According to the Region, the permit’s ambient monitoring requirement “will provide information about
the existence or absence of water quality or pressure
changes” that can confirm if the project is operating as
expected (i.e., no fluid movement is occurring along the
boreholes in the abandoned wells in the AoR that could
affect water quality in the USDW), or “provide early
warning of potential endangerment to USDWs before
any significant impact on water quality could occur. No
other monitoring in the Permit provides the information on pressure or water quality changes in the
USDW that is needed to provide early indication of
fluid movement that could endanger a USDW * * *.”
Resp. to Cmts. at 3 (Cmt. #1).
As explained below, the Region’s technical determination to require ambient monitoring is supported
by the administrative record, including information
Panoche provided, and is consistent with the UIC
regulations and the Region’s statutory obligation to
ensure USDW protection. On the other hand, Panoche
largely repeats comments it made previously and does
not address the Region’s response to comments
document, or it raises new arguments not previously
presented to the Region for consideration. Panoche has
not met its burden of showing clear error or abuse of
discretion for the Board to overturn the Region’s welldocumented technical determination. In fact, the
record in this case reflects extensive technical reviews
and shows that the Region duly considered the
technical and other issues raised by Panoche in its
comments and chose an approach that is rational in
light of all the information in the record. Based on this
28a
record, a denial of the petition is warranted. See NE
Hub Partners, 7 E.A.D. at 568.
1. The Administrative Record Supports the
Region’s Determination That There Is
Potential for Fluid Movement From the
Injection Zone into the USDW and the
Ambient Monitoring Condition in the
Final Permit
a. Overpressured Formation
The record shows that the Panoche Formation is
naturally overpressured, and, as noted above, Panoche
acknowledges this fact in its 2019 Application and as
recently as the oral argument. 2019 Application §1.2,
at 3 & attach. A at A-1, attach. C at C-1 to C-8 & tbl.
C-1; Oral Arg. Tr. at 32. Injection rates and volume
limits in a UIC permit provide important elements of
USDW protection. Resp. to Cmts. at 13 (Cmt. #13).
Every year, Panoche injects millions of gallons of
industrial wastewater into the Panoche Formation, see
id., and the permit authorizes Panoche to inject a
maximum of 635,229 gallons per day or 232 million
gallons per year.7 Final Permit pt. II.D.4.a, at 14; Resp.
7
The Final Permit establishes maximum daily injection rates
for each of the wells, the sum of which amounts to a total of
635,229 gallons per day and 232 million gallons per year when
multiplied by 365. Final Permit at pt. II.D.4.a, at 14; Resp. to
Cmts. at 13 (Cmt. #13). Panoche expressly requested the maximum
daily injection rates the Final Permit authorized. 2019 Application
attach. H tbl. H-1; Oral Arg. Tr. at 35-36. In its reply brief,
Panoche argues its air permit limits the amount of wastewater
Panoche can generate for injection to 84 million gallons per year
and that there is no scenario in which it would produce 232
million gallons of wastewater in a given year. Reply Br. at 6-7. We
find this argument late and inaccurate and address it in Part
V.A.2 below.
29a
to Cmts. at 13 (Cmt. #13); Oral Arg. Tr. at 35-36. The
Region explained that overpressured formations, like
the Panoche Formation, present unique risks because
subsurface pressures will continue to increase as
injection activities occur. Resp. to Cmts. at 13 (Cmt.
#13). Further, if the injection occurs when pressures
are abnormally high, this can lead to new fractures or
worsen existing ones that can serve as additional
pathways for fluid migration and potentially endanger
the USDW. Resp. Br. at 5 (citing Resp. to Cmts. at 13
(Cmt. #13) and U.S. EPA, Class I UIC Program: Study
of the Risks Associated with Class I Underground
Injection Wells, at 14 (Mar. 2001) (A.R. 49) (“Class I
Wells Study”)); Class I Wells Study at 14 (observing
that faults or fractures may form naturally, may be
created by the waste dissolving the rocks of the
confining zone, or by injecting wastewater at excessive
pressures). In other words, an overpressured formation
increases the risk of upward fluid movement that
could endanger USDWs. See Resp. to Cmts. at 13 (Cmt.
#13); Oral Arg. Tr. at 32 (noting that in an overpressured formation fluids naturally would migrate).
The Region explained that in combination with the
overpressured nature of the Panoche Formation, the
presence of abandoned wells located in the AoR
increase the risks of potential fluid movement from the
injection zone into the USDW due to the age of the
wells, their configuration and manner of plugging, and
uncertainty about their current conditions. See Resp.
to Cmts. at 5, 6-7, 8-11 (Cmts #4, 5, 9).
b. Old-Abandoned Wells in the AoR
Present a Reasonable Cause for Concern
Abandoned wells present a potential pathway for
fluid migration. Class I Wells Study at 14 (“[F]luids
could potentially be forced upward from the injection
30a
zone through transmissive faults or fractures in the
confining beds which, like abandoned wells, can act as
pathways for waste migration to USDWs”); Oral. Arg.
Tr. at 42-43. Here, Panoche identified twenty abandoned
wells within a three-mile radius of the Facility. See
2019 Application at attach. A tbl. A-1, attach. B at B-1.
The abandoned wells in the AoR here were of particular concern to the Region because several, like Silver
Creek #18, lack cement plugs between the top of the
injection zone and the base of the lowermost USDW,
penetrate the injection zone, and lack long string
casing. Resp. to Cmts. at 7, 9-10 (Cmts. #6, 9); see 2019
Application attach A. tbl. A-1, attach. C at C-1 to C-8
& tbl. C-1. The abandoned wells in the AoR were also
of concern to the Region because the condition of the
mud used as a plugging agent is unknown. See Resp.
to Cmts. at 2, 3-4, 9-10 (Cmts. #1, 2, 9-10).
The abandoned wells located within the AoR were
plugged and abandoned decades ago. See Part IV.B
above; June 2019 Technical Review Letter enclosure at
1; Reply Br. attachs. 2-5. The Region explained that
“mud conditions and columns in wells abandoned
decades ago can vary substantially, depending on well
construction, depth of casing and plugs, formation
pressures and permeabilities, and other factors.” Dec.
2019 Technical Review Letter enclosure at 2; see also
Barker Study at 89. Panoche’s application did not
provide empirical data on the condition of the mud,
and as noted, Panoche later declined to provide
empirical data in response to the Region’s request.
June 2019 Technical Review Letter enclosure at 1; Dec.
2019 Technical Review Letter enclosure at 2; Panoche
Response to Dec. 2019 Technical Review Letter at 3.
In addition, some of the abandoned wells in the AoR
lack long string casing or cement plugs between the
31a
top of the injection zone and the base of the lowermost
USDW and penetrate the injection zone. See Resp. to
Cmts. at 7, 9-10 (Cmts. #6, 9); see also 2019 Application
attach. A tbl. A-1, attach. C at C-1 to C-8 & tbl. C-1.
Silver Creek #18, the closest of the abandoned wells in
the AoR to the injection wells, was plugged and
abandoned in 1974, Silver Creek #18 Plugging Records
at 45, has no long string casing installed, no cement
plug between the injection zone and the base of the
USDW, and was abandoned with a lighter-weight mud
than the mud in the next closest well.8 Resp. to Cmts.
at 5, 12 (Cmts. #4, 11); Resp. Br. at 6-7. The Region
explained that “[t]he lack of long-string casing increases
the risk of fluids migrating laterally through the
injection zone and into the abandoned wells” and the
lack of a cement plug at the base of the USDW
amplifies that risk because if the fluid reaches Silver
Creek, or any of the abandoned wells, there would be
no effective barrier preventing upward migration into
the USDW. Resp. Br. at 6. Furthermore, lighter mud is
less resistant to pressure increases, Resp. to Cmts. at
5 (Cmt. #4), and potential fluid movement. See Oral
Arg. Tr. at 50. As noted above, Panoche itself
acknowledged the potential for pressure to enter
Silver Creek #18 and move fluids into the USDW. 2019
Application attach. C at C-7; Resp. Br.at 6.
The Region’s assessment of these multiple and
interrelated site-specific factors pointed to a risk of
8
The Region noted that the Silver Creek #18 well has a cement
plug from 1,437 to 1,700 feet, and explained that while this plug
may be protective of fresh-saltwater interfaces, no cement plugs
were placed to isolate the injection zone from the base of USDWs
to prevent fluid migration outside of the approved injection zone.
Resp. to Cmts. at 12 (Cmt. #11). The base of the USDW is located
at approximately 3,000 feet. 2019 Application attach. D at D-3.
32a
potential USDW endangerment, a concern the Region
needed to address in its permitting decision. See Resp.
to Cmts. at 2-3 (Cmt. #1). The Region found its concerns
about the uncertainty of the current condition of the
wells supported by a U.S. Geological Survey study
conducted in Utah. Id. at 10- 11 (Cmt. #9). The study
states that: “in older wells that were not plugged and
abandoned by current standards and procedures, or
where the integrity of the cement and mud used to
plug the wells has been compromised throughout time,
[] water could potentially move uphole [] into the []
aquifer.” U.S. Geological Survey, Water-Resources
Investigations Report 96-4155, at 58 (1996) (A.R. 25)
(“USGS Utah Study”); see also id. at 29-30 (similar
language).
To eliminate uncertainty as to the condition and
efficacy of the mud in the abandoned wells and to
evaluate the risk of potential fluid movement, the
Region, as noted above, requested empirical data on
the current condition of the mud and pressures in
Silver Creek #18 and the other abandoned wells in the
AoR. See, e.g., June 2019 Technical Review Letter
enclosure at 1; Dec. 2019 Technical Review Letter
enclosure at 2; Resp. to Cmts. at 5 (Cmt. #4); Resp. Br.
at 6. Panoche did not provide the requested empirical
data. Resp. to Cmts. at 6 (Cmt. #5). Instead, it
reiterated its position that the abandoned wells were
plugged consistent with procedures in place at the
time the wells were abandoned decades ago. And
Panoche estimated the mud column weight in each of
the wells in the AoR and the pressure needed to
overcome the mud weight and combination of gel
strength and mud weight. It provided some studies
that, among other things, discussed the relationship
between gel strength and time, and the effectiveness
and longevity of muds as plugging material. Panoche
33a
further claimed that its Facility operation would not
increase pressure within the injection zone because its
Enhanced Wastewater System (“EWS”) had reduced
injection rates by up to eighty percent since its
installation in 2016. See, e.g., Letter from Ankur K.
Tohan, K&L Gates, to David Albright, Groundwater
Protection Section, EPA Region 9, at 2-3, 5-6 (Jan. 25,
2021) (A.R. 43e); Panoche Comments at 9-10 & attach.
7; Resp. to Cmts. at 8-11 (Cmt. #9).
After extensive review of the information Panoche
provided, the Region found Panoche’s submissions
misplaced and unpersuasive. As noted above, it
observed that compliance with the procedures in place
at the time the wells were abandoned does not provide
information about the present condition of the mud,
decades later, and whether that mud can prevent the
potential movement of fluid into a USDW in an
already overpressured injection zone. Resp. to Cmts. at
6-7 (Cmt. #5). It also found that Panoche’s modeling
did not accurately represent the condition of the mud
within the AoR. See, e.g., id. at 9 (Cmt. #9). It explained
that Panoche did not calculate or otherwise determine
the gel strength within the AoR, but rather, Panoche
had “assigned the pressure needed at each borehole to
exceed an assumed gel strength that is based on
studies of other wells.” Id. And the estimates that
Panoche used were not based on “empirical data about
any of the wells in the AoR of the injection wells,
including Silver Creek #18 well.” Id. (noting that while
the assumed gel strength value Panoche used was on
the conservative side of the values identified in the
Barker Study upon which Panoche relied, the value is
still an estimate based on assumptions). The Region
also found the studies cited by Panoche to be of little
relevance and applicability because they addressed
mud strength at other locations, and none of them
34a
provided site-specific information that addressed all of
the characteristics of the site. Id. at 8-11 (Cmt. #9);
Resp. Br at 15. The Region’s assessment of the studies
on which Panoche relied is described in its technical
review as noted above, and at length in the response
to comments document. The Region explained that the
studies Panoche submitted to support the conservative
nature of its mud strength evaluation described wells
in other states, e.g., Panoche Comments attachs. 7.1
& 7.11(studies of wells in Texas), or non-injection
applications that do not involve pressure buildup due
to injection of fluids, e.g., Panoche Comments attach.
7.12 (study of the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant in New
Mexico).9 Resp. to Cmts. at 10 (Cmt. #9). Others, see
Panoche Comments attachs. 7.2, 7.3, 7.10, 7.14, 7.17, &
7.18, are general studies “of the characteristics and
effectiveness of clay-based muds, but are laboratory
studies, recommended practices, or general reviews,”
and the authors of some of these studies even acknowledged that the experiments cannot and were not
intended to replicate long abandoned wellbore conditions,
urging caution in applying their results to a field
setting. Resp. to Cmts. at 10 (Cmt. #9) (citing Panoche
Comments attach. 7.10); see, e.g., Barker Study at 89
(“Since the gel strength varies with the mud type and
the conditions that act on the mud it is difficult to
determine the exact gel strength of the mud in a
particular abandoned well bore.”); id. at 113 (“The 20
lb/100ft2 ultimate gel strength was arbitrarily selected
[in this study] to insure that a sufficient safety factor
is built into the proposed procedure. The selection is
the result of individual judgment prejudiced by the
above discussion [in the study]”); R.E. Collins and
9
See also attachs. 7.7, 7.8, 7.19 (other studies from wells in
Texas).
35a
D. Kortum, Drilling Mud as a Hydraulic Seal in
Abandoned Wellbores, at 8 (1989) (A.R. 43u) (“Collins
Mud Study”) (“direct application of this result to actual
wells should be used with caution”); see also Panoche
Energy Center, LLC Petition for Review attach. 11, at
136 (Oct. 28, 2022) (“Pet.”) (same study). The Region
also found that the studies Panoche submitted to
assert the maintenance of gel strength over time, e.g.,
Panoche Comments attachs. 7.10, 7.20, & 7.21, described
laboratory studies that attempted to evaluate the
effects of temperature, but did not “provide the sitespecific empirical data to address uncertainties about
the wells in the AoR at their current age, or their
ability to withstand increased pressures in the injection
zone.” Resp. to Cmts. at 10 (Cmt. #9). Other studies,
e.g., Panoche Comments attachs. 7.7, 7.8, & 7.19,
clarified that arguments about mud strength were
predicated on the conditions described in the particular
studies. Id. Studies, e.g., Panoche Comments attachs.
7.8 & 7.16, cautioned that gel strength increases with
time before leveling off and that “gel strength measured
at the surface after a short period of quiescence will
not be representative of downhole conditions in old,
abandoned wells,” and concluded that “the gel strengths
in abandoned wells are not usually known.” Id.
The Region also examined studies Panoche referenced
that provided field evidence of the longevity of mud as
a plugging material demonstrated during well reentries,
e.g., Panoche Comments attach. 7.19 (presenting field
data from a well in Texas), and concluded that the
studies cannot be cited as evidence of the proper
plugging of the Silver Creek #18 well or other wells in
the AoR. Id. With respect to the only report that
Panoche provided that addressed wells in the vicinity
of Panoche’s Facility, Panoche Comments attach. 6
(“Mud Column Characteristics and Conditions in the
36a
Cheney Ranch Field”), the Region concluded that the
three wells that Panoche selected from the Cheney
Field are not analogous to the wells in the AoR. See
Resp. to Cmts. at 10 (Cmt. #9). Specifically, the Region
noted that the mud in the Cheney Field wells was
inside long string casing in two of the wells, and that
the third well was “sidetracked” in 1973 and the mud
was in the open borehole for only a few weeks. Id. By
contrast, the Region explained that “the abandoned
wells in the AoR were drilled and abandoned decades
ago without long string casing, or adequate cement
behind the casing to isolate the USDW and with
uncertain mud conditions today.”10 Id.
Further, the Region considered and addressed
comments by Panoche that implementation of the
EWS has reduced pressures within the injection zone.
The Region observed that while the data obtained
from Panoche showed an 80% decline in injection
volumes during the EWS’s first year of operation, the
same data showed an increase in volume the following
10
The Region acknowledged that the information Panoche
provided supports the notion that drilling muds could potentially
prevent fluid migration and observed that its decision to eliminate
the corrective action requirements took this into account. Resp.
Br. at 16 (emphasis added). But the Region reiterated that the
information does not provide empirical data on the present
condition of the mud in the abandoned wells. Resp. to Cmts. at 9
(Cmt. #9); Resp. Br. at 16.
It also explained that even if the wells in the AoR meet current
California plugging requirements, that fact would not be
dispositive of USDW protection. See Resp. to Cmts. at 12 (Cmt.
#11) (explaining that California’s 2020 Onshore Well Regulations
relate to the protection of fresh-saltwater interfaces, not USDWs).
The Region also noted that it does not need to show that wells
were improperly plugged to require ambient monitoring. Id. at 8
(Cmt. #8).
37a
year, which has remained at that level. Id. at 13 (Cmt.
#13). And Panoche provided no evidence to demonstrate that injection rates and volumes will continue
to fall in the future. Id.
The uncertainty about the condition of the abandoned
wells in the AoR and their ability to prevent fluid
movement remained unresolved. The Region explained
that “[w]ithout definitive information about the current
condition of the mud, the impact of injection zone
pressure increases on potential fluid movement cannot
be ascertained to a level that ensures USDW protection.” Id. at 9 (Cmt. #9). Therefore, the Region’s technical judgment that ambient monitoring was necessary
to provide empirical data on current conditions and
potentially alert the permittee and the Region if
injection activities are endangering the USDW, was
reasonable and consistent with its obligations under
the law. See SDWA § 1421(b)(1), (d), 42 U.S.C. §-300h(b)(1),
(d); 40 C.F.R. §§ 144.1(g), .12, .55(a); id. § 146.13.
Recognizing the challenges related to mud sampling
as originally proposed by the Region, and concerns
expressed by Panoche that such sampling could
potentially disturb the mud, the Region determined
ambient monitoring to be the “best approach” to
demonstrate that there is no potential endangerment
to the USDW from Panoche’s injection activities (and
provide an early warning, as discussed below). Resp. to
Cmts. at 9 (Cmt. #9); see id. at 2-3 (Cmt. #1); see, Dec.
2019 Technical Review Letter enclosure at 2-3; Resp.
Br. at 8. The approach adopted by the Region is fully
consistent with the SDWA’s directives to prevent and
protect USDWs from endangerment associated with
underground injection activities. See SDWA § 1421(b)(1),
(d), 42 U.S.C. § 300h(b)(1), (d); 40 C.F.R. §§ 144.1(g),
.12(a). The statute focuses on the importance of
38a
prevention and avoiding failures that would result in
USDW endangerment. Thus, including permit conditions such as ambient monitoring, which are designed
to detect potential endangerment, falls squarely
within the objectives of and authority delegated under
the statute. The approach is also consistent with the
UIC regulations, which prohibit fluid movement into
the USDW, require the permit applicant to demonstrate such movement is not occurring, and authorize
the permitting authority to require monitoring to
detect any migration of fluids into and pressure in the
USDW, based on the potential for such fluid movement
to occur. 40 C.F.R. §§ 144.12, 146.13(a)(1), (b), (d).
In light of all the above, we conclude that the Region
articulated a rational basis in the record for the
inclusion of ambient monitoring in the Final Permit.
c. The Potential Value of the Ambient
Monitoring Condition
The Final Permit requires Panoche to drill a
monitoring well near Silver Creek #18, and to measure
pressure and conduct water quality sampling on an
ongoing basis. Final Permit pts. II.E.2-6, at 17-23. It
also requires Panoche to obtain baseline data of
ground water chemistry. Our review of the record
shows that the Region duly considered the potential
value of monitoring near Silver Creek #18 as required
by the ambient monitoring regulation, the usefulness
of the information that will be generated, and the role
of other monitoring conditions in the Final Permit.
The Region selected monitoring near Silver Creek
#18 because of the abandoned well’s proximity to the
injection zone (about 1.25 miles to the northeast of the
injection well), and its configuration and manner of
plugging (i.e., Silver Creek #18 has no long string
39a
casing, was abandoned with a lighter-weight mud than
the mud in the next closest abandoned well, and has
no cement plug between the top of the injection zone
and the base of the USDW). Resp. to Cmts. at 5, 12
(Cmts. #4, 11). The Region anticipates the selected
location would be the first place where an increase in
subsurface pressures may be observed. See id. at 5
(Cmt. #4); Resp. Br. at 20. And because the Silver
Creek #18 well was plugged in 1974 and there is
uncertainty about the present condition of the mud
and condition of the well, the Region considered
monitoring near this well to be appropriate. See Resp.
to Cmts. at 9 (Cmt. #9); see also id. at 11-12 (Cmt. #11)
(explaining why Silver Creek #18 remained a concern
to the Region even if it was abandoned in accordance
with California Geologic Management Division
(“CalGEM”) regulations in place when the well was
plugged in 1974).11
With respect to the potential value of the information that will be generated by monitoring near
Silver Creek #18, the record shows that the Region
expects the information will assist both the Region and
Panoche in determining whether there is hydraulic
communication between the injection zone and the
USDW. Id. at 14 (Cmt. #14). According to the Region,
this information will either confirm that the project
is operating as expected or will provide early warning
of potential endangerment to the USDW (i.e., by
detecting potential hydraulic communication between
the injection zone and the USDW). See id. at 3, 13, 14
(Cmts. #1, 13, 14); Resp. Br. at 20. The Region explained
that monitoring near Silver Creek #18 would provide
information on whether water quality or pressure
11
See also note 10.
40a
changes are occurring that could indicate an upward
movement of fluid through the abandoned well and
that information could be used to identify trends over
time. If the abandoned wells are adequately plugged,
no changes in the overlying formation should be
observed when the injected fluids reach and pass the
location of the abandoned wells. Resp. to Cmts. at 14
(Cmt. #14). By contrast, observed pressure changes
would likely indicate fluids are moving upward along
the borehole in the abandoned wells. Id. The Region
explained that water quality may or may not change
depending on the differences in the fluids in each
formation. Id.; see id. at 13 (Cmt. #13).
The Region further explained that the ongoing
pressure data and constituent monitoring results will
be compared to the baseline data and that trends over
time can provide an understanding of pressure and
water quality conditions within the USDW. See id. at
14-15 (Cmt. #14); Resp. Br. at 20. The Region also
addressed comments questioning how the pressure
and constituent monitoring data will be used to identify
issues resulting directly from Panoche’s injection activities
and not from other activities, such as other water
wells, irrigation wells, or pressure decreases due to
large-volume groundwater withdrawals in the Fresno
Irrigation District. See Resp. to Cmts. at 14 (Cmt. #14).
In its response to comments document, the Region
observed that because of the depth of the USDW (1,930
feet below the surface) “any changes would likely be
associated with a deficient wellbore” in the AoR, that
“it is unlikely that infiltration from the surface* * *
would affect water quality nearly 2,000 feet below the
surface,” and that any changes would likely be the
result of subsurface activity. Id. at 15 (Cmt. #14).
41a
Finally, the Region explained that ambient monitoring will produce data that are different from what will
be produced by the other monitoring provisions in the
Final Permit, and that together these monitoring
provisions will provide the data needed to ensure
protection of the USDW. See id. at 2-4 (Cmts. #1, 2);
Resp. Br. at 21-22 & n.14-15. In addressing Panoche’s
comments, the Region explained that while Permit
Conditions II.C.1 and II. D.2 are significant monitoring
requirements that will provide information about the
conditions at the location of the injection wells, they do
not provide data or other information about the
strength of muds in the Silver Creek #18 well or about
potential pressure changes or water quality impacts in
nearby USDWs.12 Resp. to Cmts. at 2-4 (Cmts. #1, 2);
Resp. Br. at 21- 22. The Region also observed that it
has required USDW/ambient monitoring in other
Class I permits, like it did here. Resp. to Cmts. at 8
(Cmt. #7).
The record shows that the Region addressed and
considered the arguments Panoche raised during the
comment period about the location and potential value
of the ambient monitoring condition along with the
role of the other monitoring conditions in the Final
Permit.
In sum, the Region articulated why any injection
could disrupt the already overpressured Panoche
Formation, why the estimates Panoche provided to
support its position that the mud was strong enough
to eliminate the risk of fluid migration were not
12
Permit Condition II.C.1 requires Panoche to review the zone
of endangering influence calculation on an annual basis, and
II.D.2, requires mechanical integrity testing of the injection wells.
Final Permit at 10, 11-13.
42a
persuasive, and why ambient monitoring near Silver
Creek #18 was appropriate within the meaning of the
ambient monitoring regulation. Uncertainties as to
the condition of the wells in the AoR remain. Panoche’s
disagreements are technical disagreements and a
disagreement as to how the Region exercised its
considerable discretion with respect to developing a
monitoring plan. See Peabody, 12 E.A.D. at 50-51.
These disagreements do not amount to clear error or
an abuse of discretion. NE Hub Partners, 7 E.A.D. at
570.
2. Panoche’s Petition Does Not Address the
Region’s Response to Comments Document,
the Arguments Are Without Merit, and
Some of the Arguments Are Untimely
On appeal, Panoche claims that it demonstrated
there will be no fluid movement from the injection zone
into the USDW and the Region ignored the existence
of record evidence that undercuts its decision. Pet. at
19-23; Reply Br. at 6-10; Oral Arg. Tr. at 8. We disagree.
Many of Panoche’s arguments in the petition repeat
comments raised on the 2021 Draft Permit, do not
address the Region’s response to comments document,
and are untimely. In any event, all of the arguments
fail on the merits.
Panoche states it provided the Region with the
following information that it argues demonstrates
there will be no fluid movement, namely that: the
injection zone goes deeper than 7,100 feet with two
confining layers and an intervening buffer aquifer;
every well within the AoR has sufficient mud column
weight to resist fluid entry; Silver Creek has 10.03
pound per gallon mud between the injection zone and
the lowermost USDW; the Panoche Formation pressure
would need to exceed 4,007 psi to displace the mud and
43a
4,054 psi to displace the mud and gel strength in Silver
Creek; Panoche applied a conservative approach in its
AoR and endangerment analysis; implementation of
its EWS has reduced injection volumes by approximately 70-80% and pressure in the injection formation;
and its air permit limits its ability to operate the
Facility, resulting in an estimated maximum injection
volume of 84 million gallons/year. Pet. at 19-20.
According to Panoche, these factors led the Region to
conclude that there is no potential for movement of
fluid from the injection zone into a USDW and
therefore no corrective actions are needed under the
Final Permit. Id. at 20. In addition, Panoche argues
that the ambient monitoring condition is not rational
and will not provide advance warning of fluid
movement. Id. at 26-29; Reply Br. at 18. Panoche
makes these arguments despite acknowledging that
there is the potential for fluid movement from the
Silver Creek #18 well into the USDW, and ignores the
Region’s response to comments document, and
explanation, discussed below, for why it decided to
require ambient monitoring rather than corrective
action in the Final Permit at this time.
a. The Region Considered and Addressed
Panoche’s Comments and Panoche
Failed to Address the Region’s
Responses or Otherwise Demonstrate
Clear Error or Abuse of Discretion
As discussed in Part V.A.1 above, the Region found
that neither Panoche’s modeling nor the studies,
laboratory data, and other information Panoche
provided described the current condition of the mud in
the abandoned wells in the AoR (e.g., strength of mud
column); addressed uncertainties about the conditions
of the wells in the AoR or their ability to withstand
44a
increased pressures in the injection zone; or provided
direct proof that the mud in the abandoned wells in
the AoR had retained its ability overtime to suppress
fluid movement. See Resp. to Cmts. at 6, 8-11, 13, 14
(Cmts. # 6, 9, 13, 14). Moreover, the Region found
support in some of those studies for its decision to
require site-specific empirical data. Id. at 10 (Cmt. #9)
(e.g., identifying studies that cautioned about applying
laboratory data to field settings, observed that gel
strength varies with mud type and condition of the
mud, making it difficult to determine exact gel strength,
and acknowledged that gel strengths in abandoned
wells are not usually known).13 The record also shows
that the Region considered and addressed Panoche’s
comments related to the impact of the EWS on
injection volumes and pressure in the injection
formation, and responded to questions about the
information that would be obtained from ambient
monitoring and the water quality data. See id. at 6, 13,
14 (Cmts. #6, 13, 14). Panoche’s petition does not
address the Region’s response to comments document
on these points. Instead, Panoche attempts to shift its
burden, reiterates its earlier comments on the 2021
Draft Permit, mischaracterizes the Region’s rationale
for rejecting Panoche’s modeling and eliminating
corrective action from the 2020 Pre-Publication Draft,
13
See, e.g., Collins Mud Study; Clark, P.W. Papadeaus, D.K.
Sparks, and R.R. McGowen, Gulf Coast Borehole Closure Text Well
Orangefield, Texas (Oct. 1991) (A.R. 43s); O.C. Johnson& B.K.
Knape, Pressure Effects of the Static Mud Column in Abandoned
Wells (Sept. 1986) (A.R. 43aa).
45a
and raises new arguments in its petition and reply
brief.14 We address Panoche’s arguments in turn.
14
Panoche’s argument related to the limits in its air permit was
not raised in its comments on the 2021 Draft Permit, but the
Region addressed them in its response brief.
Panoche also argues that the Region did not address “any of
the geologic features of this particular site that provide further
protection to USDWs,” and ignored “evidence in the record that
these types of rock will naturally close and seal abandoned
wellbores.” Reply Br. at 9 (emphasis in original) (citing Pet. at 8,
12-13). Contrary to Panoche’s claim, the record reflects that the
Region considered the geology of the Panoche Formation in its
decision-making. See, e.g., May 2018 Technical Review Letter at
3-4; Resp. to Cmts. at 2 (Cmt. #1); Resp. Br. at 4 (observing that it
“conducted a thorough site-specific assessment of the Facility’s
operations and injection activities, along with the geology of the
injection and confining zones”); see also Oral Arg. Tr. at 70 (articulating how artificial penetrations weaken the benefits of the confining
layer and the aquifer). In light of the overpressured condition of
the Panoche Formation, the abandoned wells and uncertainty
about their condition, the Region did not find that the confining
layers and buffer aquifer would provide the safeguards Panoche
claims. See Resp. to Cmts. at 2 (Cmt. #1); Oral Arg. Tr. at 70.
We also note that Panoche’s comment and arguments during
the comment period focused on the impact of reduced injection
volumes on pressurization of the Panoche Formation and the
strength of the mud in abandoned wells, not on the geological
features or confining layers as additional safeguards. See Panoche
Comments at 9-10. Panoche’s comment letter mentioned “confining
layers,” but it did so in the context of the pressure in the Panoche
Formation. Id. at 35 (“Given that there are 1,000s of feet of
confining layers between the USDW and the Injection zone, with
intervening pressure bleed-off zones, how will EPA account for
that decrease in pressure with the proposed monitoring condition
for the Silver Creek #18 well?”); see Oral Arg. Tr. at 83. The Region
considered and addressed the actual comment Panoche raised.
See Resp. to Cmts. at 13-14 (Cmt. #13) (interpreting comment as
focused on “how the pressure dissipation will affect pressure
monitoring and constituent monitoring results”).
46a
b. The Permittee Bears the Burden of
Demonstrating That Injection Activities
Will Not Be Conducted in a Manner
That Allows Movement of Fluid into
the USDW
In its petition, Panoche argues that the Region’s
concerns about the condition of the abandoned wells in
the AoR is based on speculation without factual
foundation, or site-specific record evidence. Pet. at 2023. It states that the Region relied on speculation,
“unsupported by any site-specific record evidence or
analysis” that older muds in properly plugged wells
may fail. Id. at 21.15 Along these lines, Panoche argues
that the Region did not provide one example of older
drilling muds failing. Reply Br. at 12; Oral Arg. Tr. at
32-33. But as shown in Part V.A.1, the administrative
record fully supports the Region’s concerns about the
condition of the abandoned wells, in particular the
condition of Silver Creek #18. See also Resp. to
Cmts. at 2-3 (Cmt. #1). To the extent that Panoche is
attempting to flip its burden of showing that its
injection activities will not endanger the USDW, we
15
Panoche also asserts that EPA’s “speculative concerns are
legally insufficient to impose costly monitoring requirements.”
Reply Br. at 10 (citing In re Stonehaven, Energy Mgmt. L.L.C., 15
E.A.D. 817, 830-31 (EAB 2013) and Amerijet Int’l, Inc. v. Pistole,
753 F.3d 1343, 1350 (D.C. Cir. 2014)); see generally Pet. at 21-23.
As discussed in Part V.B below, cost is beyond the scope of the UIC
program and Board review. And neither case cited by Panoche
provides support for its claims. Unlike in Stonehaven, the record
here provides a rational basis for the Region’s decision to require
ambient monitoring, and Stonehaven does not discuss the cost of
monitoring wells. Amerijet addresses Transportation Security
Administration denials of airline requests for alternative security
procedures and has nothing to do with cost consideration or the
UIC program. Amerijet, 753 F.3d at 1345-1346.
47a
note that this is contrary to the permit applicant’s
burden set forth in 40 C.F.R.§ 144.12(a). The burden of
showing that injection activities will not be conducted
in a manner that allows the movement of injection
fluid into USDWs, rests on the permit applicant, not
the Region. 40 C.F.R. § 144.12(a).16 Furthermore, the
Region is neither required to demonstrate that a well
is improperly plugged and abandoned, nor to provide
examples of abandoned wells that have failed, as a
precondition to, or justification for, requiring ambient
monitoring in a Class I UIC permit. Id. § 146.13(b), (d).
The Region has an obligation to prevent and protect
USDWs from endangerment associated with underground injection activities and need not wait until a
well abandoned decades ago in an overpressured
formation fails or facilitates fluid movement before
taking steps to detect or prevent endangerment. See
SDWA § 1421(b)(1), (d), 42 U.S.C. § 300h(b)(1), (d); 40
C.F.R. §§ 144.1(g), .12(a).17 Panoche has not met its
burden of showing clear error or abuse of discretion.
16
At Oral Argument, counsel for Panoche agreed that this
burden lies with Panoche. Oral Arg. Tr. at 18.
17
In its response brief, the Region cites to 40 C.F.R. § 144.12(b)
for the proposition that it has an obligation to impose permit
conditions that will ensure that USDWs remain protected, and
that in a situation where a permit applicant does not provide
evidence to conclusively redress a known risk, the Region may
require additional monitoring. Resp. Br. at 19. Panoche argues
that the Region erred in citing to section 144.12(b) for support,
because this is not a situation where there is actual movement of
fluid into the USDW. See Reply Br. at 19. We find no clear error in
the Region’s statement. The Region cites section 144.12(b) for the
proposition that it has a regulatory obligation to protect USDWs,
which the provision supports. See 40 C.F.R. § 144.12(b). The
Region is not claiming that the abandoned wells in the Panoche
48a
c. A Permittee Must Do More than
Reiterate Its Comments, It Must Address
the Region’s Response to Comments
Document and Explain Why the
Response Was Clearly Erroneous or
Otherwise Warrants Review
In addition to the arguments discussed above, the
petition repeats, without more, the comments Panoche
raised on the 2021 Draft Permit that the studies and
other information it provided show that mud retains
its properties over time and that the wells were
properly plugged when they were abandoned. Pet. at
21-22 (claiming that the results of the laboratory and
field studies it provided like the “Mud Column
Characteristics and Conditions in the Cheney Ranch
Field” apply to the abandoned wells in the AoR.); Reply
Br. at 4, 10-11 (stating that “all of [the] wells within
the AoR were properly plugged and abandoned”). As
discussed in Part V.A.1 above, the Region explained at
length why the Cheney Study and other laboratory
studies Panoche provided are not relevant. Resp. to
Cmts. at 8-11 (Cmt. #9). The Region also identified
flaws in Panoche’s modeling (e.g., it was based on
estimates and assumptions, not on empirical data
about the mud in wells in the AoR). See id. at 9, 11
(Cmts. #9, 10). And the Region explained that the
manner of plugging at the time of abandonment says
nothing about the current condition of the mud in
wells that were abandoned several decades ago, see id.
at 12 (Cmt. #12), and that the Silver Creek #18 well
was abandoned with lighter mud than the next closest
well and lacked cement plugs between the top of the
Formation are currently showing movement of contaminants into
the USDW from the injection zone.
49a
injection zone and the base of the USDW, id. at 5, 12
(Cmts. #4, 11).
Panoche does not address the Region’s responses to
these comments in its petition. Rather, it calls into
question the relevance of the USGS Utah Study to the
matter at hand, claims that all the wells within the
AoR have cement plugs and certification records from
CalGEM documenting that they were properly plugged
and abandoned, and asserts that the Region “did not
assess the additive benefits of those features.” Pet. at
23-26. But as the Region explained and the record
shows, the USGS Utah Study is not the only piece of
information the Region considered. Resp. Br. at 18 n.
13. As shown in Part V.A.1 above, and as noted by the
Region, it considered site-specific factors, including the
presence of old-abandoned wells near the Facility that
lack long string casing and cement plugs between the
top of the injection zone and base of the USDW, and
the overpressured condition of the Panoche Formation.
See also id. The USGS Utah Study supports the notion
that old wells that may have been improperly plugged
and abandoned by current standards, or where the
integrity of the mud may have been compromised over
time, provide a potential pathway for fluid migration
into a USDW. Resp. to Cmts. at 10- 11 (Cmt. #9); USGS
Utah Study at 29-30, 58; id. at 30 (providing examples
of old abandoned wells that exhibited signs of potential
fluid migration upward in plugged wells).18 Here, the
18
Panoche dismisses the examples the Region points to in the
USGS Utah Study, arguing that there is no evidence of similar
pooling at the wells within Panoche’s AoR, and that there is no
evidence that the integrity of the muds used to plug and abandon
the AoR wells has been compromised. Pet. at 25. But Panoche
continues to miss the point; the Region is not claiming that there
is fluid movement, but that the old wells in the AoR pose a risk,
50a
abandoned wells were plugged several decades ago,
and the Region reviewed the well records Panoche
provided and correctly concluded that they do not
provide data on the current condition of mud. See Resp.
to Cmts. at 2-3, 8-9 (Cmts. #1, 9). Also, the record shows
that the Silver Creek #18 cement plugs Panoche
references are not located in a position to protect the
USDW from fluid moving from the injection zone.19
The Injection Zone is between approximately 6,5008,500 feet, the base of the USDW is at approximately
3,000 feet, see Pet. at 9 fig., and the plugs in Silver
Creek #18 are no lower than 1,700 feet. See Silver
Creek #18 Plugging Records at 47; Resp. to Cmts. at 12
(Cmt. #11).
Panoche’s argument that operation of its EWS
reduced injection rates by 80 percent and has contributed to a decrease in formation pressures, Pet. at 1314, 20; Reply Br. at 6, 14, is also a reiteration of
comments the Region considered and responded to in
the response to comments document, that Panoche’s
petition does not address. See Part V.A.1 above; Resp.
to Cmts. at 13 (Cmt. #13) (explaining that the data
obtained from Panoche showed an increase in wastewater volume the year after EWS implementation and
has remained at that level and that Panoche provided
no evidence to demonstrate that injection rates and
volumes will continue to fall in the future); id. at 6
(Cmt. #5) (the Region eliminated the corrective action
requirement contemplated under the 2020 Pre-
that there is uncertainty and the potential for fluid movement,
and the risk needs to be evaluated and monitored.
19
See note 8 above.
51a
Publication Draft in light of the reduced injection
volume associated with installation the EWS).20
Likewise, Panoche’s arguments that there is no
nexus between the Region’s concerns and the water
quality data Panoche is required to obtain, and that
water quality testing would not indicate one way or
another whether a borehole plug has failed, Pet. at 26;
Reply Br. at 18-19, do not address the Region’s
explanation in the response to comments document
about the value of water quality testing. As shown in
Part V.A.1, the information obtained under the
ambient monitoring condition will assist in determining whether there is hydraulic communication
between the injection activities and the USDW. The
information will help to determine if water quality
changes are occurring that could indicate an upward
movement of fluid through the abandoned well and to
identify trends over time. The fact that the Region
observed that water quality may or may not change
depending on the differences in the fluids in each
formation, see Resp. to Cmts. at 14 (Cmt.
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