Amicus Curiae Brief — Diamond Alternative Energy, LLC, et al., Petitioners v. Environmental Protection Agency, et al.
Supreme Court briefAug 7, 2024
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No. 24-7
In the Supreme Court of the United States
DIAMOND ALTERNATIVE ENERGY, LLC, ET AL.,
Petitioners,
v.
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY ET AL.,
Respondents.
ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
BRIEF FOR THE SULPHUR INSTITUTE AS
AMICUS CURIAE IN SUPPORT OF THE
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
PATRICK F. PHILBIN
Counsel of Record
CHASE HARRINGTON
TORRIDON LAW PLLC
801 Seventeenth Street, N.W.
Suite 1100
Washington, DC 20006
(202) 249-6900
pphilbin@torridonlaw.com
August 7, 2024
i
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE ........................... 1
BACKGROUND ............................................................. 2
Sulfur Supply Chains Are A Critical Component of
the Economy. ................................................................... 2
A. Sulfur Is Produced As A Byproduct of
Refining Gasoline and Natural Gas. .................. 3
B. Sulfur Is Critical To The U.S. Agricultural
And Fertilizer Sectors. ....................................... 6
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT ..................................... 8
ARGUMENT .................................................................. 9
I. The D.C. Circuit’s Standing Decision Warrants
This Court’s Review. ................................................. 9
II. EPA’s Waiver Decision Also Warrants This
Court’s Review. ....................................................... 14
CONCLUSION ............................................................. 18
ii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases
Page(s)
Bennett v. Spear,
520 U.S. 154 (1997) ....................................................... 11
Corner Post, Inc. v. Board of Governors of
the Fed. Rsrv. Sys., 144 S. Ct. 2440
(2024) ............................................................................. 11
Dep’t of Commerce v. New York,
588 U.S. 752 (2019) ........................................... 10, 13, 14
FDA v. All. for Hippocratic Med.,
602 U.S. 367 (2024) ................................................. 10, 11
General Land Office v. Biden,
71 F.4th 264 (5th Cir. 2023) ......................................... 12
In re Idaho Conservation League,
811 F.3d 502 (D.C. Cir. 2016) ...................................... 13
Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife,
504 U.S. 555 (1992) ................................................. 10, 11
NRDC v. NHTSA,
894 F.3d 95 (2d Cir. 2018) ............................................ 12
PHH Corp. v. CFPB,
881 F.3d 75 (D.C. Cir. 2018) ........................................ 14
Teton Historic Aviation Found. v. Dep’t of
Def., 785 F.3d 719 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (per
curiam) ..................................................................... 12, 13
iii
Statutes
42 U.S.C.
§ 7401 ................................................................................ 4
§ 7543 .......................................................................... 9, 15
Regulations
40 C.F.R. §50.4 ..................................................................... 4
84 Fed. Reg 51,310 (Sept. 27, 2019) .................................. 15
87 Fed. Reg. 14,332 (Mar. 14, 2022) ................................... 2
Other Authorities
B. G. Goar, Sulfur Recovery Technology
Conf-860447 (1986),
https://perma.cc/T98R-R7KH....................................... 4
“The Economic Impact of U.S. Soybeans
and End Products on the U.S.
Economy—2023 Update,” Report for
United Soybean Bd. & Nat’l Oilseed
Processors Ass’n (Aug. 2023),
https://perma.cc/PNH4-YCFE ..................................... 7
Eve-Lyn S. Hinckley & Charles T.
Driscoll, Sulfur fertilizer use in the
Midwestern US increases as
atmospheric sulfur deposition declines
with improved air quality, 3 Comm.
Earth & Environ. 324 (2022),
https://doi.org/10.1038/s43247-02200662-9 ............................................................................. 6
iv
Other Authorities—continued
Federal Consortium for Advanced
Batteries, Nat’l Blueprint for Lithium
Batteries 2021-2030 (June 2021),
https://perma.cc/BN4F-Y73X ..................................... 17
The Fertilizer Inst., “TFI Releases
Fertilizer Industry Economic Impact
Study: Contributes $130 Billion to US
Economy,” (Sept. 24, 2020),
https://perma.cc/4L84-RLLZ ....................................... 7
James Q. Wilson, The Politics of
Regulation (1980) ......................................................... 14
Mark Maslin et al., Sulfur: A potential
resource crisis that could stifle green
technology and threaten food security
as the world decarbonizes, 188 The
Geographical J. 498 (2022),
https://perma.cc/23S8-XL2N ...................... 4, 15, 16, 17
Nat’l Corn Growers Ass’n, World of Corn
2024, https://perma.cc/BHB4-V8MR ........................... 8
S&P Global, Chemical Economics
Handbook: Sulfur (Mar. 2024),
https://tinyurl.com/mrj3dpy3 ........................................ 3
Sulfur Statistics and Information,
https://tinyurl.com/a223krdk ........................................ 5
TSI, FAQ, https://perma.cc/7RVX-5HZH......................... 4
TSI, Glossary “Sulphur uses,”
https://perma.cc/2DKM-M9HM ................................... 3
v
Other Authorities—continued
TSI, Sulphur – The Fourth Major Plant
Nutrient, https://perma.cc/6PQ8MCMU ............................................................................. 6
U.S. Dep’t of Transp., Bureau of Transp.
Statistics, “Daily Vehicle Travel During
the COVID-19 Public Health
Emergency,” (July 21, 2020),
https://tinyurl.com/4r8kk23h ........................................ 5
U.S. Geological Survey, Mineral
Commodity Summaries—Sulfur (Jan.
2024), https://perma.cc/YF43-Q6WE ........................... 4
“US Copper Supply to grow by 4% in
2024” Mining Technology (July 25,
2024), https://perma.cc/XEH2-ZRSJ ......................... 16
1
INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE
The Sulphur Institute (TSI) is a non-profit trade organization representing sixty global member companies
involved with producing, consuming, marketing, transporting, or otherwise adding value to elemental sulfur,
sulfuric acid, and sulfur-related agricultural products.1
Founded in 1960, TSI currently focuses on: (i) sharing and
promoting within TSI’s membership excellence in supply
chain operations, including the safe and efficient handling,
storage, and logistics practices for sulfur; (ii) providing information to governmental authorities in the U.S. and
abroad as they contemplate and develop regulatory
frameworks for sulfur and its value-added applications;
and (iii) expanding the public’s knowledge regarding the
benefits of sulfur and sulfur-related issues.
Sulfur is a valuable commodity and integral component of the U.S. and world economies. It is used to manufacture numerous products, including fertilizers, chemicals, paints, rubber products, medicines, fibers, sugar, detergents, plastics, paper, and many other products. Sulfur also is a vital nutrient for the crops making up much
of our Nation’s food chain. Without adequate sulfur supplies, stakeholders in supply and distribution chains in
these other industries, including the consuming public,
will be significantly affected.
America no longer mines sulfur. Rather, sulfur is recovered from oil and natural gas in the refining process to
1 Pursuant to Rule 37.2, TSI timely notified counsel of record of its
intent to file this brief. This brief was not authored in whole or in part
by counsel for any of the parties; no party or party’s counsel
contributed money for preparing or submitting this brief; and no one
other than amicus curiae and its counsel have contributed money for
preparing or submitting this brief. See Sup. Ct. R. 37.6.
2
reduce emissions of the chemical into the environment.
The Biden Administration has recently issued three rules
designed to force the motor vehicle industry to shift from
internal combustion engines to electric vehicles. As fuel
consumption plummets, so will sulfur supplies.
Petitioners challenge one of those rules: the EPA’s reinstatement of California’s preemption waiver under the
Clean Air Act which allows the State to impose strict
greenhouse gas tailpipe emissions standards and mandate
the sale of electric vehicles. See 87 Fed. Reg. 14,332 (Mar.
14, 2022). Other States are authorized to opt into California’s restrictions.
TSI, as the global advocate for sulfur and sulfur-related products, has a strong interest in the outcome of this
litigation. TSI is well-positioned to provide the Court with
insight into the industrial and social benefits of this chemical, as well as how the D.C. Circuit’s standing decision
will affect manufacturers (like the members of TSI) who
operate in integrated production streams. TSI can also
explain the adverse consequences of limiting sulfur supplies available to other industrial sectors—all factors that
were not adequately considered by EPA in its rulemaking.
Accordingly, TSI offers this amicus brief in support of
Petitioners’ petition for a writ of certiorari to challenge
EPA’s grant of California’s CAA waiver request.
BACKGROUND
Sulfur Supply Chains Are A Critical Component of
the Economy.
Sulfur is a critical commodity to many sectors of the
American and world economy. The most widely used derivative of sulfur is sulfuric acid (H2SO4). While sulfuric
acid is used as an industrial raw material for many
3
applications, its largest use is for the manufacture of phosphoric acid, a precursor to phosphate fertilizers and nonfertilizer phosphates.2 Sulfur and its derivatives are also
used in metallurgical ore leaching, caprolactam, pigments,
hydrofluoric acid, pulp and paper chemicals, sulfur fertilizers, petroleum refining, batteries, detergents, fungicides, pharmaceuticals, personal care products, cosmetics,
leather tanning, rubber vulcanization, plasticizers, dyestuffs, explosives, aramid fibers, construction materials,
sugar manufacture, dehydrating agent in organic chemical and petrochemical processes, water treatment, and
steel pickling.3
The array of industrial products derived from sulfur is
so vast that no comprehensive value estimates exist. Industries and product groups enabled by sulfur and sulfuric acid cut a large swath through the U.S. economy: construction materials, traditional batteries, rubber (vulcanization), pharmaceuticals, paper bleaching, water treatment, cosmetics/skin care, detergents, nylon, pigments,
leather tanning, explosives and, most importantly, fertilizers.
A. Sulfur Is Produced As A Byproduct of Refining
Gasoline and Natural Gas.
In the past, sulfur was primarily mined from native
sources in Texas and Louisiana. But the technique of extracting sulfur from underground deposits takes enormous energy to melt the sulfur and pump the molten product to the earth’s surface. This method, called the Frasch
process, ceased in America in 2000. In fact, this type of
2 See S&P Global, Chemical Economics Handbook: Sulfur (Mar.
2024), https://tinyurl.com/mrj3dpy3.
3 TSI, Glossary “Sulphur uses,” https://perma.cc/2DKM-M9HM.
4
sulfur extraction has declined over the last decade to less
than 2% of world production.4
Today, sulfur is principally extracted from oil and gas
refining. The Clean Air Act (CAA), 42 U.S.C. §7401 et
seq., requires the energy industry to reduce the amount of
“criteria pollutants,” emitted from motor vehicles and internal combustion engines. See id. at §§7408-7409. One
of the criteria pollutants subject to the CAA is sulfur dioxide (SO2), 40 C.F.R. §50.4, which is created by burning
off naturally occurring sulfur contained in oil. To prevent
SO2 from entering the atmosphere and to comply with the
CAA, the energy industry began recovering sulfur from
the oil refining process using the Claus Recovery Method.
This technique, implemented through a Sulfur Recovery
Unit, extracts naturally occurring liquid sulfur from oil
and gas streams to produce low-sulfur fuel used for internal combustion engines.5
Desulfurization of fossil fuels accounts for most sulfur
production. According to one study, “[m]ore than 80% of
the sulfur used industrially comes from the oil and natural
gas.”6 The United States Geological Survey (USGS) reports that sulfur recovery produced about 8 million metric
tons of sulfur in 2023.7
4 See TSI, FAQ, https://perma.cc/7RVX-5HZH.
5 See B. G. Goar, Sulfur Recovery Technology, Conf-860447 (1986),
https://perma.cc/T98R-R7KH.
6 See Mark Maslin et al., Sulfur: A potential resource crisis that could
stifle green technology and threaten food security as the world
decarbonizes, 188 The Geographical J. 498, 498 (2022),
https://perma.cc/23S8-XL2N.
7 U.S. Geological Survey, Mineral Commodity Summaries—Sulfur
(Jan. 2024), https://perma.cc/YF43-Q6WE.
5
Decrease in gasoline consumption results in a decrease in sulfur supplies. According to the Bureau of
Transportation Statistics, during the COVID-19 pandemic, there was a significant decrease in passenger
travel.8 With reduced demand for gasoline, there was
also a direct correlation between refinery output and sulfur supply necessary for the dozens of industries that require the chemical as an industrial raw material. According to the USGS, U.S. sulfur production during 2020
dropped by 800,000 tons—apparently due to scaled back
refining during the pandemic.9
Once extracted, the sulfur, now in molten form, is temporarily stored in a holding area at the refinery and then
transported by either railcar or cargo tank truck to industrial facilities that make sulfuric acid. These facilities include fertilizer plants, pulp and paper mills, copper smelters, sulfuric acid regeneration plants, and other chemical
processing facilities. In the form of sulfuric acid, sulfur
ranks as one of the more important elements used as an
industrial raw material. “It is of prime importance to major sectors in the world’s industrial and fertilizer complexes. Indeed, consumption of sulfuric acid has been regarded as one of the best indexes of a nation’s industrial
development.”10 In fact, “[m]ore sulfuric acid is produced
in America every year than any other chemical.”11
8 U.S. Dep’t of Transp., Bureau of Transp. Statistics, “Daily Vehicle
Travel During the COVID-19 Public Health Emergency,” (July 21,
2020), https://tinyurl.com/4r8kk23h.
9 U.S. Geological Survey, supra note 7.
10
U.S. Geological Survey, Sulfur Statistics and Information,
https://tinyurl.com/a223krdk.
11 Ibid.
6
B. Sulfur Is Critical To The U.S. Agricultural And
Fertilizer Sectors.
Sulfur is one of the 17 essential plant nutrients and is
indispensable to plant growth and crop development.12
Among other benefits, sulfur: (i) aids in the formation of
chlorophyll that permits photosynthesis through which
plants produce starch, sugars, oils, fats, vitamins, and
other compounds; (ii) serves as a building block for protein production; (iii) improves the synthesis of oils found
in oilseeds; and (iv) increases crop yields and improves
produce quality, which of course determine the market
price ultimately realized by farmers.13
Ironically, while the CAA is the reason this country
now has ample supplies of sulfur produced from oil and
gas refining, it also had the unintended effect of reducing
the amount of “free sulfur” available to farmers as a crop
nutrient. When sulfur was removed from fuel in the refining process, sulfur from atmospheric deposition created from internal combustion engine exhaust and other
industrial processes no longer fell from the sky onto farmers’ fields, creating a sulfur deficiency in many crops. As
atmospheric deposition decreased, there was not enough
free sulfur to aid in the growth of crops that feed the world
like wheat, canola, beans, and corn.14
Farmers had to replace these sulfur deficiencies, and
the TSI, academia, and the fertilizer industry responded
12
TSI, Sulphur – The Fourth
https://perma.cc/6PQ8-MCMU.
Major
Plant
Nutrient,
13 Ibid.
14 See generally Eve-Lyn S. Hinckley & Charles T. Driscoll, Sulfur
fertilizer use in the Midwestern US increases as atmospheric sulfur
deposition declines with improved air quality, 3 Comm. Earth & Environ. 324 (2022), https://doi.org/10.1038/s43247-022-00662-9.
7
accordingly. Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, TSI, in cooperation with other agricultural research entities, conducted studies on sulfur crop nutrition, and the studies established that sulfur-enhanced fertilizer substantially increases crop yields.
As a result, one of the major applications of sulfuric
acid is in the production of phosphate fertilizers. In 2019,
64% of all sulfur produced globally was used in the production of phosphate and other fertilizers.
All of this has a sizable impact on the U.S. economy.
In 2019, the fertilizer industry contributed about $130 billion and nearly 500,000 jobs to the U.S. economy.15 Likewise, major crops such as corn, wheat, and soybeans all
benefit from a healthy sulfur supply chain, which in turn
generates thousands of jobs and billions of dollars in economic output for the U.S. According to the United Soybean Board, the total economic impact from the soybean
sector is $124 billion, contributing 223,000 paid, full-time
equivalent jobs, as well as an additional 62,000 family
members, beyond growers themselves, who support and
are integral to soybean farming operations.16 The total
wage impact of the sector averaged $10 billion.17 Similar
economic benefits are seen with corn and wheat. The
15
See The Fertilizer Inst., “TFI Releases Fertilizer Industry
Economic Impact Study: Contributes $130 Billion to US Economy,”
(Sept. 24, 2020), https://perma.cc/4L84-RLLZ.
16 See “The Economic Impact of U.S. Soybeans and End Products on
the U.S. Economy—2023 Update,” Report for United Soybean Bd. &
Nat’l
Oilseed
Processors
Ass’n
at
3
(Aug.
2023),
https://perma.cc/PNH4-YCFE.
17 Ibid.
8
National Corn Growers Association reports that, in 2023,
the total U.S. corn crop value was $73.6 billion.18
Yet, without adequate sulfur stocks generated by the
petroleum and natural gas refining sector, such economic
benefits will be placed in jeopardy.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
1. The D.C. Circuit’s ruling on standing warrants review in this Court. It is well established that Article III
standing can rest on causation of injury traced through
the predictable reactions of third parties to government
regulation. And the redressability prong of standing is
the flip side of the causation coin.
In this case, it did not require any speculative leap to
recognize that regulatory actions (like California’s zeroemission-vehicle mandate) expressly designed to steer
the Nation towards an all-electric vehicle fleet would
cause injury for those, like Petitioners, who produce liquid
fuel—and that the injury would be redressed by removing
the mandate. Indeed, EPA’s waiver allowing California
to adopt a zero-emissions-vehicle mandate was expressly
intended to force lower consumption of liquid fuels than
otherwise would have occurred. The D.C. Circuit’s decision requiring proof of redressability—especially in the
form of affidavits from the regulated entities themselves
explaining how they would react to lifting the California
mandate—conflicts with this Court’s standing jurisprudence, conflicts with the decisions of several other circuits, and will interfere with the ability of businesses in
integrated supply or production chains to challenge regulatory actions that affect them through the predictable
18
Nat’l Corn Growers Ass’n, World of Corn 2024 at 3,
https://perma.cc/BHB4-V8MR.
9
reactions of other regulated entities in the interconnected
chain.
2. The Court should also grant review to address the
merits of EPA’s decision granting California a waiver under section 209(b) of the Clean Air Act. That waiver determination is unmoored from the text of section 209(b),
which authorizes EPA to grant a waiver only upon a showing that California needs a separate emissions standard to
“meet compelling and extraordinary conditions.” 42
U.S.C. §7543. “Extraordinary conditions” necessarily
means conditions that are “out of the ordinary” conditions
faced by the rest of the Nation—that is, conditions that
are unique and local to California. Because California’s
mandate was expressly designed to address global climate
change, not local conditions, it does not meet the statutory
standard for the waiver. Besides this error of law, EPA’s
decision would have far-reaching consequences on the
U.S. economy. In particular, it will overstretch the sulfur
market by depressing domestic production while at the
same time increasing the demand for sulfur to produce
electric vehicles.
ARGUMENT
I. The D.C. Circuit’s Standing Decision Warrants this
Court’s Review.
The D.C. Circuit’s standing decision warrants review
because it upends settled principles of standing law. In
particular, it threatens to hobble the ability of myriad
companies that operate in linked production or supply
chains—like members of TSI—to establish standing to
challenge regulations that affect their interests by controlling the actions of others. In such situations, the challengers themselves are not immediately subject to the
regulations, but they nevertheless bear the effects of the
regulations through the predictable actions of regulated
10
third parties. Until now, such predictable effects have
clearly been sufficient to establish standing.
Under this Court’s familiar three-part standing inquiry, a plaintiff need only show (1) “injury in fact”; (2) a
“causal connection” making that injury “fairly traceable”
to the defendant’s action; and (3) a likelihood “that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision.” Lujan v.
Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992).
Applying those factors, this Court’s decisions have
made clear that a plaintiff can establish standing based on
“the predictable effect of Government action on the decisions of third parties.” Dep’t of Commerce v. New York,
588 U.S. 752, 768 (2019). Indeed, it is well established that
government regulation may cause injury to others who
are economically interconnected with the directly regulated entity and that setting aside such a regulation satisfies the redressability prong of standing, especially given
that causation and redressability are “flip sides of the
same coin.” FDA v. All. for Hippocratic Med., 602 U.S.
367, 380 (2024).
As the Court recently explained, “the Court has identified a variety of familiar circumstances where government regulation of a third-party individual or business
may be likely to cause injury in fact to an unregulated
plaintiff.” Id. at 384. In particular, the Court has routinely recognized that, in the context of businesses in an
economically interconnected chain, “when the government regulates (or under-regulates) [one] business, the
regulation (or lack thereof) may cause downstream or upstream economic injuries to others in the chain, such as
certain manufacturers, retailers, suppliers, competitors,
or customers.” Ibid.
In such situations, the predictable effects that regulation on one entity will have for other entities has been
11
understood as sufficient to create standing—that is, it is
sufficient as to both causation and redressability. A plaintiff need only show that “‘third parties will likely react in
predictable ways’” due to the challenged regulatory action
and that their reactions “in turn will likely injure plaintiffs.” Id. at 387 (quoting California v. Texas, 593 U.S.
659, 675 (2021)); see also Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154,
169 (1997) (standing can rest on the “determinative or coercive effect” of the agency action on a third party); Corner Post, Inc. v. Board of Governors of the Fed. Rsrv. Sys.,
144 S. Ct. 2440, 2464 (2024) (Kavanaugh, J., concurring)
(“[E]ntire classes of administrative litigation . . . have traditionally been brought by unregulated parties.”).
In this case, the “predictable effect” of the EPA
waiver is straightforward. California’s greenhouse gas
emission standards and zero-emissions vehicle mandate
are designed to reduce consumption of liquid fuels. EPA
granted California a preemption waiver so that California
could address global climate change based on the link between the combustion of liquid fuels and greenhouse
gases. App.207a. The goal of the waiver and the mandate
are the same: to reduce the consumption of liquid fuels by
reducing the number of cars manufactured that use liquid
fuels. That necessarily impacts the business of Petitioners. And setting aside the waiver (and thereby blocking
California’s mandate) would redress the injury because it
would “likely” avert the predictable drop in demand for
liquid fuels that the waiver (and California mandate) are
expressly designed to create. See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561.
The court of appeals’ requirement that Petitioners provide evidence from auto manufacturers that they would
produce fewer liquid-fuel automobiles cannot be reconciled with this Court’s prior decisions, which consistently
permit reliance on such “predictable effects.” See Pet. 1821.
12
The decision below also conflicts with decisions of
other courts of appeals. For example, in NRDC v.
NHTSA, 894 F.3d 95 (2d Cir. 2018), the Second Circuit
explained that causation and redressability need not be
proved “with absolute certainty” and that a “substantial
likelihood” is all that is required “even in cases where the
injury hinges on the reactions of . . . third parties . . . to
the agency’s conduct.” Id. at 104. The court found that
environmental groups had standing to challenge agency
action delaying an increase in civil penalties for thirdparty automakers without any affidavits and instead
based largely on the view that “common sense and basic
economics tell us that the increased cost of unlawful conduct will make that conduct less common.” Id. at 105 (citation omitted). In other words, the court relied on the
“predictable effect” of the agency action on the conduct of
third parties.
Similarly, the Fifth Circuit found that Texas had
standing to challenge DHS’s decision to divert funds from
border wall construction because of its predicable effect
on illegal immigration. General Land Office v. Biden, 71
F.4th 264, 273 (5th Cir. 2023).
The decision also conflicts with the D.C. Circuit’s own
prior rulings. The D.C. Circuit has previously held that,
“when redress for a plaintiff’s injury depends on a third
party’s independent action and the third party stands to
profit by doing as the plaintiff hopes, we have found that
the third party’s ‘pecuniary interests’ and the basic dynamic of ‘naked capitalism’ are enough to satisfy the redressability requirement.” Teton Historic Aviation
Found. v. Dep’t of Def., 785 F.3d 719, 728 (D.C. Cir. 2015)
(per curiam) (quoting Abigail Alliance for Better Access
to Development Drugs v. Eschenbach, 469 F.3d 129, 135
(D.C. Cir. 2006)). In other words, without any need for
13
affidavits, “financial incentives provide an independent
basis to find standing” because the court can “trust in [a
third party’s] economic self-interest to assume that it
would likely” behave in accordance with those interests.
Ibid.; see also, e.g., In re Idaho Conservation League, 811
F.3d 502, 510 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (explaining that the “court
has long relied on . . . economic and other incentives to find
standing”).
The court of appeals’ error will have a broad effect on
businesses operating in industries with linked production
chains or supply and demand relationships. Until now, it
was clear that if a regulation was designed to induce a particular action by a regulated entity and that action would
necessarily impact another company (for example, by reducing demand for its products), the company affected
would have standing to bring a challenge based on “the
predictable effect of Government action on the decisions
of third parties.” Dep’t of Commerce, 588 U.S. at 768. The
D.C. Circuit’s decision erroneously casts that basic principle in doubt.
The D.C. Circuit’s apparent requirement, see
App.30a-32a, that, to show standing, a potential challenger must secure affidavits from the companies directly
subject to a regulation—to prove how the regulated entities will react to setting aside the regulation—is particularly wrongheaded. Even where companies are inextricably linked in interconnected production chains or supply
relationships, their interests are not necessarily entirely
aligned. A regulated entity may have reasons for acquiescing in a particular action by its regulator, including an
effort to secure more favorable regulatory treatment on
some other matter. Requiring a company that inexorably
will be affected by a regulatory change to secure cooperation from the directly regulated entities—those who
14
have an ongoing relationship with the regulator—raises a
gatekeeping restriction that would stifle legitimate challenges to government action. It makes the gatekeeper a
regulated entity whose need to maintain a relationship
with the regulator necessarily gives it a different set of
incentives from others who may be affected by regulation.19
The decision below will also have a particularly significant chilling effect on regulatory challenges because the
D.C. Circuit is traditionally the court that handles a lion’s
share of administrative litigation. A novel requirement in
the D.C. Circuit dialing back on the ability of entities to
bring challenges based on the “predictable effects” of regulation, Dep’t of Commerce, 588 U.S. at 768, will have an
outsized effect insulating a broad swath of federal regulatory actions from review. For that reason as well, the decision warrants review in this Court.
II. EPA’s Waiver Decision Also Warrants This
Court’s Review.
The Court should also grant review on the second
question presented in the Petition addressing the merits
19 Indeed, the theory of regulatory capture suggests that the relation-
ship between regulator and regulated entity may, in some instances,
produce regulations that bend toward the interests of the regulated
entity. See PHH Corp. v. CFPB, 881 F.3d 75, 185 (D.C. Cir. 2018)
(Kavanaugh, J. dissenting) (“With every agency, the fear of regulatory capture is ever-present.”) (quoting Elizabeth Warren, Unsafe at
Any Rate: If It’s Good Enough for Microwaves, It’s Good Enough for
Mortgages. Why We Need a Financial Product Safety Commission,
Democracy, Summer 2007, at 8, 18); James Q. Wilson, The Politics of
Regulation 357-94 (1980). That possibility makes it particularly dangerous to make the regulated entity the gatekeeper for regulatory
challenges brought by other parties whose interests are affected
through the regulated entity’s actions.
15
of EPA’s waiver decision. EPA is authorized to grant California a waiver under Section 209(b) when a more stringent state-level emissions standard is “need[ed]” to “meet
compelling and extraordinary conditions.” 42 U.S.C.
§7543. As Petitioners explain, that standard requires a
showing of “compelling and extraordinary conditions”
unique to California to justify granting California an exemption from otherwise uniform, national standards. Pet.
29-30.
California’s regulations, however, fail to meet that
statutory standard. They are expressly “designed to address global climate change,” 84 Fed. Reg 51,310, 51,344
(Sept. 27, 2019); cf. Pet. 29-30, which is clearly not a condition unique to California.
EPA’s decision especially warrants this Court’s review not only because it is wrong on the law, but because
of the extraordinarily widespread impact it will have on
the U.S. economy. Indeed, its impact would go far beyond
the direct effect on the automobile and oil and gas industries that Petitioners have described. EPA’s waiver
would deliver a one-two punch to domestic sulfur supply
chains: it will both slash sulfur production (from diminished fuel refining) while simultaneously incentivizing the
manufacture of electric vehicles that depend on sulfur for
making electric batteries. The result will be an overstretch in the domestic sulfur supply that forces manufacturers to become dependent on foreign sources of sulfur.20
As explained above, see supra pp. 3-4, sulfur production in the United States is currently a direct product of
fuel production. Sulfur is no longer mined but recovered
from oil and gas as part of the refining process. By allowing California to set emissions standards, the EPA waiver
20 See Maslin et al., supra note 6.
16
will, by design, slash the rate of U.S. fuel refining by reducing demand for liquid fuel. And that will inexorably
slash the domestic production of sulfur.
At the same time, EPA’s waiver will substantially increase the demand for sulfur. Green technologies, like
electric vehicles, increase demand for cobalt, nickel, and
lithium—all of which are extracted with sulfuric acid.21
The U.S. copper industry is anticipated to grow by 4%
in 2024 and to continue to grow annually by over 3.4%.22
Sulfur is consumed by U.S. copper manufacturers who
burn sulfur to produce sulfuric acid for use in copper smelters. Approximately 1.4 million tons of sulfur is required
for current U.S. copper production.23 The increase in copper production just in 2022 and 2023 increased U.S. sulfur
consumption for copper by 85,000 tons, in part to make
electric batteries.
The production of lithium for use in batteries also depends on sulfur. Lithium is extracted from ore through a
leaching process that relies on diluted sulfuric acid. On
October 19, 2022, the White House launched the “American Battery Materials Initiative,” with a goal of developing enough battery-grade lithium to supply approximately 2 million electric vehicles annually. As one of the
key stakeholders for the President’s initiative, the U.S.
Department of Energy has set forth a “Vision for the
Lithium-Battery Supply Chain” in which “[b]y 2030, the
United States and its partners will establish a secure battery materials and technology supply chain that supports
21 Maslin et al., supra note 6, at 498, 501.
22 “US Copper Supply to grow by 4% in 2024” Mining Technology
(July 25, 2024), https://perma.cc/XEH2-ZRSJ.
23 This number is based on confidential data reported from TSI
member companies.
17
long-term U.S. economic competitiveness and equitable
job creation, enables decarbonization, advances social justice, and meets national security requirements.”24
Already, the lithium industry is expanding to meet this
goal. Today, there is one active lithium mine in the U.S.
and many other mines are in development to meet increasing demand for lithium-ion batteries in electric vehicles.
While the objective of the EPA waiver and the California mandate is to reduce consumption of liquid fuels in automobiles, sulfur recovered from the oil refining process
is necessary to produce the lithium needed for electric vehicle batteries. Regulatory mandates for electric vehicles
simultaneously increase demand for sulfur while they
force an ever-decreasing supply environment in the
United States. According to researchers, decarbonization
coupled with the expansion of the green economy could
result in a “shortfall in sulfuric acid between 100 and 320
million tonnes.”25
In short, putting California effectively in charge of
regulatory changes that mandate a transition to electric
vehicles will depress domestic sulfur production, making
the U.S. reliant on international supply chains.
A decision giving one State control over such farreaching implications for the national economy plainly
warrants review by this Court, especially where it appears on its face that the decision misapplied statutory
standards.
24 Federal Consortium for Advanced Batteries, Nat’l Blueprint for
Lithium
Batteries
2021-2030
https://perma.cc/BN4F-Y73X.
25 Maslin et al., supra note 6, at 501.
at
9
(June
2021),
18
CONCLUSION
The petition for a writ of certiorari should be granted.
Respectfully submitted.
PATRICK F. PHILBIN
Counsel of Record
CHASE HARRINGTON
TORRIDON LAW PLLC
801 Seventeenth Street, N.W.
Suite 1100
Washington, DC 20006
(202) 249-6900
pphilbin@torridonlaw.com
Counsel for Amicus Curiae
The Sulphur Institute
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.