Opposition Brief — Brad Keith Sigmon, Petitioner v. South Carolina
Supreme Court briefMar 7, 2025
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No. 24-6709
_____________________________
IN THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNTED STATES
__________________________
BRAD KEITH SIGMON,
v.
Petitioner,
THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA,
__________________________
Respondent.
BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
AND APPLICATION FOR STAY OF EXECUTION
__________________________
** Execution Scheduled for March 7, 2025 @ 6:00 p.m. **
__________________________
ALAN WILSON
Attorney General of South Carolina
DONALD J. ZELENKA
Deputy Attorney General
*MELODY J. BROWN
Senior Assistant Deputy Attorney General
mbrown@scag.gov
RICHARD B. LARRABEE
Assistant Attorney General
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
P.O. Box 11549
Columbia, South Carolina 29211
(803) 734-6305
*counsel of record
Counsel for Respondents
*CAPITAL CASE*
[EXECUTION SET FOR FRIDAY, MARCH 7, 2025, at 6:00 p.m.]
QUESTION PRESENTED
Does a timely election of one of three available methods of execution
maintained by the South Carolina Department of Corrections waive arguments, and
deprive a condemned inmate of standing, to seek additional details as to other
available methods not selected?
i
TABLE OF CONTENTS
QUESTION PRESENTED ............................................................................................. i
TABLE OF CONTENTS ................................................................................................ ii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ......................................................................................... iii
INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................................... 1
STATEMENT OF THE CASE....................................................................................... 3
A.
Sigmon is sentenced to death for gruesome murders. .............................. 3
B.
Sigmon and other death-sentenced inmates litigated the
methods of execution in South Carolina years prior to his
2025 notice of execution.............................................................................. 5
C.
Sigmon objects to the Director’s certification and then moves
to reconsider ............................................................................................... 9
REASONS FOR DENYING THE PETITION AND THE APPLICATION
FOR STAY OF EXECUTION ...................................................................................... 11
I.
Sigmon has waived any objection to, and lacks standing to
litigate, aspects of a method that will not be used to execute him. ....... 11
II.
Sigmon raises his due process argument too late. ................................. 12
III. Sigmon is wrong on the merits ............................................................... 13
A.
South Carolina has not denied Sigmon any due process right.. ...... 13
B.
Sigmon’s attacks on previous executions are baseless. .................... 17
IV. The remaining factors do not support a stay.......................................... 21
CONCLUSION............................................................................................................. 24
APPENDIX
a. Notice of Election and Election of Method of Execution .......................... a1
c. Return to Objection to Certification, Att. 1, Antognini Decl. .................. a3
b. Trial Trans. pp. 1710-1716 and 1728-1731 ...............................................a53
ii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases:
Barr v. Lee, 591 U.S. 979 (2020)........................................................................ 2, 11, 20
Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35 (2008)...................................................................... 12, 14, 21
Bixby v. Stirling, No. 3:24-cv-5072, 2024 WL 4627451
(D.S.C. Oct. 30, 2024)................................................................................ 8, 9, 17, 22
Bowman v. Stirling, No. 3:25-cv-199 (D.S.C. Jan. 28, 2025) ....................................... 8
Bowman v. Stirling, No. 25-1 (4th Cir. Jan. 30, 2025) ................................................. 8
Brewer v. Landrigan, 562 U.S. 996 (2010) ................................................................. 18
Bucklew v. Precythe, 587 U.S. 119 (2019) ............................................. 2, 12, 21, 22, 23
Calderon v. Thompson, 523 U.S. 538 (1998)................................................................. 2
Creech v. Tewalt, 94 F.4th 859 (9th Cir. 2024) ........................................................... 18
DeYoung v. Owens, 646 F.3d 1319 (11th Cir. 2011) ................................................... 21
Food & Drug Admin. v. All. for Hippocratic Med., 602 U.S. 367 (2024) ............. 11, 12
Glossip v. Gross, 576 U.S. 863 (2015) ......................................................................... 23
Hill v. McDonough, 547 U.S. 573 (2006)............................................................... 11, 23
Hollingsworth v. Perry, 558 U.S. 183 (2010) .............................................................. 11
Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1 (1978) ................................................................ 15
In re Stays of Execution in Cap. Cases, 471 S.E.2d 140 (S.C. 1996) ............................ 7
Jackson v. Danberg, No. CIV. 06-300-SLR, 2011 WL 3205453
(D. Del. July 27, 2011), aff’d, 656 F.3d 157 (3d Cir. 2011) .............................. 21, 22
LaChance v. Erickson, 522 U.S. 262 (1998) ................................................................ 14
iii
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).................................................... 23
Matter of Fed. Bureau of Prisons’ Execution Protocol Cases,
471 F. Supp. 3d 209 (D.D.C. 2020) N ..................................................................... 20
Musser v. Utah, 333 U.S. 95 (1948)............................................................................... 1
Nelson v. Campbell, 541 U.S. 637 (2004) ...................................................................... 2
Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418 (2009) ..................................................................... 11, 22
Owens v. Stirling, 904 S.E.2d 580 (S.C. 2024).........................5, 6, 7, 10, 13, 14, 17, 18
Phillips v. DeWine, 841 F.3d 405 (6th Cir. 2016) ....................................................... 15
Powell v. Thomas, 784 F. Supp. 2d 1270 (M.D. Ala. 2011) ........................................ 21
Sigmon v. State, No. 2024-001373 (S.C. Nov. 14, 2024)............................................. 22
Sigmon v. State, No. 2025-000187 (S.C.) .................................................................... 22
Sigmon v. Stirling, 956 F.3d 183 (4th Cir. 2020) ................................................. 3, 4, 5
Snider Int’l Corp. v. Town of Forest Heights, Md.,
739 F.3d 140 (4th Cir. 2014) .................................................................................. 14
State v. Owens, No. 2024-001397 (S.C. Sept. 3, 2024).................................................. 8
State v. Sigmon, 623 S.E.2d 648 (S.C. 2005) ................................................................ 5
Stewart v. LaGrand, 526 U.S. 115 (1999) ............................................................. 11, 12
Swarthout v. Cooke, 562 U.S. 216 (2011) .................................................................... 13
Trottie v. Livingston, 766 F.3d 450 (5th Cir. 2014) .................................................... 15
Walters v. Nat’l Ass’n of Radiation Survivors, 473 U.S. 305 (1985) .......................... 14
Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997) ..................................................... 2, 15
Wellons v. Comm’r, Ga. Dep’t of Corr., 754 F.3d 1260 (11th Cir. 2014) .................... 15
iv
Zink v. Lombardi, 783 F.3d 1089 (8th Cir. 2015) ....................................................... 15
State Statutes:
S.C. Code Ann. § 17-25-370 ........................................................................................... 6
S.C. Code Ann. § 24-3-530 ....................................................................................... 5, 13
S.C. Code Ann. § 24-3-530(A) .................................................................................. 5, 13
S.C. Code Ann. § 24-3-530(B) ........................................................................................ 5
S.C. Code Ann. § 24-3-580(A)(1) .................................................................................... 7
S.C. Code Ann. § 24-3-580(A)(2) .................................................................................... 7
S.C. Code Ann. § 24-3-580(B) ........................................................................................ 7
S.C. Code Ann. § 24-3-580(I) ..................................................................................... 6, 8
S.C. Code Ann. § 44-43-460 ......................................................................................... 18
Other Authorities:
Stuart Banner, The Death Penalty: An American History (2003).............................. 15
Noah Cadwell, et al., Gasping for Air, NPR
(Sept. 21, 2020), https://tinyurl.com/4f8aj9ha ..................................................... 20
Jeffrey Collins, South Carolina Inmate Dies by Lethal Injection in State’s First
Execution in 13 Years, Associate Press
(Sept. 20, 2024), https://tinyurl.com/3x7662j8 ........................................................ 19
Jeffrey Collins, South Carolina Executes Richard Moore Despite Broadly Supported
Plea to Cut Sentence to Life, Associated Press
(Nov. 1, 2024), https://tinyurl.com/2s4tc4vr ........................................................ 19
Jeffrey Collins, South Carolina Puts Inmate Marion Bowman Jr. to Death in State’s
Third Execution Since September, Associated Press
(Jan. 31, 2025), https://tinyurl.com/5a9bmbz4 .................................................... 19
v
INTRODUCTION
Of this there is no question: Brad Keith Sigmon is guilty of the bludgeoning
murders of his former girlfriend’s parents, David and Gladys Larke. He has
consistently admitted his guilt. Nothing in the petition undermines or challenges his
guilt or his death sentences as returned by a jury in July 2002. His execution is to be
carried out in the next few hours.
Sigmon now asks this Court to stay his execution so that he can litigate
whether South Carolina has provided him enough information about its supply of
lethal injection drugs. For three reasons, the Court should deny the petition and the
application for a stay of execution.
First, Sigmon elected the firing squad on February 21, 2025. BIO App. a1.
Sigmon should not be permitted to litigate questions about a method that he is not
facing simply to delay his execution by another.
Second, Sigmon brings an eve-of-execution request weeks after he was aware
that his request for additional information was denied on February 19, 2025. (Pet.
App. 8a). Nothing prevented a request following that denial, yet he waited until less
than 48 hours before his scheduled execution to seek this Court’s intervention.
And third, he is wrong on the merits. The S.C. Supreme Court has made clear
that the information that Director Stirling has disclosed regarding South Carolina’s
supply of its lethal injection drug (pentobarbital) satisfies what state law requires
him to provide an inmate. The S.C. Supreme Court’s decision on that question is the
“final word” on the matter. Musser v. Utah, 333 U.S. 95, 98 (1948). Reading Sigmon’s
1
argument for what it is—an attempt to “federalize” the information a State must
provide if it gives an inmate a choice of methods of execution—does not help him.
Federal law does not establish any due process right to this information because
requiring the government to provide it is not “deeply rooted in this Nation’s history
and tradition.” Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 721 (1997). Lastly, Sigmon
gets no more traction from questioning the pentobarbital used in the State’s three
most recent executions. The opinion he relies upon offers only speculation about what
could happen “if” the inmate was sensate. That speculation is facially insufficient to
warrant a last-minute stay. In stark contrast, the State offered expert opinion, also
by affidavit, that explained how a condemned inmate is quickly rendered insensate;
why the timing of the State’s previous executions was expected; and, how the witness
statements from all three of South Carolina’s most recent lethal injection executions
confirm that the State’s single-drug protocol was effective. (The State’s expert is, no
less, the same expert that the federal government used when this Court quickly
vacated a stay of execution in Barr v. Lee, 591 U.S. 979, 981 (2020), and that Missouri
used in Bucklew v. Precythe, 587 U.S. 119, 146–47 (2019).)
The State has a “significant interest in enforcing its criminal judgments,”
Nelson v. Campbell, 541 U.S. 637, 650 (2004)—an interest that has a “moral
dimension” to it, Calderon v. Thompson, 523 U.S. 538, 556 (1998). Sigmon offers no
compelling reason for a last-minute stay of his execution. His request for delay should
be denied.
2
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.
Sigmon is sentenced to death for gruesome murders.
The State will rely, for the most part, on the general summary included in the
Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals’ opinion in the appeal from the denial of federal
habeas corpus relief:
In 2001, Sigmon and Rebecca Barbare had been in a
romantic relationship for approximately three years and
lived together in a trailer near the trailer of Barbare’s
parents, David and Gladys Larke. Sigmon v. State, 403
S.C. 120, 742 S.E.2d 394, 396 (2013). But early in that year,
after Barbare ended their relationship and moved in with
her parents, Sigmon became increasingly obsessed with
Barbare. Id.
On April 26, 2001, Sigmon and an acquaintance, Eugene
Strube, spent the evening drinking alcohol and smoking
crack cocaine. Id. Early in the morning of April 27, Sigmon
told Strube that when Barbare left to take her children to
school the next morning, Sigmon would go to the Larkes’
home, “tie her parents up,” and “get ahold of” Barbare. J.A.
40–41.
Later that morning, after Barbare left to take her children
to school, Sigmon took a baseball bat from beneath his
trailer and entered David and Gladys Larke’s home.
Sigmon, 742 S.E.2d at 396. When David Larke, upon
seeing Sigmon, called to Gladys Larke to bring him his gun,
Sigmon struck David Larke in the back of his head with
the bat several times. Id. Thereafter, Sigmon chased
Gladys Larke into the living room and struck her several
times in the head. Id. at 397. Sigmon then went to the
kitchen, saw David Larke was still moving, and struck him
again. Id. And after seeing that Gladys Larke was also still
moving, Sigmon struck her several more times. Id. David
and Gladys Larke died within minutes.
Sigmon retrieved David Larke’s gun and waited for
Barbare to return. Id. When she arrived, Sigmon forced her
into her car and drove her away. Id. But during the ride,
3
Barbare jumped from the car, causing Sigmon to pull over,
chase after her, and shoot her. Id. Barbare survived the
shooting. Id.
Meanwhile, Sigmon fled but was captured in Tennessee ten
days later after his mother helped authorities locate him.
Id. Upon his capture, Sigmon confessed to the murders. Id.
Sigmon v. Stirling, 956 F.3d 183, 189 (4th Cir. 2020).
Helpful as it is, this summary does not adequately reflect the overwhelming
evidence in aggravation and plain malice evident in the murders. For instance,
Sigmon waited all night in the home next to the Larkes, and waited for “Becky” to
leave to take her children to school, before entering the home. He surprised Mr. Larke
in the kitchen area then struck him repeatedly with a baseball bat. When Ms. Larke
entered the kitchen, Sigmon chased her back into her living room, where he
repeatedly struck her with the same baseball bat. Sigmon then returned to the
kitchen and continued beating Mr. Larke only to later go back to the living room and
continue beating Mrs. Larke. Sigmon, 956 F.3d at 189. Mr. Larke sustained a total
of nine crushing blows to the skull (some likely while his head was on the floor),
bruising on his ears and left shoulder, and a defensive wound on the back of his right
hand. His “skull was basically almost broken in two.” The pathologist testified the
injuries indicated that “these are not trivial swings with this bat. These are full force,
great deal of energy transmitted, homerun type swings.” Mrs. Larke similarly
received nine injuries to her skull and had defensive wounds to her forearms, wrists,
and elbows. Bruising indicated she attempted to put her arms up “across her head”
in futile defense as the blows were inflicted. She had also inhaled blood into her lungs
4
“indicating that she was alive following the injuries that caused her basilar skull
fractures, and was breathing through these fractured sinuses and inhaling that blood
down into her lungs.” The pathologist opined that both victims would have died in
approximately three to five minutes from the severity of the beatings. See BIO App.
a53, Tr. pp. 1710-1716 and 1728-1731.
Sigmon was convicted by a Greenville County, South Carolina jury in July
2002 and sentenced to death. His convictions and sentences were affirmed on direct
appeal and throughout state and federal collateral challenges. See State v. Sigmon,
623 S.E.2d 648 (S.C. 2005); Sigmon v. Stirling, supra.
B.
Sigmon and other death-sentenced inmates litigated the
methods of execution in South Carolina years prior to his 2025
notice of execution.
1.
After years of being unable to obtain lethal injection drugs, South
Carolina amended its method-of-execution statute to make electrocution the default
method while also giving a condemned inmate the option to elect lethal injection or
the firing squad, if those methods are available. See S.C. Code Ann. § 24-3-530(A).
The SCDC Director must certify for each execution which methods are available. Id.
§ 24-3-530(B).
Several condemned inmates, including Sigmon, immediately challenged that
new law, but the S.C. Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of these methods
and the statute. See Owens v. Stirling, 904 S.E.2d 580 (S.C. 2024). In that litigation,
the death row inmates insisted that section 24-3-530 entitled them to information
about “the drugs’ ‘potency, purity, and stability.’” Id. at 604 (quoting death row
5
inmates’ counsel). Addressing that concern, the S.C. Supreme Court required the
Director to “explain in the affidavit the basis for his determination” about which
methods are available for each execution. Id (emphasis added). However, rather than
laying out a precise formula for how the Director must explain his determination, the
court offered “two extreme examples,” one at each end of the spectrum of sufficiency.
Id. at 605. On the inadequate “extreme,” the Director might only report he “accept[s]
the word of an unnamed person with unknown qualifications.” Id. On the upper
“extreme,” the Director might “certif[y] in the affidavit that scientists at the Forensic
Services Lab of the South Carolina Law Enforcement Division (SLED), whose
experience and qualifications were verified by the Director and the Chief of SLED,
recently performed testing according to widely accepted testing protocols and found
the drugs were not only stable, but of a clearly acceptable degree of purity.” Id. But
whatever his certification included, “the Director must comply with the shield
statute.” Id.; see also S.C. Code Ann. § 24-3-580(I) (providing for “the absolute
confidentiality” of those involved in carrying out a death sentence).
The court even explained the schedule it would follow and that would allow
opportunity to challenge the information. The court would allow the clerk to issue
execution notices only on a Friday, thereby maximizing the days between the notice
and an execution under section 17-25-370 (which establishes when a statutory
schedule for when execution will take place after S.C. Supreme Court Clerk issues an
execution notice). Id. at 604 n.23. The Director must then submit his certification by
the next Wednesday, giving the condemned inmate until the following Friday to elect
6
a method 14 days before his execution. Id. “This procedure,” the court explained,
“gives the inmate at least eight days in which to evaluate the affidavit and file any
motion [to challenge the certification].” Id. If an inmate chooses to file such a motion,
he must do so “no later than fifteen days prior to the date of the scheduled execution”
(that is, on the day before the statutory deadline for electing a method). Id. (cleaned
up) (quoting In re Stays of Execution in Cap. Cases, 471 S.E.2d 140, 142 (S.C. 1996)).
“If a challenge is made,” the S.C. Supreme Court continued, that court “will promptly
decide if the challenge warrants relief.” Id. at 605.
2.
While the state court litigation was on remand, the General
Assembly passed the Shield Statute in 2023 to facilitate SCDC obtaining lethal
injection drugs. That law protects any entity that “manufactures,” “compounds,” or
“supplies” the “drugs . . . utilized in the execution of a death sentence” from having
its identity disclosed, as well as protecting the identity of any person who
“participates in the planning or administration of the execution of a death sentence.”
S.C. Code Ann. § 24-3-580(A)(1). “[A]ny identifying information” about that entity
“shall be confidential.” Id. § 24-3-580(B). “[I]dentifying information” is a “broad[]”
term that includes “any record or information that reveals a name, date of birth,
social security number, personal identifying information, personal or business
contact information, or professional qualifications.” Id. § 24-3-580(A)(2). The General
Assembly declared the Shield Statute “shall be broadly construed by the courts of this
State so as to give effect to the General Assembly’s intent to ensure the absolute
confidentiality of the identifying information of any person or entity directly or
7
indirectly involved in the planning or execution of a death sentence within this State.”
Id. § 24-3-580(I).
3.
Freddie Owens utilized the S.C. Supreme Court’s noted process
and timing for challenge and demanded the same information that Sigmon seeks
here. See Objection, State v. Owens, No. 2024-001397 (S.C. Sept. 3, 2024). The S.C.
Supreme Court rejected Owens’s argument. 1 But the process was available, and the
process worked.
4.
Meanwhile, a group of condemned inmates—and Sigmon was also
included in that group—brought a facial challenge to the Shield Statute. A district
court rejected those claims. See Bixby v. Stirling, No. 3:24-cv-5072, 2024 WL 4627451,
at *11 (D.S.C. Oct. 30, 2024). Further, the most recent inmate that South Carolina
executed by lethal injection, Marion Bowman, brought a due process claim much like
Sigmon’s argument here, and both the district court and the Fourth Circuit rejected
it (he did not seek this Court’s review in that case). See Order, Bowman v. Stirling,
No. 3:25-cv-199 (D.S.C. Jan. 28, 2025), ECF No. 21; Order, Bowman v. Stirling, No.
25-1 (4th Cir. Jan. 30, 2025), ECF No. 24. Relevant here, the district court explained:
Initially, the Court notes that Owens could not have
created a liberty interest that the Shield Statute infringes
because Owens made clear that prisoners are not entitled
to information that the Shield Statute protects. See, e.g.,
id. at 605 (“We reiterate that the Director must comply
with the [S]hield [S]tatute.”). In any event, the arguments
of the Remaining Plaintiffs notwithstanding, condemned
prisoners remain allowed to choose the execution method
they and their lawyers believe is best for them, using
whatever criteria they prefer, based on all of the
1 And this Court rejected Owens’s emergency stay motion based on a similar procedural due
process theory to the one Sigmon offers. See Order, No. 24-5603 (U.S. Sept. 20, 2024).
8
information available to them. That is all that the right to
elect their execution method provides.16 See Woods v.
Dunn, No. 2:20-cv-58-ECM, 2020 WL 1015763, at *12
(M.D. Ala. Mar. 2, 2020) (holding that Alabama's death
penalty laws, which allow condemned prisoners to choose
between death by lethal injection, electrocution, or
nitrogen hypoxia, did not confer upon the prisoners the
right to know, when making their election, that the
Alabama Department of Corrections had not yet developed
a protocol for performing nitrogen hypoxia executions;
explaining that the only interest that Alabama's death
penalty laws conferred was the opportunity to choose the
execution method), stay of execution denied, 951 F.3d 1288
(11th Cir. 2020). Accordingly, the Court concludes that the
Complaint fails to state a procedural due process claim
based on a state-created liberty interest.
Bixby, 2024 WL 4627451, at *13.
C.
Sigmon objects to the Director’s certification and then moves to
reconsider.
Even before the S.C. Supreme Court issued his execution notice, Sigmon asked
that court to delay issuing a notice until Sigmon received Marion Bowman’s autopsy
report. The S.C. Supreme Court declined to do so, and on February 7, the court issued
the execution notice.
On February 11, Director Stirling timely certified that all three of South
Carolina’s statutorily authorized methods were available for Sigmon’s execution. As
for lethal injection, Director Stirling explained that the drugs were tested by SLED’s
Forensic Services Lab (“an internationally accredited forensic laboratory . . . that . . .
used widely accepted testing protocols and methodologies in this matter” with testing
performed by “experienced, qualified, and duly authorized personnel”), which
“confirmed the concentration of the solution provided is consistent with the vial
9
labeling of pentobarbital, 50 milligrams per milliliter, and acknowledged the
substance’s concentration in terms of its purity and stability.” This explanation
tracked the S.C. Supreme Court’s upper “extreme example[],” to which the court
“doubt[ed] there could be any legitimate legal basis on which to mount a challenge”
to the certification. Owens, 904 S.E.2d at 605.
Sigmon objected to the Director’s certification on February 14, making similar
arguments to Owens and Bowman before him and using the same affidavit to support
asking for more information that Owens had used. See Pet.11. The S.C. Supreme
Court rejected his arguments on February 19. Without seeking any review of that
order from this Court, Sigmon elected the firing squad on February 21. (BIO App. a12).
After electing the firing squad, Sigmon asked the S.C. Supreme Court to
reconsider its decision on his objection to the Director’s certification, citing Marion
Bowman’s autopsy as the reason to do so. The S.C. Supreme Court again rejected his
arguments, this time on March 3.
Sigmon, after he elected the firing squad, and after his repeat attempt to utilize
the Bowman autopsy in argument for more information, seeks to have this Court stop
his scheduled execution.
10
REASONS FOR DENYING THE PETITION AND THE APPLICATION
FOR STAY OF EXECUTION
A stay pending disposition of a petition for a writ of certiorari requires an
applicant to show “(1) a reasonable probability that four Justices will consider the
issue sufficiently meritorious to grant certiorari; (2) a fair prospect that a majority of
the Court will vote to reverse the judgment below; and (3) a likelihood that
irreparable harm will result from the denial of a stay.” Hollingsworth v. Perry, 558
U.S. 183, 190 (2010). The Court may also consider the equities and relative harms.
Id.; see also Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 434 (2009) (four traditional stay factors).
A State has a “strong interest in enforcing its criminal judgments without undue
interference from the federal courts.” Hill v. McDonough, 547 U.S. 573, 584 (2006).
Though it has become commonplace to file emergency petitions, a stay of an execution
“should be the extreme exception, not the norm,” Lee, 591 U.S. at 981 (vacating stay).
I.
Sigmon has waived any objection to, and lacks standing to litigate,
aspects of a method that will not be used to execute him.
Because Sigmon will not be executed by lethal injection, he lacks standing to
litigate his claim here, which is rooted in a demand for more information about lethal
injection drugs. “Article III requires a plaintiff to first answer a basic question:
‘What’s it to you?’” Food & Drug Admin. v. All. for Hippocratic Med., 602 U.S. 367,
379 (2024). Sigmon cannot show a stake in the litigation.
In a related context, this Court has held that “[b]y declaring his method of
execution” and “picking [it] over the State’s default form of execution,” a condemned
inmate “waive[s] any objection he might have” to the method he picked. Stewart v.
11
LaGrand, 526 U.S. 115, 119 (1999). If an inmate waives a challenge to a method that
he elects, he should similarly waive a challenge to a method he doesn’t pick (even if
doctrines like standing did not preclude him from pursuing such claims).
Not enforcing these rules presents at least two problems. One, it would ignore
Article III’s “bedrock constitutional requirement” that all plaintiffs have standing.
All. for Hippocratic Med., 602 U.S. at 378. And two, it would exacerbate “[t]he
seemingly endless proceedings that have characterized capital litigation” in recent
decades. Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35, 69 (2008) (Alito, J., concurring).
II.
Sigmon raises his due process argument too late.
The crux of Sigmon’s claim is that due process requires that he be given more
information and more time. See Pet.9–10. Nothing about that argument turns on
Bowman’s autopsy, and the general gist of more information was the basis for
Sigmon’s February 14 objection to the Director’s certification. That was 20 days ago.
Sigmon could have brought his due process argument to this Court once the S.C.
Supreme Court rejected his objection on February 19, almost two weeks ago.
But Sigmon didn’t do that. Only now—on the eve of his execution—does
Sigmon bring that argument to this Court. “The people of [South Carolina], the
surviving victims of [Death Row Inmates’] crimes, and others like them deserve
better” than additional delay. Bucklew, 587 U.S. at 149. Sigmon brutally murdered
his ex-girlfriend’s parents two decades ago, and he has litigated claims ever since,
including how he might be executed for the past four years. If courts give him more
delays, he will always have more claims. But at some point, the delays must end.
12
III.
Sigmon is wrong on the merits.
A.
South Carolina has not denied Sigmon any due process right.
Sigmon is not entitled to a stay of his execution or a writ of certiorari because
he cannot show that the State has deprived him of any right. He asserts a procedural
due process claim, insisting that the certification process is insufficient. Sigmon is
incorrect.
1.
A State may create an interest protected by due process. E.g.,
Swarthout v. Cooke, 562 U.S. 216, 220 (2011). Sigmon has a “right of election” when
it comes to the method of his execution, S.C. Code Ann. § 24-3-530(A), but he has no
such right to receive the information he seeks about lethal injection. What “basic
facts,” Owens, 904 S.E.2d at 604, are needed to satisfy section 24-3-530 is a question
of state law. And the S.C. Supreme Court, of course, gets “the final word” on that.
Musser, 333 U.S. at 98.
Sigmon claims a right to more facts about the drug that would be used for his
execution beyond what the Director has provided. See Pet.11–12. All that the S.C.
Supreme Court requires the Director to do is “explain . . . how he determined the
drugs were of sufficient ‘potency, purity, and stability’ to carry out their intended
purpose.” Owens, 904 S.E.2d at 605. The Director need not disclose anything specific
or everything about the drugs.
The S.C. Supreme Court’s decision in Freddie Owens’s case confirms that the
Director’s certification provides sufficient information under state law. There, the
Director provided Owens essentially the identical explanation of how he determined
13
lethal injection was available, and the S.C. Supreme Court held that the explanation
“provide[d] sufficient detail for [the inmate] to make an informed election.” So not
only does the Director enjoy latitude in deciding what information “satisf[ies] himself
that the drugs are capable of carrying out the death sentence,” id. at 605, but the S.C.
Supreme Court has expressly blessed how the Director exercised his discretion here.
2.
Perhaps even more troubling for Sigmon’s procedural due process
claim is that he does not make a procedural due process argument. See Pet.11–14.
Rather, he makes a substantive due process one. Procedural due process is, of course,
not about a “result,” but about a process. Walters v. Nat’l Ass’n of Radiation Survivors,
473 U.S. 305, 321 (1985). At its “core,” “due process is the right to notice and a
meaningful opportunity to be heard.” LaChance v. Erickson, 522 U.S. 262, 266 (1998).
When confronted with a procedural due process claim, federal courts are not charged
with conducting “a meticulous examination of the minutiae of the state’s procedural
rubric,” but “simply . . . guarantee[ing] that there is notice and an opportunity to be
heard.” Snider Int’l Corp. v. Town of Forest Heights, Md., 739 F.3d 140, 149 (4th Cir.
2014) (cleaned up); cf. Baze, 553 U.S. at 51 (plurality op.) (courts are not “boards of
inquiry charged with determining ‘best practices’ for executions”).
In other words, with procedural due process, the question is whether the S.C.
Supreme Court’s process gives a condemned inmate like Sigmon notice and the
opportunity to be heard. It does. Sigmon received notice (he was served with the
Director’s certification), and then Sigmon had the opportunity to be heard (in the S.C.
Supreme Court on his objection). No doubt, Sigmon did not like the answer he
14
received from the S.C. Supreme Court, but not liking the answer does not mean that
he did not receive sufficient process.
To be sure, Sigmon could not succeed if his argument were framed as a
substantive due process one. Substantive due process protects only “fundamental
rights and liberties which are, objectively, deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and
tradition.” Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 720–21 (cleaned up). There is nothing in America’s
history or tradition that requires giving condemned inmates the level of detail that
Sigmon demands. See generally Stuart Banner, The Death Penalty: An American
History (2003).
The argument gets no better when framed as a right to information. “Neither
the First Amendment nor the Fourteenth Amendment mandates a right of access to
government information or sources of information within the government’s control.”
Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1, 15 (1978) (plurality op.). That’s why courts have
consistently rejected due process arguments for more information about execution
details. As the Eleventh Circuit put it, due process does not encompass “the broad
right to know where, how, and by whom the lethal injection drugs will be
manufactured, as well as the qualifications of the person or persons who will
manufacture the drugs.” Wellons v. Comm’r, Ga. Dep’t of Corr., 754 F.3d 1260, 1267
(11th Cir. 2014) (denying stay of execution); see also, e.g., Phillips v. DeWine, 841 F.3d
405, 420 (6th Cir. 2016); Zink v. Lombardi, 783 F.3d 1089, 1109 (8th Cir. 2015);
Trottie v. Livingston, 766 F.3d 450, 452 (5th Cir. 2014).
15
3.
Complaining about the supposed “timing problem” of having “only
ten days to elect his method,” Pet.14, gets Sigmon no traction for three reasons.
One, ten days is a significant amount of time to make that decision. Many
people have to make important life decisions in less time and with less notice that the
decision will have to be made. Moreover, his argument is internally inconsistent. He
complains ten days is not enough time for him but then argues “a nearly three-week”
time frame would be detrimental to assuring the drugs remain stable and effective.
See Pet. 12. It appears he concedes a concise time frame is beneficial—it simply
undercuts his argument here.
Two, it’s not really “only” ten days. Sigmon has known since South Carolina
amended its method-of-execution statute in 2021 that electrocution, lethal injection,
and the firing squad were the three possible methods, and he’s known that all three
methods were available for each of the three inmates executed in the past seven
months. Notably, he participated in litigation over several years that resulted in
detailed understanding of how the electric chair and a firing squad produces death.
Owens, supra. Surely, Sigmon understands the methods.
Three, if the timeframe were longer, some inmate would claim that the
certification came too soon to trust that it was still reliable by the execution. Indeed,
Sigmon makes that claim here. (Pet. 12). His fluid concept as to importance of timing
undermines his position.
4.
A final thought on Sigmon’s merits argument: Like other
condemned inmates, he has latched onto the S.C. Supreme Court’s statement that he
16
will “never be subjected to execution by a method he contends is more inhumane than
another method that is available.” Owens, 904 S.E.2d at 608. That is not some
guarantee of whatever information an inmate wants “to discover what is, objectively,
the best choice” for a method of execution. Bixby, 2024 WL 4224081, at *7. Instead, it
simply “gives him the right to choose his method of execution,” id., such that, when
at least two methods of execution are available, the inmate knows that he will not
have to face the method that “he contends is more inhumane,” Owens, 904 S.E.2d at
608.
B.
Sigmon’s attacks on previous executions are baseless.
Undergirding Sigmon’s argument, is the contention that recent South Carolina
inmates suffered during executions by lethal injection. That suggestion has no merit.
1.
Sigmon continues to assert that twice the dose was “required” in
those executions. Id. That at best is misleading. Sigmon knows that South Carolina’s
protocol leaves no discretion in the timing of a second series. (If the protocol did
provide for discretion, Sigmon would surely be complaining about that instead.)
We also know that lethal injection often requires more than ten minutes for an
inmate to be declared dead. Electrical activity may be observed on a heart monitor
for some time after breathing stops. Cf. Owens, 904 S.E.2d at 596 (discussing evidence
of how the brain and heart don’t necessarily cease functioning at the same time). In
other words, a condemned inmate may (and typically does) stop breathing before all
electrical activity from his heart ceases. As Dr. Antognini explains, a person’s body
must use up any stored oxygen after breathing stops, which results in “periodic
17
irregular beats” before “the heart stops all together.” BIO App. a53. Antognini Decl.
¶ 7; see also id. ¶ 26. Both the circulatory and respiratory systems must completely
stop before the inmate is declared dead. See S.C. Code Ann. § 44-43-460. And some
lag time between when breathing stops and when death is pronounced is typical.
Indeed, this lag is consistent with the fact that “it would not be unexpected that some
heart electrical activity persists after 10 minutes,” meaning that the second injection
would happen under the protocol. Antognini Decl. ¶ 28. Under SCDC’s protocol, then,
the second round of pentobarbital does not indicate that there is any issue with the
drug or its administration. Rather, it’s simply the consequence of SCDC following its
protocol 2 when all electrical activity has not ceased within ten minutes, something
that Dr. Antognini explains is “not . . . unexpected.” Id.
Given all this, all Sigmon has to offer is speculation that these executions were
painful. But “speculation” about a drug “cannot substitute for evidence” about it.
Brewer v. Landrigan, 562 U.S. 996, 996 (2010); see also Creech v. Tewalt, 94 F.4th
859, 862–63 (9th Cir. 2024) (refusing to stay an execution based on “arguments about
the provenance, quality, and reliability of the drug” that were “purely speculative”).
Sigmon’s expert, Dr. David Waisel, opines about what would happen “if” an inmate
was sensate. See Pet. App. 42a, ¶ 9. That’s a big “if.” It’s also the same type of expert
In claiming to have evidence that the previous execution went awry, Sigmon indicates that the
State in its response to his motion for reconsideration of the objection to the certification “admitted” a
redundancy dose was administered and “presume[es]” that was done in the last three lethal injection
executions. Pet. 7-8. Sigmon has the protocol (as provided under a confidentiality order in separate
litigation) and has not yet admitted his knowledge that there is no discretion in the administration of
the second series of pentobarbital. There is nothing to support his inference that a second series was
necessary to bring about death. What Sigmon has shown is a consistency in the inmates being quickly
rendered insensate and being pronounced dead in the expected timeframe.
2
18
speculation that the state court rightly rejected about electrocution in Owens. See 904
S.E.2d at 595–96.
2.
Witness statements from those earlier executions also belie any
problems. According to the witnesses, Owens “appeared to lose consciousness after
about a minute,” after which “his eyes closed and he took several deep breaths.”
Jeffrey Collins, South Carolina Inmate Dies by Lethal Injection in State’s First
Execution in 13 Years, Associate Press (Sept. 20, 2024), https://tinyurl.com/3x7662j8.
Then, “[h]is breathing got shallower and his face twitched for another four or five
minutes before the movements stopped.” Id. This is remarkably consistent with the
witnesses’ description of Richard Moore’s execution, which began at 6:01 p.m.: “Moore
took several deep breaths that sounded like snores over the next minute. Then he
took some shallow breaths until about 6:04, when his breathing stopped. Moore
showed no obvious signs of discomfort.” Jeffrey Collins, South Carolina Executes
Richard Moore Despite Broadly Supported Plea to Cut Sentence to Life, Associated
Press (Nov. 1, 2024), https://tinyurl.com/2s4tc4vr. And Marion Bowman stopped
breathing “in less than a minute,” and there were no reports that he otherwise moved
before being declared dead. Jeffrey Collins, South Carolina Puts Inmate Marion
Bowman Jr. to Death in State’s Third Execution Since September, Associated Press
(Jan. 31, 2025), https://tinyurl.com/5a9bmbz4. These statements contradict Waisel’s
prediction of conscious pain, and they leave Waisel only speculating about what
would happen “if” an inmate was “sensate.” See Pet. App. 42a, ¶ 9. (Again, “if” . . .)
As it relates to witnesses, two other things are true of all three executions.
19
First, Owens, Moore, and Bowman had a lawyer sitting in the front row of the witness
room. Second, no lawyer has claimed that any man showed any signs of pain during
his execution.
These witness statements (or lack of statements, in the case of the lawyers)
align with Dr. Antognini’s declaration. He thoroughly explains how quickly
pentobarbital renders a person insensate, at which point that person would not feel
anything. See Antognini Decl. ¶¶ 8–13.
3.
Finally, Waisel’s pulmonary edema contention has multiple
shortcomings. In the first place, claims of pulmonary edema are nothing new in lethal
injection. This objection has been lodged against lethal injection generally in recent
years, even before South Carolina resumed executions last year. See, e.g., Noah
Cadwell, et al., Gasping for Air, NPR (Sept. 21, 2020), https://tinyurl.com/4f8aj9ha.
Arguments about the risk of pulmonary edema are thus a criticism of lethal injection
generally, not of South Carolina specifically. Plus, it can be found in any death, based
on post-mortem CT scans and other studies. See Antognini Decl. ¶¶ 16–23.
In the second, this Court has already rejected Waisel’s pulmonary edema
argument. A district court stayed federal executions because, according to those
inmates’ expert, they would “suffer[] flash pulmonary edema” during their
executions. Matter of Fed. Bureau of Prisons’ Execution Protocol Cases, 471 F. Supp.
3d 209, 218 (D.D.C. 2020). This Court lifted that stay, noting that the government
had offered evidence to the contrary—from Dr. Antognini, in fact, see id. at 219—that
“any pulmonary edema occurs only after the prisoner has died or been rendered fully
20
insensate.” Lee, 591 U.S. at 981. The U.S. Supreme Court therefore has already
determined that this argument is not “the extreme exception” to warrant a “[l]astminute stay[].” Id. Nothing Waisel offers proves that the edema occurs before the
inmate is rendered insensate.
And in the third, Waisel doesn’t suggest that the effects of any pulmonary
edema—“if” sensate—would last more than a few moments. As Dr. Antognini
observes, if Moore was feeling pain for 23 minutes before his death was pronounced,
he would have displayed some signs of suffering. See Antognini Decl. ¶ 27. Or as the
Eleventh Circuit pointed out in rejecting Waisel’s objections to pentobarbital in
another case, Waisel “admitted that any suffering was short lived as it clearly ended
within a few minutes—three minutes at the most—after the pentobarbital was
injected.” DeYoung v. Owens, 646 F.3d 1319, 1326 (11th Cir. 2011); see also Antognini
Decl. ¶ 16 (a person would be quickly rendered insensate and not feel anything after
that moment). The Constitution, however, prohibits only “serious harm” and
“substantial risk,” DeYoung, 646 F.3d at 1327, because pain is “an inescapable
consequence of death,” Baze, 553 U.S. at 50. “Short lived” pain (particularly pain that
is not “superadd[ed]” just for its own sake, Bucklew, 587 U.S. at 133) does not violate
the Constitution.
IV.
The remaining factors do not support a stay.
As for irreparable harm, death alone cannot be enough. Cf. Application 7. As
one court reasoned, “[i]rreparable harm, in the context of the death penalty, cannot
mean the fact of death” because that “would make analysis of this factor
21
meaningless.” Jackson v. Danberg, No. CIV. 06-300-SLR, 2011 WL 3205453, at *3 (D.
Del. July 27, 2011), aff’d, 656 F.3d 157 (3d Cir. 2011); see also, e.g., Powell v. Thomas,
784 F. Supp. 2d 1270, 1283 (M.D. Ala. 2011). Instead, a court must consider whether
the inmate would suffer some constitutional wrong when his death sentence was
carried out. Jackson, 2011 WL 3205453, at *3. Sigmon cannot make that showing.
See supra Part III.
Taking the last two factors together, Nken, 556 U.S. at 435, Sigmon tries to
downplay the public interest, see Application 7–8. Any delay, he insists, will be
“slight.” Id. at 7. That contention rings hollow, even if Sigmon were a plausible
spokesman for the public’s interest. Sigmon committed murder in 2001, has been on
death row for more than two decades, and was just granted a judicial reprieve by the
S.C. Supreme Court, which stayed its own execution schedule over the holidays. See
Order, Sigmon v. State, No. 2024-001373 (S.C. Nov. 14, 2024). There’s already been
more than significant delay.
But more to the point, Sigmon discounts the State’s compelling interests here.
“Both the State and the victims of crime have an important interest in the timely
enforcement of a sentence.” Bucklew, 587 U.S. at 149. Too often, those interests are
“frustrated” by “delay through lawsuit after lawsuit.” Id. Sigmon is no exception: In
just the past few months, he’s filed cases in state and federal court raising various
challenges to his execution. See Sigmon v. State, No. 2025-000187 (S.C.); Bixby v.
Stirling, supra. Presumably, he’ll always have one more challenge if the courts
continue to grant him stays. “The people of [South Carolina], the surviving victims of
22
Mr. [Bowman]’s crimes, and others like them deserve better.” Bucklew, 587 U.S. at
149.
Sigmon also ignores the State’s separate interest in ensuring that federal
courts do not interfere with its criminal judgments. To be sure, federal courts “say
what the law is.” Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803). But in doing
so, they “must be sensitive to the State’s strong interest in enforcing its criminal
judgments without undue interference from the federal courts.” Hill, 547 U.S. at 584.
“The proper role of courts is to ensure that method-of-execution challenges to lawfully
issued sentences are resolved fairly and expeditiously. Courts should police carefully
against attempts to use such challenges as tools to interpose unjustified delay.”
Bucklew, 587 U.S. at 150. From this role flows the common-sense conclusion that
“[l]ast-minute stays should be the extreme exception, not the norm.” Id. That is why
courts must guard against the “Groundhog Day” that is capital litigation so that duly
imposed, fully appealed judgments can be carried out. Glossip v. Gross, 576 U.S. 863,
893 (2015) (Scalia, J., concurring).
23
CONCLUSION
The Court should deny the Petition and the Application.
Respectfully submitted,
ALAN WILSON
Attorney General of South Carolina
DONALD J. ZELENKA
Deputy Attorney General
*MELODY J. BROWN
Senior Assistant Deputy Attorney General
mbrown@scag.gov
RICHARD B. LARRABEE
Assistant Attorney General
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
P.O. Box 11549
Columbia, South Carolina 29211
(803) 734-6305
*counsel of record
Counsel for Respondents
24
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.