Opposition Brief — Jessie Hoffman, Petitioner v. Gary Westcott, Secretary, Louisiana Department of Public Safety and Corrections, et al.

Supreme Court briefMar 17, 2025

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Nos. 24A893 & 24-6778

In the Supreme Court of the United States

JESSIE HOFFMAN,

Applicant-Petitioner,

v.

GARY WESTCOTT, ET AL.,

Respondents.

BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO APPLICATION FOR STAY OF EXECUTION AND PETITION

FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

ELIZABETH B. MURRILL

Attorney General

J. BENJAMIN AGUIÑAGA

Solicitor General

Counsel of Record

ZACHARY FAIRCLOTH

Principal Deputy

Solicitor General

MORGAN BRUNGARD

KELSEY L. SMITH

Deputy Solicitors General

CAITLIN HUETTEMANN

Assistant Solicitor General

LOUISIANA DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

1885 N. Third St.

Baton Rouge, LA 70802

(225) 506-3746

AguinagaB@ag.louisiana.gov

TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ......................................................................................... iii

INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................................... 1

STATEMENT ................................................................................................................. 3

ARGUMENT .................................................................................................................. 9

I.

ON THE EQUITIES, PLAINTIFF’S DELAYS ALONE WARRANT THE DENIAL OF A

STAY. ..................................................................................................................... 9

II. IF THE COURT REACHES THE MERITS, THERE IS NO REASONABLE

PROBABILITY THAT THE COURT WILL GRANT CERTIORARI OR FAIR

PROSPECT THAT PLAINTIFF WILL SUCCEED ON THE MERITS. .............................. 12

A. Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment Question Is Not Cert-Worthy and Has No

Merit. ............................................................................................................... 12

1. Plaintiff’s question presented mischaracterizes the decision

below—and Plaintiff would receive no effectual relief from the

Court answering it....................................................................................... 12

2. Plaintiff’s real question presented is fact-bound, satisfies none of this

Court’s cert criteria, and identifies no error............................................... 15

3. The Fifth Circuit’s decision is independently correct because there are

legitimate penological reasons to choose nitrogen hypoxia over the

firing squad. ................................................................................................. 20

B. Plaintiff’s RLUIPA Question Is Not Cert-Worthy and Has No Merit. ......... 21

1. Plaintiff cannot use RLUIPA to stop his execution. .................................. 21

2. Plaintiff’s conceded inability to appeal the underlying merits ruling

presents an obvious vehicle problem. ......................................................... 23

3. Plaintiff’s RLUIPA question does not satisfy the cert criteria. ................. 24

4. The district court did not abuse its discretion in declining to reconsider

its dismissal of Plaintiff’s fact-bound RLUIPA claim. ............................... 24

CONCLUSION............................................................................................................. 29

ii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases

Barr v. Lee,

591 U.S. 979 (2020) .................................................................................................... 1

Bucklew v. Precythe,

587 U.S. 119 (2019) .............................................................................. 2, 9, 11, 13, 20

Calderon v. Thompson,

523 U.S. 538 (1998) .................................................................................................. 11

Caribbean Mgmt. Grp., Inc. v. Erikon LLC,

966 F.3d 35 (1st Cir. 2020) ................................................................................. 23, 24

Dunn v. Smith,

141 S. Ct. 725 (2021) ................................................................................................ 28

Frazier v. Hamm,

2025 WL 361172 (M.D. Ala. Jan. 31, 2025) ................................................... 1, 21, 26

Grayson v. Comm’r, Ala. Dep’t of Corr.,

121 F.4th 894 (11th Cir. 2024) ................................................................................. 13

Grayson v. Hamm,

145 S. Ct. 586 (2024) .................................................................................................. 1

Grayson v. Hamm,

2024 WL 4701875 (M.D. Ala. Nov. 6, 2024) ........................................................ 1, 26

Hill v. McDonough,

547 U.S. 573 (2006) ............................................................................................ 10, 28

Hoffman v. Jindal,

No. 12-cv-796 (M.D. La. June 14, 2024) ................................................................ 5, 6

Hoffman v. Louisiana,

531 U.S. 946 (2000) .................................................................................................... 4

In re Blodgett,

502 U.S. 236 (1992) .................................................................................................. 11

In re Ohio Execution Protocol Litig.,

881 F.3d 447 (6th Cir. 2018) .................................................................................... 13

iii

In re Westcott,

No. 25-30088 (5th Cir.) ......................................................................................... 6, 10

Moran v. Burbine,

475 U.S. 412 (1986) .................................................................................................. 11

Nelson v. Campbell,

541 U.S. 637 (2004) .................................................................................................. 11

Ramirez v. Collier,

595 U.S. 411 (2022) .................................................................................. 9, 21, 22, 28

Smith v. Comm’r, Ala. Dep’t of Corr.,

2024 WL 266027 (M.D. Ala. Jan. 24, 2024) ............................................................... 1

Smith v. Hamm,

144 S. Ct. 414 (2024) .................................................................................................. 1

Smith v. Hamm,

2024 WL 1160303 (M.D. Ala. Jan. 10, 2024) ............................................................. 1

SPV-LS, LLC v. Transamerica Life Ins. Co.,

912 F.3d 1106 (8th Cir. 2019) ............................................................................ 23, 24

State v. Biden,

10 F.4th 538 (5th Cir. 2021) ..................................................................................... 17

State v. Hoffman,

2020-00137 (La. 10/19/21), 326 So. 3d 232 ................................................................ 4

State v. Hoffman,

768 So. 2d 542 (La. 2000) ....................................................................................... 3, 4

Statutes

42 U.S.C. § 2000 ..................................................................................................... 21, 28

La. R.S. 15:569 ............................................................................................................... 4

iv

TO THE HONORABLE SAMUEL A. ALITO, JR., ASSOCIATE JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME

COURT OF THE UNITED STATES AND CIRCUIT JUSTICE FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT.

INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff’s strategy to jam this Court less than 48 hours away from his

execution is inexplicable. The Fifth Circuit’s decision vacating the district court’s

injunction against his execution came out on Friday. Yet he did not touch this Court’s

docket until midnight on Sunday. Not only that, but his questions presented today

also could have been litigated over eight months ago—i.e., the amount of time Plaintiff

has tried to use Rule 60(b)(6) to reopen an old method-of-execution challenge rather

than file this new lawsuit. In a context where an applicant’s diligence is paramount,

these days- and months-long delays alone foreclose Plaintiff’s demand for “lastminute intervention.” Barr v. Lee, 591 U.S. 979, 981 (2020) (per curiam).

But, even if the Court reaches the merits stay factors, Plaintiff does not satisfy

them—not least because Plaintiff seeks a stay of execution by nitrogen hypoxia, a

request that this Court, the Eleventh Circuit, and Alabama district courts have

uniformly rejected as to executions under a virtually identical protocol. See Frazier v.

Hamm, 2025 WL 361172 (M.D. Ala. Jan. 31, 2025) (no appeal); Grayson v. Hamm,

2024 WL 4701875 (M.D. Ala. Nov. 6, 2024), aff’d sub nom., Grayson v. Comm’r, Ala.

Dep’t of Corr., 121 F.4th 894 (11th Cir. 2024), stay of execution denied, Grayson v.

Hamm, 145 S. Ct. 586 (2024); Smith v. Hamm, 2024 WL 1160303 (M.D. Ala. Jan. 10,

2024), aff’d sub nom., Smith v. Comm’r, Ala. Dep’t of Corr., 2024 WL 266027 (M.D.

Ala. Jan. 24, 2024), stay of execution denied, Smith v. Hamm, 144 S. Ct. 414 (2024).

The district court in this case enjoined Plaintiff’s execution on March 11, holding that

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execution by firing squad qualified as an adequate alternative. See Bucklew v.

Precythe, 587 U.S. 119, 134 (2019) (Plaintiff bears the burden of proving “a feasible

and readily implemented alternative method of execution that would significantly

reduce a substantial risk of severe pain and that the State has refused to adopt

without a legitimate penological reason”). On the State’s motion, however, the Fifth

Circuit vacated that injunction on Friday, March 14, as “not just wrong” but

“[c]onstitution[ally] backwards.” Pet.App.2a (Ho and Oldham, JJ.). For it was

“premised on the odd notion that the Eighth Amendment somehow requires

Louisiana to use an admittedly more painful method of execution—namely, execution

by firing squad rather than by nitrogen hypoxia,” which everyone agrees is physically

painless. Id.

The Court is not reasonably likely to grant certiorari, much less reverse.

Plaintiff claims that the Fifth Circuit deemed superadded psychological (rather than

physical) pain “not relevant” to the Eighth Amendment analysis—and thus

contradicted this Court’s and other circuits’ precedents. Pet.19. That is unequivocally

false. The Fifth Circuit held that Plaintiff “presented no such evidence of superadded

terror to the court—let alone evidence of how execution by a firing squad would

substantially mitigate that terror.” Pet.App.8a. There is no split of authority, and

Plaintiff is left with only fact-bound arguments that are wrong and, in any event, call

for mere error-correction. Plaintiff also claims that the Fifth Circuit erred by refusing

to address the district court’s denial of Plaintiff’s motion to reconsider the dismissal

of his Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA) claim—i.e.,

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that he must be able to breathe oxygen when he dies. But this Court’s precedents

hold that Plaintiff cannot use RLUIPA to stop his execution; the Court is hardly likely

to grant certiorari when unable to directly review the underlying merits

determination given that the district court dismissed that claim earlier in the

litigation in a non-final order; and in all events, the district court properly denied

reconsideration of that claim.

Plaintiff offers no reason to depart from this Court’s and others’ judgments in

uniformly denying stays of execution by nitrogen hypoxia, which (again, everyone

agrees) is physically painless. The Court should deny the application and the petition.

STATEMENT

In the interests of time and efficiency, the State here addresses only the core

relevant facts, and it expounds where necessary in the argument section below.

A. On the night before Thanksgiving Day in 1996, Plaintiff Jessie Hoffman

kidnapped, robbed, and raped Mary “Molly” Elliot. State v. Hoffman, 768 So. 2d 542,

550 (La. 2000). Plaintiff kidnapped Molly at gunpoint, drove her to an ATM, forced

her to withdraw $200, and robbed her. Id. Plaintiff subsequently raped Molly in the

backseat of her own car in a remote area of St. Tammany Parish. Id. He then marched

her—still naked—“down a dirt path which was overgrown with vegetation and in an

area full of trash used as a dump.” Id. “Her death march ultimately ended at a small,

makeshift dock” on Middle Pearl River, where Plaintiff “forced [her] to kneel” and

“shot [her] in the head, execution style.” Id. Molly “likely survived for a few minutes

after being shot.” Id. But she was not discovered until Thanksgiving Day, when a

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duck hunter came across her naked body on the dock. Id. at 549. For his part, Plaintiff

“soon thereafter” took his girlfriend shopping with Molly’s money. Id. at 550.

A jury convicted Plaintiff of first degree murder, and he was sentenced to

death. Id. at 549; see App.15 ¶ 61. His direct appeal was litigated to finality. Hoffman

v. Louisiana, 531 U.S. 946 (2000) (denying petition). And he exhausted all of his state

and federal post-conviction remedies. See State v. Hoffman, 2020-00137 (La.

10/19/21), 326 So. 3d 232, 235–36, 242 (collecting his post-conviction cases).

B. Although lethal injection was Louisiana’s method of execution when

Plaintiff murdered Molly, drug companies have since made it extraordinarily difficult

for States to obtain the necessary drugs. As a result, Louisiana and other States

recently have turned to nitrogen hypoxia because there are no supply concerns with

nitrogen. For Louisiana, that time came in the spring of 2024, when the Legislature

amended La. R.S. 15:569 to adopt nitrogen hypoxia as a method of execution.

Nitrogen hypoxia is Louisiana’s only currently available method. App.450 ¶ 17;

App.724.

Over the past year, Louisiana’s Department of Public Safety & Corrections

constructed a nitrogen hypoxia system that mirrors Alabama’s—and since 2024,

Alabama itself has successfully carried out four nitrogen hypoxia executions. In

general terms, the system delivers pure nitrogen to a full-face silicon mask with a

plexi-glass screen known as a “source respirator”—industrial grade and superior to

medical grade masks. App.452–53 ¶ 31; App.834. Thick, cushion material presses

against the face and creates a “virtually air tight seal.” Id. The mask has a one-way

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inlet valve allowing for airflow into the mask from the industrial tube that delivers

both ambient air and nitrogen. Id. The mask also allows for exhaling through another

one-way exhaust valve. Id. (Plaintiff appears to complain that the system “uses

industrial grade, not medical grade, nitrogen,” Pet.5; he omits that medical grade

nitrogen is comparatively inferior because it has more impurities than does

Louisiana’s ultra-high grade nitrogen. App.452 ¶ 28; App.680–81.)

The State’s expert, Dr. Antognini, is the only expert in this case who inspected

and tested Louisiana’s system. Specifically, he laid down on the gurney with the mask

on at the intended flow rate—and he testified that he “could breathe very comfortably

with the mask on.” App.838. He also took a video (Defs.’ Ex. 19; App.842)

demonstrating how quickly pure nitrogen displaces oxygen in the mask: By 30

seconds, the air inside the mask is only 4.4% oxygen; 1.8% by 40 seconds; and so on.

App.849.

C. Almost immediately after the Legislature adopted nitrogen hypoxia,

Plaintiff attempted to reopen a dismissed-as-moot case challenging Louisiana’s

lethal-injection protocol. See Hoffman v. Jindal, No. 12-cv-796 (M.D. La.). That case

was dismissed a few years ago because Louisiana was (and still is) currently unable

to obtain the necessary drugs. With nitrogen now permitted under Louisiana law,

however, Plaintiff filed a Rule 60(b)(6) motion claiming that “there has since been a

material and extraordinary change of circumstances that gives rise to a live

controversy between the parties.” Mem. in Support of Mot. for Relief from J. at 1,

Hoffman v. Jindal (Hoffman I), No. 12-cv-796 (M.D. La. June 14, 2024), ECF 318-1.

5

For the next eight months, however, the district court took no action on that motion—

and Plaintiff refused to file this lawsuit.

Indeed, it was not until Plaintiff’s death warrant issued in early February 2025

that the Hoffman I docket bounced back. The district court issued an order reopening

the case—“on procedurally dubious grounds,” as the Fifth Circuit in this case would

later observe, Pet.App.3a. Hoffman I, ECF 337. The State sought mandamus relief

and secured an administrative stay on the basis that this was an improper exercise

of Rule 60(b)(6) authority. See In re Westcott, No. 25-30088 (5th Cir.).

D. Once Plaintiff realized that he would be unable to use his old case as a

subterfuge for challenging Louisiana’s new method of execution, he filed this lawsuit

(on February 25) and sought (on February 26) to enjoin his execution. App.1–61

(Complaint); App.62–102 (preliminary-injunction motion). In the ensuing two weeks,

the parties engaged in expedited discovery, motions practice, and an evidentiary

hearing on Friday, March 7, followed by proposed findings and conclusions filed at

9am on Sunday, March 9.

This case has substantially narrowed in the meantime because the district

court partially granted the State’s motion to dismiss certain claims from the bench

(App.522–24), and the court held (App.942–44) in its injunctive order that Plaintiff

was unlikely to succeed on certain other claims. As things stand, therefore, the only

live claim presented to the Fifth Circuit (and thus this Court) is Plaintiff’s Eighth

Amendment challenge to nitrogen hypoxia.

6

Here are a few key facts that inform that challenge. To begin, as the district

court recognized, both Plaintiff’s and the State’s experts “agree that nitrogen hypoxia

does not produce physical pain.” App.934. Plaintiff’s case thus depends on alleged

psychological pain. To that end, he testified that he is Buddhist and engages in

meditative breathing twice a day, which requires concentrated “deep breaths”—both

inhaling and exhaling. App.455 ¶ 42. He also testified that he plans to use his

breathing techniques during his execution. App.455 ¶ 44. He put on a PTSD expert,

Dr. Sautter, who agreed that Plaintiff has mastered his breathing techniques to

control any PTSD issues—and so long as “he can practice the breathing, then he will

be able to decrease his distress.” App.491 ¶ 166. Plaintiff also put on another expert,

Dr. Bickler, who testified that—with normal breathing, and especially with deep

breaths as Plaintiff intends—unconsciousness will occur in less than a minute after

pure nitrogen begins to flow into the mask. App.481 ¶ 138; App.783. Dr. Bickler also

testified that, at least in the assisted-suicide context, “allowing the free flow of a gas

into the lungs but with no oxygen causes a gentle hypoxic death.” App.803. His only

excuse for taking the opposite position with respect to the use of nitrogen here was

“that’s a very different context than forced asphyxiation with nitrogen in a death

chamber.” App.804.

The State’s expert, Dr. Antognini (whom the Alabama courts have uniformly

credited), agreed on the key facts: “His opinion is that Louisiana’s system will cause

unconsciousness within 35 to 40 seconds (or perhaps sooner) once Plaintiff begins to

inhale pure nitrogen—and he expects death to follow ‘rapidly,’ within 10 to 15

7

minutes.” App.480 ¶ 137; see App.832. “I do not believe the inmate would suffer any

pain ... with that system.” App.832.

For his part, Plaintiff proposed the firing squad and a drug cocktail known as

DDMAPh as alternative methods of execution that render nitrogen hypoxia

unconstitutional. In granting Plaintiff’s motion for preliminary injunction on March

11, the district court rejected DDMAPh (because the State cannot use drugs for

execution purposes, App.941), but agreed that the firing squad is a suitable

alternative. App.938–40.

On March 14, the Fifth Circuit (Ho and Oldham, JJ.) vacated that injunction

as “not just wrong” but “[c]onstitutional[ly] backwards.” Pet.App.2a. Specifically, the

Fifth Circuit rejected the idea “that the Eighth Amendment somehow requires

Louisiana to use an admittedly more painful method of execution—namely, execution

by firing squad rather than nitrogen hypoxia.” Id. The Fifth Circuit recognized that

both sides’ experts testified about pain from the firing squad while also agreeing that

nitrogen hypoxia is physically painless. Pet.App.7a. The Fifth Circuit thus held that,

as a matter of law, Plaintiff could not carry his burden under Bucklew and related

cases to show that execution by firing squad would significantly reduce a substantial

risk of severe pain from nitrogen hypoxia. Id. On top of that, the Fifth Circuit

emphasized that, although he invoked “superadded terror,” Plaintiff “presented no

such evidence of superadded terror to the court—let alone evidence of how execution

by a firing squad would substantially mitigate that terror.” Pet.App.8a.

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“In sum, the district court didn’t just get the legal analysis wrong—it turned

the Constitution on its head by relying on an indisputably more painful method of

execution” than nitrogen hypoxia. Id. “Reasonable minds can differ on the proper

understanding of the Eighth Amendment in certain cases, but surely we can all agree

that it does not require State officials to favor more painful methods of execution over

less painful ones.” Id.

Judge Haynes dissented on the ground that “there are issues that need more

time to be resolved and decided.” Pet.App.9a. She also believed that “the majority

opinion does not adequately address the facts as properly found by the district court.”

Pet.App.10a.

ARGUMENT

I.

ON THE EQUITIES, PLAINTIFF’S DELAYS ALONE WARRANT THE DENIAL OF A

STAY.

The Court need address nothing more than Plaintiff’s litigation conduct to deny

a stay of execution and his petition for writ of certiorari. The Court has long held that

“late-breaking changes in position, last-minute claims arising from long-known facts,

and other ‘attempt[s] at manipulation’ can provide a sound basis for denying

equitable relief in capital cases.” Ramirez v. Collier, 595 U.S. 411, 434 (2022) (citation

omitted). Accordingly, “[c]ourts should police carefully against attempts to use such

challenges as tools to interpose unjustified delay.” Bucklew, 587 U.S. at 150. “Lastminute stays should be the extreme exception, not the norm, and ‘the last-minute

nature of an application’ that ‘could have been brought’ earlier, or ‘an applicant’s

9

attempt at manipulation,’ ‘may be grounds for denial of a stay.’” Id. (quoting Hill v.

McDonough, 547 U.S. 573, 584 (2006)).

That is this case—at least twice over. First, there is no good reason why

Plaintiff waited to file his stay application and cert petition until midnight last night,

leaving the State just a few hours to prepare this response and this Court little more

than a day to adjudicate these filings. The Fifth Circuit’s decision came out on Friday,

March 14. This is a quintessential “[l]ast-minute stay” request that “should be the

extreme exception”—and Plaintiff has identified no reason why this case is

exceptional. Id.

Second, Plaintiff told the Fifth Circuit two weeks ago that he has had a live

controversy for eight months. See Pls’ Opp. to Request for Admin. Stay at 9, In re

Westcott, No. 25-30088 (5th Cir. Feb. 27, 2025) (“Plaintiffs diligently moved to reopen

the proceedings [in July 2024] prior to the change in the law, as soon as a justiciable

controversy re-emerged.”). Yet he refused to file this lawsuit eight months ago.

Instead, he put all his eggs in a “procedurally dubious” (Pet.App.3a) basket of hope

that the district court would reopen his long-dismissed suit and allow him to skip the

hassle of filing a new lawsuit. That strategy is inexplicable—and also an undisputed

fact.

Now, Plaintiff tries to turn his delay on the State by protesting the denial of

some grievances from nearly a year ago (and also the State’s opposition to Plaintiff’s

abuse of Rule 60(b)(6)). Appl.8. That is misdirection. His own timeline (id.) makes

clear that he sat on his hands from July 2024 until February 2025, refusing to file

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this lawsuit until three weeks ago. It is thus remarkable to read his representation

that he “has been diligently pursuing his rights in state and federal courts alike.”

Appl.9. He, the State, and the Court are in this eleventh-hour time crunch solely

because he refused to file this lawsuit eight months ago when he says he had a

justiciable controversy. And to drive this point home, there is nothing in the district

court’s analysis or the Fifth Circuit’s decision that could not have been written

months ago. Whether the Court deems that delay or manipulation, it is a fact that

tilts the equities in the State’s favor.

The State (and therefore also the public because the factors merge) has an

unquestionably compelling interest in Plaintiff’s execution. See Bucklew, 587 U.S. at

150 (“Under our Constitution, the question of capital punishment belongs to the

people and their representatives ....”); Nelson v. Campbell, 541 U.S. 637, 644 (2004)

(“[A] State retains a significant interest in meting out a sentence of death in a timely

fashion.”); Calderon v. Thompson, 523 U.S. 538, 556 (1998) (“To unsettle these

expectations [of finality] is to inflict a profound injury to the ‘powerful and legitimate

interest in punishing the guilty,’ an interest shared by the State and the victims of

crime alike.” (quotation omitted)); In re Blodgett, 502 U.S. 236, 239 (1992) (The State’s

“sovereign power to enforce [its] criminal law” carries “great weight.”); Moran v.

Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 426 (1986) (recognizing “society’s compelling interest in

finding, convicting, and punishing those who violate the law”). On the equities factors

alone, therefore, the Court should deny Plaintiff’s application and petition.

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II.

IF THE COURT REACHES THE MERITS, THERE IS NO REASONABLE

PROBABILITY THAT THE COURT WILL GRANT CERTIORARI OR FAIR PROSPECT

THAT PLAINTIFF WILL SUCCEED ON THE MERITS.

A.

Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment Question Is Not Cert-Worthy and

Has No Merit.

Plaintiff’s first question presented asks

[w]hether a method of execution that superadds psychological

suffering—including terror and mental anguish—compared to an

available alternative method violates the Eighth Amendment’s bar on

cruel and unusual punishment.

Pet.i. That is puzzling because the Fifth Circuit did not answer no—and Plaintiff

would not benefit from this Court’s answering yes. That is because the Fifth Circuit

held that Plaintiff failed to substantiate the premise of this question: that execution

by nitrogen hypoxia, in fact, superadds “psychological suffering” compared to

execution by firing squad. By failing to appeal that fact-bound and split-less question,

Plaintiff has effectively conceded that both cert and reversal are exceedingly unlikely.

1. Plaintiff’s question presented mischaracterizes the decision

below—and Plaintiff would receive no effectual relief from

the Court answering it.

Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment question presented rests on a straw man. He

claims that the Fifth Circuit rejected his Eighth Amendment claim on the ground

that so-called “psychological terror” “was not relevant” to the Eighth Amendment

analysis—that only “physical pain” is relevant. Pet.19, 21. He then concocts a circuit

split based off of the Fifth Circuit’s supposed “physical-pain-only approach.” Pet.21. 1

That blatantly mischaracterizes the Fifth Circuit’s decision below.

1 “Concocts” because there is no circuit split. No court of appeals holds that

12

The Fifth Circuit determined that Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claim “fails

on multiple levels.” Pet.App.7a (emphasis added). The first level, as Plaintiff

recognizes, is that “the district court heard expert testimony from both parties that

nitrogen hypoxia is painless.” Id.; see App.934 (district court finding that “[b]oth

experts agree that nitrogen hypoxia does not produce physical pain”). By contrast,

“experts for both parties agreed that death by firing squad can cause pain—and would

therefore necessarily be more painful than execution by nitrogen hypoxia.”

Pet.App.7a; compare App. 494 (citing App.877) (only the State’s expert making this

comparison), with App.932–34 (district court ignoring this fact). The Fifth Circuit

thus correctly recognized that Plaintiff “cannot possibly” satisfy this Court’s Bucklew

standard, which required (among other things) Plaintiff to identify a feasible

alternative “that would significantly reduce a substantial risk of severe pain.” 587

U.S. at 134.

The second level on which Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claim fails comes from

“the fact that the Supreme Court has previously ‘upheld a sentence of death by firing

terror categorically is irrelevant to the Eighth Amendment analysis. All Plaintiff can

muster for that view is that the Sixth Circuit “appears” to hold it. Pet.21 (citing In re

Ohio Execution Protocol Litig., 881 F.3d 447, 450 (6th Cir. 2018)). The cited Sixth

Circuit decision, however, simply says that ordinary psychological pain and suffering

that “is a likely result of being sentenced to death and anticipating the execution”

does not alone violate the Eighth Amendment. In re Ohio Execution Protocol Litig.,

881 F.3d at 450 (citation omitted). And the Eleventh Circuit—which Plaintiff

characterizes as splitting with the Sixth Circuit, Pet.21–22—agrees. See Grayson v.

Comm’r, Ala. Dep’t of Corr., 121 F.4th 894, 900 n.3 (11th Cir. 2024) (acknowledging

that “[t]here may exist a form of execution that induces psychological terror or pain

that is severe enough to support an Eighth Amendment claim,” but affirming as not

clearly erroneous the district court’s finding “that the likely psychological pain [in

Grayson] is ‘a type of pain that would exist regardless of the method of execution’”).

13

squad.’” Pet.App.7a (citation omitted). “So Hoffman has the impossible task of

challenging a method of execution that he admits is less painful than other

established methods of execution that the Supreme Court has already blessed.” Id.

(It bears noting, moreover, that Plaintiff does not dispute any of this.)

At this point, Plaintiff claims that the Fifth Circuit ended its analysis and

“categorical[ly] reject[ed] [] psychological suffering as a constitutional consideration.”

Pet.3; see Pet.21 (“constitutionally irrelevant”), 23 (“discarded in the Eighth

Amendment analysis”). That is unequivocally false. The Fifth Circuit expressly noted

that the third level on which Plaintiff’s claim fails is his and the district court’s

“focus[] on psychological terror.” Pet.App.7a. The Fifth Circuit emphasized that “the

Constitution only forbids the ‘superaddition’ of terror that is greater than an

alternative method of execution.” Pet.App.7a–8a. (Which is exactly what the other

circuits recognize, too. See supra n.1.) And the fatal defect here, said the Fifth Circuit,

is that Plaintiff “presented no such evidence of superadded terror to the court—let

alone evidence of how execution by a firing squad would substantially mitigate that

terror.” Pet.App.8a. Instead, Plaintiff and the district court pointed to no more than

the usual “measure of psychological terror” that accompanies every execution, which

does not make out an Eighth Amendment violation (again, as the circuits recognize).

Id.

Plaintiff’s question presented thus whistles past the key defect below. He asks

this Court to answer whether “a method of execution that superadds psychological

suffering” violates the Eighth Amendment. Pet.i. But he failed to prove that execution

14

by nitrogen hypoxia is such a method in the first place. Whether the Court answers

yes or no to the question presented, therefore, would give Plaintiff no effectual relief

because that ruling would leave undisturbed the Fifth Circuit’s holding that Plaintiff

“presented no such evidence of superadded terror to the court—let alone evidence of

how execution by a firing squad would substantially mitigate that terror.”

Pet.App.8a. The Court is thus exceedingly unlikely to grant cert on this question,

much less reverse.

2. Plaintiff’s real question presented is fact-bound, satisfies

none of this Court’s cert criteria, and identifies no error.

Indeed, the best evidence of this is that Plaintiff’s “circuit-split” argument

fades into a complaint that the Fifth Circuit improperly conducted its own abuse-ofdiscretion and clear-error review. Pet.24–27. Of course, that complaint implicates no

circuit split and is, by definition, fact-bound and a plea for error correction—and the

Court’s analysis could stop there. But Plaintiff does not even identify an error. He

says “[j]ust two examples suffice.” Pet.26.

a. First, he complains that “the panel majority never acknowledged the district

court’s finding that conscious terror and a sense of suffocation endures for at least 35

to 40 seconds but can last up to three to five minutes.” Id. (emphases omitted). He

then accuses the Fifth Circuit of “ma[king] its own factual finding that ‘[b]reathing

100% pure nitrogen causes unconsciousness in less than a minute.’” Id. (quoting

Pet.App.3a).

Plaintiff misrepresents the record. The district court itself credited Plaintiff’s

expert, Dr. Bickler, who “candidly concede[d] that a person who is administered 100%

15

pure nitrogen and is breathing normally will lose consciousness in less than one

minute.” App.934. The Fifth Circuit did not “make up its own factual findings.”

Moreover, the Fifth Circuit did not reference the alleged “three to five minutes”

of suffering because there is no valid basis for it. That number comes from the district

court’s assumption that Plaintiff might hold his breath, refuse to breathe nitrogen,

and thus increase any alleged sense of terror. The court did so by invoking Plaintiff’s

expert, Dr. Bickler. See App.934 (“[I]f the condemned holds his breath, Dr. Bickler

opines that it could take 3 to 5 minutes to lose consciousness.”); accord App.935, 936.

And Dr. Bickler himself acknowledged that he was inflating his opinion with the

“expect[ation] that [Plaintiff] would hold his breath and then probably attempt to

breathe shallowly and then only slowly get hypoxic, all the while experiencing the

effects of the progressing hypoxia and buildup of carbon dioxide in his blood.”

App.758. This is misdirection. 2

For one, as the district court acknowledged, “Plaintiff admits that he will have

the ability to breathe in the nitrogen as it is administered.” App.925. In fact, Plaintiff

testified that he “plan[s] to use [his] meditative breathing techniques,” which involve

“deep breaths,” when he is executed through nitrogen hypoxia. App.490 ¶ 164; accord

App.925 (district court’s conclusion that “there is no substantial burden to his

2 The same goes for Plaintiff’s characterization of Dr. Antognini as testifying

that Plaintiff will endure “severe emotional suffering.” Pet.11. He omits that the cited

transcript reflects Dr. Antognini’s answers to Plaintiff’s counsel’s questions about

“hold[ing] your breath”—Dr. Antognini did not testify that Plaintiff would hold his

breath. App.886–87.

16

exercise of rhythmic breathing”). There is thus no basis for the district court’s and

Dr. Bickler’s speculation that Plaintiff might self-inflict harm by refusing to breathe.

For another, as just explained, this point matters because it directly impacts

the amount of time between the initiation of pure nitrogen and Plaintiff’s loss of

consciousness. Again, Dr. Bickler “candidly conceded that a person who is

administered 100% pure nitrogen and is breathing normally will lose consciousness

in less than one minute.” App.934. But the court omitted that Dr. Bickler also

conceded that it is possible that “[a] person who is taking deep breaths”—as Plaintiff

testified he intends to do—“will lose consciousness even quicker than that.” App.481

¶ 138; App.783. Because that window will be exceedingly narrow, the district court’s

trumpeting of “conscious psychological suffering” for several minutes is completely

baseless. App.936.

For yet another, even if this record were to suggest that Plaintiff intended to

hold his breath, that would bar him from obtaining a preliminary injunction or stay

of his execution. For it is hornbook law that “a party may not satisfy the irreparable

harm requirement if the harm complained of is self-inflicted.” State v. Biden, 10 F.4th

538, 558 (5th Cir. 2021) (alteration and citation omitted) (collecting authorities).

And on top of all this, remember that Dr. Bickler likewise testified that, at

least in the assisted-suicide context, the administration of 100% nitrogen would cause

a “gentle hypoxic death.” App.804, 806. Why not here? Because “that’s a very different

context than forced asphyxiation with nitrogen in a death chamber.” App.804. Dr.

Bickler’s tailor-made “death when the State does it is different” excuse does not work.

17

See, e.g., Frazier, 2025 WL 361172, at *12 (rejecting complaints about suffering that

“is inherent in any execution”). For these reasons, Plaintiff identifies no cert-worthy

issue regarding the Fifth Circuit’s ignoring the alleged “three to five minutes”

speculation from the district court and Dr. Bickler.

b. Second, Plaintiff complains that the Fifth Circuit “ignored the district

court’s finding that execution by firing squad would render Mr. Hoffman unconscious

in three to four seconds.” Pet.26. In his view, the Fifth Circuit refused to “engage with

the district court’s comparative assessment of conscious terror caused by [the firing

squad and nitrogen hypoxia],” and instead “summarily concluded that Mr. Hoffman

had presented ‘no evidence of superadded terror.’” Id. (cleaned up).

Plaintiff has three problems. One, he submitted no evidence or testimony

actually conducting a “comparative assessment of conscious terror” caused by the two

methods—in fact, he did not submit any evidence or testimony describing the

“conscious terror” presented by the firing squad at all. His firing-squad expert, Dr.

Williams, expressly testified that he “offered no psychological evidence.” App.634. The

district court thus had no evidentiary basis to evaluate any alleged terror from the

firing squad, much less to compare that terror against alleged terror from execution

by nitrogen hypoxia.

Two, despite that evidentiary gap, the district court simply assumed that all

terror is created equal and compared final potential moments of consciousness: the

three to four seconds after being shot by the firing squad and the 30 to 40 seconds

after 100% nitrogen begins to flow. See App.939. That makes zero sense. For one,

18

imagine the terror of being alive and conscious with a gaping hole in your chest. It is

easy to suspect that such terror would far exceed any, for example, alleged terror from

“short[ness] of breath” that may come as Plaintiff loses consciousness from nitrogen

hypoxia. App.911 (Dr. Bickler’s testimony). For another, common sense suggests that

any firing squad-related terror would come long before shots ring out—think about

being led to the execution chair, positioned in front of the firing squad or gun ports,

restrained, and hooded, and then waiting for the shots that will end your life. The

district court’s blinkered focus on the three to four seconds after shots are fired makes

no sense.

Three, and perhaps most damning, the district court left out that Plaintiff’s

PTSD expert, Dr. Sautter, testified that Plaintiff’s traumatic history of being held at

gunpoint is “one of the stimuli” that could trigger Plaintiff’s PTSD—and he

acknowledged that this would be a problem if Plaintiff were “placed in front of a firing

squad.” App.495–96 ¶ 179; App.589. It was thus preposterous for the district court to

gerrymander the three to four seconds after a firing squad fires its shots and

summarily proclaim that Plaintiff “has clearly demonstrated that he is substantially

likely to prevail in his assertion that nitrogen hypoxia superadds pain and terror as

compared to firing squad.” App.939.

*

*

*

In short, Plaintiff’s cursory and fact-bound Eighth Amendment arguments do

not withstand scrutiny—and they certainly are not cert-worthy.

19

3. The Fifth Circuit’s decision is independently correct because

there are legitimate penological reasons to choose nitrogen

hypoxia over the firing squad.

Although the Court need not reach this issue (and the Fifth Circuit did not

need to reach it either), Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claim independently fails

because there are legitimate penological reasons to prefer nitrogen hypoxia over the

firing squad.

As the Fifth Circuit explained, the undisputed evidence is that the firing squad

is more physically painful than nitrogen. In its effort to efficiently and humanely

carry out death sentences, therefore, Louisiana reasonably selected the least

physically painful method vis-à-vis firing squad. Cf. Bucklew, 587 U.S. at 134 (even

“traditionally accepted methods of execution—such as hanging, the firing squad,

electrocution, and lethal injection—are [not] necessarily rendered unconstitutional

as soon as an arguably more humane method like lethal injection becomes available”).

Consider also the logistical and emotional costs of the firing squad—requiring

multiple individuals (who will know whether they fired a live or blank round, App.496

¶ 181; App.632) to pull the trigger; preparing to clean an execution chamber covered

in blood, bones, and tissue; and handling the shattered body of the condemned postexecution. None of these serious issues are presented by nitrogen hypoxia, which is

quick and clinical. Cf. Bucklew, 587 U.S. at 134 (“a State has a legitimate interest in

selecting a method it regards as ‘preserving the dignity of the procedure’”).

And finally, it is worth noting that—after being unable to obtain lethalinjection drugs for years—Louisiana adopted nitrogen on the heels of Alabama’s first

successful execution by nitrogen hypoxia. Louisiana’s gravitation toward a viable

20

method of execution (for which “‘[n]o supply concerns exist’”) is itself a “valid

penological reason to decline to adopt [Plaintiff’s] proposed alternative method.”

Frazier, 2025 WL 361172, at *13–14.

At bottom, therefore, Louisiana had legitimate penological reasons not to adopt

the firing squad—and that independently dooms Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment

claim.

B.

Plaintiff’s RLUIPA Question Is Not Cert-Worthy and Has No

Merit.

Plaintiff also presents the question

[w]hether execution by nitrogen gassing substantially burdens Mr.

Hoffman’s Buddhist faith, in violation of the Religious Land Use and

Institutionalized Persons Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc et seq. (“RLUIPA”), by

denying him the opportunity to meditatively breathe during his final

moments.

Pet.i. As an initial matter, this Court’s decision in Ramirez makes clear that Plaintiff

cannot use RLUIPA to stay his execution. But, even if that were not so, this question

is not cert-worthy because it comes to this Court only under the deferential standard

of review for the denial of a motion for reconsideration, and because it satisfies none

of the Court’s cert criteria. And finally, the district court did not abuse its discretion

in resolving this fact-bound reconsideration issue against Plaintiff.

1. Plaintiff cannot use RLUIPA to stop his execution.

At the outset, by wielding RLUIPA to try to stop his execution, Plaintiff runs

headlong into Ramirez. There, the Court emphasized that RLUIPA is an

“accommodation” statute. 595 U.S. at 425. Thus, if “a court determines that relief is

appropriate under RLUIPA, the proper remedy is an injunction ordering the

21

accommodation, not a stay of the execution.” Id. at 436. Put otherwise, “a tailored

injunction,” “rather than a stay of execution,” “will be the proper form of equitable

relief when a prisoner raises a RLUIPA claim in the execution context.” Id. at 433–

34. That distinction is critical because, while prisoners “have a strong interest in

avoiding substantial burdens on their religious exercises,” the States and crime

victims have a concomitant “interest in the timely enforcement of a sentence.” Id. at

433 (citation omitted).

Here, however, Plaintiff avowedly wields RLUIPA to stop his execution—not

to obtain a religious accommodation for his execution. His Complaint seeks a

“declar[ation] that it violates RLUIPA for Defendants to execute Mr. Hoffman by

nitrogen gas given Mr. Hoffman’s sincerely held Buddhist religious practices” and an

injunction against his execution on the same basis. App.49. Indeed, as the State

explained below, Plaintiff’s pre-litigation prison grievances never even mentioned

RLUIPA, let alone requested a religious accommodation. App.116–17, 136; see

App.152–59 (grievances). Instead, Plaintiff is doing precisely what the plaintiff in

Ramirez was not: attempting to “delay[] or imped[e] his execution.” 595 U.S. at 434.

To be sure, the Court in Ramirez entered a brief stay of execution so that it

could consider the RLUIPA question, see id. at 420—but that was entirely proper

given that, as the Court ultimately held, the Ramirez plaintiff “request[ed] a tailored

injunction” rather than “an open-ended stay of execution.” Id. at 433. Just the

opposite here: Plaintiff seeks indefinitely to stop his execution. Ramirez bars that

22

attempt on the merits—and thus also bars his attempt to leverage the RLUIPA issue

in service of a stay of execution.

2. Plaintiff’s conceded inability to appeal the underlying merits

ruling presents an obvious vehicle problem.

In all events, Plaintiff appears to recognize that he has a fatal vehicle problem

on this issue. The district court dismissed his RLUIPA claim from the bench in a

ruling that Plaintiff did not (and could not) appeal because that is not an appealable

final order. See ROA.3119–22 (notice of appeal appealing only Friday, March 11,

order); App.522–24 (March 7 dismissal of RLUIPA claim). For that reason, Plaintiff

attempts to bring the RLUIPA issue to this Court by way of the denial of his motion

for reconsideration of the dismissal ruling, since the district court also denied the

motion for reconsideration in the March 11 injunctive order. Pet.15–16 n.1.

And there is the rub: This Court’s review of the facts and law regarding the

RLUIPA issue would be constrained by the steep abuse-of-discretion standard. See,

e.g., Caribbean Mgmt. Grp., Inc. v. Erikon LLC, 966 F.3d 35, 44 (1st Cir. 2020) (“We

review the denial of a motion for reconsideration for abuse of discretion.”); SPV-LS,

LLC v. Transamerica Life Ins. Co., 912 F.3d 1106, 1111 (8th Cir. 2019) (“A district

court has wide discretion over whether to grant a motion for reconsideration of a prior

order, and we will reverse a denial of a motion for reconsideration only for a clear

abuse of discretion.” (cleaned up)). This Court almost always declines this sort of

defective vehicle in favor of a future case where the Court can directly review the

underlying merits ruling itself. It should do the same here.

23

3. Plaintiff’s RLUIPA question does not satisfy the cert criteria.

Further, as Plaintiff’s silence (see Pet.27–31) suggests, this RLUIPA question

does not implicate any division of authority that warrants this Court’s intervention.

And Plaintiff nowhere explains how this question is exceptionally important—it

appears that no one has ever raised it, that it is not recurring, and that it is just a

fact-bound issue intended to stop Plaintiff’s execution altogether. This Court’s Rule

10 criteria thus independently establish that cert is unlikely.

4. The district court did not abuse its discretion in declining to

reconsider its dismissal of Plaintiff’s fact-bound RLUIPA

claim.

If the Court considers the merits, the district court did not abuse its discretion

in its fact-bound denial of Plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration. Under that

deferential standard, “[a]n abuse of discretion will be found only if the district court’s

judgment was based on clearly erroneous factual findings or erroneous legal

conclusions.” SPV-LS, LLC, 912 F.3d at 1111 (citation omitted); see Caribbean Mgmt.

Grp., Inc., 966 F.3d at 44–45 (“To prevail on such a motion, ‘a party normally must

demonstrate either that new and important evidence, previously unavailable, has

surfaced or that the original judgment was premised on a manifest error of law or

fact.’” (citation omitted)). Plaintiff cannot meet that high standard here for at least

three reasons.

a. First, he has waived any argument that he will be unable “to meditatively

breathe during his final moments.” Pet.i. As the district court recounted, Plaintiff’s

argument in the district court was that his “‘sincerely held religious beliefs are

substantially burdened not because he will be unable to breathe’ but because he will

24

be forced to breath[e] nitrogen instead of air.” App.925 (emphasis Plaintiff’s). The

district court then rejected that argument because, although “two Buddhist clerics

testified that air (not nitrogen) is necessary for meditative breathing,” “[t]hey cited

no religious text or instruction by the historical Buddha in support of this

proposition.” Id.

Plaintiff now conspicuously foregoes his argument that he must breathe

ambient air rather than nitrogen—but he cannot switch horses and claim that the

problem is he is unable to breathe at all. He “admit[ted] [below] that he will have the

ability to breathe in the nitrogen as it is administered.” App.925. He testified that he

is “planning to use [his] meditative breathing techniques” when he is executed.

App.545. And so, the district court properly held that “there is no substantial burden

to his exercise of rhythmic breathing.” App.925. Plaintiff cannot now sandbag the

courts below and the State by arguing that, in fact, he cannot breathe.

b. Second, Plaintiff complains that the district court’s RLUIPA findings on

reconsideration conflict with the Eighth Amendment findings. In support of that

complaint, Plaintiff cites “[e]yewitness accounts of all four Alabama executions by

nitrogen gassing [which] reveal that prisoners experienced ‘conscious terror for

several minutes, shaking, gasping, and other evidence of distress.’” Pet.29. Plaintiff’s

reliance is misplaced.

The Alabama courts have uniformly rejected attempts to use those media

reports as evidence that (a) the eyewitnesses knew when nitrogen began flowing and

(b) the prisoners were conscious during any movement. Those accounts are

25

“insufficiently reliable because [the eyewitnesses] d[id] not know”—and could not

know—“when the nitrogen began to flow.” Frazier, 2025 WL 361172, at *11 (footnote

omitted). Because they did not know time zero, the witnesses could not “‘reliably

pinpoint’” how soon after the introduction of nitrogen “‘an inmate los[t]

consciousness.’” Id. On top of that, the courts have recognized that “unconscious

individuals experience involuntary movements,” such as “‘muscle tremors and

convulsion-like activity.’” Id. at *12. It is thus “not supris[ing]” that the condemned

inmates exhibited “breaths and even convulsions[] after the introduction of an inert

gas—when a person is unconscious and unable to feel pain.” Id. For that reason, “the

evidence of Smith’s, Miller’s, and Grayson’s movements during their respective

executions does not support a finding that any of them experienced severe

psychological pain or distress over and above what is inherent in any execution.” Id.;

see id. at *11 (rejecting argument that these reports “are evidence that inmates

remained conscious after the nitrogen began flowing and were distressed and in

pain”). 3 And that was one of the glaring problems in the district court’s injunction

3 To the extent this district court also invoked the Smith execution, the court

ignored that his execution was principally complicated by his own “non-cooperation

with the execution process,” specifically his “breath-holding,” which “would have

increased the level of carbon dioxide in his body, acidifying his blood and increasing

discomfort and distress.” App.488 ¶ 158. As the Alabama courts recognized, the

evidence from the Smith execution showed that Smith refused to inhale the nitrogen,

which caused the reaction Plaintiff now highlights. Frazier, 2025 WL 361172, at *5

& nn.9–10, *11 n.20; Grayson, 2024 WL 4701875, at *21 (“Smith held his breath and

struggled against the restraints while Miller did not.”). On top of that, Smith’s

autopsy showed that he had “a synthetic cannabinoid” in his blood that “can cause

hallucinations, vomiting, paranoia, and convulsions (seizures)”—which, in turn, may

have made Smith’s “convulsions more likely and pronounced.” App.488 ¶ 158;

Grayson, 2024 WL 4701875, at *17 n.18. None of this has anything to do with

26

order that Plaintiff does not now defend: Without acknowledging the Alabama

decisions to the contrary, the district court said that those “[e]yewitness accounts

from these executions are the most probative evidence of what death by forced

inhalation of nitrogen looks like.” App.931.

Perhaps because Plaintiff knows about this problem, he also cites Dr. Bickler’s

testimony as “consistent” with these accounts. Pet.29. But he omits that Dr. Bickler

expressly based his opinions (and the only paper cited in his expert declaration—his

own two-page opinion piece, ROA.139, 211) on those reports’ suggestion that the

Alabama executions “were prolonged, apparently agonizing, evidently painful and

traumatic.” ROA.3356; accord ROA.3384. Dr. Bickler’s opinions thus suffer from the

same unreliability that caused the Alabama courts to discount the media reports in

the first place. Plaintiff also tries (Pet.29) to puff up Dr. Bickler based on his “human

hypoxia” research. But he does not explain what that actually involves: “slowly

dropping subjects’ ‘oxygen saturation level to about 70 percent and sometimes lower,

down to 50 percent,’” and then holding them in that reduced-oxygen state for several

minutes. App.488 ¶ 159; App.867–68; App.769–70. That, of course, is nothing like the

facts here, which will involve rapid administration of pure nitrogen. As Dr. Antognini

put it, “probably at the 30- or 40-second level in the nitrogen hypoxia system, you’ve

already gone past the lower level of what Dr. Bickler ... would normally study. So

nitrogen’s constitutionality or efficacy as a method of execution—it has everything to

do with Smith’s own actions.

27

there isn’t really a lot of time for somebody to develop symptoms before they become

unconscious.” App.868. The puffery thus gets Dr. Bickler nowhere.

In short, for all the reasons why the district court’s and Dr. Bickler’s reliance

on the Alabama media reports was wrong as an Eighth Amendment matter, those

reports do nothing to undercut the district court’s holding that Plaintiff has no viable

RLUIPA claim.

c. Third, even if the Court reached the merits, Plaintiff’s RLUIPA claim would

not get off the ground. RLUIPA generally provides that the State shall not “impose a

substantial burden on the religious exercise” of a prisoner, unless the burden is “in

furtherance of a compelling governmental interest” and “the least restrictive means

of furthering that compelling governmental interest.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1(a).

Here, as explained above, Plaintiff failed to identify a substantial burden on

his religious exercise because he unquestionably can (and said he intends to) engage

in his meditative breathing as he is executed. But, even setting that aside, the State

would satisfy strict scrutiny.

There is no serious question that the State has a compelling interest in

pursuing justice by carrying out executions. Cf. Dunn v. Smith, 141 S. Ct. 725, 726

(2021) (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting from denial of application to vacate injunction)

(referencing “the State’s compelling interests in ensuring the safety, security, and

solemnity of the execution room”); Ramirez, 595 U.S. at 433 (“Both the State and the

victims of crime have an important interest in the timely enforcement of a sentence.”

(quoting Hill, 547 U.S. at 584)). Moreover, Defendants have no less restrictive means

28

of furthering that interest. There certainly is none under Louisiana law because

nitrogen is the only currently available method of execution. App.945 (district court

finding that “Louisiana has no readily available electric chair and cannot get the

drugs needed for lethal injunction” (footnotes omitted)). And Plaintiff has never

argued that there is a legally appreciable difference between his breathing as he fades

into unconsciousness by nitrogen hypoxia and his breathing as he would fade into

unconsciousness after being shot by a firing squad. Even on strict scrutiny, therefore,

Plaintiff’s RLUIPA claim would fail.

CONCLUSION

The Court should deny the Application to Stay Execution and the Petition for

Writ of Certiorari.

Respectfully submitted,

ELIZABETH B. MURRILL

Attorney General

J. BENJAMIN AGUIÑAGA

Solicitor General

Counsel of Record

ZACHARY FAIRCLOTH

Principal Deputy

Solicitor General

MORGAN BRUNGARD

KELSEY L. SMITH

Deputy Solicitors General

CAITLIN HUETTEMANN

Assistant Solicitor General

LOUISIANA DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

1885 N. Third St.

Baton Rouge, LA 70802

(225) 506-3746

AguinagaB@ag.louisiana.gov

29

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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