Emergency Application — Jessie Hoffman, Petitioner v. Gary Westcott, Secretary, Louisiana Department of Public Safety and Corrections, et al.

Supreme Court briefMar 16, 2025

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CAPITAL CASE

No. 25A___

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

JESSIE HOFFMAN,

Petitioner,

v.

GARY WESTCOTT, SECRETARY, LOUISIANA DEPARTMENT OF

PUBLIC SAFETY AND CORRECTIONS; DARREL VANNOY, WARDEN,

LOUISIANA STATE PENITENTIARY, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY,

JOHN DOES, UNKNOWN EXECUTIONERS,

Respondents.

On Petition for Writ of Certiorari

to the United States Court of Appeals

for the Fifth Circuit

APPLICATION FOR STAY OF EXECUTION

Jessie Hoffman’s execution is scheduled for

March 18, 2025, between 6 p.m. and 9 p.m. CDT.

To the Honorable Samuel Alito, Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the

United States and Circuit Justice for the Fifth Circuit:

Petitioner Jessie Hoffman respectfully requests that this Court stay his

execution using nitrogen hypoxia pending the Court’s disposition of his pending Petition

for a Writ of Certiorari. Mr. Hoffman is scheduled to be executed on March 18, 2025,

between 6 p.m. and 9 p.m. CDT. If the Court is unable to resolve this Application by

5:59 p.m. CDT on March 18, 2025, it should grant a temporary stay while it considers

this Application.

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE STAY OF EXECUTION

Mr. Hoffman’s execution date is presently March 18, 2025. Mr. Hoffman has

concurrently filed a Petition for a Writ of Certiorari with this Application. The impending

execution date may preclude this Court from considering Mr. Hoffman’s petition before

the scheduled execution, thus necessitating this Application. This Court has jurisdiction

to enter a stay under 28 U.S.C. § 2101(f), 28 U.S.C. § 1651, and Supreme Court Rule 23.

The issuance of a stay is left to this Court’s discretion, guided by four factors:

(1) whether the stay applicant has made a strong showing that he is likely

to succeed on the merits; (2) whether the applicant will be irreparably

injured absent a stay; (3) whether issuance of the stay will substantially

injure the other parties interested in the proceeding; and (4) where the

public interest lies.

Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 434 (2009) (quoting Hilton v. Braunskill, 481 U.S. 770, 776

(1987)). A stay of execution is justified pending the disposition of a petition for writ of

certiorari. See Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 889 (1983) (“Approving the execution of

a defendant before his appeal is decided on the merits would clearly be improper[.]”).

Mr. Hoffman’s challenge to his execution is timely raised and has a strong

likelihood of success on the merits. The State of Louisiana announced on February 10,

2025, that it had created its protocol for execution by nitrogen hypoxia—that is, the

deprivation of oxygen through the forced inhalation of pure nitrogen until a person dies.

It served Mr. Hoffman with a death warrant on February 20, 2025, notifying him for the

first time that he would be the first Louisiana inmate to be executed by nitrogen hypoxia

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on March 18, 2025. The State did not disclose its new protocol for nitrogen gassing until

over one week later. Mr. Hoffman, a practicing Buddhist, diligently exhausted his

administrative remedies and filed this suit less than a week after receiving his death

warrant, challenging the State’s method of execution under the Eighth Amendment and

the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc et seq.

(“RLUIPA”), and seeking injunctive relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

The Eighth Amendment forbids forms of execution that intensify a death sentence

with “superaddition[s] of terror, pain, or disgrace.” Bucklew v. Precythe, 587 U.S. 119,

133 (2019) (citation omitted) (cleaned up). To succeed on a method-of-execution challenge

under the Eighth Amendment, an inmate must show that a “feasible, readily

implemented” alternative procedure that would “significantly reduce a substantial risk

of severe pain.” Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35, 52 (2008); Glossip v. Gross, 576 U.S. 863, 877

(2015).

The district court—after expedited discovery and a 12-hour hearing—concluded

that Mr. Hoffman was likely to succeed on the merits of his Eighth Amendment claim and

entered a preliminary injunction based on its extensive findings of fact, which in turn

were based on expert and lay testimony. Relying on medical expert testimony, the

district court concluded that: (1) Mr. Hoffman was likely to succeed in showing that

nitrogen gassing superadds psychological terror compared to execution by firing squad

(the readily available and feasible alternative Mr. Hoffman proposed); (2) he would likely

be irreparably harmed absent a preliminary injunction; and (3) the equities and the public

interest weighed against the State’s rushed execution of Mr. Hoffman. A divided panel of

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the Fifth Circuit vacated the injunction on March 14, 2025, in an opinion flatly inconsistent

with this Court’s precedent.

As Mr. Hoffman explains in his petition, a majority of the Fifth Circuit panel

misapplied the Eighth Amendment and ignored the district court’s factual findings on the

central issue of psychological terror. The majority suggested a categorical rule that the

Eighth Amendment requires a petitioner to show that the alternative method of

execution is less physically painful than the chosen method, regardless of psychological

effect. While giving lip service to the Court’s recognition that the “superaddition” of

terror can violate the Eighth Amendment, Bucklew, 587 U.S. at 133, the majority

reasoned that “expert testimony from both parties” established “that nitrogen hypoxia

is painless,” while “death by firing squad can cause pain.” Pet. App. 6a–7a. This approach

departs from this Court’s precedent, and the well-established rule in other circuits that

psychological terror can constitute cruel and unusual punishment.

The panel majority also completely ignored Mr. Hoffman’s RLUIPA claim,

pressed by Mr. Hoffman as an alternative basis for affirming the district court’s

preliminary injunction. This case presents a logical extension of Ramirez v. Collier, 595

U.S. 411 (2022), which held in the analogous context of a pastor laying hands on an

individual being executed that RLUIPA prohibits a state from substantially burdening a

condemned inmate’s religious exercise in his final moments (unless it is the least

restrictive way to advance a compelling state interest). Nitrogen hypoxia makes Mr.

Hoffman’s religious practice impossible.

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I.

There Is a Reasonable Probability That the Court Will Grant Certiorari and

a Fair Prospect That Mr. Hoffman Will Succeed on the Merits.

Mr. Hoffman has shown a likelihood of success on the merits for the reasons

explained in his petition for a writ of certiorari and a fair prospect that this Court will

grant review of the Fifth Circuit’s decision.

As explained in the petition, the district court faithfully applied this Court’s

method-of-execution standard, exercising its discretion to conclude that Mr. Hoffman was

likely to succeed on the merits of his Eighth Amendment challenge to Louisiana’s newest

method of execution: nitrogen hypoxia. The district court’s determination was based on

its findings of fact after hearing hours of expert testimony that nitrogen gassing inflicts

sustained psychological terror far more severe than the alternative of execution by firing

squad.

The Fifth Circuit incorrectly disregarded the district court’s findings as

irrelevant, vacating the injunction on the basis that the Eighth Amendment analysis

must be confined to physical pain only and that psychological suffering, no matter how

severe, does not suffice. The Fifth Circuit’s categorical rejection of psychological

suffering as a constitutional consideration ignores Supreme Court precedent holding that

psychological terror is a component of cruel and unusual punishment, and it is flatly at

odds with the approaches of other circuits that have recognized that psychological terror

and distress are relevant to the constitutional analysis.

The Fifth Circuit also departed from this Court’s precedent in its refusal to

consider Mr. Hoffman’s RLUIPA claim. Mr. Hoffman is a long-practicing Buddhist. The

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record evidence unrebutted by the State establishes that, in Buddhist tradition,

meditative breathing at the time of death carries profound spiritual significance, founded

in the core belief that meditation and unfettered breath at the time of transition from life

to death determines the quality of rebirth.

This Court held in Ramirez, 595 U.S. 411, that RLUIPA prohibits a state from

substantially burdening a condemned inmate’s religious exercise in his final moments

unless it is the least restrictive way to advance a compelling state interest. Significantly,

the district court found, in the context of the Eighth Amendment claim, that nitrogen

gassing causes “conscious terror and a sense of suffocation” that “endures for 35 to 40

seconds” and potentially for “3 to 5 minutes if an unwilling inmate holds his breath.” Pet.

App. 35a. It also found based on eyewitness accounts of Alabama’s executions that

nitrogen hypoxia caused the person being executed to gasp for air, displaying signs of

suffocation. Pet. App. 29a. The logical conclusion from these facts is that death by

nitrogen gassing is fundamentally incompatible with a Buddhist meditative state and

breathing practice. Yet, the Fifth Circuit inexplicably, and incorrectly, did not even

mention Mr. Hoffman’s argument that the district court’s preliminary injunction should

be affirmed on the alternative ground that his scheduled method of execution violates his

rights under RLUIPA, much less provide reasoned analysis of the claim.

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II.

Mr. Hoffman Will Be Irreparably Injured Absent a Stay.

Mr. Hoffman’s impending execution is plainly an irreparable injury because he

cannot vindicate his rights once he is dead. So irreparable injury “is necessarily present

in capital cases.” Wainwright v. Booker, 473 U.S. 935, 935 n.1 (1985). As a result, this

factor “weighs heavily in the movant’s favor,” based on the “irreversible nature of the

death penalty.” O’Bryan v. Estelle, 691 F.2d 706, 708 (5th Cir. 1982).

III.

Harm to Other Parties or the Public Is Minimized, and the Public Interest

Lies In Favor of Granting a Stay.

Mr. Hoffman recognizes that “the State and the victims of crime have an

important interest in the timely enforcement of a sentence.” Hill v. McDonough, 547

U.S. 573, 584 (2006). But the public has a strong interest in ensuring that the State does

not rush to implement a method of execution that violates fundamental constitutional

rights and federal law. The State and the public will not be harmed by the full airing of

Mr. Hoffman’s claims.

Issuance of a brief stay of execution pending the Court’s consideration of Mr.

Hoffman’s petition serves the public’s interest in ensuring that capital punishment is

carried out in compliance with the Eighth Amendment and federal protections for

religious liberty. A brief stay allowing the Court the opportunity to consider a petition

for a writ of certiorari identifying a substantial departure from this Court’s precedents

concerning method of execution and RLUIPA challenges is in the public interest.

Further, Mr. Hoffman is not responsible for generating the exigencies that

necessitated this stay. Mr. Hoffman has pursued his claims as timely and diligently as

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possible, only to be rebuffed by the State at every turn. And the last-minute nature of

these proceedings is entirely attributable to the State.

As explained in the petition, Mr. Hoffman attempted to bring these claims both

before and after receiving his death warrant. In February 2024, the Louisiana

Legislature passed Act 5 of the Second Extraordinary Session of 2024, amending La.

Rev. Stat. § 15:569–570 to add two new methods of execution in addition to lethal

injection—nitrogen gas and electrocution—effective July 1, 2024. La. Rev. Stat. § 15:569

(West 2024). The next month, in March 2024, Mr. Hoffman filed a grievance with the

prison challenging all three statutory methods of execution. This grievance was rejected

as “premature” as the law had “yet to take legal effect.” Pet. App. 21a (capitalization

omitted). In June 2024, Mr. Hoffman filed a motion to reopen his original methods

lawsuit, which had been filed in 2012 and was dismissed in 2022. The State opposed this

request, arguing that his motion was not ripe. See Defs’ Opp’n to Mot. for Relief from J.,

Hoffman v. Jindal et al., No. 3:12-cv-976 (M.D. La. July 24, 2025), ECF No. 327. Mr.

Hoffman attempted to file another grievance after July 1, 2024, when the statute went

into effect. Again, the State deemed the grievance “premature.” Pet. App. 21a.

After receiving notice of his execution warrant, Mr. Hoffman invoked the

emergency provision to file grievances to contest the method of execution and seek a

copy of the protocol. Pet. App. 22a. The State notified him in writing that it would issue

a response to him within 40 days—that is, after the scheduled execution date. ROA.1900.

Mr. Hoffman’s execution warrant was signed on February 12, 2024, but Mr. Hoffman

was not informed until February 20, 2025, that his execution would be by nitrogen

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hypoxia. The warrant set a March 18, 2025 execution date, which falls before the State’s

deadline to respond to Mr. Hoffman’s grievance.

On February 10, 2025, Mr. Hoffman timely supplemented his prior motion to

reopen his case in the district court, after the State filed its motion for an execution

warrant, and Mr. Hoffman further supplemented the motion to reopen on February 14,

2025, once the warrant was signed. But the State sought mandamus and a stay from the

Fifth Circuit, which effectively froze that case. See In re Westcott, No. 25-30088 (5th Cir.

Feb. 23, 2025).

Mr. Hoffman then filed this case on February 25, 2025, seeking a preliminary

injunction the next day. Following expedited discovery and a hearing on March 7, 2025,

the district court granted the injunction on March 11, 2025. Hoffman v. Westcott, No. 25169-SDD-SDJ, 2025 WL 763945 (M.D. La. Mar. 11, 2025). The State appealed to the Fifth

Circuit the next day, which vacated the injunction on March 14, 2025. Hoffman v.

Westcott, No. 25-70006, 2025 WL 816734 (5th Cir. Mar. 14, 2025).

In short, Mr. Hoffman exhausted all available remedies and has been diligently

pursuing his rights in state and federal courts alike. Mr. Hoffman now seeks a writ of

certiorari from this Court, filed concurrently with this Application.

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CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court should grant this Application and stay Mr.

Hoffman’s execution pending the disposition of his concurrently filed Petition for Writ of

Certiorari.

March 16, 2025

Cecelia Trenticosta

Loyola Center for Social Justice

7214 St. Charles Avenue

New Orleans, LA 70118

(504) 861-5735

ctkappel@defendla.org

Respectfully submitted,

/S/ Andrianna D. Kastanek

Andrianna D. Kastanek

Counsel of Record

Alexis E. Bates

Andrew L. Osborne

JENNER & BLOCK LLP

353 North Clark Street

Chicago, IL 60654

(312) 222-9350

akastanek@jenner.com

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This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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