Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Siddhanth Sharma, Petitioner v. Alan Hirsch, Chairman of North Carolina State Board of Elections, in His Official Capacity, et al.

Supreme Court briefFeb 11, 2025

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Supreme Court, U.S.

FILED

FEB 1 1 2025

Siddhanth Sharma

OFFICE OF THE CLERK

Petitioner

Alan Hirsch, et. al

Respondent

On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the

Fourth Circuit

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Siddhanth Sharma

pro se

P.O. Box 937

Morrisville, NC, 27560

Telephone: 919-880-3394

E-Mail: Siddhanthsharma 1996@vahoo.com

<r*» -

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

To run for Congress, at least in North Carolina, one must be a Registered Voter.

Upon being a Registered Voter, one’s Residential Address gets displayed on a public

database. Additionally, another requisite to run for Congress is that one must

disclose if they are a felon - refusal to even answer the question results in being

denied form the ballot, and answering untruthfully gets one charged with a Class I

Felony. The questions for the Court are:

Li Is Petitioner’s case moot simply because the 2024 midterms are over and he

has expressed a desire to run for the 2026 midterms as the 4th Circuit noted?

2.) Whether NCOS 163-106(e) acts as an additional qualification, or is an

unconstitutional regulation for U.S. House of Representatives candidates;

and whether the Felony Disclosure violates the 1st and 14th Amendments.

And whether the 4th Circuit’s holding conflicts with U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v.

Thornton, 514 U.S. 779 (1995) and Cook u. Gralike, 531 U.S. 510 (2001):

Anderson v. Martin, 375 U.S. 399, 402 (1964)?

Ill

PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING

Petitioner Siddhanth Sharma was the Appellant in the Court of Appeals and was

the Plaintiff in the District Court.

The NC Board of Elections (NCBOE) were the Appellees in the 4th Circuit and the

Defendants in the District Court.

RULE 29.6 STATEMENT

Appellant is an individual and does not own any corporate stock.

STATEMENT OF RELATED PROCEEDINGS

•

Sharma v. Hirsch, 23-2164 (4th Cir.) - AFFIRMED by Published Opinion on

1.4th November 2024.

•

Rehearing denied 16th December 2024:

Sharma, u. Hirsch, No. 5:23-CV-506-M (E.D.N.C.) - Judgment for Defendants

on 30th October 2023.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

OPINIONS BELOW

Pg- 1

JURISDICTION

Pg- 1

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS INVOLVED

Pg- 1

INTRODUCTION

Pg- 1

STATEMENT OF CASE

Pg- 3

A.) Factual Background

Pg- 3

B.) Procedural History

Pg- 4

REASONS FOR GRANTING CERTIORARI

Pg- 6

1.) Is Petitioner’s Case Moot, Simply Because the 2024 Midterms Are Over as He Has Expressed a Desire to Run For the 2026 midterms, to Which the 4th

Circuit Noted?

Pg- 3

A.l.) The Claim..................................................... ...........................

Pg- 7

A.2.) Facial Overbreadth.................................................................

pg. 11

A.2.a) N.C. Gen. Stat. § 163-82.10(c) Fails Exacting Scrutiny

pg. 12

A.2.b) In Addition, N.C. Gen. Stat. § 163-82.10(c) is not Sufficiently Tailored

to Respondents' Interest in Informing the Electorate

pg. 15

B.) Petitioner Has Standing

.pg. 16

C.) The 4th Circuit’s Ruling.

pg. 17

2.) Does the 4th Circuit’s Holding, Regarding N.C. Gen. Stat. § 163-106(e),

Conflict with the Qualifications and Elections Clause, and/or the 1st

Amendment?

pg. 21

A.) Does the 4th Circuit’s Holding, Regarding N.C. Gen. Stat. § 163-106(e)

Conflict with U.S. Term Limits v. Thornton!

pg. 22

B.) Does the 4th Circuit’s Holding, Regarding N.C. Gen. Stat. § 163-106(e)

Conflict with Cook v. Gralike'!..............................................................................

Pg- 26

C.) Does N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1.63- 106(e) Violate Petitioner’s 1st, 1.4th

Amendment Rights?...............................................................................................

pg. 30

I.) What is the Proper Standard?.......................................... ............ pg. 31

II.) N.C. Gen. Stat. § 163-106(e) Fails Exacting Scrutiny ............pg. 32

RELIEF/CONCLUSION

.............pg- 35

CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE/WORD COUNT/SERVICE............ ............pg. 36

APPENDIX

4th Circuit Opinion

District Court Opinion

20a

4th Circuit Rehearing

48a

NCGS 163-82.10(c)

49a

NCGS 163-106

52a

NCGS 163-106.1

54a

NCGS 163-106.2

55a

NCGS 163-106.5

56a

Candidacy Form

57a

Acts of Violence

59a

Candidates’ Candidacy Forms

84a

Appellees Brief - 4th Circuit

120a

Petitioner’s Brief - 4th Circuit

206a

Informal Brief - 4th Circuit

252a

Defendant’s Brief - District Court

300a

Plaintiffs Brief/Complaint - District Court

332a

CASELAW/TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Ams. For Prosperity Found, v. Bonta,

141 S. Ct. 2373 (2021)..............

2, 11, 12, 14, 15, 16, 31

Anderson v. Celebrezze,

460 U.S. 780 (1983)

15, 16, 30, 31, 32, 33

Anderson v. Martin,

375 U.S. 399, 402 (1964)

2, 22, 29, 30, 34, 35

Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona,

520 U.S. 43, 67 (1997)......................

Board of Trustees, State Univ. of N.Y. u. Fox,

492 U.S. 469 (1989).................................

Broadrick v. Oklahoma,

413 U.S. 601, 612 (1973)

Buckley v. American Constitutional Law Foundation, Inc.

525 U.S. 182, 194-95 (1999)..........................................

Buckley v. Valeo,

424 U.S. 1 (1976)

Burdick v. Takushi,

504 U.S. 428 (1992)

Davis v. Fed. Election Comm’n,

554 U.S. 724, 735 (2008)

Dakotans for Health v. Noem,

52 F.4th 381 (8th Cir. 2022)

Doe v. Reed,,

561 U.S. 186 (2010)

Dunn v. Blumstein,

405 U.S. 330, 358 (1972)

Fed. Election Comm’n v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc.,

551 U.S. 449, 462 (2007)..............................

30, 31, 32

7, 18

16, 31, 32, 34

7, 18, 20

vii

McCutcheon v. Fed. Election Comm’n ,

572 U.S. 185 (2014)......... ...........

82, 33

McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n,

514 U.S. 334 (1995).................

33, 34

N.A.A.C.P. v. Alabama,

357 U.S. 449, 462 (1958)

10, 11

Pacific Gas Elec. Co. v. Public Util. Comm'n,

475 U.S. 1, 12-17 (1986).........................

Secretary of State of Md. v. J. II. Munson Co.,

467 U.S. 947 (1984)..................................

Storer v. Brown,

415 U.S. 724, 745-746 (1974)

7, 18

Trump v. Anderson

No. 28-719 (Sup. Ct. Mar. 4, 2024)

United States Term Limits v. Thornton,

514 IJ.S. 779 (1995)........................

2, 10, 22, 23, 24, 25, 28

Wooley v. Maynard,

430 U.S. 705, 717 (1977)

STATUTES/RULES

U.S. CONSTITUTION

Article I Section 2 Clause 2

1, 2, 4, 21, 28, 25

Article 1 Section 4 Clause 1

1, 4, 5, 21, 24, 30

1st Amendment

1, 5, 10, 11, 16. 17, 21, 30, 31, 82, 33, 34, 35

14lh Amendment

1, 17, 21, 30, 35

Local Rule

Federal Statute:

28 U.S.C. 1254

viii

NC General Statute:

NCGS 163-82.10(c)

....................... 1,

NCOS 163-106......

1, 6, 21, 22,

NCGS 163-106.1.....

....................................................... 1, 3, 6, 7, 8, 9, 19, 20, 22

NCGS 163-106.2

.......................................................................... 1, 7, 8, 19, 22

NCGS 163-106.5

................................. ........................................... 1, 3, 8, 9, 19

3, 4, 9, 10, 11, 12, 14, 15, 17, 18, 19, 20

23, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35

Other Authorities

1 J. Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States § 625 (3d ed.

1858).......................................................................................................................................

N.C. State Bd. of Elections, 2021 NCSBE Incident and Case Data (PDF),

https://s3.amazonaws.com/dl.ncsbe.gov/Investigations/NCSBE%20Incident%2

0 a n d % 20Case%20Data%20L4.22.pdf

N.C. State Bd. of Elections, in Investigations Related Documents, Excel

Spreadsheets from 2015 to 2022

https://www.nCsbe.gov/about-elections/election-securitv/investigationsdi vision

NC Voter List Maintenance

https://s3.amazonavvs.com/dl.ncsbe.gov/Voter Registration/North Carolina L

1st Maintenance Policy 2024 08 2.1.pdf

OPINIONS BELOW

The 4th Circuit’s Published Opinion, Sharma u. Hirsch, 23-2164 (4th Cir.). la

The 4th Circuit denying rehearing. 48a

The District Court’s denial Sharma u. Hirsch, 5:23-CV-506-M (E.D.N.C.). 20a

JURISDICTION

This Court retains jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1254 and Rule 10.

The 4th Circuit’s Published Opinion was issued on 14th November 2024,

Rehearing denied on 16th December 2024.

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES. ETC. INVOLVED

. „ The constitutional provisions are U.S. Const, art. 1, §2 cl. 2, U.S. Const, art.

1, §4 cl. 1, and the 1st and 14th Amendment.

. The statutory provisions are N.C. Gen. Stat. § 163-82.10(c), N.C. Gen. Stat. §

163-106(a), (e), N.C. Gen. Stat. § 163-106.1, N.C. Gen. Stat. § 163-106.2, N.C. Gen.

Stat. § 163-106.5(a), (b).

INTRODUCTION

This Court is the last bastion before these issues becomes final and no

longer redressable, thereby setting precedent into disarray - which will

then sow discord and confusion amongst the lower courts for the future.

This case is about ensuring that states do not impose additional,

unconstitutional qualifications on candidates for U.S. House of Representatives1.

The Framers of our Constitution established that those who seek to become

For the sake of brevity, Petitioner believes it best to dub U.S. House of Representatives as "Congress."

members of the U.S. House of Representatives need only have three qualifications:

(1) be at least twenty-five years old, (2) be a citizen of the United States for seven

years, and (3) reside in the state that they are chosen to represent. U.S. Const, art.

I, §2, cl. 2. Thirty years ago, the U.S. Supreme Court declared these qualifications to

be "fixed and exclusive." U.S. Term. Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 IJ.S. 779, 790

(1995).

Today, North Carolina adds to these exclusive qualifications another:

candidates for the U.S. House of Representatives must answer whether, or not, they

have a felony conviction: noncompliance results in a not appearing on the ballot.

But as the Framers warned: "A Republic may be converted into an aristocracy or

oligarchy as well by limiting the number capable of being elected." Id. at 790-91.

This disclosure qualification is unconstitutional as applied to federal congressional

candidates. See Cook u. Gralike, 531 U.S. 510, 511 (2001)\ Anderson u. Martin, 375

IJ.S. 399, 402 (1964).

This case is also about protecting a federal congressional candidate's safety.

Physical violence, stalking, and death threats are "heightened in the 21st century

and seem to grow with each passing year, as anyone with access to a computer [can]

compile a wealth of in formation about anyone else, including such sensitive details

as a person's home address or the school attended by his children." Ams. For

Prosperity Found, u. Bonta, 141 S. Ct. 2373, 2388 (2021) (citation omitted). North

Carolina unreasonably subjects federal congressional candidates to threats,

harassment, and other forms of violence by requiring them to he a Registered Voter

'i '

under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 163-106, 106.5, which in turn, publicly discloses their

addresses to anyone with internet access. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 163-82.10(c). This

should not continue.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

A.) Factual Background

Petitioner wanted to run for Congress in the 2024 Midterms as a

Republican2. Prospective candidates seeking the nomination of a political party in a

primary election must submit a notice of candidacy. See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 163

106(a). 52a, 57a.

Among other inquiries the form requires one to be a Registered Voter via

N.C. Gen. Stat. § 163-106.5(a), being Affiliated with a Political Party for 90 Days via

N.C. Gen. Stat. § 163-106.1, and a felony disclosure via N.C. Gen. Stat. § 163-106

(e). The notice form asks, “Have you ever been convicted of a felony?” Id. § 163

106(e). Candidates, like Petitioner, who check “yes” must submit a supplemental

form which requires them to list “the name of the offense, the date of conviction, the

date of the restoration of citizenship rights, and the county and state of conviction.”

Id. The form becomes a public record for voters to see. Failure to answer the

felony disclosure question results in the “individual’s name [] not appear[ing]

on the ballot,” and the voiding of all votes cast for that individual. Id. In the

event that one does not answer truthfully, it punishes one with a Class I Felony.

2 It should be noted that Petitioner intends to run in the 2026 midterms, to which the 4th Circuit noted in a

footnote. 10a.

Finally, as a requirement for being a Registered Voter, as well as on Section 3

of the Candidacy Form, one’s residential address gets displayed on a public

database, accessible via N.C. Gen. Stat. § 103-82.10(c). The statute reads: “(1) The

county board of elections shall make the voter registration information available

to the public on electronic or magnetic medium. (2) Information requested on

electronic or magnetic medium shall contain the ...residential address....” The

electronic medium is https://vt.ncsbe.gov/reglkup/3.

This alarmed Petitioner becaysc he feared that publicizing his residential

address would expose him to threats and harassment, similar to other candidates

and public officials. Petitioner knew that failing to answer the felony history

question would bar him from being placed on the primary ballot. He also knew that

denying his felony history would constitute a Class I felony. Petitioner further

believed that being a Registered Voter and being affiliated with a political party for

90 days were additional qualifications than what IJ.S. Const, Art. 1. Sec. 2 cl. 2

required. Petitioner sued via 42 U.S.C. 1983 in Federal Court. 332a-377a.

B.) Procedural History

The District Court,, regarding the Registered Voter and 90-day Party

Affiliation requirement, found those issues not ripe. 34a-36a. The District Court,

regarding the Felony Disclosure, applied exacting scrutiny, ruled on the merits and

denied relief with prejudice. 36a-42a. It found the felony disclosure to be a

permissible regulation of elections under U.S. Const, Art. 1. Sec. 4, because

All one must do is type one's first and last name and one's residential address gets displayed.

' U

■

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►> ■■

“Constituents should and do expect commitment to the rule of law from their

representatives. A disclosure designed to probe the strength of that commitment

and consequently inform the electorate of the same, directly serves that State

interest.” 41a. The District Court, in a footnote, regarding the residential address

claim found that Petitioner lacked standing. 45a. Petitioner appealed all issues.

Petitioner filed his informal brief. 252a-299a. Upon Petitioner filing his

informal brief, pursuant to the 4th Circuit’s local rules he was appointed counsel.

Counsel only raised two issues on appeal. The Felony Disclosure and the

Residential Address Disclosure.

The 4th Circuit in a published opinion, regarding the Felony Disclosure, found

that it was not an additional qualification, but a regulation permissible under

Article 1 Section 4 Cl. 1 of the U.S. Constitution. 12a-13a. The basis was that

“Disclosing past histories of lawbreaking in a prospective lawmaker falls within the

ambit of permissible safeguards necessary to ensur[e] that elections are ‘fair and

honest.’” 13a. The Panel further found that the felony disclosure did not violate the

1st Amendment. 14a- 15a. The reasoning was that it was necessary for the state to

show voters that “lawmaking and lawbreaking are, to put it gently, in tension.” 15a.

Regarding the Residential Address disclosure claim, the 4th Circuit found the issue

moot because the 2024 midterms had elapsed, yet noted in a footnote that Petitioner

would run in the 2026 midterms. 1.5a-16a, 10a. The 4th Circuit further

substantiated its position that, because of the State’s assurance at oral argument,

one can omit being a Registered Voter from the Candidacy Form and still be on the

ballot, thereby not being subjected to the Residential Address Disclosure and

making the issue no longer capable of repetition yet evading review. 1.7a.

Petitioner sought a Panel Rehearing regarding the Residential Address

disclosure being capable of repetition yet evading review. The basis for the

Rehearing was that there was a factual misrepresentation by Respondents at oral

argument, in being that Petitioner did still have to be a registered voter to run for

Congress due to the dictates of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 163-106.1. The Fourth Circuit

denied the rehearing without opinion. 48a.

REASONS FOR GRANTING CERTIORARI4

1.) Is Petitioner’s Case Moot, Simply Because the 2024 Midterms Are

Over - as He Has Expressed a Desire to Run For the 2026 midterms, to

Which the 4th Circuit Noted?

Summary.

Because of the way the 4th Circuit ruled, Petitioner has no method of seeking

review in the lower courts. This can only be remedied by this Court. The issue

sought to be challenged was the Residential Address Disclosure of Registered Voters

and Candidates by Respondents, via a public database.

The relief Petitioner seeks is reversing the 4th Circuit’s ruling on mootness so

it can determine the issue of Standing. The District Court, in a footnote, ruled that

n One additional reason for this Court to grant review is that the 4th Circuit noted the importance of this case and

North Carolina election cases in general, and dedicated 1 full page, with a subheading, explaining so. 18a-19a. This

imposes a fair inference that review should be warranted by this Court.

Petitioner lacked standing. The 4lh Circuit, instead of ruling on whether Petitioner

had standing, found that because the 2024 midterms have elapsed, it lacked

jurisdiction because the issue was moot - yet the 4th Circuit noted that Petitioner

would run in the 2026 midterms. The 4th Circuit’s ruling conflicts with Storer v.

Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 737 n.8 (1974); Fed. Election Comm’n u. Wis. Right to Life,

Inc., 551 U.S. 449, 462 (2007); Davis v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 554 U.S. 724, 735

(2008).

This case comes in an unusual posture. Because the issue of standing is still

in play, this Court must have jurisdiction. Petitioner believes it; best to proceed by

stating the nature of the claim, then adducing whether Petitioner has standing

based on the claim, then the 4th Circuit’s ruling.

A.l) The Claim

N.C. Gen. Stat. § 163-1.06(a) reads: “No one shall be voted for in a primary

election without having filed a notice of candidacy with the appropriate board of

elections, State or county, as required by this section and G.S. 163-106.1

163-106.25...To this end every candidate for selection as the nominee of a political

party shall file with and place in the possession of the board of elections specified in

G.S. 163-106.2, a notice and pledge in the following form:

I hereby file notice as a candidate for nomination as

party primary election to be held on

in the

1 affiliate with the

N.C. Gen. Stat. § 163-106.2 reads: "Candidates seeking party primary nominations for the following offices shall

[consist of]

United States House of Representatives." (cleaned up). 55a.

party, (and I certify that I am now registered on the registration records

of the precinct in which I reside as an affiliate of the

that if 1 am defeated in the primary, 1 will not run for the same office as a write-in

candidate in the next; general election.

Signed

52a.

party.) I pledge

(Name of Candidate).”

N.C. Gen. Stat. § 163-106.1 reads: “No person shall be permitted to file as a

candidate in a party primary unless that person has been affiliated with that party

for at least 90 days....” 54a.

N.C. Gen. Stat. § 163-106.5(a) reads: “Candidates required to file their notice of

candidacy with the State Board of Elections under G.S. 163-106.2 shall file along

with their notice a certificate signed by the chairman of the board of elections or the

director of elections of the county in which they arc registered to vote, stating that

the person is registered to vote in that county

person is affiliated, and that the person has not changed his affiliation from another

party or from unaffiliated within three months prior to the filing deadline under

G.S. 163-106.2.” 56a.

stating the party with which the

N.C. Gen. Stat. § 163-106.5(b) reads: “When any candidate files a notice of

candidacy with a board of elections under G.S. 163-106.2 or under G.S. 163-291(2),

the board of elections shall, immediately upon receipt of the notice of candidacy

inspect the registration records of the county, and cancel the notice of candidacy of

any person who does not meet the constitutional or statutory qualifications for the

office, including residency.” 56a.

N.C. Gen. Stat. § 163-82.10(c) reads: “(1) The county board of elections shall

make the voter registration information available to the public on electronic or

magnetic medium. For purposes of this section, "electronic or magnetic medium"

means any of the media in use by the State Board of Elections at the time of the

request.

(2) Information requested on electronic or magnetic medium shall contain the

following: voter name, county voter identification number, residential address....”

49 a.

Upon reading all the statutes cited, being a Registered Voter, at least in North

Carolina, is a requisite to appear on the ballot for IJ.S. House of Representatives.

See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 163-106.5(a); See also Candidates’ Candidacy Form (84 a-

11.9a). N.C. Gen. Stat. § 163-106.1 mandates that nobody will appear on the

primary ballot if one has not been affiliated with a political party for 90 days - the

way you get affiliated, at least in North Carolina, is by being a Registered Voter. As

a consequence for being a Registered Voter, N.C. Gen. Stat. § 163-82.10(c) makes

any registered voter’s residential address available to anyone with internet

connection, via an online database. To find any registered voter's home address,

including candidates, one need only type in a voter's first name, last name. See N.C.

State Bd. of Elections, Voter Search, https://vt.ncsbe.gov/reglkun (last visited Feb.

3, 2025).

To begin, Petitioner does not challenge the fact that he must disclose his address

to Respondents, as opposed to the public, to run for office or even to vote. Such a

restriction would thwart the State's legitimate interest in protecting an orderly

election without any fraud. Thornton, 514 U.S. at 835. Rather, Petitioner challenges

the next; step - the public disclosure of his address. This step is required for

anyone who votes or seeks office.

“A finding of a substantial ‘chill’ on protected first amendment rights requires a

showing that the statutory scheme will result in threats, harassment, or reprisals to

specific individuals.” Buckley u. Valeo, 424 U.S. at 74; NAACP v. Alabama, at 357

U.S. at 462-63 (1958). Petitioner was aware that political violence is nothing new; in

Petitioner’s home state, a shooting happened at the home of another congressional

candidate6. 59a. The display of Petitioner’s Residential Address through N.C. Gen.

Stat. § 163-82.10(c), as he sought to run for Congress, chilled his right to seek office.

Public disclosure of residential addresses "is a recipe for harassment." Dakotans for

Health v. Noem, 52 F,4th 381, 390-91 (8th Cir. 2022). Physical violence, stalking,

death threats, and other assaults are "heightened in the 21st century and seem to

6 In the Appendix, there are several other instances of violence and hooliganism against candidates and

incumbents at their homes. See 59a-83a. Petitioner has presented these acts of violence in the District Court and

4th Circuit. See 371a, 239a

(

„i'.

grow with each passing year, as ’anyone with access to a computer [can] compile a

wealth of information about anyone else, including such sensitive details as a

person's home address.'" Bonta, 141 S. Ct. at 2888 (quoting Reed, 561 U.S. at 208

(Ahto, J., concurring)) (alteration in Bonta).

Due to the instances of: violence shown, “Petitioner has made an uncontroverted

showing that on past occasions revelation of’ Petitioner’s Residential Address via

N.C. Gen. Stat. § 163-82.10(c) “has exposed threat of physical coercion, and other

manifestations of public hostility. Under these circumstances, we think it apparent

that compelled disclosure of petitioner's [Residential Address] is likely to affect

adversely the ability of petitioner to foster beliefs which [he] admittedly have the

right to advocate, in that it may induce [Petitioner] to withdraw from the [running

for office] and dissuade others from joining it because of fear of exposure of their

beliefs shown through their associations and of the consequences of this exposure.”

N. A. A. C. P. v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 462-63 (1958).

A.2) Facial Overbreadth

Petitioner makes a facial overbreadth challenge to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 163-

82.10(c). “In the First Amendment context, however, we have recognized ‘a second

type of facial challenge, whereby a law may be invalidated as overbroad if a

substantial number of its applications are unconstitutional, judged in relation to the

statute's plainly legitimate sweep.’” Ams. for Prosperity Found, v. Bonta, 141 S. Ct.

2373, 2387 (2021). The test used in Bonta, 141 S. Ct. at 2389 was viewing the

disclosure under “exacting scrutiny in a substantial number of its applications ...

judged in relation to [its] plainly legitimate sweep” A ms. for Prosperity Found, v.

Bonta, 141 S. Ct. 2373, 2389 (2021).

A.2.a) N.C. Gen. Stat. § 163-82.10(c) Fails Exacting Scrutiny

Here, disclosing a candidate's address to the public is an unconstitutional

coerced disclosure. Coerced disclosures are subject to exacting scrutiny. Reed, 561

U.S. at 196. To pass exacting scrutiny there must be a "substantial relation between

the disclosure requirement and a sufficiently important governmental interest." Id.

The statute must also be narrowly tailored. Bonta, 141 S. Ct. 2384. A law that;

requires the disclosure of sensitive information is not narrowly tailored if it does not

play an "integral part" in advancing the state's "investigative, regulatory or

enforcement efforts." Bonta, 141 S. Ct. at 2386. In fact, such a law must

demonstrate its purpose "in light of any less intrusive alternatives." Id.

'Respondents argued summarily below that their interest in public address

disclosure was: (1) protecting the integrity and regularity of the election process;

324a; (2) helping voters make well-informed voting decisions; 325a; and (3) the

informational interest of the public. Id.; see also 329a (explaining that the interests

in public address disclosure were the same as felony disclosure). For the sake of

brevity, Petitioner'will only discuss Respondents' second option7.

The second less intrusive process is SEIMS. This system functions much like the

database that'Justice Thomas envisioned in Reed. 561 U.S. at 235-38 (Thomas, J.,

dissenting). In Justice Thomas's dissent, he feared that "the state of technology"

7 For Points 1 and 3, see 241a-244a.

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f (

increases the risk that referendum signers would be subject to "threats,

harassment, or reprisals if their personal information is disclosed." Id. at 242. To

combat that concern, while still supporting the state's important interest in

protecting the regularity and integrity of the referendum process, he proposed that

Washington create a database that would weed out duplicate applicants, cross-

check their personal addresses and other private personal information, and verify

other referendum requirements. Id. By doing so, the state could have more

effectively upheld its interest of protecting the regularity and integrity of its

referendum process without requiring public address disclosure. See Id. at 236, 242.

Unlike the state of Washington in Reed, North Carolina already has a database

to do just what Justice Thomas envisioned. Here, SEIMS upholds

Respondents' interests more effectively than public address disclosure by

automatically correcting mistakes and providing the County and State,Board of

Elections with address-related information. SEIMS automatically removes North

Carolina voters "from the previous county of registration when the person is

registered in the new county." Voter List Maintenance Manual at 24,

https://s3.amazonaws.com/dl.ncsbe.govAMter Registration/North Carolina List Ma

intenance Policy 2024 08 21.pdf . It also generates a weekly report that flags

duplicate voter IDs, voters who were removed but still voted, and duplicate driver's

license numbers. Id. at 24-25. Additionally, SEIMS identifies voters who have

moved out of state but are still registered in North Carolina and compiles

cancellation notices, death reports, and DMV lists. Id. at 36-39. SEIMS provides

multiple layers of independent voter address verification and allows Respondents to

protect the regularity and integrity of their elections without exposing anyone to

threats or harassment. In sum, Respondents already have a second less intrusive

means of fulfilling their important interests.

Unlike the above processes, there is no indication that N.C. Gen. Stat. § 163-

82.10(c) helps Respondents ensure the regularity and integrity of the election

process, which is similar to the disclosure issues in Bonta. There, the Court held

that because disclosure of Schedule B tax returns did not "advance the Attorney

General's investigative, regulatory or enforcement efforts" it fell "far short of

satisfying the means-end fit that exacting scrutiny requires." Bonta, 141 S. Ct. at

2386.

Likewise, here, the public disclosure of addresses does not advance Respondents

investigative, regulatory, or enforcement efforts. Of the 358 complaints

Respondents received between September 1, 2020, and January 4, 2022, only ten

related to residency issues (2.7%). See N.C. State Bd. of Elections, 2021 NCSBE

Incident and Case Data (PDF),

https://s3.amazonaws.com/dl.ncsbe.gov/Invest.igat.ions/NCSBE%20Incident%20and

%20Case%20Data%201.4-22.pdf (Last accessed Feb. 4th 2025). Of those ten

complaints, none were prosecuted. Id. Furthermore, of all the cases from 201 o to the

present that originated from a citizen complaint and were then referred to a

prosecutor, only two related to candidate residency (0.2%) and zero were related to

voter residency. See N.C. State Bd. of Elections, in Investigations Related

Documents, Excel Spreadsheets from 2015 to 2022, https://www.ncsbe.gov/about-

elections/election-securitv/investigations-division (last visited Feb. 4th, 2025).

Like the disclosure of tax returns in Bonta, the lack of prosecutions using public

complaints demonstrates that the means do not fit the ends. Instead, the law draws

a few complaints and no prosecutions. Such a law does not play an integral part in

helping Respondents achieve their interests. Thus, under Bonta, N.C. Gen. Stat.§

163-82.10(c) "fells far short of satisfying the means-end fit that exacting scrutiny

requires." Bonta, 141 S. Ct. at 2386.

A.2.b) In Addition. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 163-82.10(c) is not Sufficiently Tailored

to Respondents' Interest in Informing the Electorate

The disclosure requirement is not well-tailored to Respondents' interest in

informing the electorate because disclosing candidate addresses does not help voters

make an informed choice. While Respondents have an interest in fostering an

informed electorate, this requirement is not well-tailored to that interest. Courts ,

conducting a tailoring analysis analyze whether the statute "employs not

necessarily the least restrictive means but ... a means narrowly tailored to achieve

the desired objective." Board of Trustees, 492 U.S. at 480 (internal quotation

omitted). If the statute does not advance the purported interest, it is not compelling.

See Bonta, 141 S. Ct. at 2386. Issues of voter education typically reflect knowledge

of the issues surrounding the vote. See Anderson, 460 U.S. at 798 (explaining that

state's interest was not narrowly tailored because voters could inform themselves of

the issues); see also Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 358 (1972) (explaining that

duration requirement; was not tailored to informing public because new voters had

access to other communications that could inform them). For federal elections,

courts presume the electorate has the ability "to inform themselves about campaign

issues." Anderson, 460 U.S. at 797. Disclosing a candidate's home address does not

help voters make an informed choice because home addresses bear no relation to

campaign issues. Voters have extensive access to information that informs them of

the political, social, and other views of a particular candidate. Knowledge of a

candidate's home address does little to inform a voter's choice of political, social, or

other views of a candidate. To the extent that it does, such information is far

outweighed by the risks that the candidate faces because of this disclosure.

B.) Petitioner Has Standing

The Supreme Court long ago relaxed "its traditional rules of standing to permit-

in the First Amendment area-attacks on overly broad statutes with no requirement

that the person making the attack demonstrate that his own conduct could not be

regulated by a statute drawn with the requisite narrow specificity." Broadrick v.

Ohio,homo,, 413 U.S. 601, 612 (1973) (internal quotation omitted). Courts will

consider the case if the statute at issue "creates the unnecessary risk of chilling in

violation of the First Amendment." Bonta. 141 S. Ct. at 2388 (internal quotation

omitted). “In related contexts, we have explained that those resisting disclosure can

prevail under the First Amendment if they can show a reasonable probability that

the compelled disclosure |of personal information] will subject them to threats,

harassment, or reprisals from either Government officials or private parties.” Doe u.

i>- *•

Reed, 561 U.S. 186, 200 (2010). The District Court, in a footnote, ruled that

Petitioner lacked standing - though not giving explicit reasons. 45a.

In this case, Petitioner has standing to bring a facial overbreadth challenge

against N.C. Gen. Stat. § 163-82.10(c) because he has alleged sufficient facts that,

taken as true, indicate that North Carolina's public address disclosure heightens

candidates' risks of exposure to assassination attempts, threats, and other dangers.

59a-83a. For example, the home of a North Carolina Republican Candidate was shot

into by an assailant while his children were present. 59a. The public display of

Petitioner’s address elevates the risk he will be subject to similar risks and chills

his 1st and 14th amendment rights to seek office. Thus, Petitioner has standing to

bring this facial overbreadth challenge. “Thus, when there is a danger of chilling

free speech, the concern that constitutional adjudication be avoided whenever

possible may be outweighed by society's interest in having the statute

challenged.” Secretary of State of Md. v. J. H. Munson Co., 467. U.S. 947, 956 (1984).

Petitioner’s case still satisfies general Article III Standing. Petitioner has

alleged an injury: a chill of his 1st 14th amendment rights to seek office due to N.C.

Gen. Stat. § 163-82.10(c) revealing his residential address on a public database,

which can induce threats, harassment, etc. This action is enforced by Respondents.

Petitioner’s case is likely to be redressed by a favorable ruling.

C.) The 4th Circuit’s Ruling

The 4th Circuit, without ruling on the issue of standing, found that the issue was

moot because 1.) the 2024 midterms were over and 2.) that the issue was not

capable of repetition yet evading review, because the 4th Circuit believed that one

can simply omit being a registered voter from the candidacy form. 15a-17a.

Addressing the 4th Circuit’s first reasoning, the 4th Circuit, in a footnote, noted

that Petitioner would run for Congress in 2026. 10a. Therefore, he will be subjected

to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 163-82.1.0(c) in the future. The 4,h Circuit’s reasoning is in

direct conflict with Storer v. Brown, 41.5 U.S. 724, 737 n.8 (1.974); Fed. Election

Comm’n v. Wis. Right to'Life, Inc., 5Pi U.S. 449, 462 (2007); Davis v. Fed. Election

Comm’n, 554 U.S. 724, 735 (2008) because the Supreme Court has repeatedly

instructed that the exception is especially appropriate when mootness would have

otherwise been the result of a completed election cycle. To further bolster Plaintiffs

claim, the 4th Circuit, regarding the Fe 1 o ny- Di scl osure - Additional -Qualificati o n -

Issue, found that; the issue was capable of repetition yet evading review. 1.0a

(footnote). If the 4th Circuit found that issue capable of repetition, there is no reason

as to why the same logic shouldn’t be applied in regards to the Residential Address

claim.

Coming to the 4th Circuit’s second reasoning, the 4th Circuit believed the issue to

be moot because it thought that the issue was not capable of repetition yet evading

review. The 4th Circuit believed that one can simply omit being a registered voter

from the candidacy form. This was based on a factual misrepresentation by

Respondents at Oral Argument; and it is this factual misrepresentation that makes

the 4th Circuit’s holding in conflict with Storer, Wis. Right to Life, Davis - which

warrants reversal by this Court;.

The 4th Circuit ruled: “The Board conceded at oral argument that North Carolina

will not and cannot mandate that candidates for federal office be registered voters

because such a requirement would constitute an unconstitutional additional

qualification on officeholding. Thus, any candidate who objects to providing his

address may simply cancel his voter registration or avoid registering altogether.”

17a.

Respondents misrepresented North Carolina law because N.C. Gen. Stat. § 163-

106.1 says that one will not be on the primary ballot if one has not been affiliated

with a political party for 90 days, and one can only be affiliated with a political

party by being a registered voter via N.C. Gen. Stat. § 163-106, 106.5(a). This

includes the office of U.S. House of Representatives. See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1.63-

106.2. When one becomes a Registered Voter, one’s residential address is available

on a database system via N.C. Gen. Stat. § 163-82.10(c). To show proof that one

cannot omit being a registered voter, as the 4th Circuit claims, attached here is

every candidate’s candidacy form that ran in District 13. 84a-119a. The fact that

every candidate filled out being a registered voter is not a mere coincidence or

voluntary: it is mandatory law.

“To qualify as a case fit for federal-court adjudication, ‘an actual controversy

must be extant at all stages of review, not merely at the time the complaint is

filed.”’ Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 67 (1997). Despite the

4th Circuit’s Ruling that the case is moot, Petitioner’s case is very much still live for

all reasons stated in this brief. Coming to the heart of the argument, with the way

the 4th Circuit ruled. Petitioner will have no method to seek further redress/relief in

the lower courts — this can only be remedied by this Court. Because of the way the

District Court and 41:h Circuit ruled, if Petitioner were to re file this claim, the

District Court will rule that it lacks jurisdiction; By the time it gets to the 4th

Circuit it will get ruled moot again.

Petitioner’s case comes under the Mootness Exception Doctrine. That exception

applies where “(1) the challenged action is in its duration too short to be fully

litigated prior to cessation or expiration; and (2) there is a reasonable expectation

that the same complaining party will be subject to the same action again,” Federal

Election Corn'n v. Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc., 5ol U.S. 449, 450 (2007). Petitioner

meets both prongs.

Satisfying the First Prong, it would be unreasonable to think Petitioner would

have his claims litigated prior to an election completing. Satisfying the Second

Prong, since Petitioner is running for Congress in the 2026 midterms as the 4th

Circuit noted, he will be subjected to having his Residential Address revealed, via

N.C. Gen. Stat. § 163-82.10(c). Because of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 163-106.1, Petitioner

must be a Registered Voter to run for Congress, subsequently his residential

address gets revealed.

Petitioner reverently requests this Court to reverse the 4th Circuit’s ruling on

mootness as this issue is capable of repetition yet evading review.

In the alternative that this Court also finds standing, Petitioner reverently

requests this Court to reverse the 4th Circuit’s decision so that it can determine the

merits.

106(e), Conflict with the Qualifications and Elections clause, and/or the 1st

Amendment?

*.T

2.) Does the 4th Circuit’s Holding, Regarding N.C. Gen. Stat. § 163-

Summary:

This Court should reverse the 4th Circuit's affirmance of the District Court.

First, N.C. Gen. Stat.§ 163-106 is an additional, unconstitutional qualification as

applied to federal congressional candidates because it forces all candidates to

answer whether, or not, they have a felony, and failure to answer disqualifies one

from the ballot. Second, if this Court finds the felony disclosure to sustain being a

qualification, it is an impermissible regulation of elections by handicapping

Petitioner. Third, even if the felony disclosure law is a permissible regulation of

elections, it is unconstitutional compelled speech in violation of the 1st and 14th

Amendment and cannot withstand review under the exacting scrutiny standard.

The 4th Circuit’s opinion regarding N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1.63-106(e) was broken

into Parts A and B. Part A viewed the statute under the Qualifications Clause U.S.

Const. Art. 1 Sec. 2. Cl. 2. and under the Elections Clause U.S. Const. Art. 1 Sec. 4.

Part B was viewed as compelled speech under the 1st and 1.4th Amendments. The 4th

Circuit’s ruling, regarding the felony disclosure under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 163-106(e),

conflicts with United States Term Limits u. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779 (1995); Cook v.

Gralike, 531 U.S. 510 (2001); Anderson v. Martin, 375 U.S. 399, 402 (1964).

A.) Does the 4th Circuit’s Holding, Regarding N.C. Gen. Stat. § 163-106(c),

Conflict with U.S. Term Limits v. Thornton?

N.C. Gen. Stat. § 163-106(e) roads: “.... at the same time the candidate files

notice of candidacy under this section and G.S. 163-106.1, 163-106.28, 163-106.3,

163-106,5, and 163-106.6, the candidate shall file with the same office a statement

answering the following question: "Have you ever been convicted of a felony?"....

The form shall be available as a public record..... If an individual does not

complete the statement required by this subsection, the board of elections accepting

the filing shall notify the individual of the omission, and the individual shall have

48 hours after notice to complete the statement. If the individual does not

complete the statement at the time of filing or within 48 hours after the notice

the individual's filing is not complete, the individual's name shall not;appear

on the ballot as a candidate, and votes for that individual shall not be

counted.” It is a Class I felony to complete the form knowing that information as

to felony conviction or restoration of citizenship is untrue, (emphasis added). 52a-

53a.

The noncompliance clause of N.C. Gen. Stat.§ 163-106(e), operates as an

additional, unconstitutional qualification in violation of the Qualifications Clause of

the United States Constitution as applied to Petitioner. In Petitioner’s case, because

8 N.C. Gen. Stat. § 163-106.2 reads: "Candidates seeking party primary nominations for the following offices

shall

United States House of Representatives."

he is a felon, it is either disclose his felony history and be subjected with pejorative

labels or be denied ballot access.

The Qualifications Clause establishes that to be a candidate for the U.S.

House of Representatives, a person must be twenty-five years old, "seven Years a

Citizen," and an "Inhabitant of that State in which he shall be chosen" when

elected. U.S. Const. Art. I, § 2, Cl. 2. These qualifications are "fixed and exclusive."

Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 790 (1995). Because the Constitution is the sole "source of

qualifications for Members of Congress," the states are "divested" of "any power to

add qualifications." Id. at 801; see also id. at 793 ("It would seem but fair reasoning

upon the plainest principles of interpretation, that when the constitution

established certain qualifications, as necessary for office, it meant to exclude all

others, as prerequisites.") (citing 1 J. Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of

the United States§ 625 (3d ed. 1858)). That is why the Supreme Court has cited

approvingly courts that have struck down "restrictions on those convicted of

felonies" as constituting additional, unconstitutional qualifications. See Thornton,

514 U.S. at 798-99.

In Part A, addressing N.C. Gen. Stat. § 163-106(e) as an unconstitutional

additional qualification, the 4th Circuit ruled that “[Petitioner's compliance with

the felony-disclosure requirement—a simple checkbox and half-page form”9 would

allow Petitioner to appear on the ballot. 12a. The 4th Circuit’s rationale conflicts

with Thornton. To comply with what is unconstitutional would handicap Petitioner

9 This sentence is the only justification by the 4lh Circuit regarding N.C. Gen. Stat. § 163-106(e) as an additional

qualification.

*V:

with pejorative labels and to not comply would result in ballot access denial. The

cause of concern is the noncompliance clause.

The 4lh Circuit, however, ignores the Supreme Court’s test for

unconstitutional qualifications. 12a-1.3a. Instead, the 4th Circuit hinges its ruling on

the test for what constitutes a “manner” regulation under the Elections Clause -

ruling, that “disclosing past histories of lawbreaking in a prospective lawmaker falls

within the ambit of permissible safeguards necessary to ensurfe] that elections are

fair and honest, and that some sort of order, rather than chaos is to accompany the

democratic process.” The 4th Circuit’s singular reliance on the Elections Clause test

distorts the Supreme Court’s holdings in Thornton because, when a state law is

"undertaken for the twin goals of disadvantaging a particular class of candidates

and evading the dictates of the Qualifications Clauses," that law is unconstitutional.

Thornton, 514 U.S. at 835.

While states are delegated the authority to regulate the "Times, Places and

Manner of holding Elections," U.S. Const, art. 1, § 4, cl. 1, that authority does not

"provide States with license to exclude classes of candidates from federal office."

Ihornton, 51.4 U.S. at 832-33. “States, of course, retain authority to prescribe the

qualifications of their own officers, but ‘[sjuch power over governance ... does not

extend to federal officeholders and candidates.’” Trump u. Anderson, No. 23-719,

slip op. at 6 (Sup. Ct. Mar. 4, 2024).

This Court must then rely on the 4th Circuit’s single statement, that

“[Petitioner]^ compliance with the felony-disclosure requirement—a simple

checkbox and half-page form would allow Petitioner to.appear on the ballot,” as the

justification for passing the Qualifications Clause. Applying the proper test,

Petitioner has alleged that the felony disclosure law violates the Qualifications

Clause because it has (1) “the likely effect of handicapping a class of candidates”

and (2) “the sole purpose of creating additional qualifications indirectly.”

First, North Carolina’s felony disclosure law, though it applies to all

candidates, was primarily intended to handicap federal congressional candidates

who have previously been convicted of felonies. Second, the language of N.C. Gen.

Stat.§ 163-106 is unambiguous: if you don’t answer the felony disclosure you will be

removed from the ballot - and even face a Class 1 felony if you do not answer

accurately..This comports with qualifying as an additional qualification for

Congress and is unconstitutional under Thornton, as conflicting with U.S. Const.

Art. 1 Sec. 2. Cl. 2. Therefore, N.C. Gen. Stat. § 163-106(e) “is an effort to dress

eligibility to stand for Congress in ballot access clothing, because the intent and the

effect of [N.C. Gen. Stat. § 163-1.06(e)] are to ‘handicap a class of candidates and has

the sole purpose of creating additional qualifications indirectly.”’ Thornton, 514 U.S.

at 829, 836 (1995).

This Court should thus reject this "indirect attempt to accomplish what the ■

Constitution prohibits [Respondents] from accomplishing directly." Thornton, 514

U.S. at 829. Our "constitutional rights would be of little value if they could be

indirectly denied." Id. (cleaned up). Accordingly, this Court should hold that N.C.

Gen. Slat § 163-106(e) is an-unconstitutional qualification as applied to Petitioner

as a federal congressional candidate.

B.) Does the 4th Circuit’s Holding, Regarding N.C. Gen. Stat. § 163-106(e),

Conflict with Cook v. Gralike?

The 4th Circuit', then viewing N.C. Gen. Stat. § 163-106(e) under the lens of

Cook, said that:

“North Carolina’s felony-disclosure requirement in no way disadvantages

political viewpoints. The disclosure is the mere repetition of a simple fact contained

in the public record... Unlike the disclosure in Cook, the felony disclosure does not

reveal anything about Sharma’s personal philosophy or opinions on public

policy........The felony-disclosure requirement is a proper exercise of North

Carolina’s “time, place, and manner” regulatory power... Disclosing past histories of

lawbreakmg in a prospective lawmaker falls within the ambit of permissible

safeguards necessary to ensurfe] that elections are ‘fair and honest,’ and ‘that some

sort of order, rather than chaos is to accompany the democratic process, (citing

Cook, 531 U.S. at 524).” 13a.

These rationales are precisely what was condemned in Cook.

in Cook, Missouri voters adopted a state constitutional amendment requiring

federal congressional candidates to use their powers in Congress to pass an

amendment to the Federal Constitution. 531. U.S. at 513-14. Candidates who failed

to support the amendment had printed, next to their names on all primary ballots,

the statements "DISREGARDED VOTERS' INSTRUCTION ON TERM LIMITS"

and "DECLINED TO PLEDGE TO SUPPORT TERM LIMITS." Id. at 514-15. The

Supreme Court rejected the state's argument that "the labels 'merely' inform

Missouri voters about a candidate's compliance with [the amendment]." Id. at 525.

Instead, the Court concluded that the labels placed candidates at a "political

disadvantage to unmarked candidates" and could have "decisively influence[d] the

citizen to cast his ballot" against "branded" candidates. Id. at 525-26. The Court

thus held that this procedural requirement was unconstitutional because "far from

regulating the procedural mechanisms of elections, [the state's requirement]

attempts to dictate electoral outcomes." Id. at 526-27 (cleaned up).

When viewing N.C. Gen. Stat. § 163-106(e) under the Elections Clause, the

intention of the statute comes into play. There can be no doubt that N.C. Gen. Stat.

§ 163-106(e) is a political viewpoint, which brings Petitioner’s past felony history

into consideration, for the voters to decide - to which the 4lh Circuit admits.10 13a.

The purpose of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 163-106(e) is to put Petitioner at a disadvantage

from other candidates by labeling him that he was a past lawbreaker and is

susceptible to commit crimes in the future, thereby giving him a pejorative

connotation11. In Petitioner’s case, because he is a felon, he must answer the felony

disclosure, and in doing so, it becomes a public record in the election context. 52a-

10 This is further admitted by the District Court and Respondents as "allowing constituents to probe the strength of

a candidate's commitment to the rule of law." See 40a-41a, 143a, 160a, 172a.

11 Further supporting evidence is that the 4th Circuit further mentions that "The state is using the requirement to

emphasize in a modest and restrained manner that lawmaking and lawbreaking are, to put it gently, in tension."

(emphasis added). 15a. The fact that the 4th Circuit even mentions that N.C. Gen. Stat. § 163-106(e) causes

"tension" exemplifies that the statute is pejorative in nature.

53a, 107a. Because the felony disclosure is intended to handicap Petitioner, the 4th

Circuit’s reasoning cannot stand.

“As we made clear in U.S. Term Limits, the Framers understood the

Elections Clause as a grant of authority to issue procedural regulations, and not as

a source of power to dictate electoral outcomes, to favor or disfavor a class of

candidates, or to evade important constitutional restraints.” Cook v. Gralike, r>31

IJ.S. 510, 523 (2001).

The fact that Petitioner’s felony history is already a public record doesn’t

mean that it gives Respondent’s the power to disadvantage Petitioner and

circumvent the Elections Clause. The 4th Circuit ruled that “significantly, the felony

disclosure does not appear on the ballot.” 13a. However, this doesn’t change the

analysis because N.C. Gen. Stat. § 163-106(e) is still disclosed to voters and is

therefore “an indirect attempt to accomplish what the Constitution prohibits”

Respondents “from accomplishing directly.” Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 829 (1995). To

the extent that Cook only applies to labels on the ballot, then Petitioner reverently

requests this Court to expand Cook to situations such as the case sub judice.

Though the statements in Cook were placed directly on the ballot, the candidacy

forms here are publicly accessible documents that Respondents use to educate the

public about the Qualifications of federal congressional candidates. 107a. In

addition, just as the Missouri amendment disfavored candidates who did not

support the term-limits amendment, the felony disclosure law here disfavors felons,

such as Petitioner. “As we have often noted, '"Constitutional rights would be of

little value if they could be . . . indirectly denied” Id.

N.C. Gen. Stat. § 163-106(e) is a matter of public policy because “At the same

time, ‘by directing the citizen's attention to the single consideration’ of the

candidate’s [past criminal record], the labels imply that the issue ‘is an important

perhaps paramount — consideration in the citizen's choice, which may decisively

influence the citizen to cast his ballot’ against candidates branded as unfaithful.

While the precise damage the labels may exact on candidates is disputed between

the parties, the labels surely place their targets at a political disadvantage to

unmarked candidates for congressional office. Thus, far from regulating the

procedural mechanisms of elections, [N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1.63-106(e)] attempts to

‘dictate electoral outcomes.’ (citations omitted). Such ‘regulation’ of congressional

elections simply is not authorized by the Elections Clause.” Cook v. Gralike, 531

U.S. 510, 525-26 (2001). See also Anderson u. Martin, 375 U.S. 399, 402 (1964).

The 4th Circuit doesn’t exactly explain how revealing Petitioner’s felony

record to the voters makes elections fair and honest; yet it’s rationale is besides the

point, since revealing Petitioner’s felony record allows Respondents “to wield the

power granted to it by the Elections Clause to handicap those who seek federal

office by affixing pejorative labels next to their names.” Cook v. Gralike, 531 U.S.

510, 528 (2001). “A State is not permitted to interpose itself between the people and

their National Government as it seeks to do here.... It simply lacks the power to

impose any conditions on the election of Senators and Representatives.” Cook v.

Grahke, 531 U.S. 510, 527 (2001). Therefore, N.C. Gen. Stat. § 163-106(e) “is not a

procedural regulation. It does not regulate the time of elections; it does not regulate

the place of elections; nor, we believe, does it regulate the manner of elections. As to

the last point, [N.C. Gen. Stat. § 163- 106(e)] bears no relation to the ‘manner’ of

elections as we understand it, for in our commonsense view that term encompasses

matters like ‘notices, registration, supervision of voting...........” Cook u. Gralike, 531

U.S. 510, 523-24 (2001).

Petitioner reverently requests that this Court to reverse the 4th Circuit’s

ruling that N.C. Gen. Stat. § 163-106(e) is a proper manner of regulations under

U.S. Const. Art. 1 Sec. 4 Cl. 1, as applied to Petitioner as a federal congressional

candidate.

C.) Does N.C. Gen. Stat. § 163-106(e) Violate Petitioner’s 1st, 14th

Amendment Rights?

Even if this Court were to hold that North Carolina's felony disclosure

requirement is not an additional qualification, it is still an unconstitutional ballot-

access requirement that violates the 1st and 14,h amendment. The 4th Circuit’s "

ruling conflicts with Anderson u. Martin, 375 U.S. 399, 402 (1964).

The 4th Circuit viewed Petitioner’s 1st amendment argument under the

Anderson/Burdick Test. 14a. In substantiating it’s ruling, the 4th Circuit rules that

N.C. Gen. Stat. § 163-106(e) is “Informing and educating voters with relevant

information about the candidates is thus a recognized state interest, and the felony

disclosure may be viewed as a reasonable assist to that endeavor. The state is using

the requirement to emphasize in a modest and restrained manner that lawmaking

and lawbreaking are, to put it gently, in tension.” 15a.

I.) What is the Proper Standard?12

Before Petitioner gets into the merits, there is the issue of what the proper

standard is. The District Court applied Exacting Scrutiny, 40a; the 4th Circuit

pivoted and applied the Anderson/Burdick Test. 14a. Because the 4th Circuit applied

the incorrect test, the ruling conflicts with Buckley v. American Constitutional Law

Foundation, Inc. 525 U.S. 182, 194-95 (1999); Doe v. Reed, 561 U.S. 186, 196 (2010)

(“First Amendment challenges to disclosure requirements in electoral contexts are

reviewed under an "exacting scrutiny" standard.”); Americans for Prosperity Found.

u. Bonta, 594 U.S. 595, 607 (2021).

To begin, the Anderson/Burdick Test is for voters; Petitioner is a candidate,

therefore Exacting Scrutiny applies. To clear any doubts, N.C. Gen. Stat. § 163-

106(e) specifically mentions that it only applies to candidates. To bolster Petitioner’s

claim, the felony disclosure has made Petitioner’s past felony history a political view

for voters to decide. This is admitted by the 4Lh Circuit, District Court, and

Respondents. See 14a-15a, 40a-41a, 143a, 160a, 172a. “Even if [Petitioner] is

agnostic as to the merits of the underlying law,” his felony history disclosure “still

expresses the political view that the question should be considered by the whole

electorate. In either case, the expression of a political view implicates a First

12 Petitioner believes there is also an argument to apply Strict Scrutiny since this is a Viewpoint Discrimination. See

Pacific Gas Elec. Co. v. Public Util. Comm'n, 475 U.S. 1, 12-17 (1986); Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 717 (1977).

Petitioner leaves the application of Strict Scrutiny in the discretion of the Court.

Amendment right. The State... must accord the participants in that process the

First Amendment rights that attach to their roles’ (citations omitted).” Doe u. Reed,

561 U.S. 186, 195 (2010) (cleaned up). In the election context, N.C. Gen. Stat. § 163

106(e) compels Petitioner to talk about his past felony record.

Importantly, this framing rules out the Anderson/Burdick test. The

Anderson/Burdick test only applies when a party challenges a provision because it

unlawfully burdens his right; to vote. See Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 433-34

(1992) (explaining the standard when a litigant challenges an election statute under

the First Amendment because it; burdens his right to vote). Petitioner makes no

such challenge; rather he challenges the legality of disclosing his felony history as a

form of compelled speech. Exacting Scrutiny is the proper standard.

II.) N.C. Gen. Stat. § 163-106(e) Fails Exacting Scrutiny

N.C. Gen. Stat;. § 163-106(e) fails Exacting Scrutiny. This standard requires a

"substantial relation" between the disclosure requirement and a "sufficiently

important;" governmental interest. "To withstand this scrutiny, ‘the strength of the

governmental interest must reflect the seriousness of the actual burden on First

Amendment rights.”' Doe v. Reed, 561 U.S. 186, 196 (2010). Specifically, even under

exacting scrutiny, a commitment to free speech requires governments to “employf ]

not necessarily the feast restrictive means but ... a means narrowly tailored to

achieve the desired objective.” McCutcheon u. Fed. Election Comm’n , 572 U.S. 185

218 (2014).

Regarding N.C. Gen. Stat. § 163-106(e) being a sufficiently important

government interest, it is not. It must be reiterated that the purpose of the Felony

Disclosure is to say that because Petitioner has previously been convicted of a

felony, he has the propensity to commit crimes in the future - this is strictly

pejorative in nature. To bolster Petitioner’s point, the 4th Circuit believes “Informing

and educating voters with relevant information about the candidates is thus a

recognized state interest... The state is using the requirement to emphasize in a

modest and restrained manner that lawmaking and lawbreaking are, to put it

gently, in tension.” (emphasis added). 15a13. “There can be no question about the

legitimacy of the State’s interest in fostering informed and educated expressions of

the popular will,” Anderson, 460 U.S. at 796, but the fact that an interest is

"important" in the abstract does not end the analysis. “In the First Amendment

context, fit matters.” McCutcheon v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 572 U.S. 185 (2014).

Here, requiring Petitioner to explicitly highlight his felony history violates

the right to refrain from speaking by conditioning his ability to run for Congress on

his making a statement that he would otherwise choose to avoid. Importantly, “ft]he

simple interest in providing voters with additional relevant information does not

justify a state requirement that a [candidate] make statements or disclosures he

would otherwise omit.” McIntyre u. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334, 348

(1995). Voters are competent enough do research on candidates themselves, but for

13 Once again, the District Court and Respondent's confirm this point. See 40a-41a ("Constituents should and do

expect commitment to the rule of law from their representatives."), 143a, 160a, 172a ("allowing constituents to

probe the strength of a candidate's commitment to the rule of law.")

»-

the government to interject in their decision only seeks to prejudice Petitioner and

influence voters. “Nor can the attacked provision be deemed to be reasonably

designed to meet legitimate governmental interests in informing the electorate as to

candidates. We see no relevance in the State's pointing up the” felony history “of the

candidate as bearing upon his qualifications for office.” Anderson v. Martin, 375

U.S. 399, 403 (1964). “Thus, just as this informational interest did not justify the

Ohio law in McIntyre, it does not justify applying” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 163-106(e) to

Petitioner’s candidacy. Doe v. Reed, 561 U.S. 186, 239 (2010).

Respondents’ objectives, regarding N.C. Gen. Stat. § 163-106(e), are not

narrowly tailored to complete their objectives, because Petitioner’s felony history is

already a public record via N.C. Gen. Stat. § 132-1 el seq. Thus, Respondents

already have a more narrowly tailored method to complete their objective.

Duplicative disclosure requirements illustrate that a state’s purpose could be

accomplished through better fitting means. Under these circumstances,

Respondents’ superfluous disclosure requirement does nothing to increase public

access to information while imposing a burden on Petitioner's First Amendment

rights by coercing his speech. The availability of this already-available information

to the public demonstrates a poor fit between the Respondents' interests and their

chosen means to achieve them.

For the reasons above, the 4th Circuit’s ruling cannot stand. N.C. Gen. Stat. §

163-1.06(e), at heart, burdens too much and furthers too little, and this one-sided

tradeoff falls short of what the First Amendment requires. Petitioner reverently

requests this Court to hold that N.C. Gen. Stat. § 163-106(e) violates Petitioner’s 1st

and 14th Amendment rights, as conflicting with Anderson v. Martin, 375 U.S. 399

(1964), and reverse the decision of the 4th Circuit.

RELIEF/CONCLUSION

WHEREFORE, Petitioner reverently requests this Court to grant Certiorari

and REVERSE the 4th Circuit’s Ruling.

Sign

mImiM JJLam.

Siddhanth Sharma pro se

Date

CERTIFICATE OF FILING/SERVICE/WORD COUNT AND PENALTY OF

PERJURY

I declare under penalty of perjury that the forgoing is true, correct, and

complete to the best of my knowledge.

Petitioner certifies, pursuant to Rule 33.2(b) that this Writ of Certiorari is in

compliance with the page-count and is 8,906 words, and is less than 40 pages.

Petitioner certifies, pursuant to Rule 33.1 that this Petition is typed using 12-Point

Century Schoolbook font and is Double-Spaced. Petitioner also certifies, pursuant to

Rule 29, that a copy has been sent to ALL PARTIES via mail/hand delivery/E-mail

as follows on 11 February 2025.

Nicholas Scott Brod

Direct: 919-716-6400

Email: nbrod@ncdoi.gov

[COR NTC Government]

NORTH CAROLINA DEPARTMENT OF JUST!CE

General Counsel Office

P. O. Box 629

Raleigh, NC 27602-0629

Sign,

Siddhanth Sharma pro se

Datc X'i\' ^

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