Petition for Writ of Certiorari — David Cassirer, et al., Petitioners v. Thyssen-Bornemisza Collection Foundation
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No. 24In the
Supreme Court of the United States
DAVID CASSIRER, et al.,
Petitioners,
v.
THYSSEN-BORNEMISZA COLLECTION
FOUNDATION, an agency or instrumentality of the
Kingdom of Spain,
Respondent.
On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the United
States Court of A ppeals for the Ninth Circuit
SUPPLEMENTAL APPENDIX
Stephen N. Zack
Boies Schiller Flexner LLP
100 SE Second Street,
Suite 2800
Miami, FL 33131
Samuel J. Dubbin, P.A.
Dubbin & Kravetz, LLP
1200 Anastasia Avenue,
Suite 300
Coral Gables, FL 33134
Laura W. Brill
Kendall Brill & Kelly LLP
10100 Santa Monica Boulevard
Los Angeles, CA 90067
David Boies
Counsel of Record
Boies Schiller Flexner LLP
333 Main Street
Armonk, NY 10504
(914) 749-8200
dboies@bsfllp.com
David A. Barrett
Boies Schiller Flexner LLP
55 Hudson Yards
New York, NY 10001
Scott E. Gant
Boies Schiller Flexner LLP
1401 New York Avenue, NW
Washington, DC 20005
Counsel for Petitioners
335064
i
TABLE OF APPENDICES
Page
SUPPLEMENTAL APPENDIX — OPINION
OF THE U.S. DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
(APRIL 30, 2019). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1a
1a
Supplemental Appendix
SUPPLEMENTAL
APPENDIX
OPINION OF THE U.S. DISTRICT COURT FOR
THE CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
(APRIL 30, 2019)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
Case No. CV 05-3459-JFW (Ex)
DAVID CASSIRER, et al.
v.
THYSSEN-BORNEMISZA
COLLECTION FOUNDATION
Filed April 30, 2019,
Decided April 30, 2019
PROCEEDINGS (IN CHAMBERS):
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
PRESENT:
HONORABLE JOHN F. WALTER,
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.
In this action, Plaintiffs David Cassirer, the Estate
of Ava Cassirer (Egidijus Marcinkevicius, Administrator
WWA), and the Jewish Federation of San Diego County
2a
Supplemental Appendix
(collectively, “Plaintiffs” or the “Cassirers”) seek to
recover the painting, Rue St. Honoré, après midi, effet
de pluie, by French Impressionist Camille Pissarro (the
“Painting”). The Painting was wrongfully taken from
Plaintiffs’ ancestor Lilly Cassirer Neubauer (“Lilly”),1
by the Nazi regime, and is currently in the possession of
Defendant Thyssen-Bornemisza Collection Foundation
(“TBC”), an agency or instrumentality of the Kingdom
of Spain.
After extensive motion practice and three appeals to
the Ninth Circuit, this action came before the Court for
trial on December 4, 2018. In accordance with the Ninth
Circuit’s instructions in its most recent remand to this
Court, see Cassirer v. Thyssen-Bornemisza Collection
Foundation, 862 F.3d 951 (9th Cir. 2017), the trial was
limited to two main questions: (1) Did TBC have actual
knowledge that the Painting was stolen property under
Spanish law?; and (2) Did the Baron Hans Heinrich
Thyssen-Bornemisza (the “Baron”) possess the Painting
in good faith under Swiss law?.
Pursuant to the Court’s Second Amended Scheduling
and Case Management Order [Docket No. 351], the parties
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RIWKHLUOLYHGLUHFWWHVWLPRQ\3ODLQWLIIVÀOHGGHFODUDWLRQV
for the following six witnesses: (1) David Cassirer; (2)
Jonathan Petropoulos; (3) William H. Smith; (4) Alfredo
1. The Court adopts Plaintiffs’ preferred designation and
refers to Lilly Cassirer Neubauer as “Lilly” in its Findings of
Fact and Conclusions of Law.
3a
Supplemental Appendix
Guerrero Righetto; (5) Marc-André Renold; and (6)
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eight witnesses: (1) Evelio Acevedo Carrero; (2) Fernando
J. Pérez de la Sota; (3) Laurie A. Stein; (4) Lynn Nicholas;
(5) Mariano Yzquierdo Tolsada; (6) Adriana de Buerba; (7)
Dr. Wolfgang Ernst; and (8) Guy Jennings. The parties
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Claude Cassirer (deceased). All of Plaintiffs’ and TBC’s
declarations and deposition excerpts were admitted into
evidence. Trial Tr. at 6-7.
TBC elected not to cross-examine any of Plaintiffs’
witnesses. Accordingly, none of Plaintiffs’ witnesses
appeared at trial. Plaintiffs elected to cross-examine only
four of TBC’s witnesses – Mr. Carrero, Mr. de la Sota, Ms.
6WHLQDQG0V1LFKRODV7KRVHZLWQHVVHVWHVWLÀHGDWWULDO
on December 4, 2018.
The parties also offered trial exhibits, numbered
from 1-385. 2 Although TBC raised objections to certain of
those exhibits at trial, the objections were subsequently
withdrawn. Accordingly, the Court admitted all of the
exhibits into evidence.
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2019.
2. Some numbers in the sequence were omitted by the parties.
The parties also submitted exhibits related to the 1958 Settlement
Agreement, merely to ensure that there is a complete record for
any appeal. The Amended List of Exhibits and Witnesses [Docket
1R@LGHQWLÀHVHDFKRIWKHH[KLELWVUHFHLYHGLQWRHYLGHQFH
4a
Supplemental Appendix
After carefully considering all of the evidence,
the parties’ trial and post-trial briefs, amicus curiae
briefs, and the arguments of counsel, the Court makes
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accordance with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a)(1):
FINDINGS OF FACT3
I.
THE CASSIRER FAMILY’S OWNERSHIP OF
THE PAINTING AND SUBSEQUENT LOOTING
OF THE PAINTING BY THE NAZIS
French Impressionist painter Camille Pissarro
completed the Painting in 1897. In 1898, Pissarro sold the
Painting to his primary dealer or agent, Paul DurandRuel of Galerie Durand-Ruel, Paris. On April 11, 1900,
Paul Cassirer purchased the Painting from DurandRuel. Julius Cassirer acquired the Painting sometime
thereafter.
Li l ly Ca s si r er Neubauer, Pl a i nt i f fs’ g r e at grandmother, inherited the Painting in 1926. As a
Jew, Lilly was subjected to increasing persecution in
Germany after the Nazis seized power. In 1939, in order
for Lilly and her husband Otto Neubauer to obtain exit
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3. The Court has elected to issue its decision in narrative
format because a narrative format more fully explains the reasons
EHKLQGWKH&RXUW·VFRQFOXVLRQV$Q\ÀQGLQJRIIDFWWKDWFRQVWLWXWHV
a conclusion of law is hereby adopted as a conclusion of law, and any
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DVDÀQGLQJRIIDFW
5a
Supplemental Appendix
Painting to Jakob Scheidwimmer, a Nazi art appraiser. In
“exchange” for the Painting, Scheidwimmer transferred
900 Reichsmarks (around $360 at 1939 exchange rates),
well below the actual value of the Painting, into a blocked
account that Lilly could not access.
In 1939, Scheidwimmer participated in a second forced
sale involving the Pissarro Painting, trading it for three
German paintings (works by Carl Spitzweg, Heinrich
Buerkel, and Franz Defregger) owned by another German
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Germany. Although Sulzbacher obtained possession of
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the Gestapo.
In 1943, the Painting was sold at the Lange Auction in
Berlin to an unknown purchaser for 95,000 Reichsmarks.
II. LILLY’S POST-WAR RESTITUTION CLAIM
After the war, the Allies established processes for
restoring property to the victims of the Nazis’ looting. The
law in the American Zone of Germany, Military Zone Law
No. 59 (“MGL No. 59”), provided for restitution of property,
or if the property could not be found, compensation. In
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under MGL No. 59 for restitution of, or compensation for,
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59 seeking restitution of, or compensation for, the Painting
and the three German paintings. In 1954, the Court of
High Restitution Appeals (“CORA”) of the Allied High
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owned the Painting (“1954 CORA decision”).
6a
Supplemental Appendix
In 1957, after the German Federal Republic regained
its sovereignty, Germany established a law governing
claims related to Nazi-looted property known as the
Brüg. Lilly then dropped her restitution claim against
Scheidwimmer, and initiated a claim against Germany
for compensation based on the wrongful taking of the
Painting. Grete Kahn, Sulzbacher’s heir, was also a
party to this action. The parties to the action against
Germany, including Lilly, were unaware of the location
of the Painting (and believed that it had been lost or
destroyed during the war). In addition, only two of the
German paintings originally owned by Sulzbacher were
available for return. Accordingly, in 1958, the parties
entered into a settlement agreement (the “1958 Settlement
Agreement”), which provided that: (1) Germany would
pay Lilly 120,000 Deutschmarks (the Painting’s agreed
value as of April 1, 1956); (2) Grete Khan would receive
14,000 Deutschmarks from the payment to Lilly; and (3)
Scheidwimmer would receive two of Sulzbacher’s three
German paintings. Although Lilly settled her claim for
monetary compensation with the German government,
she did not waive her right to seek restitution or return
of the Painting. See Order dated March 13, 2015 [Docket
No. 245]; Cassirer v. Thyssen-Bornemisza Collection
Foundation, 862 F.3d 951, 977-79 (9th Cir. 2017).
III. POST-WAR PROVENANCE
Without Lilly’s knowledge, the Painting surfaced in
the United States in 1951. On July 18, 1951, the Frank
Perls Gallery of Beverly Hills arranged to sell the Painting
to Sidney Brody, an art collector in Los Angeles, for
7a
Supplemental Appendix
$14,850. The Frank Perls Gallery received a commission
of $3,105 for arranging the sale of the Painting to Mr.
Brody. The invoice for the Painting states that it was
purchased for Mr. Brody from “Herr Urban thru Union
Bank & Trust Co.” Trial Exhibit 36. It appears that the
Painting came from Herr Urban’s collection in Munich,
Germany. Trial Exhibit 65.
Prior to arranging the sale of the Painting to Mr.
Brody, Frank Perls and E. Coe Kerr of M. Knoedler
& Co. (“Knoedler”) (an art dealer in New York City)
attempted to determine if the Painting could have been
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the dealers reviewed the 1939 Catalogue Raisonné for
Camille Pissarro, by Lionello Venturi and Ludovic Rodo
Pissarro (which listed minimal provenance information
about the Painting),4 as well as searched a list of stolen
art created after the war.5 Neither of those sources would
have revealed that the Painting had been owned by the
4. A catalogue raisonné is an annotated publication of all of
the known works of an artist, and usually includes provenance,
bibliographic, and exhibition histories for each artwork.
5. In a letter from E. Coe Kerr of Knoedler to Frank Perls
dated February 24, 1951, there is a handwritten note regarding the
Painting which states: “#1018 in Venturi & are you sure there is no
wartime juggle? - it is not listed among the stolen pictures.” Trial
Exhibit 38. (The Painting was image #1018 in the 1939 Venturi
Catalogue Raisonné). Several months later, in a letter from Kerr
to Perls dated May 11, 1951, there is a handwritten note regarding
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DSSDUHQWO\DUHIHUHQFHWREHLQJDEOHWRÀQGWKDWSDLQWLQJLQWKH
Venturi Catalogue Raisonné as well as other books. Trial Exhibit 39.
8a
Supplemental Appendix
Cassirer family or that the Painting had been looted by
the Nazis.
Around February 1952, less than a year after Sidney
Brody purchased the Painting, Frank Perls put the
Painting back on the art market for Brody, placing it on
consignment with Knoedler in New York. On May 7, 1952,
W.F. Davidson of Knoedler wrote to Frank Perls, asking
for additional exhibition and publication information on
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information you have on collections to complete our
pedigree would be very helpful.” Trial Exhibit 42. A
handwritten note on the letter indicates, “info given by
telephone.” Id.
In May 1952, Sydney Schoenberg, an art collector
in St. Louis, Missouri, purchased the Painting from
Knoedler for $16,500. Schoenberg maintained the Painting
in his collection in his hometown of St. Louis. A picture
and detailed description of the Painting was included in
an article written by Perry T. Rathbone, the then director
of the St. Louis Art Museum, about the Schoenberg
Collection in St. Louis. The article appeared in May 1954
in the London and New York editions of the Connoisseur
magazine. The Connoisseur article did not mention Lilly
or the Cassirer family. Trial Exhibit 26.
The Painting remained in the United States for
approximately 25 years from 1951 to 1976.
9a
Supplemental Appendix
IV. THE BARON’S PURCHASE AND POSSESSION
OF THE PAINTING
A.
The Baron’s Purchase of the Painting from the
Stephen Hahn Gallery in New York.
In 1975 or 1976, the Painting was sent to the Stephen
Hahn Gallery in New York City on consignment,
presumably by the Schoenberg estate. The Stephen
Hahn Gallery was a prominent gallery, specializing in
Impressionist and Modern Art, and due to its reputation,
was able to command high prices from collectors. In or
around October and November 1976, the Painting was
publicly exhibited at the Stephen Hahn Gallery. Trial
Exhibit 320.
In October 1976, Baron Hans Heinrich ThyssenBornemisza of Lugano, Switzerland (the “Baron”)
personally visited and saw the Painting at the Stephen
Hahn Gallery in New York. The Baron was a collector of
considerable wealth and standing who had an extensive
knowledge of the art market gained over many years. He
pored over catalogues and art books before purchasing
art works, and employed curators and other experts to
assist him in evaluating the works he was interested in
acquiring. The Baron was undoubtedly aware that there
had been massive looting of art by the Nazis, and it was
“generally known” that the Baron’s family (although not
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Trial Tr. at 81:25-82:6, 116:17-117:2.
10a
Supplemental Appendix
The Baron offered Stephen Hahn $300,000 for the
Painting. On October 27, 1976, Hahn wrote to the Baron
and advised him that his offer of $300,000 was accepted.
$25,000 of that purchase price was a commission that
would be paid to Stephen Hahn. The Baron purchased
three other artworks from the Stephen Hahn Gallery at
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Camille Corot, Paul Cézanne, and Fernando Léger.6
1.
The Baron paid fair market value for the
Painting.
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for the Painting in 1976, and that the commission paid
to Hahn (of just under 10% of the purchase price) was
consistent with market norms.
Fair market value is established by market data
comparison using similar and like works wherever
possible which have been sold within a similar time frame.
Attention is paid to medium, size, subject matter, date of
the work, importance in the artist’s oeuvre, and condition
where it is known. The Painting was completed in 1897,
measures 81 cm x 65 cm, and depicts a Parisian street
scene in the rain. There is public information about three
sales of comparable Pissarro paintings for the time frame
in question (1976):
6. With respect to the Cézanne, which the Baron purchased
for $1.5 million, Baron was later quoted in an interview as saying “I
neither remember where nor from whom I bought it, nor any story
related to it, only that I always wanted to have a Cézanne and I
believe I bought it in Paris.” Trial Exhibit 343 at 34.
11a
Supplemental Appendix
(1) On July 1, 1975, Camille Pissarro’s Soleil,
après-midi, la rue de l’Épicerie, Rouen,
81.9 cm x 65.4 cm (1898) was sold by
Sotheby’s London for £120,000 (or $262,800;
£1=$2.19). This was the highest publicly
reported price paid for a work by Pissarro
in 1975.
(2) On March 17, 1976, Camille Pissarro’s La
Mère Jolly raccommodant, 103 cm x 80.7
cm (1874) was sold at Sotheby Parke Bernet
for $230,000. This was the highest publicly
reported price paid for a work by Pissarro
in 1976. Although this work was completed
earlier than the Painting, it is somewhat
larger than the Painting.
(3) In May 1977, Camille Pissarro’s Boulevard
de Montmartre, après-midi, temps de
pluie, 52.5 cm x 66 cm (1897), a work very
comparable to the Painting, was sold by
Christie’s New York for $275,000. This was
the highest publicly reported price paid for
a Pissarro in 1977. It was completed in the
same year as the Painting and depicts the
same meteorological conditions, namely the
wet, glistening, Parisian streets after a rain.
It is somewhat smaller than the Painting
but depicts the more iconic Boulevard de
Montmartre.
Based on these comparable Pissarro paintings, and
the opinions expressed by TBC’s expert, Guy Jennings,
12a
Supplemental Appendix
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commission was “entirely in line with the prevailing prices
at the upper end of the Pissarro market in the mid 1970s.”
Declaration of Guy Jennings [Docket No. 394] at ¶ 37.
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expert William H. Smith unpersuasive. Mr. Smith opined
that the Baron paid far below fair market value for the
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should have sold the Painting to the Baron for between
$510,000 to $600,000. Although Mr. Smith agreed that at
least two of the above artworks were comparable to the
Painting, he believed that, because the Painting was sold
through a dealer, rather than at an auction, the fair market
price should be much higher: “All dealers mark up the
SULFHRIWKHLUDUWZRUNVWRVHOODWDSURÀW7KLVLVGLIIHUHQW
from art work sold at auction, the price of which contains
no additional mark up (because there is no dealer) . . . . [A]
small gallery operating in a cheap location might charge
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on cost, while a gallery in an expensive location [like the
Stephen Hahn Gallery] would likely charge 70-100% on
cost.” Declaration of William H. Smith [Docket No. 408]
at ¶¶ 13-14. However, as pointed out by TBC’s expert Guy
Jennings, Mr. Smith failed to take into account that the
Painting was on consignment and that Stephen Hahn did
not own the Painting. Declaration of Guy Jennings [Docket
No. 394] at ¶¶ 31-36. According to Mr. Jennings, when an
artwork is on consignment, “a commission of just under
10% for acting as an agent is entirely consistent with
market norms.” Id. at ¶ 38. Mr. Smith did not testify to the
contrary. Instead, Mr. Smith completely disregarded the
13a
Supplemental Appendix
$25,000 commission as “irrelevant” because it appeared
to be an “advisory commission” paid to a Lichtenstein
entity “Art Council Establishment Vaduz,” rather than
a commission paid to Stephen Hahn. See Declaration of
William H. Smith [Docket No. 408] at ¶ 18 n.1. However,
as more recently discovered evidence demonstrates
and as Plaintiffs’ admit, the $25,000 commission was
in fact a dealer’s commission, rather than an “advisory
commission.” See Trial Exhibit 320; Stipulated Facts
[Docket No. 377] at ¶ 27.
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Baron paid fair market value for the Painting in 1976.
2.
The Baron likely saw the remnants of
numerous labels on the verso of the Painting,
including a partial remnant of a label from
the Cassirer gallery.
The Baron likely inspected both the front and back
(or verso) of the Painting before purchasing it. Trial Tr.
84:14-17. At the time the Baron inspected the Painting,
there were remnants of numerous labels on the verso
of the Painting,7 including a remnant of a label from
a gallery owned by members of the Cassirer family,
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in Berlin, Germany. 8 The remnant of the label from the
7. When a master work of art goes to a gallery or exhibition,
the establishment places a label on the verso (back) of the work,
typically on the stretcher boards or frame.
8. In 1898, Paul and Bruno Cassirer opened an art gallery
and publishing house, “Bruno und Paul Cassirer, Kunst und
14a
Supplemental Appendix
Bruno and Paul Cassirer Gallery bears the partial address
“VICTO” of Victoriastrasse 35, refers to “BERLIN”, and
bears the partial German words “KUNST UND VE” (or
fully Kunst Und Verlagsanstalt, or Art and Publishing
Establishment), unique to the Bruno and Paul Cassirer
Gallery operated between 1898 and 1901.9 Although the
partial label from the Cassirer Gallery referenced Berlin,
the provenance information provided to the Baron did
not indicate that the Painting had ever been located in
Germany. Indeed, the provenance information provided
by the Stephen Hahn Gallery only referenced the gallery
Durand-Ruel in Paris, where the painting was exhibited
in 1898 and 1899.
There were no Nazi labels, markings, writings, or
suspicious customs stamps on the frame, verso, or any
other part of the Painting. However, some of the labels on
the verso of the Painting appear to have been intentionally
torn off or removed. See Trial Exhibits 348, 379.
Despite the minimal provenance information provided
to the Baron by the Stephen Hahn Gallery, the presence
Verlagsanstalt” at Victoriastrasse 35 in Berlin, Germany. In 1901,
Bruno Cassirer left the business to open a separate publishing house,
leaving Paul Cassirer to run the art gallery at Victoriastrasse 35.
The Cassirer Gallery, which operated under varying names over the
years, remained in business until 1935.
9. Walter Feilchenfeldt, son of the original Cassirer gallerist
Feilchenfeldt (also named Walter) did not recognize the partial label.
Declaration of Laurie A. Stein [Docket No. 412] at ¶ 100. However,
a Cassirer gallery scholar, Bernd Echte, recognized it as a partial
label from the Bruno and Paul Cassirer gallery. Id. at ¶ 102.
15a
Supplemental Appendix
of what appear to be intentionally removed labels, and the
presence of a torn label demonstrating that the Painting
had been in Berlin, there is no evidence that the Baron
made any inquiries regarding the Painting’s provenance or
conducted any investigation of the Painting’s provenance
before purchasing it.10
3.
The Baron’s employee mistakenly recorded
that the Painting had been purchased in
Paris.
On November 22, 1976, the Baron received an invoice
IURPWKH6WHSKHQ+DKQ*DOOHU\LQ1HZ<RUNUHÁHFWLQJ
his purchase of the Painting. However, in a notebook
recording the Baron’s purchases, an employee or agent of
the Baron erroneously recorded the name of the Painting
as “La Rue St. Honoré, effet de Soleil, Après-Midi, 1898”
(an entirely different Pissarro painting),11 and as having
been purchased from the “Hahn Gallery, Paris” (rather
10. It does not appear that the Baron customarily conducted
detailed investigations into the prior ownership or whereabouts of
the artworks he acquired. According to a New York Times article,
“[i]n 1972, the Italians custom police accused the Baron and some
associates of having played a role in the illegal export of art works
from Italy,” but the charges were later dropped or suspended. Trial
Exhibit 367. The Baron reportedly said, “I hope none of the pictures
in my gallery was painted in Switzerland. They were all painted
abroad. I buy the stuff in Switzerland and the United States, but
how it gets there I don’t know. I can’t check all that.” Id.
11. “La Rue St. Honoré, effet de Soleil, Apres-Midi, 1898”
UHÁHFWV WKH ´HIIHFW RI VXQµ LQ WKH DIWHUQRRQ RQ 6W +RQRUp VWUHHW
whereas the Painting (Rue St. Honoré, après midi, effet de pluie)
UHÁHFWVWKH´HIIHFWRIUDLQµLQWKHDIWHUQRRQRQ6W+RQRUpVWUHHW
16a
Supplemental Appendix
than the Stephen Hahn Gallery in New York). Trial
Exhibit 322. There is a different gallery in Paris, “Galerie
Joseph Hahn,” owned by Stephen Hahn’s father, Joseph
Hahn. There is no evidence that the Baron ever owned
Pissarro’s La Rue St. Honoré, effet de Soleil, Après-Midi,
1898” and there is no evidence that the Painting was ever
located at the Galerie Joseph Hahn in Paris.
Later, the provenance for the Painting in publications
that accompanied certain of the Baron’s exhibitions
erroneously stated that the Painting was acquired from
the “Galerie Joseph Hahn, Paris” or “Private Collection,
Paris,” rather than from the Stephen Hahn Gallery in
New York. Trial Exhibits 172, 174, 176. The name of the
3DLQWLQJKRZHYHUKDGEHHQFRUUHFWHGWRUHÁHFWWKDWWKH
Painting was “Rue Saint-Honore, Afternoon: Effect of the
Rain”. See, e.g., Trial Exhibit 172.
The Court finds that the mistaken or incorrect
provenance recorded in the purchase notebook was
unintentional, and was likely the result of carelessness.
The initial incorrect provenance information likely
resulted from the employee’s confusion between the
Stephen Hahn Gallery and the similarly-named gallery
in Paris, the Galerie Joseph Hahn. That incorrect
provenance information was then likely copied and
repeated in subsequent publications.12
12. Although the Court recognizes that at least one publication
stated that the Painting was acquired from a “Private Collection,
Paris” (instead of from Galerie Joseph Hahn, Paris as recorded in
WKH%DURQ·VQRWHERRN WKH&RXUWGRHVQRWÀQGWKLVPLVVWDWHPHQWDQ\
PRUHVLJQLÀFDQWWKDQWKHPLVVWDWHPHQWWKDWWKH3DLQWLQJKDGEHHQ
acquired from Galerie Joseph Hahn.
17a
Supplemental Appendix
Moreover, an intentional misrepresentation regarding
the provenance of the Painting is inconsistent with, and
not supported by, other evidence. For example, on March
21, 1989, Irene Martin, the Administrative Director and
Curator of the Baron’s collection, wrote to John Rewald,
a noted Pissarro expert, and invited him to curate an
exhibition at Villa Favorita (scheduled for 1990) and to
SUHSDUHD´VFKRODUO\DQGVFLHQWLÀFµFDWDORJXHRQFHUWDLQ
paintings in the collection including the Painting. Trial
Exhibit 210. Ms. Martin anticipated that it would take
three years to complete the catalogue. Id. at 1-3. Mr.
Rewald, a noted Pissarro expert, declined the invitation
in a letter dated April 13,1989, stating that he could not
commit to this task because of pre-existing commitments.
Id. at 4. Had Mr. Rewald accepted Ms. Martin’s offer, he
might have discovered that the Baron had purchased the
painting from the Stephen Hahn Gallery in New York,
rather than in Paris (and, as discussed infra, might
have even discovered that the Painting had been stolen
from Lilly). Accordingly, had the Baron intended to
misrepresent the provenance of the Painting, it is highly
unlikely that he would have asked Rewald to research the
Painting, which might have resulted in the discovery of
his misrepresentation.
Furthermore, the provenance information for the
other three paintings that the Baron purchased from the
Stephen Hahn Gallery in October 1976 also incorrectly
stated that the paintings were purchased from “Galerie
Hahn, Paris” or “Galerie Joseph Hahn, Paris” and not
from the Stephen Hahn Gallery in New York. Stipulated
18a
Supplemental Appendix
Facts [Docket No. 377] at ¶ 30.13 There has been no claim
that any of these three paintings had been looted by
the Nazis, and, thus, no rational reason to obscure their
provenance.
$FFRUGLQJO\WKH&RXUWÀQGVWKDWFDUHOHVVQHVVEHWWHU
explains the error in provenance, rather than intentional
misrepresentation. As TBC’s expert Laurie Stein states,
“[s]ometimes, an error in documentation is a simple error
in documentation.” Declaration of Laurie A. Stein [Docket
No. 412] at ¶ 153.
B. The Baron’s Possession of the Painting
Once acquired by the Baron, the Painting was
maintained as part of the Thyssen-Bornemisza Collection
(the “TB Collection”) at his Villa Favorita estate in
Lugano, Switzerland until 1992, except when it was on
public display in exhibitions outside of Switzerland.
In the July 1988 edition of Architectural Digest, The
International Magazine of Fine Interior Design, a 9-page
article titled “The Collectors: Baron Hans Heinrich
Thyssen-Bornemisza, The Villa Favorita in Lugano,”
13. The parties stipulated that TBC’s provenance report for
the four paintings that the Baron purchased from the Stephen Hahn
Gallery in October 1976 (including the Painting) incorrectly stated
that they were purchased from the Baron from “Galerie Hahn,
Paris” or “Galerie Joseph Hahn Paris” and not from the Stephen
Hahn Gallery in New York. Presumably, the incorrect provenance
information in TBC’s report came from provenance information
provided by the Baron.
19a
Supplemental Appendix
IHDWXUHG WKH 3DLQWLQJ DQG VSHFLÀFDOO\ LGHQWLÀHG LW DV
“Pissarro’s Rue Saint-Honoré, Effet de Pluie: AprèsMidi, 1897.” Trial Exhibit 327. At the time of the article
in Architectural Digest, the Painting hung in the Baron’s
dressing room. Although the galleries at Villa Favorita had
been opened to the public on weekends for seven months of
the year and on weekdays when special exhibitions were
on display, it is unclear whether visitors would have been
allowed to tour the Baron’s dressing room.
The Painting, however, was often publicly exhibited
E\WKH%DURQ6SHFLÀFDOO\LWZDVIHDWXUHGLQDWOHDVWRQH
exhibition at Villa Favorita in 1990 as well as several
exhibitions around the world, including ones in Australia
and New Zealand in 1979 and 1981; in Tokyo, Japan from
May to July 1984; in London at the Royal Academy of Arts
in 1984; in Florence, Italy at the Palazzo Pitti in 1985; in
Dusseldorf and Nuremburg, Germany in 1985; in Paris,
France at the City of Paris Modern Art Museum in 1985
to 1986; and in Spain from February 10 to April 6, 1986.
The Painting was pictured in publications accompanying
these exhibitions. As noted supra, the provenance for
the Painting in certain of these publications, however,
erroneously stated that the Painting was acquired from
the “Galerie Joseph Hahn, Paris” or “Private Collection,
Paris,” rather than from the Stephen Hahn Gallery in
New York. Trial Exhibits 172, 174, 176.
V. THE LOA N OF THE PA IN TING TO THE
KINGDOM OF SPAIN
In 1988, Favorita Trustees Limited (“Favorita”), an
entity created by the Baron, and the Kingdom of Spain
20a
Supplemental Appendix
reached an agreement that the Baron would loan a large
portion of the TB Collection (the “Loan Collection”),
including the Painting, to the Kingdom of Spain, for a
period of up to nine and a half years. Pursuant to that
agreement (the “Loan Agreement”), the Kingdom of Spain
created TBC14 to maintain, conserve, publicly exhibit, and
promote the Loan Collection’s artworks (which consisted
of 787 artworks). The Kingdom of Spain agreed to display
the Loan Collection at the Villahermosa Palace in Madrid,
Spain, which would be restored and redesigned for its
new purpose as the Thyssen-Bornemisza Museum (the
“Museum”).15 In addition, in consideration of the loan, the
Kingdom of Spain agreed to pay Favorita $5 million U.S.
dollars per year (that amount to be annually indexed to
the U.S. Consumer Price Index).
In the Loan Agreement, Favorita expressly warranted
to the Kingdom of Spain that it “owns the [p]aintings
[being loaned] and is entitled to lend the [p]aintings.”
Trial Exhibit 83, Clause 32.3. In addition, as a condition
precedent or “suspensive condition” to making the loan,
)DYRULWD ZDV UHTXLUHG WR SURYLGH D FHUWLÀFDWH WR WKH
14. TBC is an agency or instrumentality of the Kingdom of
Spain, which the Ninth Circuit previously recognized in Cassirer v.
Kingdom of Spain, 616 F.3d 1019, 1027 (9th Cir. 2010). TBC’s initial
ERDUGRIGLUHFWRUVKDGÀYHPHPEHUVDSSRLQWHGE\WKH.LQJGRPRI
6SDLQDQGÀYHPHPEHUVDSSRLQWHGE\WKH%DURQ
15. The Kingdom of Spain spent approximately $27 million to
refurbish the Villahermosa Palace and approximately $16 million for
costs associated with acquiring and furnishing it with the necessary
equipment, hardware, installations, IT, etc. Stipulated Facts [Docket
No. 377] at ¶ 49.
21a
Supplemental Appendix
Kingdom of Spain stating that “it owns directly all [p]aintings
forming part of the Loan Collection.” Id. at Clause 5.1(c).
The loan of the paintings was also conditioned on the
Kingdom of Spain receiving legal opinions by its Bermuda,
U.K., and Swiss advisors, among others, that Favorita
had the authority to enter into and perform the Loan
Agreement (i.e. deliver the paintings to the borrower).
Stipulated Facts [Docket No. 377] at ¶ 57; Trial Exhibit
83, Clause 5.1(c).
Accordingly, in 1989, the Kingdom of Spain, through
its legal counsel, conducted an investigation to verify
that Favorita had clear and marketable title to the Loan
Collection. The Kingdom of Spain’s Swiss counsel was
primarily responsible for the investigation of title because
the majority of the artworks in the Loan Collection were
located in Switzerland.
The Kingdom of Spain and its counsel decided to
assume that Favorita had ownership of the works acquired
prior to 1980, and only investigated works that were
acquired after 1980. Counsel selected 1980 as a “root of
title” based on the following factors:
(1) Counsel considered it “almost inconceivable
that the family would have made fraudulent
arrangements in regard to ownership of
the paintings as far back as 1980 with the
intention of frustrating a deal with the
Kingdom of Spain eight years later.” Trial
Exhibit 84 at 2-3; see also Trial Exhibit 223
at 490.
22a
Supplemental Appendix
(2) Counsel considered that “any fraud or
theft affecting title to the paintings which
had taken place before the paintings were
acquired by the family would be unlikely to
affect more than a single painting, or a small
group of paintings,” see Trial Exhibit 223 at
489-90, because “presumably [the paintings]
will on the whole have been purchased on a
‘piece meal’ basis from different owners.”
Trial Exhibit 84 at 3.
(3) Swiss counsel advised that the paintings
which belonged to the TB collection in
1980 (and the acquisition of which was
regulated by Swiss law) could be assumed
to be owned by Favorita pursuant to the
Swiss laws of acquisitive prescription “if,
despite an earlier irregularity, the Baron
had acquired the paintings in good faith.”
7ULDO([KLELW7KHÀYH\HDUOLPLWDWLRQRQ
any potential claims under Swiss law would
have already expired in 1988, and assuming
that the Baron had acquired the paintings in
good faith, ownership over those paintings
ZRXOGKDYH´GHÀQLWHO\µEHHQDFTXLUHG7ULDO
Exhibit 85; see also Trial Exhibit 223 at 490.
(4) The Kingdom of Spain was “not actually
buying the [paintings] themselves” and
ZRXOGKDYH´DQLQGHPQLW\DQGFHUWLÀFDWHRI
ownership in any event.” Trial Exhibit 84
at 2.
23a
Supplemental Appendix
(5) The “documentary” title investigation (not
including the physical inspection of the
paintings) had to be completed within a
short time frame (60 days) in order for the
legal opinions to be issued as required by
the Loan Agreement. See Declaration of
Fernando J. Pérez de la Sota [Docket No.
405] at ¶ 50; Trial Exhibit 83, Clause 5.1.
Based on these factors, the Kingdom of Spain and its
counsel decided not to conduct any investigation as to the
artworks acquired before 1980. Because the Baron had
acquired the Painting prior to 1980, the Kingdom of Spain
and its counsel conducted no investigation of the Painting’s
provenance or title. The Kingdom of Spain and its counsel
were aware, however, that if the Baron had acquired any
of artworks (including the Painting) in “bad faith,” or,
in other words, if he “knew or should have known of the
lacking right of the transferor,” ownership could not have
been acquired by him. Trial Exhibit 85 at 3. In such a
case, “[t]he rightful owner keeps his rights at all times to
claim recovery of the object.” Id. The Kingdom of Spain
assumed that the Baron acted in good faith, because “we
simply had no reason to believe otherwise.” Declaration
of Fernando J. Pérez de la Sota [Docket No. 405] at ¶ 56.
Although no investigation was conducted with respect
to artworks acquired prior to 1980, the Kingdom of Spain
and its counsel did investigate artworks acquired after that
date. Counsel inspected documents relating to transfers
within the Baron’s family structure since 1980 as well as
records in Lugano for paintings acquired after January
24a
Supplemental Appendix
1, 1980, including invoices, purchase agreements, internal
PHPRVSD\PHQWRUGHUVEDQNWUDQVIHUVDQGFRQÀUPDWLRQ
letters. Documentation regarding acquisitions made after
ZHUHPRUHFORVHO\VFUXWLQL]HGEHFDXVHWKHÀYH\HDU
limitation period on any potential claims under Swiss
law had not yet expired. According to Mr. de la Sota,
164 paintings (50 old masters and 114 modern masters),
URXJKO\RQHÀIWKRIWKH/RDQ&ROOHFWLRQZHUHLQYHVWLJDWHG
Declaration of Fernando J. Pérez de la Sota [Docket No.
405] at ¶ 96; Trial Exhibit 98; Trial Tr. at 25:20-27:8.
None of these investigations revealed any evidence that
the Baron had acted in bad faith.
On February 28, 1989, following their “documentary”
investigation, Swiss counsel provided an opinion to the
Kingdom of Spain that stated: “As at the date of hereof
all the Paintings of the Loan Collection are owned by
FAVORITA TRUSTEES LIMITED.” Trial Exhibit
51 at 6. This opinion was specifically limited by the
´TXDOLÀFDWLRQWKDWLWLVEDVHGRQWKHDVVXPSWLRQWKDWQR
third party outside of the group of entities controlled by
[the Baron] has any claim under any applicable law to
recover an object on the basis of prior theft, embezzlement,
abuse of trust and similar reasons or on the acquisition
or possession in bad faith by [the Baron] or the entities
he controls.” Id. at 7.
On June 22, 1992, the Museum received the Painting.
TBC’s art experts inspected and analyzed the condition of
the Painting on June 26, 1992, which included an inspection
of the front and back of the Painting. Tr. Transcript 33:1334:17; Trial Exhibit 217. The purpose of the inspection was
25a
Supplemental Appendix
to determine if the Painting had been damaged during
its transfer from Switzerland to Spain. Declaration of
Fernando J. Pérez de la Sota [Docket No. 405] at ¶¶ 67-69;
Trial Tr. 33:13-35:12.
On October 10, 1992, the Museum opened to the public
with the Painting on display.
VI. TBC’S PURCHASE AND POSSESSION OF THE
PAINTING
The Kingdom of Spain later sought to purchase the
Loan Collection (hereinafter, the “Collection”). On June
18, 1993, the Spanish cabinet passed Real Decreto-Ley
11/1993, authorizing the government to enter into a
contract allowing TBC to purchase the 775 artworks
that comprised the Collection. In accordance with Real
Decreto-Ley 11/1993, on June 21, 1993, the Kingdom of
Spain, TBC, and Favorita entered into an Acquisition
Agreement, by which Favorita sold the Collection,
including the Painting, to TBC.
A.
TBC’s Purchase Price and the Value of the
Collection
Pursuant to the Acquisition Agreement, TBC
purchased the Collection for $338,216,958.09. The total
purchase price was $350,000,000, but the amount paid
in connection with the loan (approximately $12,000,000)
was subtracted from that price. TBC’s purchase of the
Collection was entirely funded by the Kingdom of Spain.
26a
Supplemental Appendix
In addition to the purchase price, TBC also incurred
several onerous obligations, including, for example, that it
would: (1) use the Palace Villahermosa as the “ThyssenBornemisza Museum” in perpetuity; (2) not sell, exchange,
charge, pledge, or otherwise alienate, encumber, or
dispose of any artwork in the Collection in any manner
whatsoever; (3) with limited exceptions, exhibit the whole
of the Collection to the public at the Museum; (4) with
limited exceptions, not exhibit any work of art which does
not form part of the Collection with the Collection at the
Museum; (5) keep the Museum up to standards consistent
with best practices of European museums of international
standing, and ensure that the promotion and publicity of
the Collection would always be consistent with the highest
standards of artistic merit; (6) arrange for up to ten
exhibitions of paintings from the Collection at the Villa
)DYRULWDLQ/XJDQR6ZLW]HUODQGDQG PDLQWDLQVSHFLÀF
and exacting standards for the environmental conditions
of the Museum, including restrictions on light, humidity,
WHPSHUDWXUHDLUYHQWLODWLRQDQGÀOWUDWLRQYLEUDWLRQOHYHOV
and security. Trial Exhibit 96. In addition, as part of the
Acquisition Agreement, TBC agreed to amend its by-laws
such that: (1) the Thyssen family would be entitled to
appoint one third of the positions on the board of trustees
of TBC in perpetuity; and (2) those Thyssen trustees
would have veto power over a number of matters including
the standards of the Museum and the amendment of the
by-laws where their rights were affected.
Prior to entering into the Acquisition Agreement, both
Favorita and TBC requested opinions as to the value of the
Collection. At the request of Favorita, Sotheby’s prepared
27a
Supplemental Appendix
a mid-estimate auction value of the Collection as of
January 1, 1993, taking into account TBC’s obligations to
purchase, maintain, and house the Collection together as a
unit. To arrive at the appraised value, Sotheby’s began by
considering the total “insurance value” for each painting
in the Collection as of 1990. The 1990 insurance value of
the Collection was $1,692,659,500. Trial Exhibits 214, 342.
Sotheby’s then applied several correcting factors. First,
Sotheby’s converted insurance values for each artwork
into mid-auction values as follows: Old Masters and
British Pictures pre-1980, Continental paintings, Prints,
and Modern British paintings were discounted by 40%
of the insurance value; Impressionist and Contemporary
paintings were discounted by 30% of the insurance
value; and Early American and Contemporary-American
paintings were discounted by 25% of the insurance value.
Trial Exhibit 214. The 1990 mid-auction values were
WKHQ DGMXVWHG WR UHÁHFW WKH JHQHUDO GRZQWRZQ LQ WKH
art market between 1990 and 1993 (the date of the new
appraisal) as follows: Contemporary paintings were given
a 35% discount; Prints and Contemporary-American
paintings were given a 30% discount; and Impressionist
and Continental paintings were given a 25% discount,
including the Painting. Trial Exhibit 214. The 1993 midDXFWLRQYDOXHZDVWKHQDGMXVWHGWRUHÁHFWWKHUHVWULFWLRQV
placed on the purchase of the Collection, including that
the Collection had to be purchased, maintained, and
housed together as a unit. Sotheby’s determined that
these restrictive conditions would reduce the total value
by some 30 to 50%. Trial Exhibits 214, 229. As a result of
these correcting factors, Sotheby’s appraised the value
of the Collection between $495 million and $693 million.
28a
Supplemental Appendix
Trial Exhibits 229, 241. Sotheby’s emphasized that “whilst
this opinion has been reached after careful consideration,
we are not aware of any directly comparable property
disposals on which to base this opinion.” Trial Exhibit
229 at 2.
7KH6RWKHE\·VYDOXDWLRQZDVLQGHSHQGHQWO\YHULÀHG
in whole and part, by three internationally recognized
experts selected and appointed by the Kingdom of Spain.
One expert, William B. Jordan, valued the Old Masters.
He opined, in relevant part:
The question of the collection’s value becomes
something else when taking into account the
FRQGLWLRQVRIWKLVSDUWLFXODUVDOH³WKDWLWPXVW
be executed en bloc and that no paintings
may ever be sold by the buyer. . . . Sotheby’s
estimate of a 30%-50% discount in the value of
the collection to account for the purchase en bloc
and the conveyance of restricted title seems to
PHHQWLUHO\MXVWLÀHG
Trial Exhibit 230 at 3. Another expert, Theodore E.
Stebbins, provided an opinion on the American paintings
in the Collection, both Early and Contemporary. He opined
that the 30% reduction for Contemporary American
Paintings is reasonable and that the Sotheby’s reduction
for Early American paintings should be reduced further.
He also opined that: “[t]he[ ] very onerous conditions [in
WKH$FTXLVLWLRQ$JUHHPHQW@ZRXOGVLJQLÀFDQWO\UHGXFHWKH
monetary value of the Collection. In my opinion, a further
GHGXFWLRQIRUWKHVHFRQGLWLRQVRIÀIW\SHUFHQW ZRXOG
29a
Supplemental Appendix
be entirely reasonable.” Trial Exhibit 234 at 1. Another
expert, François Daulte, was asked to consider the
impressionist, post-impressionist, and modern paintings
in the collection (excepting those paintings by American
artists). Daulte stated in a letter to the Spanish Minister
of Culture that the proposed sale price of $350,000,000
VHHPV´UHDOLVWLFDQGMXVWLÀHGµ+HEDVHGWKLVRSLQLRQRQ
the same factors considered by Sotheby’s as well as TBC’s
additional obligation to refurbish and use the Palace
Villahermosa as a museum for the collection, and the fact
that the Baron and his family would be members on TBC’s
ERDUGZLWKVLJQLÀFDQWULJKWV7ULDO([KLELW
The Kingdom of Spain also asked Juan G. Dominguez
Macias, a prominent Spanish registered auditor, to
calculate the value of the main additional obligations which
Spain and TBC had agreed to undertake (other than the
purchase price), such as, for example, the refurbishment
of the Palace Villahermosa and its use for the Museum on
a permanent basis. Macias established the value of these
additional obligations at roughly 27 billion Spanish pesetas
(over $200 million). Trial Exhibit 238.
Based on the foregoing opinions on valuation, the
parties represented and warranted in the Acquisition
Agreement that they each, having been separately advised,
“independently formed the view that the consideration for
the purchase of the [Collection] provided by [TBC] is a
fair arm’s length consideration having regard to that
advice and the substantial obligations undertaken by
[TBC] under and pursuant to this Agreement and the
documents entered into this Agreement and comprised
30a
Supplemental Appendix
in the consideration provided by it and all other relevant
factors.” Trial Exhibit 96 at 26 (Clause 11.6.6); see also
id. at 5.
Based on the evidence, the Court finds that the
SXUFKDVHSULFHSDLGE\7%&IRUWKH&ROOHFWLRQ³LQOLJKW
of the other commitments and restrictions agreed to
E\ 7%&³ZDV IDLU DQG UHDVRQDEOH 7KH &RXUW UHMHFWV
Plaintiffs’ claimed valuation of $1 to 2 billion, because it
fails to take into account the additional commitments and
restrictions undertaken by TBC.16
16. Plaintiffs did not retain an expert to independently value
the Collection (as of 1993), but instead merely rely on: (1) a printout
from TBC’s website which states that the Collection had an estimated
value of “between one and one and a half billion dollars;” and (2) an
article from the Los Angeles Times, which states that the Collection
was valued at $2 billion. Trial Exhibits 53, 132 at 6. However, neither
of these sources takes into account TBC’s additional obligations. In
fact, TBC’s website expressly acknowledges that the valuation of one
to one and a half billion does not take into account TBC’s additional
obligations: “At that time, the collection was said to have an estimated
YDOXH RI EHWZHHQ RQH DQG RQH DQG D KDOI ELOOLRQ GROODUV D ÀJXUH
calculated taking into account the prices paid for acquisitions and
DSSO\LQJFRPSOH[LQGLFHVFRPSDULQJWKHPZLWKLQVXUDQFHÀJXUHV
looking at transactions on the open market for similar works of art,
etc. However, the Spanish state was no ordinary purchaser, but would
acquire a series of obligations concerning the future of the collection,
including the most important obligation: an agreement not to sell
any of the works purchased.” Trial Exhibit 132 at 6.
31a
Supplemental Appendix
B. Favorita’s Representations and Warranties
Regarding Ownership and the “Pledge” or
“Prenda”
As part of the Acquisition Agreement, Favorita
represented and warranted to TBC that it was “the legal
owner” of the artworks in the Collection and that TBC
ZRXOG EHFRPH ´WKH DEVROXWH EHQHÀFLDO RZQHUµ RI WKRVH
artworks, including the Painting. Trial Exhibit 96, Clause
11.1.1; Stipulated Facts [Docket No. 377] at ¶ 69. Favorita
also represented and warranted that “[i]t is not engaged
in any litigation or arbitration proceedings which could
in any way directly or indirectly affect title to or right to
quiet enjoyment” of TBC “to any of the Paintings or any
RIWKHSURYHQDQFHÀOHVRUWKHULJKWRUWLWOHRI>)DYRULWD@
to the consideration hereunder and it does not know of
any such proceedings pending or threatened or anything
which is likely to lead to such proceedings.” Trial Exhibit
96, Clause 11.6.4. In addition, Favorita represented and
warranted that “[n]one of the Paintings has, to [Favorita’s]
actual knowledge (without its having made any enquiry)
been illegally exported from Spain in the past.” Trial
Exhibit 96, Clause 11.1.3. Favorita, however, refused to
make any representation or warranty as to “the absence
(or otherwise) of knowledge of illegal exports from any
jurisdiction other than Spain.” Trial Exhibit 223 at 487.
In addition, as part of the Acquisition Agreement,
Favorita executed a “deed of pledge” or “prenda” for
paintings not included in the Collection with a total value
of $10 million as security for Favorita’s performance
under the terms of the Acquisition Agreement. TBC and
32a
Supplemental Appendix
the Kingdom of Spain requested this pledge, in part, in
order to protect themselves against the risk that there
might be a painting or small group of paintings that could
KDYHDWLWOHLVVXH7KHWHUPRIWKHSOHGJH³WKUHH\HDUV³
intentionally corresponded to Spain’s three-year good
faith acquisitive prescription period as provided in Article
1955 of Spain’s Civil Code. Declaration of Fernando J.
Pérez de la Sota [Docket No. 405] at ¶ 101.
C.
TBC’s 1993 Title Investigation
The Acquisition Agreement included a condition
precedent or “suspensive condition” that the Kingdom
RI 6SDLQ DQG 7%& UHFHLYH DQG EH UHDVRQDEO\ VDWLVÀHG
with, legal opinions from its Swiss counsel and its UK
counsel, among others. Trial Exhibit 96, Clause 4.1.6.
It also included a condition precedent or “suspensive
FRQGLWLRQµWKDWWKH.LQJGRPRI6SDLQDQG7%&EHVDWLVÀHG
WKDW´LQVSHFWLRQRIWKHUHOHYDQWSURYHQDQFHÀOHVDQGWLWOH
documents and other investigations have not given rise
to serious doubt about [Favorita’s] ability . . . to complete
the sale of any of the Paintings . . . .” Trial Exhibit 96,
Clause 4.1.2.
Accordingly, as contemplated by the Acquisition
Agreement, the Kingdom of Spain and TBC conducted
a further investigation of title in connection with the
purchase of the Collection. The 1989 title investigation
was used as a starting point. The Kingdom of Spain’s and
TBC’s counsel again generally assumed that the Baron
had acted in good faith and that Favorita owned the
works acquired prior to 1980 based on the Swiss laws of
33a
Supplemental Appendix
acquisitive prescription. Declaration of Fernando J. Pérez
de la Sota [Docket No. 405] at ¶¶ 96-106; Trial Exhibits
54, 98. Counsel believed that their assumption regarding
ownership was reasonable, given that four additional years
had elapsed since the 1989 investigation and there had
been no claims challenging title to the artworks during
that time. Declaration of Fernando J. Pérez de la Sota
[Docket No. 405] at ¶ 97; Trial Tr. 46:20-47:15.
Counsel decided that the 1993 title investigation
should cover four main categories of artworks: (1)
paintings which had been transferred between members
of the Thyssen family or group after 1980 but which had
not been covered by the 1989 title investigation (affecting
approximately 50 paintings); (2) paintings which had
been added to the Collection between 1989 and 1993; (3)
paintings which would be subject to the pledge by Favorita
(even if those paintings were acquired before 1980); and
(4) the 30 most iconic paintings of the Collection (even if
those paintings were acquired before 1980) (the “Iconic
Paintings”).17 Declaration of Fernando J. Pérez de la Sota
[Docket No. 405] at ¶ 103; Trial Tr. 28:18-25, 29:25-30:7;
31:3-9. The investigation of the Iconic Paintings and the
paintings subject to the pledge included an examination
RI SURYHQDQFH ÀOHV DQG WLWOH GRFXPHQWV 7ULDO ([KLELWV
54, 254 In addition, for all paintings acquired after 1988
for which counsel could not rely on the Swiss laws of
acquisitive prescription, counsel searched the Art Loss
Register to determine whether any of the paintings had
17. 27 of the 30 Iconic Paintings were acquired before 1980.
Trial Tr. 30:9-10, 31:10-12.
34a
Supplemental Appendix
been registered as stolen. Declaration of Fernando J.
Pérez de la Sota [Docket No. 405] at ¶ 103. All of the
VHDUFKHV ZHUH ´FOHDUµ³QRQH RI WKH SDLQWLQJV DFTXLUHG
after 1988 had been registered as stolen. Id.
The Painting was not included in any of the categories
of artworks investigated by counsel in 1993. Although
counsel’s 1993 title investigation revealed some minor
issues,18 no evidence of the Baron acting in bad faith came
to light.
On August 2, 1993, following the 1993 title investigation,
Swiss counsel provided an opinion to TBC and the
Kingdom of Spain, which stated that:
1. As of the date hereof, all the paintings of
the Permanent Collection (Schedule 1 and
2 of the Agreement) as well as all paintings
listed in Appendix 3 of this legal opinion and
which are to be subject to the notarial deed
of Prenda are owned by [Favorita].
2. [Favorita] has title to transfer the ownership
of the Permanent Collection to [TBC] and
to put in pledge the paintings which are to
be subject to the notarial deed of Prenda.
Trial Exhibit 54 at 7. The Painting was included on
Schedule 2.
18. For example, there was no proof of acquisition for two of
the Iconic Paintings but TBC did not consider this lack of proof
problematic because both had been acquired by the Baron’s father
and had appeared in the 1937 catalogue of the TB Collection.
Declaration of Fernando J. Pérez de la Sota [Docket No. 405] at ¶ 105.
35a
Supplemental Appendix
Swiss counsel’s opinions, however, were expressly
based on an assumption that the Baron had acquired the
artworks in good faith. Indeed, the opinion stated: “All
acquisitions are assumed to have occurred in good faith,
bad faith never having been indicated to, nor discovered
by us.” Id. at 11 (emphasis added). Swiss counsel’s opinions
were also subject to the following “reservation:” “No
opinion is expressed as to title to any painting of the
Permanent Collection and to any painting selected to be
subject to the Prenda which on the basis of bad faith or by
reasons not disclosed to us is subject to any encumbrance
or right of third parties to which the painting may be
subject in the hands of [Favorita].” Id. at 13.
D.
TBC’s Possession of the Painting
The Painting has been on public display at TBC’s
Museum in Madrid, Spain since the Museum’s opening on
October 10, 1992, except when on public display during a
1996 exhibition outside of Spain; while on loan at the Caixa
Forum in Barcelona, Spain from October 2013 to January
2014; and once again while on loan at the Caixa Forum in
Barcelona from October 2016 to February 2017.
Since TBC purchased the Painting in 1993, the
Painting’s location and TBC’s “ownership” have been
LGHQWLÀHGLQVHYHUDOSXEOLFDWLRQVLQFOXGLQJ :LYHO0LNDHO
Ordrupgaard. Selected Works. Copenhague, Ordrupgaard,
1993, p. 44; (2) Rosenblum, Robert: “Impressionism. The
City and Modern Life”. En Impressionists in Town. [Cat.
Exp.]. Copenhague, Ordrupgaard, 1996, n. 17, pp. 16-17,
il. 61.; (3) Llorens, Tomas; Borobia, Mar y Alarcó, Paloma:
36a
Supplemental Appendix
Obras Maestras. Museo Thyssen-Bornemisza. Madrid,
Fundación Collectión Thyssen-Bornemisza, 2000, p. 156,
il. p. 157; and (4) Perez-Jofre, T.: Grandes obras de arte.
Museo Thyssen-Bornemisza. Colonia, Tascnen, 2001,
p. 540, il. p. 541. Declaration of Evelio Acevedo Carrero
[Docket No. 411] at ¶ 32.
Even though TBC possessed the invoice showing that
the Baron had purchased the Painting from the Stephen
Hahn Gallery in New York, TBC published the same
incorrect provenance information as the Baron, i.e., that
the Painting had been purchased from the Galerie Joseph
Hahn in Paris. Trial Exhibits 57, 109. TBC did not correct
the provenance information for the Painting until after
WKLVDFWLRQZDVÀOHG
TBC’s provenance report for the other three paintings
that the Baron purchased from Stephen Hahn in October
1976, all of which were acquired by TBC, also incorrectly
states that the paintings were purchased from “Galerie
Hahn, Paris” or “Galerie Joseph Hahn, Paris” and not
from the Stephen Hahn Gallery in New York. Stipulated
Facts [Docket No. 377] at ¶ 30. There has never been a
claim that any of these three paintings had been looted
by the Nazis.
To date, TBC has receive no claims against any
artworks in the Collection, other than the Painting.
37a
Supplemental Appendix
VII. AVAILABLE INFORMATION REGARDING
THE PROVENANCE OF THE PAINTING IN
1976 AND 1993
As indicated supra, neither the Baron nor TBC
conducted any investigation into the provenance of the
Painting in 1976 or 1993. However, even if they had,
WKH&RXUWÀQGVWKDWLWZRXOGKDYHEHHQH[WUDRUGLQDULO\
GLIÀFXOWIRUWKH%DURQRU7%&WRKDYHGHWHUPLQHGWKDW
the Painting was stolen or looted property.
$VDQLQLWLDOPDWWHUWKH&RXUWÀQGVWKDWWKHSDUWLDO
label for the Cassirer gallery on the verso of the Painting
would not have led the Baron or TBC to discover that the
Painting had been stolen from the Cassirer family. At most,
the Baron and TBC would have been able to trace the label
to the Bruno and Paul Cassirer Gallery operated between
1898 and 1901 in Berlin. However, that partial label, even
if traced to the Bruno and Paul Cassirer Gallery, would
not necessarily have demonstrated that the Cassirer
family had even owned the Painting, let alone that it had
been looted by the Nazis more than thirty years later.
Indeed, the Cassirer gallery exhibited a large number of
works in the period around 1900, and many of those works
would have had a label from the Cassirer gallery. More
importantly, had TBC or the Baron contacted the son of
the original Cassirer gallerist, Walter Feilchenfeldt, they
would have learned that there were no Cassirer records
from that early period, and that there were no existing
records indicating that the Cassirer gallery had ever
acquired or owned the Painting. Declaration of Laurie A.
Stein [Docket No. 412] at ¶¶ 100-101.
38a
Supplemental Appendix
Moreover, in 1976 and 1993, there was limited
published, or accessible, information about the Painting’s
prior ownership. Indeed, despite the fact that the Cassirer
family had owned the Painting for thirty-nine years before
the Painting was looted by the Nazis, the 1939 Catalogue
Raisonné for Camille Pissarro, by Lionello Venturi
and Ludovic Rodo Pissarro, only mentioned the early
exhibitions of the Painting at the gallery Durand-Ruel
in 1898 and 1899. Trial Exhibit 32. It did not include any
reference to Lilly Cassirer Neubauer, the Cassirer Gallery
in Berlin, or any other member of the Cassirer family in
the provenance or exhibition history of the Painting.
In the immediate post war years, hundreds of lists
and inventories of losses, recoveries, claims, and missing
works were created by the Allied Collection Points (where
looted art was gathered), the recuperation agencies of each
country, and investigatory agencies. The Painting was not
on the French lists published during 1947-49, known as Le
Répertoire des biens spoliés en France durant la guerre
1939-1945, nor was it on the lists created by the Munich,
Wiesbaden, and associated Collection Points. The Painting
was also not included in any “Stolen Art Alerts,” the Art
Loss Register, or on any other databases of lost or looted
art as of 1976 or 1993.
The Painting was included in two 1950 publications
about Camille Pissarro (by Gotthard Jedlicka and Thadée
Natanson), but no provenance or ownership history was
provided. Although a picture and detailed description
of the Painting was included in the May 1954 article in
Connoisseur magazine about the Schoenberg Collection in
St. Louis, it did not mention the Cassirer family or Lilly.
39a
Supplemental Appendix
0RUHRYHUDOWKRXJKWKH&25$GHFLVLRQFRQÀUPHG
that Lilly owned the Painting, the published law reporter
containing the decision was not widely available (except in
specialized law libraries) and was not a typical resource for
provenance researchers. More importantly, the reporter
was indexed by party name (e.g., Lilly Neubauer), not by
the name of the artwork or property at issue, making a
search for the Painting in the 12 volume reporter a virtual
impossibility in 1976 and 1993. Unless the investigator
knew the name of the parties involved in the case, there
was no practical method to search for the Painting in
this set of reporters. Moreover, even if one recognized
the Cassirer label on the back of the Painting, the 1954
CORA decision refers to Lilly as “Lilly Neubauer” or
“Neubauer;” it makes no reference to the name Cassirer.
The CORA decision in the Neubauer case was
described by Walter Schwarz in his book, Rückerstattung
nach den Gesetzen der Alliierten Mächte (Restitution
under the laws of the Allied Powers), published by C.H.
Beck in 1974. Trial Exhibit 314. However, the book’s
description of the Neubauer case refers only to an untitled
Pissarro, and the litigants are not referred to by name but
only as “A” and “B.” The CORA source for the decision is
merely cited in a footnote. No mention is made of Lilly or
the Cassirer family.
A photo card among the Frick Art Library Photo
A rchive 19 resources in New York City references
19. The Frick Art Library Photo Archive is one of the principal
sources for provenance research.
40a
Supplemental Appendix
Schoenberg’s ownership of the Painting and refers to the
Connoisseur article. Again, there is no mention of Lilly
or the Cassirer family.
In 1974, John Rewald of the Museum of Modern Art
in New York published a study called Camille Pissarro.
The Painting is shown in this book as Figure 41. There is
no reference in this book to Lilly, or the Cassirer family’s
ownership of the Painting. However, had the Baron or
TBC contacted Rewald, a noted expert on Pissarro, it is
possible that they would have learned that the Painting
had been stolen from Lilly. Rewald was responsible for
updating the 1939 Catalogue Raisonné, which he took
over from Pissarro’s son, Ludovic Rodo Pissarro (“Rodo
Pissarro”), who had passed away in 1952. After Rodo
Pissarro’s death, Rewald inherited his Pissarro archives,
including a “Photo Card” for the Painting, which noted
in handwritten French that the Painting “was stolen
from Madame Lilly Neubauer (Jewish, during the war
in Germany), currently 18 Norham Rd, Oxford.” Trial
Exhibit 143 at 2. The source of the information is not
recorded on the card. It is not known if John Rewald ever
reviewed Rodo Pissarro’s Photo Cards or if he was aware
of the notations on the Photo Card. However, had the
Baron or TBC asked Rewald for provenance information
with respect to the Painting, it is possible that Rewald
would have reviewed the Photo Card and advised that the
Painting had been stolen from Lilly.
John Rewald died in 1994, and the project to update
the 1939 Catalogue Raisonné was not completed until
the publication of the updated Catalogue Raisonné by
41a
Supplemental Appendix
Claire Durand-Ruel Snollaerts and Joachim Pissarro,
who jointly worked on the project with the Wildenstein
Institute in Paris, in 2005. The updated 2005 Catalogue
Raisonné references the Cassirer family and Lilly in the
provenance information for the Painting, as well as the
Nazis’ looting of the Painting. Snollaerts had discovered
the Photo Card referencing the theft of the Painting
from Lilly Neubauer in the late 1990s in Rodo Pissarro’s
archives (which had been acquired by the Wildenstein
Institute after Rewald’s death). Other than the reference
on the Photo Card, there were no other references to Lilly
Neubauer (or the Cassirers) in the Pissarro archives or
materials located at the Wildenstein Institute. According
to Snollaerts, she did not become aware of any connection
between Neubauer and the Cassirer family until late 2000,
when she was contacted at the Wildenstein Institute by
Connie Lowenthal and Evie Joselow of the Commission
for Art Recovery, with inquiries about the provenance of
the Painting.
6LJQLÀFDQWO\H[FHSWIRUWKH&25$GHFLVLRQWKHUH
was no published information about Lilly’s ownership of
the Painting prior to the 2005 publication of the updated
Catalogue Raisonné.
VIII. CLAUDE CASSIRER’S DISCOVERY OF THE
WHEREABOUTS OF THE PAINTING AND
THE ENSUING LITIGATION
Neither Lilly nor any of her heirs attempted to locate
the Painting between 1958 and late 1999, because they
believed that the Painting had been lost or destroyed
42a
Supplemental Appendix
during the war. Claude Cassirer, Lilly’s heir, discovered
that the Painting was on display at the Museum sometime
in 2000.
2Q0D\&ODXGH&DVVLUHUÀOHGD3HWLWLRQZLWK
the Kingdom of Spain and TBC, seeking return of the
Painting. On May 10, 2005, after his Petition to return the
3DLQWLQJZDVUHMHFWHG&ODXGH&DVVLUHUÀOHGWKLVDFWLRQ
against the Kingdom of Spain and TBC, seeking the
return of the Painting, or an award of damages in the event
the Court is unable to order the return of the Painting. 20
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
AND ULTIMATE FINDINGS
It is undisputed that the Nazis stole the Painting
from Lilly. Under California law and common law,
thieves cannot pass good title to anyone, including a good
faith purchaser. See Cassirer v. Thyssen-Bornemisza
Collection Foundation, 862 F.3d 951, 960 (9th Cir. 2017).
However, as this Court held, and the Ninth Circuit agreed,
California law and common law do not apply in this case.
Id. at 960-64. Instead, the Court must apply Spanish law.
Id. And, under Spanish law, TBC is the lawful owner of
the Painting.
20. Claude Cassirer died on September 25, 2010, and David
Cassirer, Ava Cassirer, and United Jewish Federation of San Diego
County were substituted as plaintiffs in this action. Ava Cassirer
died on March 2, 2018, and the Estate of Ava Cassirer, Egidijus
Marcinkevicius, Administrator WWA, was substituted as a plaintiff
in this action. Pursuant to the stipulation of the parties, the Kingdom
of Spain was dismissed without prejudice in August 2011.
43a
Supplemental Appendix
I.
THE BARON DID NOT POSSESS THE PAINTING
IN GOOD FAITH UNDER SWISS LAW AND THUS
DID NOT PASS GOOD TITLE TO TBC.
TBC argues that it acquired ownership of the
Painting based on a conveyance from the Baron (via the
1993 Acquisition Agreement). The effect of the Baron’s
conveyance to TBC is governed by Spanish law, and,
under Spanish law, a consensual transfer of ownership
requires title and transfer of possession. Cassirer, 862
F.3d at 974. At the time of the 1993 Acquisition Agreement,
possession of the Painting had already been transferred
to TBC pursuant to the Loan Agreement. Accordingly,
as the Ninth Circuit held, “if the Baron had good title to
the Painting when he sold it to TBC, then TBC became
the lawful owner of the Painting through the acquisition
agreement.” Cassirer, 862 F.3d at 974. Because Spain
applies the law of the situs for movable property, Spanish
law would look to Swiss law to determine whether the
Baron acquired title to the Painting while he possessed
it in Switzerland between 1976 and 1992. Id.
TBC argues that the Baron acquired title to the
Painting through the Swiss law of acquisitive prescription.
“Under Swiss law, to acquire title to movable property
through acquisitive prescription, a person must possess
WKHFKDWWHOLQJRRGIDLWKIRUDÀYH\HDUSHULRGµCassirer,
862 F.3d at 975; see also Swiss Civil Code (ZGB) Art. 728.
As the Ninth Circuit held, “[t]he Baron completed the
ÀYH\HDU SHULRG RI SRVVHVVLRQ EHWZHHQ DQG µ
Cassirer, 862 F.3d at 975.
44a
Supplemental Appendix
However, in order for the Baron to have acquired title
to the Painting through acquisitive prescription, he must
have also possessed the Painting in good faith during
the relevant time period. Under Swiss law, “good faith”
is presumed. Swiss Civil Code (ZGB) Art. 3(1). But good
faith can be rebutted by showing that a person “failed to
exercise the diligence required by the circumstances.”
See Swiss Civil Code (ZGB) Art. 3(2). Plaintiffs have the
burden of demonstrating that the Baron failed to exercise
the diligence required by the circumstances. Declaration
of Dr. Wolfgang Ernst [Docket No. 396] at ¶ 38; Swiss
Federal Court Judgment of 18 April 2013, BGE 139 III
305, E 3.2.2.
“The degree of attention, which can be demanded
from the buyer, is determined by the circumstances.
What this means in a particular case is largely a matter
of discretion.” Swiss Federal Court Judgment of 18 April
2013, BGE 139 III 305, E 3.2.2 (English translation). In
general, under Swiss law, a purchaser does not have a
duty to conduct inquiries as to the seller’s title; he only has
such a duty if there are actual and concrete reasons for
suspicion. See, e.g., Swiss Federal Court Judgment of 29
March 2018, 5A_962/2017 E. 5.1. In determining whether
there are actual and concrete reasons for suspicion, the
Court only considers the circumstances existing at the
time of the transaction. Declaration of Dr. Wolfgang Ernst
[Docket No. 396] at ¶¶ 42-43.
45a
Supplemental Appendix
$ 7KHUHZHUHVXIÀFLHQWVXVSLFLRXVFLUFXPVWDQFHV
RU´UHGÁDJVµVXFKWKDWWKH%DURQKDGDGXW\
to investigate.
7KH&RXUWÀQGVWKDWWKHUHZHUHVXIÀFLHQWVXVSLFLRXV
FLUFXPVWDQFHVRU´UHGÁDJVµZKLFKVKRXOGKDYHSURPSWHG
the Baron to conduct additional inquiries as to the seller’s
title. Specifically, the Court finds that the following
circumstances, when considered together, should have
caused the Baron, a sophisticated art collector, to conduct
additional inquiries: (1) the presence of intentionally
removed labels and a torn label demonstrating that the
Painting had been in Berlin; (2) the minimal provenance
information provided by the Stephen Hahn Gallery, which
included no information from the crucial World War II era
and which, contrary to the partial label, did not show that
the Painting had ever been in Berlin or Germany;21 (3)
the well-known history and pervasive nature of the Nazi
ORRWLQJRIÀQHDUWGXULQJWKH:RUOG:DU,,DQG WKHIDFW
that Pissarro paintings were often looted by the Nazis.
0RVWLPSRUWDQWO\WKH&RXUWÀQGVWKDWWKHSUHVHQFHRI
intentionally-removed labels should have been suspicious
to the Baron. According to Plaintiffs’ expert Dr. Jonathan
Petropoulos, “[t]here is no legitimate reason to tear off
[ ] labels as they serve the dual purpose of fortifying
an artwork’s authenticity and increasing its value. The
21. The Court acknowledges that the minimal provenance
information provided by Stephen Hahn, by itself, would not be cause
for concern. In the 1970s, provenance was usually only referenced
if tied to a distinguished or remarkable collection. See Declaration
of Laurie A. Stein [Docket No. 412] at ¶¶ 30, 145.
46a
Supplemental Appendix
UHPRYDORIVXFKODEHOVLVOLNHÀOLQJRIIWKHVHULDOQXPEHU
RQDVWROHQJXQ³FOHDUFDXVHIRUFRQFHUQµ'HFODUDWLRQRI
Jonathan Petropoulos [Docket No. 417] at ¶ 114. According
to TBC’s expert Lynn Nicholas, on the other hand, the fact
that “some labels have been removed or have fallen off in
the course of the 100 years since the Painting was created”
is “normal.” Declaration of Lynn Nicholas [Docket No. 399]
at ¶ ´/DEHOVDUHDIÀ[HGIRUPDQ\UHDVRQV7KH\DUH
not proof of ownership, exhibition or sale. Many dealers
put one on each time a work passes, even temporarily,
through their hands in order to keep track of inventory.
2WKHU ODEHOV DUH DIÀ[HG IRU H[KLELWLRQV DQG VKLSSLQJ
by conservators, for estate purposes and for auctions.
Museums normally have their own labels placed by their
registrars.” Declaration of Lynn Nicholas [Docket No.
399] at ¶ 43. Ms. Nicholas, however, never satisfactorily
explained why such labels would be intentionally removed.
Likewise, TBC’s expert Laurie A. Stein never
satisfactorily explained why labels would be intentionally
removed. According to Ms. Stein, “[i]n provenance
research, any trace information from extant labels and
markings is an important source of information, a bonus
WKDWFDQOHDGWRNH\ÀQGLQJVRQRFFDVLRQ+RZHYHUJLYHQ
the nature of the label materials and the passage of time,
loss of labels and illegibility of verso information is not
FRQVLGHUHG D ¶UHG ÁDJ·´ 'HFODUDWLRQ RI /DXULH $ 6WHLQ
[Docket No. 412] at ¶ 185. Ms. Stein’s direct testimony
was limited to the “loss of labels” and “illegibility of
YHUVRµLQIRUPDWLRQDQGIDLOHGWRVSHFLÀFDOO\DGGUHVVWKH
intentional removal of labels. In addition, when crossexamined, Ms. Stein carefully worded her answers in an
47a
Supplemental Appendix
effort to avoid this issue. When asked if people regularly
´UHPRYHµ ODEHOV IURP SDLQWLQJV VKH WHVWLÀHG ´>L@Q P\
H[SHULHQFH RYHU WKH KXQGUHG \HDUV RU VR WKDW³RI D
painting’s existence and the many places that a painting
has been, where it has been exhibited or who’s had it,
there are many instances where labels are no longer
present that were once present.” Trial Tr. at 123:8-14
(emphasis added). When asked if it would be suspicious
LIODEHOVZHUHUHPRYHGIURPDSDLQWLQJ0V6WHLQWHVWLÀHG
“[n]ot necessarily, no.” Trial Tr. at 123:2-7. Ultimately, she
conceded that a label which is removed or scraped off could
be suspicious under certain circumstances, and that one
would have to investigate or learn why those labels had
been removed, where the work had been, and what those
labels might have been. Trial Tr. at 123:15-124:12. Based
on Dr. Petropoulos’s unequivocal testimony and the failure
of TBC’s experts to directly confront this issue, the Court
ÀQGVWKDWDQLQWHQWLRQDOO\UHPRYHGRUWRUQODEHOVKRXOG
have, at the very least, raised some suspicion in the Baron,
especially in the post-World War II era. That suspicion
should have been heightened by the fact that there was
a torn label demonstrating that the Painting had been in
Berlin, that the minimal provenance information provided
by the Stephen Hahn Gallery did not mention that the
Painting had ever been in Germany, and that there was
no provenance information available for the World War
II period.
In addition, the fact that the Painting was painted
by Camille Pissarro should have also heightened the
Baron’s suspicions. According to Plaintiffs’ expert Dr.
Petropolous, Pissarro paintings were “immediately
48a
Supplemental Appendix
of suspect provenance” because they were favored by
European Jewish collectors and often looted by the Nazis.
Declaration of Jonathan Petropolous [Docket No. 417] at
¶¶ 86-96. Indeed, as noted by Dr. Petropolous, the French
Ministry of Culture in 1947 published a compendium of
French cultural losses during World War II that included
forty-six works by Pissarro that were looted by the Nazis
(and have yet to be recovered). 22 Id. at ¶ 93.
Finally, it is undisputed that the Baron was a very
sophisticated art collector. The Baron’s “familiarity with
[the art] segment is important with regard to the diligence
22. Although TBC’s expert Lynn Nicholas disputed the fact
that Pissarro paintings were “immediately of suspect provenance,”
the Court finds that her opinion was not well supported. For
example, she claimed that “[a]nalysis of collections worldwide do
not indicate that Pissarro’s works have been collected more by Jews
than by others.” Declaration of Lynn Nicholas [Docket No. 399] at
¶ 60. However, a current analysis of collections worldwide does not
necessarily mean that Pissarro works were not historically favored
by European Jewish collectors, especially considering that more than
70 years have passed since the end of World War II and, even more
importantly, that works belonging to European Jewish collectors
were plundered during the war. She also claimed that “evidence
does not support the allegation that more Pissarros were stolen by
the Nazis than anything else,” citing the fact that, in the Répertoire
des Bien Spoliés, the 715 page listing of art looted in France, there
are 66 works by Renoir (who, unlike Pissarro, was not Jewish) and
46 by Pissarro. Declaration of Lynn Nicholas [Docket No. 399] at
¶ :LWKRXWNQRZLQJKRZSUROLÀFHDFKRIWKHDUWLVWVZHUHWKLVGRHV
little to demonstrate that Pissarro works were not more frequently
looted by the Nazis than Renoir works. Moreover, this evidence may
simply mean that Renoir works were also often frequently looted
by the Nazis.
49a
Supplemental Appendix
requirements imposed on him.” Swiss Federal Court
Judgment of 18 April 2013, BGE 139 III 305, E. 5.2.2
(English translation). Because he was a sophisticated art
collector, the Baron would have recognized and understood
the suspicious circumstances surrounding the Painting.
After carefully considering all of the evidence
presented on this issue, the Court concludes that there
ZHUHVXIÀFLHQWO\VXVSLFLRXVFLUFXPVWDQFHVWRWULJJHUDGXW\
WRLQYHVWLJDWHXQGHU6ZLVVODZ,QGHHGWKH&RXUWÀQGVLW
HVSHFLDOO\VLJQLÀFDQWWKDWWKHVHVDPHIDFWVNQRZQWRWKH
Frank Perls Gallery and Knoedler in 1951 (in addition
to Frank Perls’ knowledge that the Painting was being
sold from Herr Urban’s collection in Munich, Germany)
DSSHDUWRKDYHEHHQVXIÀFLHQWWRWULJJHUWKHLUVXVSLFLRQV
and led them to inquire as to whether the Painting was
a looted or stolen artwork. The Court acknowledges that
there were other circumstances surrounding the sale
of the Painting that were not suspicious, including, for
example, the respected reputation of the Stephen Hahn
Gallery at the time23 and the price that the Baron paid for
the Painting. However, these circumstances, while they
tend to demonstrate that the Baron did not have actual
knowledge that the Painting was stolen, do not outweigh
the other suspicious circumstances triggering a duty to
investigate.
23. The Stephen Hahn Gallery has sold at least one other work
looted by the Nazis. However, that fact would not have been known
to the Baron in 1976.
50a
Supplemental Appendix
B. The Baron failed to exercise the diligence
required by the circumstances
Despite the Baron’s duty to inquire further regarding
the provenance of the Painting, there is no evidence that
the Baron took any steps to allay any suspicions that he
may have had. However, “the failure to pay due attention
is only important, if it is causal for the lack of knowledge
about the defect of title; otherwise, it is negligible.”
Swiss Federal Court Judgment of 18 April 2013, BGE
139 III 305, E. 3.2.2 (English translation). In other words,
“[a]ccording to decisions of the Federal Supreme Court
of Switzerland, failure to undertake research may only
be construed as the lack of good faith, if the applicable
SUHFDXWLRQV ZRXOG KDYH OHG WR XQFRYHULQJ WKH GHÀFLHQW
disposal authorization of the seller.” Id. at E. 5.4.2. This
causation requirement has been interpreted to mean
that the “research measure under consideration must be
objectively suitable to discover the defect in the disposal
authorization.” Id. at E 5.4.2 and E 5.4.3 (emphasis added).
See also Swiss Federal Court Judgment of 29 March 2018,
5A_962/2017 E. 5.2; Declaration of Dr. Wolfgang Ernst
[Docket No. 396] at ¶¶ 89, 91. “However, the hypothetic
result of such investigations does not matter. It may very
well be that the objectively suitable investigations could
QRWKDYHVROLGLÀHGWKHVXVSLFLRQV,QRWKHUZRUGVWKHRQH
who does not undertake seemingly suitable and reasonable
measures, cannot rely on his good faith.” Swiss Federal
Court Judgment of 29 March 2018, 5A_962/2017 E. 5.2
(English translation).
7KH &RXUW ÀQGV WKDW WKH %DURQ IDLOHG WR FRQGXFW
suitable and reasonable inquiries in order to discover
51a
Supplemental Appendix
WKHVHOOHU·VODFNRIWLWOH6SHFLÀFDOO\LWZRXOGKDYHEHHQ
suitable and reasonable for the Baron (or one of his
employees) to contact John Rewald, a noted expert on
Pissarro, in an attempt to determine if the Painting had
been stolen. Rewald would have been a logical source of
information as he had recently published a study called
Camille Pissarro and was responsible for updating the
1939 Catalogue Raisonné. Rewald was known to the
Baron, as Rewald visited the Baron’s collection at the
Baron’s home in Switzerland in July 1976, just three
months before the Baron purchased the Painting.24 None of
TBC’s experts dispute that it would have been reasonable
for the Baron to contact Rewald. Cf. Declaration of Lynn
Nicholas [Docket No. 399] at ¶¶ 138-139; Declaration of
Laurie A. Stein [Docket No. 412] at ¶ 197; Declaration of
Wolfgang Enrst [Docket No. 396] at ¶¶ 88-109.
Had the Baron contacted Rewald (or even another art
expert who might have referred the Baron to Rewald),
he might have learned that the Painting was stolen from
Lilly by the Nazis. Whether such an inquiry would have,
in fact, revealed that the Painting was stolen will never
be known, but it is also irrelevant. Because the Baron did
not undertake such a suitable and reasonable measure,
he cannot rely on his good faith. See Swiss Federal
Court Judgment of 29 March 2018, 5A_962/2017 E. 5.2
(English translation) (“Whether such inquiries would
24. In fact, as noted supra, in 1989, Irene Martin, the
Administrative Director and Curator of the Baron’s collection,
contacted Rewald, inviting him to curate an exhibition at Villa
)DYRULWD DQG WR SUHSDUH D ´VFKRODUO\ DQG VFLHQWLÀFµ FDWDORJXH RQ
certain paintings in the collection, including the Painting.
52a
Supplemental Appendix
have substantiated the suspicion or not, does not need to
EHFODULÀHGEHFDXVHWKH'HIHQGDQWZKRGLGQRWXQGHUWDNH
any measures, which would have seemed adequate and
reasonable, cannot rely on his good faith.”).
Indeed, the Federal Supreme Court of Switzerland, in
a case involving the stolen painting, “Diener mit Samowar”
by Russian artist Kasimir Malewitsch, concluded as
follows:
In this case, the primary issue is the
question whether appellee had to engage H. or
RWKHUH[SHUWVIRUIXUWKHUFODULÀFDWLRQV
Contrary to the appraisal of the appellate
court, this is the case. After appellee heard
from H., who he engaged himself as art expert,
of a rumor about a painting of Malewitsch,
which had been stolen but which is on the
market, there would not be any question
but to ask H. or any other expert for more
information about this rumor or to research
this matter further. The measures H. would
have undertaken are immaterial in this context;
retrospectively, it can only be speculated about
them. In addition, it does not matter that he did
QRW NQRZ 1 DQ H[SHUW ZKR YHULÀDEO\ NQHZ
DERXW WKH WKHIW ,W LV VXIÀFLHQW WKDW DW WKDW
former point in time, engaging one or several
experts would have been objectively a suitable
(if not even the best) and reasonable action
WR WDNH LQ RUGHU WR ÀQG RXW PRUH DERXW WKH
UXPRUDQGDQ\GHÀFLHQFLHVFRQFHUQLQJVHOOHU·V
53a
Supplemental Appendix
authorization to sell. Appellee at least knew
+DVH[SHUWZKR³LIVKHFRXOGQRWWDNHFDUH
of the respective mandate of appellee would
OLNHWRHQJDJHVRPHRQHHOVHIRULW³FRXOGKDYH
referred him without any problems to another
expert, provided he, as art collector, did not
already know them. This hypothetic result of
such research does not matter as it can be the
case that such investigations would not have
substantiated the rumor and its connection with
the painting “Diener mit Samowar”. Appellee
would have then trusted this information even
if they would have been objectively wrong.
If this would have dispelled and should have
dispelled his concerns, his good faith would
have had to be protected because he applied all
necessary diligence to investigate the rumor.
If, on the other hand, he would have found out
that the rumor actually concerns the painting
´'LHQHUPLW6DPRZDUµWKHQDSSHOOHH³LIKHGLG
not want to restrain from the purchase under
WKHVH FLUFXPVWDQFHV³ZRXOG KDYH GHPDQG
[sic] precise proof that seller is entitled to sell
despite the earlier theft of the work (e.g., good
faith purchase abroad).
Because appellee did not undertake this
measure, which seems suitable and reasonable,
must lead to the conclusion that he cannot base
it on his good faith.
Swiss Federal Court Judgment of 18 April 2013, BGE 139
III 305, E 5.4.3 (English translation).
54a
Supplemental Appendix
Similarly, because the Baron did not undertake any
reasonable and suitable measures, such as contacting
Rewald or another art expert to allay any suspicions he
may (and should) have had, the Court concludes that the
Baron did not possess the Painting in good faith and thus
the Baron (and Favorita) did not acquire good title to the
Painting under Swiss law. Accordingly, because the Baron
(and Favorita) did not have good title to the Painting at
the time of TBC’s purchase, the Court concludes that TBC
did not become the lawful owner of the Painting via the
1993 Acquisition Agreement. 25
25. The Court does not address the many other measures
that the Baron could have taken, such as asking the Stephen Hahn
Gallery for more information regarding the Painting’s provenance,
investigating the partial label from the Cassirer gallery on the verso
of the Painting, or searching lists of stolen artworks, because the
&RXUWÀQGVWKDWVXFKPHDVXUHVZRXOGQRWKDYHOHGWKH%DURQLQ
to discover that the Painting was stolen from Lilly. “[T]he failure
to pay due attention is only important, if it is causal for the lack of
knowledge about the defect of title; otherwise, it is negligible.” Swiss
Federal Court Judgment of 18 April 2013, BGE 139 III 305, E. 3.2.2
(English translation). In any event, there is no evidence that the
Baron undertook any of these measures, and thus TBC cannot rely on
them. See Declaration of Dr. Wolfgang Ernst [Docket No. 396] at ¶ 89
(“The good-faith presumption cannot be relied upon, if measures of
inquiry were omitted, which at the time would have been considered
‘apparently suitable and reasonable’ . . . . If this were the case, the
counter-argument, relying on a counter-factual hypothetical, that
such inquiry would have led to nothing, is not heard.”).
55a
Supplemental Appendix
II. T BC AC QU I R ED OW N ER SH I P OF T H E
PA I N T I N G U N DE R S PA I N ’ S L AW S OF
ACQUISITIVE PRESCRIPTION.
However, the Court concludes, based on all of the
evidence, that TBC acquired lawful ownership of the
Painting under Spain’s laws of acquisitive prescription.
Spanish Civil Code Article 1955 provides in relevant
part: “Ownership of movable property prescribes by
three years of uninterrupted possession in good faith.
Ownership of movable property also prescribes by six
years of uninterrupted possession, without any other
condition. . . .” Spanish Civil Code Art. 1955 (English
WUDQVODWLRQ 3RVVHVVLRQLVGHÀQHGLQ$UWLFOHZKLFK
states: “Possession must be in the capacity of the owner,
and must be public, peaceful, and uninterrupted.” Spanish
Civil Code Art. 1941 (English translation).
“Read alone, Article 1955 would seem to vest title in
one who gained possession, even absent good faith, after
six years, so long as the possession was in the capacity as
owner, public peaceful, and uninterrupted.” Cassirer, 862
F.3d at 965. As the Court held in its Order Granting TBC’s
Motion for Summary Judgment on June 4, 2015 [Docket
No. 315], and as the Ninth Circuit held in Cassirer, 862
F.3d at 965, TBC has possessed the property as owner
publicly, peacefully, and without interruption for more
than 6 years (from 1993 to at least 1999). “Thus, Article
1955, read in isolation, would seem to bar the Cassirers’
action for recovery of the Painting.” Cassirer, 862 F.3d
at 965.
56a
Supplemental Appendix
“But the very next article in the Spanish Civil Code,
Article 1956, modifies how acquisitive prescription
operates.” Id. Article 1956 provides:
Movable property purloined or stolen may
not prescribe in the possession of those who
purloined or stole it, or their accomplices or
accessories [encubridores], unless the crime
or misdemeanor or its sentence, and the action
to claim civil liability arising therefrom,
should have become barred by the statute of
limitations.
Spanish Civil Code Art. 1956 (English translation).
“ Therefore, as to any principals, accomplices, or
accessories . . . to a robbery or theft, Article 1956 extends
the period of possession necessary to vest title to the time
prescribed by Article 1955 plus the statute of limitations
on the original crime and the action to claim civil liability.”
Cassirer, 862 F.3d at 966 (citing Spanish Supreme Court
decision of 15 July 2004 (5241/2004)).
Plaintiffs claim that TBC was an accessory (or
encubridor) to the theft of the Painting. The Ninth Circuit
concluded:
For the crime of encubrimiento (accessory
after the fact) and the crime of receiving
stolen property, the two crimes the Cassirers
argue TBC committed when it purchased the
Painting from the Baron in 1993, the criminal
OLPLWDWLRQVSHULRGLVÀYH\HDUV3HQDO&RGH
57a
Supplemental Appendix
Articles 30, 113, 546(bis)(a) and 1995 Penal Code
Articles 131, 298, and the civil limitations period
LVÀIWHHQ\HDUV-XGJPHQWRI-DQXDU\
(RJ 1982/184) and Judgment of July 15, 2004
(no. 5241/2004). Thus, if Article 1956 applies,
including the six-year period from Article
1955, TBC would need to possess the Painting
for twenty six years after 1993, until 2019, to
acquire title via acquisitive prescription. Since
the Cassirers petitioned TBC for the Painting
LQDQGÀOHGWKLVDFWLRQLQif Article
1956 applies, TBC has not acquired prescriptive
title to the Painting.
Cassirer, 862 F.3d at 966 (emphasis in original) (footnote
omitted). Accordingly, if Article 1956 applies, Plaintiffs
own the Painting. If Article 1956 does not apply, TBC
owns the Painting.
For the reasons that follow, the Court concludes
that Article 1956 does not apply and that TBC owns the
Painting pursuant to Article 1955.
A.
TBC is not an “accessory” or encubridor under
Article 1956.
“Article 1956 extends the time of possession required
for acquisitive prescription only as to those chattels (1)
robbed or stolen [or otherwise misappropriated] from
the rightful owner (2) as to the principals, accomplices
or accessories after the fact (‘encubridores’) with actual
knowledge of the robbery or theft.” Cassirer, 862 F.3d
58a
Supplemental Appendix
at 966 (footnote omitted). The parties agree that the
ÀUVWUHTXLUHPHQWLVVDWLVÀHGLHWKDWWKH3DLQWLQJZDV
misappropriated from Lilly by Scheidwimmer and the
Nazis. With respect to the second requirement, the
parties disagree as to whether TBC is an “accessory” or
“encubridor” within the meaning of Article 1956. 26
As the Ninth Circuit held, the term “accessory” or
“encubridor” in Article 1956 has the meaning that term
was given it in Spain’s 1870 Penal Code. Cassirer, 862
F.3d at 967-68. Under the 1870 Penal Code, “a person can
be encubridor within the meaning of Article 1956 if he
NQRZLQJO\ UHFHLYHV DQG EHQHÀWV IURP VWROHQ SURSHUW\µ
Id. 7%& KDV FOHDUO\ EHQHÀWWHG IURP LWV SRVVHVVLRQ RI
the Painting by displaying it at the Museum. The Court,
however, must resolve, based on the evidence presented
at trial, whether TBC knowingly received stolen property,
DQGPRUHVSHFLÀFDOO\ZKHWKHU7%&KDGactual knowledge
that the Painting was the product of robbery or theft. See
Cassirer, 862 F.3d at 968 n.17 (citing Spanish Supreme
Court decision of 23 December 1986 (RJ 1986/7982)).
Plaintiffs have the burden of proving TBC’s actual
knowledge.
Actual knowledge requires “willful intent” (dolo)
and may be proven directly (dolo directo) or indirectly
(dolo eventual). 27 See, e.g., Declaration of Adriana de
26. it is undisputed that TBC was not a principal or accomplice
to the 1939 misappropriation of the Painting.
27. For the reasons stated in the Declaration of Adriana de Buerba
[Docket No. 402] at ¶¶ 57-64, the Court rejects Alfredo Guerrero
59a
Supplemental Appendix
Buerba [Docket No. 402] at ¶ 57; Declaration of Alfredo
Guerrero Righetto [Docket No. 431] at § 3.1. As the
Spanish Supreme Court has held, the crime of receiving
stolen property “is a crime that is necessarily carried out
with intent, and may be committed both by direct intent
(certain knowledge of the illegal origin of the items) and
by future malicious intent, when the recipient of stolen
goods acts despite it being considered highly probable
that the goods have their origin in a property crime or
socioeconomic crime; in other words, when the illegal
origin of the stolen goods received appears to be highly
probable, in light of the circumstances involved.” Spanish
Supreme Court Judgment of May 19, 2016 (no. 429/2016))
(English translation). “The Spanish Supreme Court does
not require exact, thorough or comprehensive knowledge
about the previous offense but a state of certainty which
entails knowing beyond mere suspicion or conjecture.”
Declaration of Adriana de Buerba [Docket No. 402] at
¶ 55 (citing Supreme Court Judgment of June 9, 1993 (no.
3818/1993), and Supreme Court Judgment of November
20, 1995 (no. 5853/1995)). See also Declaration of Alfredo
Guerrero Righetto [Docket No. 431] at § 3.3(A).
“Willful blindness” may also satisfy the actual
knowledge requirement. In order to prove willful
blindness, Plaintiffs must prove that: (1) TBC was aware
that there was a high risk or likelihood that its conduct was
illegal; (2) TBC completely disregarded that risk and did
Righetto’s opinion that “gross negligence” or “recklessness,” (i.e.,
imprudencia temeraria PD\ EH VXIÀFLHQW WR GHPRQVWUDWH DFWXDO
knowledge, to the extent that his use of those terms implies a
standard less than “dolo eventual” or “willful blindness”.
60a
Supplemental Appendix
not act with the minimum diligence required; and (3) TBC
REWDLQHGHFRQRPLFSURÀWDQGWKHUHIRUHZLVKHGWRUHPDLQ
ignorant. Declaration of Adriana de Buerba [Docket No.
402] at ¶ 65. See also Spanish Supreme Court Judgment
of March 16, 2012 (RJ 2012/5012).
1.
TBC did not have “actual knowledge” that
the Painting was stolen.
After considering all of the evidence presented by the
parties, the Court concludes that Plaintiffs have failed
to demonstrate that TBC had actual knowledge that the
3DLQWLQJZDVVWROHQSURSHUW\7KH&RXUWÀQGVWKDW7%&
lacked actual knowledge, especially in light of the following
evidence: (1) but for the 1954 CORA decision (which would
KDYH EHHQ YLUWXDOO\ LPSRVVLEOH WR ÀQG WKHUH ZDV QR
published information about Lilly’s prior ownership of the
Painting or that the Nazis had looted it at the time TBC
acquired the Painting; (2) the Kingdom of Spain (and TBC)
REWDLQHGOHJDORSLQLRQVIURPUHSXWDEOHODZÀUPVWRHQVXUH
that the Baron held good title and that the conveyance
was lawful; (3) the Kingdom of Spain and TBC (and their
counsel) were not aware of any facts demonstrating that
the Baron had acted in bad faith in acquiring any of
the paintings in the Collection; (4) with respect to the
paintings that counsel did investigate, counsel did not
discover any evidence that the paintings were stolen or
that the Baron had acquired them in bad faith; (5) the
Kingdom of Spain and TBC were aware that the Baron
had publicly displayed and exhibited the Collection, and
yet were not aware of any adverse title claims having
been made on any of the paintings in the Collection; (6)
61a
Supplemental Appendix
Favorita represented and warranted to TBC that it was
“the legal owner” of the artworks in the Collection and
WKDW7%&ZRXOGEHFRPH´WKHDEVROXWHEHQHÀFLDORZQHUµRI
those artworks, including the Painting; (7) the $350 million
paid for the entire Collection, including the Painting, was
reasonable taking into account the restrictions placed
on the purchase and sale of the Collection and TBC’s
obligations under the Acquisition Agreement; and (8) TBC
has publicly exhibited the Painting at the Museum since
1992 (with the expectation that the Museum would have
millions of visitors).
This evidence fails to demonstrate that TBC had
dolo directo or dolo eventual, or that TBC was willfully
blind. Indeed, although TBC’s legal counsel decided not to
conduct any investigation into the title or provenance of the
Painting, it does not appear that they made that decision
because they were afraid of learning the truth or because
they believed (or the circumstances demonstrated) that
there was a high risk or probability that the Painting
was stolen. Rather, legal counsel made this decision after
careful consideration of various options for the scope of
their title investigation. They believed that the risk was
low that pre-1980 paintings had title issues because:
(1) the Baron would have acquired ownership of those
paintings via the Swiss laws of acquisitive prescription
if he had acquired them in good faith; and (2) “any fraud
or theft affecting title to the paintings which had taken
place before the paintings were acquired by the family
would be unlikely to affect more than a single painting, or
a small group of paintings,” see Trial Exhibit 223 at 48990, because “presumably [the paintings] will on the whole
62a
Supplemental Appendix
have been purchased on a ‘piece meal’ basis from different
owners,” see Trial Exhibit 84. Plaintiffs heavily criticize
the Kingdom of Spain and TBC’s counsel for assuming
that the Baron acted in good faith without conducting
DQ\LQYHVWLJDWLRQ7KH&RXUWÀQGVKRZHYHUWKDWFRXQVHO
had a sound basis for that assumption. Indeed, even
though the Baron had publicly displayed and exhibited the
Collection, there were no adverse title claims made on any
of the paintings in the Collection at the time. Moreover,
with respect to the paintings that counsel did investigate,
counsel did not discover any evidence that the paintings
were stolen or that the Baron had acquired them in bad
faith.
The Kingdom of Spain and TBC’s counsel did
recognize that there was a risk that a painting or small
number of paintings could have a title issue, and decided
to cover that “hypothetical” risk by obtaining the pledge
or prenda. But recognizing that a minor risk exists does
not equate to dolo eventual or “willful blindness.” The
evidence presented at trial simply failed to demonstrate
that TBC was aware of, or that the circumstances
demonstrated, a high risk or probability that a painting
or the Painting was stolen.
Moreover, the Court concludes that, although the
SUHVHQFH RI WKH ´UHG ÁDJVµ LGHQWLÀHG supra (i.e., the
intentionally removed labels, the minimal provenance
information provided, the partial label demonstrating that
the Painting had been in Berlin, and the fact that Pissarros
were frequently the subject of Nazi looting) might have
EHHQVXIÀFLHQWWRUDLVH7%&·Vsuspicions with respect to
63a
Supplemental Appendix
the Painting, they fall well short of demonstrating TBC’s
“actual knowledge,” i.e. that TBC had certain knowledge
that the Painting was stolen, or that there was a high
risk or probability that the Painting was stolen. In other
words, although failing to investigate the provenance of
the Painting may have been irresponsible under these
circumstances, the Court concludes that it certainly was
not criminal.
2.
The Baron did not have “actual knowledge”
that the Painting was stolen.
Plaintiffs argue, under Spanish law, that the Baron’s
actual knowledge can be imputed to TBC. The Court need
not resolve that issue of Spanish law, because the Court
ÀQGVWKDWWKH%DURQGLGQRWKDYHDFWXDONQRZOHGJHWKDWWKH
3DLQWLQJZDVVWROHQ6SHFLÀFDOO\WKHIROORZLQJHYLGHQFH
DPSO\VXSSRUWVWKH&RXUW·VÀQGLQJWKDWWKH%DURQODFNHG
actual knowledge: (1) the Baron paid fair market value for
the Painting in 1976; (2) the Baron purchased the Painting
from the Stephen Hahn Gallery, which was a reputable
art dealer; (3) the Painting was part of a public exhibition
at the Stephen Hahn Gallery when the Baron purchased
it; (4) the Baron publicly and frequently exhibited the
Painting in various locations around the world; and (5) in
1976, but for the 1954 CORA decision (which would have
EHHQYLUWXDOO\LPSRVVLEOHWRÀQG WKHUHZDVQRSXEOLVKHG
information about Lilly’s prior ownership of the Painting
or that the Nazis had looted it. Again, although the “red
ÁDJVµ VKRXOG KDYH UDLVHG WKH %DURQ·V suspicions, they
fall well short of demonstrating the Baron’s “actual
knowledge,” i.e. that the Baron had certain knowledge
64a
Supplemental Appendix
that the Painting was stolen, or that there was a high risk
or probability that the Painting was stolen.
%HFDXVH WKH &RXUW ÀQGV WKDW QHLWKHU 7%& QRU WKH
Baron, had actual knowledge that the Painting was stolen,
the Court concludes that TBC is not an “accessory”
(or encubridor) and that Article 1956 is not applicable.
Because Article 1956 is not applicable, the Court concludes
that TBC acquired ownership of the Painting under
Article 1955. See Order Granting TBC’s Motion for
Summary Judgment on June 4, 2015 [Docket No. 315];
Cassirer, 862 F.3d at 965.
B. TBC’s Remaining Arguments Regarding the
Applicability of Article 1956 Fail as a Matter
of Law.
In light of the Court’s determination that TBC is not
an accessory or encubridor for the purposes of Article
1956, the Court need not address TBC’s remaining
arguments as to why Article 1956 is inapplicable. However,
given that the parties will certainly pursue additional
appellate review, and in the interest of a complete record,
the Court considers TBC’s remaining legal arguments.
TBC argues that Article 1956 cannot apply as a
matter of law because: (1) it has not been charged with, or
convicted of, a predicate crime; and (2) it is a legal person,
rather than an individual. 28
28. TBC did not raise these issues as to the inapplicability of
Article 1956 until TBC’s Petition for Rehearing and Rehearing En
65a
Supplemental Appendix
1.
Article 1956 does not require a criminal
conviction.
The Court concludes that Article 1956 does not require
a criminal conviction. Indeed, the clear statutory language
demonstrates that a criminal conviction is not required.
As noted supra, Article 1956 provides:
Movable property purloined or stolen may
not prescribe in the possession of those who
purloined or stole it, or their accomplices or
accessories, unless the crime or misdemeanor,
or its sentence, and the action to claim civil
liability arising therefrom, should have
become barred by the statute of limitations.
Spanish Civil Code Art. 1956 (2013) (English translation)
(emphasis added).
In accordance with the Spanish rules of statutory
construction, the Court construes Article 1956 “according
to the proper meaning of [its] wording and in connection
with the context, with [its] historical and legislative
background and with the social reality of the time in
which [it is] to be applied, mainly attending to [its] spirit
Banc or until after the most recent remand to this Court. Plaintiffs
claim that the Court’s consideration of these two new arguments
are barred by the mandate rule, the law of the case doctrine, and/
or because TBC waived or forfeited these arguments. The Court
need not address whether TBC’s new arguments are precluded by
any of these doctrines because the Court concludes that TBC’s new
arguments fail as a matter of law.
66a
Supplemental Appendix
and purpose.” Spanish Civil Code Art. 3.1 (English
Translation). The Court concludes that Article 1956 does
not require a conviction according to the “proper meaning
of [its] wording.” Indeed, as persuasively argued by Amici
Curiae Comunidad Judía de Madrid and Federación de
Comunidades Judías de España, the express language of
Article 1956 differentiates between two scenarios:
i. If there is no criminal conviction yet, the
statute of limitation to prosecute the crime or
misdemeanor must have elapsed; or
ii. If there is a criminal conviction, the statute
of limitation to enforce the sentence of guilt for
a crime or misdemeanor must have elapsed.
Brief of Amici Curiae Comunidad Judía de Madrid and
Federación de Comunidades Judías de España [Docket No.
401-1] at 12. 29 “In both cases, the statute of limitations to
claim civil liability arising from the crime or misdemeanor
must also have elapsed. . . .” Id.
29. Article 1956’s adoption of these two alternatives for
determining when a principal, accomplice, or accessory can acquire
property through acquisitive prescription is not surprising, given
WKDW WKH 6SDQLVK 3HQDO &RGH LGHQWLÀHV SUHVFULSWLRQ RI WKH FULPH
and prescription of the sentence as different ways of extinguishing
FULPLQDOOLDELOLW\6SHFLÀFDOO\$UWLFOHRIWKH6SDQLVK3HQDO
Code, Article 112 of the 1973 Spanish Penal Code, and Article 130
of the 1995 Spanish Penal Code all provide that criminal liability is
extinguished by both prescription of the crime and prescription of
the sentence.
67a
Supplemental Appendix
The Court recognizes that no Spanish court has applied
Article 1956 in absence of a criminal conviction. However,
prominent Spanish legal scholars and commentators
agree that no criminal conviction is required. See, e.g.,
Manuel Albaladejo García, Comentarios Al Código Civil y
Complicaciones Forales, Tomo XXV, Vol. 1 (1993) (“these
individuals are prevented from consummating such
acquisition until the statute of limitations on the crime has
expired; if there was no prosecution for the crime, then the
time-barring of the sentence, which was not imposed, does
not come into play . . . .”); Bercovitz Rodríguez-Cano, R.
(Coord.), Comentario al Código Civil, Thomson Reuters
Aranzadi (4th ed.) (2013), comment on Article 1956, at
2529 (English translation) (“In order for [the Article 1956]
SURKLELWLRQWREHLQHIIHFWQRÀUPFRQYLFWLRQLVUHTXLUHGLQ
the criminal scope. The dismissal of the criminal process
or its extinction by a ruling other than a sentence will
not prevent a civil judge from declaring, if applicable, the
existence of a theft or robbery, though naturally only for
civil purposes.”).
For the foregoing reasons, the Court concludes, as a
matter of law, that Article 1956 does not require a criminal
conviction.
2.
Article 1956 applies to both natural persons
and legal persons.
TBC also argues that a “legal person” or legal entity
cannot be declared to be an accessory or encubridor for
the purposes of Article 1956 of the Spanish Civil Code.
68a
Supplemental Appendix
As a general rule (except with respect to a limited
QXPEHURIRIIHQVHVQRWDWLVVXHKHUH RQO\LQGLYLGXDOV³
DQGQRWOHJDOHQWLWLHV³FDQEHKHOGcriminally liable under
Spanish criminal law. However, Article 1956 is a provision
of the Spanish Civil Code. And, the provisions of the
Spanish Civil Code regulating acquisitive prescription,
including Article 1956, apply to both natural and legal
persons. See Spanish Civil Code A rt. 38 (English
translation) (“Legal entities may acquire and possess
property of all kinds, and contract obligations and exercise
civil and criminal actions, in accordance with the laws and
internal regulations.”); id. at Art. 1931 (“Persons with the
capacity to acquire property or rights by other legitimate
means may also acquire them by prescription.”).
Moreover, if TBC’s interpretation of Article 1956 were
correct, a thief could entirely escape the implications of
Article 1956 simply by making the acquisitions through a
legal entity. Under Spanish rules of statutory construction,
such an absurd interpretation must be rejected. See Teresa
Asunción Jiménez París, Supplementary Sources of Law
and Application of Legal Rules at 88; Spanish Supreme
Court Judgment of November 21, 1994 (RJ 1994/8542).
Accordingly, the Court concludes, as a matter of law,
that Article 1956 can apply to legal entities.
III. LACHES
Finally, TBC argues that Plaintiffs’ claims are barred
by laches or the similar doctrine under Spanish law,
69a
Supplemental Appendix
“Verwirkung.” 30 The Ninth Circuit apparently concluded
that Spanish law applies to this defense. See Cassirer v.
Thyssen-Bornemisza Collection Foundation, 862 F.3d
951, 977 (9th Cir 2017). The Ninth Circuit, however,
also considered whether TBC was entitled to summary
judgment on its laches defense in the event that California
law applied. The Court concludes that, no matter what law
the Court applies to resolve this issue, Plaintiffs’ claims
are not barred.
Verwirkung, like laches, is based on a plaintiff’s
unreasonable or “objectively unfair” delay in bringing
a claim. See Spanish Supreme Court Judgment of
April 26, 2018 (EDJ 2018/54808) (English translation);
Declaration of Mariano Yzquierdo Tolsada [Docket
No. 409] at 25 n.10; Antoni Vaquer, Verwirkung Versus
Laches: A Tale of Two Legal Transplants, 21 Tul. Eur.
Civ. L.F. 53, 61-66 (2006). The doctrine is premised
on the understanding that “[r]ights must be exercised
in accordance with the requirements of good faith.”
Spanish Civil Code Art. 7.1 (English translation). See
also Spanish Supreme Court Judgment of April 26, 2018
(EDJ 2018/54808). In order to apply this doctrine, three
requirements must be met:
30. Plaintiffs argue that the Court may not consider TBC’s
argument that Plaintiffs’ claims are barred by laches or Verwirkung
because: (1) the Ninth Circuit concluded that Spanish law applies,
not California law; and (2) TBC had previously only raised a laches
defense under California law, not Spanish law. The Court need not
resolve this issue, because the Court concludes, on the merits, that
Plaintiffs’ claims are not barred by laches or Verwirkung.
70a
Supplemental Appendix
(1) The passage of a long period of time, during
which the holder of the right remained inactive
without exercising it. Nevertheless, unlike what
occurs with the statute of limitations . . . , the
mere passage of time is not enough, but rather
must be accompanied by circumstances that
make the delay in exercise of the right unfair.
(2) Inactivity by the holder of the right during
that period of time, when they could have
exercised it.
(3) And lastly, . . D OHJLWLPDWH FRQÀGHQFH LQ
the passive subject that the right would not be
exercised. It must be the holder of the right that
LQVSLUHV WKLV FRQÀGHQFH ZKLFK LPSOLHV PRUH
than mere inactivity.
Spanish Supreme Court Judgment of April 26, 2018 (EDJ
2018/54808) (English translation).
Similarly, “[t]o establish laches a defendant must prove
both an unreasonable delay by the plaintiff and prejudice
to itself.” Couveau v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 218 F.3d 1078,
1983 (9th Cir. 2000) (per curiam). “Ultimately, as an
equitable doctrine, the denial of relief on the basis of laches
is not determined by simple rules of thumb or rigid legal
rules. Rather, it is determined by a consideration of the
circumstances of each particular case and a balancing of
the interests and equities of the parties.” Saul Zaentz Co.
v. Wozniak Travel, Inc., 627 F. Supp. 2d 1096, 1109 (N.D.
Cal. 2008) (quotations and citations omitted).
71a
Supplemental Appendix
7KH&RXUWÀQGVWKDW3ODLQWLIIV·GHOD\LQÀOLQJVXLWZDV
not unfair or unreasonable, and that the balance of equities
favors Plaintiffs. Indeed, the Cassirers moved quickly to
enforce their rights. Three years after the war ended, Lilly
sought physical restitution of the Painting. Ultimately, she
dropped her claim for restitution, and after ten years of
litigation, settled her claim for monetary compensation
in the 1958 Settlement Agreement. Importantly, the
parties to that settlement agreement all believed that the
Painting had been lost or destroyed during the war and
that it was not available for restitution. Accordingly, it was
reasonable for Claude Cassirer to continue to rely on that
belief and, thus, not to search for the Painting. Moreover,
once Claude Cassirer learned that the Painting was not
ORVWRUGHVWUR\HGKHDFWHGSURPSWO\E\ÀOLQJD3HWLWLRQ
with the Kingdom of Spain and TBC in 2001, and then,
after that Petition was denied, an action in this Court
in 2005. Finally, based on the evidence that TBC failed
to conduct any investigation into the provenance of the
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´LQVSLUHOHJLWLPDWHFRQÀGHQFHµLQ7%&WKDWQRRQHZRXOG
seek the Painting’s return.
Accordingly, the Court concludes that the doctrine
of laches or Verwirkung does not bar Plaintiffs’ claim for
return of the Painting.
CONCLUSION
In December 1998, forty-four countries, including
the Kingdom of Spain, committed to the Washington
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72a
Supplemental Appendix
Principles”). These non-binding principles appeal to the
moral conscience of participating nations and recognize:
“If the pre-War owners of art that is found to have
been confiscated by the Nazis and not subsequently
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be taken expeditiously to achieve a just and fair solution,
recognizing that this may vary according to the facts and
circumstances surrounding a particular case.”
In 2009, forty-six countries, including the Kingdom of
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Principles by signing the Terezin Declaration. The
Terezin Declaration reiterated that the Washington
Principles “were based upon the moral principle that
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Holocaust (Shoah) victims should be returned to them or
their heirs, in a manner consistent with national laws and
regulations as well as international obligations, in order to
achieve just and fair solutions.” The Terezin Declaration
also “encouraged all parties including public and private
institutions and individuals to apply [the Washington
Principles] as well.”
TBC’s refusal to return the Painting to the Cassirers
is inconsistent with the Washington Principles and the
Terezin Declaration. However, the Court has no alternative
but to apply Spanish law and cannot force the Kingdom
of Spain or TBC to comply with its moral commitments.
Accordingly, after considering all of the evidence and the
arguments of the parties, the Court concludes that TBC
is the lawful owner of the Painting and the Court must
73a
Supplemental Appendix
enter judgment in favor of TBC.
Counsel shall meet and confer and prepare a joint
proposed Judgment consistent with these Findings of Fact
and Conclusions of Law. The joint proposed Judgment
shall be lodged with the Court on or before May 6, 2019.
In the unlikely event that counsel are unable to agree upon
a joint proposed Judgment, the parties shall each submit
separate versions of a proposed Judgment along with
a declaration outlining their objections to the opposing
party’s version on or before May 6, 2019.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
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