Respondents Brief — Diamond Alternative Energy, LLC, et al., Petitioners v. Environmental Protection Agency, et al.

No. 24-7

In the Supreme Court of the United States

DIAMOND ALTERNATIVE ENERGY, LLC, ET AL.,

PETITIONERS

v.

ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, ET AL.

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI

TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

BRIEF FOR THE FEDERAL RESPONDENTS

JAMES PAYNE

Acting General Counsel

KYLE DURCH

Attorney

Environmental Protection

Agency

Washington, D.C. 20004

SARAH M. HARRIS

Acting Solicitor General

Counsel of Record

ADAM R.F. GUSTAFSON

Acting Assistant Attorney

General

MALCOLM L. STEWART

Deputy Solicitor General

MATTHEW GUARNIERI

Assistant to the Solicitor

General

ERIC G. HOSTETLER

SUE CHEN

Attorneys

Department of Justice

Washington, D.C. 20530-0001

SupremeCtBriefs@usdoj.gov

(202) 514-2217

QUESTION PRESENTED

The Clean Air Act (CAA), 42 U.S.C. 7401 et seq., generally preempts state laws that regulate emissions from

new motor vehicles, but the CAA directs the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to waive preemption

for California laws under specified conditions. See 42

U.S.C. 7543(a) and (b). In 2013, EPA issued a waiver to

allow California to impose certain vehicle-emissions

standards. EPA partially withdrew that waiver in 2019

but reinstated it in 2022. Petitioners, who had not challenged the 2013 waiver, challenged EPA’s 2022 reinstatement decision. The court of appeals determined

that petitioners lack standing. This Court granted a petition for a writ of certiorari limited to the following

question, as stated in the petition:

Whether a party may establish the redressability

component of Article III standing by relying on the coercive and predictable effects of regulation on third parties. Pet. I.

(I)

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

Opinion below ................................................................................ 1

Jurisdiction .................................................................................... 1

Statutory provisions involved ...................................................... 1

Introduction................................................................................... 1

Statement:

A. Statutory background ..................................................... 5

B. The Advanced Clean Car program ................................ 7

C. The present controversy ................................................. 9

D. Subsequent developments ............................................ 13

Summary of argument ............................................................... 15

Argument:

Petitioners failed to create a record showing that their

asserted injuries would likely be redressed if EPA’s

2022 reinstatement of its 2013 waiver were held to be

invalid...................................................................................... 19

A. Because Article III requires the party invoking a

federal court’s jurisdiction to prove redressability,

petitioners’ proposed categorical rule is unsound ...... 20

1. Article III demands more than mere

speculation when a party’s theory of standing

relies on future conduct by a third party .............. 21

2. Petitioners were not exempt from making the

case-specific showing of proof required by

Article III ................................................................. 23

B. On the particular record here, petitioners failed

to carry their burden of demonstrating

redressability ................................................................. 29

1. Petitioners failed to adduce the affirmative

evidence required to prove standing in this

case ........................................................................... 30

2. Attorney argument cannot substitute for the

record evidence that petitioners failed to

adduce ....................................................................... 38

(III)

IV

Table of Contents—Continued:

Page

3. Petitioners’ policy arguments are irrelevant

and unsound ............................................................. 43

C. The court of appeals’ error regarding the duration

of the waiver was harmless ........................................... 45

Conclusion ................................................................................... 47

Appendix — Statutory provisions........................................... 1a

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases:

Association of Data Processing Serv. Orgs., Inc. v.

Camp, 397 U.S. 150 (1970) ................................................. 42

Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154 (1997)....................... 16, 24-26

CBS, Inc. v. United States, 316 U.S. 407 (1942) ........... 26, 27

California v. Texas, 593 U.S. 659 (2021) ............................. 42

Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U.S. 398 (2013) .......... 22

DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332 (2006) ........ 28

Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168 (1986) ....................... 39

Davis v. FEC, 554 U.S. 724 (2008) .................................. 23

Department of Commerce v. New York,

588 U.S. 752 (2019)............................................ 18, 21, 39, 40

Energy Future Coalition v. EPA,

793 F.3d 141 (D.C. Cir. 2015) ....................................... 27, 28

Engine Mfrs. Ass’n v. EPA,

88 F.3d 1075 (D.C. Cir. 1996) ........................................... 6, 7

FDA v. Alliance for Hippocratic Medicine,

602 U.S. 367 (2024)........................................................ 28, 42

Grupo Dataflux v. Atlas Global Group, L.P.,

541 U.S. 567 (2004) ....................................................... 23

Haaland v. Brackeen, 599 U.S. 255 (2023) ................... 22, 42

Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife,

504 U.S. 555 (1992)..................3, 11, 19, 21-23, 27, 30, 36, 43

Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007) ....................... 41

V

Cases—Continued:

Page

Murthy v. Missouri,

603 U.S. 43 (2024) .................................. 19, 21, 22, 28, 42, 44

National Credit Union Admin. v. First Nat’l Bank

& Trust Co., 522 U.S. 479 (1998) ....................................... 42

New York v. United States Department of

Commerce, 351 F. Supp. 3d 502 (S.D.N.Y.),

aff ’d in part, rev’d in part, remanded,

588 U.S. 752 (2019) .......................................................... 39

Pierce v. Society of the Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) .... 26, 27

Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 578 U.S. 330 (2016) ........................ 19

Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t,

523 U.S. 83 (1998) ............................................................... 43

Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus,

573 U.S. 149 (2014) ....................................................... 29

TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, 594 U.S. 413 (2021) ........... 28

United States v. Texas, 599 U.S. 670 (2023) ....................... 42

Uzuegbunam v. Preczewski, 592 U.S. 279 (2021) ............... 43

Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149 (1990) ....................... 23

Constitution, statutes, and regulations:

U.S. Const. Art. III ........... 3, 10, 15, 18, 20, 21, 23, 25, 26, 28,

29, 37, 40, 42-44, 46, 47

§ 2 ...................................................................................... 19

Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. 7401 et seq. ..................................... 1

Tit. II .................................................................................. 5

42 U.S.C. 7401(b)(1) .......................................................... 5

42 U.S.C. 7521-7590........................................................... 5

42 U.S.C. 7521(a) (§ 202(a)) ...................................... 30, 2a

42 U.S.C. 7521(a)(1) ..................................................... 5, 2a

42 U.S.C. 7522 .................................................................. 30

42 U.S.C. 7522(a)(1) ............................................... 5, 27, 3a

VI

Statutes and regulations—Continued:

Page

42 U.S.C. 7523 .............................................................. 5, 7a

42 U.S.C. 7523(b) ......................................................... 1, 7a

42 U.S.C. 7524(a) ......................................................... 5, 7a

42 U.S.C. 7543(a) (§ 209(a)) .................................. 6, 30, 9a

42 U.S.C. 7543(b) (§ 209(b)) ................. 2, 6, 8, 9, 13, 30, 9a

42 U.S.C. 7543(b)(1) .................................................... 6, 9a

42 U.S.C. 7543(b)(1)(A)-(C) ................................ 6, 9a, 10a

42 U.S.C. 7543(b)(1)(B) ............................................... 8, 9a

42 U.S.C. 7550 .................................................................... 5

42 U.S.C. 7607(b)(1) .......................................................... 9

Congressional Review Act, 5 U.S.C. 801 et seq. ................. 15

5 U.S.C. 801(b)(2) ............................................................ 15

Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. 1531

et seq. .................................................................................... 24

Energy Policy and Conservation Act,

42 U.S.C. 32919(a) ................................................................. 8

Exec. Order. No. 14,154, 90 Fed. Reg. 8353

(Jan. 29, 2025):

§ 1, 90 Fed. Reg. 8353 ..................................................... 14

§ 2(e), 90 Fed. Reg. 8353 ............................................. 2, 14

§ 3(a), 90 Fed. Reg. 8354 ................................................. 14

Cal. Code Regs. tit. 13 (2024):

§ 1961.3(a)(1)(A)................................................................. 7

§ 1962.2(a)......................................................................... 14

§ 1962.4(a)(1) .................................................................... 14

§ 1962.4(c)(B) ................................................................... 14

VII

Miscellaneous:

Page

EPA, News Release, Trump EPA to Transmit

California Waivers to Congress in Accordance

with Statutory Reporting Requirements

(Feb. 14, 2025) ..................................................................... 15

78 Fed. Reg. 2112 (Jan. 9, 2013) ....................................... 7, 37

84 Fed. Reg. 51,310 (Sept. 27, 2019) ...................................... 8

86 Fed. Reg. 74,434 (Dec. 30, 2021) ....................................... 9

87 Fed. Reg. 14,332 (Mar. 14, 2022) ....................................... 9

89 Fed. Reg. 27,842 (Apr. 18, 2024) ..................................... 13

90 Fed. Reg. 642 (Jan. 6, 2025) ............................................. 13

H.R. Rep. No. 728, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967) ................... 7

Minnesota Pollution Control Agency, Statement of

Need and Reasonableness: Proposed Revisions to

Minnesota Rules, Chapter 7023, Adopting Vehicle

Greenhouse Gas Emissions Standards (Dec. 2020) ....... 38

S. Rep. No. 403, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967) .................... 6, 7

In the Supreme Court of the United States

No. 24-7

DIAMOND ALTERNATIVE ENERGY, LLC, ET AL.,

PETITIONERS

v.

ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, ET AL.

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI

TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

BRIEF FOR THE FEDERAL RESPONDENTS

OPINION BELOW

The opinion of the court of appeals (Pet. App. 1a-49a)

is reported at 98 F.4th 288.

JURISDICTION

The judgment of the court of appeals was entered on

April 9, 2024. The petition for a writ of certiorari was

filed on July 2, 2024, and granted on December 13, 2024.

The jurisdiction of this Court rests on 28 U.S.C. 1254(1).

STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED

Pertinent statutory provisions are reproduced in an

appendix to this brief. App., infra, 1a-12a.

INTRODUCTION

This case arises from a series of actions by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) under the Clean

Air Act (CAA or Act), 42 U.S.C. 7401 et seq. In general,

(1)

2

the CAA authorizes EPA, not States, to prescribe nationwide standards to control the emission of air pollutants from new motor vehicles. Those federal standards

ordinarily preempt state law. But in certain circumstances, Section 209(b) of the Act directs EPA to waive

federal preemption for emissions standards established

by the State of California. 42 U.S.C. 7543(b).

In 2013, EPA granted a waiver under Section 209(b)

for California emissions standards that limit greenhouse

gas emissions from new motor vehicles and require that a

certain percentage of new vehicles sold in the State by

each manufacturer be zero-emission vehicles, such as

plug-in electric vehicles. As originally designed, both

sets of standards were to increase in stringency until

model-year 2025; thereafter, the 2025 levels would remain in effect. In 2019, EPA withdrew the portion of

the 2013 waiver that had allowed California’s greenhouse gas and zero-emission-vehicle standards to take

effect. In 2022, EPA reinstated the 2013 waiver.

Upon taking office on January 20, 2025, President

Trump ordered that the policy of the United States is to

“terminat[e], where appropriate, state emissions waivers that function to limit sales of gasoline-powered automobiles” and to “consider[] the elimination” of other

measures “that favor [electric vehicles] over other technologies and effectively mandate their purchase * * *

by rendering other types of vehicles unaffordable.”

Exec. Order. No. 14,154, § 2(e), 90 Fed. Reg. 8353, 8353

(Jan. 29, 2025) (EO 14,154). Consistent with that order,

EPA is now considering the basis for and legality of the

agency’s 2022 reinstatement of the 2013 waiver.

That review is ongoing and may culminate in a decision to again withdraw the 2013 waiver. EPA’s review

may also involve re-evaluating the effect of California’s

3

emissions standards on demand for liquid fuels and conventional gas-powered vehicles. EPA will undertake any

such re-evaluation based on the evidence before it, informed by the agency’s accumulated experience and expertise. In the meantime, however, the narrow question

before the Court in this case is whether, on the record

presented to the lower court, petitioners—a coalition of

groups that sell or refine liquid fuels or the ingredients

used in liquid fuels—carried their burden of establishing their standing to challenge EPA’s reinstatement at

the time they sought judicial review in 2022. The answer

to that distinct question is no.

To satisfy Article III’s case-or-controversy requirement, the party invoking federal jurisdiction must have

standing to sue, i.e., a concrete and particularized injury in fact, which was caused by the challenged conduct

of the defendant, and which is likely to be redressed by

the judicial relief the party seeks. Lujan v. Defenders

of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992). Those elements

are to be evaluated at the time federal jurisdiction is invoked, not based on later developments. See id. at 569

n.4. And each element is an “indispensable part of the

plaintiff ’s case,” which the plaintiff must prove “in the

same way as any other matter on which the plaintiff

bears the burden of proof.” Id. at 561.

Petitioners do not manufacture any new motor vehicles and therefore are not themselves subject to the

underlying emissions standards. Petitioners contend,

however, that EPA’s reinstatement of the 2013 waiver

injured them by requiring manufacturers to sell more

fuel-efficient vehicles, thus reducing consumer demand

for liquid fuels. Petitioners further contend that vacating the 2022 reinstatement would redress their asserted

injury by increasing demand for liquid fuels. On the

4

record amassed by the parties in the court of appeals,

petitioners failed to substantiate that theory. Contrary

to petitioners’ principal submission in this Court, petitioners could not carry their burden of proving redressability merely by alleging that the emissions standards

that were allowed to take effect as a result of the 2022

reinstatement had a coercive effect on vehicle manufacturers. Petitioners were also required to show that setting aside the reinstatement would likely cause vehicle

manufacturers to change course, and petitioners failed

to make that showing in this case. To attempt to prove

their standing, petitioners submitted seven declarations

that all contained the same sentence, repeated verbatim: “All these injuries would be substantially ameliorated if EPA’s decision were set aside.” J.A. 130, 137,

150, 154, 158, 167, 181. Petitioners’ other declarations

on standing did not address redressability.

The court of appeals determined that the evidence

adduced below by other parties showed that manufacturers were already exceeding the challenged emissions

standards, were planning to continue to exceed them in

future model years, and would not likely change course

even if the 2022 reinstatement were vacated. The court

mistakenly thought that the underlying waiver would

expire after model-year 2025 and thus that any such

change of course would need to occur quickly for petitioners to show redressability. But, given the other evidence of record, the onus was on petitioners to show

that, if a court entered the judicial decree that petitioners seek, at least one vehicle manufacturer would likely

respond to that decision by altering its products or

prices in a way that would lead to greater consumer demand for liquid fuels—whether for model-year 2025 or

afterwards. Petitioners introduced no such support and

5

cannot rely on evidence circa 2013 or inferences circa

now to fill the gap. The judgment below should be affirmed.

STATEMENT

A. Statutory Background

Congress enacted the CAA “to protect and enhance

the quality of the Nation’s air resources so as to promote the public health and welfare and the productive

capacity of its population,” 42 U.S.C. 7401(b)(1). This

case concerns Title II of the Act, which governs control

of air pollution from mobile sources, including motor vehicles. See 42 U.S.C. 7521-7590. For “new motor vehicles or new motor vehicle engines,” the Act directs EPA

to prescribe nationwide “standards applicable to the

emission of any air pollutant * * * which in [its] judgment cause[s], or contribute[s] to, air pollution which

may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public

health or welfare.” 42 U.S.C. 7521(a)(1).

The emissions standards prescribed by EPA under

that authority apply to emissions of air pollutants from

“new motor vehicles or new motor vehicle engines.” 42

U.S.C. 7521(a)(1); see 42 U.S.C. 7550 (relevant definitions). The Act generally prohibits “a manufacturer of

new motor vehicles or new motor vehicle engines” from

selling, offering for sale, or importing into the United

States any new motor vehicle or new motor vehicle engine unless the vehicle or engine is certified to comply

with applicable emissions standards. 42 U.S.C. 7522(a)(1).

The CAA authorizes the government to enforce that prohibition by bringing an action against a manufacturer to

restrain violations of Section 7522(a)(1), and by suing for

or assessing civil monetary penalties for a manufacturer’s violations. 42 U.S.C. 7523, 7524(a).

6

The CAA generally “preempts any corresponding

state regulation” of emissions from new motor vehicles,

Pet. App. 4a, subject to EPA’s authority to waive the

Act’s preemptive effect in certain circumstances for

emissions standards promulgated by California. In particular, Section 209(a) of the Act provides that “[n]o

State or any political subdivision thereof shall adopt or

attempt to enforce any standard relating to the control

of emissions from new motor vehicles.” 42 U.S.C. 7543(a).

Section 209(b), in turn, directs EPA to “waive application of [Section 209(a)] to any State which has adopted

standards * * * for the control of emissions from new

motor vehicles or new motor vehicle engines prior to

March 30, 1966, if the State determines that the State

standards will be, in the aggregate, at least as protective of public health and welfare as applicable Federal

standards.” 42 U.S.C. 7543(b)(1). Section 209(b) specifies that “[n]o such waiver shall be granted if the Administrator finds that”: “(A) the determination of the

State is arbitrary and capricious, (B) such State does

not need such State standards to meet compelling and

extraordinary conditions, or (C) such State standards

and accompanying enforcement procedures are not consistent with section 7521(a) of this title.” 42 U.S.C.

7543(b)(1)(A)-(C).

California is the only State that regulated vehicle

emissions before March 30, 1966, so it is the only State

that is eligible for a waiver under Section 209(b). Pet.

App. 6a (citing Engine Mfrs. Ass’n v. EPA, 88 F.3d 1075,

1079 n.9 (D.C. Cir. 1996)); see S. Rep. No. 403, 90th

Cong., 1st Sess. 33 (1967) (Senate Report). Congress

made a waiver available to California because, when the

CAA was enacted, the State was perceived as a “ ‘lead[er]

in the establishment of standards for regulation of au-

7

tomotive pollutant emissions’ at a time when the federal

government had yet to promulgate any regulations of

its own.” Engine Mfrs. Ass’n, 88 F.3d at 1079 (citation

omitted; brackets in original). Congress also viewed the

State as facing “unique” air pollution problems “as a result of its climate and topography.” H.R. Rep. No. 728,

90th Cong., 1st Sess. 22 (1967); cf. Senate Report 33 (citing the State’s “peculiar local conditions” as justifying

the waiver provision).

B. The Advanced Clean Car Program

In 2012, California adopted a set of emissions standards known as the Advanced Clean Car (ACC) program.

Pet. App. 12a. That program includes a low-emissionvehicle program, which (as relevant here) establishes

“standards to regulate [greenhouse gas] emissions.” 78

Fed. Reg. 2112, 2114 (Jan. 9, 2013). It also includes a

zero-emission-vehicle program, which requires a certain

percentage of manufacturers’ sales of new vehicles to be

zero-emission vehicles. See id. at 2114-2115. Under the

ACC program as originally constructed, both the lowemission-vehicle program and the zero-emission-vehicle

program were to increase in stringency through modelyear 2025. See Cal. Code Regs. tit. 13, § 1961.3(a)(1)(A)

(2024); J.A. 50; C.A. Admin. R. Doc. 8111, at 1. After

model-year 2025, the programs were designed to remain in effect, with their stringency held constant at

2025 levels. See ibid.; see also 78 Fed. Reg. at 2119 (describing the ACC’s zero-emission-vehicle requirements

as extending through “2025 and beyond”). In 2013, EPA

found “that the entire ACC program me[t] the criteria

for a waiver of Clean Air Act preemption,” and the agency

therefore “grant[ed] a waiver for [California’s] ACC program.” 78 Fed. Reg. at 2113; see id. at 2112.

8

In 2019, as part of a joint rulemaking process with

the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration

(NHTSA), EPA withdrew the 2013 waiver for the portions of California’s ACC program that addressed zeroemission vehicles and that set low-emission-vehicle standards for greenhouse gases. 84 Fed. Reg. 51,310, 51,310

(Sept. 27, 2019). EPA identified three grounds for the

withdrawal. First, NHTSA had determined that state

regulations of greenhouse gas emissions from new motor vehicles “relate[] to fuel economy standards” and are

therefore preempted by the Energy Policy and Conservation Act (EPCA), 42 U.S.C. 32919(a). See 84 Fed.

Reg. at 51,337-51,338. Second, EPA explained that, in

evaluating whether a Section 209(b) waiver must be denied because California “does not need” a given emissions standard “to meet compelling and extraordinary

conditions,” 42 U.S.C. 7543(b)(1)(B), it was appropriate

to consider each standard “individually” rather than focusing on “California’s entire program in the aggregate,” 84 Fed. Reg. at 51,341. And third, EPA determined that California could not demonstrate that the

relevant emissions standards were individually needed

to meet compelling and extraordinary conditions because California could not show a “particularized nexus”

between greenhouse gas emissions and California’s local air-pollution problems. Ibid.

After EPA withdrew the 2013 waiver, automobile

manufacturers representing nearly 30% of U.S. vehicle

sales, including Honda, Ford, Volvo, BMW, and Volkswagen, entered into independent agreements with

California under which the manufacturers would continue to meet California’s low-emission-vehicle and zeroemission-vehicle standards for specified model years.

9

See Pet. App. 13a-14a; 86 Fed. Reg. 74,434, 74,458 (Dec.

30, 2021).

In 2022, EPA changed course and reinstated California’s 2013 waiver. 87 Fed. Reg. 14,332, 14,332 (Mar. 14,

2022). Among other grounds, EPA stated that, contrary to the interpretation of Section 209(b)(1)(B) that

EPA had adopted in the 2019 withdrawal decision, the

agency had decided to “examine[] whether California

needs a separate motor vehicle program as a whole—

not specific standards—to address the state’s compelling and extraordinary conditions.” Ibid. EPA also

stated that Section 209(b) does not permit relying on

the preemptive effect of other federal laws (such as the

EPCA) as a reason for denying a requested waiver, and

that in any event NHTSA had since withdrawn its

preemption finding. Ibid.; see Pet. App. 14a.

C. The Present Controversy

Petitioners produce or sell liquid fuels and raw materials used to produce those fuels, or have members

that engage in those activities. Pet. App. 2a. In 2022,

petitioners sought judicial review of EPA’s 2022 reinstatement decision in the D.C. Circuit. Ibid.; see 42

U.S.C. 7607(b)(1). Petitioners are not directly regulated

by the emissions standards at issue. See Pet. App. 19a20a. But petitioners contend that EPA’s reinstatement

of the 2013 waiver will cause manufacturers to produce

and sell more fuel-efficient vehicles and will “depress

the demand for liquid fuels.” Id. at 19a.

A group of 17 States also sought judicial review of

EPA’s reinstatement decision. Pet. App. 15a. California, 19 other States, the District of Columbia, and two

cities (collectively, the California respondents) intervened to defend EPA’s decision, as did various environmental organizations. Ibid. Five manufacturers—Ford,

10

Volkswagen, BMW, Honda, and Volvo—and several trade

groups also intervened to defend EPA’s decision. Id. at

15a & n.6. The D.C. Circuit consolidated the petitions

for review into a single proceeding. Id. at 15a.

As relevant here, the California respondents contended that petitioners had failed to establish the redressability component of Article III standing. See Cal.

C.A. Br. 13-15. The California respondents observed

that petitioners’ asserted injury—reduced demand for

liquid fuels—depended on decisions by manufacturers

of new motor vehicles “about which vehicles to offer,”

and that petitioners had introduced no evidence to show

that those third parties would make different decisions

even if EPA’s reinstatement were set aside. Id. at 13.

In addition, the California respondents introduced their

own evidence that, “in response to surging consumer

demand, manufacturers have announced plans to sell

even more zero-emission vehicles than required by California’s standards.” Id. at 14 (emphasis omitted); see

J.A. 191-192, 201-203.

The court of appeals dismissed petitioners’ claims for

lack of Article III standing. Pet. App. 1a-49a. The court

agreed with the California respondents’ contention that

petitioners had not “met their burden of demonstrating” that their alleged injuries would be redressed by a

judicial decree holding the challenged EPA decision invalid. Id. at 19a.1

The court of appeals also determined that the 17 States opposed

to EPA’s decision lacked standing to bring their asserted claims—

with the exception of a constitutional challenge, which the court rejected on the merits. Pet. App. 19a, 32a-49a. Those States filed a

petition for a writ of certiorari seeking further review with respect

to their constitutional challenge, which this Court denied. Ohio v.

EPA, No. 24-13 (Dec. 16, 2024).

1

11

The court of appeals observed that “[t]he difficulty for

[petitioners] is that their claimed injuries,” in the form

of reduced demand for liquid fuels, depend on “the actions of third parties—the automobile manufacturers

who are subject to the waiver.” Pet. App. 22a. As a result, the court explained, the redressability of petitioners’ claimed injuries likewise “ ‘hinges on the response of ’

those same automobile manufacturers.” Ibid. (quoting

Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 562 (1992))

(brackets omitted). Petitioners’ “injuries would be redressed only if automobile manufacturers responded to

vacatur of the waiver by producing and selling fewer nonconventional vehicles, or by altering the prices of their

vehicles such that fewer non-conventional vehicles—and

more conventional vehicles—were sold.” Ibid.

In the court of appeals’ view, “redressability is further complicated by the relatively short duration of the

waiver” that petitioners challenge. Pet. App. 22a. The

court observed that petitioners had challenged only

EPA’s 2022 decision “to reinstate the waiver [EPA] had

previously granted California as to Model Years 2017

through 2025.” Ibid. The court stated that, “to meet

their burden of demonstrating redressability,” petitioners would therefore need to “demonstrate a ‘substantial

probability’ not only that automobile manufacturers are

likely to respond to a decision * * * by changing their

fleets in a way that alleviates their injuries in some way,

but also that automobile manufacturers would do so relatively quickly—by Model Year 2025.” Id. at 23a (citation omitted). The court emphasized, however, that the

standing analysis was properly focused on the state of

affairs “ ‘as of the time’ this lawsuit commenced,” rather

than on any developments postdating the filing of the

petition for review in 2022. Id. at 25a (citation omitted).

12

The court of appeals determined that “[t]he record

evidence provides no basis” for finding redressability.

Pet. App. 23a. The court first noted that petitioners had

“fail[ed] to point to any evidence affirmatively demonstrating that vacatur of the waiver would be substantially likely to result in any change to automobile manufacturers’ vehicle fleets by Model Year 2025.” Ibid.

Indeed, the court found that “[t]he only evidence points

in the opposite direction, indicating that automobile manufacturers need years of lead time to make changes to

their future model year fleets.” Ibid.; see id. at 23a-24a

(discussing comments submitted by automakers at various times during EPA’s consideration of possible withdrawal or reinstatement of the 2013 waiver).

The court of appeals further emphasized record evidence showing that “ ‘manufacturers are already selling

more qualifying vehicles in California than the State’s

standards require,’ ” which “suggest[s] that vacatur of

the zero-emission-vehicle mandate would not redress

Petitioners’ injuries.” Pet. App. 28a (citation omitted).

The court observed that several automobile manufacturers had filed a brief explaining “that ‘both internal

sustainability goals and external market forces’ are

prompting manufacturers to transition toward electric

vehicles, irrespective of California’s regulations.” Id. at

24a n.8 (citation omitted). The court thus perceived a

lack of evidence that “vacatur of the challenged waiver”

would “result in any change on the part of automobile

manufacturers.” Id. at 27a.

The court of appeals observed that, “[d]espite the

paucity of evidence in the record regarding the redressability of their injuries” and “the relatively short nature

of the waiver they challenge,” petitioners “seem to have

treated redressability as a foregone conclusion.” Pet.

13

App. 24a-25a. The court noted that petitioners had not

attempted “to explain in any detail how their injuries

are redressable, let alone to ‘cite any record evidence’

or to file ‘additional affidavits or other evidence sufficient to support’ redressability.” Ibid. (brackets and citation omitted). The court therefore found “no basis to

conclude that Petitioners’ claims are redressable—a

necessary element of standing that Petitioners bear the

burden of establishing.” Id. at 29a.

After oral argument, petitioners had moved to supplement the record to address what they characterized

as a question of mootness. Pet. App. 30a. The court of

appeals denied that request, ibid., finding no good cause

to allow petitioners to add to the record at that juncture.

See id. at 31a-32a.

D. Subsequent Developments

The court of appeals issued its decision in April 2024.

Pet. App. 1a. Later that month, EPA published a final

rule under Section 202(a) of the CAA to set “new, more

stringent vehicle emissions standards for * * * greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions from motor vehicles” for

model years “2027 through 2032 and beyond.” 89 Fed.

Reg. 27,842, 27,843 (Apr. 18, 2024).

On January 6, 2025, EPA published a notice of its approval of a Section 209(b) waiver that California had

sought for a new program known as ACC II. 90 Fed.

Reg. 642, 642-643 (Jan. 6, 2025). Under that new program, California has amended the emissions standards

for which EPA reinstated its 2013 waiver. As explained

above, the zero-emission-vehicle standards encompassed

by the 2013 waiver were designed to increase in stringency until model-year 2025 and then to remain in effect

at the 2025 levels. In ACC II, California amended the

relevant state law so that those standards will cease to

14

apply after model-year 2025. See Cal. Code Regs. tit.

13, § 1962.2(a) (2024). California has also adopted a new

set of zero-emission-vehicle standards in ACC II, which

will apply to new vehicle sales starting in model-year

2026, and which will gradually increase in stringency

through model-year 2035 and then remain in effect at

the 2035 levels. See id. § 1962.4(a)(1) and (c)(B) (2024).

The waiver that EPA published in 2025 encompasses

those new standards.

After the change in Administration, President Trump

issued an executive order finding that “burdensome and

ideologically motivated regulations” have contributed

to “high energy costs” and have harmed American consumers and businesses. EO 14,154, § 1, 90 Fed. Reg. at

8353. To address those problems, the President determined that it shall be the policy of the United States to,

among other things, “terminat[e], where appropriate,

state emissions waivers that function to limit sales of

gasoline-powered automobiles.” Id. § 2(e), 90 Fed. Reg.

at 8353. The President also declared a policy of “considering the elimination of unfair subsidies and other illconceived government-imposed market distortions that

favor [electric vehicles] over other technologies.” Ibid.

And he directed Executive agencies to undertake an immediate review of existing agency actions for conformity with the policies set forth in the order. Id. § 3(a), 90

Fed. Reg. at 8354.

Consistent with that order, EPA has determined

that the agency should reassess the basis for and soundness of the 2022 reinstatement decision at issue in this

case. See Fed. Resp. Mot. for Abeyance 3. That review

is ongoing. EPA also transmitted to Congress the waiver

the agency had published on January 6, 2025, relating

to California’s ACC II program, for Congress to con-

15

sider whether to disapprove the waiver under the Congressional Review Act, 5 U.S.C. 801 et seq. See EPA,

News Release, Trump EPA to Transmit California

Waivers to Congress in Accordance with Statutory Reporting Requirements (Feb. 14, 2025). When Congress

exercises its authority under the procedures in that Act

to enact legislation disapproving of an agency rule, the

Act specifies that the rule “may not be reissued in substantially the same form, and a new rule that is substantially the same as such a rule may not be issued,” unless

specifically authorized by a later-in-time law. 5 U.S.C.

801(b)(2).

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

Petitioners failed to carry their burden under Article

III of demonstrating that the judicial relief that they

seek—vacatur of EPA’s 2022 reinstatement of the 2013

waiver allowing California’s ACC I emissions standards

to take effect—would likely redress their asserted injuries. The court of appeals therefore correctly dismissed

their petition for review based on petitioners’ failure to

establish standing on the record before that court.

A. The party invoking federal jurisdiction has the

burden of establishing each of the elements of Article

III standing, including redressability. The redressability inquiry is typically straightforward when a plaintiff

challenges a regulation that restricts the plaintiff ’s own

conduct and causes an injury in fact. But standing is

more difficult to establish when a plaintiff challenges

the regulation of a third party and asserts that setting

aside the regulation will cause that third party to take

steps that will in turn redress the plaintiff ’s injury. In

those circumstances, the plaintiff may not rely on mere

speculation about how the third party will respond to the

16

judicial relief that the plaintiff seeks. Here, petitioners

are not the object of the underlying emissions standards.

Petitioners contend that, whenever a favorable judicial ruling would eliminate a legal impediment to thirdparty conduct that would benefit the plaintiff, redressability can be established on that basis alone, without

regard to the practical likelihood that the third party

would actually engage in the desired conduct if it were

legally free to do so. That contention is unsound and

unsupported by petitioners’ principal authority for that

view, Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154 (1997). The other

cases that petitioners identify likewise do not support

their request for any categorical rule that Article III’s

redressability requirement is always satisfied when a

plaintiff challenges agency action that constrains the legal options available to a third party. Adopting any such

rule would be inconsistent with the practical focus of

Article III standing analysis. It would also contravene

the principle that standing is not dispensed in gross and

instead must be established separately for each claim

and each form of relief.

B. On the record created by the parties during the

judicial proceedings here, petitioners failed to carry

their burden of demonstrating redressability. Petitioners’ theory of standing turns on an inference that, if

EPA’s 2022 reinstatement of the 2013 waiver were set

aside, vehicle manufacturers would likely alter their

products or prices in such a way as to increase consumer

demand for liquid fuels and their ingredients. As far as

the record in this case reveals, however, manufacturers

would not likely change course in that way because—

according to statements from manufacturers—they are

already planning to exceed the emissions standards at

issue for reasons independent of those standards. Five

17

manufacturers intervened below and explained both

their own plans to exceed the minimum floors set by the

emissions standards at issue and the market forces

driving those plans.

EPA is currently reassessing the 2022 reinstatement

and may reevaluate its premises, including any potential economic harm it may have caused to manufacturers

of conventional gas-powered vehicles and to fuel producers. The proper disposition of the redressability issue here, however, depends on the state of affairs that

prevailed when petitioners invoked the court of appeals’

jurisdiction, and on the record that was assembled during the judicial proceedings. Petitioners did not contribute to that record any meaningful particularized evidence concerning vehicle manufacturers’ likely responses to the judicial ruling that petitioners seek.

The standing declarations that petitioners submitted

merely asserted, in conclusory terms, that a favorable

decision would redress their injuries. Petitioners cannot overcome their failure of proof by relying on statements that California or EPA made in connection with

granting the original 2013 waiver. Petitioners did not

challenge that waiver, and industry practices have

changed substantially during the intervening years. To

have standing to challenge the 2022 reinstatement, petitioners must establish that, under market conditions

as of the time of suit, manufacturers would change

course if that reinstatement were invalidated. Petitioners failed to make that showing.

Petitioners contend that they were entitled to rely on

inferences and common sense to show standing. But petitioners cannot substitute attorney argument for the

evidence they failed to submit below. Nor can petitioners overcome their failure of proof merely by asserting

18

that the future conduct of the third-party vehicle manufacturers is predictable. This Court’s decision in Department of Commerce v. New York, 588 U.S. 752 (2019),

does not support petitioners’ approach. There, the Court

held that the State plaintiffs had shown redressability

by proving, with evidence introduced at trial, that including a citizenship question on the decennial census

would predictably cause an increase in nonresponse rates

for aliens’ households. Petitioners introduced no comparable proof here.

Petitioners’ policy arguments could not justify a departure from established Article III requirements, and

those arguments are unsound on their own terms. The

court of appeals did not limit the forms of proof that petitioners might have used to establish redressability in

this case. The court instead focused on petitioners’ failure to offer any meaningful particularized evidence of

vehicle manufacturers’ likely response to a judicial order vacating EPA’s 2022 reinstatement. Consistent

with core standing principles, that focus on the likely

practical consequences of judicial action ensures that

Article III courts will resolve legal disputes only at the

behest of parties who have a personal stake in the outcome.

C. Although the court of appeals was wrong to believe that the reinstated 2013 waiver would expire after

model-year 2025, that error was harmless. In the proceedings below, petitioners offered no persuasive evidence that, if the 2022 reinstatement is set aside, manufacturers will likely change course after model-year

2025 either. The judgment of the court of appeals should

be affirmed.

19

ARGUMENT

PETITIONERS FAILED TO CREATE A RECORD SHOWING

THAT THEIR ASSERTED INJURIES WOULD LIKELY BE

REDRESSED IF EPA’S 2022 REINSTATEMENT OF ITS 2013

WAIVER WERE HELD TO BE INVALID

Article III limits the jurisdiction of the federal

courts to the resolution of “Cases” and “Controversies.”

U.S. Const. Art. III, § 2. “A proper case or controversy

exists only when at least one plaintiff ‘establishes * * *

standing to sue.’ ” Murthy v. Missouri, 603 U.S. 43, 57

(2024) (brackets and citation omitted); see Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-561 (1992). And

to establish standing, a plaintiff must show that he has

“(1) suffered an injury in fact, (2) that is fairly traceable

to the challenged conduct of the defendant, and (3) that

is likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial decision.” Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 578 U.S. 330, 338 (2016).

The party invoking federal jurisdiction bears the burden of proving that each of those elements was satisfied

at the time federal jurisdiction was invoked. See Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. at 561.

Here, petitioners assert that they have suffered economic injuries in the form of reduced demand for liquid

fuels as a result of EPA’s 2022 reinstatement of the 2013

waiver that EPA had granted for California’s ACC program. Pet. App. 19a-20a. Contrary to petitioners’ lead

argument, petitioners could not establish standing

simply by showing that judicial vacatur of EPA’s reinstatement would remove a legal impediment to manufacturers’ sale of less fuel-efficient vehicles. Rather, petitioners were required to show that, as of the filing of

their petition for review in 2022, invalidating the 2022

reinstatement would likely result in actual increased

sales of such vehicles, increasing consumer demand for

20

liquid fuels and thereby redressing petitioners’ asserted injuries.

Petitioners failed to carry their burden of showing

that such effects would likely result if the court of appeals issued the ruling that petitioners seek. Petitioners did not submit any evidence that setting aside the

2022 reinstatement would cause vehicle manufacturers

to alter their products or prices in such a way as to increase the demand for liquid fuels. Other record evidence suggests that vehicle manufacturers would not do

so. Based on the precise, narrow, and case-specific circumstances of the record before the court of appeals,

petitioners failed to show that vehicle manufacturers

are likely to change course in response to the judicial

decree that petitioners seek, and thus lack standing to

request that decree.

A. Because Article III Requires The Party Invoking A Federal Court’s Jurisdiction To Prove Redressability, Petitioners’ Proposed Categorical Rule Is Unsound

Petitioners are not regulated by the challenged agency

action. Their theory of standing relies on a prediction

that, if a court invalidated EPA’s 2022 reinstatement of

the 2013 waiver, third-party vehicle manufacturers

would respond by altering their products or prices in

ways that would in turn increase demand for liquid

fuels. In the proceedings below, petitioners failed to substantiate that prediction with record evidence and thus

failed to prove that they had standing to bring this challenge as of the time they filed their petition for review.

And when a party fails to make that showing in a particular case, Article III requires that the suit be dismissed for lack of a concrete case or controversy.

Petitioners’ lead argument (Br. 25-29) focuses on the

fact that the judicial ruling they seek would eliminate a

21

legal impediment to manufacturers’ sale of less fuelefficient vehicles. Petitioners contend that this legal

effect is sufficient to establish redressability, without

regard to the practical likelihood that manufacturers

would actually sell more such vehicles if EPA’s 2022 reinstatement were vacated. That argument is inconsistent with well-established Article III principles. This

Court has never recognized any such “categorical rule”

for redressability (Pet. Br. 18), and it should not do so

here.

1. Article III demands more than mere speculation

when a party’s theory of standing relies on future

conduct by a third party

Redressability is part of the “irreducible constitutional minimum” for establishing Article III standing.

Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. at 560. And because

“standing is not dispensed in gross,” the party invoking

federal jurisdiction must make that showing with respect to “each claim” and “each form of relief.” Murthy,

603 U.S. at 61 (citation omitted). Mere speculation will

not suffice. The party must show that an asserted injury is “likely to be redressed by a favorable ruling.”

Department of Commerce v. New York, 588 U.S. 752,

766 (2019) (emphasis added; citation omitted); see Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. at 561.

That showing is particularly difficult to make in

cases like this, involving hypothetical future conduct by

third parties. “[I]t is a bedrock principle that a federal

court cannot redress ‘injury that results from the independent action of some third party not before the

court.’ ” Murthy, 603 U.S. at 57 (citation omitted). “In

keeping with this principle,” the Court has “ ‘been reluctant to endorse standing theories that require guesswork as to how independent decisionmakers will exer-

22

cise their judgment.’ ” Ibid. (quoting Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U.S. 398, 413 (2013)). The Court

has repeatedly rejected theories of redressability that

depend on such guesswork.

In Murthy, for example, the Court found that the

plaintiffs had failed to demonstrate redressability in a

challenge asserting that the government had pressured

social media platforms to adopt policies that had the effect of “suppress[ing]” the plaintiffs’ speech on the platforms. 603 U.S. at 73. The plaintiffs sought an injunction to prevent the government from “coercing or encouraging the platforms” to apply the platforms’ policies in particular ways. Ibid. The Court explained, however, that any such injunction against the government

would have left the platforms “free to enforce, or not

enforce,” the same underlying policies. Ibid. The Court

therefore concluded that, given the independent role of

the platforms themselves, the plaintiffs had failed to establish that the requested judicial relief was likely to

redress their alleged injuries. See ibid.; see also, e.g.,

Haaland v. Brackeen, 599 U.S. 255, 293-294 (2023); Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. at 568-571.

In a related vein, this Court has distinguished for

standing purposes between suits in which the plaintiff

is “himself an object of the action * * * at issue,” and

those in which the “plaintiff ’s asserted injury arises from

the government’s allegedly unlawful regulation * * * of

someone else.” Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. at 561562. In the latter circumstance, “much more is needed”

to establish standing because “causation and redressability ordinarily hinge on the response of the regulated

* * * third party to the government action.” Id. at 562.

When a plaintiff who is not the object of a challenged

regulation asserts that invalidating it would cause reg-

23

ulated parties to make choices that would in turn redress the plaintiff ’s claimed injury, “it becomes the burden of the plaintiff to adduce facts showing that those

choices have been or will be made.” Ibid.

The three elements of Article III standing are “an

indispensable part of the plaintiff ’s case” and must be

“supported in the same way as any other matter on

which the plaintiff bears the burden of proof.” Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. at 561; see Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 155-156 (1990) (“A federal court is

powerless to create its own jurisdiction by embellishing

otherwise deficient allegations of standing.”). And under the “time-of-filing rule,” a party’s Article III standing must be determined as of the “ ‘state of things at the

time of the action [is] brought,’ ” not based on events

postdating the invocation of federal jurisdiction. Grupo

Dataflux v. Atlas Global Group, L.P., 541 U.S. 567, 570

(2004) (citation omitted) (discussing subject-matter jurisdiction); see Davis v. FEC, 554 U.S. 724, 734 (2008)

(“While the proof required to establish standing increases as the suit proceeds, the standing inquiry remains focused on whether the party invoking jurisdiction had the requisite stake in the outcome when the

suit was filed.”) (citation omitted).

2. Petitioners were not exempt from making the casespecific showing of proof required by Article III

Petitioners devote hardly any of their opening brief

to addressing the scant evidence they introduced below.

See Pet. Br. 37-38, discussed at pp. 35-38, infra. Petitioners instead train their fire on the premise that they

were required to prove redressability through evidence

concerning the likely practical effects on third-party

conduct of the judicial ruling they seek. Petitioners

principally contend (Br. 25-29) that they have shown re-

24

dressability under the logic of this Court’s decision in

Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154 (1997). Petitioners describe Bennett as establishing that “the removal of the

coercive effect of government action on third parties alone

suffices to establish redressability,” and that “[c]hallengers do not need to supply additional record evidence of third parties’ likely reactions.” Pet. Br. 17.

This Court said no such thing, either in Bennett or in

any of the other cases that petitioners invoke. To the

contrary, the “categorical rule” that petitioners propose

(Br. 18) would violate established Article III principles.

In Bennett, two irrigation districts and two ranch operators within those districts sought judicial review of a

biological opinion issued by the Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) under the Endangered Species Act of 1973

(ESA), 16 U.S.C. 1531 et seq., regarding the operation

of a federal irrigation project by the Bureau of Reclamation (Bureau). See Bennett, 520 U.S. at 158-160. The

FWS’s biological opinion recommended—but did not

require—that the Bureau maintain certain minimum

water levels in two reservoirs to avoid jeopardizing the

continued existence of endangered fish. Id. at 159, 168.

The challengers in Bennett alleged that maintaining

those water levels would result in less available irrigation water for the challengers’ use. Id. at 167. The government contended in response that any such injury

was not fairly traceable to the biological opinion itself,

nor redressable by a judicial decision vacating the biological opinion, because the opinion was merely a recommendation to the Bureau, which had not been named

as a defendant and which had the ultimate authority to

decide how to proceed. Id. at 168.

This Court rejected the government’s causation and

redressability arguments in that case, but its reasons

25

for doing so do not support petitioners here. The Court

emphasized that, although the biological opinion “theoretically serves an ‘advisory function,’ in reality it has a

powerful coercive effect on the agency action.” Bennett,

520 U.S. at 169 (citation omitted). An agency may disregard such advice only if it articulates reasons for doing so. Ibid. The Court further explained that “[a] Biological Opinion of the sort rendered here alters the legal regime to which the [Bureau] is subject,” ibid., since

the Bureau and its employees would be subject to severe potential penalties if the Bureau behaved inconsistently with the biological opinion and its conduct was

found to violate the ESA, id. at 170.

Petitioners focus (Br. 25) on the Court’s observation

that, although a plaintiff lacks Article III standing if the

plaintiff ’s injury is “ ‘the result of the independent action of some third party not before the court,’ ” that

principle “does not exclude injury produced by determinative or coercive effect upon the action of someone

else.” Bennett, 520 U.S. at 169 (brackets and citation

omitted). But petitioners are wrong to suggest (Br. 26)

that merely alleging such an effect on a third party was

sufficient to show redressability in that case. The Court

in Bennett went on to explain that the challengers had

satisfied their burden of showing redressability, at least

at the pleading stage, by alleging that the Bureau would

“not impose such water level restrictions” if the biological opinion were vacated. 520 U.S. at 171. The Court

found that allegation plausible because the complaint

recited that the Bureau had “operated the [irrigation

project] in the same manner throughout the 20th century,” before changing course when the biological opinion was issued. Id. at 170; see id. at 159.

26

That aspect of Bennett would have been unnecessary

if the mere coercive potential of FWS biological opinions had been sufficient to satisfy Article III requirements. And if the FWS had advised the Bureau to take

action that the Bureau already wished to take for independent reasons, any injury to the plaintiffs would not

have been “produced by” the biological opinion’s “determinative or coercive effect upon the” Bureau’s conduct. Bennett, 520 U.S. at 169. Unlike the challengers

in Bennett, petitioners did not identify any longstanding

practice to which the relevant third parties here—the

vehicle manufacturers—would necessarily revert in the

absence of the challenged agency action. To the contrary, the immediate effect of the 2022 reinstatement

was simply to restore the binding legal force of California requirements with which vehicle manufacturers

were already complying. See Pet. App. 28a.

Petitioners are likewise wrong in relying (Br. 26) on

two decisions involving what they describe as “indirectly regulated parties.” Those cases concerned governmental limits on dealings between parents and private schools, see Pierce v. Society of the Sisters, 268

U.S. 510, 530-533 (1925), and between a television network and broadcasting stations, see CBS, Inc. v. United

States, 316 U.S. 407, 410-411 (1942). Those decisions illustrate that a plaintiff may suffer a redressable injury

if the government restrains the plaintiff ’s business relationship with a third party, even if as a legal matter

the restraint falls only on the third party—the parents

rather than the private schools in Pierce, for example.

Petitioners, however, are not in the same position as

the schools in Pierce or the television network in CBS.

The agency action at issue here regulates the vehicles

that manufacturers may sell to consumers, not any

27

transaction between vehicle manufacturers and fuel

producers. See 42 U.S.C. 7522(a)(1). And in any event,

both Pierce and CBS involved evidence, or at least factual allegations, of harms likely to be redressed by a favorable decision. See Pierce, 268 U.S. at 533 (private

school’s “business [was] being destroyed” because the

state law was causing parents to “refus[e] to make contracts for the future instruction of their sons”); CBS,

316 U.S. at 423 (stations were “cancelling or threatening to cancel their contracts” with the network “in order

to conform to the regulations”).

Petitioners’ reliance (Br. 28) on the D.C. Circuit’s decision in Energy Future Coalition v. EPA, 793 F.3d 141

(2015) (Kavanaugh, J.), is likewise misplaced. In that

case, biofuel producers alleged that an EPA regulation

prohibited the use of their product—an ethanol blend

known as E30—as a test fuel in emissions testing under

the CAA. Id. at 143-144. The court of appeals observed

that, although the regulation governing which fuels

could be used as test fuels was “technically directed at

vehicle manufacturers,” in practical effect both the biofuel producers and the manufacturers were “ ‘object[s]

of the action * * * at issue.’ ” Id. at 144 (quoting Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. at 561-562). Pointing to

comments in the rulemaking record from Ford that expressed the company’s support for ethanol, the court

found “substantial reason to think that at least some vehicle manufacturers would use” E30 as a test fuel if they

were permitted to do so. Ibid. Petitioners seize (Br. 28)

on the court’s observation that a judicial decision in the

challengers’ favor would “remove a regulatory hurdle”

to the use of their product as a test fuel. Energy Future,

793 F.3d at 144. But that observation was premised on

the court’s determination that some vehicle manufac-

28

turers would actually use E30 as a test fuel if the challenged regulation were set aside. See ibid. Petitioners

proffered no comparable evidence here.

No decision of this Court supports petitioners’ proposed “rule” that the “removal of a regulatory hurdle to

the use of a challenger’s product” will always suffice to

show redressability. Pet. Br. 27-28. Article III demands

that the party invoking federal jurisdiction show redressability on the particular facts of each case, “with

the manner and degree of evidence required at the successive stages of the litigation.” TransUnion LLC v.

Ramirez, 594 U.S. 413, 431 (2021) (citation omitted).

The Court has generally eschewed categorical rules or

shortcuts of the kind that petitioners propose here. See,

e.g., FDA v. Alliance for Hippocratic Med., 602 U.S.

367, 391-393 (2024) (rejecting any special Article III

doctrine of “doctor standing” to challenge general safety

regulations); DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S.

332, 342-345 (2006) (rejecting any special Article III exception for state taxpayer standing). The Court has also

repeatedly made clear that “standing is not dispensed in

gross.” Murthy, 603 U.S. at 61 (citation omitted). That

principle precludes granting standing to the plaintiffs in

a whole category of cases, without any case-specific

inquiry into injury, causation, or redressability.

Petitioners’ argument is also inconsistent with more

general standing principles. Petitioners contend (e.g.,

Br. 27) that, if the judicial ruling a plaintiff seeks would

remove a legal impediment to third-party conduct that

would benefit the plaintiff, the ruling would necessarily

redress the plaintiff ’s injury. Article III standing analysis, however, focuses on the likely practical effect of the

defendant’s conduct and of a favorable judicial ruling.

29

A plaintiff cannot establish injury in fact, for example, simply by alleging and proving that a challenged

statute or agency action constrains the range of options

that are legally available to her. Rather, such a restriction will cause the plaintiff injury in fact only if it

prevents her from engaging in conduct in which she

would otherwise engage. See, e.g., Susan B. Anthony

List v. Driehaus, 573 U.S. 149, 159 (2014) (explaining

that “a plaintiff satisfies the injury-in-fact requirement

where he alleges ‘an intention to engage in a course of

conduct arguably affected with a constitutional interest,

but proscribed by statute, and there exists a credible

threat of prosecution thereunder’ ”) (citation omitted);

id. at 158-161. The redressability inquiry here is similarly practical, focusing on the steps that vehicle manufacturers would likely take if they were no longer subject to the legal obligations imposed by California’s

ACC program. And because petitioners bore the burden of establishing the elements of Article III standing,

it was their obligation to proffer evidence concerning

manufacturers’ likely response to a judicial order vacating EPA’s reinstatement.

B. On The Particular Record Here, Petitioners Failed To

Carry Their Burden Of Demonstrating Redressability

For the reasons set forth above, Article III required

petitioners to show that, at the time they filed their petition for review in 2022, it was likely that one or more

vehicle manufacturers would respond to a judicial decree setting aside the reinstated 2013 waiver by taking

steps that would in turn have the effect of increasing

demand for liquid fuels. Petitioners failed to carry that

burden here, instead treating redressability as an afterthought or “foregone conclusion.” Pet. App. 25a. Petitioners therefore lack standing.

30

Petitioners attempt to minimize their burden of establishing redressability and to substitute attorney argument for the evidence that they failed to adduce below. Those efforts are unavailing. There may be cases

in which appeals to “common sense” or “Economics 101”

can suffice to show how third-party market participants

likely would react to the invalidation of a challenged

agency action. Pet. Br. 35-36. Given the specific record

in 2022, however, this case is not one of them.

1. Petitioners failed to adduce the affirmative evidence

required to prove standing in this case

a. Petitioners are not the “object of the action * * *

at issue.” Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. at 561. The

relevant emissions standards apply to manufacturers of

new motor vehicles—not to producers or sellers of liquid fuels, let alone to soybean or corn farmers (Pet. Br.

III, 12). EPA is authorized to adopt standards for controlling the emission of air pollutants from “new motor

vehicles or new motor vehicle engines,” 42 U.S.C.

7521(a), and the CAA prohibits “manufacturer[s]” from

violating those standards by selling, offering for sale, or

importing noncompliant vehicles or engines, 42 U.S.C.

7522. The federal standards generally preempt any

state-law “standards relating to the control of emissions

from new motor vehicles,” subject to EPA’s authority to

waive federal preemption under Section 209(b). 42

U.S.C. 7543(a) and (b). Those provisions all address

emissions standards for vehicle manufacturers; none

imposes legal obligations or restrictions on petitioners.

Petitioners’ theory of standing therefore necessarily

“hinge[s] on the response” of third parties, namely vehicle manufacturers, to EPA’s 2022 reinstatement. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. at 562. Petitioners contend

(Br. 9) that vehicle manufacturers can comply with the

31

greenhouse gas emissions standards in the ACC program only by producing more electric vehicles or otherwise implementing within new cars technologies that

reduce consumption of liquid fuels. Likewise, petitioners contend (ibid.) that manufacturers generally can

comply with California’s zero-emission-vehicle standards only by selling more electric vehicles, which do not

combust liquid fuels.

b. To establish redressability on that theory, petitioners must show more than that vehicle manufacturers had to adopt particular fuel-saving mechanisms in

order to comply with California’s ACC program standards. Rather, petitioners must show that vehicle manufacturers would cease to utilize those mechanisms, and

would instead make and sell “more vehicles that run on

more liquid fuel,” if EPA’s 2022 waiver reinstatement

were set aside and the relevant California standards

were again preempted. Pet. Br. 35. The onus was on

petitioners to substantiate that theory.

Petitioners did not satisfy that burden on the record

amassed below. The court of appeals determined that

the 2013 waiver has now been in effect for more than a

decade (with a partial hiatus from 2019 to 2022), and

during that period manufacturers have made significant

“investments” in “updating their fleets and growing

consumer demand for electric vehicles.” Pet. App. 14a.

The record below contained evidence that “ ‘both internal sustainability goals and external market forces’ are

prompting [manufacturers] to transition toward electric vehicles, irrespective of California’s regulations.”

Id. at 24a n.8 (citation omitted). The court further found

that manufacturers “are already selling more qualifying

vehicles in California than the State’s standards require.” Id. at 28a (citation omitted).

32

For example, in July 2021 the staff of the California

Air Resources Board (CARB), which administers the

State’s emissions programs, reported that vehicle manufacturers “all have collectively exceeded” the zeroemission-vehicle requirements in the ACC program and

had done so “by increasing margins” since 2012. J.A.

95. The staff further explained that manufacturers

were “complying more and more on their own,” rather

than relying on a system of transferable credits available under the program, and were “in fact expected to

increase [zero-emission-vehicle] production” in future

years. J.A. 96-97. Manufacturers planned to increase

such sales in part because their prior investments in research and development had yielded improved “[b]attery charge capacity, vehicle range, and efficiency,”

along with reduced costs for those technologies—all of

which, the staff explained, “point to increased deployment of zero-emission technologies at costs competitive

with conventional engines.” J.A. 97.

In disputing redressability, the California respondents relied principally on a declaration from the Chief

of CARB’s Advanced Clean Cars Branch. See Cal. C.A.

Br. 13-15; see also J.A. 188-207 (Cunningham Declaration). The Cunningham Declaration stated that “the

zero-emission vehicles sold in calendar year 2022” in

California already “exceed[ed] what California’s standards require.” J.A. 192. The Cunningham Declaration

also explained that sales data and news reports both

pointed to strong consumer demand for electric vehicles. J.A. 192-194. Citing public announcements by specific manufacturers including General Motors, MercedesBenz, and Stellantis, the declaration further noted that

“multiple manufacturers have announced plans to sell

substantially more zero-emission vehicles in the future

33

than the standards at issue in this litigation require.”

J.A. 202; see J.A. 202-203 & nn.37-44.

Several of those manufacturers intervened in the

proceedings below to defend the 2022 waiver reinstatement. See Pet. App. 15a n.6 (listing the intervenors).

Those manufacturers represented that, due to market

forces and long-term investment decisions, they anticipated selling more electric vehicles in the future than

would be required by California’s ACC program. The

manufacturers stated that they had already committed

to massive investments in electrification, with plans for

more than half of the vehicles they sold globally or in

the United States to be “fully electric by 2030.” Final

C.A. Br. for Indus. Resp.-Intervenors 3 (Industry C.A.

Br.); see id. at 2-3 (stating that Ford “expects that, by

2030, electric vehicles will represent half of its global

volume”; that Volkswagen “plans to * * * make 55% of

U.S. sales fully electric by 2030”; that BMW intends to

“mak[e] electric vehicles half of its global volume” by

2030; and that Honda “has announced that 100% of its

vehicles worldwide will be electrified by 2040”). Those

estimates substantially exceed the sales mandates under the ACC program. As originally designed, the ACC

program required zero-emission vehicles to represent

22% of sales for model-year 2025 and beyond. J.A. 50.

Petitioners discount (Br. 37) those statements as efforts to anticipate the increasingly stringent requirements of the ACC program. But the emissions standards at issue in the 2022 reinstatement were designed

to increase in stringency to model-year 2025 and then

to reach a steady state. See p. 7, supra. The manufacturers who intervened below also stated that the “transition [to electrification] is accelerating for numerous

reasons beyond compliance with California’s regulatory

34

program.” Industry C.A. Br. 11. The intervenors identified “dramatically” growing “consumer demand for

electric vehicles,” and “myriad regulatory programs

across the world” that have encouraged investments in

electrification, as significant drivers of those changes.

Id. at 11-12; see id. at 13 (acknowledging that those

trends will “reduc[e] demand for conventional fuels,” but

explaining that “[r]educed interest in legacy products

due to technology advancements and consumer preference shifts are an inevitable reality of the market”).

Petitioners contend (Br. 37) that the court of appeals

should not have relied on the stated plans of the industry intervenors because those parties did not speak for

“every automaker.” On petitioners’ view (ibid.), the intervenors had an incentive to defend the 2022 reinstatement to protect their investments in electrification and

to prevent being undercut by competitors who might

“pull back their electric-vehicle numbers and instead

sell more liquid-fuel-powered vehicles” if the reinstatement were invalidated.

The court of appeals’ determination that petitioners

had failed to establish redressability did not depend on

proof that “every automaker” (Pet. Br. 37) had already

committed to exceeding the challenged emissions standards. Rather, the burden was on petitioners to show

that a decision in their favor would likely cause at least

one manufacturer to alter its prices or products in a

way that would increase demand for liquid fuels. Petitioners did not identify any such manufacturer when

seeking to prove their standing below, and they still have

not named a candidate. To be sure, a court need not

treat as conclusive any regulated party’s representation

about the actions that party would take in specified hypothetical circumstances. But the court of appeals can

35

scarcely be faulted for giving weight to the vehicle manufacturers’ representations here, given petitioners’ failure to proffer any contrary evidence regarding the manufacturers’ likely response to vacatur of the 2022 reinstatement.

c. The above factual conclusions may well be open to

question. As noted above (see p. 14), EPA is currently

reassessing the 2022 reinstatement and may reevaluate

its factual premises, including any potential economic

harms it may have caused to manufacturers of conventional gas-powered vehicles and to fuel producers. EPA’s

review will be appropriately based on the evidence before the agency in the ongoing administrative process.

In evaluating that evidence, moreover, the agency can

draw on the experience and expertise it has accumulated over decades in administering the CAA generally,

and in implementing the California waiver program in

particular.

The court of appeals’ standing determination, by

contrast, depended on the closed record that had been

assembled by the parties in the federal litigation, and

the court’s inquiry focused on the state of affairs that

existed at the time federal jurisdiction was invoked.

And because federal judges are neither policy-makers

nor specialized experts in the motor-vehicle industry,

the court was appropriately reluctant to adopt a view of

vehicle manufacturers’ likely conduct that was both contrary to the manufacturers’ own representations and

unsupported by record evidence in this case. Focusing

solely on the record here, the court correctly held that

petitioners had failed to make the showing needed to

establish redressability.

Petitioners point (Br. 37) to the “14 declarations”

they submitted with their opening brief below. But

36

those declarations said virtually nothing about redressability. The declarants did not attempt “to explain in

any detail how their injuries are redressable,” nor did

petitioners seek to file any “ ‘additional affidavits or other

evidence sufficient to support’ redressability” with their

reply brief. Pet. App. 24a-25a (citation omitted). Petitioners accordingly failed to meet their “burden * * *

to adduce facts showing that” the third-party automakers would act “in such manner as to * * * permit redressability of [their asserted] injury.” Defenders of

Wildlife, 504 U.S. at 562.

For example, one of petitioners’ 14 declarants was a

representative of the Illinois Corn Growers Association,

who stated that allowing California’s ACC program to

take effect had reduced demand for gasoline and in turn

for ethanol, which is produced from corn. J.A. 128-129.

But with respect to the effect of invalidating the 2022

reinstatement, that declarant merely asserted: “All

these injuries would be substantially ameliorated if

EPA’s decision were set aside.” J.A. 130. Petitioners’

other standing declarations were similarly conclusory;

many repeated word-for-word the same boilerplate.

See, e.g., J.A. 137 (“All these injuries would be substantially ameliorated if EPA’s decision were set aside.”);

J.A. 150, 154, 158, 167, 181 (same). Others did not address redressability at all, simply asserting that EPA’s

2022 reinstatement had caused financial injury. J.A.

126, 141, 162, 170, 174, 177, 184.

Rather than come forward with their own evidence,

petitioners sought to rely below on various statements

that California had made in seeking the original 2013

waiver—an approach petitioners reprise in this Court.

See J.A. 118, 210; cf. Pet. Br. 3-4, 35, 38. Petitioners are

correct that, when California sought a waiver for its

37

original ACC program more than a decade ago, the State

predicted that the greenhouse gas emissions standards

and zero-emission-vehicle sales mandate would result in

“substantial reductions in demand for gasoline.” J.A.

13; see J.A. 35. When EPA granted the waiver in 2013,

it similarly contemplated that manufacturers would

comply with the emissions standards by implementing

technologies for more fuel-efficient cars. See, e.g., 78

Fed. Reg. at 2114, 2136, 2140-2141.

Those predictions, however, are largely irrelevant to

the present redressability inquiry. Petitioners did not

contest the original 2013 waiver and instead brought

this challenge to EPA’s 2022 reinstatement of that

waiver. Under Article III, petitioners had the burden

to show that a judicial decision invalidating the reinstatement would cause third-party vehicle manufacturers to change their plans, and that showing must be

based on the record in this case and evaluated as of the

filing of the petition for review in 2022, not circa 2013.

Even if California’s 2013 predictions were accurate—

i.e., even if the Court assumes that the ACC program

caused vehicle manufacturers to develop and implement

fuel-saving technological features that they would not

otherwise have adopted—that would not prove here

that the manufacturers would abandon those features if

the legal obligation to implement them were removed.

Petitioners cite one of the declarations filed below to

suggest that California “recently projected that the

waiver would ‘reduce emissions through reductions in

fuel production.’ ” Pet. Br. 38 (quoting J.A. 148). But as

that declaration makes clear, California made that projection “in its original waiver request” in 2012. J.A. 148;

cf. J.A. 180 (citing the same statement from 2012). Petitioners’ invocation of a 2020 statement from a Minne-

38

sota regulator (Br. 38; see J.A. 174) is no more persuasive. That regulator was not predicting what would

happen in the absence of the California standards, but

rather was estimating how much less gasoline would be

consumed by vehicles that complied with those standards than by vehicles that complied only with the default federal standards then in place. See Minnesota

Pollution Control Agency, Statement of Need and Reasonableness: Proposed Revisions to Minnesota Rules,

Chapter 7023, Adopting Vehicle Greenhouse Gas Emissions Standards, No. 04626, at 65 (Dec. 2020) (estimating “that the [low-emission-vehicle] standard would result in a reduction of approximately 700 million gallons

of gasoline purchased by Minnesotans over these 10

years compared with if Minnesotans had instead been

driving SAFE-certified vehicles”).

Petitioners’ remaining evidence (Br. 38) consists of

two 2021 statements by California. Neither statement

addresses any question about how manufacturers would

respond if the 2022 reinstatement were set aside. See

J.A. 66 (describing in general terms how California’s

emissions standards “incentivize technological advancement that facilitates greater emission reductions in the

future”); J.A. 84 (describing cost-benefit analysis that

took account of “emissions reductions that would result

from the avoided production and delivery of gasoline”

for zero-emission vehicles).

2. Attorney argument cannot substitute for the record

evidence that petitioners failed to adduce

Petitioners contend (Br. 29-30) that they were entitled to rely on “case-specific inferences” about the “predictable” behavior of vehicle manufacturers in order to

show redressability. Petitioners are of course free to

argue about the inferences to be drawn from the evi-

39

dence before the Court. But as juries are routinely instructed, “the arguments of counsel [are] not evidence.”

Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 182 (1986). And

petitioners introduced no evidence to support the inference they are asking the Court to draw, beyond conclusory declarations stating that setting aside the 2022 reinstatement would ameliorate their injuries. See p. 36,

supra.

Recognizing petitioners’ failure of proof would not

call into question any legitimate place in the law of

standing for “common sense and basic economics.” Pet.

Br. 30. There may well be cases in which commonsense

economic principles can establish redressability, given

the other evidence of injury and causation. But as the

court of appeals correctly recognized, this is not such a

case. Pet. App. 24a-25a, 29a. On the record amassed

here and judged at the time of the petition for review in

2022, it is hardly “Economics 101” (Pet. Br. 35) to assume that manufacturers would likely alter their products or prices in response to the judicial decree petitioners seek, given the contrary record evidence from those

manufacturers. Petitioners also did not address the evidence showing that “manufacturers are already selling

more qualifying vehicles in California than the State’s

standards require.” Pet. App. 28a (citation omitted).

Petitioners’ reliance (Br. 30-31) on this Court’s decision in Department of Commerce v. New York, 588 U.S.

752 (2019), is also misplaced. That case came to this

Court after an eight-day bench trial, at which the district court heard evidence about each of the elements of

standing. See New York v. United States Department of

Commerce, 351 F. Supp. 3d 502, 516, 576-625 (S.D.N.Y.)

(district court’s findings of fact and conclusions of law

on standing), aff ’d in part, rev’d in part, remanded, 588

40

U.S. 752 (2019). On clear-error review, this Court affirmed the district court’s finding that the addition of a

question about citizenship status to the decennial census would “result in noncitizen households responding

to the census at lower rates than other groups, which in

turn would cause them to be undercounted.” Department of Commerce, 588 U.S. at 767. This Court also

agreed that at least some of the State plaintiffs had

standing to challenge the addition of the citizenship

question because even a relatively small undercounting

of aliens’ households would cause the States to “lose out

on federal funds that are distributed on the basis of

state population.” Ibid. And the Court found that the

States had demonstrated causation under Article III

even though their asserted injury relied on the “independent action of third parties choosing to violate their

legal duty to respond to the census.” Ibid.

The Court in Department of Commerce observed

that aliens “will likely react in predictable ways to the

citizenship question.” 588 U.S. at 768. But that observation does not help petitioners here. The Court was

not suggesting that because aliens’ behavior was predictable, the plaintiff States had no need to prove causation. Rather, the Court reasoned that the plaintiff

States had established causation by showing, through

testimonial and documentary evidence, that aliens’

households would predictably respond to the census at

lower rates if the citizenship question were included.

See ibid. (explaining that the States had “met their burden,” and citing “[t]he evidence at trial” regarding historical non-response rates). Here, by contrast, petitioners have no persuasive evidence to warrant their predictions regarding how automakers would likely react

to vacatur of EPA’s reinstatement.

41

Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007) (cited at

Pet. Br. 31-32), likewise does not support petitioners’

redressability argument here. In that case, Massachusetts argued that EPA’s denial of a rulemaking petition,

seeking to require the agency to regulate greenhouse

gas emissions from new motor vehicles, had injured the

State in various ways, including by contributing to rising sea levels that were eroding state-owned coastal

lands. Id. at 510-511, 521-522. This Court found that

Massachusetts had adequately demonstrated Article

III standing based on the scientific affidavits and other

evidence the State had submitted to substantiate its

theory. See id. at 521-526.

Petitioners describe this Court’s decision in Massachusetts as reflecting the premise, based on “EPA’s own

statements about its regulatory priorities,” that a judicial decree “ordering EPA to set emission standards

would cause fewer vehicle emissions and therefore redress [the plaintiffs’] injuries.” Pet. Br. 31 (citing Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 526). That analogy might have

force if petitioners had challenged EPA’s 2013 waiver at

the time it was issued. Petitioners could then have invoked California’s projections as support for allegations

that the waiver would injure petitioners by causing

manufacturers to produce more fuel-efficient vehicles,

and that vacatur of the waiver would redress that injury

by allowing manufacturers to continue their existing

practices.

As explained above, however, the evidence of likely

future conduct by the manufacturers circa 2022 as

amassed in the proceedings below, which petitioners did

not counter with evidence of their own, suggested that

the predictions California had made in instituting the

ACC program have been overtaken by the events of the

42

past decade. The pertinent Article III question here is

not whether the 2013 waiver caused manufacturers to

produce more fuel-efficient vehicles than they otherwise would have. It is instead whether the record before the court of appeals shows that, at the time petitioners sought judicial review in 2022, it was likely that

vacatur of the reinstatement, and consequent preemption of the ACC program, would cause manufacturers to

reverse those practices.

Petitioners’ remaining cases (Br. 32-34) involve circumstances in which this Court found that parties

lacked Article III standing. See Murthy, 603 U.S. at 56;

Alliance for Hippocratic Med., 602 U.S. at 396-397;

United States v. Texas, 599 U.S. 670, 675-678 (2023);

Brackeen, 599 U.S. at 291-296; California v. Texas, 593

U.S. 659, 674 (2021). To the extent those cases addressed

redressability, they confirm that petitioners—as challengers who are not the object of the emissions standards at issue—face a “difficult” burden to establish their

standing and cannot “rely on speculation about the unfettered choices made by independent actors not before

the courts.” Alliance for Hippocratic Med., 602 U.S. at

382-383 (citations omitted); see Murthy, 603 U.S. at 5758; California, 593 U.S. at 675. Application of those

principles supports the D.C. Circuit’s conclusion that

petitioners likewise failed to establish standing here. 2

Petitioners also invoke (Br. 20, 34, 42) decisions involving competitor standing. See, e.g., National Credit Union Admin. v. First

Nat’l Bank & Trust Co., 522 U.S. 479, 488 n.4 (1998); Association of

Data Processing Serv. Orgs., Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 152 (1970).

But petitioners are not challenging the government’s regulation of

their competitors—or their suppliers or customers. Petitioners sell

fuel or the raw material used to make fuel for the ultimate use of

consumers (i.e., drivers), not vehicle manufacturers.

2

43

Because petitioners failed to show that manufacturers would be likely to alter their practices in response

to the judicial decree that petitioners seek, it is no help

to petitioners to invoke (Br. 4, 19, 24) the principle that

redressing even a small amount of economic harm can

be sufficient for Article III standing. Cf. Uzuegbunam

v. Preczewski, 592 U.S. 279, 291 (2021) (explaining that

a judicial decree ordering the defendant to pay the

plaintiff nominal damages “provide[s] redress”). The

judicial decree that petitioners seek would not itself require anyone to pay petitioners anything.

3. Petitioners’ policy arguments are irrelevant and

unsound

The “triad of injury in fact, causation, and redressability constitutes the core of Article III’s case-or-controversy requirement.” Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better

Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 103-104 (1998) (footnote omitted).

Those three requirements reflect the “irreducible constitutional minimum of standing.” Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. at 560. Accordingly, petitioners’ policy arguments (Br. 41-45) are beside the point. If petitioners

have failed to carry their burden of proving redressability, no policy concern could authorize an exercise of federal jurisdiction that Article III forbids. In any event,

petitioners’ policy arguments are unavailing.

Petitioners contend (Br. 42-43) that requiring them

to prove how vehicle manufacturers would likely respond to the judicial decree that petitioners seek makes

petitioners’ standing too dependent on the manufacturers themselves, who may have incentives to cooperate

with regulators. Nothing in the decision below, however, suggests that a supporting affidavit from a vehicle

manufacturer was the only way petitioners could have

carried their burden of proof on redressability. Peti-

44

tioners might instead have submitted affidavits from

analysts, economists, or other knowledgeable experts

who could have addressed the market factors that the

manufacturers had identified as causing them to plan to

exceed the challenged emissions standards.

The fact that petitioners’ standing turns on manufacturers’ plans is a feature, not a bug, of this Court’s Article III case law. Article III standing principles ensure

that federal courts decide disputed legal issues only at

the behest of litigants who have a personal stake in the

outcome. Even a plaintiff who has been injured by allegedly unlawful conduct has no such stake unless a favorable judicial ruling would redress that harm. Petitioners’ injury would not be redressed by a decision in

their favor unless such a decision caused at least one

manufacturer to sell vehicles that increase demand for

liquid fuels. When a litigant’s theory of standing turns

on “the independent action of some third party,” this

Court has properly required more than mere speculation or “guesswork” about the third party’s likely future

conduct. Murthy, 603 U.S. at 57 (citations omitted).

Petitioners contend (Br. 43-44) that affirming the decision below will create incentives for an agency to seek

to avoid judicial review by “appeasing the directly regulated industry.” But in assessing how vehicle manufacturers would likely react to a judicial decision vacating EPA’s 2022 reinstatement, the court of appeals

could scarcely have ignored the manufacturers’ own

submission addressing that question. And as explained

above, petitioners could have introduced alternative evidence to support their theory of redressability. Petitioners simply failed to proffer such evidence.

Petitioners also observe that California would have

standing to challenge an EPA denial of a CAA preemp-

45

tion waiver, based on the “State’s interest in vindicating

its laws.” Pet. Br. 44. Petitioners assert that “the decision below creates a one-way ratchet in favor of the regulator over the regulated.” Ibid. But under the legal

regime at issue here, petitioners are not among “the

regulated”: California’s ACC program regulates vehicle manufacturers, not providers of liquid fuel or fuel

components. And this Court has long recognized that

standing is more difficult to establish when a plaintiff

challenges the government’s regulation of a third party.

See pp. 21-23, supra. There is consequently nothing

anomalous about the disparity petitioners identify.

C. The Court Of Appeals’ Error Regarding The Duration

Of The Waiver Was Harmless

The court of appeals appears to have decided this

case under the misimpression that EPA’s reinstatement

of the 2013 waiver pertained only to new-motor-vehicle

emissions standards through model-year 2025. Based

on that understanding, the court believed that petitioners could show redressability only by demonstrating

that vehicle manufacturers would change their conduct

“relatively quickly” if EPA’s 2022 reinstatement were

vacated. Pet. App. 23a; see U.S. Br. in Opp. 12-13.

In fact, EPA’s reinstated waiver does not expire after model-year 2025. In its original form, California’s

ACC program set low-emission-vehicle standards and

zero-emission-vehicle standards that would increase in

stringency through model-year 2025 and then remain in

effect at the 2025 levels. See p. 7, supra. When EPA

reinstated the 2013 waiver, it waived federal preemption under the CAA for those emissions standards for

as long as they continue in force as a matter of state law.

Petitioners now contend (Br. 45-47) that they have

demonstrated redressability when the issue is analyzed

46

without the mistaken premise that the reinstated waiver

pertained only to standards applicable through 2025.

But the court of appeals’ apparent error was harmless

and should not be a basis for reversing the judgment

below. Petitioners do not point to any record evidence

that entry of the judicial decree they seek would cause

any manufacturer to take steps after model-year 2025

that would redress petitioners’ asserted injuries. Expanding the time horizon for assessing redressability

beyond model-year 2025 thus does not help petitioners

because they have no evidence for that period either.

Contrary to petitioners’ assertion (Br. 39-41), the

court of appeals’ discussion of the duration of the 2013

waiver did not conflate redressability with mootness.

The court correctly recognized that redressability was

to be assessed at the time petitioners sought judicial review, and the court explained that petitioners had failed

to show redressability “from the start.” Pet. App. 25a.

* * * * *

This case does not present any occasion to address in

the abstract the relationship between California’s emissions standards and consumer demand for liquid fuels.

Under Article III, the relevant question here is far narrower and more case-specific: On the record amassed

below, did petitioners carry their burden to show that,

as of the filing of their petition for review in 2022, it was

likely that a decision in their favor would cause the vehicle manufacturers who are actually subject to the

challenged emissions standards to change course in

such a way as to redress petitioners’ asserted injuries?

The answer to that question is no.

As previously explained, EPA is undertaking its own

review of the 2022 reinstatement, and the agency may ultimately conclude in that process that California’s emis-

47

sions standards have had a deleterious impact on American consumers and liquid fuel producers. But parties

seeking to invoke the jurisdiction of the federal courts

cannot rely on later administrative developments to establish that they satisfied Article III standing requirements at the time of suit. Whatever EPA may conclude

about the effects of the 2013 waiver, petitioners did not

show during the judicial proceedings here that setting

the waiver aside would redress their asserted injuries.

CONCLUSION

The judgment of the court of appeals should be

affirmed.

Respectfully submitted.

JAMES PAYNE

Acting General Counsel

KYLE DURCH

Attorney

Environmental Protection

Agency

MARCH 2025

SARAH M. HARRIS

Acting Solicitor General

ADAM R.F. GUSTAFSON

Acting Assistant Attorney

General

MALCOLM L. STEWART

Deputy Solicitor General

MATTHEW GUARNIERI

Assistant to the Solicitor

General

ERIC G. HOSTETLER

SUE CHEN

Attorneys

APPENDIX

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

Appendix — Statutory provisions:

42 U.S.C. 7507 ............................................. 1a

42 U.S.C. 7521(a)(1)-(2) .............................. 2a

42 U.S.C. 7522(a) ........................................ 3a

42 U.S.C. 7523 ............................................. 7a

42 U.S.C. 7524(a)-(b) .................................. 7a

42 U.S.C. 7543 ............................................. 9a

(I)

APPENDIX

1.

42 U.S.C. 7507 provides:

New motor vehicle emission standards in nonattainment

areas

Notwithstanding section 7543(a) of this title, any

State which has plan provisions approved under this

part may adopt and enforce for any model year standards relating to control of emissions from new motor vehicles or new motor vehicle engines and take such other

actions as are referred to in section 7543(a) of this title respecting such vehicles if—

(1) such standards are identical to the California

standards for which a waiver has been granted for

such model year, and

(2) California and such State adopt such standards at least two years before commencement of such

model year (as determined by regulations of the Administrator).

Nothing in this section or in subchapter II of this chapter shall be construed as authorizing any such State to

prohibit or limit, directly or indirectly, the manufacture

or sale of a new motor vehicle or motor vehicle engine

that is certified in California as meeting California

standards, or to take any action of any kind to create, or

have the effect of creating, a motor vehicle or motor vehicle engine different than a motor vehicle or engine certified in California under California standards (a “third

vehicle”) or otherwise create such a “third vehicle”.

(1a)

2a

2.

42 U.S.C. 7521(a)(1)-(2) provides:

Emission standards for new motor vehicles or new motor

vehicle engines

(a)

Authority of Administrator to prescribe by regulation

Except as otherwise provided in subsection (b)—

(1) The Administrator shall by regulation prescribe

(and from time to time revise) in accordance with the

provisions of this section, standards applicable to the

emission of any air pollutant from any class or classes of

new motor vehicles or new motor vehicle engines, which

in his judgment cause, or contribute to, air pollution

which may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public

health or welfare. Such standards shall be applicable

to such vehicles and engines for their useful life (as determined under subsection (d), relating to useful life of

vehicles for purposes of certification), whether such vehicles and engines are designed as complete systems or

incorporate devices to prevent or control such pollution.

(2) Any regulation prescribed under paragraph (1)

of this subsection (and any revision thereof) shall take

effect after such period as the Administrator finds necessary to permit the development and application of the

requisite technology, giving appropriate consideration

to the cost of compliance within such period.

3a

3.

42 U.S.C. 7522(a) provides:

Prohibited acts

(a)

Enumerated prohibitions

The following acts and the causing thereof are prohibited—

(1) in the case of a manufacturer of new motor

vehicles or new motor vehicle engines for distribution

in commerce, the sale, or the offering for sale, or the

introduction, or delivery for introduction, into commerce, or (in the case of any person, except as provided by regulation of the Administrator), the importation into the United States, of any new motor vehicle or new motor vehicle engine, manufactured after

the effective date of regulations under this part which

are applicable to such vehicle or engine unless such

vehicle or engine is covered by a certificate of conformity issued (and in effect) under regulations prescribed under this part or part C in the case of cleanfuel vehicles (except as provided in subsection (b));

(2)(A) for any person to fail or refuse to permit

access to or copying of records or to fail to make reports or provide information required under section

7542 of this title;

(B) for any person to fail or refuse to permit entry, testing or inspection authorized under section

7525(c) of this title or section 7542 of this title;

(C) for any person to fail or refuse to perform

tests, or have tests performed as required under section 7542 of this title;

4a

(D) for any manufacturer to fail to make information available as provided by regulation under section 7521(m)(5) of this title;

(3)(A) for any person to remove or render inoperative any device or element of design installed on

or in a motor vehicle or motor vehicle engine in compliance with regulations under this subchapter prior

to its sale and delivery to the ultimate purchaser, or

for any person knowingly to remove or render inoperative any such device or element of design after

such sale and delivery to the ultimate purchaser; or

(B) for any person to manufacture or sell, or offer to sell, or install, any part or component intended

for use with, or as part of, any motor vehicle or motor

vehicle engine, where a principal effect of the part or

component is to bypass, defeat, or render inoperative

any device or element of design installed on or in a

motor vehicle or motor vehicle engine in compliance

with regulations under this subchapter, and where

the person knows or should know that such part or

component is being offered for sale or installed for

such use or put to such use; or

(4) for any manufacturer of a new motor vehicle

or new motor vehicle engine subject to standards

prescribed under section 7521 of this title or part

C—

(A) to sell or lease any such vehicle or engine

unless such manufacturer has complied with (i)

the requirements of section 7541(a) and (b) of this

title with respect to such vehicle or engine, and unless a label or tag is affixed to such vehicle or engine in accordance with section 7541(c)(3) of this

5a

title, or (ii) the corresponding requirements of

part C in the case of clean fuel vehicles unless the

manufacturer has complied with the corresponding requirements of part C 1

(B) to fail or refuse to comply with the requirements of section 7541(c) or (e) of this title, or

the corresponding requirements of part C in the

case of clean fuel vehicles 1

(C) except as provided in subsection (c)(3)

of section 7541 of this title and the corresponding

requirements of part C in the case of clean fuel vehicles, to provide directly or indirectly in any communication to the ultimate purchaser or any subsequent purchaser that the coverage of any warranty under this chapter is conditioned upon use

of any part, component, or system manufactured

by such manufacturer or any person acting for

such manufacturer or under his control, or conditioned upon service performed by any such person, or

(D) to fail or refuse to comply with the terms

and conditions of the warranty under section

7541(a) or (b) of this title or the corresponding requirements of part C in the case of clean fuel vehicles with respect to any vehicle; or

(5) for any person to violate section 7553 of this

title, 7554 of this title, or part C of this subchapter or

any regulations under section 7553 of this title, 7554

of this title, or part C.

1

So in original.

Probably should be followed by a comma.

6a

No action with respect to any element of design referred

to in paragraph (3) (including any adjustment or alteration of such element) shall be treated as a prohibited act

under such paragraph (3) if such action is in accordance

with section 7549 of this title. Nothing in paragraph

(3) shall be construed to require the use of manufacturer

parts in maintaining or repairing any motor vehicle or

motor vehicle engine. For the purposes of the preceding sentence, the term “manufacturer parts” means,

with respect to a motor vehicle engine, parts produced

or sold by the manufacturer of the motor vehicle or motor vehicle engine. No action with respect to any device or element of design referred to in paragraph (3)

shall be treated as a prohibited act under that paragraph if (i) the action is for the purpose of repair or replacement of the device or element, or is a necessary and

temporary procedure to repair or replace any other item

and the device or element is replaced upon completion

of the procedure, and (ii) such action thereafter results

in the proper functioning of the device or element referred to in paragraph (3). No action with respect to

any device or element of design referred to in paragraph

(3) shall be treated as a prohibited act under that paragraph if the action is for the purpose of a conversion of

a motor vehicle for use of a clean alternative fuel (as defined in this subchapter) and if such vehicle complies

with the applicable standard under section 7521 of this

title when operating on such fuel, and if in the case of a

clean alternative fuel vehicle (as defined by rule by the

Administrator), the device or element is replaced upon

completion of the conversion procedure and such action

results in proper functioning of the device or element

when the motor vehicle operates on conventional fuel.

7a

4.

42 U.S.C. 7523 provides:

Actions to restrain violations

(a)

Jurisdiction

The district courts of the United States shall have jurisdiction to restrain violations of section 7522(a) of this

title.

(b)

Actions brought by or in name of United States; subpenas

Actions to restrain such violations shall be brought

by and in the name of the United States. In any such

action, subpenas for witnesses who are required to attend a district court in any district may run into any

other district.

5.

42 U.S.C. 7524(a)-(b) provides:

Civil penalties

(a)

Violations

Any person who violates sections1 7522(a)(1), 7522(a)(4),

or 7522(a)(5) of this title or any manufacturer or dealer

who violates section 7522(a)(3)(A) of this title shall be

subject to a civil penalty of not more than $25,000. Any

person other than a manufacturer or dealer who violates section 7522(a)(3)(A) of this title or any person

who violates section 7522(a)(3)(B) of this title shall be

subject to a civil penalty of not more than $2,500. Any

such violation with respect to paragraph (1), (3)(A), or

(4) of section 7522(a) of this title shall constitute a separate offense with respect to each motor vehicle or mo1

So in original.

Probably should be “section”.

8a

tor vehicle engine. Any such violation with respect

to section 7522(a)(3)(B) of this title shall constitute a

separate offense with respect to each part or component.

Any person who violates section 7522(a)(2) of this title shall be subject to a civil penalty of not more than

$25,000 per day of violation.

(b)

Civil actions

The Administrator may commence a civil action to assess and recover any civil penalty under subsection (a)

of this section, section 7545(d) of this title, or section

7547(d) of this title. Any action under this subsection

may be brought in the district court of the United States

for the district in which the violation is alleged to have

occurred or in which the defendant resides or has the

Administrator’s principal place of business, and the

court shall have jurisdiction to assess a civil penalty.

In determining the amount of any civil penalty to be assessed under this subsection, the court shall take into

account the gravity of the violation, the economic benefit

or savings (if any) resulting from the violation, the size

of the violator’s business, the violator’s history of compliance with this subchapter, action taken to remedy the

violation, the effect of the penalty on the violator’s ability to continue in business, and such other matters as

justice may require. In any such action, subpoenas for

witnesses who are required to attend a district court in

any district may run into any other district.

9a

6.

42 U.S.C. 7543 provides:

State standards

(a)

Prohibition

No State or any political subdivision thereof shall

adopt or attempt to enforce any standard relating to the

control of emissions from new motor vehicles or new motor vehicle engines subject to this part. No State shall

require certification, inspection, or any other approval

relating to the control of emissions from any new motor

vehicle or new motor vehicle engine as condition precedent to the initial retail sale, titling (if any), or registration of such motor vehicle, motor vehicle engine, or

equipment.

(b)

Waiver

(1) The Administrator shall, after notice and opportunity for public hearing, waive application of this section to any State which has adopted standards (other

than crankcase emission standards) for the control of

emissions from new motor vehicles or new motor vehicle

engines prior to March 30, 1966, if the State determines

that the State standards will be, in the aggregate, at

least as protective of public health and welfare as applicable Federal standards. No such waiver shall be

granted if the Administrator finds that—

(A) the determination of the State is arbitrary

and capricious,

(B) such State does not need such State standards to meet compelling and extraordinary conditions, or

10a

(C) such State standards and accompanying enforcement procedures are not consistent with section 7521(a) of this title.

(2) If each State standard is at least as stringent as

the comparable applicable Federal standard, such State

standard shall be deemed to be at least as protective of

health and welfare as such Federal standards for purposes of paragraph (1).

(3) In the case of any new motor vehicle or new motor vehicle engine to which State standards apply pursuant to a waiver granted under paragraph (1), compliance with such State standards shall be treated as compliance with applicable Federal standards for purposes

of this subchapter.

(c)

Certification of vehicle parts or engine parts

Whenever a regulation with respect to any motor vehicle part or motor vehicle engine part is in effect under section 7541(a)(2) of this title, no State or political

subdivision thereof shall adopt or attempt to enforce any

standard or any requirement of certification, inspection,

or approval which relates to motor vehicle emissions and

is applicable to the same aspect of such part. The preceding sentence shall not apply in the case of a State

with respect to which a waiver is in effect under subsection (b).

(d)

Control, regulation, or restrictions on registered or

licensed motor vehicles

Nothing in this part shall preclude or deny to any

State or political subdivision thereof the right otherwise

to control, regulate, or restrict the use, operation, or

movement of registered or licensed motor vehicles.

11a

(e)

Nonroad engines or vehicles

(1) Prohibition on certain State standards

No State or any political subdivision thereof shall

adopt or attempt to enforce any standard or other requirement relating to the control of emissions from

either of the following new nonroad engines or

nonroad vehicles subject to regulation under this

chapter—

(A) New engines which are used in construction equipment or vehicles or used in farm equipment or vehicles and which are smaller than 175

horsepower.

(B) New locomotives or new engines used in

locomotives.

Subsection (b) shall not apply for purposes of this

paragraph.

(2) Other nonroad engines or vehicles

(A) In the case of any nonroad vehicles or engines other than those referred to in subparagraph

(A) or (B) of paragraph (1), the Administrator shall,

after notice and opportunity for public hearing, authorize California to adopt and enforce standards and

other requirements relating to the control of emissions from such vehicles or engines if California determines that California standards will be, in the aggregate, at least as protective of public health and

welfare as applicable Federal standards. No such

authorization shall be granted if the Administrator

finds that—

(i) the determination of California is arbitrary and capricious,

12a

(ii) California does not need such California

standards to meet compelling and extraordinary

conditions, or

(iii) California standards and accompanying

enforcement procedures are not consistent with

this section.

(B) Any State other than California which has

plan provisions approved under part D of subchapter

I may adopt and enforce, after notice to the Administrator, for any period, standards relating to control

of emissions from nonroad vehicles or engines (other

than those referred to in subparagraph (A) or (B) of

paragraph (1)) and take such other actions as are referred to in subparagraph (A) of this paragraph respecting such vehicles or engines if—

(i) such standards and implementation and

enforcement are identical, for the period concerned,

to the California standards authorized by the Administrator under subparagraph (A), and

(ii) California and such State adopt such

standards at least 2 years before commencement

of the period for which the standards take effect.

The Administrator shall issue regulations to implement this subsection.