Amicus Curiae Brief — Diamond Alternative Energy, LLC, et al., Petitioners v. Environmental Protection Agency, et al.

Supreme Court briefMar 19, 2025

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No. 24-7

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States



DIAMOND ALTERNATIVE ENERGY, LLC

et al.,

Petitioners,

v.

ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY

et al.,



Respondents.

On Writ of Certiorari to the

United States Court of Appeals for the

District of Columbia Circuit



BRIEF OF AMICI INTERNATIONAL COUNCIL ON

CLEAN TRANSPORTATION AND THE

UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, DAVIS INSTITUTE

OF TRANSPORTATION STUDIES

IN SUPPORT OF RESPONDENTS



MATTHEW D. ZINN

Counsel of Record

SHANTHI CHACKALACKAL

SHUTE, MIHALY &

WEINBERGER LLP

396 Hayes Street

San Francisco, CA 94102

(415) 552-7272

zinn@smwlaw.com

i

TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE OF CONTENTS ............................................. i

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ...................................... ii

INTERESTS OF AMICI CURIAE ..............................1

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT.....................................2

ARGUMENT ...............................................................3

I.

The challenged regulation in fact did

not have the effect that Petitioners

claim was “predictable” or “obvious.” .........3

A.

California’s Advanced Clean Cars

program supported early electric

vehicle development and

deployment, but manufacturers

quickly over-complied. ...........................6

B.

By 2022, manufacturers were

producing and selling far more

electric vehicles than ACC required. ....9

C.

Private-sector innovation—not the

requirements of ACC—was

primarily responsible for California’s

robust electric vehicle market in

2022. .....................................................11

CONCLUSION ..........................................................17

ii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases

Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife,

504 U.S. 555 (1992) ......................................... 4

Murthy v. Missouri,

603 U.S. 43 (2024) ........................................... 4

Federal Regulations

84 Fed. Reg. 51,310 (Sep. 27, 2019) ........................... 9

State Regulations

Cal. Code Regs. tit. 13, § 1962.1 (2023) ..................... 8

Cal. Code Regs. tit. 13, § 1962.2 (2023) ..................... 7

Other Authorities

Alliance for Automotive Innovation, Get

Connected: Electric Vehicle Quarterly

Report – Fourth Quarter (2022) .................... 15

Anh Bui et al., Evaluating Electric Vehicle

Market Growth Across U.S. Cities 15

(2021) ............................................................. 14

Anne C. Mulkern, EV Buyers Face Long

Waits, Price Hikes Above Sticker Costs,

E&E News by Politico (Mar. 4, 2022) ........... 13

Argonne National Laboratory, Light Duty

Electric Drive Vehicles Monthly Sales

Updates – Historical Data (2025) ................. 15

iii

California Air Resources Board, Annual ZEV

Credits Disclosure Dashboard, ................. 7, 10

California Air Resources Board, California’s

Advanced Clean Cars Midterm Review,

Appendix A: Analysis of Zero Emission

Vehicle Regulation Compliance

Scenario (2017) .............................................. 12

California Air Resources Board, Low Carbon

Fuel Standard (Feb. 2025), ............................. 7

California Air Resources Board, Staff Report:

Initial Statement of Reasons: Advanced

Clean Cars – 2012 Proposed

Amendments to the California Zero

Emission Vehicle Program Regulations

(2011), .............................................................. 6

California Air Resources Board, States that

Have Adopted California’s Vehicle

Regulations (Jun. 2024) ................................ 15

California Clean Vehicle Rebate Project,

Rebate Dashboards: Rebate Statistics .......... 14

Chang Shen et al., The Global Automaker

Rating 2022: Who is Leading the

Transition to Electric Vehicles? (2023), ........ 17

Daniel Sperling & Anthony Eggert,

California’s Climate and Energy Policy

for Transportation, 5 Energy Strategy

Reviews, 88-94 (Dec. 2014) ............................. 8

International Energy Agency, Global EV

Outlook 2024. Trends in Electric Cars

(2024) ............................................................. 13

It Ain’t What You Don’t Know That Gets You

Into Trouble. It’s What You Know for

Sure That Just Ain’t So,

Quote Investigator (Nov. 18, 2018) ................. 3

iv

Lithium-Ion Battery Pack Prices Hit Record

Low of $139/kWh, Bloomberg New

Energy Finance (Nov. 26, 2023) .................... 12

Nic Lutsey, ICCT, Modernizing Vehicle

Regulations for Electrification (Oct. 21,

2018)............................................................... 16

Notable and Quotable: Milton Friedman, The

Wall Street Journal (Oct. 6, 2015) .................. 5

Paul Lienert, Exclusive: Automakers to Double

Spending on EVs, Batteries to $1.2

trillion by 2030, Reuters (Oct. 25, 2022) ...... 16

Robert N. Stavins, What Can We Learn from

the Grand Policy Experiment? Lessons

from SO₂ Allowance Trading, 12 J.

Econ. Perspectives 69 (1998)........................... 7

Roland Irle, Global EV Sales for 2022, EVVolumes (Feb. 6, 2023) .................................. 16

Sydney Vergis & Vishal K. Mehta, Technology

Innovation and Policy: A Case Study of

the California ZEV Mandate, in PAVING

THE ROAD TO SUSTAINABLE TRANSPORT

136-58 (2012) ................................................... 7

Tom Taylor et al., Tracking the State of U.S.

EV Manufacturing (2025) ............................. 17

1

INTERESTS OF AMICI CURIAE 1

Amici are the International Council on Clean

Transportation (“ICCT”) and the University of California, Davis Institute of Transportation Studies

(“ITS-Davis”).

ICCT is an independent nonprofit organization

that provides internationally recognized technical research and analysis to policymakers. ICCT staff

members have authored or co-authored more than 68

reports and studies analyzing existing conditions,

technological feasibility, and policy updates related to

the development of greenhouse gas standards and

other transportation-sector standards in the United

States.

ITS-Davis is one of the world’s leading academic

research centers focused on sustainable transportation and energy. It employs some of the foremost

experts on the integration of electric vehicles into the

U.S. electricity system, and its Electric Vehicle Research Center has conducted extensive empirical

studies on electric vehicle deployment. ITS-Davis is

uniquely positioned to aid the Court in evaluating the

impacts of the challenged regulation and understanding the current state of zero-emission vehicle

technology in California.

This amicus brief is intended to assist the Court

by discussing the challenged regulation, its impact on

the California automobile sector, and the state of

Pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 37.6, no counsel for a party

authored this brief in whole or part, and no party or their counsel

made a monetary contribution intended to fund the preparation

or submission of this brief. No person other than amici, their

members, or their counsel made a monetary contribution intended to fund this brief’s preparation or submission.

1

2

zero-emission vehicle technology during the period

covered by the regulation. The brief will also demonstrate that Petitioners’ arguments rest on mistaken

assumptions about the state of the market and the

impact, or lack thereof, of the regulation in 2022.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

In some cases, it may be that a regulated entity’s

response to the end of regulation is a “predictable”

increase in the previously proscribed or limited

conduct. In those cases, that response may well be

“common sense” or “obvious,” as Petitioners insist.

But this is not such a case. Here, through a

combination of California’s early efforts to encourage

development of electric vehicles, a remarkable

efflorescence of innovation by the automobile

industry, and a surge in consumer demand for those

vehicles, California’s zero-emission-vehicle regulation

had ceased to play a meaningful role in the

automobile market by the time Petitioners filed suit

in 2022.

The question presented focuses solely on “the

coercive and predictable effects of regulation on third

parties.” As Amici will show, when Petitioners filed

suit—ten years after California adopted its

regulations—those regulations no longer had a

coercive effect on the automobile industry.

Accordingly, even if in an appropriate case “a party

may establish the redressability component of Article

III standing by relying on” such coercive, third-party

effects, Petitioners could not have done so here even

if they had tried.

California may have given the industry a push in

2012, and one might have called its regulation

coercive at the time. But the industry reacted in ways

3

wholly unforeseen by regulators. Private-sector

innovation over the subsequent ten years,

particularly in increasing the range of electric

vehicles, meant that, by 2022, industry was selling far

more zero-emission vehicles, and those vehicles were

traveling much farther on a charge, than California

required. Given the industry’s voluntary and

dramatic overcompliance, it is “obvious” and “common

sense” to conclude that any court order invalidating

the Clean Air Act preemption waiver on which

California’s program depends would have no effect on

the manufacturers’ production of zero-emission

vehicles or the liquid-fuel vehicles that Petitioners

prefer. Petitioners therefore lack standing to press

their claims under these unusual circumstances.

ARGUMENT

I.

The challenged regulation in fact did not

have the effect that Petitioners claim

was “predictable” or “obvious.”

It ain’t what you don’t know that gets you into trouble.

It’s what you know for sure that just ain’t so. 2

Petitioners insist that the court of appeals improperly demanded evidence of the effects of EPA’s

preemption waiver on automakers’ behavior when

those effects were “predictable,” and that “commonsense inferences” should have sufficed. Pet. Br.

30. But while common sense may be sufficient in some

cases to show the impacts of regulation on regulated

2

Often attributed, probably incorrectly, to Mark Twain. It Ain’t

What You Don’t Know That Gets You Into Trouble. It’s What You

Know for Sure That Just Ain’t So, Quote Investigator (Nov. 18,

2018), https://quoteinvestigator.com/2018/11/18/know-trouble/.

4

third parties, the unique facts of this case make such

impacts far from predictable.

As with each element of Article III standing, a

plaintiff must establish redressability “as of the time

[plaintiff] brought th[e] lawsuit”—here, 2022. Murthy

v. Missouri, 603 U.S. 43, 58 (2024); Pet. App. 15a.

Where redressability “hinge[s] on the response” of

regulated third parties not before the court, “it becomes the burden of the plaintiff to adduce facts

showing that those choices . . . will be made in such

manner as to produce causation and permit redressability of injury.” Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S.

555, 562 (1992). Here, as the court below correctly

concluded, a favorable order could mitigate Petitioners’ alleged injury only if, as of 2022, it would have

caused manufacturers to sell more vehicles powered

with liquid fuel instead of electric vehicles. Pet. App.

22a.

That the automobile manufacturers would respond in this way, Petitioners repeatedly insist, is

“obvious,” “predictable,” and “common sense,” a matter of “basic economics.” E.g., Pet. Br. 30, 34, 36. If

EPA’s waiver were vacated in 2022 and California’s

regulation could no longer compel manufacturers to

produce more electric vehicles, Petitioners contend,

the manufacturers would produce and sell more vehicles that run on liquid fuel. This, Petitioners claim, is

“Economics 101.” Pet. Br. 35.

Freshman-year economic theory does not resolve

the standing issue here. To be sure, in some cases,

regulated third parties may predictably modify their

behavior when no longer subject to regulation. But

this case is far from typical. As the following sections

demonstrate, rescinding EPA’s waiver—and the California regulations that depend on it—would not

5

redress Petitioners’ injuries because California’s regulations are not to blame for the injury they assert:

the “depression of demand” for their products. Pet. Br.

20-21. Petitioners’ actual quarrel is not with California regulators or EPA, but with the automobile

market itself.

In the years since California first introduced the

regulations, electric vehicle technology has far outpaced regulators’ expectations. As the court of appeals

observed, for several years, manufacturers have been

selling more zero-emission vehicles (“ZEVs”) than the

regulations require. Pet. App. 28a. By 2022, the industry

had

so

out-performed

California’s

requirements that the regulations had no effect on

manufacturers’ sale of ZEVs.

That reducing sales of liquid-fuel-powered vehicles

was the regulation’s “raison d’être,” Pet. Br. 24, is irrelevant. As economist Milton Friedman once

observed, “[o]ne of the great mistakes is to judge policies and programs by their intentions rather than

their results.” 3 In 2012, California regulators aspired

to push the development and sales of ZEVs, but market forces quickly and entirely overtook what turned

out to be modest regulatory goals.

Petitioners could not create a record that shows a

favorable decision would benefit them because market conditions show exactly the opposite. In the

parlance of the question presented, the effect of the

challenged regulation here may have been predictable, but it was not what Petitioners predicted, and it

Notable and Quotable: Milton Friedman, The Wall Street Journal (Oct. 6, 2015) https://www.wsj.com/articles/notable-quotablemilton-friedman-1444169267.

3

6

was not coercive. Petitioners therefore cannot show

redressability on the unusual facts of this case.

A.

California’s Advanced Clean Cars

program supported early electric

vehicle development and

deployment, but manufacturers

quickly over-complied.

In 2012, California adopted the Advanced Clean

Cars (“ACC”) program that was the subject of the

Clean Air Act preemption waiver challenged here.

Aimed at accelerating innovation, curbing tailpipe

emissions, and improving public health, ACC includes

ZEV regulations, low-emission-vehicle standards, and

greenhouse-gas-emission standards for light-duty vehicles in model years 2017 through 2025. The

industry thus had five years of lead time before the

first year of regulatory requirements and more for

later model years. 4

ACC’s ZEV program establishes a credit-and-trading system, a market-based regulatory approach that

allows covered manufacturers to earn credits for each

qualifying vehicle sold and bank or trade those credits

with other manufacturers. 5 Manufacturers earn credCalifornia Air Resources Board, Staff Report: Initial Statement

of Reasons: Advanced Clean Cars – 2012 Proposed Amendments

to the California Zero Emission Vehicle Program Regulations

(2011),

https://ww2.arb.ca.gov/sites/default/files/barcu/regact/2012/zev2012/zevisor.pdf.

4

Market-based regulatory tools—including cap-and-trade systems, credit trading, and pollution taxes—harness economic

incentives to allow regulated entities to find their own cost-effective compliance pathways. Their adoption began with the sulfur

dioxide emissions trading program in the 1990 Clean Air Act

5

7

its based on the electric-driving range of the vehicles

they sell. From model year 2018 onward, they earn

one ZEV credit for every 50 miles of all-electric range,

up to a maximum of four credits per vehicle. 6 The program required manufacturers to collectively hold

89,316 credits in 2018, rising to 287,609 credits by

2023. 7

Vehicles with greater electric ranges earn higher

credits. For example, the 2022 Mazda MX-30, with an

electric range of 92 miles in combined city and highway driving, qualified for 2.01 credits per vehicle sold.

In contrast, models that offered significantly greater

all-electric ranges, such as Teslas, received the maximum of four credits per vehicle. 8

Amendments signed by President George H.W. Bush. That program showed that market-based approaches could often achieve

environmental objectives at lower cost than conventional regulation. See Robert N. Stavins, What Can We Learn from the

Grand Policy Experiment? Lessons from SO₂ Allowance Trading,

12 J. Econ. Perspectives 69, 69-71 (1998), https://pubs.aeaweb.org/doi/pdfplus/10.1257/jep.12.3.69 (finding that the SO2

trading program “resulted in cost savings of up to $1 billion annually” compared to command-and-control alternatives).

Cal. Code Regs. tit. 13, § 1962.2 (2023); California Air Resources Board, Annual ZEV Credits Disclosure Dashboard,

https://ww2.arb.ca.gov/applications/annual-zev-credits-disclosure-dashboard (last visited Mar. 13, 2025) [hereinafter ZEV

Dashboard]; California Air Resources Board, Low Carbon Fuel

Standard (Feb. 2025), https://ww2.arb.ca.gov/our-work/programs/low-carbon-fuel-standard.

6

ZEV Dashboard, supra note 6; Sydney Vergis & Vishal K. Mehta, Technology Innovation and Policy: A Case Study of the

California ZEV Mandate, in PAVING THE ROAD TO SUSTAINABLE

TRANSPORT 136-58 (2012); Cal. Code Regs. tit. 13, § 1962.2

(2023).

7

8

ZEV Dashboard, supra note 6.

8

Manufacturers may meet their compliance obligations in a given year in various ways. Beyond selling

vehicles that generate credits, they can use banked

surplus credits from prior years or purchase credits

from other manufacturers that have generated surplus credits. Companies with strong ZEV portfolios

can thus profit from overcompliance. 9

In the first few years after ACC’s 2012 adoption,

the regulations prompted automakers to make significant investments in research and pilot programs for

ZEVs. 10 But even at that time, ACC was not the sole

driver of ZEV development. Other local, national, and

global policies and market developments worked in

tandem with ACC to create a strong ZEV market. At

the same time, uncertainty in petroleum markets and

pressure on manufacturers to emerge as market leaders further pushed companies to produce more

electric vehicles. 11

As a result, numerous automakers set ambitious

electric vehicle sales targets and accelerated development of low-emission technologies, collectively

transforming the electric vehicle market. 12 By 2014—

three years before the program’s requirements became effective—automakers were already slightly

over-complying with the regulations. 13 That trend

would increase dramatically in 2021 and beyond.

9

Cal. Code Regs. tit. 13, § 1962.1 (2023).

Daniel Sperling & Anthony Eggert, California’s Climate and

Energy Policy for Transportation, 5 Energy Strategy Reviews,

88-94 (Dec. 2014), https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2211467X14000418.

10

11

ZEV Dashboard, supra note 6.

12

Id.

13

Id.

9

B.

By 2022, manufacturers were

producing and selling far more

electric vehicles than ACC

required.

By 2022, automakers had far outpaced both ACC’s

requirements and the regulators’ expectations. 14 Even

after EPA temporarily withdrew the waiver in 2019, 15

electric vehicle sales continued to grow.

Figure 1: Annual ZEV Credits 2014-2023 16

Figure 1 illustrates the rapidly increasing gap between ACC’s ZEV credit requirements and the credits

automakers received for selling vehicles. In 2014, automakers slightly exceeded ACC’s requirements,

ending the year with a 386,907-credit surplus. By

2022, automakers had exceeded the ZEV credit requirements by 2,888,594 credits. In other words,

automakers produced and sold vastly more electric

14

Id.

See Safer Affordable Fuel-Efficient (SAFE) Vehicles Rule Part

One: One National Program, 84 Fed. Reg. 51,310 (Sep. 27, 2019).

15

16

Id.

10

vehicles than ACC required. This gap has only continued to expand since 2022. 17

Using the California Air Resources Board’s annual

sales and annual credit reports, Amici estimated the

gap between the regulators’ estimated total market

share of electric vehicles required by ACC and actual

market shares. The divergence between the two is

shown here in Figure 2. While the estimated required

market share increased gradually from two percent in

2018 to just under five percent in 2023, actual sales

grew dramatically faster.

ZEV Requirements and Market Share

30%

25%

20%

15%

10%

5%

0%

2018

2019

ZEV market share

2020

2021

2022

2023

ACC I Required ZEV Share

Figure 2: Actual vs. Estimated Required Market Share

of Electric Vehicles 18

17

Id.

Amici’s estimates are based on actual ZEV sales, not forecasts,

and thus differ from earlier estimates, such as a 2013 projection

that electric vehicles would need to comprise 15 percent of the

market by 2025 to comply with ACC. See State Resp. Br. 19.

Amici’s estimates consider the credits required each year divided

by the actual sales in that same year to estimate the required

market share under ACC. For example, in 2021, ACC required

18

11

By 2021, electric vehicle sales had already surpassed ten percent of the California market and

reached about 16 percent of the market in 2022, significantly outpacing the regulatory targets. 19 And

most of those electric vehicles sold were each generating the maximum of four ZEV credits under ACC. In

2022, 77 percent of new electric vehicle sales in California earned maximum credits. Excluding plug-in

hybrids, that number rises to 92 percent of ZEV

sales. 20

In short, by 2022, California’s electric vehicle market had left ACC’s requirements far behind. At that

point, the regulation was not pushing manufacturers

to produce electric vehicles in lieu of liquid-fuel-powered vehicles.

C.

Private-sector innovation—not the

requirements of ACC—was

primarily responsible for

California’s robust electric vehicle

market in 2022.

ACC played a key role in creating the certainty

necessary to encourage development of the electric vehicle market. But after the initial impetus of ACC in

its early years, it was market forces, not regulation,

that drove the rapid advancements in electric vehicle

sales in California. Automakers made unexpected

242,585 credits, translating to a requirement of 75,403 total electric vehicle sales. Divided by the number of actual vehicle sales

in 2021—1,710,555—this results in a required market share of

4.41 percent. Actual electric vehicle sales in 2021, however,

reached 172,905, equivalent to a market share of 10.11 percent.

By 2023, electric vehicles had exceeded 20 percent of the California market. Id.

19

20

Id.

12

technological strides, resulting in plummeting battery costs. These factors, interacting with the

structure of the ZEV regulation and surging consumer demand, led to the industry’s massive

overcompliance. 21

Electric-vehicle and battery technologies have improved much faster than California regulators could

possibly have anticipated. From 2013 to 2020, global

volume-weighted average prices for lithium-ion battery packs plummeted from $780/kWh to $160/kWh

and then decreased further to $139/kWh by 2023. 22

Greater production volumes, a greater range of

models available to consumers, and technological improvements in battery-energy density led to lower

costs, reduced prices, and longer-range electric vehicles than regulators expected. Indeed, in its 2017

Midterm Review, the California Air Resources Board

acknowledged that, compared to its expectations in

2012, technology had developed much more rapidly

and much more capable electric vehicles had become

available. 23 The International Energy Agency identified approximately 590 electric vehicle models being

produced globally in 2023 and found that the global

sales-weighted average range of battery-electric cars

California Air Resources Board, California’s Advanced Clean

Cars Midterm Review, Appendix A: Analysis of Zero Emission

Vehicle

Regulation

Compliance

Scenario

(2017),

https://ww2.arb.ca.gov/sites/default/files/2020-01/appendix_a_minimum_zev_regulation_compliance_scenarios_formatt

ed_ac.pdf [hereinafter 2017 Midterm Review].

21

Lithium-Ion Battery Pack Prices Hit Record Low of $139/kWh,

Bloomberg New Energy Finance (Nov. 26, 2023),

https://about.bnef.com/blog/lithium-ion-battery-pack-prices-hitrecord-low-of-139-kwh/.

22

23

2017 Midterm Review, supra note 21

13

had increased by 75 percent from 2015 to 2023, commensurate with a sharply narrowing price gap

between electric and liquid-fuel-powered vehicles. 24

As noted above, the ACC ZEV regulation allocates

credits to manufacturers based on the all-electric

range of vehicles sold—a direct function of battery capacity. Enormous innovation in battery technology

and manufacturing between the adoption of ACC in

2012 and the first regulated model year of 2017 meant

that ZEVs were generating far more credits than regulators anticipated when they adopted the program.

That innovation caused the dramatic overcompliance

depicted above—overcompliance that has only accelerated with time. See Fig. 1, supra.

Consumer demand had also skyrocketed by 2022,

motivated in large part by a combination of California’s policies, industry innovation, and technological

advancements in electric vehicle performance, range,

and model availability. 25 By early 2022, surging

global demand for electric vehicles had exceeded supply. Media reports highlighted instances of dealership

markups and bidding wars among buyers eager to secure an electric vehicle. 26

California has had numerous fiscal, non-fiscal,

and charging infrastructure policies unrelated to ACC

International Energy Agency, Global EV Outlook 2024. Trends

in Electric Cars (2024), https://www.iea.org/reports/global-evoutlook-2024/trends-in-electric-cars.

24

Demand for electric vehicles also arises from their inherent

benefits, such as reduced emissions and lower operating costs.

26

Anne C. Mulkern, EV Buyers Face Long Waits, Price Hikes

Above Sticker Costs, E&E News by Politico (Mar. 4, 2022),

https://www.eenews.net/articles/ev-buyers-face-long-waitsprice-hikes-above-sticker-cost/.

25

14

that have also encouraged electric vehicle sales. 27 For

instance, California provides rebates for new electricvehicle purchases, carpool lane access and parking

benefits for electric vehicles, funding and direct deployment of charging infrastructure, utility rebates

for charging infrastructure, and lower electricity

rates for electric vehicle charging. 28 California has issued over 590,000 rebates totaling approximately

$1.5 billion for purchases of new electric vehicles. 29 A

2021 study found that California cities tended to have

34 to 44 different electric vehicle promotion policies

across state, city, and utility programs, and that these

policies led to increased electric vehicles sales. California cities also tended to have the most public and

workplace electric vehicle charging infrastructure deployed of all U.S. states. 30

This increase in electric vehicle sales and adoption

has not been unique to California, further demonstrating that ACC could not be responsible for the

industry’s expansion of electric-vehicle production.

Domestic trends outside California also show a rapidly growing electric-vehicle market. In the United

States, 930,000 new electric vehicles were sold in

2022, representing around 6.8 percent of new light-

Anh Bui et al., Evaluating Electric Vehicle Market Growth

Across U.S. Cities 15 (2021), https://theicct.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/12/ev-us-market-growth-cities-sept21_0.pdf.

27

28

Id.

California Clean Vehicle Rebate Project, Rebate Dashboards:

Rebate Statistics, https://cleanvehiclerebate.org/en/rebate-statistics (last visited Mar. 17, 2025).

29

30

Bui, supra note 27, at 4-7, 11-12.

15

duty vehicle sales and an increase of about 46 percent

from 2021 sales. 31

Robust electric-vehicle sales in states without

ACC confirm that ACC was not the catalyst for such

sales by 2022. In that year, sales of electric vehicles

as a share of total vehicle sales exceeded the 4.8 percent share estimated to be required by ACC in 12

states without ACC: Washington, Nevada, Colorado,

Hawaii, Virginia, Utah, Arizona, Illinois, Florida,

Delaware, Georgia, and North Carolina. 32 See Section

I.B & Fig. 2, supra.

That the markets in states without ACC have also

seen electric-vehicle sales that exceed ACC’s requirements confirms that California’s strong electricvehicle market in 2022 cannot be attributed to the

ZEV regulation, but rather was part of a broader

trend driven by market forces.

Finally, global trends confirm that, by 2022, the

explosive growth of the electric-vehicle market was

not attributable to ACC. More than 10.5 million new

electric vehicles were sold globally in 2022—an increase of approximately 55 percent from 2021 sales—

bringing the total number of electric vehicles in oper-

Argonne National Laboratory, Light Duty Electric Drive Vehicles Monthly Sales Updates – Historical Data (2025),

https://www.anl.gov/esia/reference/light-duty-electric-drive-vehicles-monthly-sales-updates-historical-data.

31

Alliance for Automotive Innovation, Get Connected: Electric

Vehicle Quarterly Report – Fourth Quarter (2022),

https://www.autosinnovate.org/posts/papers-reports/Get%20Connected%202022%20Q4%20Electric%20Vehicle

%20Report.pdf; see also California Air Resources Board, States

that Have Adopted California’s Vehicle Regulations (Jun. 2024)

https://ww2.arb.ca.gov/our-work/programs/advanced-clean-carsprogram/states-have-adopted-californias-vehicle-regulations.

32

16

ation to around 27 million. 33 In 2022, industry players

also announced increasing electric vehicle investments, model availability, and sales targets. In

October 2022, global automakers reported planned investments of nearly $1.2 trillion through 2030 in

electric vehicles and batteries—nearly double the

level of investment reported in 2021. 34

A 2018 analysis by Amicus ICCT found that automaker projections for electric vehicle sales through

2024 exceeded electric vehicle sales required by government regulations by about 50 percent. 35 Since

then, automakers have announced an increasing

number of electric vehicle production plans. By 2022,

global automakers had collectively forecast plans to

manufacture 54 million battery-electric vehicles annually by 2030. 36 Separately, a 2023 ICCT report

rating the electric-vehicle progress by global automakers through 2022 identified more than a dozen

automakers that had 100 percent electric-vehicle

sales targets by 2035 or earlier, either globally or in

leading markets. 37 An additional dozen companies

Roland Irle, Global EV Sales for 2022, EV-Volumes (Feb. 6,

2023), https://ev-volumes.com/news/ev/global-ev-sales-for-2022/.

33

Paul Lienert, Exclusive: Automakers to Double Spending on

EVs, Batteries to $1.2 trillion by 2030, Reuters (Oct. 25, 2022),

https://www.reuters.com/technology/exclusive-automakers-double-spending-evs-batteries-12-trillion-by-2030-2022-10-21/.

34

Nic Lutsey, ICCT, Modernizing Vehicle Regulations for Electrification (Oct. 21, 2018),

https://theicct.org/publication/modernizing-vehicle-regulationsfor-electrification/.

35

Lienert, supra note 34.

This included General Motors, Ford, Stellantis, MercedesBenz, Audi, Bentley, Volvo, Jaguar, Land Rover, and Mini. See

36

37

17

had electric-vehicle sales targets ranging from 25 percent to 80 percent of their total sales by 2035 or

earlier. 38

* * *

California regulators in 2012 undoubtedly intended ACC to increase the pace of electric vehicle

sales and development in California. And it may have

been effective in doing so, by initially pushing the industry to invest in ZEV technology. But the market

quickly outgrew the regulations. The unprecedented

scale of private sector innovation in ZEV technology

since 2012 has led automobile manufacturers to dramatically over-comply with the regulation. Far from

exerting a coercive effect on manufacturers, ACC has

lagged behind them. By 2022, the industry had so outperformed California’s requirements that ACC had

virtually no effect on the market.

CONCLUSION

The judgment of the court of appeals should be affirmed.

Chang Shen et al., The Global Automaker Rating 2022: Who is

Leading the Transition to Electric Vehicles? (2023),

https://theicct.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/05/The-Global-Automaker-Rating-2022_final.pdf.

See Tom Taylor et al., Tracking the State of U.S. EV Manufacturing

(2025),

https://atlaspolicy.com/wpcontent/uploads/2025/01/Tracking-the-State-of-U.S.-EV-Manufacturing.pdf.

38

18

Respectfully submitted,

MATTHEW D. ZINN

Counsel of Record

SHANTHI CHACKALACKAL

SHUTE, MIHALY & WEINBERGER LLP

396 Hayes Street

San Francisco, CA 94102

(415) 552-7272

zinn@smwlaw.com

March 19, 2025

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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