Amicus Curiae Brief — Diamond Alternative Energy, LLC, et al., Petitioners v. Environmental Protection Agency, et al.
Supreme Court briefMar 19, 2025
Ask Donna
What actually matters in this document.
Text
No. 24-7
IN THE
Supreme Court of the United States
DIAMOND ALTERNATIVE ENERGY, LLC
et al.,
Petitioners,
v.
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY
et al.,
Respondents.
On Writ of Certiorari to the
United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit
BRIEF OF AMICI INTERNATIONAL COUNCIL ON
CLEAN TRANSPORTATION AND THE
UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, DAVIS INSTITUTE
OF TRANSPORTATION STUDIES
IN SUPPORT OF RESPONDENTS
MATTHEW D. ZINN
Counsel of Record
SHANTHI CHACKALACKAL
SHUTE, MIHALY &
WEINBERGER LLP
396 Hayes Street
San Francisco, CA 94102
(415) 552-7272
zinn@smwlaw.com
i
TABLE OF CONTENTS
TABLE OF CONTENTS ............................................. i
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ...................................... ii
INTERESTS OF AMICI CURIAE ..............................1
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT.....................................2
ARGUMENT ...............................................................3
I.
The challenged regulation in fact did
not have the effect that Petitioners
claim was “predictable” or “obvious.” .........3
A.
California’s Advanced Clean Cars
program supported early electric
vehicle development and
deployment, but manufacturers
quickly over-complied. ...........................6
B.
By 2022, manufacturers were
producing and selling far more
electric vehicles than ACC required. ....9
C.
Private-sector innovation—not the
requirements of ACC—was
primarily responsible for California’s
robust electric vehicle market in
2022. .....................................................11
CONCLUSION ..........................................................17
ii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases
Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife,
504 U.S. 555 (1992) ......................................... 4
Murthy v. Missouri,
603 U.S. 43 (2024) ........................................... 4
Federal Regulations
84 Fed. Reg. 51,310 (Sep. 27, 2019) ........................... 9
State Regulations
Cal. Code Regs. tit. 13, § 1962.1 (2023) ..................... 8
Cal. Code Regs. tit. 13, § 1962.2 (2023) ..................... 7
Other Authorities
Alliance for Automotive Innovation, Get
Connected: Electric Vehicle Quarterly
Report – Fourth Quarter (2022) .................... 15
Anh Bui et al., Evaluating Electric Vehicle
Market Growth Across U.S. Cities 15
(2021) ............................................................. 14
Anne C. Mulkern, EV Buyers Face Long
Waits, Price Hikes Above Sticker Costs,
E&E News by Politico (Mar. 4, 2022) ........... 13
Argonne National Laboratory, Light Duty
Electric Drive Vehicles Monthly Sales
Updates – Historical Data (2025) ................. 15
iii
California Air Resources Board, Annual ZEV
Credits Disclosure Dashboard, ................. 7, 10
California Air Resources Board, California’s
Advanced Clean Cars Midterm Review,
Appendix A: Analysis of Zero Emission
Vehicle Regulation Compliance
Scenario (2017) .............................................. 12
California Air Resources Board, Low Carbon
Fuel Standard (Feb. 2025), ............................. 7
California Air Resources Board, Staff Report:
Initial Statement of Reasons: Advanced
Clean Cars – 2012 Proposed
Amendments to the California Zero
Emission Vehicle Program Regulations
(2011), .............................................................. 6
California Air Resources Board, States that
Have Adopted California’s Vehicle
Regulations (Jun. 2024) ................................ 15
California Clean Vehicle Rebate Project,
Rebate Dashboards: Rebate Statistics .......... 14
Chang Shen et al., The Global Automaker
Rating 2022: Who is Leading the
Transition to Electric Vehicles? (2023), ........ 17
Daniel Sperling & Anthony Eggert,
California’s Climate and Energy Policy
for Transportation, 5 Energy Strategy
Reviews, 88-94 (Dec. 2014) ............................. 8
International Energy Agency, Global EV
Outlook 2024. Trends in Electric Cars
(2024) ............................................................. 13
It Ain’t What You Don’t Know That Gets You
Into Trouble. It’s What You Know for
Sure That Just Ain’t So,
Quote Investigator (Nov. 18, 2018) ................. 3
iv
Lithium-Ion Battery Pack Prices Hit Record
Low of $139/kWh, Bloomberg New
Energy Finance (Nov. 26, 2023) .................... 12
Nic Lutsey, ICCT, Modernizing Vehicle
Regulations for Electrification (Oct. 21,
2018)............................................................... 16
Notable and Quotable: Milton Friedman, The
Wall Street Journal (Oct. 6, 2015) .................. 5
Paul Lienert, Exclusive: Automakers to Double
Spending on EVs, Batteries to $1.2
trillion by 2030, Reuters (Oct. 25, 2022) ...... 16
Robert N. Stavins, What Can We Learn from
the Grand Policy Experiment? Lessons
from SO₂ Allowance Trading, 12 J.
Econ. Perspectives 69 (1998)........................... 7
Roland Irle, Global EV Sales for 2022, EVVolumes (Feb. 6, 2023) .................................. 16
Sydney Vergis & Vishal K. Mehta, Technology
Innovation and Policy: A Case Study of
the California ZEV Mandate, in PAVING
THE ROAD TO SUSTAINABLE TRANSPORT
136-58 (2012) ................................................... 7
Tom Taylor et al., Tracking the State of U.S.
EV Manufacturing (2025) ............................. 17
1
INTERESTS OF AMICI CURIAE 1
Amici are the International Council on Clean
Transportation (“ICCT”) and the University of California, Davis Institute of Transportation Studies
(“ITS-Davis”).
ICCT is an independent nonprofit organization
that provides internationally recognized technical research and analysis to policymakers. ICCT staff
members have authored or co-authored more than 68
reports and studies analyzing existing conditions,
technological feasibility, and policy updates related to
the development of greenhouse gas standards and
other transportation-sector standards in the United
States.
ITS-Davis is one of the world’s leading academic
research centers focused on sustainable transportation and energy. It employs some of the foremost
experts on the integration of electric vehicles into the
U.S. electricity system, and its Electric Vehicle Research Center has conducted extensive empirical
studies on electric vehicle deployment. ITS-Davis is
uniquely positioned to aid the Court in evaluating the
impacts of the challenged regulation and understanding the current state of zero-emission vehicle
technology in California.
This amicus brief is intended to assist the Court
by discussing the challenged regulation, its impact on
the California automobile sector, and the state of
Pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 37.6, no counsel for a party
authored this brief in whole or part, and no party or their counsel
made a monetary contribution intended to fund the preparation
or submission of this brief. No person other than amici, their
members, or their counsel made a monetary contribution intended to fund this brief’s preparation or submission.
1
2
zero-emission vehicle technology during the period
covered by the regulation. The brief will also demonstrate that Petitioners’ arguments rest on mistaken
assumptions about the state of the market and the
impact, or lack thereof, of the regulation in 2022.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
In some cases, it may be that a regulated entity’s
response to the end of regulation is a “predictable”
increase in the previously proscribed or limited
conduct. In those cases, that response may well be
“common sense” or “obvious,” as Petitioners insist.
But this is not such a case. Here, through a
combination of California’s early efforts to encourage
development of electric vehicles, a remarkable
efflorescence of innovation by the automobile
industry, and a surge in consumer demand for those
vehicles, California’s zero-emission-vehicle regulation
had ceased to play a meaningful role in the
automobile market by the time Petitioners filed suit
in 2022.
The question presented focuses solely on “the
coercive and predictable effects of regulation on third
parties.” As Amici will show, when Petitioners filed
suit—ten years after California adopted its
regulations—those regulations no longer had a
coercive effect on the automobile industry.
Accordingly, even if in an appropriate case “a party
may establish the redressability component of Article
III standing by relying on” such coercive, third-party
effects, Petitioners could not have done so here even
if they had tried.
California may have given the industry a push in
2012, and one might have called its regulation
coercive at the time. But the industry reacted in ways
3
wholly unforeseen by regulators. Private-sector
innovation over the subsequent ten years,
particularly in increasing the range of electric
vehicles, meant that, by 2022, industry was selling far
more zero-emission vehicles, and those vehicles were
traveling much farther on a charge, than California
required. Given the industry’s voluntary and
dramatic overcompliance, it is “obvious” and “common
sense” to conclude that any court order invalidating
the Clean Air Act preemption waiver on which
California’s program depends would have no effect on
the manufacturers’ production of zero-emission
vehicles or the liquid-fuel vehicles that Petitioners
prefer. Petitioners therefore lack standing to press
their claims under these unusual circumstances.
ARGUMENT
I.
The challenged regulation in fact did not
have the effect that Petitioners claim
was “predictable” or “obvious.”
It ain’t what you don’t know that gets you into trouble.
It’s what you know for sure that just ain’t so. 2
Petitioners insist that the court of appeals improperly demanded evidence of the effects of EPA’s
preemption waiver on automakers’ behavior when
those effects were “predictable,” and that “commonsense inferences” should have sufficed. Pet. Br.
30. But while common sense may be sufficient in some
cases to show the impacts of regulation on regulated
2
Often attributed, probably incorrectly, to Mark Twain. It Ain’t
What You Don’t Know That Gets You Into Trouble. It’s What You
Know for Sure That Just Ain’t So, Quote Investigator (Nov. 18,
2018), https://quoteinvestigator.com/2018/11/18/know-trouble/.
4
third parties, the unique facts of this case make such
impacts far from predictable.
As with each element of Article III standing, a
plaintiff must establish redressability “as of the time
[plaintiff] brought th[e] lawsuit”—here, 2022. Murthy
v. Missouri, 603 U.S. 43, 58 (2024); Pet. App. 15a.
Where redressability “hinge[s] on the response” of
regulated third parties not before the court, “it becomes the burden of the plaintiff to adduce facts
showing that those choices . . . will be made in such
manner as to produce causation and permit redressability of injury.” Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S.
555, 562 (1992). Here, as the court below correctly
concluded, a favorable order could mitigate Petitioners’ alleged injury only if, as of 2022, it would have
caused manufacturers to sell more vehicles powered
with liquid fuel instead of electric vehicles. Pet. App.
22a.
That the automobile manufacturers would respond in this way, Petitioners repeatedly insist, is
“obvious,” “predictable,” and “common sense,” a matter of “basic economics.” E.g., Pet. Br. 30, 34, 36. If
EPA’s waiver were vacated in 2022 and California’s
regulation could no longer compel manufacturers to
produce more electric vehicles, Petitioners contend,
the manufacturers would produce and sell more vehicles that run on liquid fuel. This, Petitioners claim, is
“Economics 101.” Pet. Br. 35.
Freshman-year economic theory does not resolve
the standing issue here. To be sure, in some cases,
regulated third parties may predictably modify their
behavior when no longer subject to regulation. But
this case is far from typical. As the following sections
demonstrate, rescinding EPA’s waiver—and the California regulations that depend on it—would not
5
redress Petitioners’ injuries because California’s regulations are not to blame for the injury they assert:
the “depression of demand” for their products. Pet. Br.
20-21. Petitioners’ actual quarrel is not with California regulators or EPA, but with the automobile
market itself.
In the years since California first introduced the
regulations, electric vehicle technology has far outpaced regulators’ expectations. As the court of appeals
observed, for several years, manufacturers have been
selling more zero-emission vehicles (“ZEVs”) than the
regulations require. Pet. App. 28a. By 2022, the industry
had
so
out-performed
California’s
requirements that the regulations had no effect on
manufacturers’ sale of ZEVs.
That reducing sales of liquid-fuel-powered vehicles
was the regulation’s “raison d’être,” Pet. Br. 24, is irrelevant. As economist Milton Friedman once
observed, “[o]ne of the great mistakes is to judge policies and programs by their intentions rather than
their results.” 3 In 2012, California regulators aspired
to push the development and sales of ZEVs, but market forces quickly and entirely overtook what turned
out to be modest regulatory goals.
Petitioners could not create a record that shows a
favorable decision would benefit them because market conditions show exactly the opposite. In the
parlance of the question presented, the effect of the
challenged regulation here may have been predictable, but it was not what Petitioners predicted, and it
Notable and Quotable: Milton Friedman, The Wall Street Journal (Oct. 6, 2015) https://www.wsj.com/articles/notable-quotablemilton-friedman-1444169267.
3
6
was not coercive. Petitioners therefore cannot show
redressability on the unusual facts of this case.
A.
California’s Advanced Clean Cars
program supported early electric
vehicle development and
deployment, but manufacturers
quickly over-complied.
In 2012, California adopted the Advanced Clean
Cars (“ACC”) program that was the subject of the
Clean Air Act preemption waiver challenged here.
Aimed at accelerating innovation, curbing tailpipe
emissions, and improving public health, ACC includes
ZEV regulations, low-emission-vehicle standards, and
greenhouse-gas-emission standards for light-duty vehicles in model years 2017 through 2025. The
industry thus had five years of lead time before the
first year of regulatory requirements and more for
later model years. 4
ACC’s ZEV program establishes a credit-and-trading system, a market-based regulatory approach that
allows covered manufacturers to earn credits for each
qualifying vehicle sold and bank or trade those credits
with other manufacturers. 5 Manufacturers earn credCalifornia Air Resources Board, Staff Report: Initial Statement
of Reasons: Advanced Clean Cars – 2012 Proposed Amendments
to the California Zero Emission Vehicle Program Regulations
(2011),
https://ww2.arb.ca.gov/sites/default/files/barcu/regact/2012/zev2012/zevisor.pdf.
4
Market-based regulatory tools—including cap-and-trade systems, credit trading, and pollution taxes—harness economic
incentives to allow regulated entities to find their own cost-effective compliance pathways. Their adoption began with the sulfur
dioxide emissions trading program in the 1990 Clean Air Act
5
7
its based on the electric-driving range of the vehicles
they sell. From model year 2018 onward, they earn
one ZEV credit for every 50 miles of all-electric range,
up to a maximum of four credits per vehicle. 6 The program required manufacturers to collectively hold
89,316 credits in 2018, rising to 287,609 credits by
2023. 7
Vehicles with greater electric ranges earn higher
credits. For example, the 2022 Mazda MX-30, with an
electric range of 92 miles in combined city and highway driving, qualified for 2.01 credits per vehicle sold.
In contrast, models that offered significantly greater
all-electric ranges, such as Teslas, received the maximum of four credits per vehicle. 8
Amendments signed by President George H.W. Bush. That program showed that market-based approaches could often achieve
environmental objectives at lower cost than conventional regulation. See Robert N. Stavins, What Can We Learn from the
Grand Policy Experiment? Lessons from SO₂ Allowance Trading,
12 J. Econ. Perspectives 69, 69-71 (1998), https://pubs.aeaweb.org/doi/pdfplus/10.1257/jep.12.3.69 (finding that the SO2
trading program “resulted in cost savings of up to $1 billion annually” compared to command-and-control alternatives).
Cal. Code Regs. tit. 13, § 1962.2 (2023); California Air Resources Board, Annual ZEV Credits Disclosure Dashboard,
https://ww2.arb.ca.gov/applications/annual-zev-credits-disclosure-dashboard (last visited Mar. 13, 2025) [hereinafter ZEV
Dashboard]; California Air Resources Board, Low Carbon Fuel
Standard (Feb. 2025), https://ww2.arb.ca.gov/our-work/programs/low-carbon-fuel-standard.
6
ZEV Dashboard, supra note 6; Sydney Vergis & Vishal K. Mehta, Technology Innovation and Policy: A Case Study of the
California ZEV Mandate, in PAVING THE ROAD TO SUSTAINABLE
TRANSPORT 136-58 (2012); Cal. Code Regs. tit. 13, § 1962.2
(2023).
7
8
ZEV Dashboard, supra note 6.
8
Manufacturers may meet their compliance obligations in a given year in various ways. Beyond selling
vehicles that generate credits, they can use banked
surplus credits from prior years or purchase credits
from other manufacturers that have generated surplus credits. Companies with strong ZEV portfolios
can thus profit from overcompliance. 9
In the first few years after ACC’s 2012 adoption,
the regulations prompted automakers to make significant investments in research and pilot programs for
ZEVs. 10 But even at that time, ACC was not the sole
driver of ZEV development. Other local, national, and
global policies and market developments worked in
tandem with ACC to create a strong ZEV market. At
the same time, uncertainty in petroleum markets and
pressure on manufacturers to emerge as market leaders further pushed companies to produce more
electric vehicles. 11
As a result, numerous automakers set ambitious
electric vehicle sales targets and accelerated development of low-emission technologies, collectively
transforming the electric vehicle market. 12 By 2014—
three years before the program’s requirements became effective—automakers were already slightly
over-complying with the regulations. 13 That trend
would increase dramatically in 2021 and beyond.
9
Cal. Code Regs. tit. 13, § 1962.1 (2023).
Daniel Sperling & Anthony Eggert, California’s Climate and
Energy Policy for Transportation, 5 Energy Strategy Reviews,
88-94 (Dec. 2014), https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2211467X14000418.
10
11
ZEV Dashboard, supra note 6.
12
Id.
13
Id.
9
B.
By 2022, manufacturers were
producing and selling far more
electric vehicles than ACC
required.
By 2022, automakers had far outpaced both ACC’s
requirements and the regulators’ expectations. 14 Even
after EPA temporarily withdrew the waiver in 2019, 15
electric vehicle sales continued to grow.
Figure 1: Annual ZEV Credits 2014-2023 16
Figure 1 illustrates the rapidly increasing gap between ACC’s ZEV credit requirements and the credits
automakers received for selling vehicles. In 2014, automakers slightly exceeded ACC’s requirements,
ending the year with a 386,907-credit surplus. By
2022, automakers had exceeded the ZEV credit requirements by 2,888,594 credits. In other words,
automakers produced and sold vastly more electric
14
Id.
See Safer Affordable Fuel-Efficient (SAFE) Vehicles Rule Part
One: One National Program, 84 Fed. Reg. 51,310 (Sep. 27, 2019).
15
16
Id.
10
vehicles than ACC required. This gap has only continued to expand since 2022. 17
Using the California Air Resources Board’s annual
sales and annual credit reports, Amici estimated the
gap between the regulators’ estimated total market
share of electric vehicles required by ACC and actual
market shares. The divergence between the two is
shown here in Figure 2. While the estimated required
market share increased gradually from two percent in
2018 to just under five percent in 2023, actual sales
grew dramatically faster.
ZEV Requirements and Market Share
30%
25%
20%
15%
10%
5%
0%
2018
2019
ZEV market share
2020
2021
2022
2023
ACC I Required ZEV Share
Figure 2: Actual vs. Estimated Required Market Share
of Electric Vehicles 18
17
Id.
Amici’s estimates are based on actual ZEV sales, not forecasts,
and thus differ from earlier estimates, such as a 2013 projection
that electric vehicles would need to comprise 15 percent of the
market by 2025 to comply with ACC. See State Resp. Br. 19.
Amici’s estimates consider the credits required each year divided
by the actual sales in that same year to estimate the required
market share under ACC. For example, in 2021, ACC required
18
11
By 2021, electric vehicle sales had already surpassed ten percent of the California market and
reached about 16 percent of the market in 2022, significantly outpacing the regulatory targets. 19 And
most of those electric vehicles sold were each generating the maximum of four ZEV credits under ACC. In
2022, 77 percent of new electric vehicle sales in California earned maximum credits. Excluding plug-in
hybrids, that number rises to 92 percent of ZEV
sales. 20
In short, by 2022, California’s electric vehicle market had left ACC’s requirements far behind. At that
point, the regulation was not pushing manufacturers
to produce electric vehicles in lieu of liquid-fuel-powered vehicles.
C.
Private-sector innovation—not the
requirements of ACC—was
primarily responsible for
California’s robust electric vehicle
market in 2022.
ACC played a key role in creating the certainty
necessary to encourage development of the electric vehicle market. But after the initial impetus of ACC in
its early years, it was market forces, not regulation,
that drove the rapid advancements in electric vehicle
sales in California. Automakers made unexpected
242,585 credits, translating to a requirement of 75,403 total electric vehicle sales. Divided by the number of actual vehicle sales
in 2021—1,710,555—this results in a required market share of
4.41 percent. Actual electric vehicle sales in 2021, however,
reached 172,905, equivalent to a market share of 10.11 percent.
By 2023, electric vehicles had exceeded 20 percent of the California market. Id.
19
20
Id.
12
technological strides, resulting in plummeting battery costs. These factors, interacting with the
structure of the ZEV regulation and surging consumer demand, led to the industry’s massive
overcompliance. 21
Electric-vehicle and battery technologies have improved much faster than California regulators could
possibly have anticipated. From 2013 to 2020, global
volume-weighted average prices for lithium-ion battery packs plummeted from $780/kWh to $160/kWh
and then decreased further to $139/kWh by 2023. 22
Greater production volumes, a greater range of
models available to consumers, and technological improvements in battery-energy density led to lower
costs, reduced prices, and longer-range electric vehicles than regulators expected. Indeed, in its 2017
Midterm Review, the California Air Resources Board
acknowledged that, compared to its expectations in
2012, technology had developed much more rapidly
and much more capable electric vehicles had become
available. 23 The International Energy Agency identified approximately 590 electric vehicle models being
produced globally in 2023 and found that the global
sales-weighted average range of battery-electric cars
California Air Resources Board, California’s Advanced Clean
Cars Midterm Review, Appendix A: Analysis of Zero Emission
Vehicle
Regulation
Compliance
Scenario
(2017),
https://ww2.arb.ca.gov/sites/default/files/2020-01/appendix_a_minimum_zev_regulation_compliance_scenarios_formatt
ed_ac.pdf [hereinafter 2017 Midterm Review].
21
Lithium-Ion Battery Pack Prices Hit Record Low of $139/kWh,
Bloomberg New Energy Finance (Nov. 26, 2023),
https://about.bnef.com/blog/lithium-ion-battery-pack-prices-hitrecord-low-of-139-kwh/.
22
23
2017 Midterm Review, supra note 21
13
had increased by 75 percent from 2015 to 2023, commensurate with a sharply narrowing price gap
between electric and liquid-fuel-powered vehicles. 24
As noted above, the ACC ZEV regulation allocates
credits to manufacturers based on the all-electric
range of vehicles sold—a direct function of battery capacity. Enormous innovation in battery technology
and manufacturing between the adoption of ACC in
2012 and the first regulated model year of 2017 meant
that ZEVs were generating far more credits than regulators anticipated when they adopted the program.
That innovation caused the dramatic overcompliance
depicted above—overcompliance that has only accelerated with time. See Fig. 1, supra.
Consumer demand had also skyrocketed by 2022,
motivated in large part by a combination of California’s policies, industry innovation, and technological
advancements in electric vehicle performance, range,
and model availability. 25 By early 2022, surging
global demand for electric vehicles had exceeded supply. Media reports highlighted instances of dealership
markups and bidding wars among buyers eager to secure an electric vehicle. 26
California has had numerous fiscal, non-fiscal,
and charging infrastructure policies unrelated to ACC
International Energy Agency, Global EV Outlook 2024. Trends
in Electric Cars (2024), https://www.iea.org/reports/global-evoutlook-2024/trends-in-electric-cars.
24
Demand for electric vehicles also arises from their inherent
benefits, such as reduced emissions and lower operating costs.
26
Anne C. Mulkern, EV Buyers Face Long Waits, Price Hikes
Above Sticker Costs, E&E News by Politico (Mar. 4, 2022),
https://www.eenews.net/articles/ev-buyers-face-long-waitsprice-hikes-above-sticker-cost/.
25
14
that have also encouraged electric vehicle sales. 27 For
instance, California provides rebates for new electricvehicle purchases, carpool lane access and parking
benefits for electric vehicles, funding and direct deployment of charging infrastructure, utility rebates
for charging infrastructure, and lower electricity
rates for electric vehicle charging. 28 California has issued over 590,000 rebates totaling approximately
$1.5 billion for purchases of new electric vehicles. 29 A
2021 study found that California cities tended to have
34 to 44 different electric vehicle promotion policies
across state, city, and utility programs, and that these
policies led to increased electric vehicles sales. California cities also tended to have the most public and
workplace electric vehicle charging infrastructure deployed of all U.S. states. 30
This increase in electric vehicle sales and adoption
has not been unique to California, further demonstrating that ACC could not be responsible for the
industry’s expansion of electric-vehicle production.
Domestic trends outside California also show a rapidly growing electric-vehicle market. In the United
States, 930,000 new electric vehicles were sold in
2022, representing around 6.8 percent of new light-
Anh Bui et al., Evaluating Electric Vehicle Market Growth
Across U.S. Cities 15 (2021), https://theicct.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/12/ev-us-market-growth-cities-sept21_0.pdf.
27
28
Id.
California Clean Vehicle Rebate Project, Rebate Dashboards:
Rebate Statistics, https://cleanvehiclerebate.org/en/rebate-statistics (last visited Mar. 17, 2025).
29
30
Bui, supra note 27, at 4-7, 11-12.
15
duty vehicle sales and an increase of about 46 percent
from 2021 sales. 31
Robust electric-vehicle sales in states without
ACC confirm that ACC was not the catalyst for such
sales by 2022. In that year, sales of electric vehicles
as a share of total vehicle sales exceeded the 4.8 percent share estimated to be required by ACC in 12
states without ACC: Washington, Nevada, Colorado,
Hawaii, Virginia, Utah, Arizona, Illinois, Florida,
Delaware, Georgia, and North Carolina. 32 See Section
I.B & Fig. 2, supra.
That the markets in states without ACC have also
seen electric-vehicle sales that exceed ACC’s requirements confirms that California’s strong electricvehicle market in 2022 cannot be attributed to the
ZEV regulation, but rather was part of a broader
trend driven by market forces.
Finally, global trends confirm that, by 2022, the
explosive growth of the electric-vehicle market was
not attributable to ACC. More than 10.5 million new
electric vehicles were sold globally in 2022—an increase of approximately 55 percent from 2021 sales—
bringing the total number of electric vehicles in oper-
Argonne National Laboratory, Light Duty Electric Drive Vehicles Monthly Sales Updates – Historical Data (2025),
https://www.anl.gov/esia/reference/light-duty-electric-drive-vehicles-monthly-sales-updates-historical-data.
31
Alliance for Automotive Innovation, Get Connected: Electric
Vehicle Quarterly Report – Fourth Quarter (2022),
https://www.autosinnovate.org/posts/papers-reports/Get%20Connected%202022%20Q4%20Electric%20Vehicle
%20Report.pdf; see also California Air Resources Board, States
that Have Adopted California’s Vehicle Regulations (Jun. 2024)
https://ww2.arb.ca.gov/our-work/programs/advanced-clean-carsprogram/states-have-adopted-californias-vehicle-regulations.
32
16
ation to around 27 million. 33 In 2022, industry players
also announced increasing electric vehicle investments, model availability, and sales targets. In
October 2022, global automakers reported planned investments of nearly $1.2 trillion through 2030 in
electric vehicles and batteries—nearly double the
level of investment reported in 2021. 34
A 2018 analysis by Amicus ICCT found that automaker projections for electric vehicle sales through
2024 exceeded electric vehicle sales required by government regulations by about 50 percent. 35 Since
then, automakers have announced an increasing
number of electric vehicle production plans. By 2022,
global automakers had collectively forecast plans to
manufacture 54 million battery-electric vehicles annually by 2030. 36 Separately, a 2023 ICCT report
rating the electric-vehicle progress by global automakers through 2022 identified more than a dozen
automakers that had 100 percent electric-vehicle
sales targets by 2035 or earlier, either globally or in
leading markets. 37 An additional dozen companies
Roland Irle, Global EV Sales for 2022, EV-Volumes (Feb. 6,
2023), https://ev-volumes.com/news/ev/global-ev-sales-for-2022/.
33
Paul Lienert, Exclusive: Automakers to Double Spending on
EVs, Batteries to $1.2 trillion by 2030, Reuters (Oct. 25, 2022),
https://www.reuters.com/technology/exclusive-automakers-double-spending-evs-batteries-12-trillion-by-2030-2022-10-21/.
34
Nic Lutsey, ICCT, Modernizing Vehicle Regulations for Electrification (Oct. 21, 2018),
https://theicct.org/publication/modernizing-vehicle-regulationsfor-electrification/.
35
Lienert, supra note 34.
This included General Motors, Ford, Stellantis, MercedesBenz, Audi, Bentley, Volvo, Jaguar, Land Rover, and Mini. See
36
37
17
had electric-vehicle sales targets ranging from 25 percent to 80 percent of their total sales by 2035 or
earlier. 38
* * *
California regulators in 2012 undoubtedly intended ACC to increase the pace of electric vehicle
sales and development in California. And it may have
been effective in doing so, by initially pushing the industry to invest in ZEV technology. But the market
quickly outgrew the regulations. The unprecedented
scale of private sector innovation in ZEV technology
since 2012 has led automobile manufacturers to dramatically over-comply with the regulation. Far from
exerting a coercive effect on manufacturers, ACC has
lagged behind them. By 2022, the industry had so outperformed California’s requirements that ACC had
virtually no effect on the market.
CONCLUSION
The judgment of the court of appeals should be affirmed.
Chang Shen et al., The Global Automaker Rating 2022: Who is
Leading the Transition to Electric Vehicles? (2023),
https://theicct.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/05/The-Global-Automaker-Rating-2022_final.pdf.
See Tom Taylor et al., Tracking the State of U.S. EV Manufacturing
(2025),
https://atlaspolicy.com/wpcontent/uploads/2025/01/Tracking-the-State-of-U.S.-EV-Manufacturing.pdf.
38
18
Respectfully submitted,
MATTHEW D. ZINN
Counsel of Record
SHANTHI CHACKALACKAL
SHUTE, MIHALY & WEINBERGER LLP
396 Hayes Street
San Francisco, CA 94102
(415) 552-7272
zinn@smwlaw.com
March 19, 2025
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.