Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Jeffrey Hutchinson, Petitioner v. Ricky D. Dixon, Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections
Supreme Court briefMay 1, 2025
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*** CAPITAL CASE ***
No. _____
IN THE
Supreme Court of the United States
_________________________________________________________________
JEFFREY GLENN HUTCHINSON,
Petitioner,
v.
RICKY D. DIXON, SECRETARY,
FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS,
Respondent.
__________________________________________________________________
On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the
United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
___________________________________________________________________
PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
____________________________________________________________________
EXECUTION SCHEDULED FOR MAY 1, 2025, AT 6:00 P.M.
______________________________________________________________
SEAN T. GUNN
Counsel of Record
LAURA B. SILVA
MAUREEN BLENNERHASSETT
Capital Habeas Unit
Federal Public Defender
Northern District of Florida
227 North Bronough St., Suite 4200
Tallahassee, Florida 32301
(850) 942-8818
sean_gunn@fd.org
Counsel for Petitioner
CAPITAL CASE
QUESTIONS PRESENTED
Jeffrey Glenn Hutchinson, a decorated combat veteran, returned from the front
lines of the Gulf War plagued by persecutory delusions about a government
conspiracy to silence his knowledge of military secrets and advocacy related to Gulf
War Illness.
From his first contact with law enforcement, Mr. Hutchinson attributed the
commission of the crimes to the government. His belief that the government is
responsible for killing his girlfriend and her children has persisted without wavering
for nearly 30 years. Mr. Hutchinson does not believe that he will die for crimes he
committed, but instead, that the government conspiracy is responsible for his death
sentences, and if this Court does not intervene, will lead to his execution.
Based upon the standard set forth by this Court in Panetti v. Quarterman, 551
U.S. 930, 952 (2007), Mr. Hutchinson is incompetent to be executed. Florida’s
continued rejection of the correct application of Panetti violates the long-held
principle that the execution of the insane violates the Eighth Amendment. Ford v.
Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 401, 410 (1986).
Mr. Hutchinson requests that his execution be stayed, and certiorari be
granted to address the following questions:
1. Does a finding of competency because a petitioner has a “rational
understanding of the fact of his pending execution and the reason for it[,]”
solely because he is “aware that the State is executing him for the murders
that were committed and that he will physically die as a result of the
execution[,]” run afoul of the Panetti rational understanding standard?
2. Does the Panetti standard account for a petitioner’s subjective understanding
of the reason for their execution as opposed to their ability to coherently
explain the State’s reason for carrying out the execution?
i
LIST OF DIRECTLY RELATED PROCEEDINGS
Direct Review
Caption:
Court:
Docket:
Decided:
Published:
Hutchinson v. State
Supreme Court of Florida
SC01-500
July 1, 2004
882 So. 2d 943 (Fla. 2004)
State Collateral Review
Caption:
Court:
Docket:
Decided:
Published:
State v. Hutchinson
Circuit Court of the First Judicial Circuit, Okaloosa County, Florida
1998 CF 001382 AC
January 3, 2008 (Initial State Postconviction Motion)
2008 WL 8948638 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Jan. 3, 2008)
Caption:
Court:
Docket:
Decided:
Published:
Hutchinson v. State
Supreme Court of Florida
SC08-99
July 9, 2009 (Initial State Postconviction Appeal)
17 So. 3d 696 (Fla. 2008)
Caption:
Court:
Docket:
Decided:
State v. Hutchinson
Circuit Court of the First Judicial Circuit, Okaloosa County, Florida
1998 CF 001382 AC
November 11, 2011 (Motion for DNA Testing)
November 19, 2013 (First Successive Postconviction Motion)
May 30, 2017 (Second Successive Postconviction Motion)
December 4, 2020 (Third Successive Postconviction Motion)
April 4, 2025 (Fourth Successive Postconviction Motion)
April 11, 2025 (Fifth Successive Postconviction Motion)
April 27, 2025 (Motion to Determine Competency to be Executed)
Caption:
Court:
Docket:
Decided:
Published:
Hutchinson v. State
Supreme Court of Florida
SC11-2301 (Appeal re Motion for DNA Testing)
February 8, 2012
N/A
Caption:
Court:
Hutchinson v. State
Supreme Court of Florida
ii
Docket:
Decided:
Published:
SC13-1005 (Appeal re First Successive Postconviction Motion)
January 19, 2014
N/A
Caption:
Court:
Docket:
Decided:
Published:
Hutchinson v. State
Supreme Court of Florida
SC17-1229 (Appeal re Second Successive Postconviction Motion)
March 15, 2018
243 So. 3d 880 (Fla. 2018)
Caption:
Court:
Docket:
Decided:
Published:
Hutchinson v. State
Supreme Court of Florida
SC21-18 (Appeal re Third Successive Postconviction Motion)
June 16, 2022
343 So. 3d 50 (Fla. 2022)
Caption:
Court:
Docket:
Decided:
Published:
Hutchinson v. State
Supreme Court of Florida
SC25-497 (Appeal re Fourth Successive Postconviction Motion)
April 21, 2025
2025 WL 1155717 (Fla. Apr. 21, 2025)
Caption:
Court:
Docket:
Decided:
Published:
Hutchinson v. State
Supreme Court of Florida
SC25-517 (Appeal re Fifth Successive Postconviction Motion)
April 25, 2025
2025 WL 1198037
Caption:
Court:
Docket:
Decided:
Published:
Hutchinson v. State
Supreme Court of Florida
SC25-590 (Appeal re Competency to be Executed)
April 30, 2025
N/A
Federal Habeas Review
Caption:
Court:
Docket:
Decided:
Published:
Hutchinson v. Florida
United States District Court for the Northern District of Florida
5:09-cv-261-RS
September 28, 2010 (Initial Federal Habeas Petition)
2010 WL 3833921 (N.D. Fla. Sep. 28, 2010)
Caption:
Court:
Hutchinson v. Florida
United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
iii
Docket:
Decided:
Published:
10-14978 (Initial Federal Habeas Appeal)
April 19, 2012
677 F.3d 1097 (11th Cir. 2012)
Caption:
Court:
Docket:
Decided:
Hutchinson v. Crews
United States District Court for the Northern District of Florida
3:13-cv-128-MW
April 24, 2013 (Second Federal Habeas Petition)
June 12, 2013 (Rule 59(e) Motion)
January 15, 2021 (Rule 60(b) Motion)
April 16, 2025 (2d Rule 60(b) Motion)
2013 WL 1765201 (N.D. Fla. Apr. 24, 2013)
2013 WL 2903530 (N.D. Fla. June 12, 2013)
[Rule 60(b) Decision Not Published]
[2d Rule 60(b) Decision Not Published]
Published:
Caption:
Court:
Docket:
Decided:
Published:
Hutchinson v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corr.
United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
13-12296 (Appeal re 2nd Federal Habeas Petition, Rule 59(e) Motion)
August 15, 2013
N/A
Caption:
Court:
Docket:
Decided:
Published:
Hutchinson v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corr.
United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
21-10508 (Appeal re Rule 60(b) Motion)
March 24, 2021
N/A
Caption:
Court:
Docket:
Decided:
Published:
Hutchinson v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corr.
United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
25-11271 (Appeal re 2d Rule 60(b) Motion)
April 23, 2025
N/A
Caption:
Court:
Docket:
Decided:
Published:
Hutchinson v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corr.
United States District Court for the Northern District of Florida
4:25-cv-205
May 1, 2025 (denying petition)
N/A
Caption:
Court:
Docket:
Decided:
Hutchinson v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corr.
United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
25-11485
May 1, 2025 (denying COA)
iv
Published:
N/A
Certiorari Review
Caption:
Court:
Docket:
Decided:
Published:
Hutchinson v. Florida
Supreme Court of the United States
12-5582 (Appeal re Initial Federal Habeas Petition)
October 9, 2012
568 U.S. 947 (2012)
Caption:
Court:
Docket:
Decided:
Published:
Hutchinson v. Florida
Supreme Court of the United States
18-5377 (Appeal re Third Successive State Postconviction Motion)
October 1, 2018
139 S. Ct. 261 (2018)
Caption:
Court:
Docket:
Decided:
Published:
Hutchinson v. Florida
Supreme Court of the United States
22-6015 (Appeal re 2d Rule 60(b) Motion)
January 9, 2023
139 S. Ct. 261 (2018)
Caption:
Court:
Docket:
Decided:
Hutchinson v. Florida
Supreme Court of the United States
24-7079
Pending
Caption:
Court:
Docket:
Decided:
Hutchinson v. Florida
Supreme Court of the United States
24-7084
Pending
Caption:
Court:
Docket:
Decided:
Hutchinson v. Florida
Supreme Court of the United States
24-7087
Pending
v
TABLE OF CONTENTS
QUESTIONS PRESENTED ........................................................................................... i
LIST OF DIRECTLY RELATED PROCEEDINGS ...................................................... ii
TABLE OF CONTENTS ............................................................................................... vi
INDEX TO APPENDIX ............................................................................................... vii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ....................................................................................... viii
DECISION BELOW ...................................................................................................... 1
JURISDICTION............................................................................................................. 1
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS INVOLVED......................................................... 1
INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................................... 1
STATEMENT OF THE CASE....................................................................................... 3
A. Relevant procedural history ............................................................................... 3
B. Relevant facts ..................................................................................................... 5
REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT .................................................................. 15
THIS COURT SHOULD CONSIDER WHETHER THE STATE COURTS
UNREASONABLY APPLIED PANETTI’S “RATIONAL” UNDERSTANDING
INQUIRY ................................................................................................................ 15
CONCLUSION............................................................................................................. 22
vi
INDEX TO APPENDIX
Eleventh Circuit Opinion ............................................................................................ 1a
vii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases
Coe v. Bell, 209 F.3d 815 (6th Cir. 2000) .................................................................... 15
Commonwealth v. Banks, 29 A.3d 1129 (Pa. 2011) .................................................... 20
Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986) ................................................................... 15
Hutchinson v. State, No. SC2025-0590 (Fla. Apr. 30, 2025) ...................................... 19
Madison v. Alabama, 586 U.S. 265 (2019).................................................................... 2
Owen v. State, 363 So. 3d 1025 (Fla. 2023) ................................................................. 19
Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930 (2007)..................................................... 2, 14, 20
Provenzano v. State, 760 So. 2d 137 (Fla. 2000) ......................................................... 15
Panetti v. Dretke, 540 U.S. 1052 (2003) .......................................................... 16, 17, 21
Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 407 (2000) ............................................................. 20
viii
Petitioner Jeffrey Hutchinson, a death-sentenced Florida prisoner scheduled
for execution on May 1, 2025, respectfully requests that the Court grant this petition
for a writ of certiorari and stay his execution pending a decision on the merits. A
separate application for a stay of execution accompanies this request.
DECISION BELOW
.
The Eleventh Circuit’s decision is available at Hutchinson v. Secretary, Case
25-11485 (11th Cir. May 1, 2025). It is also included in the Appendix (App.) at 1a.
JURISDICTION
The Eleventh Circuit’s order was entered on May 1, 2025. This Court has
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS INVOLVED
The Eighth Amendment provides:
Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor
cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.
The Fourteenth Amendment provides in relevant part:
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any
State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process
of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection
of the laws.
INTRODUCTION
Jeffrey Glenn Hutchinson is scheduled to die tonight, but he has no rational
understanding of why. Suffering from Delusional Disorder, Mr. Hutchinson fervently
believes that his death sentence is attributable to a government conspiracy to silence
him because he knows unsavory military secrets. Mr. Hutchinson’s persecutory belief
1
system well predates the crimes for which he stands to die, having taken root upon
his return from serving on the front lines of the Gulf War, being documented over a
period of nearly thirty years, and persisting to the present day. Unable to surface
from these longstanding fixed delusions, Mr. Hutchinson is incompetent to be
executed under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States
Constitution, as interpreted by this Court’s precedent in Ford v. Wainwright, 477
U.S. 399 (1986), Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930 (2007), and Madison v.
Alabama, 586 U.S. 265 (2019).
Yet, due to a fundamental misapplication of this Court’s precedent, the state
courts have paved the way for Mr. Hutchinson’s unconstitutional execution. Florida’s
method for determining competency to be executed, previously found to be
insufficiently protective in Ford, is once again out of constitutional lockstep in the
wake of Panetti and Madison. The state courts unreasonably applied federal law by
basing their determination of Mr. Hutchinson’s competency on his factual
understanding of his death sentence.
2
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 1
A.
Relevant procedural history
After his death warrant was signed on March 31, 2025, Mr. Hutchinson’s
counsel initiated competency proceedings pursuant to Fla. Stat. § 922.07, by
submitting a letter to Governor DeSantis stating a reasonable basis to believe Mr.
Hutchinson’s execution is unconstitutional under Ford and Panetti. PCR6. 523-24.
On April 17, 2025, Governor DeSantis issued an Executive Order appointing a
Commission of three psychiatrists to evaluate Mr. Hutchinson. PCR6. 526-27. The
Commission returned its findings on April 22, 2025, and the Governor issued an
Executive Order adopting the Commission’s conclusions the next day, that Mr.
Hutchinson is in fact competent to be executed. PCR6. 17-18.
Pursuant to Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.812. Mr. Hutchinson was provided with a
hearing on his competency-to-be-executed claim in the Bradford County circuit court
1 Citations shall be as follows: The abbreviation “R.” refers to the first eighteen (18)
volumes of the record on direct appeal to the Florida Supreme Court (SC01-0500).
“T.” refers to the separately paginated trial transcript in volumes nineteen through
thirty-two of the record on appeal. “PCR1.” refers to the record on appeal from the
initial state postconviction appeal to the Florida Supreme Court (SC08-0099).
“PCR2.” refers to the record on appeal from the successive state postconviction appeal
to the Florida Supreme Court (SC17-1229). “PCR3.” refers to the record on appeal
from the successive state postconviction appeal to the Florida Supreme Court (SC210018). “PCR4.” refers to the record on appeal from the successive state postconviction
appeal to the Florida Supreme Court (SC25-0497). “PCR5.” refers to the record on
appeal from the successive state postconviction appeal to the Florida Supreme Court
(SC25-0517). “PCR6.” refers to the current record on appeal. “Supp-PCR6.” refers to
the current supplemental record on appeal. “ST.” refers to the 3.811 status hearing
held on April 24, 2025. “CT.” refers to the transcript of the 3.811 motion hearing held
on April 25, 2025. All other references will be self-explanatory or otherwise explained
herein.
3
on April 25, 2025. Mr. Hutchinson and the State each presented two mental health
experts and a number of lay witnesses. The circuit court entered an order finding Mr.
Hutchinson competent to be executed on April 27, 2025. PCR6. 958-77. The order was
appealed, and the Florida Supreme Court affirmed yesterday, April 30, 2025.
Hutchinson v. State, No. SC2025-0590 (Fla. Apr. 30, 2025).
Hours later, Mr. Hutchinson filed an emergency petition for a writ of habeas
corpus in the Federal District Court for the Northern District of Florida. Hutchinson
v. Dixon, No. 4:25-cv-00205-MW. ECF. 1. Mr. Hutchinson asserted that he is not
competent to be executed, and his execution would violate the Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendments to the United States Constitution. ECF. 1. He argued that the state
court’s ruling was an unreasonable application of clearly established Supreme Court
precedent, and its findings were based on an unreasonable determination of the facts.
The district court denied the petition this morning, May 1, 2025. ECF. 5. The court
also denied a certificate of appealability (COA). ECF 5 at 5.
Mr. Hutchinson appealed to the Eleventh Circuit and filed an emergency
application for stay of execution. Hutchinson v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corr., No. 2511485-P. CA-ECF. 3, 4. The Eleventh Circuit denied hall relief without discussion
less than two hours ago. The court stated,
We construe Mr. Hutchinson’s notice of appeal as a motion for a
certificate of appealability, and after careful review, we deny the motion
because his claims are not debatable largely for the reasons set out by
the district court. See Buck v. Davis, 137 S.Ct. 759, 774 (2017). We issue
this order without further discussion due to the execution being set for
6:00 pm tonight.
Hutchinson v. Secretary, Case 25-11485 (11th Cir. May 1, 2025).
4
B.
Relevant facts
Evidence of longstanding delusional beliefs
Mr. Hutchinson’s beliefs about a government conspiracy to silence him due to
his advocacy surrounding Gulf War Illness have been a persistent part of his
delusional thought processes, spanning many years. Alison Brown, Mr. Hutchinson’s
first wife, described a stark contrast between his pre- and post-war mental state.
Brown stated that “[b]efore the war, [Mr. Hutchinson] had been a calm and mellow
guy.” PCR6. 633. Once he returned from the Gulf, “he had mood swings, and his
behavior was driven by his extreme paranoia.” PCR6. 633. Mr. Hutchinson did not
sleep due to nightmares, was irritable, and did not trust people. PCR6. 633.
Unable to cope with his paranoia, Mr. Hutchinson’s irrational thinking started
to affect his civilian life. Brown described features of his distorted reality as “men . .
. [from] Quantico [who] were ‘after him’ because of what he knew.” PCR6. 633-34.
Brown recalled that on one occasion, Mr. Hutchinson “ordered [her] and [their] son
into the car because he said that the men from Quantico had found [them]. [Mr.
Hutchinson] got his shotgun . . . . He jumped in and [they] sped away ‘so [he] could
lose their trail.’” PCR6. 634. Mr. Hutchinson believed that caution was necessary,
given “what he knew about the Gulf War—exposure to chemicals or gulf war
syndrome”—was causing the government to persecute him. PCR6. 634. Because Mr.
Hutchinson’s paranoia was so extreme, Brown “went along with him, even if [she]
knew it was not anything to be concerned about because he was so certain about what
was happening and why.” PCR6. 634.
5
Jennifer Shorts, Mr. Hutchinson’s sister, reiterated that his behavior was
driven by paranoia. PCR6. 636. Mr. Hutchinson thought someone was trying to break
into his house, and he would take different routes in public to elude the person
following him. PCR6. 636. Mr. Hutchinson believed the government was behind his
surveillance, as it was concerned about what he knew about the war and the
possibility he would expose it all. PCR6. 636.
Mr. Hutchinson’s delusions were prevalent throughout his relationship with
the victim, Renee Flaherty. He became increasingly fearful of Gulf War Illness. R.
797. He was afraid that Renee and the children were getting symptoms, and he was
infecting them. R. 797-98. Determined to spread awareness, Mr. Hutchinson posted
flyers to promote his 1-800 line. PCR4 201. 2 He continuously received hang-up calls,
which triggered his government conspiracy suspicions. PCR4 211. Mr. Hutchinson’s
paranoia heightened the week before September 11, 1998, when he saw a black van
with tinted windows driving by his house. PCR4 211. He suspected that he and his
family’s movement were being surveilled. PCR4 211.
After his arrest, Mr. Hutchinson told investigators that government operatives
may have been dispatched from Quantico to commit the murders. R. 2. Mr.
Hutchinson wrote a number of letters while awaiting trial addressed to “whom it may
concern,” seeking to bring the truth of the government’s attempts at trying to silence
him and murder his family. PCR6. 639, 641, 643-44. In one letter, Mr. Hutchinson
2 Mr. Hutchinson created a 1-800 line for sick veterans to call and posted flyers
around his community. PCR4 201.
6
stated his belief that he was being railroaded for something he did not do. PCR6. 639;
see also PCR6. 647-54.
Once in jail, Mr. Hutchinson continued his fixation on Gulf War Illness, and
how it affected him and others. Mr. Hutchinson wrote about how he and his military
team were sick and dying. PCR6. 639. He believed that Gulf War Illness was
transferable and other inmates in the jail exposed to him were getting sick. PCR6.
639; 3 see also PCR1. 1003. Mr. Hutchinson created leaflets to distribute within the
jail. PCR6. 657. He explained that he tried to tell other inmates the truth, but
Okaloosa County retaliated against him and was sweeping the whole thing under the
rug. PCR6. 639. Mr. Hutchinson noted, “I don’t honestly believe that I will not be
swept under the rug by Okaloosa County—but I do believe that they are willing to do
anything so they won’t have to defend me (A.K.A. fight the feds). I don’t think that I
will get a ‘fair’ trial unless someone important catches this germ[.]” PCR6. 659.
Mr. Hutchinson believed the conspiracy included not only the government, but
his attorneys, and the court, as well. On multiple occasions, Mr. Hutchinson stated
his attorneys were working “hand-in-hand” with the prosecution. PCR6. 641, 662,
665; see also R. 554 (trial counsel Nickolas Petersen and John Harrison moved to
withdraw because Mr. Hutchinson thought they were conspiring with the State, and
he would no longer speak to them). Mr. Hutchinson claimed his subsequent trial
3 Mr. Hutchinson believed that members of the Public Defender’s Office were given
special health insurance coverage in case they got sick as a result of exposure to the
illness. PCR6. 643.
7
counsel, Stephen Cobb, deliberately withheld exculpatory DNA evidence “to allow the
prosecution to mislead the jury with disinformation and an implausible theory of how
the crime occurred.” PCR1. 313. He believed his attorneys, the prosecutor, and the
judge all knew the DNA evidence cleared him. PCR6. 669. Mr. Hutchinson stated,
“They knew they had no evidence, no witness, no motive and that I would walk if they
didn’t ‘bend’ the rules a little.” PCR6. 669. Years later, after learning of his trial
judge’s suicide in December 2008, Mr. Hutchinson stated, “I expected a full
investigation of my case and several others[,] but the suicide note has either been
legally sealed (by the State) or swept under the proverbial rug.” PCR6. 737.
In a document written to his father in 2000, Mr. Hutchinson touched on many
facets of his delusional belief, stating the judge was taking bribes; the judge cut a
deal with crooked cops in exchange for their testimony; the judge, prosecutor, and
defense counsel conspired against him to interfere with court ordered medical tests;
witnesses were being coerced; and tapes and other evidence were being tampered
with. PCR6. 656.
Mr. Hutchinson compiled a list of those who needed to be informed of
systematic genocide that was happening “as a result of the Gulf War disease and
subsequent cover-up by the authorities that were originally developed to protect our
great country and the people who live here.” PCR6. 658. Mr. Hutchinson’s list
included Ross Perot, the World Health Organization, Amnesty International, King
Abdul Aziz, the government of Kuwait, Pope John Paul II, Judge Sid White, the
8
Reverand Jesse Jackson, and England’s Prime Minister John Major. PCR6. 658. 4
As a result of Mr. Hutchinson’s behavior, his trial counsel asked the court for
a competency determination on December 13, 2000. Cobb stated he observed multiple
specific behaviors by Mr. Hutchinson “which suggest Defendant is possibly delusional
and incompetent,” including: (1) his continuing refusal to speak with his attorney; (2)
his “unabated paranoia” regarding the defense team; (3) his paranoia of the court; (4)
his “apparently delusional statements, behavior, and actions prior to the incident at
410 John King Road in Crestview, Florida, and afterward, which resulted in the filing
of these charges, to wit; belief in a government conspiracy against him, belief in a
government cover-up regarding his medical status and the status of other Gulf War
veterans, posting of flyers concerning such a conspiracy, conversations with others
regarding such conspiracies, statements to each defense team and in the media
regarding such conspiracies, Defendant’s statements to law enforcement regarding
the events of September 11, 1998, as being part of a government conspiracy, irrational
behavior regarding self-representation, reckless, inconsistent and self-damaging
statements, actions and behaviors with regard to his legal position.” R. 1793. In a
subsequent filing, counsel stated that Mr. Hutchinson had “hallucinations or
delusions which caused [him] to honestly believe things to be facts which were not
true or real.” R. 1826.
4 In a letter to his trial counsel, Mr. Hutchinson also wanted to have the former
Speaker of the House of Representatives, Tom Foley, listed as a witness. PCR6. 676.
Mr. Hutchinson stated that Foley ordered a congressional investigation, and Mr.
Hutchinson was being retaliated against as a result of said investigation. PCR6. 676.
9
In a January 4, 2001, report, one expert (Dr. V.F. Dillon) stated that Mr.
Hutchinson did not have the capacity to disclose to his attorney pertinent facts
surrounding the offense, specifically that Mr. Hutchinson “has changed defense
counsel a number of times[;] this seems to stem from paranoia and grandiosity”; he
did not have the capacity to manifest appropriate courtroom behavior, specifically, he
“took issue with the present judge because of perceived bias and a possible
conspiracy”; and he did not have the capacity to testify relevantly, because
“grandiosity, paranoia, and delusions severely hinder this.” R. 2317-18.
During a January 5, 2001, competency hearing, Dr. Dillon testified that in “my
interview with [Mr. Hutchinson], I asked him about certain parts about what had
happened that got him into jail, and one answer that I got pretty consistent is that
there is a conspiracy. Someone had done this. He did not do this.” R. 3143. When
asked at the penalty phase if Dr. Dillon believed Mr. Hutchinson’s story that two
other men killed Renee and the children, Dr. Dillon testified, “I believe that’s what
he believes.” T. 2395.
Mr.
Hutchinson’s
delusions
continued
throughout
his
postconviction
proceedings as well. In a July 6, 2008, letter, Mr. Hutchinson stated, “[P]ut yourself
in my position, wrongfully charged for a terrible crime I did not commit, then
wrongfully convicted for it and sent to Death Row to be executed, and all along the
way being represented by lawyer[]s who are paid by the State, and are actively
helping the State to perpetuate an absolute lie, so they can execute me.” PCR6. 687
(emphasis in original). In a July 23, 2008, letter Mr. Hutchinson complained that his
10
lawyers were trying to get him killed. PCR6. 691. Mr. Hutchinson stated, “They are
the State’s hit team, and they are experts at hiding evidence of innocence.” PCR6.
691.
In a July 30, 2009, letter, Mr. Hutchinson stated, “I really wish people would
listen to me, I’ve been saying all along that he [postconviction counsel Clyde Taylor]
was working with Bobby [the prosecutor].” PCR6. 700 (emphasis in original). In a
September 2009 letter, Mr. Hutchinson stated the only thing his former
postconviction attorneys, Baya Harrison and Clyde Taylor, did was assist the
prosecutor in continuing to railroad him for a crime they knew he did not commit.
PCR6. 705; see also PCR6. 647-48 (Mr. Hutchinson stated that postconviction counsel
orchestrated a deficient evidentiary hearing with the prosecutor and trial counsel).
And in a September 26, 2011, letter Mr. Hutchinson claimed to “have evidence on
Clyde Taylor, Baya Harrison, [postconviction counsel] D. Todd Doss and several
others—that will prove fraud at the very least, and it could show these same lawyer[]s
deliberately withheld evidence and manipulated evidence too.” PCR6. 711. 5
In a 2010 letter to his brother, Mr. Hutchinson stated, “[I]f you do not hear
from me on or before January 15th[,] 2011, you will know that something has
5 Mr. Hutchinson believed the conspiracy’s reach extended to the federal courts as
well, stating in an August 8, 2009, letter that he sent documents to the federal district
court in Panama City, but the Pensacola branch, where the prosecutor in his case
knew people, “scooped up” his case instead. PCR6. 727. However, Mr. Hutchinson
believed the federal judge in Panama City “smelled a skunk,” and the case was
reassigned to Judge Smoak in Panama City, PCR6. 727, presumably to get it away
from the crooked prosecutor.
11
happened to me, you must contact the following [].” PCR6. 737. The list of people Mr.
Hutchinson wanted contacted included Tom Foley, the Inspector General, the
Governor’s office, Kevin Kline, Nancy Reagan’s office, Command Sargeant Major Jeff
Meadows, and attorney Mark Olive. PCR6. 738.
After being appointed federal counsel, Mr. Hutchinson stated in a March 5,
2015, letter, “Finally, after 16 years of wrongfully being incarcerated, I now have
lawyer[]s who are not controlled or manipulated by the state; who are actually
fighting for me.” PCR6. 719 (emphasis in original). Yet, Mr. Hutchinson’s delusional
beliefs persisted, complaining in 2020 that a secret hearing about his case was being
held in the state court. PCR6. 722. Mr. Hutchinson believed that one of his federally
appointed attorneys [Terri Backhus] along with Clyde Taylor was undermining
everything at the state level. PCR6. 704.
Mr. Hutchinson was also consumed by the notion that bank robbers were
involved in the plot, and the Government capitalized on their actions. He blamed the
FBI for withholding evidence about the bank robberies. See PCR6. 722 (“THE FBI
WITH[H]ELD THIS EVIDENCE FOR OVER 20 YEARS, SO THEY ARE JUST AS
CULPABLE AS THE STATE…AND THEY KNEW IT WOULD EXONERATE ME.”)
(emphasis in original). In a 2017 letter, Mr. Hutchinson stated that his attorney
indicated the Adamses (Deanne and Creighton) were involved from the beginning and
the prosecutor “brought them in” to target him. PCR6. 741; see also PCR6. 744 (Mr.
Hutchinson stating in a 2017 letter, “Now that we know, their 1st (attempted) bank
robbery was before September 11th, 1998, then its very likely Bobby Elmore put the
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Adams into position to develop a connection to me very early on.” (emphasis in
original).
Testimony of Mr. Hutchinson’s witnesses at the incompetency-to-be
executed hearing
The Delusional Disorder that plagued Mr. Hutchinson was witnessed by
numerous members of his postconviction legal teams throughout the years, spanning
from 2005 to the present time. The witnesses who testified at the 3.812 competency
hearing were in universal agreement of Mr. Hutchinson’s delusion: he was being
framed by the government for the murder of his family, and it was the government
who sent men to his house to commit the crimes because he was raising concerns
about Gulf War Illness. CT. at 11, 12, 22, 27-28, 61, 97, 98, 100, 111. Mr. Hutchinson
was being framed so he would be sent to death row. CT. at 16.
The delusion about the government conspiracy was consistent and Mr.
Hutchinson never wavered. CT. 116, 22-23, 61, 99, 112. The actors involved in the
conspiracy were many—state prosecutors, FBI agents, the military, the CIA, and the
judge. CT. 61, 100-01. Mr. Hutchinson even believed the prosecutor had somehow coopted his attorneys and almost all of the witnesses conspired together in order to
convict him and then keep him in prison. CT. at 29. Each witness was of the opinion
that Mr. Hutchinson truly believed his delusion. CT. at 22-23, 28, 31-32, 33, 62, 99,
112.
Mr. Hutchinson’s two mental health experts, Drs. Barry Crown and Bhushan
Agharkar, confirmed the legitimacy of his delusional beliefs, and they diagnosed him
with Delusional Disorder during their post-warrant evaluations. CT. 143, 188. Dr.
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Crown explained that a Delusional Disorder is “a fixed false belief that will not or
cannot be altered by … facts” that contradict the delusion. CT. 145. “[I]t is a
psychos[i]s, meaning that it’s a split from reality as most of us know it.” CT. 146.
Mr. Hutchinson’s Delusional Disorder is of the persecutory type. CT. 146. Mr.
Hutchinson believes that two masked bank robbers were sent by the government to
murder his girlfriend and her family. CT. 143. Thus, he believes that he is innocent
and was sent to death row as retaliation for speaking out against the government’s
activities in the Persian Gulf War. CT. 143, 184. Mr. Hutchinson’s assertion of
innocence is unique because it operates in a world detached from reality. CT. 146. It
forms the entire scope of his belief system, which has been fixed for nearly three
decades. CT. 146.
Mr. Hutchinson’s core delusion is that the United States government seeks to
silence him from exposing the truth about wartime government secrets. CT. 143, 189.
This fixed, false belief predates the 1998 crime, as evidenced in the record. Yet, as Dr.
Agharkar testified, the fact that Mr. Hutchinson has incorporated new information
into this core belief over the ensuing decades is quite typical for an individual with
Delusional Disorder:
So as he learns new information, he’s going to incorporate it. He’s trying
to understand why has this happened? Why are they against me? Or
what are they trying to do to me? So as he picks up new information, he
will weave that into the narrative because – oh, this is why. Oh, this
explains it. Or, look, here’s more evidence that they’re trying to shut me
down because they don’t want me to speak the truth. They don’t want
the stuff about the Gulf War Illness to come out.
CT. 188.
14
Based on a reasonable degree of medical certainty, Drs. Agharkar and
Crown concluded that Mr. Hutchinson is not competent to be executed. CT.
145, 158, 199. While Mr. Hutchinson understands he is going to be executed
and understands the nature and effect of the death penalty, he does not have
a rational understanding of why. CT. 156, 198-99.
REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT
THIS COURT SHOULD CONSIDER WHETHER THE STATE
COURTS UNREASONABLY APPLIED PANETTI’S “RATIONAL”
UNDERSTANDING INQUIRY
The Eighth Amendment forbids executing the insane. Ford v. Wainwright, 477
U.S. 399 (1986). A State therefore must assess and decide a condemned prisoner’s
competency to be executed before carrying out that punishment. The Ford plurality
did not articulate a competency standard, but Justice Powell in concurrence did:
“[T]he Eighth Amendment forbids the execution only of those who are unaware of the
punishment they are about to suffer and why they are to suffer it.” Id.
In Ford’s wake, the lower state and federal courts regularly applied Justice
Powell’s formulation as the governing standard for determining competency to be
executed. See, e.g., Coe v. Bell, 209 F.3d 815, 821-22, 826-27 (6th Cir. 2000) (asking
whether condemned was “aware of his imminent execution and the reason for it”).
Florida courts were among them. In close keeping with Justice Powell’s formulation,
the Florida Supreme Court held that “the Eighth Amendment only requires that
defendants be aware of the punishment they are about to suffer and why they are to
suffer it.” Provenzano v. State, 760 So. 2d 137, 140 (Fla. 2000).
15
This Court found that standard constitutionally deficient in Panetti, 551 U.S.
at 962. “Reject[ing] the standard followed by the Court of Appeals,” this Court
explained that a condemned prisoner’s mere awareness of “the State’s announced
reason for a punishment or the fact of an imminent execution” does not satisfy the
Eighth Amendment. Id. at 960, 959. The prisoner must have a “rational
understanding” of the fact of and reason for his execution. Id. at 959. As the Panetti
Court explained, whether an inmate “suffers from a severe, documented mental
illness that is the source of gross delusions preventing him from comprehending the
meaning and purpose of the punishment to which he has been sentenced” must be
considered when evaluating whether the inmate possesses the requisite rational
understanding of what will imminently befall him. Id. at 960.
Despite the clear language from Panetti, the state courts and the State’s
experts in Mr. Hutchinson’s case repeatedly applied the standard in an unreasonable
manner. They either omitted or confused the significance of “rational understanding.”
In actuality, the faulty instruction started with the Governor’s Executive Order
appointing three experts to evaluate Mr. Hutchinson. The Order stated, “The
Commission shall examine JEFFREY GLENN HUTCHINSON to determine whether
he understands the nature and effect of the death penalty and why it is to be imposed
upon him.” PCR6. 527. Thereafter, in the Commission’s April 24, 2025, response to
the Governor, the experts stated they were making the determination of “whether
Mr. Hutchinson rationally understands the nature and effect of the death penalty
and why it is to be imposed on him.” PCR6. 19. In conclusion, the Commission found
16
that Mr. Hutchinson “fully understands the nature and effect of the death penalty
and why it is to be imposed on him.” PCR6. 20.
The State’s experts continued to mangle the Panetti standard during their
testimony at the competency hearing. Dr. Werner alternated between utilizing and
omitting the “rational understanding” portion of the analysis. PCR6. 224-26. When
Dr. Werner did address it, there was no recognition that “[a] prisoner’s awareness of
the State’s rationale for an execution is not the same as a rational understanding of
it.” Panetti, 551 U.S. at 959. Instead, Dr. Werner expressed the exact opposite, stating
that Mr. Hutchinson “doesn’t agree with it, but he fully understands that he was
found guilty by a jury of his peers based on the evidence that was presented at trial.
… He fully rationally understands all of that[.] … [H]e says that he’s innocent, but
he understands . . . that he will be executed for his murder convictions.” CT. 225-26.
Thus, Dr. Werner simply inserted the word “rational” in her finding that Mr.
Hutchinson is factually aware of his impending execution.
Dr. Myers fared no better as he also utilized the old Ford “factual awareness”
standard while conflating it with the phrase “rational understanding.” Dr. Myers
stated that the standard used to find Mr. Hutchinson competent was “[does] he
understand the nature of the death penalty and why it was being imposed on him.”
CT. 249. Dr. Myers defined rational understanding as “not just parroting what
somebody’s told him. He understands exactly what he’s facing. And he’s . . . very sad
about . . . the potential loss of his future if he is executed because he’s got a lot to live
for were he to get out of prison.” CT. 281. After further clarification, Dr. Myers stated
17
he did not have any concern that Mr. Hutchinson did not rationally understand the
reason for his execution because “[h]e knows what the [death penalty] is. He knows
why it’s been imposed on him. And he’s not giving up on trying to convince anybody
who will listen that he’s not responsible for it.” CT. 281.
Following in the footsteps of the Governor and the Commission, the circuit
court likewise employed a faulty standard. 6 It held that Mr. Hutchinson “does not
meet the criteria for incompetency at the time of execution” because he (1) “does not
lack the mental capacity to understand the fact of the pending execution”; (2) “does
not lack the mental capacity to understand the reason for the pending execution”; and
(3) “understands that his execution is imminent and the reason why he is to be
executed.” PCR6. 975-76.
Like the State’s experts, when the circuit court did insert the “rational
understanding” language, it utilized it in an inappropriate manner. The circuit court
stated that if it were to find Mr. Hutchinson has Delusional Disorder, “there is no
evidence that that mental illness interferes in any way with his ‘rational
understanding’ of the fact of his pending execution and the reason for it.” PCR6. 975.
The circuit court found that Mr. Hutchinson is “rational” because he “is aware that
the State is executing him for the murders that were committed and that he will
physically die as a result of the execution.” PCR6. 975. It concluded that “[t]here is
no credible evidence that in his current mental state Mr. Hutchinson believes himself
6 The circuit court found “the testimony and opinions of Dr. Werner, Dr. Myers and
Dr. Lazarou both credible and compelling as it relates to Mr. Hutchinson’s current
mental condition or lack thereof.” PCR6. 974.
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unable to die or that he is being executed for any reason other than the murderers he
was convicted of by a jury of his peers.” PCR6. 975. The circuit court failed to
understand that knowledge of your pending death and conviction is not enough to
meet a “rational understanding” under Panetti.
Rather than correcting the unreasonable application of Panetti, the Florida
Supreme Court wholly endorsed the distorted analysis of its predecessors. After citing
to the standard set forth in Panetti and Madison, the Florida Supreme Court
erroneously found that the lower court “stated and applied the correct legal standards
in determining that Hutchinson was sane or competent to be executed.” Hutchinson,
No. SC2025-0590, slip op. at 9. The Florida Supreme Court relied on the fact that the
lower court cited to Owen v. State, 363 So. 3d 1025 (Fla. 2023), and it “indirectly
quoted” principles from Panetti and Madison. Id. In finding that the lower court’s
determinations were supported by legally sufficient evidence, the Florida Supreme
Court concluded:
Hutchinson’s steadfast refusal to take responsibility for his
actions aside, it is clear from the record that Hutchinson understands
and fully comprehends the following: Renee and her three children were
brutally murdered; the evidence against him was great, a jury of his
peers found him guilty; he was sentenced to death in a court of law; the
sentence of death will be executed upon him for those crimes; and he will
die as a result of the execution.
Hutchinson, No. SC2025-0590, slip op. at 13 (emphasis in original).
Upon review of the state courts’ determinations, the district court conducted
no analysis of the Panetti standard. Instead, the court stated in conclusory fashion
that “the state trial court applied the correct standard,” and the Florida Supreme
19
Court did “not misapply federal law in refusing to weigh the [expert] testimony on
appeal.” ECF. 5 at 3. The Eleventh Circuit on appeal gave even less consideration,
issuing its denial “without further discussion due to the execution being at 6:00 pm
tonight.” Hutchinson, Case 25-11485 at 1.
Contrary to the district court’s minimal ruling, the Florida Supreme Court’s
determination constitutes an unreasonable application of clearly established federal
law. Under Panetti, the Eighth Amendment requires a condemned inmate to not only
have a factual understanding of the death penalty and the reasons for it, but also a
rational understanding of the purpose of the punishment unaffected by delusional
beliefs. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Banks, 29 A.3d 1129, 1145-46 (Pa. 2011) (applying
Panetti and concluding that although the defendant “recognize[d] his responsibility
for most of the murders,” “underst[ood] that he was sentenced to death,” and
“appear[ed] to understand what the execution entails and . . . that he would die as a
result of it,” the defendant “had a significant number of fixed delusions relating to his
crime and punishment” that precluded any finding that he had a “rational
understanding of the death penalty or the reasons for it”).
As with the Governor, the Commission, and the circuit court, the Florida
Supreme Court made no attempt to discern, as Panetti requires, whether the record
also supports a conclusion that Mr. Hutchinson possesses a rational understanding
that he is to be killed because he has been convicted of murder, rather than, as he
believes, because there is a government conspiracy to silence him. This error is
abundantly clear when compared to the factual findings on which the Fifth Circuit
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relied in Panetti: “First, [Panetti] is aware that he committed the murders; second, he
is aware that he will be executed; and third, he is aware that the reason the State
has given for the execution is his commission of the crimes in question.” Panetti, 551
U.S. at 956 (citing Panetti v. Dretke, 448 F.3d at 817). The facts cited by the Florida
Supreme Court fall even further short of establishing Mr. Hutchinson’s “rational
understanding” of his impending execution than those on which the Fifth Circuit
relied.
In light of the unreasonable application of Panetti by the Florida Supreme
Court—and every state actor before it—de novo review should be conducted, and Mr.
Hutchinson should be found incompetent to be executed. The only experts who opined
on whether Mr. Hutchinson has a “rational understanding” within the meaning of
Panetti were Drs. Crown and Agharkar. They affirmatively stated that Mr.
Hutchinson does not.
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CONCLUSION
The Court should grant the petition for a writ of certiorari and review the
decision of the Eleventh Circuit.
Respectfully submitted,
/s/ Sean Gunn
SEAN T. GUNN
Counsel of Record
LAURA B. SILVA
MAUREEN BLENNERHASSETT
Capital Habeas Unit
Federal Public Defender
Northern District of Florida
227 North Bronough St., Suite 4200
Tallahassee, Florida 32301
(850) 942-8818
sean_gunn@fd.org
Counsel for Petitioner
MAY 1, 2025
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This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.